Resp Edited

TEAM CODE: NMCC 2019-07-
2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

DEPARTMENT OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS,

INDICA
MS.RIYA (PETITIONER)
VERSUS
MR.RAMAKANT SHUKLA (RESPONDENT NO.1)
MR.RAHUL (RESPONDENT NO.2)
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

METROPOLIS, INDICA
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

2 ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019
[TABLE OF CONTENTS]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................... iv
JUDICIAL DECISIONS............................................................................................ iv
BOOKS........................................................................................................................v
ONLINE RESOURCES...............................................................................................v
STATUTES.................................................................................................................vi
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................................................................................. vii
SATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................... viii
ISSUES RAISED.................................................................................................................... x
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...........................................................................................xi
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED.................................................................................................1
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[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[TABLE OF CONTENTS]
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

FACT?.................................................................................................................................1
II. WHETHER THEE IS LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

MS.RIYA AND ME.RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE TOP ACT?......................8
III. WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS JUST AND

REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM CONJUGAL SOCIETY?..10
IV. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS, INDICA HAS THE POWER
TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDIBATE COURT UNDER ARTICLE
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA?.............................................................. 12
A. SOURCE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION CONFERRED TO THE HIGH

COURT........................................................................................................................... 13
B. OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE.................................................... 14
C. ASSUMPTION OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 227............ 15
PRAYER..............................................................................................................................xiii
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[TABLE OF CONTENTS]
iv | P a g e

[INDEX OF AUTHORITIES]
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Marwa Manghari v. Sanghram Sampar AIR 1960 PUNJAB 35
L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India &Ors (1997) 3 SCC 261
Gujarat v.Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481
State through Special Cell, New Delhiv. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641
State Of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao And Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1401
K.Dhanapal v. The Superintendent Of Police H.C.P.No.2525 of 2018
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey ,AIR 2002 SC 291 : (2002) 2 SCC 765
Naveen Kohli v.Neelu Kohli(2006) 4 SCC 558 ;
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706
A.Jayachandra v. Aneel Kumar(2005) 2 SCC 22
SamarGhosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511
Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh (2017) 4 SCC 85
Parsun Chakraborty v. Smt. Indira Jaiswal (2016) 4 Cal LT 420
Bokaro And Ramgur Ltd. v. State Of Bihar AIR 1966 Pat 154
Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital Prasad AIR 1981 Delhi 251
NalamatiLatchanna v. MasinaSriramulu 1993 (1) ALT 26
Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi(Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.Etc AIR 2016 SC 4653
Anil Malhotra v.ChanderMalhota And OrsRSA No. 1658 of 2010
M/S Vasanth Colour Laboratories Private Limited v. SmtDivyaW.P. No. 46319/2015
v|Page

BOOKS
DR. J. N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India (Central Law Agency ,Allahabad ,55st
edn., 2018)
Sir Dinshaw Fardunji Mulla,The Transfer Of Propert Act (Lexis Nexis, Haryana, 12th edn.,
2015)
DR. S.R. Myneni , Code Of Civil Procedure & Limitation Act (Asia Law House, Hyderabad
,3rd edn,. 2016)
DR. Paras Diwan, Family Law (Narender Gogia & Company , Hyderabad , 10th edn., 2018)
S.N. Misra, The Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (Central Law Publication, Uttar Pradesh,
20th edn., 2016)
DR. Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India (Wadhwa And Company, Nagput 13th
edn., 2001)
ONLINE RESOURCES
www.indiankannon.org
www.scconline.com
www.manupatra.com
www.lesixnesix.co.in
STATUTES
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LIMITATION ACT, 1963
HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955
WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT, 1997
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA , 1950
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973
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[STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION]
STATEMENT OF JURISDCTION
Petitioner has filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indica before
this Hon’ble Court. Respondent No.1 humbly submits to this jurisdiction.
Respondent No. 2 humbly submits to the suo motu jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court under
Article 227 of The Constitution of Indica. This Article mentions the Power of
Superintendence over all Courts by the High Court.
viii | P a g e

