Balochistan's Climate, Geography and History

University Of Management and Technology
Balochistan Operation
Introduction:
(http://www.balochistan.sdnpk.org/introduction.htm)
The Balochistan plateau is extends westward, average 263 m. high, with

many ridges running across it from northeast to southwest. It is
separated from the Indus plain by the Sulaiman and Kirther ranges. It
consists of dry valleys, saline lakes and a vast area of desert with dry
hills, generally running across the plateau from the northeast to
southwest. The Chagai-raskoh range is a chain of relatively low hills.
Hamun-I-Mashkel and Hamun-I-Lora are large playa basins, which are
evaporate lakes or saline marshes most time of the year. The plateau is
an extremely arid country. The Toba Kakar and Chagai ranges in the
north separate this plateau from Afghanistan.
The brahvi extinct volcano, koh-I-sultan is situated about 500 km. west
of Quetta.
Economically, its vast rangelands, large numbers of livestock, rich

mineral and gas deposits, and good quality deciduous fruits are of
significant value although there is relatively little industrialization in the
province. Balochistan arid but diverse climatic zones have contributed
to a rich animal and plants biodiversity while building a definitive culture
heritage that allowed survival in this rugged and harsh landscape.
1
History:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Baluchistan)
Balochistan was conquered by the British Empire on October 1, 1887. In

1948, it forcefully became part of Pakistan. Since then, a number of separatist
groups in the province have engaged in armed violence against the Pakistani
government—first led by Prince Karim Khan in 1948, and later by Nawab
Nowroz Khan in 1968. These tribal uprisings were limited in scope. A more
serious insurgency was led by the Marri and Mengal tribes in 1973-1977. All
these groups fought for the existence of a "Greater Balochistan"—a single
independent state ruled under tribal jirgas (a tribal system of government) and
comprising the historical Balochistan region, presently split between Iran,
Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2005 there was another violent struggle to
achieve these aims. In 2006, the Pakistan army killed Nawab Akbar Bugti
Ancient history:
From the 1st century to the 3rd century CE, the region was ruled by the
Pāratarājas (lit. "Pārata Kings"), a dynasty of Indo-Scythian or Indo-Parthian
kings. The dynasty of the Pāratas is thought to be identical with the Pāradas
of the Mahabharata, the Puranas and other Indian sources.
They are essentially known through their coins, which typically exhibit the bust
of the ruler on the observe, with long hair within a headband), and a swastika
within a Brahmi legend on the reverse (usually silver coins) or Kharoshthi
(usually copper coins). The coins can mainly be found in the Loralai area of
modern Pakistan.
Herodotus in 650 BCE describes the Paraitakenoi as a tribe ruled by Deiokes,

a Persian king, in north-western Persia (History I.101). Arrian describes how
Alexander the Great encountered the Pareitakai in Bactria and Sogdiana, and
had them conquered by Craterus (Anabasis Alexandrou IV). The Periplus of
2
the Erythraean Sea (1st century CE) describes the territory of the Paradon
beyond the Ommanitic region, on the coast of modern Baluchistan.
Bulk of Bloch migrations from what was Persia came at the time of invasion of
Gangis Khan into that region. Blochies were given refuge in what was the
greater Sindh region. Later infighting between Blochies resulted in clans led
by sardars, which claimed regions within Sindh. In an effort to gain total
control of the regions, the British named the area Blochistan and got the
support of Bloch Sardars who then were titled as Nawabs. These Nawabs
were to keep minor Bloch, Pathan etc. sardars in check. For the last 150
years the region has seen continual fighting to gain access to natural
resources in otherwise barren land.
Major Kings:
 Yolamira, son of Bagavera (2nd century)

 Arjuna, son of Yolamira (2nd century)
 Hvaramira, another son of Yolamira (2nd century)
 Mirahvara, son of Hvaramira (2nd century)
 Miratakhma, another son of Hvaramira (2nd century)
3
Climate:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_(Pakistan)#Climate)
Very cold winters and hot summers characterise the climate of the upper highlands.
Winters of the lower highlands vary from extremely cold in the northern districts to
mild conditions closer to the Makran coast. Summers are hot and dry, especially the
arid zones of Chaghai and Kharan districts. The plain areas are also very hot in
summer with temperatures rising as high as 120 °F (50 °C). Winters are mild on the
plains with the temperature never falling below the freezing point. The desert climate
is characterised by hot and very arid conditions. Occasionally strong windstorms
make these areas very inhospitable.
4
Demographics and society:

Balochistan has a population of around 10 Historical populations
million inhabitants. Overall, province wise, the
Baloch tribes comprise 62%, rest are Pashtuns, Census Population Urban
Sindhis and Brohis of the province. Baloch are
living in the sparsely populated north-west, west,
east, and south, Brohi living in centre of province 1951 1,167,167 12.38%
and while the Pashtuns are the majority in the 1961 1,353,484 16.87%
north. Quetta, the capital of the province, has a
Pashtuns majority with Baloch, Hazara, and 1972 2,428,678 16.45%
Punjabi minorities. Near the Kalat region and 1981 4,332,376 15.62%
other parts of the province there are significant
numbers of Brahui speakers. Along the coast 1998 6,565,885 23.89%
various Makran Balochis predominate. Persian- 2005 9,839,417 23.89%
speaking Dehwars also live in the Kalat region
and further west towards the border with Iran. In
addition, 769,000 Afghan refugees can be found in the province
including Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Hazaras. Many Sindhi farmers have also
moved to the more arable lands in the east. There are also a growing
number of other(s) ethnic groups consisting of Hazara, Kurdish, Panjabi,
Mohajir and Iranians who have made Balochistan their home in recent
decades
Administrative division:
Balochistan is divided into 27 districts.
 Awaran  Kharan  Nasirabad

 Barkhan  Kohlu  Nushki
 Bolan  Khuzdar  Panjgur
 Chagai  Qilla Abdullah  Pishin
 Dera Bugti  Qilla Saifullah  Quetta
 Gwadar  Lasbela  Sibi
 Jafarabad  Loralai  Turbat or Kech
 Jhal Magsi  Mastung  Zhob
 Kalat  Musakhel  Ziarat
5
Map of Balochistan
(http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&q=Climate+of+
+Balochistan&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=N&tab=wi)
6
List of Cities in Balochistan:

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cities_in_Balochistan)
This is a list of all cities of Balochistan, Pakistan with a population more than
25,000.
Rank Place Population (2004) Latitude Longitude

01 Quetta 653,300 30.21°N 67.02°E
02 Khuzdar 108,500 27.80°N 66.60°E
03 Turbat 79,200 25.99°N 63.07°
04 Chaman 76,300 30.92°N 66.44°E
05 Hub 74,300
06 Sibi 56,200 29.55°N 67.87°E
07 Zhob 51,600 31.35°N 69.44°E
08 Gwadar 51,100 25.14°N 62.33°E
09 Dera Murad Jamali 44,000
10 Dera Allah Yar 43,400
11 Usta Muhammad 43,300 28.18°N 68.05°E
12 Loralai 37,200 30.36°N 68.60°E
13 Pasni 32,600 25.27°N 63.45°E
14 Kharan 30,400 28.57°N 65.42°E
15 Mastung 28,600 29.80°N 66.85°E
16 Nushki 27,300 29.56°N 66.01°E
17 Kalat 26,300 29.03°N 66.58°E
7
Famous people:
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_%28Pakistan%29#Famous_people)
There are many famous people from Balochistan including the following:
Historical Personalities
 Mir Chakar Khan Rind

 Mir Sher Muhammad Talpur
 Mir Hammal Khan Mazari
 Nawab Imam Buksh Khan Mazari
 Nawab Bahram Khan Mazari
 Mir Sohrab Khan Talpur
 Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur I
 Mir Ali Murad Khan Talpur II
 Mir Ali Nawaz Khan Talpur
 Paunni
Post-Independence (post-1947)
 General Mohammed Musa Khan

 Prince Karim Khan
 Zafarullah Khan Jamali
 Nawab Nowroz Khan
 Sardar Ataullah Mengal
 Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti
 Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri
 Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo
 Sardar Sherbaz Khan Mazari
 Mir Gul Khan Naseer Mengal
 General Abdual Qadir Baloch
 General Rahimuddin Khan
 Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry Chief Justice of Pakistan
 Ramzi Yousef
 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
8
Balochistan Conflict - A Review from

the Past
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_conflict)
The controversial history of the south-western region of Pakistan dates back

to the time when the Durand Line was drawn by the British in 1893 after
fighting two wars with Afghanistan. The border was drawn to divide the
Pashtun and Baloch tribes of the area into the international borders of Iran,
Afghanistan and what later became West Pakistan (present day Pakistan).
The Balochs found their nomadic ways disrupted by the division created by
the international borders, and were not happy with the outcome, and hence
the seed of strife was sown.
Afghanistan also strongly objected to the inclusion of ethnic Pashtun and

Afghan areas into present day Pakistan. When India and Pakistan eventually
gained independence from the British in August 1947, provinces were given
the choice of either joining Pakistan or India or being independent. Khan of
Kalat, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan declared Kalat's independence. The Governor-
general Lord Mountbatten decided that the province would not survive as an
independent entity and that offer was taken off the table
First conflict 1948 (led by Mir Ahmad Yar Khan):

In April 1948 the central government sent the Pakistan army who forced Mir
Ahmed Yar Khan to give up his state. Mir Ahmed Yar Khan signed an
accession agreement ending Kalat's de facto independence. His brother,
Prince Karim Khan, decided to carry on with the struggle. Basing himself in
Afghanistan he conducted guerrilla warfare against the Pakistan army. Later
he was killed in clashes with the army along with many of his supporters.
9
Second conflict (1958-59 led by Nawab Nowroz

Khan):
Nawab Nowroz Khan took up arms in resistance to the One Unit policy
designed and initiated by the federal government to eliminate ethnic and
provincial divides and prejudices. He and his followers were charged with
treason and arrested and confined in Hyderabad jail. Five of his family
members (sons and nephews) were subsequently hanged. Nawab Nowroz
Khan later died in captivity.
Third conflict 1963-69 (led by Sher Mohammad

Bijarani Mari):
After the second conflict the Federal government sent the Army to build new
garrisons in the key trouble areas of Balochistan. Sher Mohammad Bijarani
Marri led like-minded militants to start a guerilla warfare against the
establishment of these posts by creating it’s own posts of insurgency
spreading over 45,000 miles of land from the Mengal tribal area in the south
to the Marri and Bugti tribal areas in the north. The insurgents bombed railway
tracks and ambushed convoys. The Army retaliated by destroying vast areas
of the Marri tribe. This insurgency ended in 1969 when Yahya Khan abolished
the "One Unit" policy and the Balochs agreed to a ceasefire . This eventually
led to the recognition of Balochistan as the fourth province of West Pakistan
(present-day Pakistan) in 1970.
Fourth conflict 1973-77 (led by Nawab Khair

