19 Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals PDF

11/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 200
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 271

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 93252. August 5, 1991.
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T.
SANTOS, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 93746. August 5, 1991.
MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON.

LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, NICANOR M.
PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service of the
Department of Local Government, and SALVADOR
CABALUNA, JR., respondents.
*
G.R. No. 95245. August 5, 1991.
RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUIS T.
SANTOS, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government, respondents.
Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.—It is

the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the
change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend
to divest the legislature of its right—or the President of her
prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion
that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”) signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments ‘autonomy
from congress and to break Congress’ “control” over local
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e3737fe994fb790e3003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/27
governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend,

for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all
authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Same; Same; Local autonomy explained.—It is noteworthy
that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a
local government code, a local tax law, income distribution
legislation, and a national representation law, and measures
designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also
noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the
_______________
* EN BANC.
272
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Constitution places the local governments under the general

supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the
Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President.
Same; Same; Supervision and control, meaning of.—The
petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has
left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly
excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control,
which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, “supervision” is not incompatible
with disciplinary authority. x x x “Control” has been defined as
“the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter.” “Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing or the

power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties.”
Same; Same; Suspension.—The successive sixty-day
suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another
matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very
large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative
charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie
findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in
public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of
misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him
serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him
out of office. x x x.
Same; Same; Same.—The plain truth is that this Court has
been ill at ease with suspensions, x x x because it is out of the
ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole
objective of a suspension, x x x is simply “to prevent the accused
from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses” or to keep him
off “the records and other evidence.” It is a means, and no more,
to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not
exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty
days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is
also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved
their purpose in a shorter span.
273
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PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.
Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioners take common issue on the power of the

President (acting through the Secretary of Local
Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.
The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos.
93252 and 95245) and a member of the Sangguniang
Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series
of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against
him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various
charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression,
grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct,
intimidation, culpable1
violation of the Constitution, and
arbitrary detention. The personalities involved are
Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office;
Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza,
Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-
Mayor; Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales,
Larry Ong, and Eduardo Peña Redondo, members of the
Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay
tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are 2set forth in
the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. We quote:
xxx xxx xxx
In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk
assigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due
to political reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs.
Rosa O. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the
exigency of the service and the interest of the public, pulled her
out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited
and assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-
career service employee. To
_______________
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.

2 Hon. Bonifacio Cacdac, Jr., J.
274

make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public

Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant’s duties and
functions, has been detailed to take her place. The petitioner’s act
are pure harassments aimed at luring her away from her
permanent position or force her to resign.
In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the
petitioner handpicked her to perform task not befitting her
position as Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her
office was padlocked without any explanation or justification;
that her salary was withheld without cause since April 1, 1988;
that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-
around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with
Dr. Rodolfo Villegas and that she was the object of a well-
engineered trumped-up charge in an administrative complaint
filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).
On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duty elected
ViceMayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan
Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Peña Redondo
are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo.
Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry
Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without
previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor
Ong had to hold office at Plaza Libertad. The Vice-Mayor and the
other complainants sympathized with him and decided to do the
same. However, the petitioner, together with his fully-armed
security men, forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad.
Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner’s actuations the
following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the
Freedom Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many
people who gathered to witness the incident. However, before the
group could reach the area, the petitioner, together with his
security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in dozing water to
the people and the bystanders.
Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a
barangay tanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On
March 13, 1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him
and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and
detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner.
In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees3 thereby
causing injuries. He was released only the following day.
4
4
The Mayor thereafter answered, and the cases were
shortly
_______________
3 Rollo, id., 76-77.

4 Id., 77.
275
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set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also

set forth the succeeding events:
xxx xxx xxx
The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were
set for hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the
Department of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through
telegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the parties
received them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for
a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and was
represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing
officers, Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had
to come all the way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was
actually held only on June 20, 1988 in view of the inability and
unpreparedness of petitioner’s counsel.
The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27, 1988 in the
same venue—Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay
the proceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse
that he had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing
officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the
parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings
(Annex M).
In the said hearings, petitioner’s counsel cross-examined the
complainants and their witnesses.
Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued
a preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until
October 11, 1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.
Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988
and the petitioner again asked for a postponement to September
26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and

petitioner were present, together with their respective counsel.
The petitioner sought for a postponement which was denied. In
these hearings which were held in Manila, the petitioner testified
in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.
The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case
and the complainants testified including their witnesses.
On October 10, 1988, petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Original
moved for a postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to
November 7 to 11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion
for change of venue was denied due to lack of funds. At the
hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel were
present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and
moved for postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal
to take the deposition of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing
was indefinitely postponed. However, the parties failed to come to
terms and after the parties were notified of the hearing, the
investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.
276

