ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.

vs.

MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC.

Facts:

On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV
"Jinlian I" 60,000 plastic bags of soda ashdense from China to Manila.

The shipment, with an invoice value of US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc.,and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company
with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and ChemphilAlbright and Wilson
Corporation as the notify party. On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel in Manila,

the stevedores of petitioner AsianTerminals, Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation

engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services, unloaded the 60,000 bags of soda
ashdense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for
temporary storage and safekeeping. When the unloading of the bagswas completed on
November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition. On November 29,
1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs
Brokerage for transport and delivery to the consignee. On December 28, 1995, after all the bags
were unloaded in the warehouses of the consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order
condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents. On April 19, 1996, respondent,
as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount of
P643,600.25.On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before
the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages against petitioner (Asian Terminals, Inc.), the
shipper (Inchcape Shipping Services), and the cargo broker (MEC Customs Brokerage). The RTC
rendered adecision finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but
absolving the other defendants - Inchcape Shipping Services andMEC Customs Brokerage. The
RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioner’s
stevedores who handled theunloading of the cargoes from the vessel. The RTC emphasized that
despite the admonitions of Marine Cargo Surveyors not to use steel hooks inretrieving and
picking-up the bags, petitioner’s stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags
and caused the spillage. The RTC,thus, ruled that petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts
and omissions of its stevedores and is ordered to pay plaintiff Malayan InsuranceCompany,
Inc.Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appeal was denied. The CA agreed with
the RTC that the damage/loss was caused by thenegligence of petitioner’s stevedores in
handling and storing the subject shipment. The CA likewise rejected petitioner’s assertion that
it received thesubject shipment in bad order condition as this was disproved by the Marine
Cargo Surveyors who testified that the actual counting of bad order bagswas done only after all
the bags were unloaded from the vessel and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes
(TOSBOC) upon which petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28, 1995
or after the unloading of the bags was completed. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the
CA denied the same in a Resolution for lack of merit. Petitioner contends that respondent has
no cause of action because it failed to present the insurance contract or policy covering the
subjectshipment. Petitioner argues that the Subrogation Receipt presented by respondent is
not sufficient to prove that the subject shipment wasinsured and that respondent was validly
subrogated to the rights of the consignee. Thus, petitioner submits that without proof of a
validsubrogation, respondent is not entitled to any reimbursement.2.Petitioner likewise puts in
issue the finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, that the proximate cause of the
damage/loss to theshipment was the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores. Petitioner avers
that such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, i.e., theTOSBOC, the Request for Bad
Order Survey (RESBOC) and the Report of Survey. According to petitioner, these documents
prove that itreceived the subject shipment in bad order condition and that no additional
damage was sustained by the subject shipment under itscustody. Petitioner asserts that
although the TOSBOC was prepared only after all the bags were unloaded by petitioner’s
stevedores, thisdoes not mean that the damage/loss was caused by its stevedores.

Petitioner also claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00,
pursuant to its Management Contract for cargohandling services with the PPA. Petitioner
contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract since it is an
officialact of an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the non-presentation of the insurance contract or
policy was not raised in the trial court. Thus, itcannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Respondent likewise contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, presentation of
theinsurance policy is not indispensable.

Respondent further avers that "the right of subrogation has its roots in equity - it is designed to
promote and to accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate
payment of a debt by one who in justice,equity and good conscience ought to pay."
Respondent likewise maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly found that the damage/loss
sustained by the subject shipment was caused by the negligent acts of petitioner’s stevedores.
Such factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, are conclusive and should no longer be
disturbed. In fact, under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review oncertiorari.

As to the Management Contract for cargo handling services, respondent contends that this is
outside the operation of judicial notice. Andeven if it is not, petitioner’s liability cannot be
limited by it since it is a contract of adhesion.

Issues:

(1) Whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondent’s
cause of action;(2) Whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the
negligence of petitioner’s stevedores;

(3) Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner
and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit.(1)Whether or not the respondent’s non-presentation of the

insurance contract or policy between the respondent and the consignee is fatal to its cause of
action. – NO.

Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case.

First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. Basic is the rule that "issues or
grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the
parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice and due
process."Besides, non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not necessarily fatal.

In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

the presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not indispensable before the
insurer may recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the exercise
of its subrogatory right. Thesubrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the
relationship of the insurer and the assured shipper of the lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but
also the amount paid to settle the insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply
upon payment by theinsurance company of the insurance claim.

In Home Insurance Corporation v. CA,

the presentation of the insurance policy was necessary because the shipment therein
(hydraulicengines) passed through several stages with different parties involved in each stage.
In the absence of proof of stipulations to the contrary,the hauler can be liable only for any
damage that occurred from the time it received the cargo until it finally delivered it to the
consignee.Ordinarily, it cannot be held responsible for the handling of the cargo before it
actually received it.However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan
Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated that the presentation of the insurance
policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on board the
petitioner’s vessel, unlike inHome Insurance in which the cargo passed through several stages
with different parties and it could not be determined when the damage to the cargo occurred,
such that the insurer should be liable for it. As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the
cargo in the present case occurred while in petitioner’s custody.

Similarly, in this case, the presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary.
Although petitioner objected to the admission of the Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to
respondent’s formal offer of evidence on the ground that respondent failed to present the
insurance contract or policy, a perusal of petitioner’s Answer and Pre-Trial Brief shows that
petitioner never questioned respondent’s right to subrogation, nor did it dispute the coverage
of the insurance contract or policy. Since there was no issue regarding the validity of the
insurance contract or policy, or any provision thereof, respondent had no reason to present the
insurance contract or policy as evidence during the trial. Hence, the factual findings of the CA,
affirming the RTC, are binding and conclusive.

(2)Whether or not the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence
of petitioner’s stevedores. – YES.

Both the RTC and the CA found the negligence of petitioner’s stevedores to be the proximate
cause of the damage/loss to the shipment. In disregarding the contention of petitioner that
such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, the CA had this to say: ATI, however,
contends that the finding of the trial court was contrary to the documentary evidence of
record, particularly, the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes dated November 28, 1995,
which was executed prior to the turn-over of the cargo by the carrier to the arrastre operator
ATI, and which showed that the shipment already contained 2,702 damaged bags. However,
contrary to ATI’s assertion, the witnesses – marine cargo surveyors of Inchcape for the vessel
Jinlian I which arrived on November 21, 1995 and up to completion of discharging on November
28, 1995, testified that it was only after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel that the
actual counting of bad order bags was made.

There is no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that ATI should be made
liable for the 2,702 bags of damaged shipment. Needless to state, it is hornbook doctrine that
the assessment of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial
court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or attitude of the
witnesses. The findings of the trial court on this point are accorded great respect and will not be
reversed on appeal, unless it overlooked substantial facts and circumstances which, if
considered, would materially affect the result of the case. The proximate cause of the damage
(i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and caked/hardened portions of the contents) was the
improper handling of the cargoes by ATI’s stevedores; and ATI has not satisfactorily rebutted
plaintiff-appellee’s evidence on the negligence of ATI’s stevedores in the handling and
safekeeping of the cargoes .Indeed, from the nature of the damage caused to the shipment,
i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not
difficult to see that the damage caused was due to the negligence of ATI’s stevedores who used
steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions of the piles thereby piercing the bags
and spilling their contents, and who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI within
sufficient cover thereby exposing them to the elements and [causing] the contents to cake or
harden. Clearly, the finding of negligence on the part of petitioner’s stevedores is supported by
both testimonial and documentary evidence. Hence, we see no reason to disturb the same.

(3)Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner
and the Philippine Ports Authority(PPA) in determining petitioner’s liability. – NO.

Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01, Article VII of the
Management Contract for cargo handling services it entered with the PPA, which limits
petitioner’s liability to P5,000.00 per package. Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail
of judicial notice.

The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is not among the matters
which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the
executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as
amended, is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the
ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it
entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, v. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite
respondent being already married, their relationship developed. During their illicit relationship,
petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a
manpower services company.Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and
were registered in petitioner and respondents names, ostensibly as husband and wife.
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decidedto part ways sometime in
1991.In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business
partnership by executing a Partition Agreement. Initially, respondent agreed to petitioners
proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter,
while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.However, when
petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent
refused. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition of the said
properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.

On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is thepro
indivisoowner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial courts
decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary
to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue
on ownership in an action for partition. Her appeal was denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on ownership;

2. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action
for partition

3. Whether respondent is estopped from contesting the Partition Agreement

HELD:

The petition is bereft of merit.

CIVIL LAW: Existence of co-ownership in an action for partition.

First issue: In Municipality of Bin v. Garcia, the Court explained that the determination as to the
existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. While it is
true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-
owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title
(TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore,
until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be
premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties. More importantly, the complaint will
not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest
over the subject properties.

Second issue: There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked, but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued
by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document. Petitioner apparently
confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be
confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used

REMEDIAL LAW: Admissions.

Third issue: An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or
unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by
him. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the
admitters interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of
which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among
themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioners argument would be to allow
respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who
may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed
by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties.

DENIED.

G.R. No. 175991; August 31, 2011

JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to implement the
promotion and appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as
Vocational Supervisors III despite the directive of CHED and the Civil Service commission.
Catacutan questioned the judgment, contending that he was denied due process when he was
not allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the adiminstrative case against him.

Issue:

Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of violating RA 3019, was well founded
despite the refusal of the trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as
evidence.