Baksh Marri) & General Sherof Bijarani (Mari):
In 1972, major political parties from a wide spectrum of political ideology
united against the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (the then President of
Pakistan) and formed the National Awami Party NAP and demanded more
representation for the ethnic Baloch in the government. This did not sit well
with Bhutto's approach, seen by some as elitist and authoritarian. In February
1973, in the presence of news media and the Iraqi ambassador to Islamabad,
the police opened a consignment of Iraqi diplomatic pouches containing arms,
ammunition and gorilla warfare literature. The Pakistani intelligence agencies
claimed these arms were en route to the Baloch (Marri) insurgents of
Balochistan. Citing treason, Bhutto subsequently dismissed the provincial
government of Balochistan and imposed governor rule. Secretly, the
intelligence agencies as well as Bhutto knew the real intended party of the
arms consignment was the ethnic Balochs of Iran. This was Iraq's response to
Iran's support for the Kurds in northern Iraq.
10
Dismissal of the provincial government led to armed insurgency. Khair Baksh

Marri formed the Balochistan People’s Liberation Front (BPLF) which led large
numbers of Marri and Mengal tribesmen into gorilla warfare against the
central government.
According to several authors, the Pakistani military lost 3,000 to 3,300

soldiers during the conflict with the Balochi separatists, while the Balouch lost
5,300 men, and civilian casualties during this period are estimated at 6,000.
Fifth conflict 2004-to date (lead by Nawab Akbar

Khan Bugti and Mir Baloch Marri):
Due to government policies in 2004 Baluchistan was up in arms against the
federal government, with the Baluchistan Liberation Army, Baluchistan
Liberation Front, and People's Liberation Army conducting operations. Rocket
attacks and bomb blasts have been a regular feature in the provincial capital,
particularly its cantonment areas of Kohlu and Sui Town, since 2000, and had
claimed over 25 lives by mid-2004. In response Pakistan army demolished
many houses and Marri areas and killed many civilians as war is still going on
though media is not reporting much on it because of restriction on media in
Pakistan.
The Gwadar Port project employed close to 500 Chinese nationals by 2004.
On 03 May 2004, the BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the Port.
Gwadar airport was attacked by rockets at midnight on 21 May 2004. On 09
October 2004, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in South Waziristan in
the northwest of Pakistan, one of whom was killed later on October 14 in a
botched rescue operation.
Pakistan blamed India and Iran for fanning insurgency in Baluchistan.
Violence reached a crescendo in August of 2005 when the Pakistani

government attempted and killed Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a seventy one
year old Sardar (tribal leader) who had fought against the government for
decades.
Main characters:
Pakistan Army claims that Balochistan Liberation Army is clandestinely
funded by the Afghan government and its arms supposedly flow into
Baluchistan through the Pakistan-Afghanistan porous border. Iran also has
strategic interests in the region and keep an eye on the affairs of
Balochistan.The Indian government has been trying to help Pakistan with this
grievance in spite of bitter relations between the two countries.
11
Area of dispute:
Distribution of Balochs is marked in pink.


Historical Balochistan comprises the Balochistan region. In the west, is the
southern part of Sistan o Baluchestan province, Iran. In the east is Pakistani
Balochistan. In the north is the Helmand province of Afghanistan. The Gulf of
Oman forms its southern border.
Pakistani Balochistan is one of the four provinces of Pakistan. Although it is

the largest (45% of the country's area) of the country's four provinces, it is the
least populated (only 5% of the country's population) and the least developed.
Balouchi peoples were not given a share in the Federal and local government
and they were forced to join Pakistan in 1948. The Federal government with
the help of local Sardars looted the natural resources of Baluchistan.
12
Since 1948, tribal lords including Bugti, Marri, Mengal,Magsi,Jamali with the
help of the local government have used tribal chiefs to keep the Balochi
people backward and illiterate by systematically opposing any attempts to
establish modern educational institutions in their areas of influence; all these
Sardars have been educated at various European and American universities,
but they still support old traditions to keep the local populace illiterate.
Baloch grievances:
Fueled by grievances of lack of autonomy, excessive meddling in nomadic
affairs and influx of skilled settlers, miners and traders from other provinces of
Pakistan into Balochistan, there erupted an armed conflict between the
Baloch and the central government.
Main characters:
There are three distinct parties involved and affected by this conflict:
 Central governments (1946-2006)

 Sardars (Tribal chiefs)
 Baloch people
13
Development;
Balochistan's population consists of mix between Balochi & Pashtuns but
Pashtuns enjoy a reasonable representation in the state & military jobs of
Pakistan and their more religious leaning makes them mainly more pro-
Pakistan but after 9/11 they have been fighting too, for the pro-Baloch
independence. It is widely believed that the government of Pakistan needs to
bring an end to the tribal system and provide more job opportunities to the
common Balochistani, in the name of education, outsiders (especially
Punjabis and Urdu speaking) are being settled in different parts of Balochistan
turning majority of Balouch area into minorities which threats local tribesmen.
As such, steps are being taken for industrialisation of the province and
industrial zones are planned along the new Gwadar-Karachi highway. This
development is expected to bring accelerated progress in the near future
although uprisings against the decline of the tribal system will probably
accompany such a situation.
References:
1. Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the storm (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2002)
2. Selig S Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow, pp.27-28
3. "Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan," International Crisis
Group, Asia Report No. 119,
4. The State of Martial Rule, Aysha Jalal, Sang-e-Meel 1999 ISBN 969-
35-0977-3 page 40.
5. Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (New Delhi: Pentagon
Press, 2005) p
6. Eckhardt, SIPRI 1988: 3,000 military + 6,000 civilians = 9,000,
Clodfelter: 3,300 govt. losses
Key Players:
 Taliban (Militants)
 Pakistan Army
 Nawab Akbar Bugti
14
Taliban
(http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761588418/Taliban.html)
The Taliban movement emerged out of the chaos and uncertainty of the Afghan-
Soviet War (1979-1989) and subsequent civil war in Afghanistan. During the
1980s Afghanistan was occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR) and ruled by a Soviet-backed government. Afghanistan’s long war with
the USSR was largely fought by mujahideen (Islamic guerrilla) factions with
assistance from the United States; Pakistan also provided places of refuge,
military training, and other support. After the Soviets completed their withdrawal
in 1989, civil war broke out between the mujahideen factions and the central
government. Afghanistan’s central government had long been dominated by the
country’s majority ethnic group, the Pashtuns, but after the Soviet withdrawal a
coalition government that included Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and other minority
groups came to power. The Taliban emerged as a faction of mujahideen soldiers
who identified themselves as religious students. The Taliban consisted mostly of
Pashtuns intent on once again dominating the central government in Kābul. They
were trained and armed by the Frontier Constabulary, a quasi-military unit in
Pakistan, which also has a significant Pashtun population. The Taliban actively
recruited thousands of young men in the Afghan refugee camps and the madrasas
in Pakistan. Many war orphans also joined the movement. The Taliban promoted
itself as a new force for peace and unity, and many war-weary Afghan people,
particularly Pashtuns, supported the Taliban in hopes of respite from years of war.
In late 1994 and early 1995 the Taliban moved through the south and west of
Afghanistan, taking control of Kandahār and many other towns and cities
dominated by fellow Pashtuns. Herāt and most of the other towns along the main
southern and western highway soon followed. In February 1995 the Taliban
reached the outskirts of Kābul but was ousted by government forces in March.
Again it advanced to the capital in October. While continuing to assault Kābul
with rockets and bombs, Taliban soldiers advanced and took control of eastern
Afghanistan, as well as the country’s central area. The Taliban continued its siege
of Kābul off and on throughout 1996 until it was able to advance and capture the
city in September. Government troops and officials, including President
Burhanuddin Rabbani and Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, fled to the
northern part of the country. Shortly after the capital fell to the Taliban, the
country’s last Soviet-backed president, Mohammad Najibullah, and his brother,
security chief Shahpur Ahmadzai, were seized and publicly hanged.
15
16
Pakistan Army
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan_Army)
Pakistani Army has espoused a doctrine of limited "offensive-defense" which it

has tried to refine consistently ever since 1989 when it was pushed out to the
formations during "Exercise Zarb-e-Momin". The main purpose of this strategy is
to launch a sizeable offensive into enemy territory rather than wait to be hit from
the enemy's offensive attack. The doctrine is based on the premise that while on
the offensive, the enemy can be kept off-balance while allowing Pakistani Army
to be able to seize enemy territory of strategic importance which can be used as a
bargaining chip on the negotiating table. In order to do this, currently Pakistani
Army maintains two sizable strike Corps awhich will be backed up by holding
Corps forming the defensive tier behind the strike corps. By pushing the offensive
into the enemy territory, the Pakistani Army hopes to consolidate its gains inside
the enemy's territory and will attempt to keep the war on the enemy side of the
border rather than giving ground on the Pakistani side.
In the 1990s, the Army created a strong centralized corps of reserves for its
formations in the critical semi-desert and desert sectors in southern Punjab and
Sindh provinces. These new formations were rapidly equipped with assets needed
for mechanized capability. These reserve formations are dual-capable, meaning
they can be used for offensive as well as defensive (holding) purposes.
Pakistan, today has a 45 day reserve of ammunition and fuel as compared to only
13 days in 1965 and has fairly effective and efficient lines of communication and
can fully mobilize its formations in less than 96 hours owing to the lack of depth
in the country's North South axis.
17
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nawab_Akbar_Bugti)
Nawab Akbar Shahbaz Khan Bugti (Urdu: ‫( )نواب اکبر شہاز خان بگٹی‬July 12, 1927–
August 26, 2006) was the Tumandar (head) of the Bugti tribe of Baluch and
served as Minister of State for Interior and Governor of Balochistan Province in
Pakistan. He received his early education from the towering personality of Allama
I. I. Kazi. An Oxford-educated man, he was a towering personality in Baloch
politics for more than five decades.
After an armed struggle started in Balochistan in 2004, Bugti was widely

perceived as a leader but went underground in 2005. On August 26, 2006, after
several attempts were made on his life in the preceding months, he was killed in
his cave in Kohlu, about 150 miles east of Quetta, leading to widespread unrest in
the area, where he is widely regarded as a hero and martyr.
With a wide following that crossed tribal lines among ethnic Baloch groups, the
contradictions in this western educated tribal leader roused strong emotions, both
positive and negative. Despite making harsh decisions at times, he was considered
a pacifist by many and certainly did not espouse a violent path in his early
political career. In recent years, he was accused by the Pakistani government of
being a warlord and running a well-organized militia, sometimes thought to be the
shadowy Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) with members numbering in the
thousands. The BLA allegedly ran dozens of militant guerrilla training camps.
While campaigning from the mountain ranges of Dera Bugti, he was, according to
the Pakistani government, directing a “Omar Mukhtar, Fidel Castro and Che
Guevara” style guerrilla war. In July 2006, Pakistani president General Musharraf
targeted him through aerial bombing, using air force jets and gunship helicopters.
The leader of Balochistan National Party, Sardar Akhtar Mengal said, "The
increase in bomb attacks in the Bugti and Marri areas are meant to target Baloch
nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Bugti and his associates" and called upon the
international community to take note of the situation.
18
Bomb Blasts in Balochistan