[STATEMENT OF FACTS]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Ambridge is a town in the state of Metropolis located in the country of Indica. Jamalpur
is another city of Metropolis state, Indica. Both Mr. Rahul and Ms. Riya are residents of
Ambridge and are Hindus who got married under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 in
February of 2011. After marriage they moved to Jamalpur where Mr.Rahul had been
working since 2009 and earning a salary of Rs.20,000/- per month.
II. The couple rented a flat from Mr.Ramakant Shukla (landlord) who made an agreement
for 11 months with Mr.Rahul and Ms. Riya and fixed the rent at Rs.10, 000/- per month.
Soon, Ms. Riya started working in a KidZee in Jamalpur and was paid Rs.5000/- per
month. In the last week of May, 2011, Mr. Rahul lost his job due to which the rent of the
property remained due for 6 months consecutively. His spouse was unaware of the
reason for delay in the payment of rent.
III. In November, 2011 the landlord sent a notice expressing his desire to not continue the
agreement with the couple and requested the couple to vacate the premises within one
month. Following this, the unemployed status of Mr. Rahul was revealed to Ms. Riya. She
left the shared flat on 01st December, 2011. Several futile attempts were made by her
spouse to talk to her. During the absence of Ms. Riya, repeated requests were made to
Mr. Rahul to pay the rent, but the payment remained irregular in nature.
nd
IV. On 22 April, 2015, Ms. Riya came back to the shared flat and expressed her desire to
divorce Mr. Rahul. Further, she asked Mr. Rahul to leave the flat and informed the landlord that
from then onwards she would be staying in the flat and paying the rent. The landlord refused
and issued a notice for eviction to the couple in May,2015.
ix | P a g e

[STATEMENT OF FACTS]
V. When the couple did not vacate, the landlord filed a suit for eviction against The couple
before the Controller in June 2015 contending that he needed the suit property for his
personal use. Simultaneously, a suit for Restitution of Conjugal Rights was filed by Mr.
Rahul before the District Court. The Controller in the suit for eviction decided in favor of
the landlord following which Mr. Rahul left the suit property. However, Ms. Riya
continued to stay on and filed an appeal before the Tribunal where the Controller’s
decision was upheld. The Tribunal asked Ms. Riya to vacate the suit property. Aggrieved
by the decision of the Tribunal Ms. Riya is on appeal before this Hon’ble Court.
Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal Ms. Riya is on appeal before this Hon’ble Court.
The High Court has also suo motu taken up the Restitution of Conjugal Rights suit under
Article 227 for adjudication.
x|Page

[ISSUES RAISED]
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE ORESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH I N LAW AND

IN FACT?
ISSUE II: WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN MS.RIYA AND MR.RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE TRANSFER OF
PROPERTY ACT?
ISSUE III: WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS JUST

AND REASONABLE GROUND FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CONJUGAL
RELATIONSHIP BY MS.RIYA?
ISSUE 1V: WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS, INDICA HAS THE
POWER TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE COURT UNDER
ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA?
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[SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. THE PRESENT SUIT IS NOT MAINATAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of Metropolis, Indica that the
present suit, Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul is not maintainable both in law and in fact
as this Hon’ble High Court has erred in Suo motto clubbing two suits of different nature,
having no common remedy.
II. THERE IS NO LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

MS.RIYA AND MR.RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER TOP ACT
It is humbly submitted on behalf of the respondent that initially there was a landlord tenant
relationship between Ms. Riya and the respondent but such relationship is no longer existent
since under section 2 (g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act states, “tenant…shall not
include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court
of competent jurisdiction”
III. CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS NOT REASONABLE

GROUND FOR WITHDARWAL FROM CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY
MS.RIYA
It is humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of unemployment of Mr.Rahul

(hereinafter referred as "Respondent”) is not a just and reasonable ground for withdrawal
from the conjugal relationship by Ms.Riya (hereinafter referred as "Petitioner”) It is
contended on behalf of the respondent that the concealment of unemployment is a frivolous
matter and does not constitute mental trauma as claimed by the Petitioner.
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[SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
IV. HIGH COURT HAS POWER UNDER ART 227 TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM
A SUBORDINATE COURT
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that High Court of Metropolis, Indica is
conferred with the power of supervision under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica which
involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and tribunals ‘within the bounds
of their authority and to see that they do what their duty requires and that they do it in a legal
manner’ and to that effect, the High Court can take up a case from the Subordinate Court
under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica.
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[ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