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground

that his witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation
due to lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the
petitioner was given up to December 14, 1988 to present his
evidence.
On December 14, 1988, petitioner’s counsel insisted on his
motion for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner
up to December 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December
15, 1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases
were considered submitted for resolution.
In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in
the arbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the
respondent ordered the petitioner’s second preventive suspension
dated October 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner
was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 5of Iloilo City.
The second preventive suspension was not enforced.
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon

instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent
Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the
Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in
obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Presently, he
instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for prohibition,
in the respondent Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary
issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor
Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty
months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto
Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon
commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 6
20736 of the Court of Appeals,
a petition for prohibition, (Malabor, it is to be noted, is one
of the complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing
Mayor Ganzon ousted.)
On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5,
1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing CA-
G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24,
1990, it issued a
_______________
5 Id., 77-78.
6 Id., 78. The first suspension was on the Cabaluna and Ortigoza
complaints. CA-G.R. No. 16417 was on the Erbite complaint. CA-G.R. No.
20736 was a challenge on the designation of Vice-Mayor Malabor.
277
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Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda,

who had been similary charged by the respondent
Secretary, to this Court.
On June 26, 1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining
Order, barring the respondent Secretary from
implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the
enforcement of the Court of Appeals’ two decisions.
In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we

consolidated all three cases. In our Resolutions of January
15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.
Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (G.R. No.
93252), that the Department of Local Government in
hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due
process of law and that the respondent Secretary7
had been
“biased, prejudicial and hostile” towards him arising from
his (Mayor Ganzon’s) alleged refusal
8
to join the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino party and the running political
rivalry they
9
maintained in the last congressional and local
elections; and
10
his alleged refusal to operate a lottery in
Iloilo City. He also alleges that he requested the
Secretary to life his suspension since it had come ninety
days prior to an election
11
(the barangay elections of
November 14, 1988), notwithstanding which, the latter
proceeded with the hearing—and meted out two 12more
suspension orders—of the aforementioned cases. He
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo
City (they were held in Manila) in order to reduce the costs
13
of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his request. He
states that14 he asked for postponement on “valid and
justifiable” grounds, among them, that he was suffering
from a15heart ailment which required 16confinement; that his
“vital” witness was also hospitalized but that the latter
_______________
7 Id., 21
8 Id.
9 Id., 27.
10 Id., 28.
11 Id., 30.
12 Id., 31-32.
13 Id., 34-35.
14 Id., 36.
15 Id.
16 Id.
278

17
unduly denied his request.
Mayor Ganzon’s primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252
and 95245) is that the Secretary of Local Government is
devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend and
remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the
petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon’s charges of denial of due process,
the records do not show very clearly in what manner the
Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by the
respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary
Luis Santos were (are) political rivals and that his
“persecution” was politically motivated are pure
speculation and although the latter does not appear to
have denied these contentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon,
claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would
have under less political circumstances, considering
furthermore that “political feud” has often been a good
excuse in contesting complaints.
The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his
say-so’s that Secretary Santos had attempted to seduce
him to join the administration party and to operate a
lottery in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed
to rebut his allegations, we can not accept them at face
value, much more, 18
as judicial admissions as he would have
us accept them, for the same reasons above-stated and
furthermore, because his say-so’s were never corroborated
by independent testimonies. As a responsible public
official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function,
is presumed to be performing his duties regularly and in
the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be
ascribed to him.
As to Mayor Ganzon’s contention that he had requested
the respondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account
of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas
Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and
academic since we have in fact restrained the Secretary
from further 19
hearing the complaints against the
petitioners.
_______________
17 Id., 38.
18 Id.
19 By virtue of the Temporary Restraining Order the Court issued on
June 26, 1990.
279
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 279