Held:

The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the memorandum issued by CHED was
attended by ill motive and bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial courts, which was affirmed
by the sandiganbayan, was based on the evidence presented before it. The non-admittance of
the dismissal of the administrative case did not violate petitioner’s right to due process where
such dismissal was not relevant to the adjudication of the criminal case. After all, administrative
proceedings require a different quantum of proof compared to criminal proceedings, the
judgment in one is not dependent on the other.

Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner guilty of violating Sec3(e) of RA
3019, to wit: 1.that the accused was a public officer performing an official function; 2) that he
acted in bad faith; and 3) that injury was caused to another party because of such act.
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE, VS. JAY MANDY MAGLIAN Y REYES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

Facts:

Atty. Mary Jay and Jay are husband and wife. The couple had a son, Mateo Jay. On January 4,
2000, Mary and Jay were having dinner when they got into an argument. Jay did not want her
husband to attend a party. When Jay got angry, he collected the clothes that Mary had given
him for Christmas and told Mary he would burn them all. He started to pour kerosene. Mary
started to wrestle with Jay for possession of the gas, at the same time warning him not to pour
gas on her. Despite her pleas, Jay still poured gas on her, setting the clothes and her wife on
fire. Jay brought her to the hospital, and later transferred her to another hospital which did not
have a burn unit. When her situation did not improve, her mother transferred her to the
Philippine General Hospital where she eventually expired. Before she died, she told her mother
what happened to her, declaring, “Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin”. In his defense, Jay
alleged that the burning was completely accidental. They wrestled for possession of the
kerosene, and both of them got wet. To avoid provoking her, he went upstairs to look for his
son. He heard Mary saying “Mandy, Mandy, nasusunog ako”. He ran downstairs and saw the
blaze already spread to the kitchen. He embraced his wife and tried to put out the fire. He then
rushed Mary Jay to the hospital.

After being charged with the crime of parricide, and a warrant of arrest issued against him, he
voluntarily surrendered to the police. During trial, the dying declaration of Mary Jay was
presented as evidence thru the testimony of Mary Jay’s mother and the househelp, Norma. Jay
alleged that Lourdes, his mother-in-law had an axe to grind against him. She also presented the
testimony of his friend, a police officer, who took another declaration of Mary Jay in the
presence of another visitor, a lawyer.

The Regional Trial Court convicted him for parricide and sentenced him accordingly to a penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.

The Court of Appeals denied his appeal, hence he elevated his case to the Supreme Court.
Issues: Whether or not he raised in his appeal was the failure of the trial court to appreciate the
dying declaration made by Mary Jay in the presence of the police officer and the lawyer, and its
appreciation of the dying declaration made by Mary Jay in the presence of her mother and the
house help.

Ruling:

“The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following
circumstances are present: “(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under
a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify
had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of
inquiry involves the declarant’s death.” The question to be answered is which dying declaration
satisfies the aforementioned circumstances, the one made by Mary Jay to Lourdes and Norma,
or the one she made before Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose.

Accused-appellant contends that his late wife’s dying declaration as told to the defense
witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose effectively absolved him from any wrongdoing.
However, it is the dying declaration presented by the prosecution that satisfies all the requisites
provided in the Rules. In contrast, the dying declaration for the defense did not show that Mary
Jay’s death at the time of said declaration appeared to be imminent and that she was under a
consciousness of impending death.

Moreover, We defer to the factual finding that the witnesses for the prosecution were more
credible. Mary Jay’s dying declaration to her mother Lourdes and to Norma showed that
accused-appellant was the one who set her in flames. Lourdes and the Maglians’
laundrywoman Norma both testified that Mary Jay, moments before her actual death, told
them that it was accused-appellant who was responsible for burning her. Lourdes and Norma
both testified that at the time of May Jay’s declaration, she was lucid and aware that she was
soon going to expire. Furthermore, the so-called dying declaration made by Mary Jay to
defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose suffers from irregularities. The dying
declaration allegedly made to Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose was handwritten by the latter but
he did not have it sworn under oath. We reiterate too that it was not clear that it was executed
with the knowledge of impending death since the statements were made more than a month
before Mary Jay died.
We agree with the trial and appellate courts that Lourdes and Norma were both credible
witnesses and had no motive to lie about Mary Jay’s dying declaration. The appellate court
correctly pointed out that although Lourdes was Mary Jay’s mother, this relationship did not
automatically discredit Lourdes’ testimony. And while accused-appellant alleged that Lourdes
as his mother-in-law did not approve of him, he could not give any improper motive for Norma
to falsely accuse him. Between the two competing statements of the two sets of witnesses, the
one presented by the prosecution should clearly be given more weight as it satisfies the
requisites of an admissible dying declaration.”

JOSE T. TUBOLA, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.

Jose Tubola, Jr. (petitioner) appeals the December 7, 2000 Decision[1] and June 10, 2002
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 12015 which found him guilty of
Malversation of Public Funds penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner was the cashier of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)-Aganan, Sta. Barbara
River Irrigation System in Iloilo City. On November 8, 1982, Commission on Audit (COA) State
Auditing Examiners Yvonne Gotera (Gotera) and Theresita Cajita (Cajita) conducted an audit
examination of petitioner's account which indicated a shortage of P93,051.88.

Gotera and Cajita thus sent a letter of demand dated November 23, 1982 to petitioner directing
him to account for the shortage. Petitioner refused to receive the letter, however, hence,
Gotera and Cajita sent it by registered mail.

Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing malversation of public funds before the
Sandiganbayan to which he pleaded "not guilty."
By the account of Gotera, the lone witness for the prosecution, petitioner had an account
balance of P30,162.46 prior to June 25, 1982; that from June 25 to November 8, 1982, the date
petitioner's account was audited, his cash collections totaled P347,995.64; that his remittances
from June 25 to November 8, 1982 totaled P285,105.41; and that the total collections less total
remittances amounted to P93,051.88 as of November 8, 1982.

Still by Gotera's account, the audit team found in petitioner's drawer "vales/chits" or
promissory notes or receivables signed by NIA employees involving the total amount of
P79,044.51.

Petitioner, who claimed that he was assigned as cashier since 1978 and was also in charge of
payment of salaries of more than 2,000 field employees in the NIA Jalaur Project, declared that
his task of keeping the collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to Editha Valeria
(Valeria) upon instruction of his superior, Regional Director Manuel Hicao,[9] for he (petitioner)
was also handling the payroll of around 2,000 employees.

Petitioner further declared that no accounting of the collected fees was undertaken since he
trusted Valeria, who directly remitted them to the bank, after he signed the statement of
collection without reading the contents thereof.

Petitioner presented "vales" and "chits" involving the total amount of P115,661.66 representing
loans extended by Valeria to certain NIA employees and even COA auditors.[11] And he
identified "chits" and "vales" dated 1975 to 1981 inclusive representing loans extended prior to
the audit period.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT CONCLUDING THAT HE HAS COMMITTED INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN

DELEGATING THE CUSTODY OF THE ACCOUNT TO ANOTHER PERSON

Held:

The court held that the guilt of the accused, JOSE TUBOLA, JR., having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts him of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same,
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) years and ONE (1) day of Prision Mayor as Minimum, to
SEVENTEEN (17) years, FOUR (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum, and the accessory
penalties provided for by law.

He is likewise ordered to indemnify the Republic of the Philippines the amount of Ninety Three
Thousand Fifty One Pesos and Eighty Eight Centavos (P93,051.88); to pay a fine in the same
amount, which is the amount of money malversed and the costs of suit, and finally to suffer
perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

SPOUSES SUR AND RITA VILLA AND LETICIA GOREMBALEM VALENZUELA VS. PRESIDING
JUDGE ROBERTO L. AYCO, ET AL.

Facts:

Before the Court is an administrative matter against Presiding Judge Roberto L. Ayco, OIC Clerk
of Court Virginia Bartolome and Sheriff IV Crispin S. Calsenia, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, Surallah, South Cotabato. In the Decision dated July 13, 2011, the Court found,
among others, Sheriff Calsenia Jr. guilty of simple misconduct and suspended him from service
for three months without pay and other fringe benefits.

Thereafter, Sheriff Calsenia, Jr. filed the subject "Motion for Reduction of 3-Month Period of
Suspension" dated August 24, 2011. In said motion, respondent recited the following grounds:
(a) That the offense charged upon him is the very first offense that he has ever committed due
to honest unintentional inadvertence;

(b) That his job as a court employee is the sole source of income of his family;

(c) That the long period of three (3) months of receiving no salaries and other fringe benefits
will certainly mean starvation and penury on his family that completely depends on his
compensation as a court employee with nothing to augment the same as his wife, who is
jobless, has been suffering from the chronic ailment of Diabetes and Kidney Disorder and every
so often confined in the hospital, exacerbated by the fact that his three (3) grandchildren, one
of whom is now in the elementary school and whose parents are also unemployed, are under
his care and custody, and all of their basic daily necessities in life totally rely on his meager
income;

(d) That the undersigned hereby earnestly states that the offense complained of will never be
repeated as he hereby promises to be circumspect at all times in the performance of his duties
as Deputy Sheriff IV.

Issue:

Whether or not the penalty against Sheriff IV Crispin S. Calsenia, Jr. is hereby MODIFIED from
suspension of three (3) months to one (1) month from the service without pay, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Held:

The Court RESOLVES to GRANT the motion on humanitarian grounds, considering that
respondent was charged with the offense for the first time and that his employment as an
officer of the court is the sole source of income for his family. The penalty against Sheriff IV
Crispin S. Calsenia, Jr. is hereby MODIFIED from suspension of three (3) months to one (1)
month from the service without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
RIZALINA L. GEMINA, A.C. No. 6689

Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. ISIDRO S. MADAMBA, August 24, 2011

Respondent.