STATISTICS
(www.satp.org)
19
2005:
(http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/data/2005.htm)
Injure
Date Place Killed
d
6 11
January 9 Sui
2 2
January 10 Sui
3 3
January 10 Mastung
2 5
January 11 Sui
0 2
January 19 Chaman
1 9
February 1 Quetta
0 1
February 3 Kohlu
2006:
(http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/data/2006.htm)
20
Injure
Date Place Killed
d
4 3
January 1 Mashkal, Kharan district
1 1
January 18 Pirkoh
6 5
January 25 Kharcha, Dera Bugti
1 4
January 31 Pirkoh gas plant, Dera Bugti
14 19
February 5 Kolpur, Mastung
0 3
April 23 Quetta
5 0
April 25 Quetta
2007:
(http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/balochistan/data/2007.htm)
February 10 Sibi 1 2
February 17 Quetta 17 30
February 18 Kashmore area/ Sindh-Balochistan 2 0
border.
February 18 Dera Bugti 0 3
February 21 Dera Bugti 0 3
21
February 21 Dera Allah Yar 0 4

February 25 Kohlu 3 0
March 7 Sui 1 12
March 16 Quetta 1 0
March 20 Quetta 0 2
March 29 Dera Bugti 0 1
22
Balochistan Timeline
STATISTICS
(www.satp.org)
2005:
(http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/timeline/2005.h
tm)
January 7 Rocket attack destroys a gas pipeline in the Sui area.
January 9 Unidentified people blow up a gas pipeline again at Sui killing six people,
including two Frontier Corps personnel, and injuring 11 others.
Two more people die in continued rocket attacks by unidentified people on a
January 10 gas installation in the Sui area.
Three brothers are killed and their parents’ sustain injuries when an explosive
device went off in their home in the Drengar area of Mastung district.
January 11 At least two Defence Services Guard personnel are killed and five others
sustain injuries as unidentified people attacked the Sui gas field. Military
authorities extend the deadline for two wanted militants in South Waziristan to
surrender to January 26.
January 14 The Balochistan Government formally seeks Federal Government's

assistance to ensure security of natural gas installations in the Sui area.
January 15 Unidentified assailants fire six rockets targeting a checkpoint of the

paramilitary forces in Kohlu district, located some 160 kilometers north of Sui.
23
January 17 Unidentified persons fire at least six rockets at a Frontier Corps camp near
Mach.
January 26 The Pakistan Army has set up a new military base near the Sui gas field,
where troops have been deployed after a series of rocket attacks disrupted
fuel supplies earlier this month. The decision was announced to journalists on
a trip organised by the military to Balochistan.
2006:
(http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/timeline/2006.h
tm)
January 1 Four persons are killed and three children sustain injuries when a bomb
exploded inside a house in the Mashkal area of Kharan district.
January 2 At least three people are killed and eight others sustain injuries in clashes
between paramilitary forces and Bugti tribesmen in Balochistan.
January 3 Security forces (SFs) killed two tribesmen and injured seven others in a
shoot-out in the Dera Bugti district.
January 4 Three people are killed and four others sustain injuries during a clash
between SFs and tribesmen around the Sui area.
January 7 Suspected insurgents fired more than 20 rockets at paramilitary camps in

the Machh area of Bolan and Mand area of Makran division, killing at least
one person.
January 10 One Frontier Corps personnel is killed and two others sustained injuries in a
24
gun-battle between tribesmen and SFs in the Loti gas field area.
January 12 At least 15 people, including three Frontier Corps personnel, were killed and
three others injured in an armed clash between the paramilitary force and
armed tribesmen in the Pirkoh area of Dera Bugti district.
January 14 Paramilitary forces launched another operation in the Marri area using
helicopter gun-ships and heavy weapons. Mir Balach Khan Marri, a member
of the Balochistan Assembly, informed that SFs had been lobbing mortars
and rockets at the small township of Kahan for the last two days in which 25
people, mostly women and children, had been killed and several others
injured.
January 15 At least eight people were killed in clashes between armed men and SFs in
the Kahan area of Kohlu district.
January 16 SFs killed three children in an attack at Kahan and other adjacent areas of
Balochistan province.
January 18 One Frontier Corps personnel is killed and another sustained injuries in a
landmine explosion in the Pirkoh area.
2007:
(http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/Balochistan/timeline/2007.htm)
January 1 Suspected insurgents blew up a main gas pipeline and two electricity pylons
at Dera Bugti in Balochistan. The Balochistan Liberation Army leader,
Wadera Alam Khan Bugti, claimed responsibility for the attack. He also
claimed responsibility for two other incidents in which three electricity poles
in Dasht and a gas pipeline were blown up.
Insurgents blew up an 18-inch diameter pipeline in Dera Bugti, suspending
January 3 the supply of gas to Pir Koh and other areas of the district.
Police in Jaffarabad arrested 24 alleged terrorists and seized several

weapons.
Police in Quetta, capital of Balochistan, arrested two terrorists allegedly

involved in gas pipeline explosions in the province.
January 5 A gas pipeline is blown up in the Dera Bugti district of Balochistan province,
disrupting supply to a nearby gas plant.
Security forces (SFs) kill four insurgents, including ‘commander’ Dur
January 6 Mohammed, and arrest seven others during a raid on a farrari (fugitive)
camp in the Dera Bugti district.
Unidentified miscreants blew up a portion of the railway track at Nasirabad.
SFs continue their crackdown on insurgents and their alleged camps in

various areas of the Dera Bugti and Kohlu districts.
25
January 7 Security forces arrest 16 suspected Taliban operatives from Pishin. They
are arrested during a raid in the Pishin Bazaar.
Two SF personnel, Sakhi Jan and Zainullah, are killed during an encounter
January 9 with the insurgents in the Chakar Marri village in the Bolan district. Nine
insurgents and two SF personnel are injured in the clash.
A special anti-terrorism court in Quetta issues arrest warrants for the slain
tribal chief Nawab Akbar Bugti’s grandson, Bramdag Bugti, and six others.
They are wanted under the Explosive Substances’ Act, in a case registered
with the Sariab police.
January 14 A bomb attached to an Afghanistan-bound petrol tanker supplying fuel to

American forces in that country exploded in the Chaman town of
Balochistan, but caused no casualties. A paramilitary commander told AFP
that a convoy of four petrol tankers is near the town of Chaman, bordering
Afghanistan’s Kandahar province, when the bomb detonated. The explosion
overturned the tanker, causing a huge blaze, he confirmed, adding that no
one is hurt in the incident and the three other tankers are able to proceed to
safety.
January 15 Abul Haq Haqiq, who is known to the media as Mohammad Hanif, is
arrested in the eastern province of Nangarhar. During interrogation he
reportedly said Omar is in the western Pakistan city of Quetta (capital of
Balochistan province), the Afghan intelligence agency said in a statement.
"He is under the protection of the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] in Quetta,"
it quoted Hanif as saying.
26
Terrorism realated Fatalities in Pakistan,

2007
(http://www.kashmirherald.com/main.php?t=OP&st=D&no=350)
Pakistan’s slide towards state failure accelerated dramatically in year 2007, and the
assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on December 27 was a sharp reminder
that the country’s progressive collapse was much more rapid and irretrievable than most had
envisaged. In more ways than one, 2007 was a cumulative reflection on all of President
Pervez Musharraf’s errors of omission and commission since he took power in the coup of
October 1999.
A simple truth in vast regions of Pakistan today is that the state has withered away. A wide
array of anti-state actors is currently engaged in varying degrees of violence and subversion
in an extended swathe of territory. A cursory look at the map indicates that the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Balochistan are
witnessing large-scale violence and insurrection. Violence in parts of the Sindh, Punjab and
Gilgit-Baltistan has also brought these areas under the security scanner. Islamabad’s writ is
being challenged vigorously – violently or otherwise – in wide geographical areas, and on a
multiplicity of issues. Well over half of the territory presently under Pakistan’s control,
including Gilgit-Baltistan and ‘Azad Jammu & Kashmir’, has passed outside the realm of civil
governance and is currently dominated essentially through military force.
Terrorism-related Fatalities in Pakistan, 2007
Security
Terrorists
Months Civilians Force Total
/Insurgents
Personnel
January 26 16 29 71
February 35 4 8 47
March 28 21 261 310
April 176 18 83 277
May 57 10 14 81
June 31 12 40 83
July 144 143 191 478
August 56 63 117 236
27
September 101 67 144 312
October 282 101 154 537
November 293 94 341 728
December 293 48 97 438
Total 1523 597 1479 3599
Comparative Levels of Violence in Pakistan, 2003-2007
Security
Year Civilians Force Terrorist Total
Personnel
2003 140 24 25 189
2004 435 184 244 863
2005 430 81 137 648
2006 608 325 538 1471
2007 1523 597 1479 3599

Source: Institute for Conflict Management Database
Year 2007 unambiguously demonstrated that the flag of extremist Islam

continues to flail vigorously and violently across Pakistan, even as state
agencies appear less in control, and more vulnerable. In a welter of violence,
at least 3,599 persons, including 1,523 civilians, 597 security force (SF)
personnel and 1,479 militants, were killed in 2007. While militant and terrorist
violence has been reported from all the provinces, the worst affected were
FATA followed by the NWFP. Fatalities in 2007, at 3599, were substantially
more than double the fatalities in the preceding year (1471). The number of
civilians killed remained marginally higher than the number of militants and
terrorists killed – a continuing trend since 2003. A sharp increase in terrorist
violence was recorded after the Army’s assault on the Lal Masjid in Islamabad
on July 11, 2007. Indeed, the first half of 2007 (January-June) was marginally
less violent than the same period in 2006 – with 869 fatalities in 2007 as
against 984 in 2006. [It is necessary to note that, given Islamabad's
understated accounts, the suppression of the Press and erratic reportage
28
from all the conflict zones, the actual numbers of fatalities could be
considerably higher than those indicated above.
Balochistan
The Balochistan province – accounting for approximately 44 per cent of