FACT?
(¶1.) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of Metropolis, Indica that
the present suit, Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul is not maintainable both in law
and in fact as this Hon’ble High Court has erred in Suo motto clubbing two suits of
different nature, having no common remedy.
(¶2.) In the case of Syeda Rahimunnisa vs Malan Bi (Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.Etc 1, it was
held that “Since all the aforementioned five suits were in relation to one suit- land
and were between the same parties pending in different Courts, all the five civil suits
were clubbed together for disposal in accordance with law. Parties adduced common
evidence in all the five civil suits”
(¶3.) Further it is mentioned that since the five suits filed were in relation to one suit – land
and were between the same parties pending in different Courts it was clubbed
together. On the other hand in our present case of Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and
Rahul the two suits namely the one filed by Rahul for Restitution of conjugal rights
and the other appeal being the one filed by Riya before the High Court of Metropolis,
Indica against the landlord Ramakant Shukla aggrieved by the decision of the
tribunal. Hence in this instance both these suits have no common relation and hence
no common remedy as well. Hence it is contended before this Hon’ble High Court
that clubbing of these two suits are not at all relevant and hence this clubbing is not
maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine.
(¶4.) In the case of Anil Malhotra vs Chander Malhota And Ors 2, the Hon’ble High
Court of Punjab and Haryana, Chandigarh held that , “This judgment will dispose of
1
Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi(Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.EtcAIR 2016 SC 4653
2
Anil Malhotra v.ChanderMalhota And OrsRSA No. 1658 of 2010
1|Page

two appeals bearing RSA Nos. 1658 and 1795 of 2010, as common questions of law
and facts are involved. Both the suits were clubbed and were decided by a common
judgment by the trial Court and even the appeals were also consolidated and decided
by a common judgment, as the suit property is same. Both the appeals have been
preferred by Anil Malhotra, as the suit filed by him seeking partition of the property
was dismissed and the suit filed against him for mandatory injunction and possession
was decreed. The submission is that the primary question in the present litigation is
as to whether the Will projected by the brothers of the Petitioner is a valid document
and in case it is not, the property will have to be shared amongst all the legal heirs,
Vidya Rani having died intestate. If the Petitioner succeeds, then automatically the
second suit filed by the brothers of the Petitioner will have to be dismissed as the
Petitioner will not remain in possession of the property merely as a licensee, rather,
in his own right. Even if for arguments' sake, the Will is upheld, still the Petitioner,
being in possession of part of the suit property since long and having made
substantial improvements by spending huge amount, even if he is a licensee, the same
cannot be revoked”
(¶5.) Reliance has been placed on this case as in this case it has been explicitly stated that
both the suits were clubbed and were decided by a common judgment by the trial
Court and even the appeals were also consolidated and decided by a common
judgment, as the suit property is same. But in our present case the nature of both the
suits being entirely different, (Suit for matrimonial relief and an Appeal for Rent
control) cannot be clubbed and is liable to be dismissed in limine.
(¶6.) Reliance is also placed on the decision of the High Court of Karnata in the case of
M/S Vasanth Colour Laboratories Private Limited vs Smt. Divya 3, where the
Court held that the , “Decree holder is the owner of the suit schedule property and
same was taken on lease by the judgment debtor. On expiry of lease period, decree
holder filed a suit O.S.NO.836/1981 against the judgment debtor for ejectment from
suit schedule property. Judgment debtor also filed a suit in O.S.No.3396/1996 seeking
specific performance of the contract, contending interalia that under the lease deed
3
M/S Vasanth Colour Laboratories Private Limited v. Smt. DivyaW.P. No. 46319/2015
2|Page

there is a specific clause for extension to be given for another 14 years after the
expiry of stipulated period and same was not extended. Judgment debtor also filed
another suit O.S.No.62/2006 seeking for extension of the period of lease of the suit
schedule property. Since above referred three suits were pending in different Courts
of City Civil Court, Bengaluru, judgment debtor filed a Civil Petition No.60/2011
under Section 24 CPC for clubbing/connecting/consolidating all the suits to be tried
in one Court. While examining said prayer for clubbing/consolidating the suits, a
compromise came to be entered into between the parties, which was placed on record
and all the suits were ordered to be placed before City Civil Court, CCH-9,
Bengaluru and directed the said Court to receive the compromise petition and pass
the decree accordingly. In that view of the matter, trial Court adjudicating
O.S.No.836/1981 heard the Advocates, recorded presence of the parties and accepted
compromise petition and pursuant to the same, decree has been drawn in
O.S.No.836/1981 in terms of compromise. On account of judgment debtor not
vacating suit schedule property as agreed to in the compromise petition, decree
holder filed Execution Petition No.1094/2015 and after issuing cause notice to
judgment debtor and the holding service sufficient, by impugned order dated
15.10.2015 has ordered for issuance of delivery warrant. Same is questioned in the
present writ petition.’’
(¶7.) In the above mentioned case, since all the three suits were interconnected and
revolving around the same subject matter they were decided to be clubbed together.
On the other hand in our present case the two suits mentioned therein are distinct and
unique. They are not inter-related in any way and hence it is humbly submitted that
the Hon’ble High Court of Metropolis Indica has erred in clubbing both the suits.
(¶8.) Additionally, reliance is placed on the case of Nalamati Latchanna vs Masina