Facts:

We review Resolution No. XVIII-2008-101 dated March 6, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), dismissing the complaint filed by Rizalina L. Gemina
(complainant). The complaint charged Atty. Isidro S. Madamba (respondent) with deceit,
malpractice and gross negligence, and prayed for his suspension/disbarment.

The complainant alleged that she is an heir of the registered owner of several parcels of land
located in Laoag City.These parcels of land were unlawfully sold by Francisco Eugenio in
connivance with the respondent. The documents pertaining to the transactions over these
lands were notarized by the respondent either without the presence of the affiants or with
their forged signatures.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Isidro S. Madamba GUILTY of violating the Notarial Law, the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice

Held:

The IBP resolution, based wholly on Commissioner Maalas Report and Recommendation, totally
missed and disregarded the submitted evidence and the respondents testimony during the
hearing of the complaint. The IBP apparently had treated the respondent with exceptional
leniency. In our view, the respondents age and sickness cannot be cited as reasons to disregard
the serious lapses he committed in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and as a notary
public. The inaccuracies in his Notarial Register entries and his failure to enter the documents
that he admittedly notarized constitute dereliction of duty as a notary public. He cannot escape
liability by putting the blame on his secretary. The lawyer himself, not merely his secretary,
should be held accountable for these misdeeds.

A notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of which are
the acknowledgement and affirmation of documents or instruments. In the performance of
these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the significance of the notarial seal
affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a private to a public
instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need for proof of its
genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty,
meaningless or routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and
faithfulness. Notaries must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly,
they should not take part or allow themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
The Notarial Law and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, moreover, require a duly
commissioned notary public to make the proper entries in his Notarial Register and to refrain
from committing any dereliction or any act which may serve as cause for the revocation of his
commission or the imposition of administrative sanctions.

Under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, the respondents failure to make the proper entry or
entries in his Notarial Register of his notarial acts, his failure to require the presence of a
principal at the time of the notarial acts, and his failure to identify a principal on the basis of
personal knowledge by competent evidence are grounds for the revocation of a lawyers
commission as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Isidro S. Madamba GUILTY of violating the
Notarial Law, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and hereby orders the REVOCATION of his notarial commission, if still existing. He is further
SUSPENDED indefinitely from reappointment as a Notary Public. Considering the seriousness of
his violations, he deserves disbarment from the practice of law but taking into account his old
age and sickness, the Court, for humanitarian reasons, hereby orders his SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
People vs. Santiago

FACTS:

Petitioner Gregorio Santiago caused the death of a 7year old boy by striking himwith an
automobile that he was driving. Santiago was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless
negligence, Santiago does not agree with the courts sentence,questioning the constitutionality
of act no. 2886 amending order no. 58 stating thatall prosecutions for public offenses shall be in
the name of the U.S... Act no. 2886stating that all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in
the name of thePhilippine islands.

ISSUE:

Whether the procedure in criminal matters is incorporated in the constitution of thestate?

HELD:

NO, procedure in criminal matter is not incorporated in the constitution of thestates, but it is
left in the hand of the legislature, so that it falls within the realm of public statutory law.It is
limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its provision theeffect of law in
criminal matters.In pursuance of the constitution of the US each state has the authority, under
itspolice power rule to define and punish crimes and to lay down the rules of
criminalprocedure. The delegation to our government needs no demo, the crimes committed w
in ourterritory even before sec 2 of general orders no.58 was amended, were prosecutedand
punish jurisdiction .Act no. 2886 (feb 24 1920) criminal complainant was filed may 10 1920. The
silenceof congress regarding those laws amendatory of the said general orders must
beconsidered as an act of the approval.
BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner,

vs.

GOODMAN FIELDER INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. Respondent.

Facts:

Goodman Fielder International Philippines, Inc. (respondent), a corporation duly registered and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is engaged in marketing of fats and oil
shortening.

Keraj Marketing Company (Keraj), represented by its purported owner Sunil K. Amarnani
(Amarnani), sought a distributorship agreement from respondent. As a pre-requisite to
respondent's consent, a credit line/bank guaranty in the amount of P500,000.00 was required
from Keraj. Amarnani thus applied for a credit line/bank guaranty with the Bacolod branch of
Bank of Commerce (petitioner).

Aragon subsequently issued a similar letter (dated October 18, 20004) in favor of Bacolod RK
Distributors and Co., (Bacolod RK), an entity also allegedly owned by Amarnani, attesting to the
arrangement by Keraj for a credit line in the amount of P2,000,000.00, to be utilized for the
settlement of Keraj's accounts with respondent.

Both letters of Aragon contain a "check write" on the left side indicating the amount applied for
as credit line.1avvphil Keraj and Bacolod RK did not pursue their application for a credit line,
however, despite follow-up advice from petitioner.

A year later, respondent informed petitioner, by letter of October 24, 2001,5 its intent to claim
against the bank guaranty issued to settle Keraj and Bacolod RK's unpaid accounts. By another
letter dated November 20, 2001,6 respondent advised petitioner its intent to collect the
amount of P1,817,691.30 representing Keraj and Bacolod RK's unpaid obligations.

Negotiations for the settlement of Keraj and Bacolod RK's obligations having failed, respondent
filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Keraj, Amarnani, Bacolod RK, and
petitioner and its manager Aragon before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig.

In defense, petitioner and Aragon claimed that the letters merely certified that Keraj and
Bacolod RK applied for the issuance of a bank guaranty, but no actual bank guaranty was
approved, both companies having failed to present the required documents for processing the
application.

Bacolod RK, on the other hand, denied any involvement in the transaction between Keraj and
respondent.Only petitioner presented evidence.

Issue:

THE DOCTRINE OF APPARENT AUTHORITY DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE

Held:

The resolution of the case hinges on what Aragon's statement in the letters sent to respondent
that "… we are pleased to inform you that said Corporation has arranged for a credit line "
conveys.

Section 13, Rule 130, Rules of Court on interpretation of an instrument provides:

SEC. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances - For the proper construction of an

instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject
thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown so that the judge may be placed in the position
of those whose language he is to interpret. (underscoring supplied)

A consideration of the circumstances under which Aragon's letter-certifications were issued is

thus in order.
Amarnani's letter-request of August 21, 2000 for a conditional certification from Aragon was
granted two days later when Aragon issued the letter-certification addressed to respondent.
Within that period, it could not have been possible for petitioner to even process the
application, given that Amarnani had not even complied with the requirements as he, himself,
indicated in his letter-request to Aragon to "please tell [him] the requirements for the credit
line so [he] c[ould] apply."

The Distributorship Agreement between respondent and Keraj was forged on October 2, 2000
or 39 days after the issuance of the letter-certification, long enough for respondent to verify if
indeed a bank guaranty was, to its impression, granted.

By respondent's finance manager Leonora Armi Salvador's testimony, upon receipt of the two
letter-certifications,11 she concluded that they were bank guarantees considering their
similarity with other bank guarantees in favor of respondent by other distributors; and she
made inquiries with petitioner only after Keraj defaulted in the payment of its obligation to
respondent.12

In light of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner could not have conveyed that it was issuing a
bank guaranty in favor of Amarnani.

Respondent's reliance on Aragon's use of a "check writer," a machine used to input a numerical
or written value impression in the "payment amount field" of a check that is very difficult to
alter, on the left side of each letter- certification, was misplaced, what prevails being the
wordings of the letter-certifications.13

The challenged Court of Appeals Decision of June 17, 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
complaint of respondent, Goodman Fielder International Philippines, Inc. is, with respect to
petitioner, Bank of Commerce, DISMISSED.
ESTRADA V DESIERTO

Facts:

After Estrada’s impeachment proceedings were aborted and his resignation from the
Presidential post, a cluster of legal problems started appearing. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion including among others,
bribery and graft and corruption, plunder, perjury, serious miscounduct, malversation of public
funds, illegal use of public funds. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the
respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner.Petitioner filed with
this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in any other
criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President
is over and only if legally warranted Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman
should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the
barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial
publicity

Held:

No. Then and now, we now rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to
a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective
judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself
prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality.
Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts
does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to
the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. To warrant a
finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar,
the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality
of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a
result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during
the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden. The court recognizes that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. However, petitioner
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Thus the petition was dismissed.
HEIRS OF SEVERA P. GREGORIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICARDO SANTOS, ROSALINA PALOMO,
SPOUSES WILSON TAN and BENITA LUI TAN

Facts:
Spouses Wilson Tan and Benita Lui Tan are the registered owners of a 1,381.1 square meter lot
located along Quezon Blvd., Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 349788 issued by the register of
Deeds of Quezon City. The lot was previously owned by Severa Gregorio as evidenced by TCT
No. 8787 issued to her on January 4, 1949. Sometime in 1965, Shell company leased the lot
from Severa for a period of twenty (20) years. On September 20, 1976, Severa died intestate
leaving behind three (3) legitimate children - Buenconsejo Vivar, Jesusa aGalang and Cecilio
Pineda. On March 9, 1982, Cecilio died. Buenconsejo was shocked to find that her brothers title,
TCT No. 8787, was cancelled and that in lieu thereof, TCT No. 349787 was issued to spouses
Tan.