Pakistan’s landmass – is now afflicted by an encompassing insurgency.
Currently, all 30 Districts of Balochistan are affected either by a sub-
nationalist tribal insurgency or, separately, by Islamist extremism. Most of the
violence in Balochistan is, however, 'nationalist' and there is no co-operation
between pre-dominantly Pashtun Islamist militants in the North and the
Baloch nationalist insurgents. Structural and constitutional biases prevailing
against the provinces feed popular anger and the insurgencies, and militate
against any possible solution to the Baloch problem, particularly given
Islamabad’s track record of intransigence.
On the face of it, it seems that the province has relatively calmed down after
the assassination of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26, 2006, by the
military. The momentum of the Baloch insurgency declined relatively in 2007,
as some leaders either fled Pakistan or were neutralized by the state. The
operational capacity of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), the most
prominent insurgent group in Balochistan, was considerably reduced in 2007
and is expected to remain
diminished in the immediate future. At least 450 persons, including 226

civilians, 82 soldiers and 142 insurgents, were killed in 772 incidents in 2006.
Violence in 2007 was at relatively lower levels, with at least 245 persons,
including 124 civilians, killed in the year. But, the insurgency continues to
simmer, and there has been a steady stream of bomb and rocket attacks on
gas pipelines, railway tracks, power transmission lines, bridges, and
communications infrastructure, as well as on military establishments and
Government facilities. The rebels are still capable of carrying out acts of
sabotage on a daily basis across the province and a political solution to the
insurgency is nowhere in sight. Acts of violence are, importantly, not restricted
to a few Districts, but are occurring in practically all of them, including the
provincial capital Quetta.
Still reeling under the loss caused by the assassination of Nawab Akbar Bugti
in August 2006, the Baloch insurgents were dealt another significant blow
when Nawabzada Balach Marri, purported chief of the Balochistan Liberation
Army, was killed on November 21, 2007. Marri was reportedly killed along
with his bodyguards in a clash somewhere inside Afghanistan, triggering
widespread violence in Quetta and other parts of the province. Mystery
29
shrouds Marri’s killing, as some reports suggested he was killed in

Afghanistan while others stated it was in Pakistan.
Adding to the Baloch insurgency are the Islamist militants concentrated in the
north of the province, who are orchestrating violence on both sides of the
Afghan border in their areas of domination. There were regular reports
throughout 2007 of the presence of al Qaeda-Taliban operatives in
Balochistan. In fact, Abul Haq Haqiq aka. Mohammad Hanif, an arrested
Taliban spokesman, reportedly told Afghan intelligence in January 2007 that
the fugitive Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar was living in Quetta under
the protection of the Inter-Services Intelligence.
The Federal Government’s experiment of maintaining peace in Balochistan by

converting the ‘B’ areas (where the Police do not operate) into ‘A’ areas
(under Police jurisdiction) has failed to secure desired results, with the crime
ratio in ‘A’ areas increasing alarmingly over the past three years. The ‘Levies’
Force policed 95 per cent of Balochistan five years ago, while just five per
cent of the area was under Police control. The Government abruptly decided
to abolish the centuries-old community-based Levies Force, replacing it with
the Police. Presently, 22 districts of Balochistan are ‘A’ areas and eight ‘B’
districts are yet to be converted. Official statistics stated that as many as
1,170 people had been killed in Balochistan since 2004.
30
Balochistan: The Army Blunders
The assassination of Nawab Akbar Shehbaz Khan Bugti, the legendary leader
of the Baloch freedom struggle, in a brutal military operation by the Pakistan
Army will have serious long-term repercussions on Pakistani politics, as a
martyr is born to inspire the rebel Baloch nationalists in their ongoing struggle
for greater rights and control over their natural resources.
In his death and the barbaric manner in which it was inflicted by those who
wanted to establish their stronghold in Balochistan by setting up cantonments
there, Bugti has already become a martyred hero for Baloch nationalists
everywhere in Pakistan, rather than the anti-state tribesman General
Musharraf sought to portray him as. To the warrior Bugti tribe, he was not only
the tribal head but also the latest in a long line of nationalist leaders who tried
to defend the province from exploitation by the Centre at the hands of the
mighty Punjab-dominated military establishment.
“It is better to die — as the Americans say — with your spurs on. Instead of a
slow death in bed, I would rather prefer death come to me while I am fighting
for a purpose”. So said Akbar Bugti in May 2006 while talking to a Time
magazine.
He 80-year old nationalist who wanted to fight to the death got his wish three
months later when the Pakistani security forces killed him in a ruthless military
operation on August 26. General Musharraf, who had declared Bugti a
‘terrorist’, made no bones about fulfilling the rebel leader’s desire.
31
Within hours of his death, described by many as an extra-judicial killing,

Balochistan witnessed bloody reactions, leaving ten people dead and dozens
injured. Over 500 people were detained in riots throughout the province, with
many of the Baloch protesters targeting Punjabi-owned properties and
businesses in Quetta, worsening already volatile ethnic divisions across
Pakistan.
Born on July 12, 1927, Bugti attended the elite Aitchison College in Lahore
and Oxford University, London before going into politics. Bugti, 80, a former
Chief Minister and Governor of Balochistan, was considered an articulate
spokesman for the Baloch cause for decades. Bugti was a member of the
Shahi Jirga (Council) that had voted for the creation of Pakistan at the time of
Partition in 1947. He became a member of the first Constituent Assembly and
served as Minister of State for Interior and Defence in 1956. The gruesome
murder of an avowed secularist like Bugti, who was concerned about the
Talibanisation of Pakistani society, demonstrates how a so-called enlightened
moderate military dictator treats his political opponents. Ironically, the
Musharraf administration is negotiating with far more lethal hardline Islamist
groups operating in the Waziristan tribal area.
To Musharraf and his cronies, Bugti was no more than an insurgent feudal
lord who wanted to prevent development from reaching his tribesmen and
who operated a ‘state within a state’. Musharraf used to describe Bugti as a
miscreant, a term introduced by the British East India Company – a term
which was last used widely in 1971 by the Pakistani military elite to describe
the Bengali people of erstwhile East Pakistan. The General blamed Bugti for
past insurgencies in Balochistan, and accused him of being a warlord running
a well-organised militia, private courts and prisons, using his income from the
gas fields in Dera Bugti.
32
Balochistan Freedom Sturggle

(http://intellibriefs.com/balochistanmovement.bmp)
33
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti

(The Tiger of Balochistan)
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nawab_Akbar_Bugti)
Akbar Bugti was the son of Nawab Mehrab Khan Bugti and a grandson of Sir
Shahbaz Khan Bugti. He was born in Barkhan on July 12, 1927. He was
educated
at Oxford, England and Aitchison College, Lahore. It is alleged that he
Committed his first murder when he was only 12 and that he had several
men
Killed to avenge the assassination of his son, (Salal Bugti).
Nawab Akbar Bugti was elected in a by-election to the National Assembly of
Pakistan in May 1958 to fill the vacancy created as a result of the
assassination of
the incumbent, Dr Khan Sahib, and sat on the government bench as a
member of
the ruling coalition.
Nawab Akbar Shahbaz Khan Bugti (July 12, 1927–August 26, 2006) was
the
Tumandar (head) of the Bugti tribe of Baluch and served as governor of
Balochistan Province in Pakistan. An Oxford-educated man in a land of
widespread illiteracy, he was a towering personality in Baloch politics for more
than five decades.
After an armed struggle started in Balochistan in 2004, Bugti was widely
perceived as a leader but went underground in 2005. On August 26, 2006,
after
several attempts were made on his life in the preceding months, he was killed
in
his cave in Kohlu, about 150 miles east of Quetta, leading to widespread
unrest
in the area, where he is widely regarded as a hero and martyr.
34
Bugti’s Role as A Leader
Bugti was involved in failed insurgencies in Balochistan in the 1950s, 1960s

and
1970s.
. May 1958 - Bugti was elected in a by-election to the National Assembly of
Pakistan.
. September 20, 1958 to October 7, 1958 - Bugti served as Minister of State
(Interior) in the Malik Sir Feroz Khan Noon Government.
.1960 - He was arrested and convicted by a Military Tribunal and

subsequently
disqualified from holding public office.
. February 1973 - Nawab Akbar Bugti was appointed the Governor of
Balochistan.
. January 1, 1974 - Resigned after disagreeing with the manner in which the
Government was carrying out policies in Balochistan.
1988 - Bugti joined the Balochistan National Alliance.
February 4, 1989 - Elected Chief Minister. His government frequently
disagreed
with the Federal Government led by the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
(Pakistan
Peoples Party).
. August 6, 1990: Governor of Balochistan General Muhammad Musa Khan
dissolves assembly on the instructions of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan
1990: Bugti forms his own political party, the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP),
being
Balochistan's single largest party and was elected to the provincial assembly.
35
1993: Nawab Akbar Bugti was elected to the National Assembly of Pakistan
representing the JWP in parliament.
. Ordered the killing of 100 men to avenge the assassination of his son
Nawabzada Salal Akbar Bugti.
.2004: Actively launches the Balochistan freedom struggle
.August 2006: Bugti killed in an army operation in the hills of Kohru.
Pak Army Operation in Bugti Region

(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2006/08/mil-060827-
irna01.htm)
. Pakistani forces had established the whereabouts of Nawab Akbar Bugti,

chieftain of the Bugti tribe, by monitoring satellite phone intercepts of the rebel
leader. British-educated Bugti, who was hiding in a cave complex when the
army assault took place. General Musharraf reportedly gave the go-ahead for
the
final operation even though Bugti was in communication with the government
till the last moment.
An ISPR statement said that two army helicopters, flying over the general
area of
Tartani in Kohlu on August 23, were fired upon from the ground and one
helicopter was damaged.
Another chopper was then dispatched to investigate and was also hit, but
returned safely.
The military launched air strikes against a cave complex in the mountains on
the
border of the Dera Bugti and Kohlu districts, where the chieftain was said to
be
hiding. There was little fighting on the ground, they said.
The missile raid destroyed the entrance to the rocky hideout and Special
Forces
moved in on Saturday to carry out a cordon and search operation.
36
Heavyfighting broke out as the insurgents returned fire, killing several soldiers
including the leader of the commando team, the official said.
The soldiers eventually secured the area and ascertained that Bugti was
among
the dead. As many as 21 army commandos and 37 rebels were also killed in
the
same operation, which targeted 50 to 80 of Nawab Bugti's closest family
members and top commanders. Key members of Bugti's family were
reportedly
killed in the operation.
Media reports indicated that General Musharraf, on hearing about Bugti's

killing,
commended the security forces for successfully eliminating the veteran rebel
leader. Musharraf reportedly termed Bugti's killing as a 'great victory' for
Pakistani army.
Bugti's killing evoked criticism from ordinary people in Pakistan as well as in
the
subcontinent.
37
Death of Akbar Bugti