Sriramulu (Andhra High Court):
(¶9.) Brief Facts: Respondent herein is the Plaintiff is O.S.Nos. 464/83 and 372/88 on the
file of the Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Kakinada. Originally, the respondent
filed O.S.No. 178/83 on the file of the I Additional District MunsiffCourt, Kakinada
3|Page

for declaration of his fishing rights in Chintalacheruvu and consequently to restrain

the defendants therein from interfering with the said rights. A temporary injunction
was also obtained by the respondent-plaintiff restraining the defendants therein from
obstructing him from catching fish. It is under the background that the defendants
therein have obstructed the plaintiff from catching fish and thereby caused damages to
the tune of Rs. 60,000/-, the respondent-Plaintiff filed O.S.No. 464/83 before the
Principal Subordinate Judge's Court, Kakinada against the defendants therein for
recovery of the said damages. Later on, he filed O.P.No. 174/88 before the III
Additional District Judge, Kakinada for transferring O.S.No. 178 /83 to the Court of
Principal Subordinate Judge, Kakinada where O.S.No. 464/83 was pending and
sought indulgence of the Court for trying the suits together. Pursuant to the transfer
order, the suit was re-numbered as O.S.No. 372/88.
(¶10.)Judgement Briefing: It is seen that the learned III Additional District Judge while
passing order in O.P.No. 174/88 observed that the matters could be tried together by
one and the same Court in order to avoid conflicting judgments. The learned District
Judge further observed that whether all the matters will be clubbed together or may be
tried separately and simultaneously, is the matter to be decided by the Principal
Subordinate Judge, Kakinada. Under this background, the respondentplaintiff filed
I.A.No. 3341/89 in O.S.No. 464/83 praying for clubbing both the suits, recording
common evidence and pronouncing common judgment. The learned Principal
Subordinate Judge by order dated 14-2-1990 has allowed I.A.No. 3341/89 and
directed clubbing of the suits together, recording common evidence and passing
common judgment in both the suits. As against this order, the present revision petition
is filed by defendant No. 14 in O.S.No. 464/83. 83.
(¶11.)Sri P.Venkataramana Sarma, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff,

has contended that in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation and conflicting
decisions, it is better the suits could be clubbed together, common evidence could be
recorded and common judgment could be pronounced and, therefore, he justified the
order passed by the learned Subordinate Judge in I.A.No. 3341/89. Sri C. Subba Rao,
learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, who is defendant No. 14 in O.S.No.
4|Page

464/83, has, on the contrary, contended that these suits cannot be tried together
inasmuch as the first suit - O.S.No. 372/88 - is filed by the respondent herein for
declaration of his fishing rights in Chintalacheruvu and for a consequential relief of
restraining the defendants therein from interfering with the said rights, whereas
O.S.No. 464/83 is filed for recovery of damages said to have been caused by the
defendants therein. He further contended that the first suit is for a different relief, that
is to say, for a declaration and the second suit is for damages, it is admitted that the
plaintiff and some of the defendants in both the suits are common and some of the
defendants are strangers. It is under this background, Sri Subba Rao contended that
the respondent herein has to first establish his rights in O.S.No. 372/88 and secondly
the extent of damages said to have been caused by each of the defendants in O.S.No.
464/83 has to be separately assessed. He has further contended that some of the
defendants are admittedly different and, therefore, the two suits cannot be clubbed and
tried together and common judgment cannot be passed.
(¶12.)No doubt, in cases where parties are common and matter is absolutely similar, to
avoid multiplicity of suits and to eliminate chances of conflicting decisions on the
same point, consolidation of two or more suits can be ordered. Where, however, suits
brought by the same plaintiff are prima facie based on different and independent
transactions, the consolidation cannot be ordered, as there cannot be conflicting
decisions.
(¶13.)It is seen that the Trial Court admits that issues are though different and yet, felt that
the subject-matter as well as the oral and documentary evidence that could be let in
would probably be same and, therefore, directed that the above suits should be
clubbed and tried together.
(¶14.)Relying upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital
Prasad4, AIR 1981 Delhi 251 Sri Subba Rao contended that there will not be any
conflicting decisions as far as these cases are concerned and as is observed by the trial
Court, the issues are different and, therefore, the suits cannot be clubbed together. As
observed by the Delhi High Court in the above decision, no doubt, in order to avoid
4
Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital Prasad AIR 1981 Delhi 251
5|Page