With respect to the remaining 1/3 portion, it appears that in 1978, spouses Felicisimo and
Rosalina Palomo filed with the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City an action for a sum
of money against Jesusa Galang (Severas daughter) and her husband Victoriano Galang. The
court decided the case in favor of the Palomos. On December 20, 1978, the 1/3 undivided share
of Jesusa in the lot was sold on execution to the Palomos, being the highest bidders. The
Galangs failed to redeem the property within one year. Hence, a final deed of sale in favor of
the Palomos was confirmed by the court and recorded in the Quezon City Registry of Deeds.

On October 30, 1986, the heirs of Severa Gregorio filed with the trial court the instant
complaint against spouses Tan for cancellation of title and/or reconveyance with damages
alleging that the deeds of conveyance were forged and are therefore void.

Thereafter, or on June 11, 1988, a fire gutted the Quezon City Hall Building. The entire records
of this case were destroyed. The key documents, such as the original copy of the deed of sale
between Severa Gregorio and Ricardo Santos dated July 14, 1971 covering 2/3 portion of the
lot; the original copy of the deed of sale between Ricardo Santos and spouses Tan covering the
same portion dated September 17, 1986; the original copy of the deed of assignment from
spouses Palomo to spouses Tan covering 1/3 portion of the same lot dated September 18,
1986; and the original copy of TCT No. 349788 in the names of spouses Tan were all burned.

On July 10, 1989, the trial court issued an order for the reconstitution of the records. The
parties had hardly started the reconstitution when, on September 29, 1989, the heirs of
Gregorio filed an amended and/or supplemental complaint which was admitted by the court.
The supplemental matters revolved around the signature of Severa Gregorio affixed to the July
14, 1971 deed of sale between her and Ricardo Santos. On February 12, 1990, spouses Tan filed
an answer to the amended complaint alleging that the deed of sale was genuine and that they
purchased the property in good faith.
Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONY OF THE NBI HANDWRITING EXPERT FOR THE REASON THAT WHAT HE
TESTIFIED ON IN COURT WAS A MERE XEROX COPY OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE

Held:

The assignment of rights by the spouses Palomo to respondent spouses Tan over a 1/3 portion
of subject property sold on execution to the Palomos in satisfaction of a final judgment is not
raised as an issue in this appeal.

Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for not giving credence to the testimony of NBI
handwriting expert Bienvenido Albacea, who examined the deed of sale in question and
concluded that the signature thereon purporting to be that of the late Severa Gregorio, is
forged. They contend that, as borne out by the records, (1) on September 10, 1987, Albacea
conducted an examination of the original copy of subject deed of sale dated July 14, 1971 at the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; (2) on the basis of such examination, he arrived
at the conclusion that the signature appearing thereon was forged; (3) unfortunately, as a
result of the fire of June 11, 1988, which destroyed the Quezon City Hall, the records of the case
were all burned including the original copy of the aforesaid deed of sale; and (4) the said
original copy of the deed of sale could not be produced in court thereby necessitating the
presentation of a certified true xerox copy thereof.

Following the ruling in U.S. vs. Gregorio[5] and Borje vs. Sandiganbayan[6], the Court of Appeals
reversed the findings by the trial court and ruled out the testimony of the NBI handwriting
expert, holding that when the genuineness of signatures on a document is sought to be proved
or disproved through comparison of standard signatures with the questioned signatures, a
xerox copy or photo copy cannot be used by the expert witness in lieu of the original. It
disregarded the expert testimony of the said witness who presented during his testimony in
court only a mere photostat (xerox) copy of the subject deed of sale. The petition is not
impressed with merit.

Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Mere photocopies of
documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. This is especially true when the
issue is that of forgery.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a
forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged
signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized upon to have been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged
forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A
comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under controversy
cannot produce reliable results.

ERNESTO M. PUNZALAN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FERDINAND D.

MENESES

Facts:

Danilo Manalastas, Ferdinand Meneses and Ernesto Punzalan were among the four (4)
candidates for mayor of the municipality of Mexico, Pampanga during the May 8, 1995
elections.

On May 24, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed Ferdinand Meneses as
the duly elected mayor, having garnered a total of 10,301 votes against Danilo Manalastas
9,317 votes and Ernesto Punzalans 8,612 votes.

On May 30, 1995, Danilo Manalastas filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. E-
005-95 before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, challenging the results of
the elections in the municipalitys forty-seven (47) precincts. In due time, Ferdinand Meneses
filed his answer with counter protest impugning the results in twenty-one (21) precinctsof the
47 protested by Manalastas.

On June 2, 1995, Ernesto Punzalan filed his own election protest docketed as Election Case No.
E-006-95, also before the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga, questioning the results of the
elections in one hundred and fifty seven (157) precincts. Meneses, on his part, filed an answer
with counter-protest with respect to ninety-six (96) precincts of the 157 protested by Punzalan.

Since the two (2) election protests involved the same parties and subject matter, they were
ordered consolidated and were jointly tried by the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 44.

Issue:

Whether or not an expert witness genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots

Held:

On the issue of the genuineness of the handwriting on the ballots, it is observed that the
specimens examined by Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, presented by Punzalan as an expert witness,
were mere certified true copies of the ballots and documents concerned. This fact raised a
cloud of doubt and made the findings suspect. Consequently, the examination of the ballots
themselves by the COMELEC should not be brushed aside. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court explicitly authorizes the court the COMELEC in this case to make itself the comparison of
the disputed handwriting with writings admitted as genuine by the party whom the evidence is
offered.

Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the sense that they must be accepted as true on
the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as purely advisory in character; the
courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and may reject it, if they
find that it is consistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.

In the same manner, whether or not certain ballots were marked had been addressed by the
COMELEC by personally and actually examining the ballots themselves. We find no compelling
reasons to disturb its findings.

In closing, we would like to stress a well-founded rule ensconced in our jurisprudence that laws
and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so
that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.

Facts:

On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On May 14,
1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in
the City of Manila. On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant
contracted another marriage with Carmencita Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage
gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.

The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and,
therefore, non-existent, having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis
August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August
19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after the death of
Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's
second marriage to Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of
a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40
Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
Issue:

Whether or not Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary
formalities

Held:

The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not
controlling. Said case is essentially different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas,
impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary formalities, and the Court of
Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.

In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted during the existence of his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the
marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant contracted his second marriage in
1941, provides as follows:

Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:

(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee
being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case
until declared null and void by a competent court.

This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during
the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages. There is
here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted in the belief
that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a
competent court.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with
costs de officio so ordered.
PEOPLE V. ADOVISO

Facts:

Adoviso was charged with double murder. He offered in evidence the testimony a NBI
polygraph examiner who conducted a test on him. The examiner’s report revealed that “there
were no specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant to the
investigation of the crime.”

Issue:

Whether or not polygraph is not conclusive

Held:

The Court held that are not bound to submit to expert testimony. Faith and credit must not be
vested upon the lie detector test, which is not conclusive as the polygraph has not yet attained
scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA

Facts:

Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the
trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion
for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.

These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during
trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence

Whether or not the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly
availed of by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible
in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording
of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.

However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of
appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a
mode of redress
JAO VS COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 128314. May 29, 2002.

Facts:

Petitioner (Rodolfo Jao) and Private Respondent (Perico Jao) were the sons of the deceased
Spouses Ignacioand Andrea Jao who died intestate in 1988 and 1989.Private respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in the RTC of Quezon City over theestate of
his parents. Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, private respondent Perico
moved that he beappointed as special administrator, alleging that petitioner Rodolfo was
dissipating the assets of the estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition on the
ground of improper venue. He alleged that his parents did not reside in Quezon City during
their lifetime but in Angeles City, Pampanga. He submitted documentary evidence showing that
his deceased parents were residents of Angeles City, Pampanga. Private respondent Perico
countered that his parents resides in Quezon City and in fact, actually resided inpetitioner’s
house as shown in the death certificate presented before the court. Petitioner argued that his
parents stay in Quezon City was merely transitory and that the death certificates could not be
deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence. The trial court ruled in favor of
private respondent Perico. The CA affirmed in to the trial court’s decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.

Held:

Yes. The settlement proceeding was properly laid in Quezon City.As provided for under the
Rules of Court, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of
administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides
at the time of his death. The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of death, not to the
permanent residence or domicile. In the case of it was held that the term resides connotes ex vi
termini “actual residence” as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. xxx resides should
be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence and also an intention
to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time is required; however, the residence must
me more than temporary. In the case at bar, it was found that the decedents’ have been living
in Quezon City at the time of their death and sometime prior thereto, and as was also shown in
the death certificate presented by private respondent. Thus, the venue for the settlement of
the decedents’ intestate was properly laid in the Quezon City.

PEOPLE V. LEONCIO ALIVIANO G.R. NO. 133985

Facts:

Accused was convicted of raping a 7 year old girl. He interposed denial and assails the
admissibility of the medical certificate since the doctor who prepared it was not presented.

Issue:

Whether or not medical certificate is not indispensable to prove the commission of rape. It is
merely a corroborative evidence

HELD:

Concededly, the subject medical certificate cannot be given any probative value. It is settled
that since a medical certificate involves an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it could not be given weight nor credit unless the doctor who issued it be
presented in court to show his qualifications. In any case, medical certificate is not
indispensable to prove the commission of rape. It is merely a corroborative evidence. The lone
testimony of the complainant which is credible and free from serious and material
contradictions is sufficient to warrant the conviction of appellant.
PEOPLE V. VALLEJO

Facts:

Vallejo was charged with rape with homicide. The prosecution submitted DNA evidence
gathered from the body of the victim which matched the DNA profile of Vallejo. He assailed the
DNA analysis, claiming that it failed to show that the samples submitted for DNA testing were
not contaminated after having been soaked in smirchy water before being submitted to the
laboratory.