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nawab_Akbar_Bugti#Death)
On Saturday August 26, 2006, around 2230 hrs (PST), Bugti was killed in a
bombing operation that caused the cave roof to collapse on him. His location
was
traced through the satellite phone he was using, and Pakistani secret service
agencies pin-pointed his location. (It is not clear if he was pinpointed through
a
satellite phone) The news of his death was broken to the media by
Makhdoom
Amin Fahim, leader of Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians.
Pakistani President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, has termed his death a victory
for
Pakistanis and congratulated the secret service chief who carried out this
operation. Pakistan's Information Minister Mohammad Ali Durrani, confirmed
that the operation included both air and ground assault. In a short telephonic
interview made to a private television network, Pakistani Information Minister
said that Bugti's death occurred as the cave he was in collapsed.
38
There have been stories reported in the press that Akbar Bugti's otherwise
Marri allies, who apparently were still embittered by his support of the 1970s
military operation against them, exposed his hiding place to the Army, who
surrounded the area and sent in a few senior officers in charge of the
operation along with a Bugti guide into the Nawab's cave to negotiate a
surrender.
Given Akbar Bugti's renowned stubbornness and non-compromising
attitude, it is thought that Bugti or his associates detonated explosives in the
case, killing all present inside, including the army negotiators and Akbar Bugti
himself. Thus creating a legacy that Bugti was a 'martyr' for Baluch rights and
freedom.
On August 24, 2006, under controversial circumstances, some Bugti

tribesmen announced an end to the Nawabi system and requested the
handing over of
Nawab Bugti to authorities. His property was seized, and he was declared as
a proclaimed offender."
Burial of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti
39
Gas Pipeline issue in Balochistan

Iran-Pakistan-India
News Update Service

Sunday, January 15, 2006 : 1000 Hrs
(http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200601151040.htm)
Balochistan restive, India concerned about gas pipeline:
New Delhi, Jan. 15 (PTI): With unrest prevailing in Balochistan, concerns are growing in India over the
proposed 4.16 billion US dollar Iran-India gas pipeline which has to pass through the region of Pakistan.
India's worries stem from the fact that it would have huge stakes in the nearly 3000 km long pipeline project,
about 800 km of which has to pass through Balochistan.
"We are concerned about the future of the pipeline in view of the growing instability in Balochistan," official
sources said here.
"India will have immense strategic stakes in the pipeline once completed. Naturally, instability in the region
(Balochistan) will not be in the interest of the project," the sources said.
New Delhi apprehends that the pipeline could be caught in the cross-fire if violence continues to increase in
Balochistan, they said, citing the past incidents when pipelines of water and gas have been targeted in the
region.
These concerns are believed to have been one of the provocations for External Affairs Ministry to issue a
statement recently on situation in Balochistan.
40
News Papers Report: Daily Times (15-07-2003)
(http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_15-7-
2003_pg7_2)
Suspected tribesmen set fire to natural gas pipelines near Dera Bugti, 550
kilometres east of Quetta, the third time in five months, officials said.
An official of the Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), the owner of the

pipelines, said, “Two sub-pipelines caught fire, but they were later brought
under control.” A provincial government official said a tribal dispute was
suspected, adding the attackers had AK-47 assault rifles. Pipelines have been
attacked in the past in the province and officials have blamed tribal chieftains
fighting for a share of benefit from exploration.
Dera Bugti police station has registered a case against unidentified people for
attacking sub-pipeline No 3738, which takes gas to a purification plant, on the
complaint of PPL Manager Sagheer Haider Malik at 5am on Monday.
Dera Bugti District Coordination Officer (DCO) Sarmad Khan confirmed

damage to the sub-pipeline and Federal Petroleum Secretary Abdullah
Yousaf said, “It is a minor incident.” However, Federal Interior Secretary Syed
Tasneem Noorani denied any firing incident near the sub-pipeline and said
the fire was caused by a technical fault. The gas supply to the purification
plant was restored within hours after stopping leakage from the sub-pipeline,
he said.
Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited Chairman Rasheed Lone said supply to
the main gas pipeline was not interrupted by the attack.
The DCO said he was informed Monday morning that some unidentified
people damaged the sub-pipeline, but the leakage was stopped later.
41
A senior police officer from Dera Bugti requesting anonymity said the PPL
manager had lodged a case against unidentified people for damaging the sub-
pipeline. He said fire did not break out due to the firing of unidentified people
because the sub-pipeline carried raw gas. He said raids had been conducted
at different areas to arrest the culprits.
Federal Petroleum Secretary Abdullah Yousaf said the sub-pipeline was

damaged by the firing of unidentified men. “But the incident is not comparable
with the previous acts of terrorism,” he said, adding such events were routine
in the area and the situation was in the control of law enforcement agencies.
The SNGPL chairman said it was not a big attack because the main pipeline
was not damaged. He said he himself had talked to Karachi SNGPL office,
which confirmed that the gas supply was continuing from Sui to Karachi and
Peshawar.
Interior Ministry sources said the government was facing a law and order
problem in Baloch areas including Dera Bugti, Goth Mazari, Sui and Uch.
Sources said miscreants were also creating problems in Rajanpur, Sadiqabad
and Kashmore.
In Gas Pipeline Project Pakistan-Iran-India are acting as follows:
1. Iran – The supplier

2. Pakistan – The Facilitator
3. India- The Buyer
42
In this Trilateral Gas Pipeline project, Iran will be the Supplier of the Gas.
Pakistan will act as a Facilitator between Iran and India. Whereas India
will act as a Buyer. But is is also in favour of Pakistan as then it will be
the Best chance for Paksitan to get maximum Benefit from this Project.
By this Pakistan will be able to overcome the Shortage of Gass Supply
all over the country. And it will be very cheap for Pakistan as well.
43
Re-Engineering of Balochistan
(www.satp.org)
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor,
Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
The stage for escalated, and possibly extraordinary, violence has been set in
Balochistan. Addressing the media at Turbat in the province on December 16,
2004, President Pervez Musharraf declared that his Government would crush
all anti-Pakistan movements: "We are gathering information through
intelligence and other sources that who is doing what in the area and I warn
them because when the Government starts action against them, they will be
crushed."
This declaration of intent only completes what has been on the cards, at least
since 31st March 2004, when the General had declared on the Pakistan
Television (PTV) "Newsnight" programme, that the problem with Balochistan
was that only 5 per cent of the area was 'A area', while 95 per cent was 'B',
where the police did not operate. Soon, he had stated, the entire 95 per cent
'B area' would be made into 'A area'. Already, he disclosed further, five
districts in the 'B area' had been declared 'A area'.
The British colonial administration divided Balochistan into A and B Areas: the
former were under direct British control and administration; in the latter, the
British exercised proxy control through the Sardars or tribal chiefs. The
system was continued after Independence by the Pakistan Establishment.
44
With its vast potential for a wide range of natural resources, including oil,
uranium, copper and other minerals, its critical strategic location - it
commands over 900 miles of the Arabian Sea coastline, and the
development, particularly, of the Gwadar Port with massive Chinese financial
and technical assistance, 'stabilizing' Balochistan and consolidating
Islamabad's administrative hold over the province is emerging as an
overarching objective of the present regime. These objectives militate directly
both against the long-standing system of near autonomy most of the province
has enjoyed since and even before the creation of Pakistan, and against a
number of critical demands consistently held by the Baloch people and
leadership. Specifically, the Baloch Ittihad (Baloch Unity) movement seeks,
among a range of other objectives, to bring an end to the exploitation of
Baloch resources by Islamabad, particularly by North Punjab; to secure fair
royalties for Baloch gas; to secure employment for locals in projects being
executed in Baloch areas; and to ensure that revenues from various projects
in Balochistan are invested in the province itself.
More significantly, the Baloch have long and bitter memories of Islambad's
repression and betrayal over the past, and there is great venom against the
'Punjabis' in the Baloch discourse. In the 1950s, after an unsuccessful
insurrection, Pakistan offered a General Amnesty to the rebels, but when their
leaders came out they were hanged. This betrayal weighs heavily in the
consciousness of the Baloch, as does the brutality with which the rebellion of
the 1970s was suppressed, with indiscriminate use of superior firepower -
including air power - against Baloch camps and villages in which thousands
were killed.
45
The military crackdown in Balochistan is clearly slated for intensification. The

operations against the jirgas in Waziristan have already demonstrated that no
one can be exempt from punitive action if Islamabad's authority is challenged,
and that Musharraf believes that there are certain areas of Pakistan that have
to be 'quietened' in the immediate future. With the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) relatively secured, it is now Balochistan's turn. Other events
that may propel such action beyond a 'turning point' would include an act of
major sabotage at Gwadar; a major disruption of the gas pipeline; or the
linking up of Baloch forces across international borders.
46
47
Latest Situation
What Benazir’s death means for Balochistan?

(http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?
page=2008%5C01%5C01%5Cstory_1-1-2008_pg7_37)
QUETTA: In one of her immensely chaotic interactions with the press, I asked
former premier Benazir Bhutto during her last visit to Quetta two weeks before
her assassination that would she apologise to the Baloch people over the
massacre of 1973 that her father had carried out. Benazir initially seemed
offended by the question. But soon she displayed a blissful smile, and said
she had come to Balochistan with a message of reconciliation and general
amnesty to everyone.
“I was a young student then [in 1973]…It will be unfair to solely hold the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) responsible for the military operation of that
time. All parties were equally responsible for the bad blood of 1970s,” she
remarked, “but we need to forget the past so that we can look for a bright
future.” Benazir said she had deep respect for Sardar Attaullah Mengal,
whose elected government was ousted by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1973 leading
to a deadly military operation in the province, despite all political differences.
The military operation of 1973 led to the killing of around six thousand Baloch
people, according to Dr Ayesha Siddiqa’s book Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s
Military Economy.
Benazir assumed that it was meaningless to grumble over past incidents.