multiplicity of suits, the clubbing of suits together is welcome. But the question is
whether the chances of conflicting decisions would arise in the event of the suit not
clubbed together. In the present case, He contended that he does not find that there
would be conflicting decisions if the suits are not tried together, as the first suit is for
declaration of rights and the second suit is for recovery of damages and when the
issues are not similar.
5
(¶15.)In yet another decision in Bokaro&Ramgur Ltd. v. State ,the Patna High Court,
held that it has to be seen whether or not the non-consolidation of two or mere suits is
likely to lead, apart from multiplicity of suits, to leaving the door open for conflicting
decisions on the same issue, which may be common to the two or more suits sought to
be consolidated. It also held that the convenience of the parties and the expenses in
the suits are subsidiary to the more important consideration viz., whether it would
lead to rendering conflicting decisions on the same point if the suits are not clubbed
together. As observed by the Patna High Court, it is to be seen that the convenience of
the parties and the expenses involved are to be subsidiary factors to avoid multiplicity
of suits where the chances of avoiding conflicting decisions on the same point are to
be taken into consideration. In the context of the decision of the Patna High Court, it
is to be seen whether there could be conflicting decisions if the suits are not clubbed
and tried together.
(¶16.)As discussed by the counsel above, when the issues and nature of the suits are
different, It is difficult to accept the contention of Sri Venkataraman Sarma, learned
Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff that if the suits are not clubbed and tried together,
it would lead to rendering of conflicting decisions. In the present case, the first suit is
for declaration of fishing rights and the second suit is for recovery of damages and
tine question of rendering conflicting decisions, in my opinion, would not arise at all,
as the issues are different and some of the defendants figured are also different in the
two suits. Under these circumstances, the order dated 14-2-90 in I.A.No. 3341/89 in
O.S.No. 464/83 was set aside on the file of tine Principal Subordinate Judge,
Kakinada.
5
Bokaro And Ramgur Ltd. v. State Of Bihar AIR 1966 Pat 154
6|Page

(¶17.)Thus from the above judgments it is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High
Court of Metropolis, Indica that two or more suits can be clubbed together only when
the following conditions are satisfied:
1) Having Parties in Common.
2) Ability to record common evidence and deliver common judgment, being the
cases of similar nature.
3) The primary matter or the subject matter around which the suits (mentioned to
be clubbed) revolve must be common. As in, if suit 1 is regarding a land
dispute then suit 2 must also be in relation with the same land for the two suits
to be clubbed together.
4) If the suits proposed to be clubbed are not clubbed then there must be no
conflicting decisions arising from the different Courts in which they are being
tried.
(¶18.)In the case of Riya v. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul none of the above conditions
comes into play and moreover there cannot be any conflicting decisions arising if they
are not being clubbed as both the suits are of entirely different nature.
(¶19.)Thus it is contended that Clubbing of these two cases cannot be done and hence they
are to be dismissed in limine.
The present suit, Riya V. Ramakant Shukla and Rahul is not maintainable both in
law and in fact
II. WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN MS.RIYA AND MR.RAMAKANT SHUKLA UNDER THE
TRASNFER OF PROPERTY ACT?
7|Page

(¶20.) It is humbly submitted on behalf of the respondent that initially there was a
landlord tenant relationship between Ms.Riya and the respondent but such
relationship is no longer existent.
(¶21.) Firstly, it is clarified that the rental agreement in the present case denotes a
lease falling under the definition of lease under section 105 of the Transfer of
Property Act. Along with lease, section 105 also defines Lessor, lessee , premium and
rent. It is as follows:
(¶22.) SECTION 105. Lease defined. A lease of immovable property is a transfer
of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in
perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of
crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered, periodically or on specified
occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.
(¶23.) Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined. The transferor is called the
lessor, the transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the
money, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent
(¶24.) In the present case, Mr. Ramakant Shukla is the lessor who transfers his
property to the couple who are named as lessees in the agreement. The agreement
made by Mr.Ramakant Shukla with the couple mentioned that both Ms.Riya and Mr.
Rahul would be staying in the suit premise and to that effect both their ID proofs were
taken6. Further, when the landlord issued an eviction notice against the couple (and
not just one of the spouses) in May 2015, he has impliedly recognized Ms.Riya as a
tenant. Such implied recognition through an eviction notice was held to be sufficient
to consider a person as a tenant in the Parsun Chakraborty7 case.
(¶25.) It is further argued that the above mentioned relationship came to an end in
June 2015, when the Rent Controller of Metropolis in the suit for eviction, filed by
Mr.Ramakant against Ms.Riya, ruled in favor of Mr.Ramakant Shukla and ordered
Ms.Riya to vacate the suit property.
(¶26.) The same is substantiated by Section 2(g) of The West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, which defines a tenant and states that:
6
Common Clarification as to the Moot Proposition – Question 2
7
Parsun Chakraborty v. Smt. Indira Jaiswal (2016) 4 Cal LT 420
8|Page