Issue:

Whether or not assessing the probative value of DNA evidence

Held:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, among other things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification
of the analyst who conducted the tests.
TIJING VS CA

FACTS:

Edgardo Tijing and Bienvenida Tijing, husband and wife, have six children. The youngest is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of Angelita
Diamante.According to Bienvenida, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an
urgentlaundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she askedAngelita
to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under her care, as
she usually let Angelita take care of the child whileBienvenida was doing laundry.When
Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., weregone. She was told that
her employer went out for a stroll and was told to comeback later. She returned to Angelita's
house after three days, only to discover thatAngelita had moved to another place.Bienvenida
and her husband looked for their missing son in other places.However, despite their serious
efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid
about the death of TomasLopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita. Thus, she wen
to toHagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first timeafter four
years. She claims that the boy was already named John Thomas Lopez.She avers that Angelita
refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to doso. The spouses filed their petition
for habeas corpus with the trial court in orderto recover their son. To substantiate their
petition, petitioners presented twowitnesses. One of whom is Benjamin Lopez, the brother of
Tomas Lopez. He,declared that his brother, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez asthe latter was sterile. The trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-
law husbandcould not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.
The Court of Appeals however reversed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and thesame person and is
the son of petitioners?

HELD:

YES. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidencepresented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actuallyher missing son, Edgardo
Tijing, Jr.First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children.

People vs Yatar

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmother Isabel Dawang house, despite her
intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other former’s housemate-relatives left in the
morning. At 10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house
where Kathylyn stayed during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first cousin saw Yatar,
who was then wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second
floor and was pacing back and forth at the back of Isabel Dawangs house, Judilyn didn’t find this
unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn,
telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he had been gathering. This time,
Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and blue pants; and
noticed that the latters eyes were reddish and sharp. Accused-appellant asked about the
whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the former purports to talk with the latter. Then, Yatar
immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived. In the evening, when Isabel Dawang arrived
home, she found the lights of her house turned off, the door of the ground floor opened, and
the containers, which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the second
floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was tied
with rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the
darkness of the second level of her house, she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some
intestines protruding out from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide
assistance. Therein, they found Kathylyns clothes and undergarments beside her body.
Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away
from Isabels house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns
cadaver. When subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the
sperm specimen is identical to Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide and was convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk,
Kalinga. Thereafter, he made an appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the
court a quos decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1) the trial court erred in giving much
weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of the seminal fluid found
inside the victim’s (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is violative of his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in violation
on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as
evidence for Yatar’s conviction?

HELD :

Noteworthy is the fact this case was decided on 2004, which was three (3) years before the
Rules on DNA evidence took effect. The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case
of Daubert vs. Merrell Dow as a precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used, so long as the same is
RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as the DAUBERT TEST. At present, SECTION
7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the legal basis. Sec. 7 of the Rules on DNA
evidence,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENJAMIN C. MAGPAYO, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant Benjamin C. Magpayo was charged with Rape, Robbery, Robbery with Hold-up and
Forcible Abduction with Rape before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon in four (4) separate
complaints and informations allegedly committed. He was charged for the (1) rape of a minor,
Lilibeth Bobis, on April 10, 1988; (2) robbery of the Lilibeth’s cash money on the same date; (3)
robbery with hold-up on an 8-year-old Jacquiline Yutuc-Jaime of her earrings and gold ring on
February 1988; and (4) forcible abduction with rape of Mara N. Chico on November 1987.

Magpayo entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. However, after trial, he was found guilty of
all offenses charged in a joint decision rendered by the trial court.

In the first case of rape, victim Lilibeth was able to provide a description of her rapist to the NBI
artist, who, on the basis thereof, made a sketch of the rapist’s face. She also clearly identified
the accused as her rapist, after referring to the shape of his nose as “matangos” and the eyes as
“singkit”, in the police station. Simarly on the case for forcible abduction with rape, the victim
Mara also gave a description to an NBI artist who drew the suspect’s face. On May 22, 1998, the
victims Lilibeth, Mara and Jacquiline (case for robbery hold-up) were able to positively identify
the appellant as the perpetrator of the crimes when the latter was arrested by the police and
brought to the police station.

Appellant vehemently questions the trial court’s decision finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt because the prosecution witnesses allegedly failed to positively identify him. He avers
that when he was arrested to answer for an alleged wrongdoing on May 22, 1988,
complainants were hesitant to point at him and kept on looking at their parents.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE FOUR CHARGES, DESPITE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT HE IS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIMES CHARGED.

RULING: NO.

Under the circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the lingering shock caused by such
harrowing experience at the hands of appellant could have caused the minor complainants to
hesitate in directly identifying him. Hence, the fact that complainants kept on looking at their
parents is of no moment. They were simply scared, looked at their parents for assurance, and
such initial hesitation could by no means indicate that complainants were guilty of fabrication.

Although Lilibeth Bobis admitted that she was not able to immediately identify the appellant at
the police station after his arrest, she declared that she thought it over very carefully if the
appellant was indeed the offender. The crime was committed on April 10, 1988 or one (1)
month before Lilibeth Bobis was again confronted with the man who had sexually abused her.

Appellant points out, however, that his actual physical features vary with the sketches prepared
by the NBI artists based on the description of the offender given by complainants Bobis and
Chico. But this is beside the point. Given the immaturity of complainants, it is of course natural
that the sketches of appellant based on the descriptions given by them would somehow differ
with appellant’s actual physical features.

What is important is that Bobis remembered the square shape of appellant’s face, his eyes to
be “singkit” and his nose as “matangos”. Indeed, familiarity with the physical features,
particularly those of the face, is actually the best way to identify the person (People v.
Reception, 198 SCRA 670 [1991]).

JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. JESUS BALIGOD y PINEDA, Appellant.

Facts:

That on or about August 16, 2001, in the Municipality,Province and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, JESUS BALIGOD Y PINEDA, with lewd design and by the
use of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with the offended party, [AAA],6 against her will.

Based on the testimonies of AAA, the victim herself, and BBB, the wife of AAA's nephew, the
prosecution established that at around 9:00 p.m. on August 16, 2001, AAA, 67 years old, was on
her way to her sister's place in xxx, Cagayan. While she was at the roadside looking for a
tricycle, Baligod came from behind, grabbed her and held her neck. She struggled but she fell to
the ground. Baligod dragged her towards the inner portion of the roadside and continuously
boxed her on the chest and mouth. Then he forced her to lie down. He threatened to kill her.
When she got weak, Baligod removed her shorts and underwear, went on top of her and
inserted his penis inside her vagina. After satisfying his lust, Baligod ran away. AAA cried for
help.

BBB was at her residence around 9:30 p.m. and heard AAA's cry for help. She and her husband
went outside and saw AAA sitting at the roadside naked from waist down. AAA's mouth was
bleeding, her face was swollen and she was having difficulty breathing. When they asked AAA
what happened, AAA narrated that she was sexually molested by "Kisut" Baligod. BBB sought
the help of DDD, AAA's brother, who reported the incident to the police authorities. AAA was
brought to xxx District Hospital.

Issue:

Whether or not appellant's guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling but modified the award of moral damages. It
regarded AAA as a credible witness and accorded full credence to AAA's testimony because it
was categorical, straightforward and consistent. It also ruled that appellant's acts of grabbing
AAA, holding her neck, boxing her several times on the chest and mouth and threatening to kill
her are strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation sufficient to bring her to submission.
The decretal portion of the decision the appealed decision in Criminal Case is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Jesus Baligod y Pineda is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant
the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of
Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED

Facts: On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and owned by the herein private
respondent Bangpai shipping company under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally
bumped the power barge of the herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for
damages on april 26, 1996 before the sala of the herein public respondent judge. During the
presentation of evidence, the petitioner presented as pieces of evidence Xerox copies, to which
such was admitted by the court. Hoever, a motion to strike out the evidence was filed before
the court to which the court ordered that such pieces of evidence be stricken out of the records
but has to be attached to the documents for proper disposition by the appellate in case of
appeal before the latter. The petitioner aver that such documents be admitted for the basic
reason that such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.

Issue: Whether or not thepeices of evidence submitted by the petitioner be regarded within
the purview of the electronic evidence for the court be compelled to admit?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following?

Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:

"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,

figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or
other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For
the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with
"electronic data message".
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which
a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically.It includes digitally signed documents and any printout,
readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document.

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to
any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which
the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal
that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the
imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence,
the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an
electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on
Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law.
Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional
equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.

Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a

writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;

(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made
evidence by law;

(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole."

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of
secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of
the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent
must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but
unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. However,
in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as
enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the
court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary
evidence.

Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as evidence before the court were not
within the purview electronic document or electronic data message. It will be highly
unacceptable to regard an information manually written down to be regarded as electronic
message. The petitioner cannot aver now to submit the original copies of the documents since
they were given enough time to submit such but they refused to do so and insist that the
photocopies be admitted instead. The high court denied such petition.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION,
respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One
of its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul,
South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations
conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions.
Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order
to petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed
copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax.

Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants
breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of
US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-
1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.

After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that
respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil
action was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices
presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale
are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law
merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent
posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original
facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic
document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further
claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently
explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.