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is

afraid that he has not given any compelling reason why we
should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found no
convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying
his requests. Besides, postponements are a matter of
discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based on
Mayor Ganzon’s above story, we are not convinced that the
Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that
Secretary Santos’ actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of
due process of law.
We come to the core question: Whether or not the
Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter
ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.
It is the 20
petitioners’ argument that the 1987
Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to
both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to
strengthen self-rule by local government units and second,
21
by deleting the phrase “as may be provided by law,” to
strip the President of the power of control over local
governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds
support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission.
The provision in question reads as follows:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure
that the acts of their component units22

are within the scope of
their prescribed powers and functions.
It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935

Constitution, which we quote:
_______________
20 CONST., art. X, sec. 4.

21 CONST. (1935), art. X, sec. 10(1). The 1973 Constitution contained
no similar provision, but see art. VII, sec. 18.
22 CONST. (1987), supra.
280

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided
23
by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
The petitioners submit that the deletion (of “as may be

provided by law”) is significant, as their argument goes,
since: (1) the power of the President is “provided by law”
and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer. It is to
be noted that in meting out the suspensions under
question, the Secretary of Local Government acted in
consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas Blg.
337, the Local Government Code, we quote:
Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.—Within seven days after the

complaint is filed, the Minister of Local Government, or the
sanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require the
respondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from
receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such
answer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held within
ninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive
suspension shall be imposed within the said period. If preventive
suspension has been imposed prior 24to the aforesaid period, the
preventive suspension shall be lifted.
Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.—(1) Preventive suspension
may be imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the
respondent is a provincial or city official, by the provincial
governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after
the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe
that the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of,
when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of
the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all
cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days
after the start of said suspension.
(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the
continuation of
_______________
23 CONST. (1935), supra.

24 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 62.
281
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 281

the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if

the delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect
or request, the time of the delay 25
shall not be counted in
computing the time of suspension.
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three

questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the
phrase “as may be provided by law” intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline,
and/or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution
repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government
Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the

constitutional language?
It is the considered opinion of the Court that
notwithstanding the change in the constitutional
language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right—or the President of her prerogative
as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our
opinion that the omission (of “as may be provided by law”)
signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments’ autonomy from congress and to break
Congress’ “control” over local government affairs. The
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over
municipal corporations, in particular, concerning
discipline.
Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-
states out of local government units, as in the federal
governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or
Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared
municipal 26 corporations euphemistically to “small
republics”. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is
subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the
legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the
Constitution—and as the “supervision clause” itself
suggest—is to wean local government units from
overdependence on the central government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local
autonomy” is not instantly self-executing, but subject to,
among other things,
_______________
25 Supra, sec. 63.

26 CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 64 (1987 ed.)
282

27 28
27 28
the passage of a local government code,
29
a local tax law,
income distribution 30
legislation, 31 and a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in
spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the
Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows
Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that
Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing
Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to
the President. Thus:
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which

shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative,
and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term,
salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters
32
relating to the organization and operation of the
local units.
As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of “as may be

provided by law” was meant to stress, sub silencio, the
objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by
33
the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation.
The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar
as existing legislation authorizes the President (through
the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against
local officials administratively, the Constitution contains
no prohibition.
_______________
27 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

28 Supra, secs. 5, 6.
29 Supra, sec. 7.
30 Supra, sec. 9.
31 See supra, sec. 14, providing for regional development councils to be
organized by the President.
32 Supra, sec. 3.
33 G.R. No. 95245, id., 53; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
283
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 283

The petitioners are under the impression that the

Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken
impression because legally, “supervision” is not
incompatible
34
with disciplinary authority as this Court has
held, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz.,
No. 6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and
extent of the power of supervision by the President over local
government officials in contrast to the power of control given to
him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two
different things which differ one from the other in meaning and
extent. Thus in that case the Court has made the following
digression: “In administration law supervision means overseeing
or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill
them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of
the President over local government officials does not include the
power of investigation when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires, as postulated
35
in Section 64(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to

alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute
36
the judgment of the former for test of the
latter.” “Supervision” on the other hand means
“overseeing or the power or authority of
_______________
34 Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id.,