(¶27.) ““tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the
rent of any premises is or, but for a special contract, would be payable, and includes
any person continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy… but shall not
include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made
by a Court of competent jurisdiction”
(¶28.) According to the facts of the present case, an eviction order was made
against the couple by the Controller in June, 2015 and the same was upheld by the
Tribunal as well. This clearly indicates that the landlord and tenant relationship
between Mr.Ramakant Shukla and Ms.Riya came to an end in June of 2015.
(¶29.) Therefore it is most humbly submitted that there had been a landlord tenant
relationship between Mr.Ramakant Shukla and Ms.Riya up until June, 2015 but no
such relationship exists at present.
(¶30.) There is no longer a landlord and tenant relationship between

Ms.Riya and Mr.Ramakant Shukla under the Transfer of Property Act.
(¶31.) III. WHETHER THE CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF

UNEMPLOYMENT OF MR.RAHUL IS JUST AND REASONABLE GROUND
FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CONJUGAL RELATIONSHIP BY
MS.RIYA?
(¶32.) It is humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of unemployment of

Mr.Rahul (hereinafter referred as "Respondent”) is not a just and reasonable ground
9|Page

for withdrawal from the conjugal relationship by Ms.Riya (hereinafter referred as

"Petitioner”) It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the concealment of
unemployment is a frivolous matter and does not constitute mental trauma as claimed
by the Petitioner.
(¶33.) Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Savitri Pandey8, where the Court held that, “Cruelty may be physical or
mental. Mental cruelty is the conduct of the other spouse which causes mental
suffering or fear to the matrimonial life of the other. “Cruelty”, therefore, postulates
a treatment of the Petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable
apprehension in his or her mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the
Petitioner to live with the other party. Cruelty, however, has to be distinguished
from the ordinary wear and tear of family life”
(¶34.) Therefore, it can be said that an essential requirement for cruelty would be
a reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injurious for a spouse to live
with the other9
(¶35.) It is staunchly contended that, in the present case, the concealment of
unemployment is not sufficient to cause a reasonable apprehension that it would be
harmful for the Petitioner to continue living with the respondent. Mere suppression of
a fact falls under the ambit of “ordinary wear and tear of family life”. In the present
case, the respondent’s actions are so inconsequential that they neither threaten the
Petitioner’s state of mind nor induce a fear of injury. Such trivial irritations, quarrels,
normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day to day life would not
be adequate 10to establish mental trauma.
(¶36.) Moreover, it is a well established principle of law that mental cruelty

should not be judged from a solitary event 11 In the present case, the Petitioner left the
conjugal society of the respondent solely because he did not reveal the fact of his
unemployment. Such an isolated event of unpleasantness or annoyance cannot be
8
Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey ,AIR 2002 SC 291 : (2002) 2 SCC 765
9
Dastane v.Dastane, AIR 1970 Bom.312 ; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558 ; Parveen Mehta v.
Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706 ; A.Jayachandra v.Aneel Kumar(2005) 2 SCC 22
10
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511
11
Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh (2017) 4 SCC 85
10 | P a g e

attributed as mental cruelty. This stance was fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Parveen Mehta12, where the Court held that, “In case of mental cruelty
it will not be a correct approach to take an instance of misbehavior in isolation and
then pose the question whether such behavior is sufficient by itself to cause mental
cruelty. The approach should be to take the cumulative effect of the facts and
circumstances...”
(¶37.) This view is further substantiated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case
of Samar Ghosh13, where the Court has held that, “The married life should be
reviewed as a whole and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not
amount to cruelty. The ill-conduct must be persistent for a fairly lengthy period,
where the relationship has deteriorated to an extent that because of the acts and
behavior of a spouse, the wronged party finds it extremely difficult to live with the
other party any longer…” It is submitted that the Petitioner has wrongly withdrawn
from the conjugal society of the respondent since the isolated act of not revealing the
fact of unemployment does not amount to cruelty.
(¶38.) Therefore, it is most humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of
unemployment by the respondent is not just and reasonable ground for withdrawal
from conjugal relationship by the Petitioner.
(¶39.) Concealment of fact of unemployment is not just and reasonable

ground for withdrawal from conjugal relationship by Ms. Riya.
(¶40.) IV. WHETHER THE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS, INDICA

HAS THE POWER TO TAKE UP ANY CASE FROM A SUBORDINATE
COURT UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA?
12
Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706
13
Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511
11 | P a g e