Issue:

Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence
and admissible as such?

Held:

Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means,
showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data
message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an
“electronic document.

The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data
Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or
similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy.

The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model
Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were taken.
While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the
IRR reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.

Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the
same meaning as the term “electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term
“electronic data message,” which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes,
is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless” communications and
the “functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this
sense, “paperless,” but verily are paper-based.

[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data
that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual
or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct
printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals.
Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is
interchangeable with “electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions,
which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.
These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress
anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except
computer-generated faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax
machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term “electronic data message.” The
terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile
transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of
an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF APPEALS, Complainant, vs.

CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.

Facts:
Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and incompetence of official
duty; conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and directly and indirectly
having financial and material interest in an official transaction considering his undue interest in
the service of the order of release and actual release of Melchor Lagua.

Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of Prisons National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Lagua’s petition for bond was approved in a Resolution where
the appellate court directed the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution
was brought to the office of Atty. Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.

Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the National Penitentiary,
where Lagua was detained for homicide.Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a
certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s relative, asking how much more
they had to give to facilitate Lagua’s provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a
certain Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. When Atty.
Madarang was able to get the mobile number of respondent, he represented himself as Lagua’s
relative and exchanged text messages with said respondent for a possible pay-off for the
Lagua’s provisional liberty. Atty. Madarang later discovered that the respondent did not
properly serve the copies of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant
and his counsel. but gave them to a certain Art Baluran, allegedly Lagua’s relative.

Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent
denied extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release, or in any other case. He, however,
admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his
counsel to Art Baluran. Complainant then lodged the complaint against the respondent in a
Letter dated November 14, 2003.

Issue:

Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a violation of right to
privacy of the accused?

Held:

No. The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
“ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or
has personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now
moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he
was the sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao. In that
case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct,
considered text messages addressed to the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange
for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:

The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered
by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and

other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”
RAMCAR, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, v. HI-POWER MARKETING, LEONIDAS D. BOHOL, and
RHODORA A. BOHOL, Respondents.

Facts:

Respondent Leonidas Bohol (Bohol) is a distributor of Ramcar products in Quezon City and San
Pablo City using the business name Hi-Power Marketing. On 4 March 1982, Ramcar and Bohol
entered into a loan agreement whereby Ramcar allotted P300,000.00 as a trade credit line for
the batteries to be distributed by Bohol, and released another P300,000.00 as a straight loan to
the latter. To secure the payment of the loan, Bohol executed a Real Estate Mortgage over a
parcel of land and its improvements covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 285976.
Bohol also signed an undated promissory note stipulating the schedule of payments and the
breakdown of the principal amount and the interest to be paid.

Subsequently, on the premise that Bohol had defaulted on his loan, Ramcar petitioned the
sheriff of Quezon City to foreclose the mortgage to satisfy an indebtedness plus interest. The
auction sale was set on 6 July 1984.

On 3 July 1984, Bohol and his wife (spouses Bohol) filed a Petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 101,
docketed as Special Civil Action No. Q-42032, to prevent the sheriff from conducting the auction
sale. The RTC issued a status quo order on 4 July 1984, thereby temporarily averting the
scheduled sale.

After trial, finding that Bohol had defaulted in the performance of his obligation, the RTC
rendered its decision dismissing the petition for prohibition. The spouses Bohol filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and For New Trial which was denied by the RTC on 4 November 1985.

Issue:

Whether or not evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence

Held:

The Court ruled that on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary
evidence before the court, as follows: firstly, the documents should be authenticated and
proved in the manner provided in the rules of court; secondly, the documents should be
identified and marked; and thirdly, it should be formally offered to the court and shown to the
opposing party so that the latter may have the opportunity to object thereto.
We have carefully examined the documentary evidence presented by the parties in the RTC and
the CA and found that the documents now being presented by Ramcar, the purchases of Hi-
Power Marketing, payments of battery account, and credit memos issued by Ramcar applied to
Hi-Power Market thru offsetting were not part of the records in the lower court or the appellate
court. They were submitted for the first time to this Court. This being the case, we shall not take
them into account.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals committed neither grave abuse of
discretion nor any error in judgment in rendering the assailed Decision. The instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 June 2002 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
ANTONIO LITONJUA and ARNOLD LITONJUA, petitioners vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

On 10 January 1985, pursuant to its by-laws, respondent club posted the monthly list of
delinquent members on its premises. Included therein was petitioner Antonio Litonjua.On 13
January 1985, after Antonio Litonjua discovered that his name was on the January 1985
deliquent list, he proceeded to the Cashiers Office of the club and was informed therein that
the reason behind his deliquency was his failure to pay his November 1984 dues (which should
have been paid before the end of December 1984 as provided in the corporate by-laws).
Antonio Litonjua alleged that he was not able to pay his monthly bill on time because he has
not received his statement of account for November 1984. As proof, he presented a sealed
enveloped which he allegedly presumed to be the November 1984 bill (but was actually the
December 1984 statement of account) and explained that he received it only on 12 January
1985.

A check with the accounting office , however, revealed that the November 1984 statement of
account had already been delivered to Antonio Litonjuas office and was received by his
employees allegedly named Aquino. Petitioner asserted that he did not receive said account
and had no employee by the name of Aquino.

On 13 February 1985, Antonio Litonjua was advised of another outstanding balance in the
amount of P9,414.00. Again, he issued a check in payment thereof. As a result, his name was
deleted from the February 1985 list of deliquent members.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS

WERE VALIDLY SUSPENDED DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.

Held:
The court ruled that it is Well-settled is the rule that the finding of the facts of administrative
bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. In a long string of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to
the rule that decisions of administrative officers are not to be disturbed by the courts except
when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. The Supreme Court held that Finding of fact by an administrative board of official,
following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the
board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional power or
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS, MIGUEL DANILA, RAYMUNDO A. DANILA,

CONSOLACION SANTOS, MIGUEL G. DANILA, AMOR DANILA, MOISES MARTINEZ, MIGUELA
GAVINO, MELITON NISTA, PRIMITIVA NISTA, HEIRS OF DANIEL NISTA, MOISES NISTA,
DOMINGO NISTA and ADELAIDA NISTA, petitioners,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, MARCELINA (MARTINA) GUERRA and THE HEIRS OF BUENAVENTURA

GUERRA, respondents.

Facts:

It appears that on June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs,
filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 (Exhibit
H) and codicil dated April 18, 1963 (Exhibit L) of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21,
1966. The petitioner prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and
codicil be probates and allowed and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator
of the testatrix's estate. She also prayed that in case no opposition thereto be interposed and
the value of the estate be less than P10,000.00, said estate be summarily settled in accordance
with the Rules.

Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition on July 18,
1966 and an amended opposition on August 19, 1967, to the petition alleging among others
that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and
Eugenia Danila (Exhibit 1); that the purported will and codicil subject of the petition (Exhibits H
and L) were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities requited by law
for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not
properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported
testatrix; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will
and testament (Exhibit 3) which was duly probated (Exhibit 4) and not revoked or annulled
during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not competent and qualified to act
as administration of the estate.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN NOT HAVING GIVEN WEIGHT TO THE
MANIFESTATION CLAUSES IN THE TESTAMENT AND CODICIL ANNEX B (PETITION) AND INSTEAD
IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OR BIASED WITNESSES OVER THEIR OWN
ATTESTATION CLAUSES AND THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND NOTARIAL
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC

Held:

Petitioners argue that the attestation clauses of the win and codicil which were signed by the
instrumental witnesses are admissions of due execution of the deeds, thus, preventing the said
witnesses from prevaricating later on by testifying against due execution. Petitioners further
maintain that it is error for respondent court to give credence to the testimony of the biased
witnesses as against their own attestation to the fact of due execution and over the testimonial
account of the Notary Public who was also present during the execution and before whom right
after, the deeds were acknowledged.

Private respondents, on the other hand reiterate in their contention the declaration of the two
surviving witnesses, Odon Sarmiento and Rosendo Paz, that the win was not signed by the
testatrix before their presence, which is strengthened by two photographic evidence showing
only the two witnesses in the act of signing, there being no picture of the same occasion
showing the testatrix signing the will. Respondent court holds the view that where there was an
opportunity to take pictures it is not understandable why pictures were taken of the witnesses
and not of the testatrix. It concludes that the absence of the latter's picture to complete the
evidence belies the testimony of Atty. Barcenas that the testatrix and the witnesses did sign the
will and the codicil in the presence of each other.

The oppositors' argument is untenable. There is ample and satisfactory evidence to convince us
that the will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities required by law. It
appears positively and convincingly that the documents were prepared by a lawyer, Atty.
Manuel Alvero The execution of the same was evidently supervised by his associate, Atty.
Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity
surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some intricacies not usually within the
comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus GILBERTO VILLARICO

FACTS:

That on or about August 8, 1999, at about 7:50 oclock in the morning at Barangay Bolinsong,
Municipality of Bonifacio, Province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, armed with a short firearms , did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously suddenly and treacherously shoot HAIDE CAGATAN at the
back penetrating through the neck which cause the instant death of said victim and that he had
no chance to avoid or defend himself from the attack.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE IDENTITY OF
THE ASSAILANT AS WELL AS ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD:

The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal, for, even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, an
identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any
evidentiary force. The intervention of any mistake or the appearance of any weakness in the
identification simply means that the accused constitutional right of presumption of innocence
until the contrary is proved is not overcome, thereby warranting an acquittal, even if doubt may
cloud his innocence. Indeed, the presumption of innocence constitutionally guaranteed to
every individual is forever of primary importance and every conviction for crime must rest on
the strength of the evidence of the State, not on the weakness of the defense.