48-61), Justice Mendoza cited this case.
35 Supra, 489-490.
36 Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148 (1955).
284

an officer
37
to see that 38subordinate officers perform their
duties.” As we held, however, “investigating” is not
inconsistent with “overseeing”, although it is a lesser
power than “altering”.
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the
Court’s39 pronouncements in 40
at least three cases, Lacson
41
v.
Roque, Hebron v. Reyes, and Mondano v. Silvosa, 42and
possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General. In
Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no
control
43
powers but only supervision “as may be provided by
law,” a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In
Pelaez, we stated that the President “may not . . . suspend
an elective official of a regular municipality or take any
disciplinary action against him, except on appeal 44
from a
decision of the corresponding provincial board.” However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically
banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of
disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control
powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise
disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove

or suspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken.
Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled

by the particular law applicable 45and its proper construction
subject to constitutional limitations.
In Hebron, we stated:
Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer

is specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and
adhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision to
the
_______________
37 Supra, 147.
38 Ganzon v. Kayanan, supra.
39 92 Phil. 456 (1953).
40 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
41 Supra.
42 No. L-23825, December 24, 1965, 15 SCRA 569.
43 Lacson v. Roque, supra, 463.
44 Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
45 Lacson v. Roque, supra, 462.
285
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 285

contrary—which
46
does not exist with respect to municipal officers
...
In Mondano, the Court held:
x x x The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the

provincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincial
governor who is authorized to “receive and investigate complaints
made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of
office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving
moral turpitude.” And if the charges are serious, “he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board,
furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally
or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer
(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board,

if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity
of the officer in question.” Section 86 of the Revised
Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to
be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of
x x x municipalities x x x. If it be construed that it does and such
additional power is the same authority as that vested in the
Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative
Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have47been
abrogated by Section 110(1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose

disciplinary measures on local officials except on appeal
from the
48
provincial board pursuant to the Administrative
Code.
Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President
the power (to suspend/remove) it was not because we did
not think that the President can not exercise it on account
of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases in which the law gave him
the power, the Court, as in Ganzon 49
v. Kayanan, found
little difficulty in sustaining him.
_______________
46 Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.

47 Mondano v. Silvosa, supra, 148.
48 Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra, 583.
49 G.R. No. 95245, id., 50-51; see Mendoza, J., Concurring.
286

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can

rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional
Commission to defeat the President’s powers. The Court
believes that the deliberations are by themselves
inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo
50
50
would exclude the power of removal 51
from the President,
Commissioner Blas Ople would not.
The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new
Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code,
Batas Blg. 37. As we said, “supervision” and “removal” are
not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other
notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy
under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite
of the approval52of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in
force and effect.
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy
means “a more responsive and accountable local
government structure
53
instituted through a system of
decentralization.” The Constitution, as we observed, does
nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments
and as put by political adherents, to “liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila.” Autonomy,
however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership
and interdependence between the central administration
and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a
regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a
radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution,
are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other
purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance
self-government. 54
As we observed in one case, decentralization means
devolution of national administration—but not power—to
the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or

decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration
_______________
50 Id., 23.
51 Id., 53.
52 Bagabuyo v. Davide, G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989.
53 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.
54 Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
287
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 287

when the central government delegates administrative powers to

political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments “more
responsive and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables
it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
“general supervision” over them, but only to “ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law.” He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According
to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
“self-immolation,” since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable
55
not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.
The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor

Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the
Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that
since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the
Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of
suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie
findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance
in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of
misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make
him serve 600 days of suspension, which56
is effectively, to
suspend him out of office. As we held:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao

del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not
for this information and the suspension decreed by the
Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was
elected precisely to do so. As of October 26,
_______________
55 Supra, 794-795.
56 Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, No. 65848, May 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 536.
288

1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the

electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people
are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be
proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established.
Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension
may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable
length of time raises a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold
office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case
an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is
injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as
mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the
protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun
the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of
due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional
57
application that the order of suspension should
be lifted.
The plain truth is that this Court has

