Australasian Journal of Philosophy

ISSN: 0004-8402 (Print) 1471-6828 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajp20

The Stage Theory of Groups

Isaac Wilhelm

To cite this article: Isaac Wilhelm (2020): The Stage Theory of Groups, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2019.1699587

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1699587

Published online: 02 Mar 2020.

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AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1699587

The Stage Theory of Groups

Isaac Wilhelm
Rutgers University

ABSTRACT
I propose a ‘stage theory’ of groups: a group is a fusion of group-stages, where a group-
stage is a plurality of individuals at a world and a time. The stage theory consists of
existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood conditions for groups.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 4 June 2019; Revised 16 November 2019

KEYWORDS groups; metaphysics; social ontology; stages

1. Introduction
Groups are everywhere. The U.S. Supreme Court is a group, as is the chess club at a local
college. Mobs are groups, as are baseball teams and faculty committees. And plenty of
groups are not composed of people: the Cheerios in your bowl are a group, for instance.
In this paper, I propose existence conditions, identity conditions, and parthood con-
ditions for groups. Taken together, these conditions form a theory of the metaphysics of
groups: call it the ‘stage theory’. According to the stage theory, groups are fusions of
pluralities. That is, take a plurality of entities at a world and a time. Call that plurality
a ‘group-stage’. Take a bunch of group-stages, and fuse them together. That fusion,
according to the stage theory, is a group.1
It is often pointed out that groups cannot be identified with either pluralities or
fusions: the standard identifications face a long list of problems [Uzquiano 2004,
2018; Effingham, 2010; Ritchie, 2013, 2015; Epstein, 2015]. But, as the stage theory
shows, those problems can be avoided by identifying groups with fusions of pluralities.
So, analyses of groups that rely on pluralities and fusions need not be doomed from the
start. When used appropriately, pluralities and fusions provide the basis for a clear,
compelling theory of groups.
In section 2, I list seven criteria that a theory of groups should satisfy. In section 3, I
present two existence conditions for groups. In section 4, I present two identity con-
ditions. In section 5, I present two parthood conditions. In section 6, I show that the
stage theory satisfies the seven criteria from section 2. Along the way, I compare the
stage theory to alternative accounts of groups in the literature.
1
For the purposes of this paper, I generally assume that groups are distinctive sorts of things: in particular, they are
distinct from physical objects, abstract objects, sets, and so on. So, groups might have existence conditions, iden-
tity conditions, parthood conditions, persistence conditions, and so on, that differ from the corresponding con-
ditions for things that belong to other ontological categories.
© 2020 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
2 ISAAC WILHELM

2. Seven Criteria
In this section, I discuss seven criteria for a good theory of groups. The criteria are
drawn from Ritchie [2013], Epstein [2015], and Uzquiano [2018].
First, Contingency: the theory should allow groups to have their members contin-
gently. In other words, the theory should allow groups to possibly have different
members. For instance, the theory should imply that Merrick Garland could have
been a member of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Second, Temporality: the theory should allow groups to have their members tempor-
arily. In other words, the theory should not imply that groups never change their
members. For instance, the theory should imply that, from 1912 to today, the member-
ship of the U.S. Supreme Court changed.
Third, Non-Necessity: the theory should allow groups to exist at some but not all
possible worlds. In other words, the theory should not imply that all groups exist
necessarily. For instance, the theory should imply that there are worlds at which the
U.S. Supreme Court does not exist.
Fourth, Non-Eternal: the theory should allow groups to exist at some but not all
times. In other words, the theory should not imply that all groups always exist. For
instance, the theory should imply that the U.S. Supreme Court has not always existed.
Fifth, Spatiotemporal: the theory should allow for groups that exist within spacetime. In
other words, the theory should not imply that all groups exist outside of time and space. For
instance, the theory should imply that the U.S. Supreme Court is a spatiotemporal thing.
Sixth, Coincidence: the theory should not imply that, if group X always has exactly
the same members as group Y in the actual world, then X and Y are identical. In
other words, the theory should allow for distinct groups that, in the actual world,
always coincide. For instance, consider two groups at a local college—the chess club
and the knitting club. Suppose that, in the actual world and at all times, the
members of the chess club are all and only the members of the knitting club. Neverthe-
less, these groups are distinct: the chess club and the knitting club are not identical. The
theory of groups should allow for this.
Seventh, Parthood: the theory should specify conditions under which one group is
part of another. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court contains the group of associate
justices as a part. The theory of groups should capture that.2