The accused contend that the Prosecution witnesses did not actually see who had shot Haide;
hence, their identification as the malefactors was not positively and credibly made. We cannot
uphold the contention of the accused.

Relevantly, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification namely: (a) that by
direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by
circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim immediately
before or after the crime. The Court said

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an
eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive
identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator
of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes
direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a
suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the person or
one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission
of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification, which forms part of
circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting
an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the
author of the crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones
allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then
nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary
that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a
proposition is absolutely absurd, because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of
a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of
guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused
on the absence of direct evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be
denied proper protection.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.BAIDA SALAK y BANGKULAS

FACTS:

That on or about the 23rd day of May, 2001, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and personal
circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping each other, not having
been authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did,
then and there wilfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale 305.4604 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is a regulated drug.

ISSUE:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO COMPLY WITH THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A CONVICTION AND WHEN THE EVIDENCES OF THE PROSECUTION
WERE INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO COMMON HUMAN EXPERIENCE

HELD:

While it appears that the buy-bust team failed to comply strictly with the procedure outlined
above, the same does not overturn the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duty. A violation of the regulation is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and
the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case since the
commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once
the sale or transaction is established and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the
arresting officers’ inability to conform to the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board.
Further, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of
bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. Moreover, non-
compliance with the said regulation is not fatal to the prosecution as it does not render
appellant’s arrest illegal or the seized items inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of herein appellant. It is
also worthy to note that appellant never alleged that the drugs presented during the trial have
been tampered with. Neither did appellant challenge the admissibility of the seized items when
these were formally offered as evidence. In the course of the trial, the seized shabu were duly
marked, made the subject of examination and cross-examination, and eventually offered as
evidence, yet at no instance did the appellant manifest or even hint that there were lapses in
the safekeeping of the seized items as to affect their admissibility, integrity and evidentiary
value. It was only during her appeal that she raised the issue of non-compliance with the said
regulation. Settled is the rule that objections to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal.

It should also be noted that appellant failed to present evidence to show that the NBI-STF team
was impelled by improper motives to testify against her. She merely gave the bare assertion
that she was arrested by the NBI operatives to be used as leverage in pressuring her husband to
divulge the whereabouts of alias Boy Life.

It must be stressed that the shabu confiscated from appellant weighed 305.4604 grams with
87.99% average purity. To the Court, the difficulty and enormous risk of obtaining such huge
amount of regulated drugs, with a street value of at least P180,000, only for the purpose of
incriminating and extorting money from an individual who was not shown to be of good
financial standing and business importance, renders the allegation highly improbable.55 If the
NBI-STF operatives indeed wanted to frame-up appellant and extort money from her or her
relatives, a small quantity of shabu would have been sufficient to cause her arrest.

Finally, as to appellant’s argument that she should have been acquitted since the prosecution
failed to present the buy-bust money used during the operation, again, the argument is without
merit. Failure to present the buy-bust money is not indispensable in drug cases since it is
merely corroborative evidence, and the absence thereof does not create a hiatus in the
evidence for the prosecution provided the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and
the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence
requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation.
In crimes involving the sale of illegal drugs, two essential elements must be satisfied: (1)
identities of the buyer, the seller, the object and the consideration, and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment for it. These elements were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt through testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented
during the trial. The appeal is DISMISSED.

SANTIAGO PAERA versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera

(petitioner) allocated his constituents use of communal water coming from a communal tank by
limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the
neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong
(Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioners scheme,
Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded
Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.

The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply
interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected.
To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a
wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by
the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prosecution evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats
HELD:

The court held that the petitioner found guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and
pay fine for each of the three counts. The MCTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to
prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs persistent
water tapping contrary to petitioner’s directive must have angered petitioner, triggering his
criminal behavior. The MCTC rejected petitioners defense of denial as self-serving and
uncorroborated. Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court, the RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latters finding on
petitioners motive. The RTC similarly found unconvincing petitioners denial in light of the clear,
direct, and consistent testimonies of the Darongs and other prosecution witnesses. Hence, this
appeal. Petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the continued
complex crime of Grave Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case filed by
Vicente as the latters failure to testify allegedly deprived him of his constitutional right to
confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the charges for having
acted in defense of the property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty, justifying
circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioners concession of liability for the
single count of the continued complex crime of Grave Threats. The OSG, however, rejects
petitioners prayer for the dismissal of Vicentes complaint, arguing that petitioners guilt was
amply proven by the prosecution evidence, not to mention that petitioner failed to raise this
issue during trial. Further, the OSG finds the claim of defense of stranger unavailing for lack of
unlawful aggression on the part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes the absence of regularity
in petitioner’s performance of duty to justify his conduct.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABELARDO SALONGA

FACTS:

That on or before the 23rd day of October, 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding one another,
and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company,
with grave abuse of confidence, intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to sign the
said check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, the
supposed payee when in truth and in fact there is no such transaction between Firebrake and
Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a simulated check described as Check
No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through
which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total sum of
P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust Company in the total amount
of P36,480.30.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH ARE NOT
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THEY ARE BASED ON
SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND PROBABILITIES.

HELD:

The Court held that in view of ruling on the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, they
must likewise reject accused-appellants contention that his conviction was based merely on
speculations, possibilities, suspicions and conjectures. According to him, while it was
established that as Assistant Cashier he had access to the preparation and releasing of
Metrobank cashiers checks, there was no evidence that he was seen in the actual act of
falsifying the check; releasing it; or encashing the same. He argues further that conspiracy with
his co-accused in the commission of the offense was not proved clearly and convincingly.
Evidently, accused-appellants arguments are still premised on the inadmissibility of his written
extra-judicial confession which we have already affirmed as admissible. As mentioned earlier,
accused-appellant admitted in said extra-judicial confession that he issued the subject cashiers
check without a legitimate transaction to Amiel Garcia; that his co-conspirators were Garcia and
Pangilinan; and that he got a share of P8,500.00 from the sum encashed.

We are in accord with the findings of both the trial court and appellate court that the
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the participation of accused-appellant in the
crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the blank
Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano of the
spot audit group testified that the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as
reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date, showing that
the check was issued without any transaction. He also testified that after finding basic
differences in the signature of bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check
with other specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the signature appearing
therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing
in the cashiers check varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15,
1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank marked as Exhibit C, accused-appellant
confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the amount of
P8,500.00.
Furthermore, Assistant Accountant Valentino Elevado (Internal Affairs) who investigated the
anomalies surrounding the issuance of the check testified that he personally interviewed
accused-appellant regarding the matter. Benito T. Cuan testified that he was present during the
entire interview and signing of the statement by accused-appellant and that no force or
coercion was employed against accused-appellant during the interview. It is a well-entrenched
rule that this Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material
facts or gravely abused its discretion, especially where, as in this case, such assessment is
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[10] Verily, we find that the evidence for the prosecution
deserves credence and that the same is sufficient for conviction.

PHILIPPINE CREOSOTING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

On March 11, 1982, defendant Philippine Creosoting Corporation (defendant PCC, for brevity)
ordered from plaintiff treated creosoted wood poles pursuant to Purchase Order No. 2395
signed by defendant corporation's president, defendant Monina Nepomuceno. Because of the
failure of plaintiff to complete the delivery of the ordered items, defendants cancelled Purchase
Order No. 2395. On March 8, 1993, defendants ordered from plaintiff the delivery of 145 pcs. of
creosoted wood poles. On different occasions, plaintiff delivered all the ordered items. On
March 20, 1984, defendants through a letter called the attention of plaintiff regarding the
alleged discrepancy of defendant PCC's account as reflected in plaintiff's book which stood at
P988,611.16 and as reflected in defendant PCC's book which stood at P537,579.42. Defendants
explained that the discrepancy was the result of the failure of the plaintiff to deduct the 20%
discount given by plaintiff to defendants. On July 18, 1984, plaintiff sent defendants a letter
explaining that the ordered items were priced at P2,731.55 each and no 20% discount was
granted to defendants. Plaintiff demanded payment of the outstanding balance in the amount
of P406,866.04. Defendants however refused to pay. On account of said refusal, plaintiff filed a
civil complaint against defendants for the collection of P406,866.04 with prayer for the Issuance
of Writ of Attachment. Plaintiff insisted therein that the price for each creosoted wood pole is
P2,731.55 and that no 20% discount was ever granted to defendants. Defendants insisted that
they were given a 20% discount by plaintiff; that it would be illogical for them to agree to
purchase the pole at P2,731.55 each because at said price, they would be operating in a losing
scheme; that if computed properly, they have already paid their obligation. On December 5,
1984, the trial court issued a writ of attachment ordering the Sheriff of Makati to attach
whatever properties of the defendant PCC equivalent to the amount of P406,866.04. Plaintiff,
for the same amount, posted the corresponding bond.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the preponderance of evidence shows that the invoices and delivery receipts
did not indicate any discount which Creosoting tried to prove by testimonial evidence

HELD:

The ruling of the Court of Appeals is binding on the parties and may not be reviewed on appeal
via certiorari. However, when such ruling conflicts with the findings of the trial court, we are
justified in reviewing the appellate court's ruling. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
Pacwood did not give a trade discount of twenty (20%) per cent on the purchase price.

he preponderance of evidence shows that the invoices and delivery receipts did not indicate
any discount which Creosoting tried to prove by testimonial evidence. Such testimonial
evidence will not prevail over documentary proof showing otherwise. It is thus shown by
incontrovertible evidence that Pacwood delivered to Creosoting, upon the latter's purchase
orders on various dates in April and May 1983, 145 pieces of creosoted wood poles, 55 feet, at
a unit price of P2,731.55 each, with no discount. Pacwood demanded payment of the
outstanding balance in the amount of P406,866.04, including interest at 14% per annum and
penalty charges of 2% a month.