58
been ill at ease with
suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because it
is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government.
59
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have
held, is simply “to prevent the accused from hampering
the normal cause of the investigation with his influence
60
60
and authority over possible witnesses”
61
or to keep him off
“the records and other evidence.” It is a means, and no
more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any,
against an erring local official. Under the 62
Local
Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is
to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a
shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to
say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved
their purpose in a shorter span.
_______________
57 Supra, 541.
58 See supra.
59 Lacson v. Roque, supra.
60 Supra, 469.
61 Batas Blg. 337, sec. 63.
62 Supra.
289
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 289

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive

imprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his
presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and
until found guilty.
Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local
Government Code provides, 63it may be imposed for no more
than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust
and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than
tyranny.
As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension
—which is not a remote possibility—on Mayor Ganzon is to
all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his
term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and
purposes, his suspension permanent.
It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the
fact that the Mayor’s guilt has not been proven. Worse, any
absolution will be for naught because needless to say, the

length of his suspension would have, by the time he is
reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably.
The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the
efforts of the respondent Secretary to see that justice is
done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to inflict
on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when
apparently, the respondent Secretary has had sufficient
time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case
against the Mayor-without suspending him a day longer.
What is intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has
been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal—
apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he,
the respondent Secretary, could have pursued a
consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President,
through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal
power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of
Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and
needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court is aware that only the third suspension is
under questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is
in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor
Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of
suspension and the
_______________
63 Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
290

possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the

corner (which amounts to a violation of the Local
Government Code)—which brings to light a pattern of
suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his
natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing what
appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to

perpetuate an arbitrary act.
As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.
We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer
the duration of his third suspension and lifting, for the
purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we
are urging the Department of Local Government, upon the
finality of this Decision, to undertake steps to expedite the
same, subject to Mayor Ganzon’s usual remedies of appeal,
judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and
meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary from meting
out further suspensions based on those remaining
complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie
evidence.
In resumé, the Court is laying down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a

mere decentralization of administration, not of
power, in which local officials remain accountable
to the central government in the manner the law
may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe
federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with
respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to
deny legislative control over local governments; it
did not exempt the latter from legislative
regulations provided regulation is consistent with
the fundamental premise of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the
national authority, the latter may, by law, and in
the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary
action against local officials;
5. “Supervision” and “investigation” are not
inconsistent terms; “investigation” does not signify
“control” (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve
the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be
suspended for the offenses he was charged
originally; provided:
291
VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 291

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges

“due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the
delay) shall not be counted in computing the time
of suspension.” [Supra, sec. 63(3)]
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his
preventive suspension, the petitioner commits
another or other crimes and abuses for which
proper charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension
shall not be a bar to his being preventively
suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2),
Section 63 of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are

DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued is
LIFTED. The suspensions of the petitioners are
AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo
Ganzon, may not be made to serve future suspensions on
account of any of the remaining administrative charges
pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11,
1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to
consolidate all such administrative cases pending against
Mayor Ganzon.
The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary
Ann Rivera Artieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Petitions dismissed. Suspension of petitioners affirmed.
Note.—Complaints against elective provincial or city

officials should be filed before the Minister of Local
Government. (Regidor, Jr. vs. Chiongbian, 173 SCRA 507.)
——o0o——
292
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11/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 200

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 271

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON.

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE

Local Governments; Power to discipline local officials.—It is

governments affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend,

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

Constitution places the local governments under the general

latter.” “Supervision” on the other hand means “overseeing or the

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 273

PETITIONS to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the

1 Rollo, G.R. No. 93252, 76; 77.

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public

3 Rollo, id., 76-77.

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 275

set for hearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also

26, 1988. On September 26, 1988, the complainants and

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 277

Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda,

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ganzon vs. Court of Appeals

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 279

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

that the acts of their component units22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935

20 CONST., art. X, sec. 4.

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of “as may be

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing.—Within seven days after the

23 CONST. (1935), supra.

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 281

the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three

Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the

25 Supra, sec. 63.

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of “as may be

27 CONST., supra, art. X, sec. 3.

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 283

The petitioners are under the impression that the

“Control” has been defined as “the power of an officer to

34 Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985). In this concurrence (id.,

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove

Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer

VOL. 200, AUGUST 5, 1991 285

In Mondano, the Court held:

x x x The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the

(not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board,

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose

46 Hebron v. Reyes, supra, 185.