3. Existence Conditions
In this section, I formulate two existence conditions for groups. The first expresses the
conditions under which a stage of a group exists. The second expresses the conditions
under which, more generally, groups exist.
The existence conditions rely on the notion of a plurality. Pluralities are just bunches
of entities. The U.S. Supreme Court justices form a plurality, for instance.
Pluralities obey the principles of plural logic, which supplements the vocabulary of
first-order logic with—among other things—a distinguished binary predicate for plural
membership.3 This membership predicate corresponds to such natural language
2
Due to a lack of space, I do not discuss an eighth criterion, due to Uzquiano [2018: 423]: namely, a good theory of
groups should illuminate the distinction between highly structured groups and highly unstructured groups. My
theory of groups does that: highly structured groups exemplify various structural properties, and highly unstruc-
tured groups do not. But I will not explore this here.
3
For more on plural logic, see Rayo [2002].
 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 3

expressions as ‘is a member of’, ‘is one of’, or ‘is among’. It captures the fact that plur-
alities have members. For instance, each U.S. Supreme Court justice is a member of the
plurality that is the U.S. Supreme Court. For future purposes, it will be helpful to refer to
the relation picked out by this predicate as the ‘p-membership’ relation (the ‘p’ stands
for ‘plurality’). So I will say that x is a ‘p-member’ of Y just in case Y is a plurality of
entities, one of which is x.
With all of that as background, here is the existence condition for stages of groups.4
Stage Existence. Let w be a world and let t be a time. Xw,t is a group-stage at w and t if and only if
at w and t, Xw,t is a plurality of individuals.

In other words, a group-stage is a plurality indexed to a world and a moment. For

example, consider the plurality of actual-world U.S. Supreme Court justices at the
start of the year 2012: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, John Roberts, and so on. That plurality,
at this world and at that moment, is a group-stage.
The existence condition for groups is as follows.
Existence. X is a group if and only if X is a fusion of group-stages.

In other words, groups are fusions of pluralities at worlds and times. In what follows, if
Xw,t is one of the group-stages that feature in the fusion that is group X, I will say that X
‘contains’ Xw,t.
For example, for each world w and each time t at which the U.S. Supreme Court
exists, consider the plurality of U.S. Supreme Court justices at w and t. By Stage Exist-
ence, each of these pluralities is a group-stage. Let X be the fusion of all of those group-
stages. Then X is a group: in particular, X is the U.S. Supreme Court.
Existence implies that there are groups of groups. As with any other group, a group of
groups is a fusion of group-stages. The group-stages are pluralities of groups, and, as usual,
the pluralities are indexed to worlds and times. For example, let C be the group of all clubs at
a local college. Let w be the actual world, and let t be the present time. Then C contains the
group-stage Cw,t, where Cw,t is the plurality whose p-members are those college clubs that
actually exist at t. So, for instance, Cw,t contains the chess club as a p-member. But, since p-
members of the chess club are people, they are not p-members of Cw,t. And only the chess
club itself, not any of the group-stages contained in the chess club, is in Cw,t as a p-member.
For the group-stages contained in the chess club are not clubs at the college.
Effingham [2010] advocates a set-theoretic account of groups that bears some simi-
larities to Existence. Roughly, according to Effingham, a group is a set of triples whose
first member is a world, whose second member is a time, and whose third member is a
set of entities. For two reasons, however, I prefer Existence to Effingham’s account. First,
as he points out, his account faces an arbitrariness problem [ibid.: 263–5]. Groups can
be identified with any number of different set-theoretic constructions, and it seems
unattractively arbitrary to identify groups with one—with the set of triples described
above, say—rather than with another. Existence, in contrast, does not face any arbitrari-
ness problem. Second, since sets are generally assumed to be non-spatiotemporal,
Effingham’s account implies that groups do not exist in space and time. Existence, in
contrast, allows groups to be spatiotemporal entities, since fusions of pluralities of
spatiotemporal entities are themselves spatiotemporal.

4
For more discussion of group stages, see Epstein [2015].
4 ISAAC WILHELM

Existence is akin to four-dimensionalism about physical objects. According to four-