We find Creosoting still liable to Pacwood for the unpaid balance of its purchase of 145 pieces
of creosoted wood poles, 55 feet, computed at P2,731.55 multiplied by 145 equals
P396,074.75, less payment of P225,000.00, leaving a balance of P171,074.75. To this balance,
legal interest at six per cent (6%) per annum may be added counted from the filing of the
complaint on November 22, 1984, until fully paid.
 ROSARIO FELICIANO VDA. DE RAMOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

It appears that on June 2, 1966, Adelaida Nista who claimed to be one of the instituted heirs,
filed a petition for the probate of the alleged will and testament dated March 9, 1963 (Exhibit
H) and codicil dated April 18, 1963 (Exhibit L) of the late Eugenia Danila who died on May 21,
1966. The petitioner prayed that after due notice and proper hearing, the alleged will and
codicil be probates and allowed and that she or any other person be appointed as administrator
of the testatrix's estate. She also prayed that in case no opposition thereto be interposed and
the value of the estate be less than P10,000.00, said estate be summarily settled in accordance
with the Rules.

Buenaventura and Marcelina (Martina) both surnamed Guerra filed an opposition on July 18,
1966 and an amended opposition on August 19, 1967, to the petition alleging among others
that they are the legally adopted son and daughter of the late spouses Florentino Guerra and
Eugenia Danila (Exhibit 1); that the purported will and codicil subject of the petition (Exhibits H
and L) were procured through fraud and undue influence; that the formalities requited by law
for the execution of a will and codicil have not been complied with as the same were not
properly attested to or executed and not expressing the free will and deed of the purported
testatrix; that the late Eugenia Danila had already executed on November 5, 1951 her last will
and testament (Exhibit 3) which was duly probated (Exhibit 4) and not revoked or annulled
during the lifetime of the testatrix, and that the petitioner is not competent and qualified to act
as administration of the estate.

ISSUE:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED GRAVELY IN NOT HAVING GIVEN WEIGHT TO THE
MANIFESTATION CLAUSES IN THE TESTAMENT AND CODICIL ANNEX B (PETITION) AND INSTEAD
IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OR BIASED WITNESSES OVER THEIR OWN
ATTESTATION CLAUSES AND THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND NOTARIAL
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC

HELD:
In this jurisdiction, all the attesting witness to a will if available, must be called to prove the wilt
Under this circumstance, they become "forced witnesses" " and their declaration derogatory to
the probate of the will need not bind the proponent hence, the latter may present other proof
of due exemption even if contrary to the testimony of or all of the at, testing witness.

As a rule, if any or all of the submitting witness testify against the due execution of the will, or
do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful ability, the will may,
nevertheless, be allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witness and from
all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner by law.
Accordingly, although the subscribing witnesses to a contested will are the best witness in
connection with its due execution, to deserve full credit, their testimony must be reasonable,
and unbiased; if otherwise it may be overcome by any competent evidence, direct or
circumstantial.

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, his statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the
instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
anticipate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the
attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney being conversant of the
instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and he is more likely than other persons
to retain those incidents in his memory.

We find here that the failure to imprint in photographs all the stages in the execution of the win
does not serve any persuasive effect nor have any evidentiary value to prove that one vital and
indispensable requisite has not been acted on. Much less can it defeat, by any ordinary or
special reason, the presentation of other competent evidence intended to confirm a fact
otherwise existent but not confirmed by the photographic evidence. The probate court having
satisfied itself that the win and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities
required by law, and there being no indication of abuse of discretion on its part, We find no
error committed or any exceptional circumstance warranting the subsequent reversal of its
decision allowing the probate of the deeds in question.

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby reversed in so far its it disallowed the
probate of the will and codicil. With costs against respondents.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.

SONNY CANON alias “POGI”

FACTS:

One evening in December 1997, as the then fifteen-year-old Maryjane

was left home alone in Barangay San Vicente, Buhi, Camarines Sur, her
parents having gone to their farm about two kilometers away
therefrom,appellant, a neighbor, knocked at the door of the Borsongs house
and Maryjane opened it. Appellant soon trained his flashlight on her and
suddenly pulled her inside.
As appellant poked a fan knife at the neck, and covered the mouth, of
Maryjane who was made to lie down, he removed her shorts and inserted his
penis into her vagina.
As she tried to push appellant, Maryjane felt pain and blood came out of
her private part. When appellant had satisfied his lust, he told her not to tell
anybody about what had happened.
Maryjanes mother Eufrecina and her husband found nothing unusual
about Maryjane in the days following the incident until, in the second week of
February 1998, Eufrecina noticed that Maryjanes abdomen was getting bigger.
She was thus prompted to bring Maryjane to a midwife and later to a doctor
who found her pregnant.
When Maryjanes parents asked her who impregnated her, she was initially
hesitant and afraid to utter anything, drawing them to beat her. She thereupon
revealed that she was raped by appellant. Appellant later went into hiding.
Eufrecina described the hapless Maryjane, who delivered a child (a girl) on
April 20, 1998, to be mentally deficient, she having difficulty speaking and
reading, and whose highest educational attainment was Grade III. Having the
mentality inferior to that of her age, Maryjane could not look after her needs
much less those of her baby such that Eufrecina bore the responsibility of
taking care of them.
Appellant came out of hiding when Maryjane gave birth and sought
settlement from the Borsongs, he proposing to marry her but Eufrecina
rejected it.
Appellant denied raping Maryjane. He admitted though that he had carnal
knowledge of Maryjane whom he claimed to be his sweetheart and that he sired
her child.
 Originally a resident of Barangay Igbac also in Buhi, Camarines Sur,
appellant narrated that when he started to work in January 1997 as caretaker
of the house of one Emelin Belleza, a neighbor of the Borsongs, he got to know
Maryjane as she frequented Bellezas house to watch movies shown by him for
a fee through his operation of a betamax machine; that he courted Maryjane
who responded positively to his romantic overtures; that they subsequently
engaged in sexual intercourse on about ten occasions from February to
December 1997 at Bellezas residence; and that his offer to marry Maryjane was
rebuffed by her parents, and his criminal prosecution was actuated with malice
as Maryjane was merely acting under duress from her parents.
Defense witness Marcelino L. Apante corroborated appellants claim that he
and Maryjane were sweethearts. He gave the following tale: Hired at one time to
harvest the palay of the Bellezas and to clean their banana plantation, he
spent the night of October 2, 1997 at the Bellezas residence as his work was
then still unfinished. At around eleven oclock in the evening of said date, while
he was sleeping at a corner of the house and appellant and Maryjane were at
the living room, he heard Maryjane moaning. Apante turned on the light and
saw both appellant and Maryjane naked and lying down with appellant on top
of Maryjane. Apante then remarked that it was too much for the two lovers to
let him see what they were doing but Maryjane replied in the local dialect that
it was not a problem because appellant and she loved each other anyway.
Continuing, Apante related that Maryjane and appellant had been
sweethearts since October 1996 and that in the four days that he stayed at
Bellezas home, Maryjane was always there to cook for them.
With leave of court, the prosecution recalled Maryjane on rebuttal. She
denied having ever been appellants sweetheart or having had any intimate
relationship or engaging in sex with him. Declaring that appellant and she did
not personally know each other, she insisted that he never courted her. She
admitted, however, that she once watched appellants showing of a video film.
Now before this Court, appellant assails his conviction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the pieces of evidence are sufficient enough to
warrant his conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
The Court opined that the prosecution has met the quantum of proof to
establish the commission of the crime of rape. In People v. Duranan, this
Court, citing Senator Vicente J. Franciscos treatise on evidence, laid down the
following judicial dictum:
 “The mother of an offended party in a case of rape, though not a
psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and mental condition of the party, how
she was born, what she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is
competent to testify on the matter.”

Eufrecina, being Maryjanes mother, has had all the opportunity to bear
witness to the manifestations of the mental abnormality afflicting Maryjane
since birth, hence, her statements thereon can be believed. And Dr. Saez
corroborated the actuality of her mental retardation. Her feeble-mindedness did
not, however, hamper her ability to communicate her experiences but even
provided a spontaneous, unrehearsed element to her manner of recalling the
incident.
Of immense significance is, as indicated in the above-quoted portion of her
testimony, Maryjanes crying and pointing to the accused as noted by the trial
court, and showing her anger as observed by the interpreter. For the crying of a
victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape accusation
with the verity born out of human nature and experience.
As for Maryjanes statement that appellant simultaneously covered her
mouth as he poked a knife at her and removed her shorts, this does not
necessarily weaken the force of her asseverations. As pointed out by the Office
of the Solicitor General, such acts are not inherently impossible of
simultaneous performance, especially when something else was used to cover
her mouth. At any rate, Maryjanes said statement should not, in light of her
limited facility for self-expression, be interpreted literally, for the poking of a
knife, covering of the mouth and removing of the shorts may have been done in
a very quick fashion.