However, she said, “I am willing to talk to Sardar Mengal and any other
Baloch leader to address their grievances.” There was this feeling that she
was aware of the reasons that had compelled disillusioned Baloch youth to
move to the hills to wage an armed struggle against the government.
Benazir was extremely concerned with the prevailing situation in Balochistan

during her last trip to the province. She lamented that Islamabad was
mistreating Balochistan. “If Balochistan continues to be mistreated,” she
warned, “I am afraid the people of this province will be obliged to seek
separation from the federation.” It was this reason that her trip and promises
were largely admired by local politicians and the media.
Alienated Baloch leadership: Benazir had moved faster than any other
national leader to access the alienated Baloch leadership. She was one of the
few leaders to condemn the killing of Nawabzada Balaach Marri, the son of
48
Nawab Khair Baksh Marri. She also visited the Bugti House in Quetta to offer
condolences to the family of late Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. “Political dissent is
one thing,” she said while referring to Bugti’s killing, “but it does not mean that
you crush your opponents by bombing them. This is inhuman, undemocratic
and uncivilised.”
Benazir promised that if her party was elected to power then she would
immediately end the ongoing military operation in Balochistan. She believed
that the problem was the engagement of “our forces against our own people”.
Benazir was perturbed by the growing number of missing people in

Balochistan and elsewhere in the country. To her, it was the main cause
behind unrest in smaller provinces and the political instability in the country.
She said that the basic duty of intelligence agencies was to monitor anti-state
elements but the agencies were tasked with an odd responsibility of troubling
politicians.
The PPP does not have an overwhelming presence in Balochistan as it had

won only two provincial assembly seats in the 2002 elections. However, her
assassination was mourned all over the province. Her untimely demise leaves
the vision of a happy Balochistan integrated with the federation incomplete.
Benazir calls for ending Balochistan Operation

(Z:\SATP\Benazir calls for ending Balochistan operation -DAWN - National.htm)
ISLAMABAD, April 16: Former prime minister and chairperson of the Pakistan
People’s Party Benazir Bhutto has expressed grave concern over the
continuing military operation in Balochistan and called for an end to the
operation and settlement of political disputes through dialogue.
A press statement issued by the party’s media centre said that the PPP
chairperson had been receiving reports from the party’s provincial
organisation that life had become miserable in Balochistan for people in areas
where the military operation was under way.
It said she had received the latest complaint from leaders of Sarawan and
Jhalwan tribes, alleging large-scale military operations in their respective
areas. They complained of brutal military operation in Mastung, Bolan, Kalat
and Awaran districts where men, women and even children were targeted
with tanks and gunship helicopters.
According to the PPP statement, the former prime minister warned against
cornering people of Balochistan against the wall as the most potent threat to
the federation.
49
History has taught us that political issues could be

resolved only through political means of dialogue
and consultation and not through the barrel of the
gun. History has taught us the fragility of solutions
imposed through brute might,” she said and
warned the rulers to learn lessons from the 1971
crisis that culminated in disastrous consequences
for the federation
She said that the use of

brute force would
alienate the people from
the federation and lead
to “extremism that must
be avoided at all costs”
Ms Bhutto said that there were also complaints of

large-scale ‘disappearances’ of political activists in
the province that were substantiated by
documentation of human rights bodies. She said
that people who had ‘disappeared’ in the province
had nothing to do with the war against terrorism,
indicating that besides the regime was resorting to
‘disappearances’ in addition to the use of force,
which was against international and domestic law.
50
Mega Projects in Balochistan

(http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/01/balochistan-mega-projects-to-
bring.html)
ISLAMABAD, Jan 4 (APP): Caretaker Prime Minister Mohammedmian

Soomro on Friday said the increased development spending in Balochistan
has improved the standard of living and helped creation of job opportunities
for the local people. He mentioned spending on infrastructure expansion,
provision of gas, electricity, schools, health facilities and clean drinking water
to various parts of Baluchistan.
He said the people of the province have for the first time been able to benefit
from the strong economic growth and development, thus positively affecting
their lives.
The Prime Minister said this while reviewing the progress on the ongoing
development projects in Balochistan here at the Prime Minister Secretariat
this afternoon.
He said the mega projects like Gwadar Deep Sea Port, Coastal Highway,
Mirani Dam, Kachi Canal, Sandak Copper Project would bring about
economic prosperity for the people of Baluchistan.
These mega projects would facilitate the economic activities thus opening up
job opportunities for the people of different areas of the province, he added.
51
52
Besides taking several economic initiatives for the welfare of the people of
Balochistan including appropriate representation in the federal services, the
government has increased the job quota for the educated youth of the
province, he added.
The Prime Minister said the government has been sincerely striving to provide
basic facilities including health and education to all so that educated youth
can play their role for the progress of the country.
He said Balochistan has vast potential in various areas like mining, gas,
mineral exploration, fisheries, petroleum and other natural resources,
adding, there is need to utilize the available natural resources to benefit
the people of the area as well as the country.
The Prime Minister said that the government is pursuing investment-friendly

policies and has offered level playing field to all the local and foreign investors
to benefit from the ideal business opportunities.
The work on 66 marble factories with significant investment by Italian

and European Union countries will be completed soon while other
sectors are also attracting foreign investment, he added.
The Prime Minister said that the government is focusing on the building of
National Trade Corridor and with the completion of roads network,
access to the Central Asian States and beyond, would become possible.
Earlier the Chief Secretary during his presentation said that the government and the
people of Balochistan greatly appreciate the economic policies and the development
projects undertaken by the federal and provincial governments.
He updated the meeting that the pace of work on various projects is going on
satisfactorily including the work on rehabilitation of the infrastructure which was
damaged after the flood in the province.
53
He said that the conversion of B areas to A areas in three districts has

been completed by 100% with the help of federal government.
He said 4000 persons have been recruited in Balochistan Constabulary

and further 2000 would be recruited during the current financial year.
He said it would help a great deal in maintaining law and order, which is the
prerequisite to maintain the pace of the ongoing development programme in
the province.
He also apprised the meeting that the work on night landing facility at Quetta
Airport is also moving forward at a satisfactory pace which would be
completed as per schedule at a cost of Rs. 6 billion.
He said that the development work on 11 cadet colleges is also moving

ahead, as planned.
The Chairman National Highway Authority (NHA) briefed the meeting that
work on the development of roads network is in progress.
He said roads like N-50, Quetta-Taftan, Shahdad Kot-Ratodero, Khuzdar-

Ratodero and Khojak Tunnel are at different stages and would be
completed within the stipulated time period.
He said the connectivity of Gwadar with other areas and Central Asian States
would be completed during the given timeframe.
54
The Secretary Railways briefed the meeting that the feasibility for the
upgradation of Quetta Zhob Railway line is in the progress and project will
be completed with an amount of Rs. 42 billion. The feasibility of linking
Gwadar through rail will be completed by the end of February this year
with an amount of Rs. 98 billion. He said the work is continuing
satisfactorily.
The Chairman National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) updated the

meeting that rehabilitation of the flood and cyclone affectees is moving
forward at a good pace and a damage and need assessment has been
carried out.
He said that about 7500 tents, 33000 blankets and seeds of various crops
weighing 700 tonnes were distributed among the farmers. He said that
Rs. 1600 million were distributed as compensation among the affectees
of Mirani Dam.
55
FG to provide Rs. 30 billion additional for road sector

in Balochistan: Bhutani
QUETTA Jan 5 (APP) Caretaker Chief Minister Balochistan Sardar
Mohammad Saleh Bhutani has said the federal government has promised to
provide Rs. 30 billion additional for uplift of road sector in Balochistan while a
committee has also been constituted to evolve a feasible formula to settle
issue regarding Gas Development Surcharge and Gas Reality between the
federal and the provincial governments. The committee would comprise both
the representatives of the federal government and the provincial
governments.
Addressing a press conference here Friday, he said these decisions have
been taken in the meeting headed by the Prime Minister held in Islamabad.
Besides, increasing the road sector development budget the meeting also
reviewed the pace of work on Railway track in the province as feasibility of
Quetta-Dera Ismail Khan via Zhob Railway track would be launched by
February next. Work on Lackpass tunnel some 30 km of the provincial capital
on Quetta-Karachi highway would also be completed soon while the meeting
also approved Khujjak Tunnel project and work on which would be launched
soon.
The meeting also approved projects for supplying gas to Loralai, Zhob, Killa
Siafullah and Noshki districts while work on the project to supply gas to
Winder industrial state would be launched soon.
Besides, the meeting directed for expediting work on electricity supply

projects to Northern and Western areas in the project.
He said Dadu-Khuzdar transmission line would be completed soon which

would ensure power supply to Awaran, Washuk, Kurkh and other parts in the
province. Rs. 100 million allocated for establishment of Kurkh grid station
during the meeting and work on this project would be launched as early as
possible.
Besides, the Saudi government has promised Rs. 320 million for electricity
supply project for Dalbandin while rest of the cost of the project would be
borne by the federal government, he said, adding negotiations between
Iranian and Pakistani governments is continue regarding supply of power
supply to Gwadar, Awaran and Chaghi areas.
56
Referring to shortage of bulldozers for agriculture purposes, the CM said the

meeting approved the purchase of 200 bulldozers for China. However, we
demanded the government to provide the province 25 bulldozers for trial after
which we would place demand for more bulldozers.
He said the government has also approved Rs. 60 million for equipping
Quetta Airport with night landing facility and this project would be completed
by June next.
He said both the President and the Prime Minister have agreed with the
provinces stand about Gas Development Surcharge and Gas Royalty issue.
However, in view of the technicalities of the issue, the government has
constituted the committee to draw a viable formula acceptable to both the
federal and the provincial governments.
Regarding implementation on conversion of B area into A project, the CM said

almost all areas in the province have been declared police controlled and for
the purpose the government has to incur about Rs. 8 to 10 billions in this
regard. The amount would have to be provided by the federal government up
to 2009 but on the province’s request the President and Prime Minister have
decided that the federal government would bear the cost unless the province
gain self relieance in economy in order not to disturbed development process
in the province.
He said the province would gain self reliance in terms of economy after the
Reko Dic Copper and Gold project is made functional.
Referring to losses caused by flashfloods in the province, the CM said losses

have been estimated as about 16 billions and the amount would be provided
by the federal government for rehabilitation of affected infrastructure. Besides,
the federal government has also conceded to bear the deficit of 8 out of 14
diesel run power houses in the province. The electricity generated by these
power houses is being provided to consumers on subsidy.
Besides, the federal government has also promised Rs. 166 million under
Education Support Programme while Rs. 1.5 billion would be provided to
province under DERA-II.
57
Media Development in Balochistan

Print and Electronic
Daily Intekhab
http://www.dailyintekhab.com/
Radio Balochi FM
http://www.radiobalochi.com/
Daily Balochistan Express

http://www.balochistanexpress.com/
Welcomequetta - Quetta City on the Web

http://www.explorequetta.net/
The Monthly Balochi Labzank Online Edition

http://balochilabzank.cjb.net/
Baloch Media
http://www.balochistan.org/
Welcome Quetta. News & Information all around the World

http://www.welcomequetta.com/news/index.htm
Balochi Radio
http://www.balochiradio.net/
58
Balochistan and Internationl Media

(http://baltimore.indymedia.org/newswire/display/15695/index.php)
FACTS ABOUT BALOCHISTAN: WORLD MUST KNOW
WHAT BALOCHISTAN HAS?