dimensionalism, physical objects are four-dimensional entities [Sider 2001]. They are
spacetime ‘worms’: they extend through time as well as through space. According to
Existence, groups are somewhat similar. But groups are modal as well as temporal:
groups are modal-temporal worms. So, groups are five-dimensional: they extend
through modal space as well as through physical space and time.5
Think of Existence as the group-theoretic version of mereological universalism about
objects. According to mereological universalism, any arbitrary collection of entities
makes for an object of some sort. My pen and a trout, for instance, compose an
object. Existence says much the same about groups: namely, any fusion of any pluralities
of entities (at worlds and times) counts as a group. For instance, consider a fusion of
the following two pluralities—the 1998 Yankees at the moment when they won that
year’s baseball World Series, and a herd of unicorns at some possible world at year
zero. That fusion, according to Existence, is a group.
This is, I think, an attractive feature of Existence. For I doubt that there is a precise worldly
boundary between (i) those collections of entities that we intuitively classify as groups, and
(ii) those collections of entities that we intuitively classify as non-groups. Any boundary
seems highly context-dependent: pretty much all collections can seem like a group, if the
background context is described aptly. For instance, let F be the fusion of group-stages con-
sisting of my pen and a trout at each world and at each time. Suppose that my favourite
things happen to be all and only that pen and that trout. Then, plausibly, F is a group—
the group of my favourite things. So, a good theory of groups ought to countenance
more groups than our intuitions might have initially suggested.
One might ask why we only focus on some of the many, many groups that exist. The
answer is that we focus on the groups in which we are interested. Some groups are extre-
mely significant for us: the group of U.S. Supreme Court justices is more significant to more
people than is the group of my favourite things, for instance. Some groups feature in our
explanations: the group consisting of the top 1% of the wealthiest U.S. citizens, for instance,
features in many explanations of social, political, and economic phenomena in the U.S.
These groups matter to us, in various ways. So, these are the groups on which we focus.6
Nevertheless, for those who really want a worldly boundary—a boundary, that is,
between (i) those collections of entities that we intuitively classify as groups, and (ii)
those collections of entities that we intuitively classify as non-groups—I suggest the follow-
ing. Some collections of entities exemplify many natural properties.7 Those are the

5
For a five-dimensional account of objects, see Wallace [2014].
6
Many groups are candidate referents of the term ‘U.S. Supreme Court’. They differ on just a few group-stages,
and it is vague whether the pluralities corresponding to those group-stages ought to be included in the U.S.
Supreme Court fusion. I think that this vagueness, in exactly which fusion of pluralities (at worlds and times) is
the referent of ‘U.S. Supreme Court’, is a matter of semantic indecision. Any resulting problems—for instance,
the problem of specifying the semantics for claims about the U.S. Supreme Court—can be solved using the
usual strategies: see Lewis [1999] for discussion.
7
Strictly speaking, naturalness comes in degrees: properties can be more, or less, natural than one another. For my
purposes here, the relevant properties—the ones exemplified by those collections that we intuitively classify as
groups—are sufficiently natural: when I write ‘natural properties’ in what follows, I mean ‘sufficiently natural prop-
erties’. That is, the relevant properties have a sufficiently high degree of naturalness. So, these properties might be
—but need not be—perfectly natural. They need not have a maximally high degree of naturalness. As a matter of
fact, I think that many of these properties are perfectly natural. On my preferred view, gender properties, the prop-
erties of economic institutions, and so on, are natural to the highest degree. These properties carve nature at the
joints—the social joints, in particular. But one need not subscribe to this view, in order to accept the above
account of what makes some collections of entities seem, intuitively, like groups. One need only accept that
some properties are sufficiently natural.
 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 5

collections that we intuitively classify as groups. Other collections of entities do not exem-
plify many natural properties. Those are the collections that we intuitively classify as non-
groups.
A comprehensive account of natural properties is beyond the scope of this paper.
For present purposes, however, the following three features of natural properties are
particularly important. First, natural properties are explanatory [Sider 2011: 23].
That is, natural properties support explanations of phenomena, in a way that
non-natural properties do not. Second, natural properties are causal [Lewis 1983:
347; Schaffer 2004: 95]. The causal powers of particles, molecules, and political
parties derive from the natural properties that those objects exemplify. Third,
natural properties make for genuine similarity among objects that have them,
and for genuine dissimilarity among objects that differ over them [Lewis 1983:
347; Schaffer 2004: 94]. Objects that share most of their natural properties are
extremely similar to one another; objects that differ over most of their natural prop-
erties are not.
By way of illustration, take any collection of people who are in a music band.
Consider the property of being influenced by specific other such bands, or the property
of touring in such-and-such cities at such-and-such times. Those properties are natural
because (i) they enter into explanations of the band’s behaviour, (ii) they are responsible
for the band’s causal powers, and (iii) they make for genuine similarity and dissimilar-
ity. The band members jointly exemplify these natural properties, and so, intuitively,
they form a group.
But again, all this is somewhat beside the point. One can subscribe to Existence
without subscribing to this particular way of drawing a worldly boundary between
intuitive and non-intuitive groups. For, as mentioned earlier, there might well be no
such boundary to draw. And regardless, it seems plausible that there are many, many
more groups than the ones on which we tend to focus. Existence implies as much,
and that is a reason to like it.
Stage Existence and Existence can be used to formulate the following definition of
group membership (where the ‘g’ in ‘g-member’ stands for ‘group’).
Group Member. Let X be a group, let w be a world, let t be a time, and let e be an entity. Then e is
a ‘g-member’ of X at w and t just in case there is a group-stage Xw,t (at w and t) such that X
contains Xw,t and e is a p-member of Xw,t.

For example, at the actual world w and at the present time t, Ginsburg is a g-member of
the U.S. Supreme Court. For there is a group-stage Xw,t (at w and t) such that the U.S.
Supreme Court contains Xw,t and Ginsburg is a p-member of Xw,t.
A good definition of group membership ought to allow for transitivity failures. To
see why, consider the following three claims.
(1) Ginsburg is a member of the U.S. Supreme Court.
(2) The U.S. Supreme Court is a member of the group of all nine-membered groups of U.S. jus-
tices.
(3) Ginsburg is a member of the group of all nine-membered groups of U.S. justices.

Intuitively, (i) and (ii) are true, and (iii) is false. But if group membership were transi-
tive, then (i) and (ii) would imply (iii). So, a rigorous definition of group membership
should validate (i) and (ii) without validating (iii). That is, a rigorous definition of group
membership should allow for violations of transitivity.
6 ISAAC WILHELM

Group Member does just that. As mentioned above, Ginsburg is a g-member of the
U.S. Supreme Court (at the actual world and at the present time). So, (i) holds. For
similar reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court is a g-member of the group of all nine-mem-
bered groups of U.S. justices (at the actual world and at the present time). So, (ii) holds.
But Ginsburg is not a g-member of the group of all nine-membered groups of U.S. jus-
tices (at any world or any time), since Ginsburg is not a group with nine U.S. justices as
members.8 So, (iii) is false.
Because of this, Group Member allows my theory of groups to avoid a well-
known objection to theories that identify groups with fusions [Uzquiano 2004:
136–7; Effingham 2010: 255; Ritchie 2013: 263]. Those other theories usually
define group membership as follows: entity e is a member of group X just in
case e is part of X. Call this the ‘fusion definition’ of group membership.
Because the parthood relation is transitive, the fusion definition implies that
group membership is transitive, too. But, as the above example shows, group mem-
bership is not transitive. Group Member avoids this problem because it defines g-
membership in terms of both parthood—the ‘contains’ relation—and plural mem-
bership—the ‘p-member’ relation. The combination of these two relations allows
for transitivity violations.
For similar reasons, Group Member avoids another kind of transitivity problem that
arises for theories that, in addition to identifying groups with fusions, also accept the
fusion definition. By way of illustration, note that Ginsburg’s arm is part of her.
Since she is a member of the U.S. Supreme Court, it follows from the fusion definition
that Ginsburg is part of the U.S. Supreme Court. Since the parthood relation is transi-
tive, it follows that her arm is part of the U.S. Supreme Court, too. So, the fusion
definition implies, incorrectly, that Ginsburg’s arm is a member of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Group Member avoids this problem because it is inconsistent with the fusion
definition. So, Ginsburg’s arm, although part of her, is not a member of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Group Member distinguishes the present account of groups from an account due to
Hawley [2017]. The accounts are somewhat similar, since each relies on the notion of a
fusion. But, according to Hawley, no general account of group membership can be
given: different groups have different group membership conditions, and those con-
ditions are determined only by a variety of natural and social facts [ibid.: 401–2].
Group Member implies, however, that group membership can be analysed in terms
of fairly familiar notions—worlds, times, pluralities, fusions, and the p-membership
relation. Of course, natural and social facts can still help to determine group member-
ship. And, of course, different groups have different membership conditions. But that
does not bear on what the group membership relation itself is. That relation can
admit of an illuminating analysis, even if group membership is as heterogeneous and
varied as Hawley describes.

8
In general, Group Member does not imply that the g-members of a group G are also g-members of any group of
which G is, itself, a g-member. To see why, let X be any group of groups. Let G be a g-member of X at some world
w and some time t. So, by Group Member, G is a p-member of Xw,t. Let m be a g-member of G at w and t; it follows
from Group Member that m is a p-member of Gw,t. So, m is a p-member of Gw,t, and G is a p-member of Xw,t. It does
not follow, however, that m is a p-member of Xw,t. That would only follow if Gw,t—in addition to G—were a p-
member of Xw,t (and if p-membership were transitive). But that may not be the case. And so it does not follow that
m is a g-member of X.
 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 7

Existence supports an account of the semantics of tensed and modal statements

about groups. Tensed statements are true in virtue of groups having group-stages at
certain times with certain properties, and modal statements are true in virtue of
groups having group-stages at certain worlds with certain properties. For instance,
‘The U.S. Supreme Court used to contain just eight members’ is true at present
because there is an earlier time t such that the U.S. Supreme Court has a group-stage
—at the actual world, and at t—that has the property of containing just eight
members. Similarly, ‘The U.S. Supreme Court could have had no male justices’ is
true because there is a world w and a time t such that the U.S. Supreme Court has a
group-stage—at w and t—with the property of having no justices who are male.
In addition, Existence supports an account of the conditions under which groups
pass into and out of existence. First of all, say that ‘group G exists at world w and
time t’ just in case G contains a group-stage at w and t. Then say that ‘G comes into
existence at w and t’ just in case (i) G exists at w and t, and (ii) for a range of times
shortly before t, G does not exist at w and at those times. Similarly, say that ‘G goes
out of existence at w and t’ just in case (i) G does not exist at w and t, and (ii) for a
range of times shortly before t, G exists at w and at those times.
As pointed out by Epstein [2015: 169], groups can exist even when they have
no members. Existence allows for that. For, arguably, there are empty pluralities:
the empty plurality E is the plurality that has no p-members.9 So, group
G exists at world w and time t, despite having no members at w and t, so long
as G contains Ew,t.

4. Identity Conditions
In this section, I formulate two identity conditions for groups. The first is an identity
condition for group-stages. The second is an identity condition for groups in general.
Here is the identity condition for group-stages.
Stage Identity. Let Xw,t be a group-stage at world w and time t, and let Yw`,t` be a group-stage at
world w` and time t`. Then Xw,t is stage-identical to Yw`,t` if and only if
(1) w is w`,
(2) t is t`,
(3) each p-member of Xw,t is a p-member of Yw`,t`, and
(4) each p-member of Yw`,t` is a p-member of Xw,t.

In other words, group-stages are identical just in case they are the same plurality
indexed to the same world and the same time.
Here is the identity condition for groups.
Identity. Group X is identical to group Y if and only if
(1) each group-stage contained in X is stage-identical to a group-stage contained in Y, and
(2) each group-stage contained in Y is stage-identical to a group-stage contained in X.

In other words, groups X and Y are identical just in case they are fusions of the same
pluralities at the same worlds and times.
Epstein [2019] argues that there are no identity conditions for groups in general.
There are no conditions that, like Identity, say what it takes for any given groups X
and Y to be identical. Instead, different kinds of groups have different kinds of identity
9
Linnebo [2013] gives reasons for accepting the existence of an empty plurality.
8 ISAAC WILHELM

conditions. Epstein proposes a number of different conditions like that, but, for present
purposes, it suffices for us to focus on two—an identity condition for groups of street
musicians, and an identity condition for faculty committees [2019: 4913]. The identity
condition for the street musicians—call it ‘Street Identity’—is as follows: for groups
of street musicians g1 and g2, g1 is identical to g2 if and only if the time and place of
origin of g1 is sufficiently similar to the time and place of origin of g2. The identity con-
dition for faculty committees—call it ‘Committee Identity’—is as follows: for faculty
committees g1 and g2, g1 is identical to g2 if and only if g1 and g2 originate in the
same formation-act.
The facts about identity conditions for groups depend, I think, on what groups are.
If groups are sets, then the identity conditions for groups just are the identity con-
ditions for sets. If groups are fusions, then the identity conditions for groups just
are the identity conditions for fusions. And if groups are fusions of pluralities at
worlds and times—as Existence implies—then the identity conditions for groups
just are the identity conditions for fusions of pluralities at worlds and times. There
is just one identity condition for pluralities: any pluralities p1 and p2 are identical if
and only if p1 and p2 have exactly the same members. And there is just one identity
condition for fusions: any fusions f1 and f2 are identical if and only if f1 and f2 have
exactly the same parts. So, if Existence is correct, there is just one identity condition
for groups: any groups X and Y are identical just in case, roughly, X and Y are the
same fusions of the same pluralities at the same worlds and times. In other
words, if Existence is correct, then there is a single identity condition for groups—
namely, Identity.
So, here is the situation. If Street Identity and Committee Identity are right—if there
are different identity conditions for different kinds of groups—then Existence must be
wrong. For if Existence is right—if groups just are fusions of pluralities at worlds and
times—then there is a single identity condition for groups—namely, Identity. So,
should we accept Existence, and give up Street Identity and Committee Identity? Or
should we accept Street Identity and Committee Identity, and give up Existence?
I prefer to give up Street Identity and Committee Identity, because I worry that
there are counterexamples to both. Consider the following counterexample to
Street Identity. Susy and Billy, both drummers, strongly dislike Kima and Omar,
who also play the drums. One day, all four of them meet each other while
walking along the street. Susy and Billy stare at Kima and Omar, who stare back.
They all sit down, silently, in synchronicity, and have a ‘drum-off’: Susy and Billy
compete against Kima and Omar, to see who plays best. There are two groups of
street musicians here—the group whose members are Suzy and Billy, and the
group whose members are Kima and Omar. But these groups have the same time
and place of origin. So, according to Street Identity, they are identical. And consider
the following counterexample to Committee Identity. Suppose that the faculty at a
local college decides to hold a vote: if the majority vote ‘Aye’, then the budgeting
committee and the grants committee will be formed. These committees would
contain different members. The vote is held, and the majority vote ‘Aye.’ The budget-
ing committee group is distinct from the grants committee group; they have different
members, after all. But, according to Committee Identity, these groups are identical,
since they originate in the same formation-act.
One might object to Identity along the following lines. According to Identity, if
groups X and Y coincide at all worlds and all times, then X and Y are identical. But
 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 9