(¶41.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that High Court of
Metropolis, Indica is conferred with the power of supervision under Article 227 of the
Constitution of Indica which involves a duty on the High Court to keep the inferior
Courts and tribunals ‘within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do what
their duty requires and that they do it in a legal manner’ 14 and to that effect, the High
Court can take up a case from the Subordinate Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of Indica
(¶42.) Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica, 1950 reads as follows:
(¶43.) 227. Power of superintendence over all Courts by the High Court:
(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all Courts and
tribunals throughout the territories interrelation to which it
exercises jurisdiction.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the
High Court may
(a) Call for returns from such Courts;
(b) Make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for
regulating the practice and proceedings of such Courts; and
(c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be
kept by the officers of any such Courts.
(3) High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff
and all clerks and officers of such Courts and to attorneys,
advocates and pleaders practicing therein: Provided that any rules
made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause
(3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the
time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the
Governor.
(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court
powers of superintendence over any Court or tribunal constituted by
or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.
(¶44.) 4.1 SOURCE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION CONFERRED
TO THE HIGH COURT
14
Banerjee, D.N. v. P.R. Mukherjee, (1953) SCR 302 : AIR 1953 SC 58
12 | P a g e

(¶45.) In Marwa Manghariv.Sanghram Sampar15It was held that the

constitution had sought to secure justice to the citizens on a top priority and for that
purpose vested in High Courts very wide power of judicial supervision and
superintendence which enabled that Court to act suomotu in the interest of justice.
Because the power is derived directly from the Constitution which is the fountain
source and parent of all laws and statute in the Republic, the power imposed on the
High Court grave and sacred responsibilities for the administration of justice and the
Court is invested in with unlimited and unfathomable reserve of judicial power of
supervision under art 227 of the constitution.
(¶46.) In Surya Dev Rai vs Ram Chander Rai &Ors on 7 August16: the
Supreme Court, referred to the case L.Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India
&Ors.17,where the Constitution Bench, dealt with the nature of power of judicial
review conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution and the power of superintendence
conferred by Article 227. It was held that the jurisdiction conferred on the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution and on the High Courts under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is part of the basic structure of the
Constitution, forming its integral and essential feature, which cannot be tampered
with much less taken away even by constitutional amendment, not to speak of a
parliamentary legislation.
(¶47.) In the case of Gujarat vs. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela 18 ,the
Court held that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives theHigh Court
the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories
in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It is held that this jurisdiction cannot be
limited or fettered by any act of the State Legislature. It is held that the supervisory
jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate Tribunals within the limits of the
authority and to seeking that they obey the law.
(¶48.) Thus, it is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Constitution, being
the supreme law confers the power of supervision to the High Court and hence can
15
Marwa Manghari v. Sanghram Sampar AIR 1960 PUNJAB 35
16
Surya Dev Raiv.Ram Chander Rai &OrsAIR 2003 SC 3044
17
L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India &Ors (1997) 3 SCC 261
18
Gujarat v.Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481
13 | P a g e

expedite the process in order to advance justice. This power cannot be fettered by a
constitutional amendment, let alone a parliamentary or state legislation.
(¶49.) 4.2 OBJECTIVE OF FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE
(¶50.) In the case of State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu19,
it was held that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the
power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in
relation to which it exercise jurisdiction. The powers under Article 227 are wide and
can be used, to meet the ends of justice.
(¶51.) In the case of State Of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao And Ors. 20, the
Petitioner approached the High Court in Writ Petition No. 610 of 1974 under Article
227 of the Constitution. The High Court declined to interfere with the order of the
learned District Judge even though it was satisfied that the Petitioner had established
that it was prevented by a sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. This is
frankly un-understandable and exhibits a rigid and inflexible view of jurisdiction
under Article 227 ultimately leading to injustice. This is what the High Court says:
“May be, if I had considered the matter as the Court of first instance I might have
taken a different view, but unless it can be held that the view taken by the learned
District Judge was not a plausible view that cannot be reversed in exercise of the
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
(¶52.) The Supreme Court also held that the Article 227 or Article 226 were
devised to advance justice and not to thwart it. Therefore, accepting the finding of the
High Court that sitting as trial Court, it was satisfied that the Petitioner had made out
sufficient cause for condoning the delay; we must interfere in this appeal so as to
advance justice.
(¶53.) It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the power under Article 227
is a discretionary power, wide enough to meet the ends of justice as and when
required. Hence, it would be inappropriate for the High Court not to interfere and take
up a case from subordinate Court when the whole motive is furtherance or
advancement of justice. Also, the Section 24 of Code of Civil Procedure,1908 vests
19
State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu (2003) 6 SCC 641
20
State Of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao And Ors. AIR 1984 SC 1401
14 | P a g e