 A newspaper report of April 4, 2005 says, “Mineral deposits usually
occur within minerogenic zones (of non-metallic minerals) and
metallogenic zones (of metallic minerals). Of nine such zones in
Pakistan, five are located in Balochistan. Base metal deposits, such as
copper, lead and zinc, are found in Chagai, Khuzdar and Lasbela
Districts. Silver and gold in association with Saindak copper ore has
recently been re-assessed. Balochistan also hosts several sizeable
sub-bituminous coalfields in the Quetta-Harnai-Duki region.”
 According to Pakistan Energy Book 2005, 1.5 million tons of coal
was mined from Balochistan, which is 40 percent of national
production.
 Balochistan has 49 percent of the total livestock in the country.
 In 2003 it produced 1.4 million tons of fruit.
 In 2002, 121,212 metric tons of fish was caught. Only 11,575 metric
tons were consumed locally whereas 109,655 metric tons were
available as exportable surplus.
 Asian Development document “Balochistan Economic Report (Project

Number 39003-Dec 2005)” says, “39 minerals, of the recorded 50, are
now being mined in the province. In FY2003 this sector yielded
revenues of almost Rs 1 billion. The discovery of large copper deposits
in the Chagai district, coupled with the coal and iron ore production in
the province, can generate significant additional income for the
provincial government.”
 These are only a few glimpses of the rich mineral resources of

Balochistan. The most important one is the treasure of natural gas
deposits, which turned the fate of the country in the early 1950s,
benefiting the whole country except Balochistan. The 10,000 feet deep
gas reserve was estimated as 10.78 trillion cubic feet. Over the past 55
years the country has consumed 8.14 TCF leaving 2.63 TCF behind,
sufficient for another two decades. In 2004-05 it produced about 920
million TCF per day, yielding annually 336,493 million TCF. Providing
fuel to the national economy for years, gas reached Balochistan after
25 years when Quetta first received LPG in 1976. Six decades are
gone, but even today Balochistan has only 3.4 percent of gas
consumers as compared to 51 percent from Punjab alone, which
59
contributes only 4.75 percent gas. The province contributes Rs 85

billion per year through gas revenues but receives only Rs 7
billion from the federal government. What Dera Bugti received in
return for the wealth it generated is evident from the UNDP Human
Development Report 2003, which ranked Dera Bugti last among
the 91 districts of the country on the Human Development Index.
The eye-opening report reveals that among the top 31 districts on
the HDI, only three belonged to Balochistan whereas the province
shared 12 among the lowest 30 districts on the HDI.
WHAT WE GOT AFTER 60 YEARS?
Literacy
The Balochistan province has 26.6 percent literacy against the national
average of 47 percent and the corresponding figures of female literacy are 15
percent and 33 percent.
Sanitation facilities
The country provides sanitation facilities to 18 percent of the population

against only 7 percent in Balochistan.
Infant mortality rate
The infant mortality rate in the country is 100 (per 1,000 live births), whereas
Balochistan has 108. The national mother mortality rate is 350 (per 100,000)
and the province has a frighteningly high 600.
Electricity
75 percent of the villages of the country are electrified but only 25 percent in
Balochistan.

Poverty
According to the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 2001-02,

Balochistan has the highest poor population with 48 percent and the
worst in rural areas with 51 percent living below the poverty line. There
are only 32 Utility Stores throughout the province whereas Islamabad
alone has 34 Utility Stores.
60
(Source: http://www.un.org.pk/nhdr/htm_pages/cp_1.htm)
Unemployment
Unemployment rate in Balochistan province is recorded around 33.4 per cent

as compared to 26.8 per cent in NWFP, 19.1 per cent in Punjab and 14.4 per
cent in Sindh.
Usage of Open ponds for drinking water
According to PSLM 2004-5, 52 per cent in Balochistan as compare of three

per cent in Punjab, 13 in Sindh, 35 per cent in NWFP use wells and open
ponds for drinking water.
Percapita GDP rise over 28 years
The Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC) recently conducted a

study that exposed that during the 28 years period, Punjab's per capita GDP
showed a rise of 2.4 per cent a year, followed closely by the NWFP at 2.2 per
cent. But Balochistan's per capita recorded an insignificant growth of 0.2
per cent against Sindh's per capita growth of 1.7 per cent. The study has
found a gradual pauperisation of the two southern provinces —- Sindh and
Balochistan -— and a corresponding rise in prosperity in the two northern
provinces -— Punjab and the NWFP.
Pakistan: The Worsening Conflict in Balochistan

(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4373)
61
Asia Report N°119

14 September 2006
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
President Pervez Musharraf and the military are responsible for the worsening
of the conflict in Balochistan. Tensions between the government and its
Baloch opposition have grown because of Islamabad’s heavy-handed armed
response to Baloch militancy and its refusal to negotiate demands for political
and economic autonomy. The killing of Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan
Bugti in August 2006 sparked riots and will likely lead to more confrontation.
The conflict could escalate if the government insists on seeking a military
solution to what is a political problem and the international community,
especially the U.S., fails to recognise the price that is involved for security in
neighbouring Afghanistan.
Tensions with the central government are not new to Balochistan, given the
uneven distribution of power, which favors the federation at the cost of the
federal units. The Baloch have long demanded a restructured relationship that
would transfer powers from what is seen as an exploitative central
government to the provinces. But Musharraf’s authoritarian rule has deprived
them of participatory, representative avenues to articulate demands and to
voice grievances. Politically and economically marginalised, many Baloch see
the insurgency as a defensive response to the perceived colonisation of their
province by the Punjabi-dominated military.
Although regional parties still seek provincial autonomy within a federal

parliamentary democratic framework, and there is, as yet, little support for
secession, militant sentiments could grow if Islamabad does not reverse ill-
advised policies that include:
 exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources without giving the

province its due share;
 construction of further military garrisons to strengthen an already
extensive network of military bases; and
 centrally driven and controlled economic projects, such as the Gwadar
deep sea port, that do not benefit locals but raise fears that the
resulting influx of economic migrants could make the Baloch a minority
in their homeland.
While Baloch alienation is widespread, crossing tribal, regional and class

lines, the military government insists that a few sardars (tribal leaders) are
challenging the centre’s writ, concerned that their power base would be
eroded by Islamabad’s plans to develop Balochistan; the state therefore has
little option but to meet the challenge head on. This failure to accept the
legitimacy of grievances lies at the heart of an increasingly intractable conflict,
as does Islamabad’s reliance on coercion and indiscriminate force to silence
dissent.
62
The military government should recognise that it faces conflict not with a
handful of sardars but with a broad-based movement for political, economic
and social empowerment. The only one way out is to end all military action,
release political prisoners and respect constitutionally guaranteed political
freedoms.
As a preliminary confidence-building measure, Islamabad should implement

recommendations of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan, which
have local support. But a sustainable solution requires implementation, in
spirit and substance, of constitutional provisions for political, administrative
and economic autonomy. The federation would also be strengthened if the
national parliament were to amend the constitution, to shift powers from an
overbearing centre to the provinces. However, centralised rule is the hallmark
of authoritarianism. Like its predecessors, this military government is averse
to democratic engagement and powersharing, preferring to retain and
consolidate power through patron-client relations and divide-and-rule
strategies.
Reliance on the Pashtun religious parties to counter its Baloch opposition has
strengthened Pashtun Islamist forces at the cost of the moderate Baloch. With
their chief Pakistani patron, Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam running
the Balochistan government in alliance with Musharraf’s Muslim League
(Quaid-i-Azam), a reinvigorated Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are attacking
international forces and the Kabul government across Balochistan’s border
with Afghanistan. But the international community, particularly the U.S. and its
Western allies, seem to ignore the domestic and regional implications of the
Balochistan conflict, instead placing their faith in a military government that is
targeting the anti-Taliban Baloch and Pashtuns and rewarding pro-Taliban
Pashtun parties.
With the federal government refusing to compromise with its Baloch

opponents, intent on a military solution to a political problem and ignoring
local stakeholders in framing political and economic policies, the directions of
the conflict are clear. The military can retain control over Balochistan’s
territory through sheer force, but it cannot defeat an insurgency that has local
support.
Still, the conflict could be resolved easily. Free and fair elections in 2007
would restore participatory representative institutions, reducing tensions
between the centre and the province, empowering moderate forces and
marginalising extremists in Balochistan. In the absence of a democratic
transition, however, the militancy is unlikely to subside. The longer the conflict
continues, the higher the costs – political, social and economic for a fragile
polity.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
To the Government of Pakistan:
63
1. End reliance on a military solution in Balochistan and quickly take the
following steps to deescalate:
(a) cease military action, send the armed forces back to the barracks and
restrict their role to guarding the province’s land and nautical borders;
(b) withdraw the Frontier Corps, replacing it with provincial security forces
that are firmly under provincial control;
(c) dismantle all check posts manned by paramilitary and other federal
security agencies; and
(d) halt construction of military bases (cantonments) and end plans to

construct additional military or paramilitary facilities.
2. Respect democratic freedoms by:
(a) producing immediately all detainees before the courts and releasing
political prisoners;
(b) ending the political role of intelligence agencies, military and civil, and
barring them from detaining prisoners;
(c) withdrawing travel restrictions, internal and external, on Baloch opposition

leaders and activists;
(d) ending intimidation, torture, arbitrary arrests, disappearances and extra-

judicial killings;
(e) allowing all political parties to function freely, respecting the