one might think that some such groups are distinct.10 Let P and Q be properties that
have the same extension at all times and all possible worlds [Epstein 2019: 4905]. For
instance, perhaps P is the property of being a bachelor, and Q is the property of
being an unmarried man. The group of bachelors is, arguably, distinct from the
group of unmarried men. But, since these groups coincide at all worlds and times, Iden-
tity implies that they are identical. Or suppose that, upon founding a band A, the band
members simultaneously found band B. Suppose that the membership conditions for A
and B involve retaining membership in the other band: in order to be a member of A,
for instance, one must also be a member of B. Then A and B have the same group-stages
at all worlds and all times. So, according to Identity, A and B are identical. But intui-
tively, one might claim, A and B are distinct.
When faced with examples like these, my intuitions break down. For instance, I
do not have strong intuitions regarding whether the group of bachelors is, or is not,
identical to the group of unmarried men. And if it is metaphysically impossible for A
and B to have different members, then it is hard for me to tell whether A and B are
intuitively distinct.11 In short, my intuitions do not settle these cases for me. So I am
not bothered by the fact that, according to Identity, the group of bachelors is the
group of unmarried men, and A is B. That strikes me as a reasonable way to
settle cases like these.
For those who disagree, however, I can offer the following. In Stage Existence,
allow w to be an impossible world [Nolan 1997; Jago 2015]. That is, let a group-
stage be a plurality indexed to a world—possible or impossible—and a time. As
before, in accord with Existence, let a group be a fusion of group-stages. There
are impossible worlds where some bachelors are married, and there are impossible
worlds where A has a member that B lacks. So, on this revised account of groups,
the group of bachelors is distinct from the group of unmarried men, and A is dis-
tinct from B.

5. Parthood Conditions
In this section, I formulate two parthood conditions. The first expresses a parthood con-
dition for group-stages. The second expresses a parthood condition for groups in
general.
Here is the parthood condition for group-stages.
Stage Part. Let Xw,t be a group-stage at world w and time t, and let Yw`,t` be a group-stage at
world w` and time t`. Xw,t is a stage-part of Yw`,t` if and only if
(1) w is w`,
(2) t is t`, and
(3) each p-member of Xw,t is a p-member of Yw`,t`.

In other words, one group-stage is part of another just in case every member of the
former is a member of the latter.
10
Thanks to two anonymous reviewers for raising this concern, and for proposing these examples.
11
Here is why I have trouble evaluating this case. In order for Identity to imply that A and B are identical, the
membership conditions for A must be necessary. It must be necessary, in other words, that A’s membership con-
ditions involve membership in B. But it seems intuitively plausible that the membership conditions for A can vary
between worlds: after all, intuitively, A could have had different membership conditions. But if that is so, then A
and B do not have the same group-stages at all worlds and all times. And so, according to Identity, A and B are
distinct.
10 ISAAC WILHELM

Here is the parthood condition for groups.

Part. Group X is part of group Y if and only if each group-stage contained in X is a stage-part of a
group-stage contained in Y.

In other words, one group is part of another just in case each member of each group-
stage of the former is a member of a corresponding group-stage of the latter. To put it
more roughly, but more intuitively, one group is part of another just in case the
members of the latter (at given worlds and times) include the members of the former
(at those worlds and times).
For instance, according to Part, the group of associate justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court is part of the U.S. Supreme Court. To see why, take any world w and any time t.
Suppose that there is a group-stage Aw,t of the associate justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court at w and t. Then there is a group-stage Sw,t of U.S. Supreme Court justices such
that each member of Aw,t is a member of Sw,t. In particular, Sw,t is the plurality consisting
of all members of Aw,t plus the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court at w and t. So, the
U.S. Supreme Court contains the group of associate justices as a part.
Part and Group Member are somewhat similar in spirit. For they both articulate
senses in which one group might be ‘within’ another. According to the sense articulated
by Part, one group is ‘within’ another whenever, roughly, each member of the former is
a member of the latter. According to the sense articulated by Group Member, one group
is ‘within’ another whenever, roughly, the former is a member of the latter.
Nevertheless, Part and Group Member are distinct. In particular, according to Part
and Group Member, parthood is distinct from g-membership: neither implies the
other. And that is a point in favour of both Part and Group Member. For, intuitively,
one group can be part of another, even if the former is not a g-member of the latter.
And, intuitively, one group can be a g-member of another, even if the former is not
part of the latter. Part and Group Member are attractive, since they get that right.
Here is an example of groups that are parts, but not g-members, of one another. Let S
be the group of U.S. Supreme Court justices, and let A be the group of associate justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court. As shown above, according to Part, A is part of S. According
to Group Member, however, A is not a g-member of S: since A is not itself a justice, A is
not a p-member of any of S’s group-stages.
Here is an example of groups that are g-members, but not parts, of one another. Let
C be the group of all clubs at the local college, and let C` be the chess club. According to
Group Member, C` is a g-member of C (at the actual world, and at the present time).
According to Part, however, C` is not part of C: the p-members of C` are people,
while the p-members of C are groups.

6. The Stage Theory and the Seven Criteria

Stage Existence, Existence, Stage Identity, Identity, Stage Part, and Part form a theory of
the metaphysics of groups: call it the ‘stage theory’. In this section, I show that the stage
theory satisfies the seven criteria from section 2.
To start, note that the stage theory satisfies Contingency: that is, the stage theory
allows groups to have their members contingently. For instance, Merrick Garland
could have been a member of the U.S. Supreme Court because there is a possible
world w and a time t such that the U.S. Supreme Court has a group-stage (at w and t)
of which he is a member.
 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 11

The stage theory satisfies Temporality: that is, the stage theory allows groups to have
their members temporarily. A group has different members at different times by having
group-stages with different members at different times. For instance, the present group-
stage of the U.S. Supreme Court has members who are not members of the court’s
group-stage at the start of the year 1912. So, from 1912 to today, the U.S. Supreme
Court changed its members.
Because of this, the stage theory avoids a problem that arises for many accounts that
identify groups with pluralities [Ritchie 2013: 262]. The problem is that such accounts
violate Temporality: if groups are pluralities, then it is impossible for one and the same
group to have different members at different times, since pluralities with different
members at different times are distinct. The stage theory avoids this problem because
it identifies groups with fusions of pluralities at times (and worlds), rather than just
with pluralities.
The stage theory satisfies Non-Necessity: that is, the stage theory allows groups to
exist at some worlds but not others. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court exists at
the actual world because, for some time t, the court has a group-stage at the actual
world and at t.12 But there are worlds at which the U.S. Supreme Court does not
exist: just consider a world in which the U.S. has no judiciary branch.
The stage theory satisfies Non-Eternal: that is, the stage theory allows groups to exist
at some times but not others. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court exists at the present
time t because it has a group-stage at the actual world and at t.13 But there are times
when the U.S. Supreme Court does not exist: it did not exist at the start of the year
1000 because it has no group-stage at the actual world and at that time.
The stage theory satisfies Spatiotemporal: that is, the stage theory allows groups to
exist within spacetime. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court exists in space and time
because there is a world w—the actual world, say—and a time t such that the following
two conditions hold: (i) the U.S. Supreme Court has a group-stage at w and t, and (ii)
the plurality which is that group-stage exists in space and time.
The stage theory satisfies Coincidence: that is, the stage theory implies that two
groups in the actual world can have exactly the same members at every time at
which they exist, yet still be distinct. To see why, recall the chess club and the knitting
club. These groups always have exactly the same members. That is, each group-stage of
the chess club at the actual world (and at any time t) is a group-stage of the knitting club
at the actual world (and at t), and each group-stage of the knitting club at the actual
world (and at any time t) is a group-stage of the chess club at the actual world (and
at t). Nevertheless, there are possible worlds at which the chess club and the knitting
club do not overlap. Just consider a possible world w and a time t at which the chess
club has a member that the knitting club lacks. So, a member of a group-stage of the
chess club (at w and t) is not a member of any group-stage of the knitting club (at w
and t). Therefore, the former group-stage is not a group-stage of the knitting club.
And so Identity implies that the chess club and the knitting club are distinct, even
though they coincide at the actual world.
Because of this, the stage theory avoids a problem that arises for many accounts
that identify groups with either pluralities [Uzquiano 2004: 141–2] or fusions

12
In general, say that ‘group X exists at world w’ just in case there is a time t such that X contains a group-stage at
w and t.
13
In general, say that ‘group X exists at time t’ just in case X contains a group-stage at the actual world and at t.
12 ISAAC WILHELM

[Ritchie 2013: 263]. The problem is that such accounts violate Coincidence. If groups are
pluralities, then it is impossible for two distinct groups always to have exactly the same
members at the actual world. For pluralities with exactly the same members are iden-
tical. Similarly, if groups are fusions—and if group membership is defined solely in
terms of the parthood relation, as discussed in section 3—then it is impossible for
two distinct groups always to have exactly the same members in the actual world.
For fusions with exactly the same members—that is, exactly the same parts—are iden-
tical. The stage theory avoids this problem, because it allows groups to be different in
virtue of containing different pluralities at different worlds.
Finally, the stage theory satisfies Parthood: that is, the stage theory provides parthood
conditions for groups. That is what Part does. According to it, parthood among groups
is a matter of sharing members.
This is one of the main reasons to prefer the stage theory over Ritchie’s account of
groups. Roughly, according to Ritchie’s account, a group is a realisation of a structure
[ibid.: 270–1]. Ritchie’s account does not satisfy Parthood, however, since she does
not provide parthood conditions for groups. And, for two reasons, I am not sure
how to supplement her account with a parthood condition. First, according to
Ritchie, some relations in a structure can hold ‘more strongly’ or ‘less strongly’
than others [ibid.: 269]. Ritchie proposes three different ways of capturing this
phenomenon—assigning weights to relations, taking groups to exist only when
many extremely similar structures are realised, and taking the referent of ‘group’
to be vague. I am not exactly sure how, for any given one of these options, to for-
mulate a parthood relation among groups. Second, Ritchie takes any given group
to be distinguished by structural relationships in two different ways—the structural
relations that comprise that group, and also the structural relations in which that
entire group stands [ibid.: 270]. I am not quite sure how to formulate parthood con-
ditions that take into account both kinds of structural relations.
Before closing, it is worth comparing the stage theory with Uzquiano’s theory of
groups [2018]. According to Uzquiano, groups are variably plural embodiments consti-
tuted by rigid plural embodiments. Variably plural embodiments, constitution, and
rigid plural embodiments are primitives of Uzquiano’s theory. But, roughly, rigid
plural embodiments can be thought of as pluralities at worlds and times qua conditions
which those pluralities satisfy [ibid.: 430]. Variably plural embodiment are, roughly,
material objects that manifest themselves as pluralities at worlds and times: for each
world and time, the plurality that manifests a given variably plural embodiment is
the output of some functional condition [ibid.: 444].
The stage theory and Uzquiano’s theory are, in some ways, similar. Both analyse
groups using pluralities at worlds and times, for instance. And both satisfy the seven
criteria from section 2.
But, for three reasons, I prefer the stage theory. First, Uzquiano’s theory invokes
more unanalysed notions than the stage theory does. The stage theory invokes plural-
ities, worlds, times, and fusions. In addition to those four primitives, however, Uzquia-
no’s theory also invokes the constitution relation, variably plural embodiments, and
rigid plural embodiments. Moreover, some of the extra primitives in Uzquiano’s
theory—in particular, variably plural embodiments and rigid plural embodiments—
are relatively unfamiliar. And, all else being equal, it is better to avoid invoking relatively
unfamiliar primitives when analysing groups. The stage theory does not invoke those
primitives, and that is a reason to prefer it.
 AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 13

Second, I worry that Uzquiano’s theory might not countenance enough groups.
Every rigid plural embodiment, and so every variably plural embodiment, corresponds
to a condition of some sort. Uzquiano does not say exactly what it is to be a condition,
but, plausibly, conditions are linguistic formulas expressible in the formal language that
Uzquiano employs. So, according to his theory, for every group, there is a linguistic con-
dition describing that group alone. But then the formal language puts a bound on how
many groups exist, and that seems problematic. Depending on exactly which formal
language is at issue, it seems intuitively plausible that there are more groups than lin-
guistic conditions that describe them, just as there are more sets of natural numbers
than well-formed formulas—in the language of arithmetic—that define those sets.
Third, Uzquiano does not provide an account of how groups can be members of
other groups. He provides an account of individual membership: he provides an
account, that is, of what it takes for a group to contain an individual as a member.
And he provides an account of group parthood: he provides an account, that is, of
what it takes for one group to be part of another. But he does not provide an
account of what it takes for one group to be a member—rather than a part—of
another group.

7. Conclusion
Theories that identify groups with pluralities, and theories that identify groups with
fusions, face many problems. But, as the stage theory shows, pluralities and fusions
can still be used to analyse groups. By identifying groups with fusions of pluralities,
the stage theory satisfies seven criteria that a theory of groups ought to satisfy. So,
the stage theory is worth taking seriously.14

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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14
Thanks to Karen Bennett, Brian Epstein, Augie Faller, Dee Payton, Katherine Ritchie, two anonymous referees,
and especially Jonathan Schaffer, for much helpful feedback and discussion.
14 ISAAC WILHELM

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