CASTRO vs. GREGORIO G.R. No.

188801, October 15, 2014

FACTS: A petition for adoption filed by Jose was granted alleging that Jed and Regina are his
illegitimate children with a housekeeper. This was granted by the court, however, when Jose
died, his estranged wife, Rosario, filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul
the adoption on the ground that her consent was not obtained and the document purporting to
be her consent was fraudulent, hence the adoption was not valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the adoption
shall be granted.

HELD: Yes, the petition shall be granted. The law requires that the person seeking to adopt
his or her illegitimate child must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse. Since the
consent of Rosario, Jose’s wife, was not obtained, the adoption was invalid. Hence, the
petition for annulment of the adoption must be granted.

Cang vs CA GR No 105308 25 September 1998

Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari over the Decision of CA affirming the
decree of adoption issued by the RTC of Cebu for the adoption of minors Keith, Charmaine
and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, Spouses Clavano.Minors’ parents are Hebert Cang
(Petitioner) and Anna Marie Clavano. Anna Marie subsequently filed for legal separation
which was granted. Petitioner then left for US. Petitioner sought a divorce decree there and
was granted. Petitioner thereafter took an American wife and thus became a naturalized
American citizen. Later on, he divorced his American wife and never remarried. While in U.S.
Petitioner remitted money to the Philippines for his minor children.

Meanwhile, Spouses Clavano, here in the Philippines, filed a Special Proceedings for the
Adoption of the three (3) minor Cang children before the RTC of Cebu. 14 year old Keith, as
well as the mother Anna Marie, consented to said adoption and alleged that Petitioner
abandoned them and forfeited already his parental rights over their children. (Note: Anna
Marie wants to adopt her children to her relatives because she will go to U.S. as well to live
there and find a job)

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto. He alleged that although he has only meager finance
compared to Spouses. Clavano, he cannot allow anybody to strip him of his parental
authority.
Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his
children alleging that Anna had gone to the US thereby leaving custody to their children to
Spouses. Clavano (Private Respondents). Such petition was granted and the Trial Court
ordered that the custody of the minor children should be transferred to their father.
Later on, the the Petition for Adoption was granted.

ISSUE: Whether adoption should be granted?

HELD: No. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment.
General Rule: (Rule 99 of the ROC)
The written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the validity of the decree of
adoption.
Exception: The requirement of written consent can be dispensed with if the parent has
abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly intemperate.
In the instant case, records disclose that Petitioner’s conduct did not manifest a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to
constitute abandonment.
While admittedly, Petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the US, he was not
remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He
maintained regular communication with his wife and children through telephone calls and
letters. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
VDA DE JACOB VS. CA

FACTS:Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E.

Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by
virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Defendant-
appellee Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo.
Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio,
because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.. Appellant claims
that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana,
CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original
copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. Based on the evidence presented, the
trial court ruled for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of
deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-
existent. CA affirmed trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.

HELD: The Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and
the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed
adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as
to costs.

With regard to the contention the marriage was void ab initio because of the lack of a
marriage license, it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob
and petitioner.11 Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require
a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code. With regard to the loss of the marriage
certificate, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even
by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. In the present
case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The
subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court. These are relevant,
competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence — testimonial
and documentary — may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage..

Republic vs CA GR No 103695 15 March 1996

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA which affirmed in
toto the decision of the RTC of Cavite granting private respondent’s petition for the adoption
of Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the correction of the minors first name Midael to Michael.

A petition for adoption was filed by spouses Caranto for the adoption of Midael Mazon, then
15 yrs old, who had been living with private respondent since he was 7 yrs old. When private
respondent later on got married, Midael stayed with them under their care and custody.
RTC set the case for hearing and giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Province of Cavite and by the service of the order upon the DSWD
and the Solicitor General.

Solicitor General opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name of the
child from Midael to Michael. He argued that although the correction sought concerned only a
clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under the Rule 108 of the Rules.
RTC rendered its decision. It dismissed the opposition of the Solicitor General on the ground
that Rule 108 applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of persons.
The correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108.
Further, the Trial Court held that the error could be corrected in the same proceeding for
adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions, and inconvenience to the petitioners. Therefore, it
granted the adoption of Midael Mazon and the change of his name from Midael to Michael.
CA affirmed in toto the decision of the Trial Court. Here Republic added that RTC did not
acquired jurisdiction over the case because in the notice published in the newspaper, the
name given was Michael, instead of Midael, which is the name of the minor given in his
Certificate of Live Birth.

ISSUE: Whether or not TC acquired jurisdiction over the PR’s petition for adoption.

HELD: IT HAD ACQUIRED JURISDISCTION.

Solicitor General in proving its contention invoked the ruling in Cruz vs. Republic. There the
petition for adoption was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction because the name of the
adoptee used in the publication was the child’s baptispmal name (Rosanna E. Cruz) instead
of her name in the record of Birth (Rosanna E. Bucoy). The court held there that there was a
substantial defect in the petition and the published order of hearing.
The instant case, however, is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the
child sought to be adopted. In this case the correction involves merely the substitution of the
letters “CH” for the letter “D”, so that what appears as MIDAEL as given name would read as
MICHAEL. Even the Solicitor General admits that the error is a plainly clerical one.
Changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly
cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme
and tone. The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those who have
any objection to the adoption can make their objection known.
REYES vs. MAURICIO G.R. No. 175080, November 24, 2010

FACTS: During the pendency of a suit for ejectment instituted by Librada and her adopted
daughter Leonida against Eugenio, Librada died. Eugenio questioned the legal standing of
Leonida as a party averring that Leonida is a mere ward of Librada, thus not a legal heir.

ISSUE: Can Eugenio question the legitimacy of Leonida in a case regarding land dispute?

HELD: No, Eugenio cannot question the legitimacy of Leonida in a case regarding land
dispute. The legitimacy, filiation or the legality of the adoption by the testator can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
Since the question regarding the legitimacy, legality or the legality of adoption was not raised
in a separate action brought for that purpose, but rather in a case regarding land dispute,
Eugenio cannot validly question the same.

In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia GR 148311, March 31, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner HonoratoCatindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate

child Stephanie, and that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle and surname;
and that he is now a widower and qualified to her adopting parent. He prayed
that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that
her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.

ISSUE: May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name?
HELD: YES. Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie
is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of
any kind, including the right to bear surname of her father and her mother.
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname as her middle name will maintain
her maternal lineage. The Adoption Act and the Family Code provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie
can assert her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim GR No. 168992-93,
May 21, 2009

FACTS: Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless.  Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD.  The spouses registered the children making it appears as
if they were the parents.  Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.  She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.  Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing
of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child.  In
2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. 
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven
months old.  Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the
adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD: Petition was denied.  The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already
remarried.  Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present
in the case at bar.  In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental
authority.  The use of the word “shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is
mandatory.  This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses
to adopt jointly.  The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain
requirements that he must comply as an American Citizen.  He must meet the qualifications
set forth in Sec7 of RA8552.  The requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7.  Parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption.  It includes caring and rearing the children for
civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical
character and well-being.

NERY vs. SAMPANA A.C. No. 10196, September 9, 2014

FACTS: A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Sampana for making his client believe that
the Petition for her Adoption by an alien adopter was already filed despite payment of fees.
According to Atty. Sampana he already prepared the Petition, but since Nery failed to furnish
him a copy of the Certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt from the Japanese
Embassy, he did not file the Petition.

ISSUE: Can a Certification of the alien’s qualification be dispensed with in a petition for

adoption by an alien adopter?

HELD: Yes, a certification of the alien’s qualification can be dispensed with in a petition for
adoption by an alien adopter. Under the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, an alien adopter can
jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino
spouse, and the certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt is waived. Hence, Atty.
Sampana could file the Petition for Adoption despite the absence of the said certification.

Bartolome vs SSS G.R. No. 192531               November 12, 201

FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He
was enrolled under the government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP). He died
due to an accident while on board the vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and
unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.

 SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent
of John since the latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who
qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner.

 According to the records, Cornelio died during John’s minority.

ISSUES: Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptee’s minority results to the
restoration of the parental authority to the biological parents of the latter and whether or not
Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.

HELD: The Court ruled that John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant
factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to
have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent
ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by
virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed
away?

The Court also applied by analogy,  insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the
provisions of law on rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee’s biological parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or
incapacitated.

The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission, justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and
the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological
parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for
himself at such a tender age.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights
of succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of
the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals
the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of
the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s
adoptive parent.

Yes. The Court held that Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent
parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption
already died, then the death benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program shall
accrue solely to herein petitioner, John’s sole remaining beneficiary.