constitutionally guaranteed rights of speech and expression, assembly,
association and movement; and
(f) respecting the constitutional obligation to preserve and promote distinct

language and culture.
3. Entrust the Baloch with more responsibility for their own security by:
(a) accepting provincial jurisdiction over law and order and policing;
(b) retaining Balochistan Levies, re-establishing those that have been

disbanded, reforming them into a professional force accountable to provincial
authority and replacing them by the police only once police reform has been
enacted countrywide;
(c) ensuring that locals are recruited to the police force and Levies in
Balochistan; and
(d) meeting the quota for Baloch recruitment in the armed forces and federal
security agencies.
64
4. Allow local and international media unhindered access to all districts in
Balochistan, including the conflict zones.
5. Begin immediately a dialogue with all regional and national-level political
parties on ways of solving the crisis and create a favorable environment for
such a dialogue by:
(a) implementing at once recommendations of the Mushahid Hussain

parliamentary subcommittee, particularly those that pertain to revised gas
royalties, social sector expenditure by the federation as well as oil and gas
companies, and jobs for Baloch in the federal government and its institutions;
(b) establishing and empowering the special task force proposed by the
Mushahid Hussain subcommittee to monitor and implement these
recommendations;
(c) revising the distribution criteria for National Finance Commission awards
to account for backwardness, level of development, geographic size, and
revenue levels of the provinces; and
(d) reviving the moribund Council of Common Interests, accepting

parliamentary authority over the body, and accepting and implementing its
decisions.
6. Ensure sustainable development with local ownership by:
(a) meeting Baloch concerns about Gwadar Port by placing the project under
provincial government control; ending the practice of allocating coastal lands
to security agencies; giving local fishermen unimpeded access to their fishing
grounds; revising the “master plan” so locals are not dislocated; addressing
pressing health and education needs, with an emphasis on new technical
institutes and colleges; and implementing job quotas for locals at the port and
related projects;
(b) ensuring in Sui and other oil and gas extraction projects that the well head
value and natural gas rates are on par with other provinces; renegotiating
natural gas rates and the royalty formula; encouraging oil and gas companies
to hire and train Baloch workers and allocate funds for social development;
and consulting with the province on privatisation of the oil and gas industry
and other state-owned enterprises; and
(c) making the provincial government a party to all investment and

development projects.
7. Refocus policies towards human development by:
(a) allocating an annual financial package for social sector development

pursuant to district level recommendations;
65
(b) granting specific funds for hospitals, technical institutions, medical

colleges and universities, as well as high schools in all districts; and
(c) developing irrigation schemes, including small dams, for rural Balochistan,
on the recommendation of the provincial government.
To the National Assembly:
8. Enhance provincial autonomy and strengthen the federation by:
(a) eliminating the Concurrent Legislative List and devolving all its subjects to
the provinces;
(b) constituting a bipartisan parliamentary committee to recommend, within a

fixed timeframe, the transfer of subjects from the Federal Legislative List to
the provinces, beginning with subjects in Part II of the list;
(c) enacting legislation to regulate and monitor land allotment, sales and
transfers in Gwadar; and
(d) constituting a parliamentary committee, with an equal number of members

from the ruling and opposition benches, to examine cases of abuse of power
by security agencies.
To the Supreme Court:
9. Form a high-level judicial commission to enquire into the 26 August 2006
killing of Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti.
To the International Community:
10. Urge the Pakistan government to immediately end military action in

Balochistan.
11. Press the Pakistan government to end all practices that violate
international human rights standards, including torture, arbitrary arrests,
detentions, and extra-judicial killings.
Islamabad/Brussels, 14 September 2006
Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan

(http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5131)
Asia Briefing N°69

22 October 2007
OVERVIEW
66
Violence continues unabated in Pakistan’s strategically important and

resource-rich province of Balochistan, where the military government is
fighting Baloch militants demanding political and economic autonomy.
President Pervez Musharraf’s government insists the insurgency is an attempt
to seize power by a handful of tribal chiefs bent on resisting economic
development. Baloch nationalists maintain it is fuelled by the military’s
attempts to subdue dissent by force and the alienation caused by the absence
of real democracy. Whether or not free and fair national and provincial
elections are held later this year or in early 2008 will determine whether the
conflict worsens.
Instead of redressing Baloch political and economic grievances, the military is

determined to impose state control through force. The killing of the Baloch
leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti by the army in August 2006 was followed by
the incarceration of another, Sardar Akhtar Jan Mengal, who has been held
on terrorism-related charges without due process since December. Law
enforcement agencies have detained thousands of Baloch nationalists or
those believed to be sympathetic to the cause; many have simply
disappeared. With the nationalist parties under siege, many young activists
are losing faith in the political process and now see armed resistance as the
only viable way to secure their rights.
Relying also on divide-and-rule policies, the military still supports Pashtun

Islamist parties such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Deobandi Jamiat Ulema-e-
Islam (JUI-F) in a bid to counter secular Baloch and moderate Pashtun forces.
The JUI-F is the dominant member of the six-party Islamist alliance, the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), Musharraf’s coalition partner in the provincial
government since October 2002. It is also a key patron of the Afghan Taliban.
Using Balochistan as a base of operation and sanctuary and recruiting from
JUI-F’s extensive madrasa network, the Taliban and its Pakistani allies are
undermining the state-building effort in Afghanistan. At the same time, U.S.
and other Western support for Musharraf is alienating the Baloch, who
otherwise could be natural partners in countering extremism in Pakistan.
Although the military has retained control through force, it is fast losing the
campaign to win hearts and minds. The insurgency now crosses regional,
ethnic, tribal and class lines. Musharraf appears oblivious to the need to
change course if the insurgency is to be contained and political stability
restored. Islamabad has yet to implement any of the recommendations on
Balochistan’s political and economic autonomy made by a Senate (upper
house) committee in November 2005.
The federal government has also disregarded the Balochistan provincial

assembly’s unanimous resolutions against unpopular federal development
plans. The government’s inadequate response to the cyclone and floods that
devastated the area in June and July 2007 has further worsened alienation.
Although the crisis in Balochistan is assuming threatening dimensions, it is not

irremediable provided the national and provincial elections are free and fair.
The restoration of participatory representative institutions would reduce
67
tensions between the centre and the province, empower moderate forces and
marginalise extremists. In the absence of a transition to meaningful
democracy, however, the military’s strong-arm tactics are bound to further fuel
the insurgency, at great cost to the Baloch people and Pakistan’s enfeebled
federal framework.
Islamabad/Brussels, 22 October 2007
68
CONCLUSION
 No development in the country especially in the backward areas
particularly BALOCHISTAN.
It includes Education sector, health sector, Human living standards,
basic needs of life like clean and healthy water, hygienic food, any
agricultural development etc.
 Killing of thousands of Innocent people in Balochistan, both Army
personnel and the common residents of Balochistan.
 Pakistani Govt. is paying very high cost in Balochistan. As a result of it,
Pakistan Economy is being affected day by day. Due to these
circumstances, inflation rate is going higher.
 Americans belong to jewish group and our Holy Book says that jew and
muslim can’t be friend. So Americans are always the enemy of muslims
and trying to vanish the muslims by attacking different muslim
countries. It might be possible and America is feeding the Pakistani
Govt for this operation.
 But last but not the least still there is a better chance to develop our
Balochistan because it’s also a part of our Home Land. It can’t be
ignored at all because people of Balochistan also have the complete
Right to live a better and a developed life.
69

Balochistan's Climate, Geography and History

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Balochistan's Climate, Geography and History

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University Of Management and Technology

The Balochistan plateau is extends westward, average 263 m. high, with

Economically, its vast rangelands, large numbers of livestock, rich

Balochistan was conquered by the British Empire on October 1, 1887. In

Herodotus in 650 BCE describes the Paraitakenoi as a tribe ruled by Deiokes,

 Yolamira, son of Bagavera (2nd century)

Demographics and society:

 Awaran  Kharan  Nasirabad

 Kalat  Musakhel  Ziarat

List of Cities in Balochistan:

Rank Place Population (2004) Latitude Longitude

 Mir Chakar Khan Rind

 General Mohammed Musa Khan

Balochistan Conflict - A Review from

The controversial history of the south-western region of Pakistan dates back

Afghanistan also strongly objected to the inclusion of ethnic Pashtun and

First conflict 1948 (led by Mir Ahmad Yar Khan):

Second conflict (1958-59 led by Nawab Nowroz

Third conflict 1963-69 (led by Sher Mohammad

Fourth conflict 1973-77 (led by Nawab Khair

Dismissal of the provincial government led to armed insurgency. Khair Baksh

According to several authors, the Pakistani military lost 3,000 to 3,300

Fifth conflict 2004-to date (lead by Nawab Akbar

Pakistan blamed India and Iran for fanning insurgency in Baluchistan.

Violence reached a crescendo in August of 2005 when the Pakistani

Distribution of Balochs is marked in pink.

Pakistani Balochistan is one of the four provinces of Pakistan. Although it is

 Central governments (1946-2006)

Pakistani Army has espoused a doctrine of limited "offensive-defense" which it

Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti

After an armed struggle started in Balochistan in 2004, Bugti was widely

Bomb Blasts in Balochistan

February 21 Dera Allah Yar 0 4

January 7 Rocket attack destroys a gas pipeline in the Sui area.

January 14 The Balochistan Government formally seeks Federal Government's

January 15 Unidentified assailants fire six rockets targeting a checkpoint of the

January 7 Suspected insurgents fired more than 20 rockets at paramilitary camps in

Police in Jaffarabad arrested 24 alleged terrorists and seized several

Police in Quetta, capital of Balochistan, arrested two terrorists allegedly

Unidentified miscreants blew up a portion of the railway track at Nasirabad.

SFs continue their crackdown on insurgents and their alleged camps in

January 14 A bomb attached to an Afghanistan-bound petrol tanker supplying fuel to

Terrorism realated Fatalities in Pakistan,

Terrorism-related Fatalities in Pakistan, 2007

March 28 21 261 310

April 176 18 83 277

July 144 143 191 478

August 56 63 117 236

September 101 67 144 312

October 282 101 154 537

November 293 94 341 728

December 293 48 97 438

Total 1523 597 1479 3599

Comparative Levels of Violence in Pakistan, 2003-2007

2003 140 24 25 189

2004 435 184 244 863

2005 430 81 137 648

2006 608 325 538 1471

2007 1523 597 1479 3599

Year 2007 unambiguously demonstrated that the flag of extremist Islam

The Balochistan province – accounting for approximately 44 per cent of

diminished in the immediate future. At least 450 persons, including 226