the High Court with the power of withdrawal of any suit pending before any Court
subordinate to it.
(¶54.) 4.3 ASSUMPTION OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 227
(¶55.) Further, in the case of K. Dhanapal v. The Superintendent Of Police 21,
the Court held that since, the Petitioner and the 4th respondent agreed to get
separated, it is appropriate to grant divorce by invoking Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and Section 13 (b) of Hindu Marriage Act by mutual consent.
The categorical statements made by the Petitioner, 3rd respondent as well as 4th
respondent would make it clear that the 4th respondent is not interested in going along
with her husband and she is interested only in living with the 3rd respondent. A memo
of compromise would also show that there is no possibility of reunion. Under these
circumstances, this Court, suo motu invokes Article 227 of the Constitution of India
and Section 13 (b) of Hindu Marriage Act and grants divorce to the Petitioner and the
4th respondent dissolving the marriage celebrated on 02.11.2014 between them.
(¶56.) In the above case, the Madras High Court have assumed original
jurisdiction and awarded the divorce under Section 13 (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
Hence, relying upon this decision, it is humbly stated that the High Court can assume
original jurisdiction and try and dispose off the proceeding in appropriate cases in
order to render justice.
(¶57.) Hence, it is contended before this Hon’ble Court that the High Court, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica, is vested with the power of supervision to
keep the Subordinate Court within the bounds of their authority. The High Court can
take up cases from subordinate Courts when necessary and it is a wide discretionary
power that the High Court can invoke for expeditious adjudication. The High Court
has inherent powers to do what is required to advance justice.
(¶58.) The High Court of Metropolis, Indica has the power to take up any
case from a subordinate Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of Indica.
21
K. Dhanapal v. The Superintendent Of Police H.C.P.No.2525 of 2018
15 | P a g e

[PRAYER]
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the
counsel for the Respondent humbly prays that the Hon’ble Court be pleased:
1. To declare that the present suit is not maintainable both in law and in fact,
2. To uphold the order of the Rent Control Tribunal,
3. To pass the decree for restitution of conjugal rights,
And pass any order that this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interest of equity, justice and
good conscience.
And for this act of kindness, the counsel for the Respondent shall be duty bound and forever
pray.
Sd/-
(Counsel for the Respondents)
xiii | P a g e

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TEAM CODE: NMCC 2019-07-

2ND NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF METROPOLIS,

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.................................................................................. vii

SATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................... viii

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

II. WHETHER THEE IS LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

III. WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS JUST AND

A. SOURCE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION CONFERRED TO THE HIGH

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

Marwa Manghari v. Sanghram Sampar AIR 1960 PUNJAB 35

L.Chandra Kumar v. Union of India &Ors (1997) 3 SCC 261

Gujarat v.Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481

Naveen Kohli v.Neelu Kohli(2006) 4 SCC 558 ;

Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002) 5 SCC 706

A.Jayachandra v. Aneel Kumar(2005) 2 SCC 22

SamarGhosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511

Suman Singh v. Sanjay Singh (2017) 4 SCC 85

Parsun Chakraborty v. Smt. Indira Jaiswal (2016) 4 Cal LT 420

Bharat Nidhi Ltd., v. Shital Prasad AIR 1981 Delhi 251

NalamatiLatchanna v. MasinaSriramulu 1993 (1) ALT 26

Syeda Rahimunnisa v. Malan Bi(Dead) By Lrs. &Anr.Etc AIR 2016 SC 4653

Anil Malhotra v.ChanderMalhota And OrsRSA No. 1658 of 2010

M/S Vasanth Colour Laboratories Private Limited v. SmtDivyaW.P. No. 46319/2015

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

LIMITATION ACT, 1963

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT, 1955

WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT, 1997

THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA , 1950

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE ORESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH I N LAW AND

ISSUE II: WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP

ISSUE III: WHETHER CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS JUST

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

I. THE PRESENT SUIT IS NOT MAINATAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN FACT

II. THERE IS NO LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

III. CONCEALMENT OF FACT OF UNEMPLOYMENT IS NOT REASONABLE

It is humbly submitted that the concealment of the fact of unemployment of Mr.Rahul

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

I. WHETHER THE PRESENT SUIT IS MAINTAINABLE BOTH IN LAW AND IN

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

(¶8.) Additionally, reliance is placed on the case of Nalamati Latchanna vs Masina

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

for declaration of his fishing rights in Chintalacheruvu and consequently to restrain

(¶11.)Sri P.Venkataramana Sarma, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff,

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]

II. WHETHER THERE IS LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP

[MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT]