Animal Maltreatment

Animal Maltreatment
Animal Maltreatment
Forensic Mental Health
Issues and Evaluations
EDITED BY L ACEY LEVITT
G A R Y PAT R O N E K
AND
THOMAS GRISSO
1
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Animal maltreatment : forensic mental health issues and evaluations / edited by Lacey Levitt,
Gary Patronek, and Thomas Grisso.
pages cm
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–19–936090–1 (alk. paper)
1. Animal welfare—United States. 2. Animal welfare—Law and legislation—United States.
3. Forensic psychology—United States. 4. Mentally ill offenders—United States. I. Levitt,
Lacey, editor. II. Patronek, Gary, editor. III. Grisso, Thomas, editor.
HV4764.A636 2016
614ʹ.15—dc23
2015014416
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
CONTENTS
Foreword by Kirk Heilbrun vii

About the Editors ix
Contributors xi
Introduction xv
SECTION I Social and Legal Context for Animal Maltreatment

1. Animal Maltreatment as a Social Problem 3
Gary Patronek
2. Law and Animal Maltreatment 40
Sandra R. Sylvester and Alexander G. von Fricken
3. Building a Knowledge Base for Legal and Social Concerns
about Animal Maltreatment 74
Thomas Grisso
SECTION II Theory and Research on Animal Maltreatment

4. Understanding Animal Cruelty and Sexual Abuse 95
Lacey Levitt
5. The Relation of Animal Maltreatment to Aggression 140
Emily Patterson-Kane
6. Understanding Animal Neglect and Hoarding 159
Gary Patronek and Jane N. Nathanson
SECTION III Responding to Animal Maltreatment

7. Understanding the Effects of Maltreatment on Animal Welfare 197
Lila Miller and Gary Patronek
8. Social Responses to Animal Maltreatment Offenders: Neglect
and Hoarding 234
Catherine R. Ayers, Mary E. Dozier, and Christiana Bratiotis
9. Social Responses to Animal Maltreatment Offenders: Cruelty
and Sexual Abuse 251
Lisa Lunghofer
vi C O N T E N T S
SECTION IV Forensic Evaluations in Animal Maltreatment Cases

10. Conceptualizing Forensic Animal Maltreatment Evaluations 287
Lacey Levitt and Thomas Grisso
11. Methods for Forensic Animal Maltreatment Evaluations 309
Philip Tedeschi
12. Practice and Ethics in Forensic Animal Maltreatment Evaluations 332
Terry Kukor, Daniel Davis, and Kenneth Weiss
Index 361
FOREWORD
As I begin this Foreword, I am sitting by a fire surrounded by three dogs, all

sources of great joy and wonderful companionship to my family and me. The
bond between humans and animals is ancient. When Harry Truman wryly
observed, “If you want a friend in Washington, get a dog,” he was saying as much
about dogs as about our nation’s capital. So I’m very pleased to say a few words at
the beginning of a book that breaks new ground.
The maltreatment of animals is increasingly viewed through the perspective
of animals as living beings due respect and rights, rather than as property to be
treated as their owners wish. But it takes discipline and diligence to take the next
step of developing a formal structure that will guide research, shape law and
policy, and help to define a standard of practice in the emerging area of animal
maltreatment.
That is the first reason this book is so important. Often a good edited volume
is described as conveying “what we know” about a topic. This book does that,
and what we know about some aspects of this topic right now is “not much.” But
editors Levitt, Patronek, and Grisso did not have the luxury of simply selecting
important topics and soliciting contributions. Rather, they had to design this
book so that those who follow are clearly informed about the new field’s termi-
nology and parameters. The editors draw on the lessons we have learned from
the development of other interdisciplinary specializations such as law and vet-
erinary medicine, public health, and law and psychology. By describing concepts
and defining terms, the editors provide focus and clarity. By covering applicable
theory and research, they lay the groundwork for considering current policy and
practice within their larger structure, which in turn will guide others in this area
for years to come.
The second reason this book is so valuable: it is comprehensive. By care-
fully assembling the supporting structure, the editors allow the contributors to
address various important components of an interdisciplinary specialization.
Law, science, ethics, and practice function in harmony in a mature specializa-
tion. Saying this—and describing what we know about each—is a vital early step
in the formalization of a new interdisciplinary area.
viii F oreword
Many of the pioneers in the analysis, assessment, and treatment of animal

maltreatment are among those contributing to this book. These chapters provide
glimpses of what they have done. Forensic assessment of animal maltreatment
as a formal specialization is in its very early days, but it’s exciting to see it grow.
And make no mistake, this book will help enormously in promoting its healthy
growth. The animals of this world, and the humans who care for them, will be
the better for it.
Kirk Heilbrun
December 18, 2014
ABOUT THE EDITORS
Lacey Levitt, PhD, is a licensed clinical psychologist who was one of the original
researchers involved in the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit’s Criminal Histories of
Animal Cruelty Offenders project. She and Dr. Grisso co-chaired a symposium
on Forensic Animal Maltreatment Evaluations at the American Psychology-Law
Society’s annual conference. She has worked as a forensic psychologist in a
county jail and as a psychologist in the assessment unit of a state prison.
Gary Patronek, VMD, PhD, is a veterinarian and epidemiologist who now works
as an independent consultant. He also maintains an adjunct faculty appoint-
ment at the Cummings School of Veterinary Medicine at Tufts University, where
he was previously the director of the Center for Animals and Public Policy and
founded the Hoarding of Animals Research Consortium (HARC). He has pub-
lished and worked professionally in the area of animal maltreatment for over
25 years.
Thomas Grisso, PhD, ABPP (Forensic), a clinical psychologist, is professor

emeritus at the University of Massachusetts Medical School and engages in
consultation nationwide and internationally on forensic assessments and juve-
nile justice reform. His research has focused on the development of models and
methods for criminal, civil and juvenile forensic assessments. He serves as exec-
utive director of the American Board of Forensic Psychology.
CONTRIBUTORS
Catherine Ayers, Ph.D., ABPP (Clinical), is a psychologist at the VA San Diego

Healthcare System, division director of the La Jolla Mental Health Outpatient
Clinics, assistant professor at the University of California-San Diego Department
of Psychiatry, and a faculty member in the SDSU/UCSD Joint Doctoral Program
in Clinical Psychology. Dr. Ayers’ research focuses on the treatment and neuro-
psychiatric characterization of hoarding and has been funded by the International
OCD Foundation and the Veterans Health Administration. She is the author of
over 40 peer-reviewed publications and book chapters on hoarding and anxiety
disorders across the lifespan.
Christiana Bratiotis, Ph.D., M.S.W., is an assistant professor of social work. She
teaches graduate-level clinical practice courses and has a research specialization
in hoarding disorder. Dr. Bratiotis investigates the formation and operation of
hoarding community response networks. She is a cognitive behavioral thera-
pist who treats individuals and families who experience hoarding. She provides
international consultation and trainings, and her work has been featured in the
New York Times, Chicago Tribune, and Boston Globe.
Daniel L. Davis, Ph.D., ABPP (Forensic), is a senior forensic psychologist with
Netcare Forensic Center in Columbus, Ohio and is also in private practice. He
has served in both clinical and administrative roles in youth-serving and juve-
nile justice agencies and has published in topics related to forensic assessment
and therapeutic interventions with children and adolescents.
Mary E. Dozier, M.S., is a graduate student in the San Diego State University/
University of California, San Diego Joint Doctoral Program in Clinical
Psychology. Her research focus is on geriatric hoarding and anxiety, and she is
the author of five peer-reviewed publications and four book chapters on hoard-
ing disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder across the lifespan.
xii C ontributors
Terry Kukor, Ph.D., ABPP (Forensic), is the director of Forensic and Specialized
Assessment Services for Netcare Access in Columbus, Ohio. He serves as an
adjunct professor in the departments of Psychology at Drexel University and
Miami University, and as a member of the auxiliary faculty in the department
of Psychiatry at The Ohio State University. At the Netcare Forensic Center, he
performs and supervises criminal forensic evaluations on court-referred adults
and juveniles.
Lisa Lunghofer, Ph.D., an expert in social policy and psychology, is founder
and executive director of Making Good Work, LLC, which specializes in help-
ing animal-related programs and causes achieve results. She directs the Animals
and Society Institute's AniCare and Rapid Response Program. She serves as
a consultant to a variety of animal-related programs throughout the country,
helping them to develop conceptual frameworks, write successful grant propos-
als, develop evaluation plans, craft marketing materials, and identify and track
outcomes.
Lila Miller, D.V.M., a veterinarian, is Vice President of Shelter Medicine at the
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. She has extensive
experience working in an animal shelter and clinic and has examined hundreds
of dogs and cats who were victims of animal maltreatment. She is the co-author
of an article on the need for veterinary forensics, co-edited two textbooks on
shelter medicine that address veterinary forensics and animal cruelty, and lec-
tures frequently on the role of the veterinarian in handling animal abuse.
Jane N. Nathanson, LCSW, LRC, CRC, is a social work and rehabilitation con-
sultant in private practice, specializing in human-animal health and welfare and
the development of supportive living services for elders, persons with disabili-
ties, and their families. Her work has included the design and implementation of
client counseling and professional training programs for animal hoarding crisis
intervention and case management.
Emily Patterson-Kane, Ph.D., is a behavioral psychologist and animal welfare
scientist. As a researcher she contributed to the literature on animal motiva-
tion and humane husbandry. She is now an advocate for mutually beneficial
human-animal interactions and for the role of science in assessing and address-
ing social issues.
Sandra R. Sylvester, J.D., is a career prosecutor with the Office of the
Commonwealth’s Attorney in Prince William County, Virginia. She has pros-
ecuted child abuse cases for 25 years and animal cruelty cases for over 15 years.
She is the legal advisor for the Virginia Police Canine Association and a certified
dog trainer.
C ontributors xiii
Philip Tedeschi, M.S.W., is executive director of the Institute for Human-Animal

Connection at the University of Denver, where he is clinical professor within
the Graduate School of Social Work. He is recognized for expertise in the clini-
cal methods for animal-assisted interventions and coordinates the school’s
Animal-Assisted Social Work Certificate program for Master of Social Work
(MSW) students, as well as the Animals and Human Health global professional
development certificate program. His research, scholarship, presentations, train-
ing, and community practice work have focused on the bio-affiliative connection
between humans and animals, human and animal health and welfare, environ-
mental social work, and forensic social work practice.
Alexander G. von Fricken, Esq., is an Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney in
Prince William County, Virginia. He has prosecuted a wide range of misde-
meanor and felony cases to completion, including those involving animal cruelty.
He has lectured for the Virginia Police Canine Association on issues of search
and seizure and has written for the National District Attorneys Association on
the issue of animal cruelty.
Kenneth J. Weiss, M.D., is clinical professor of psychiatry, Perelman School of
Medicine, University of Pennsylvania. Specializing in forensic psychiatry, he is
Associate Director of the Forensic Psychiatry Fellowship Program and is a mem-
ber of the Philadelphia Hoarding Task Force.
INTRODUCTION
This book introduces an emerging subfield of forensic mental health that aims
to assist society and the courts in their responses to animal maltreatment. The
term “forensic” refers to the application of scientific knowledge and methods to
assist the legal system in its responses to criminal and civil cases. The subfield of
forensic mental health that this book describes applies the research and clinical
methods of psychology, psychiatry, and social work to help our legal system face
significant challenges in cases involving animal maltreatment.
T H E P OT EN T I A L FO R A N A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
S U B FI EL D O F FO R EN S I C M EN TA L H E A LT H
Developing a subfield of forensic mental health committed to responding to ani-

mal maltreatment requires an understanding of the causes and motivations of
persons who are charged with animal maltreatment. Such charges may arise for
animal maltreatment of many types by many kinds of people for many differ-
ent reasons. Animals in maltreatment cases may have been neglected, hoarded,
cruelly abused, or sexually assaulted. Just as people who maltreat other people
are diverse in their motivations and character, there is no single “type” of person
who engages in animal maltreatment. Animal maltreatment is a broad concept
involving the behaviors of a wide range of people—female and male, culturally
diverse, conventional and antisocial, with and without various mental disorders,
and developmentally as different as the five-year-old and his grandfather.
In the face of this diversity, our legal system tries to develop meaningful laws
defining animal maltreatment and its proper prosecution. Courts attempt to
understand motivations behind animal maltreatment and consider the impli-
cations of acts of maltreatment, especially whether the individual will engage
in them again or whether they are a forewarning of future aggression against
humans. These issues are important to courts so that they can apply the law
fairly, protect human and non-human animals in the future, and mete out
proper interventions to change the neglectful or abusive behaviors that brought
the individual to the court’s attention.
xvi I ntroduction
The promise of an animal maltreatment subfield of forensic mental health is its

potential to assist society, its laws, and its courts in addressing those questions,
using information with reliable and valid meanings.
One source of this assistance is the ability of psychology, psychiatry, and social
work to develop empirical research on causes, human motivations, and social
circumstances behind the types of animal maltreatment offenses to which the
legal system responds. These fields have a long history of research to support
legal decisions in other areas of law, including research on aggression, child
abuse, and crime and delinquency in general, as well as research on interven-
tions to reduce those behaviors.
The second source of assistance that forensic mental health professionals can
provide is in the assessment of individuals who come before the courts on ani-
mal maltreatment charges. Forensic mental health assessments are commonly
requested by courts in many other areas of delinquency and criminal behavior.
These evaluations by psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers typically
use specialized interview methods and validated assessment tools that provide
information specifically relevant for the causal, motivational, and dispositional
questions the court needs to address in such cases.
Related to this second source of assistance in individual legal cases, some vet-
erinarians are specialized in forensic applications of their field. They use their bio-
logical and behavioral knowledge of animals to inform courts about the impact of
maltreatment on animal victims, as well as the special needs of animals of various
species, when considering the capacities of individuals to care for animals.
The promise for developing these types of assistance must take into account
the current state of our knowledge and assessment methods relevant for animal
maltreatment cases. As this book will show, there is both a wealth and poverty
of information—depending on the specific types of knowledge needed—for
launching an animal maltreatment subfield of forensic mental health research
and evaluation.
On the positive side, society’s concern about animal maltreatment has a
long history, paralleling its concern about child maltreatment. As chapters in
this book will describe, there is a 150-year record of special animal protection
organizations that have sought to identify and reduce animal maltreatment, and
their efforts have produced a significant body of research on the prevalence and
types of animal maltreatment.
Similarly, laws for the protection of animals date back to the American colo-
nies. As described in Chapter 2, however, modern law for animal protection cur-
rently struggles with inconsistencies and lack of clarity in its definition of animal
maltreatment. Reform of animal maltreatment laws is underway in many states,
and as the law struggles to improve its codes, it is in need of more informa-
tive research on the causes and consequences of animal maltreatment, as well as
effective ways to assess and understand animal maltreatment offenders. As con-
tributors to this book describe, that research has been underway for some years,
but much more is required to meet the needs of society and the law in animal
maltreatment cases.
I ntroduction xvii
In contrast to this longer legal history, the application of forensic mental health
to animal maltreatment evaluations for the courts has only just begun to emerge.
In recent years, laws have increasingly encouraged, and courts have increasingly
requested, mental health evaluations of persons charged with or convicted of
violating laws against animal neglect and cruelty. As this book describes, some
pioneers have taken on the challenge of developing and performing evaluations
to explain individuals’ animal maltreatment and to guide courts in their efforts
to provide legal dispositions in the interest of both offenders and their animal
victims. Their efforts are the first sign of a movement toward what we believe will
be a new subfield of forensic mental health assessment, for which we suggest the
name forensic animal maltreatment evaluations.
Therefore, one of the primary objectives of this book is to provide a conceptual
framework to stimulate the systematic development of methods and strategies for
forensic animal maltreatment evaluations. Toward that end, let us describe the
contributions in this volume, divided into four sections associated with the types
of legal, empirical, and clinical knowledge we have or that we need to develop.
S ECT I O N I: SO C I A L A N D L EG A L C O N T E X T
FO R A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
The primary anchor for any area of forensic behavioral science is an understand-
ing of the social, legal, and scientific contexts to which it intends to contribute.
The three chapters in this section explore those three contexts with regard to
animal maltreatment.
Chapter 1 by Gary Patronek, a veterinarian, addresses the societal context. It
offers an historical view of the nature of attachments and abuses in human-animal
relationships, beginning with ancient hunter-gatherer and agrarian cultures,
and moving to the modern (19th century) development of animal welfare orga-
nizations that preceded and influenced the present child welfare system in the
United States. These observations are preliminary to a more detailed review of
animal maltreatment as a social problem in the late 20th century to the present,
focusing especially on a modern, evolving social ethic concerning the status of
animals. Statistical evidence is provided for the scope and types of animal mal-
treatment in recent years. The chapter concludes with an important explanation
of the definitions of terms and concepts used throughout the book, especially the
classification of types of animal maltreatment.
Chapter 2, by lawyers Sandra Sylvester and Alexander von Fricken, describes
modern laws related to animal maltreatment. Beginning in the late 19th cen-
tury, these laws were influenced in part by the need for property laws to protect
owners from harm to their animals, but increasingly they reflected a sense of
the need to protect animals for reasons other than their ownership. The chapter
then reviews the 50 states’ current statutes regarding the protection of animals
from maltreatment. It deals with legal definitions of “animals” (not all animals
xviii I ntroduction
enjoy the same protections across the states) and how the law handles animal
maltreatment cases for adults and for juveniles. It describes the states’ provisions
for forensic evaluations of persons convicted of animal maltreatment, including
the apparent reasons for those evaluations, available evidence about how those
evaluations are used, and what little is known about the frequency with which
courts call for forensic animal maltreatment evaluations of various kinds.
Chapter 3, by Thomas Grisso, a research and forensic psychologist, offers a
science-based context for conceptualizing a subfield of animal maltreatment
with a forensic mental health framework. What would a complete knowledge
base for such a subfield look like as it matures? Three broad types of research are
offered as a way to classify a science-based field of knowledge in this area and to
generate questions for research. Other chapters review how far this research has
come. In contrast, this chapter describes how to identify and classify the types of
research that are needed to form the field’s hypothetical knowledge base. While
doing this, the chapter also sketches some of the methodological problems the
field has encountered or will encounter in performing future research to support
an animal maltreatment subfield of forensic mental health.
S ECT I O N II: T H EO RY A N D R ES E A R C H
O N A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
Law, the legal system, and forensic mental health efforts to assist the law in this
area must be guided by theories and empirical knowledge about animal mal-
treatment. The three chapters in Section II provide reviews of research that has
begun to build that knowledge base. They focus especially on the characteristics
and circumstances of people who engage in various forms of animal maltreat-
ment, as well as implications of those findings for reducing future offending.
Chapter 4 by Lacey Levitt, a clinical forensic psychologist, offers a comprehen-
sive review of research on people who intentionally assault or abuse animals. It
includes research with children, adolescents, and adults, and it considers many
types of intentional animal maltreatment: for example, torturing animals, ani-
mal assault in domestic cases, animal abuse as a reaction to one’s own abuse,
bestiality (sexual acts with animals), and animal fighting as a sport. The chap-
ter reviews what is known about the characteristics of animal maltreatment
offenders within those categories, examining their demographics, developmen-
tal histories, personality characteristics, mental disorders, and delinquent and
criminal offenses. Special attention is given to research that attempts to identify
relations between animal abuse and a propensity to harm humans. The chapter
also identifies the most important things that we do not know and that should be
the focus of future research.
Chapter 5, by Emily Patterson-Kane, a behavioral psychologist, addresses the
complexities associated with interpreting the research reviewed in Chapter 4 on
the relation of animal abuse to aggression against humans. Animal maltreatment
has long been suspected of having a relation to aggression in general and crimes
I ntroduction xix
against humans in particular. After careful inspection of the existing research

on this question, the author cautions us that the relation between animal abuse
and more general aggression is not provided by the mere fact that a greater pro-
portion of persons with crimes against people have animal abuse histories. This
is because the evidence suggests that most people who maltreat animals do not
harm humans. This chapter reviews the empirical evidence for this cautionary
point and examines whether there are ways in which animal maltreatment offers
warnings about later general aggression and criminal behavior.
Chapter 6, by Gary Patronek, a veterinarian, and Jane Nathanson, a social
worker, examines research on animal neglect and hoarding, typically involving
owners of animals who fail to provide what the animals need to survive and
to have an acceptable quality of life. Cases of neglect without intentions to do
harm raise a different set of concerns from cases involving intentional animal
cruelty. The chapter focuses especially on animal hoarding, offering descriptive
cases, theories about animal hoarding and mental disorders, and research on
the demographics, histories, and characteristics of animal hoarders and others
who neglect animals. Guidance is provided on what we do and do not know that
should be the focus of future research on animal neglect and hoarding.
S ECT I O N III: R ES P O N D I N G TO A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
Society responds to animal maltreatment cases through its legal authority to

implement sanctions, limits, and treatment for persons who are found to have
maltreated animals. Effective laws and judicious use of them by the courts
requires an understanding of what options for intervention are available and rel-
evant for specific types of animal maltreatment, as well as their likely effective-
ness. The three chapters in Section III review factors to take into consideration
when deciding on interventions in specific cases.
Chapter 7, by Lila Miller and Gary Patronek, both veterinarians, describes the
needs of animals and the consequences of particular types of abuse or neglect
for animal victims. This is important guidance for our legal responses in animal
maltreatment cases. Just as in child custody cases, the needs of the dependent
organism (in this case, an animal) in part define the criteria that will be used
to determine whether or not an individual has the requisite capacity to provide
necessary care. Appreciating animals’ needs also is relevant when considering
sentencing recommendations, whether to allow the offender to retain custody of
some or all of the animals affected by the abuse/neglect, and whether to allow,
restrict, or prohibit ownership of other animals in the future. Thus the chapter
reviews current concepts of animal pain, suffering, and quality of life that are rel-
evant across species, and the duties of care either explicitly or implicitly required
in state cruelty statutes containing language about preventing suffering.
Chapter 8, by Catherine Ayers, a clinical psychologist; Mary Dozier, a psy-
chology graduate student; and Christiana Bratiotis, a professor of social work,
describe potential responses to animal neglect and hoarding cases. They focus
xx I ntroduction
first on relevant characteristics of such cases that require consideration when

deciding on interventions. Then they describe the range of current legal and
clinical responses to animal maltreatment, as well as their values and limita-
tions. Currently there are no known treatments specifically for animal hoarding,
yet available treatment for object hoarding gives us helpful clues of potentially
efficacious treatments. Implications for future research include exploration of
neuropsychiatric characterization and multidisciplinary treatment for animal
hoarding.
Chapter 9, by Lisa Lunghofer, who has a doctoral degree in social welfare pol-
icy, examines trends in legal and clinical responses to animal cruelty and sexual
abuse cases. It examines what legal approaches to the problem have evolved and
whether they are sufficient or need to develop in different directions. Then it
focuses on clinical interventions for people who have maltreated animals, high-
lighting a program called AniCare. The chapter concludes with suggestions for
the design of studies that will offer evidence of the value of interventions in ani-
mal cruelty cases.
S ECT I O N I V: FO R EN S I C E VA LUAT I O N S

I N A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T CAS ES
This book seeks especially to contribute to the development of effective and

valid forensic mental health evaluations in animal maltreatment cases before
the courts. The development of systematic methods and tools for forensic animal
maltreatment evaluations has begun to emerge. This section identifies these early
developments and seeks to stimulate and guide future progress to devise meth-
ods for forensic animal maltreatment evaluations.
Chapter 10, by Lacey Levitt and Thomas Grisso, both psychologists, offers a
conceptual blueprint for development of forensic animal maltreatment evalua-
tions (FAMEs). This chapter draws on examples from more fully developed areas
of forensic assessment, such as violence risk assessment and child custody evalu-
ations, to offer guidance for the development of methods that could assist courts’
forensic questions in animal maltreatment cases. It first identifies the questions
that FAMEs are expected to address, based on what courts want to know in
making their decisions about animal maltreatment cases. It then offers concepts
that may be useful in translating what the law wants to know into things that
are observable and therefore assessable. Finally, the chapter offers guidance for
developing reliable and valid methods to assess courts’ forensic questions in ani-
mal maltreatment cases.
Chapter 11, by Philip Tedeschi, a professor of social work, offers concepts and
methods for forensic animal maltreatment evaluations that have been developed
in a clinical practice devoted specifically to assisting courts. It describes the
context and purpose of those evaluations, recommended skills and training for
performing them, and the process of eliciting relevant clinical data. The chapter
I ntroduction xxi
includes a review of a significant number of tools and tests that have developed
within this new subfield of clinical assessment.
Chapter 12, by Terry Kukor and Daniel Davis, both clinical forensic psy-
chologists, and Kenneth Weiss, a psychiatrist, describe ethical and practical
concerns that professionals face when performing forensic animal maltreat-
ment evaluations. The chapter offers guidance for competent and ethical prac-
tice in this relatively new area of forensic assessment. Most ethical principles
in forensic mental health practice are applicable across civil and criminal
areas of forensic mental health evaluation. However, ethical issues often arise
in unique ways from one type of forensic evaluation to another, and forensic
animal maltreatment evaluations are no exception. For example, clinicians’
empathy for animal victims presents special challenges in efforts to approach
animal maltreatment evaluations objectively, and suggestions are provided
for mitigating examiner biases that might arise in collecting and interpreting
one’s data.
ED I TO R S’ G R AT I T U D E
As editors we are indebted to our contributing authors who gave their time and
knowledge to this project. We are grateful for their dedication but not surprised,
because we are aware of the values that drive their work. Mental health and legal
professionals who apply their science or clinical skills to better understand the
human motivations behind animal maltreatment often are motivated by their
passion for animals. We care about them, and this caring, tempered by the
objectivity that our professions require, drives the work of people who are rep-
resented in this book. They are the early models for a subfield that has a chance
to improve society’s protection of animals through effective laws and system-
atic approaches to forensic mental health evaluation and intervention in animal
maltreatment cases.
SECTION I
Social and Legal Context

for Animal Maltreatment
1
Animal Maltreatment as
a Social Problem
G A RY PAT R O N E K ■
Society’s attitudes toward non-human animals (hereafter referred to as “ani-

mals”) have been inconsistent, contradictory, of mixed motives, and even regres-
sive at times. Despite that uneven and sometimes obscure path, it is clear that
animals today benefit from a very special status in Western society. Beginning
with historical reflections on the nature of human-animal relations, this chap-
ter proceeds chronologically to review the history of attitudes, laws, and social
justice movements relevant to animal maltreatment, as well as changing concep-
tualizations of animal welfare in more recent years. The chapter enables forensic
examiners to put animal maltreatment in proper social and legal context when
engaging in evaluations of an animal maltreatment offender.
The use of consensual and consistent definitions of terms used in discourse
about animal maltreatment is important for the future development of literature,
research, and assessment in this area. The chapter concludes with a discussion
of difficulties associated with arriving at a consensus about definitions of animal
maltreatment terms and concepts, as well as a description of definitions used in
this book.
H I STO R I CA L PER S PECT I V ES

O N H U M A N -A N I M A L R EL AT I O N S
Turner (1980) notes that one of the first records of humans’ special relationship
with animals was the cave paintings at Lascaux in southern France, painstak-
ingly incised on the rock walls about 30,000 years ago. Although the preserva-
tion and discovery of these archeological treasures may have been a fortuitous
accident, the choice of subject matter likely was not. Of all the facets of daily
4 S O C I A L A N D L E G A L C ON T E X T F OR A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M E N T
life that could have been depicted (e.g., friends, foes, family life, gods) by these
unknown Paleolithic artists, it was animals, in all of their wild majesty, who
were immortalized. Their special status was reinforced, as Carson (1972) notes,
by being drawn in much more detail than the human figures present. We can
only wonder whether they invoked the same awe and inspiration at the time they
were painted as they do today.
Turner (1980) emphasizes that every human culture has lived closely with
and relied upon animals for survival. Presumably to distance this fact from any
notion that this relationship was characterized by overwhelming sentimentality,
Turner (1980, p. 2) emphasizes that the “reverence for animals in the abstract
typically coexisted with a daily round of careless brutality.” In one sense, animal
suffering should not be at all surprising given the toil, hardship, peril, and brev-
ity that characterized human lives for much of history. Nevertheless, for mil-
lennia, there has also been a thread of compassion woven through the human
struggle for survival. It is the evolution of that thread of compassion that I will
emphasize here, as that is the aspect most relevant for appreciating the current
status of animals in society and why laws have been written to criminalize their
maltreatment and/or encourage better care.
The tension between compassion and cruelty described here is reflected in
the philosophical and religious traditions that have been instrumental in shap-
ing cultural attitudes. As Livingston (2001) describes, the interests of animals
may have been considered as subordinate to, intertwined with, or separate but
equal to human interests. Nevertheless, the unifying thread among these diver-
gent approaches was that needless cruelty should be avoided (Livingston, 2001).
Rollin (2011, p. 107) notes how, since biblical times, there have been socially
accepted prohibitions against “deliberate, willful, sadistic, deviant, purposeless,
unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering on animals, or outrageous neglect.”
Perhaps nowhere is this tension better reflected than in the use of animals for
religious sacrifice, which required an item of great value as an indication of one’s
devotion to God.
The idea that animals’ instinctive behaviors and needs should be respected
is also present in biblical teachings. As Rollin (2007, 2011) reminds us, there
are Old Testament prohibitions against practices such as yoking an ox and
ass together to plow, or muzzling an ox when it was being used to mill grain,
because all of these practices were against the animals’ natures. As will be
discussed later in this chapter and others, the notion that certain natural,
intrinsic behaviors that make a dog a dog, a bird a bird, and a pig a pig (their
“telos”) are essential to welfare, and interfering with them can inflict consid-
erable suffering, has come to influence contemporary thinking about animals
(Rollin, 2007, 2011).
With the passing of hunter-gatherer culture and the organization of society
around fixed villages approximately 10,000 years ago, much of our relation-
ship with animals was shaped by domestication of a limited number of species
(Carson, 1972). As Rollin (2007, 2011) describes, at least in broad terms, the wel-
fare of these farmed animals was linked to the welfare of their human caregivers
Animal Maltreatment as a Social Problem5
through proper husbandry. The word husbandry, derived from a Norse word
“hus/band,” means bonded to the household (Rollin, 2011). As Rollin (2011) con-
cludes, the implication of this language is that it was important for animals to
receive care that met their needs if humans were to survive and thrive. If the
animals did well, then people did well, at least in general. This of course hardly
means that animal cruelty and suffering were non-existent, but it does suggest
that there was an implicit recognition of the importance of meeting animals’
intrinsic needs as part of what has been described as man’s “ancient contract”
with animals (Dawkins & Bonney, 2008; Rollin, 2007, p. 130; 2011). Others, how-
ever, are reluctant to characterize this arrangement in quite so noble terms, and
have suggested that, given the lack of consent on the part of animals for these
arrangements, the term “covenant,” which implies a one-sided agreement, bet-
ter describes the obligation (Whay, 2009). Either way, the key point is that some
degree of accommodation of the animals’ needs was understood, and that mal-
treatment was not in anyone’s interest.
Societal motivations for opposing maltreatment of animals have varied
throughout history and largely follow, to varying degrees, Livingston’s (2001)
descriptions of the status of animals (e.g., as subservient to, intertwined with,
or separate from, human interests). One predominant motivation for prevent-
ing maltreatment has been that of protecting property. Indeed, as Livingston
(2001) notes, in feudal times, domestic animals such as cattle, sheep, and poultry
were actually used as a form of currency for payment of rents and taxes, in addi-
tion to their more prudential role of providing food, labor, and transport. Given
this, it is easy enough to see why acts (maltreatment) that injured the property
of another were of great concern. Although property interests have receded as
a motivator in contemporary legislative activity, the property-based legacy of
existing state statutes concerning animal maltreatment can at times confound
the alignment of moral and legal considerations in court decisions. For example,
DeCoux (2007) describes a contemporary prosecution involving a man who cap-
tured a small dog, broke his jaw, strangled him, beat him with a shovel, and
finally set fire to him, ultimately resulting in the dog’s death, all the while video-
taping the entire crime. For the maltreatment per se, the offender was convicted
of misdemeanor cruelty to animals and sentenced to probation. Additionally,
and only because the dog was owned by another person, the offender was also
convicted of the greater crime of arson and sentenced to 27 months in jail. As
will be discussed later, animals are generally considered (and treated as) evi-
dence, without any legal status as victims of a crime (Bernstein & Wolf, 2005;
Moore, 2005), albeit with one court decision in Oregon indicating some progress
in this area (Heiser, 2012).
Another motivation, at least historically, for prohibiting gratuitous maltreat-
ment of animals has been ascribed to the belief that mistreatment of animals
could further degrade human morals and encourage other undesirable vices
and behaviors. Taken to the extreme, this theme was powerfully reinforced
by William Hogarth’s printed engravings, The Four Stages of Cruelty (1751)
(see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Four_Stages_of_Cruelty; Munro &
Munro, 2008). These prints, deemed shocking in their day, depict the progres-
sion of the central figure, Tom Nero, from boyhood animal abuse to becoming
a hardened murderer as an adult. The final print shows him executed for his
crimes, with his corpse being publicly dissected by surgeons for study. Hogarth
ensured these prints were priced inexpensively enough that they could be readily
available for moral instruction of the masses.
On a larger scale, as will be discussed later, this morality theme was played
out in legislative efforts to ban blood sports such as bull baiting and bear baiting
(described in detail later in this chapter). These socially sanctioned spectacles
were common sources of entertainment, particularly in English village
life. They were (at least officially) viewed with disdain by the upper classes
because they were thought to be associated with idleness, drunkenness, and
gambling—all social vices to be discouraged (Carson, 1972; Turner, 1980). As
Carson (1972) further explains, during the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell in
the United Kingdom during the mid-1600s, Puritan condemnation of blood
sports derived largely from their offense at the pleasure the spectators displayed,
rather than distaste for the pain the animals endured. The historical legacy of
animal cruelty viewed as moral vice lingers today, considering the placement
of some U.S. anticruelty statutes in sections of the law dealing with gambling,
prostitution, obscenity, and substance abuse.
The final motivation for prohibiting maltreatment of animals—because it was
against the interests of animals themselves—remained confined largely to the
writings of philosophers and pleadings of theologians, and was not expressed
in statute until comparatively recently. A considerable amount of the reluctance
to accept the premise that animals matter in and of themselves can be traced to
the writings of French philosopher Renee Descartes (1596–1650) (Carson, 1972).
Descartes believed that animals were unconscious machines without minds,
the ability to reason, or the ability to suffer, and he maintained that that their
writhing and screaming during vivisection (e.g., dissection, surgery, and experi-
mentation while conscious) were nothing more than reflex actions [Descartes
(reprinted) 2007]. These grossly distorted views of animal behavior and physi-
ology, now unambiguously disproven, unfortunately negatively affected social
perceptions and treatment of animals well into the 20th century.
PR O H I B I T I N G A N D PU N I S H I N G A N I M A L
M A LT R E AT M EN T U N D ER T H E L AW
The idea of identifying and punishing maltreatment of animals through the legal
system is a phenomenon of the last 500 years and, as will be shown, even more
so of the last two centuries. The first animal protection legislation in the Western
world, passed in Ireland in 1635, prohibited pulling wool of sheep and attaching
plows to horses’ tails (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_rights#cite_ref-19).
This was closely followed by the Body of Liberties enacted by Puritans in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1641. Two of these “liberties” prohibited “Tirrany
or Crueltie” and required resting of “Cattel” when being driven (Livingston,

2001; Lockwood, 2006, p. 5). Good intentions aside, it is not clear what this legis-
lation meant in practice, since there is little other historical record.
There is a considerable written record regarding 18th-century efforts to enact
animal protection legislation. In the United Kingdom, the story often begins with
Jeremy Bentham, a barrister and man of letters who addressed the status of ani-
mals in his writings. His Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
in 1781 was highly influential in encouraging people to think of animals in a
different way (Bentham, 2007; Favre & Tsang, 1993). Bentham’s footnote, which
addressed the issue of sentience head-on, is well known in animal welfare circles:
“The day may come when the rest of animal creation may acquire those
rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand
of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of the
skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress
to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the
number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum
are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same
fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of
reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is
beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal,
than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old. But suppose they
were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason?
nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” (Favre & Tsang, 1993, p. 3, Quoting
Bentham, 1781).
As Favre (2013) notes, Bentham’s argument about the capacity for suffering was
vital to future legal consideration for animals.
As previously mentioned, one of the most egregious forms of socially sanc-
tioned animal maltreatment in England were the blood sports. In these popu-
lar “entertainments,” various types of animals were pitted against each other in
some type of violent physical struggle. In bull baiting, bulls were tied in a specific
location and large, physically strong “bulldogs” were set upon them for the enter-
tainment of the public. Bulls were mauled and killed, and dogs often also suffered
and died when gored or trampled by the terrified animals. The first attempt to
outlaw bull baiting in the UK, introduced in Parliament by Sir William Pulteney
in 1800, was defeated, as was a more formidable second attempt in 1809, that
time initiated in the House of Lords by Lord Erskine (Turner, 1980).
As Turner (1980, p. 21) notes, despite these early failures, the proponents
of these bills were already “laying the axe to rotten timber.” Village life, and
the blood sports associated with it, was already becoming an anachronism in
England, supplanted by a new industrial age. Coincident with industrialization
was a rise in humanitarian concern on multiple fronts. For example, the slave
trade was abolished in England in 1807, and the first Factory Acts intended to
remediate some of the worst abuses of workers, including child labor, were passed
in 1802 and 1819 (Turner, 1980). Thus, the time was ripe for a repeat attempt to
address this egregious maltreatment of animals.
With the support of Evangelical leaders such as William Wilberforce, a partial
victory was obtained with legislation driven by member of Parliament Colonel
Richard Martin, nicknamed “Humanity Dick” (Carson, 1972; Favre & Tsang,
1993; Turner, 1980). Passed in 1822, and referred to as “Martin’s Act,” the law
made it illegal and punishable by fines or imprisonment to “wantonly and cruelly
beat or ill-treat any horse, mare, gelding, mule, ass, ox, cow, heifer, steer, sheep
or other cattle” (Favre & Tsang, 1993, p. 4). Paradoxically, the courts managed
to contrive a way to exclude the bull from this definition (Turner, 1980), so bull
baiting remained legal until outlawed by the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1835.
Hunting foxes on horseback with hounds, however, a bloody pastime favored
by the upper classes, remained legal in the United Kingdom until the early 21st
century.
Coincident with the passage of Martin’s Act (and involving many of its key
supporters) was the establishment of the first Society for the Protection of
Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) (Carson, 1972; Favre & Tsang, 1993; Turner, 1980).
Being extremely successful in attracting the social elite to its list of supporters,
the organization later became, with Queen Victoria’s patronage in 1840, the
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA). Similar organi-
zations were soon established in several other European nations, and the RSPCA
model became a pivotal influence in the development of the animal protection
movement in the United States (Carson, 1972).
ESTA B L I S H M EN T O F A N I M A L PR OT ECT I O N

L EG I S L AT I O N I N T H E U N I T ED STAT ES
In the United States, protection of animals from maltreatment via the legal sys-
tem did not really take hold until the later 19th century. As Favre and Tsang
(1993) discuss, between 1800 and 1850 there are records of only a handful of
cases in which cruelty to animals was prosecuted under legal theories anchored
in malicious and mischievous destruction of property, particularly if the (ani-
mal) property belonged to another. Typically this concern was restricted to
animals that were commercially valuable, did not apply to pets or wildlife, and
suffering per se was not addressed. A Maine law enacted in 1821 represented an
incremental improvement over previous statutes in that it prohibited “cruelly
beating” one’s own horse or cattle, as well as animals owned by others (Favre &
Tsang, 1993).
This more expansive spirit influenced a New York law, passed in 1829, which
later became a model for the first real wave of meaningful anticruelty legisla-
tion in other states (Favre & Tsang, 1993; Lockwood, 2006). As Favre and Tsang
(1993) emphasize, the New York law was notable because it provided protection
for private property and also prohibited certain types of maltreatment regard-
less of ownership. Actions prohibited in the first section of the statute were those
likely to interfere with the commercial value (e.g., killing, maiming, wounding)
whereas the second section further expanded protections against acts (e.g., beat-
ing and torture) that were relevant because of animals’ capacity to suffer. Thus,
by this legal logic, if someone killed their own horse by beating it to death, the
beating, but not the killing, would be illegal (Favre & Tsang, 1993). By contrast,
there have been other cases where motive or intent, as opposed to property status,
was the defining issue in whether an action was defined as criminal behavior. For
example, there is contemporary case law where a court agreed that a defendant
beating a dog for disciplinary purposes, even if painful or excessive, was not a
crime without an evil motive, but that the same action for purposes of torture
would be within the statute (Dicter, 1978). It should also be noted that affirma-
tive duties of care, considered more burdensome than a simple prohibition of
maltreatment, were not yet included in these early laws (Favre & Tsang, 1993).
The person most credited with enshrining legal protection of animals as we
know it today was Henry Bergh. His enormous contributions for achieving
transformational change have been well described (Carson, 1972; Turner, 1980).
Briefly, Bergh was born into a wealthy family and traveled extensively through-
out Europe, where he was in a position to observe the treatment of animals in
cities throughout the continent. In 1863, he was appointed to a diplomatic post
in Russia by President Abraham Lincoln. In Russia (as well as other parts of
Europe), he was very troubled by the maltreatment he witnessed, particularly of
horses, who were the primary means of transportation of people and goods in a
pre-automotive age.
Traveling to the United Kingdom, Bergh sought the counsel of the Earl of
Harrowby, then president of the RSPCA, and learned much about how that
organization had developed. Inspired by those achievements, upon his return
to the United States, Bergh became outspoken against many forms of maltreat-
ment. He was particularly appalled by the widespread indifference to the sys-
tematic punishment inflicted on horses in their role as beasts of burden on the
streets of New York. With his numerous social connections, Bergh persuaded
many influential people to sign on to his plan for reform, which ultimately
resulted in founding of the first formal animal protection organization in the
United States, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA).
U N D ER STA N D I N G EN FO R C EM EN T
O F A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T L AWS
Coincident with formally chartering the ASPCA, the New York legislature
amended the maltreatment statute and took the groundbreaking step of delegat-
ing enforcement authority to a private organization—the ASPCA. The assump-
tion that regular police could not be relied upon to seriously enforce the new
law established a precedent that was subsequently replicated to varying degrees
throughout the United States. This decision has had enormous influence, positive
as well as negative, on how animal maltreatment cases are handled today in the
legal system.
Mental health professionals should be aware that the agencies that have
today inherited this enforcement power vary tremendously in their organi-
zational structure, mission, resources, expertise, and even name. Therefore,
the array of players and their roles in enforcement of maltreatment stat-
utes can be very confusing. For example, the name ASPCA is quite specific,
referring to the national non-profit established in New York City by Henry
Bergh. However, many local organizations have the phrase “SPCA” as part
of their name. This does not imply any association with or supervision by
the ASPCA, which does not operate shelters outside of the New York City
metropolitan area. Furthermore, organizations with entirely different names
(e.g., “Humane Society,” “Animal Rescue League,” etc.) may perform identical
work to an organization called an SPCA. And not every organization with
one of these names is necessarily involved in enforcing animal maltreatment
statutes. Some may simply be animal shelters, pet adoption centers, foster
care providers, educational groups, or advocacy groups, not involved in direct
law enforcement. Finally, in some communities, enforcement of the animal
maltreatment statutes can be the responsibility of a municipal animal con-
trol department and/or regular police. As a further twist, sometimes animal
control has its administrative home within a police department, but in other
cases may be under a completely different area of administration within a
municipality that has nothing to do with regular law enforcement (e.g., sani-
tation department or public works).
Delegation of enforcement powers to private humane organizations has in
general stood the test of time. SPCAs and humane societies have proven they
often do have the motivation, training, and expertise to pursue investigations
seriously and effectively. This is in contrast to local police, who often receive
little training in animal law or animal care and consequently may have mini-
mal expertise in these areas. Police may also have little interest in investigat-
ing animal maltreatment complaints, particularly when faced with homicides,
assaults, thefts, and a host of other offenses against people deemed more urgent
or deserving of attention. Pierce (2011) describes five different practice models
and demonstrates how the amount of police power granted to local agencies can
affect their activities as a law-enforcement entity:
• Ordinary rights approach—used by the majority of jurisdictions.

Organizations have the same rights as ordinary citizens and have no
police powers.
• Animal rescue approach—Organizations assist and cooperate with local
police, providing care to animals and assistance with removal at the
crime scene, with limited powers to investigate cruelty.
• Limited law enforcement approach—Organizations have more police
powers than in the animal rescue approach but not as much as those
granted to a regular police officer. Generally do not have the power to
arrest, but may investigate complaints of animal maltreatment, execute

search warrants, and seize animals.
• Law enforcement approach—Special officers employed by the organiza-
tion are granted all of the powers of a uniformed officer for purposes of
animal cruelty investigation (seizing animals, arrest, investigation, issu-
ing citations, executing search warrants). These programs are also more
likely to be coupled with rigorous training and oversight.
• Community policing approach—Requires an active-duty police officer
to work as a representative of the organization (used only in Indiana).
A sixth type of practice model now appears to be in the making, with the
ASPCA signing a memorandum of understanding in September 2013 with the
New York City police department (NYPD). Representing a substantive reversal
of historical precedent, the regular NYPD will now take the lead in responding to
animal maltreatment complaints in the city (National Link Coalition, 2013). The
role of the ASPCA will be to provide services to support a successful prosecution,
including investigative support, care for animal victims, veterinary forensics
expertise, and animal law expertise. How feasible or desirable it may be for this
model to be expanded to other jurisdictions in the United States remains to be
determined, as resources are not necessarily coupled with added responsibilities.
Regardless of which of these practice models guides the investigation of cases,
prosecution often ultimately becomes the responsibility of local law enforce-
ment, typically under the broad oversight of a district attorney. This can create
some challenges. For example, as with police investigators, the interest, training,
motivation, and expertise of prosecutors with respect to animal maltreatment
varies dramatically. Some prosecutors and judges may work hand-in-hand with
and/or seek input from the local non-profit that investigated the case, whereas
others may nearly exclude the non-profit from substantive involvement. So in
the worst possible situation, the non-profit agency may find itself responsible for
bearing the cost of caring for the animals for months to years as a case winds its
way through the judicial process, with little input into decisions that affect case
disposition or even the welfare of the animals involved.
The problem of providing for the best interest of the animals is further com-
pounded because animals do not have any legal status as victims of crime when
maltreatment is prosecuted—technically, the crime has been committed against
the state, and seized animals are legally considered as “evidence” (Bernstein &
Wolf, 2005; Moore, 2005). This is also true for human crime victims, of course,
but other processes have been formally established in every state to give voice
to those individuals. Unlike humans who are victims of a crime, treatment and
rehabilitation of seized animals may be compromised because of their eviden-
tiary status and the misguided notion that like inanimate evidence of a crime,
the “evidence” must and can be preserved (Bernstein & Wolf, 2005). This often
results in animals being confined for an extended period of time in an insti-
tutional environment where rehabilitation is difficult if not impossible while
legal proceedings drag on. An inherent contradiction in this situation is that
following seizure and removal from the abusive situation, the animal’s condition
may improve dramatically, despite the need to “preserve” evidence. This high-
lights the importance of careful documentation at the time of seizure.
One additional issue with neglect (as well as any other form of animal mal-
treatment), is that most (40/50) states are legislatively silent on the issue of how to
charge defendants and sentence convicted offenders when multiple animals are
injured (Serafino, 2012). Consequently, as Serafino (2012) has noted, this leaves
the decision of how to charge in the hands of prosecutors. Some prosecutors
may charge one count for each individual animal, some may elevate the level of
offense if multiple animals are involved, some may separate charges by species,
and others may charge only the most egregious offense.
There are some promising innovations, however, toward ensuring that the
interests of animals are represented. For example, Rhode Island has become the
first state in the United States to pass a law allowing a veterinarian or special
agent from the Rhode Island SPCA to act as an advocate for animals in judi-
cial proceedings (see: http://www.animallaw.info/statutes/stusrist4_1_1_38.
htm#s31). Court-appointed Special Masters have also been used to advance
the representation of animals’ interest in several high-profile cases (Fox, 2008;
Huss, 2008). To remedy deficiencies in training and expertise of traditional law
enforcement, professional attorneys’ organizations have been formed to pro-
vide resources to prosecutors. For example, the National District Attorneys
Association (NDAA) has established The National Center for the Prosecution
of Animal Abuse (Phillips, 2011). The Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) is
another organization offering similar kinds of assistance.
C O N N ECT I O N O F A N I M A L PR OT ECT I O N

W I T H OT H ER SO C I A L J U ST I C E M OV EM EN TS
One may well ask why animal protection legislation happened as it did, where
it did, and when it did. Briefly, scholars have advanced the notion that early
opposition to animal maltreatment was part of a broader swell of upheaval and
humanitarian concern over a plethora of social ills rampant during the late 19th
century in England. These included the plight of the disenfranchised, including
women’s suffrage and legal rights; the evils of industrialization (e.g., vast slums,
exploitation of factory workers and child labor); prison reform; abolition of slav-
ery; and opposition to vivisection (as used here, this term implies performing
surgical procedures and anatomical dissection upon conscious animals for sci-
entific discovery) (Carson, 1972; Turner, 1980).
The Social Context for Late 19th-Century Reforms
Coral Lansbury (1985; first chapter reprinted in 2007), in her book The Old
Brown Dog: Women, Workers, and Vivisection in Edwardian England, provides
an in-depth discussion about how the antivivisectionist concern over the exploi-
tation of dogs for scientific inquiry eventually became conflated with other social
concerns. Lansbury argues, in part, that indifference to animal suffering on the
vivisector’s table mirrored callous attitudes towards women, and poor women
in particular, by the medical profession. She also notes how poor men as well
as women lived in fear of being claimed for dissection after death by medical
scientists. Thus, albeit for different reasons, male union workers and female
suffragettes found themselves in joint opposition to the medical students (and
their support for vivisection) during the Brown Dog Riots of 1907 in Battersea,
England.
Several classic and very influential books further underscore the intertwin-
ing of various social phenomena in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Anna
Sewell’s book Black Beauty has been called the “Uncle Tom’s Cabin of the Horse”
(Carson, 1972, p. 111). The novel is written as the horse’s own autobiographi-
cal memoir, tracing his transition from his birth in the carefree countryside to
the hard life of an aged horse straining to pull a carriage on the gritty streets of
London. First published in 1877, it achieved enormous popularity and is still in
publication today, standing as a major work in humane education on both sides
of the Atlantic. The book is credited with having a major impact on the humane
treatment of horses and elimination of certain socially sanctioned abuses in the
United Kingdom and the United States.
It has also been suggested that the work of Charles Darwin and his theory of
natural selection should not be underestimated in its influence. Publication of
On the Origin of Species (1859), The Descent of Man (1871), and the Expression
of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) revolutionized thinking in the biological
sciences, but had much broader social consequences. Turner (1980) argues that
increased awareness of the kinship between humans and other animals helped
create an intellectual and social climate much more receptive to the messages of
preventing animal maltreatment. Although Darwin himself was not opposed to
medical research involving animals, his deep affection towards dogs, his close
association with prominent anti-vivisectionists, and his interest in protecting
animals from inhumane treatment during experiments have been described
(Feller, 2009).
In 1906, investigative journalist Upton Sinclair used the meatpacking indus-
try as the setting of his novel The Jungle. Although his intention was to increase
public awareness of the harsh labor conditions endured by working class immi-
grants, the novel ultimately became more known for its exposure of the inhu-
mane and filthy conditions animals faced in U.S. slaughterhouses and of the
contaminated meat being sold to the American public. Concern over these issues
ultimately led to passage of the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug
Act of 1906; the latter established the Bureau of Chemistry, which in 1930 was
renamed the Food and Drug Administration (see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
The_Jungle).
These examples summarize a few themes and events that are thought to have
greatly influenced changing attitudes towards animals. However, Turner (1980)
cautions against using any single explanation for the rise of animal protection
during these years and of the dangers of oversimplifying the motives of advocates.
He emphasizes (p. 37) how, in those socially turbulent times, different notions
“swirled inseparably in people’s minds, weaving different patterns, colliding with
beliefs about other matters, reshaping and reinforcing each other.” Ultimately, he
identifies the following basic threads as making important contributions:
• A drive to reform the manners of the lower classes

• A wider recognition of the extent of kinship of people with animals
• A practical concern that blood sports could threaten the discipline
required for work in the new factories (as opposed to the rhythms of
nature which guided farm/village life)
• A more general reaction to modernization that left people longing for
more of a connection to nature
So why the focus on animals in particular? Noting that concern does not nec-
essarily imply action, Turner (1980) suggests that overly enthusiastic embrace-
ment of social reform could have threatened both social order and powerful
economic interests, given the needs of an industrializing society for a ready
supply of compliant workers. He describes (p. 37) Victorian compassion as
“damned up behind a wall of convention, ideology, and interest” and wonders
(p. 54) whether “uneasy Victorians have subconsciously transferred their chari-
table impulses from the forbidden ground of the working class slums to a more
acceptable object of benevolence,” (i.e., the suffering of animals; Turner, 1980).
By comparison, Jasper and Nelkin (1992) describe these times as a period of sen-
timental anthropomorphism when people retreated emotionally into a private
life centered around the immediate family. They suggest that romanticization
of nature was a reaction to increasing industrialization, with house pets becom-
ing the primary animals with which people had regular and overtly sentimental
contact (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992).
The Related Child Protection Reform
In the United States, it is important to recognize the early links between animal
protection and child protection, as the latter owes a major debt to recognition of
the shared vulnerability of both children and animals to the actions (and inac-
tions) of their caregivers (Costin, 1991; Zilney & Zilney, 2005). Nearly a decade
after passage of the landmark animal protection law in New York, the plight of
an abused child, Mary Ellen Wilson, brought the resources of animal protection
to her aid. Although there are minor variations in the story, the basic elements
are that Mary Ellen was regularly and severely beaten by her foster parents,
Mary and Francis Connolly (Costin, 1991). Etta Wheeler, a concerned neighbor/
social worker, spent months attempting to have the child removed from this abu-
sive home. Given the deeply held cultural values of the time about the sanctity
of family life and parental authority, her lack of success was not unexpected.
With no legal means to intervene, Ms. Wheeler approached Henry Bergh at the
ASPCA with a plea to assist, using the common-sense notion that a child could
certainly suffer as greatly as an animal under mistreatment.
Contrary to the simplicity and appeal of the Mary Ellen legend as it is some-
times told, Bergh initially resisted involvement in the case, as he had in other
cases involving children (Costin, 1991; Shelman & Lazoritz, 2005). When he
eventually did intervene, his efforts are described as being mostly in his capacity
as a private citizen, rather than in his official role at the ASPCA (Costin, 1991).
Nevertheless, it was the ASPCA’s legal counsel, Elbridge T. Gerry, who filed the
petition (a writ of habeus corpus) for Mary Ellen’s removal in 1874, and ASPCA
agents assisted in gathering evidence for the court hearing. This intervention
ultimately resulted in the rescue of Mary Ellen and the conviction and jailing
of her foster mother. Shortly thereafter, the New York Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children was formed, likely the first organization of its kind in
the world (Costin, 1991; Shelman & Lazoritz, 2005; Zilney & Zilney, 2005).
Elbridge Gerry emerged from the case as a leading figure in the child protection
movement. This also triggered formation of similar societies elsewhere, often
in conjunction with or under the auspices of animal protection organizations.
Close association between animal protection and child protection continued for
many years, until they gradually drifted apart. Indeed, one national organiza-
tion in the United States, the American Humane Association, originally voted
to include both animal and child protection in its mission, and continued to do
so for many years.
Costin (1991) cautions against an overly simplistic characterization of the
Mary Ellen case as being responsible for the development of child protection
legislation and its implications for social transformation. Many of the same
social conditions (particularly women’s rights and suffrage) that created a fer-
tile ground for animal protection also nurtured the incipient child protection
movement. Because Mary Ellen was an out-of-wedlock child not living with her
biological parents, hers was considered a non-traditional and perhaps less wor-
thy family, and thus Costin (1991) puts forth the idea that it was more socially
acceptable to intrude into their private affairs. The involvement of men of wealth,
influence, and conservative inclinations (women were conspicuously excluded
from the power structure of the Society for the Protection of Children until 1921)
also likely reassured the public and officials about the very circumscribed and
conservative nature of the new organization’s mission (Costin, 1991). In terms
of what this meant for social progress, Costin argues that the judicial patriarchy
that replaced paternal authority had a downside through its coercive control of
poor, immigrant families that were often headed by women. So, as with the suc-
cesses described for animal protection, child protection progress was also tem-
pered by social realities, and motives may have been mixed.
It is interesting that the laws protecting children, although facilitated by some
of the same social concerns that enabled growth of animal protection, evolved
along very different paths in the United States. Despite Costin’s (1991) concern
about the over-reaching that occurred with judicial patriarchy, the courts did
become empowered to represent the best interest of the child, at least as deter-
mined by older, conservative, wealthy, white men. This was a fundamentally
different approach compared to the New York animal protection law (and the
states which used it as a model for their own statutes). Animal protection laws,
although clearly influenced by concern for the suffering of animals, remained
hampered by their inability to intervene before a crime was committed and an
animal had suffered. The focus of animal protection was on punishing offenders
after the fact, and hoping this would serve as a deterrent.
T H E P O ST-WA R PER I O D: T H E PE T AS FA M I LY M EM B ER
It appears that following significant progress in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies, formal animal protection activities in the United States were largely set
aside in the period dominated by two world wars and the Great Depression. The
loss of the horse as a highly visible victim of abuse and the growing burden of
animal control also helped to deflect the movement’s focus on broader animal
protection issues (Steve Zawistowski, Personal Communication, September 2,
2014). However, when animal protection efforts resumed after World War II,
they grew to a scale that could not have been anticipated.
Numerous authors have noted how one of the social changes that forever altered
our sensibilities towards animals was the dramatic demographic shift that moved
the United States away from its agrarian roots (see Environmental Protection
Agency, 2013). The rise of industrial agriculture, loss of family farms, and move-
ment of young families to the suburbs all helped shift relationships with animals
towards pets living in the home rather than with farm animals or wildlife. Images
of Lassie, Old Yeller, and Bambi in books and movies depicted animals as having
personalities and/or having close bonds with people (Steve Zawistowski, Personal
Communication, September 2, 2014). The rise of the pet as family member was
underscored by seminal academic books published during the 1980s and 1990s
which firmly established the legitimacy of studying our relationship to animals
as a scholarly endeavor (e.g., Beck & Katcher, 1996; Katcher & Beck, 1983; Serpell,
1996). Academic centers devoted to these issues were established at major uni-
versities (e.g., Center for the Interaction of Animals and Society at the University
of Pennsylvania, The Center for Animals and Public Policy at Tufts University,
The Center for the Human-Animal Bond at Purdue University, to name a few).
National bioethics centers such as the The Hastings Center began to regularly
include animal issues in their publications and discussions. During this time, as
Jasper and Nelkin noted (1992), membership in animal welfare/protection/rights
organizations soared into the millions. Concern for animals because of who they
are, rather than who owned them, was clearly entering the mainstream.
Perhaps nowhere are these societal changes reflected more than in the pro-
fession of veterinary medicine. Formerly almost exclusively male and devoted
to caring for agricultural animals, the profession has undergone seismic
shifts. Freshmen classes entering veterinary school are now overwhelmingly

female, and most students are drawn to companion animal practice. There are
continual laments in the veterinary literature about the dearth of veterinar-
ians entering food animal practice (Lofstedt, 2003). Today, the veterinary care
that can be provided to highly valued pets now approaches the sophistication
available in human medicine, with advanced orthopedic surgery, oncology
and hospice, CAT scans and MRIs, and critical care services being routinely
available in many communities.
The influence of the pet on animal protection legislation cannot be overstated,
as attachment to and sympathy for companion animals was largely responsible
for the first major federal legislation governing animal care in the United States
(the Animal Welfare Act or AWA). The seminal events leading to this legis-
lation are again worth recounting, as they illustrate the growing recognition
of animal sentience and of suffering as an underlying concern for the general
public. The legislative history of the AWA begins with efforts by a compara-
tively small number of animal advocates to improve treatment of animals used
in laboratory research. Reform was discussed in Congress in the early 1960s,
but there was insufficient motivation and interest to generate legislation (Free,
1996). Interestingly, when the first legislation was introduced, it was drafted
by attorney Abe Fortas (later to become a U.S. Supreme Court justice) (Free,
1996). The legislation evidently pleased very few. It was jointly opposed by the
unlikely coalition of research proponents (who wanted no controls on scien-
tists) and anti-vivisectionists (who wanted no use of animals at all in research)
(Free, 1996).
Ultimately, a series of exposés highlighting both poor treatment of animals
(mostly dogs) and egregious abuses in the procurement of these animals (i.e.,
via theft of family pets by unscrupulous and unregulated dealers) are cred-
ited with being the tipping point for coalescing public outrage and transform-
ing it into meaningful legislative action. These exposés had the advantage of
being published in two enormously popular magazines of the time, Sports
Illustrated (November 29, 1965) and Life (February, 1966) (Adams & Larson
2007; Free, 1996). The first story, in Sports Illustrated, described the theft of a
pet Dalmatian dog named Pepper from her family’s yard by a dealer providing
random-source dogs to biomedical research institutions. It was purely coinci-
dence that the dog’s distraught owner recognized her missing pet in a picture
depicting a group of dogs in a dealer’s overcrowded truck that appeared in a
local newspaper. When they attempted to rescue Pepper, both her owner and
political officials were denied entrance to the dealer’s premises, and before
further action could be taken, Pepper was sold to a research institution and
killed in an experimental procedure. On the heels of the story of Pepper, an
article titled Concentration Camp for Dogs was published in Life showing
gruesome photographs of stolen family pets, starving and living in deplorable
conditions at a dealer’s premises (Anonymous, 1966; Free, 1996). It has been
reported that the magazine received more mail on that story than on anything
related to the Vietnam War or civil rights.
The Animal Welfare Act, signed into law on August 24, 1966 by President
Lyndon Johnson, initially only regulated animal dealers and the laboratories
who bought from them. However, the legacy of that law however has extended
far beyond the pet theft issue. Today, the so-called “Class B” dealers, whose
misdeeds prompted the original AWA, have largely faded from view, with less
than a dozen still providing random source dogs and cats for research (National
Research Council, 2009a). The AWA has since been amended at least five times to
provide incrementally greater protections for animals actually used in research.
These amendments transformed the biomedical research industry in ways that
could never have been imagined in 1966 (Adams & Larson, 2007; Carbone,
2004). Changes include regulatory mandates to attend to psychosocial aspects of
animal well-being, such as providing exercise for dogs and psychological enrich-
ment for primates (Carbone, 2004). Perhaps ironically, the AWA otherwise failed
to regulate the treatment of animals beyond the walls of research institutions,
leaving state cruelty statutes still the primary laws affecting the treatment and
care of pets in the community. It should also be noted that biomedical research
is exempted in all state animal cruelty statutes.
E VO LU T I O N O F 21ST- C EN T U RY C O N C ER N:
T H E PR EEM I N EN C E O F S EN T I EN C E
The re-emergence of concern for animal welfare that emerged post–World War
II and that facilitated passage of the AWA coincided with a considerable amount
of civil unrest and intellectual ferment over numerous other issues occurring
in the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., the Vietnam War, civil rights, the environment,
women’s rights, gay rights, rights of the disabled) (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992; Rollin,
2011). This was a fertile climate for renewed efforts on behalf of animals. Jasper
and Nelkin (1992), in their comprehensive history of the growth of the animal
rights movement in the United States during the final quarter of the 20th cen-
tury, make it quite clear that the driving moral force behind the enactment of
new laws and regulations was an appreciation of sentience and respect for the
interest of the animals themselves (Silverman, 2008).
One of the most telling indicators of the recognition of animal sentience and
the importance of addressing animal’s interests is the growth of animal law as
a profession, (Gilette & Tischler, 2006). Over 70 law schools in the United States
now offer classes in animal law, and there are three law reviews devoted to ani-
mal law issues (Gilette & Tischler, 2006). These, along with an ever-growing
number of bar associations and attorneys groups, law student groups, animal
law conferences, and books by eminent scholars, all collectively point to a main-
streaming of animal law within the legal profession. Even a cursory inspection
of the content of these scholarly and professional activities indicates an over-
whelming concern for protection of the interests of animals themselves. When
considering how to assess animals’ interests, two concepts fundamental to the
welfare of a sentient being—avoidance of pain and fulfillment of telos—are cen-

tral to appreciate.
Avoidance of Pain
As we have seen, the issue of pain was present in the earliest discussions of ani-
mal maltreatment, but the role it played has changed over time. Turner (1980)
emphasizes how sympathy for pain and suffering in England during the 19th
century tended to “accent sympathy rather than the suffering,” apparently
a nod to the moral virtues accruing to the sympathizer. There was a subtle
but important shift in tone in the Reverend Dr. Humphrey Primatt’s book, A
Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals, which
may have represented the first book-length discussion of humane treatment
of animals (Turner, 1980). According to Turner (1980, p. 11), Primatt was one
of the first who “shifted his gaze from the pitying subject to the pitiful object.”
Turner (1980, p. 14) cautions against overstating the meaning of this adjust-
ment, given the status of animals in those times, when animals merely “nib-
bled at the leavings of eighteenth-century humanitarianism.” Nevertheless, he
does emphasize how this shift would loom much larger in shaping attitudes
towards pain and suffering in the next century.
From the scientific standpoint today, this shift has been completed. Enabled
by unequivocal evidence of similarities in neuroanatomy and neurophysiology
across many species (discussed in more detail in Chapter 7), pain is now a central
focus in discussions of animal welfare. For example, as Rollin reports, prior to
his testimony before Congress in 1982, a search of the scientific literature turned
up only two papers on analgesia for laboratory animals, and one of those was a
paper lamenting the lack of literature on the topic (Rollin, 2011). By comparison,
at the time of publication of his 2009 report, over 11,000 papers were retrieved on
the subject of pain [Rollin, 2011]. In community veterinary practice, administra-
tion of analgesics after surgical procedures was uncommon if not even rare even
enterring the last quarter of the 20th century. Today, routine pain management
has become the standard of care for people’s pets.
For laboratory animals, Carbone (2004) discusses a similar shift in atti-
tudes towards pain and suffering. Previously, pain was treated only when it was
unequivocally diagnosed, whereas today analgesia is withheld only when certain
that it would interfere with the experimental procedure and no alternatives are
available. In the United States, research institutions that receive funds from the
United States Public Health Service (the vast majority of academic biomedical
research) must now comply with guidelines to avoid or minimize discomfort,
distress and pain in research animals (Carbone, 2004; 2012). Under the AWA
(policy 11), any procedure that would be deemed painful for a person should
be considered painful to a research animal (National Research Council, 2009b).
Indeed, the physiology and felt experience of pain is believed to be so universal
that animal models are used to study pain and develop analgesics for human use
(see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion) (Mogil et al., 2010).
Fulfillment of Animals’ Telos
Telos is a concept Rollin (2007, 2011) has discussed in depth. In lieu of a

more technical explanation, telos can be thought of as the qualities, needs,
interests, and behaviors that make a dog a dog, a horse a horse, a bird a bird,
and a pig a pig. Violations of basic telos for farm animals were brought to
public consciousness in a major way in 1964 by Ruth Harrison in the United
Kingdom with publication of her book Animal Machines (with a forward
written by Rachel Carson, author of Silent Spring, a book credited with
launching the modern environmental movement) (Harrison, 1964; Van de
Weerd & Sandilands, 2008). Harrison described in detail the practices of
high-confinement, industrialized agriculture where opportunities to engage
in essential species-specific behaviors are severely curtailed if not eliminated.
The impact of these revelations cannot be overestimated. As Rollin describes,
this institutionalization of suffering through behavioral frustration, lack of
mental stimulation and exercise, and stress, is not captured by the “traditional
vocabulary of cruelty” (Rollin, 2011).
Public outrage over publication of Animal Machines in the UK prompted the
government to convene a high-level panel led by Professor F. W. R. Brambell
to examine the issues raised (Van de Weerd & Sandilands, 2008). The result-
ing assessment (known as “The Brambell Report”) helped widen awareness of
the range of factors (beyond deliberate or intentional individual acts of mal-
treatment) to include acts of omission that could cause considerable pain and
suffering for animals. The Brambell Report (1965) is best known for putting a
punctuation mark on the self-evident concept that farm animals should have
freedom to stand up, lie down, turn around, groom themselves, and stretch their
limbs. More recently, the Farm Animal Welfare Committee has operationalized
these principles into the Five Freedoms, which represent an ideal state of welfare
where physical and mental needs are fulfilled, as follows (FAWC, undated):
• Freedom from Hunger and Thirst—by ready access to fresh water and a
diet to maintain full health and vigor.
• Freedom from Discomfort—by providing an appropriate environment
including shelter and a comfortable resting area.
• Freedom from Pain, Injury or Disease—by prevention or rapid diagno-
sis and treatment.
• Freedom to Express Normal Behavior—by providing sufficient space,
proper facilities, and company of the animal’s own kind.
• Freedom from Fear and Distress—by ensuring conditions and treat-
ment which avoid mental suffering.
There is considerable evidence that awareness of the importance of the Five

Freedoms (even if not explicitly acknowledged by referral to the term), has
achieved significant prominence in discussions of animal care and use in numer-
ous contexts. As Rollin (2011) describes, the suffering of laboratory animals from
being forced to live in housing that is contrary to their biological natures likely
far exceeds the suffering incurred directly from the pain of research procedures.
Thus, it is not so surprising that recent amendments to the Animal Welfare
Act and associated Public Health Service regulations have focused heavily on
attending to psychological well-being in research animals. The scientific lit-
erature about assessing and addressing quality of life and welfare of animals,
including companion animal species, is currently substantial and continues to
grow (Appleby & Hughes, 2011; Fraser, 2008; Scott et al., 2007; Taylor & Mills,
2007; Webster, 2005). Entire textbooks have been written specifically about men-
tal health and well-being (McMillan, 2004) and the physiology and behavior of
suffering (Gregory, 2004). Mainstream neuroscience journals are publishing
scientific research about affective experiences of animals and the similarities
in basic subcortical emotional systems across mammals, discussed in detail in
Chapter 7 (Baars, 2005; Panksepp, 2005; 2011). Animal welfare is now a recog-
nized boarded specialty in veterinary medicine in the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.
Today, operational guidelines and codes of ethics, some of which explicitly
embrace the Five Freedoms, have been developed for a wide array of settings in
which animals are kept: zoos, breeding kennels, catteries, wildlife sanctuaries,
boarding kennels and equine rescue settings, in addition to research laborato-
ries (see Introduction in Newbury et al., 2010). If nothing else, the diversity of
these settings and entities can be viewed as a reflection of the breadth of the
social ethic concerning proper animal treatment. The Association of Shelter
Veterinarians has used the Five Freedoms as foundational principles for their
Guidelines for Standards of Care in Animal Shelters, a document designed to
apply to any environment where companion animals are kept in population set-
tings (Newbury et al., 2010). These will be reviewed again in a later chapter in
this book in the context of animal hoarding, where suffering occurs in part due
to deficiencies in animal care.
EPI D EM I O LO GY O F A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
The existing data on the epidemiology of animal maltreatment provide a general

snapshot of events, but are also characterized by significant gaps. One major issue
is the difficulty in case ascertainment. As Livingston (2001) has noted, because
maltreatment can be a private, hidden crime, it may never be witnessed by out-
siders and the victims never discovered. Unlike humans (for the most part), ani-
mals can die with no record of their passing and there is no trigger to account
for those who are missing. For these and other reasons, only some unknown
fraction of maltreatment cases come to the attention of authorities where they
might be logged and reported. Epidemiological research on animal maltreat-

ment is further hindered because there is no centralized database for reporting
or cataloguing these types of crimes when they are identified. A major national
crime reporting database in the United States, The Uniform Crime Reporting
Program, until recently, did not specifically include animal maltreatment as a cat-
egory, although these crimes could be lumped into a generic group of “All other
offenses” (Addington & Randour, 2012). In September 2014, the FBI announced
that it will implement changes to the National Incident Based Reporting System
so that the Uniform Crimes Report can include data on animal maltreatment,
broken into four categories: simple/gross neglect, intentional abuse and torture,
organized abuse (dog and cock fighting), and animal sexual abuse.
Efforts to collect and summarize data on animal maltreatment are further
hampered because of the diversity of agencies responding to complaints. As
described previously, often this is done not by regular police but by animal con-
trol or private non-profit humane societies who have been given various levels
of authority to enforce animal cruelty laws. The latter organizations for the most
part do not participate in the broader data collection and reporting programs
of regular police agencies nor do they typically share data with each other in
a systematic fashion. Finally, confusion and inconsistency in terminology and
definitions of various types of maltreatment, both in statutes as well as within
organizations, would make it difficult to combine data from multiple sources,
even if such data were available. These definitional issues are discussed more
fully at the end of this chapter.
The only nationally representative data on the frequency of animal maltreat-
ment are derived from self-reports in a cross-sectional survey of a sample of over
43,000 adults (>18 years) (Vaughn et al., 2009). As part of a larger inventory of
items, the survey included the following question concerning animal maltreat-
ment: “In your entire life, did you ever hurt or be cruel to an animal or pet on
purpose?” (Vaughn et al., 2009, p. 1214). Based upon responses to that single
question, lifetime prevalence of maltreatment was estimated as 1.8%. This esti-
mate may suffer from under-reporting bias due to the self-reported source of
the data, but could also suffer from over-inclusion due to the broad phrasing of
the survey question, which could include isolated, single incidents during child-
hood. It is unknown how respondents viewed actions that inflicted mental vs.
physical harm. Nevertheless, in that survey, maltreatment was found to be sig-
nificantly associated with all antisocial behaviors assessed. Factors associated
with reports of maltreatment were youth, poverty, history of conduct disorder
and family histories of antisocial behavior, histrionic personality disorders, and
pathological gambling (Vaughn et al., 2009).
The only database with a quasi-national scope is an Internet-based system
(The Animal Abuse Registry Database Administration System [AARDS]) estab-
lished in 2002 and currently run by a private organization (pet-abuse.com). It
appears that although a mixture of passive and active surveillance methods are
used to identify cases, the database depends largely on media reports and is thus
likely to be heavily skewed towards more serious offenses and those which are
prosecuted. Originally confined to the US, the AARDS has recently expanded to
include cases from the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Spain. As of August 26,
2014, the U.S. case breakdown (n = 17,267) in the AARDS database is shown in
Table 1.1.
As Table 1.1 suggests, the categories of offenses in the AARDS lean toward
nuanced descriptive characterizations (e.g., choking, drowning, burning, hang-
ing) of acts, which may not correlate with the terminology of maltreatment as
actually used in statutes. The data do, however, paint a sobering picture of the
range of acts committed against animals, and also provide a window to how
serious cases are handled by authorities. Furthermore, the large volume of data
allows stratification of cases by a host of factors (e.g., species of animal, type of
maltreatment, gender and age of offender, prosecution status, region of the coun-
try) and thus can allow exploration of the relationship between type of maltreat-
ment and other factors. It is quite likely that the case listings are not complete,
and although it is possible the data may well be representative of features of more
serious offenses, that has not yet been established.
Table 1.1. U.S. Animal Abuse Classifications

Type of abuse N cases %
Neglect/abandonment 5586 32.4
Hoarding 2145 12.4
Subtotal 7731 44.8
Shooting 1955 11.3
Fighting 1506 8.7
Beating 1209 7.0
Mutilation/torture 954 5.5
Throwing 435 2.5
Stabbing 432 2.5
Burning—fire or fireworks 365 2.1
Vehicular 307 1.8
Poisoning 303 1.8
Kicking/stomping 245 1.4
Choking/strangulation/suffocation 243 1.4
Bestiality 229 1.3
Hanging 125 0.7
Drowning 118 0.7
Burning—caustic substance 98 0.6
Subtotal 8515 49.3
Unlawful trade/smuggling 203 1.2
Theft 195 1.1
Other 163 0.9
Unlawful trapping/hunting 136 0.8
Unclassified 315 1.8
Total 17267 100.0
Source: Pet-Abuse.com and the AARDS Project.
On a statewide level, data have been published for one agency (the MSPCA)
with enforcement powers throughout Massachusetts (Arluke & Luke, 1997).
With respect to relative frequency, the majority (57.8%) of cases involved dogs,
with cases involving cats occurring at about half that frequency (26.9%), with
beating, shooting, stabbing, or throwing being the methods used in 75% of the
cases. Informal conversations with humane investigators in other parts of the
country suggest that the findings are fairly typical, and the data for dogs are also
in line with the proportions derived from the AARDS (~61% of cases).
With respect to overall frequency, the results from the Massachusetts study
indicated there were approximately 80,000 complaints in the period from 1975
to 1996, 268 (0.3%) of which were prosecuted (Arluke & Luke, 1997). The human
population during that period was roughly 6 million people; however, deter-
mining absolute frequency is more problematic since another statewide agency
in Massachusetts as well as numerous municipal animal control departments
also receive animal maltreatment complaints. By comparison, the data from the
United Kingdom appear to be more representative, since enforcement appears
to be concentrated within a single agency, the RSPCA (also a non-governmental
agency) (Hughes & Lawson, 2011). In 2009, the RSPCA received 1.3 million calls,
generating 141,000 investigated complaints and 2,500 convictions (<0.2%) from
a population of about 60 million people. Without more information about how
calls are logged and complaints identified or classified, it is hard to know what
to make of the large disparity in complaints per person logged by the two orga-
nizations. What does appear consistent is the comparatively small proportion of
complaints that result in prosecution.
The small number of convictions or prosecutions relative to the volume of
complaints received by agencies may appear worrisome. Indeed, this type of
complaint-to-prosecution ratio has been used to support the notion that animal
maltreatment is not taken seriously by authorities (Rackstraw, 2003]. However,
the situation is not so simply characterized, and although there are certainly
ample reports of animal maltreatment not being pursued aggressively by author-
ities, these numbers cannot be used per se to support that contention. By way of
explanation, when complaints are received by humane agencies, they constitute
a heterogeneous collection of issues and concerns that may or may not reflect
an actual crime under the law. Complaints may also be made over issues that
are beyond the scope of animal maltreatment laws, reflecting annoyance over
barking dogs and stray cats, as well as neighborhood disputes (Arluke, 2004).
Many other complaints will be deemed unfounded or unactionable due to lack of
evidence, inability to identify or locate the animal, lack of timeliness of informa-
tion, anonymity or lack of credibility of the complainant, lack of relevance of the
complaint under the law, or the complaint being outside of the agency’s jurisdic-
tion. As described in the next section, agencies and/or prosecutors will also make
a reasoned decision about which cases merit prosecution and which should be
resolved with other approaches.
Another way to study the epidemiology of animal maltreatment is via its con-
nection to a larger pattern of violence in society. Indeed, a body of literature
exists documenting how animal maltreatment may be part of a web of aggres-

sion, including domestic violence or child abuse. In shorthand, this connection
is often referred to as “The LINK.” This territory is not without controversy, nor
is the process of making generalizations straightforward, as the research data
have their own limitations (Patterson-Kane & Piper, 2009; also see Chapter 4 and
Chapter 5 in this book). Solot (1997, p. 262) expresses concern that an unintended
consequence of this emphasis on “LINK” issues can lead to animal maltreatment
being framed as a problem mostly because it could be a “an early warning sign
for more important kinds of violence,” rather than on its own merits. Clearly,
animal maltreatment is of great societal importance in either case.
EN FO R C EM EN T I S S U ES
When animal maltreatment can be confirmed, when it appears to be uninten-

tional or arising out of ignorance, and/or is not judged to be too serious, most
agencies initially pursue a policy of education and support, which depends upon
some degree of voluntary cooperation from the offender. This can be the optimal
approach when it allows the desired goal to be achieved expeditiously, while pre-
serving limited resources for cases involving significant suffering and/or intent
to cause harm, and/or repeat offenders. There may be other times when situa-
tions either do not adequately fulfill the technical elements of a violation of the
law or are not sufficiently egregious for prosecution to be either warranted or
likely to be successful, when striving for voluntary cooperation may be the only
viable option.
One reason agencies may be reluctant to pursue prosecution is that, as evi-
dence of a crime and the personal property of the offender, animals removed
involuntarily must be held in protective custody and cared for throughout the
duration of legal proceedings. For a large case taking months to years to litigate,
costs for animal care alone can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Humane investigators have also expressed the concern that the risk of keeping
animals in protective custody in an institutional environment may extend their
period of victimization (Berry et al., 2005). Furthermore, because animals do
not technically have the status of victims in these proceedings, there is no guar-
antee that their best interests will ultimately be taken into account by the court
(Bernstein & Wolf, 2005; Moore, 2005). It is completely possible for a defendant
to be convicted and sentenced with little to no thought given by the court to
what might be in the best interests of surviving animals when disposition deci-
sions are made. Although common sense might dictate otherwise, there is often
no legal requirement that animals be permanently removed from the care of
someone convicted of maltreatment, and the degree with which courts inquire
about what might be in the animals’ best interest can vary considerably. A foren-
sic mental health evaluation provides an additional avenue to assist the court in
more formally taking those interests into account before, during, or after legal
proceedings.
Criminal prosecution certainly has an important place in the effort to dis-

courage and address animal cruelty, but due to the resource-intensive require-
ments of prosecution and other reasons described earlier, it is the first choice in
only a small subset of more serious cases. Therefore, a forensic examiner should
anticipate that any referral is likely to arise from more egregious offenses. This
could include individuals acting with malice or intent, repeat offenders, recalci-
trant owners who cannot be persuaded to upgrade care voluntarily, or individu-
als who appear to lack the capacity to provide adequate care for the number of
animals present and who resist assistance.
One challenge prosecutors face when intentional injury is suspected is finding
individuals with the needed expertise in forensic pathology, which is an emerging
field of study in veterinary medicine. Unlike child protection, in which Kempe
et al. (1962) landmark paper about battered child syndrome transformed physi-
cians’ understanding about the pathognomonic signs of child abuse, no such
single seminal publication has yet emerged for defining animal maltreatment. As
Tong (2014) has pointed out, given the heterogeneity in anatomy and physiology
among animal species, as well as the presence of hair and feathers covering skin,
the task is considerably more complicated for animal maltreatment.
A series of papers by Munro & Thrusfield (2001a-d) may have been the first
to systematically bring these issues to the attention of the veterinary commu-
nity. Subsequently, several textbooks in the field of veterinary forensics have
now been published, laying out the procedures for animal crime scene investiga-
tion and examination of animal victims (Cooper & Cooper, 2007, 2013; Merck,
2013; Munro & Munro, 2008; Sinclair et al., 2006). In 2008, the International
Veterinary Forensic Sciences Association was established to further scholarly
investigation and training in this specialized area (see: http://www.ivfsa.org/).
It appears that the literature in this area continues to grow (Munro & Munro,
2013; Tong, 2014). The AVMA Model Veterinary Practice Act now encourages
reporting of suspected animal maltreatment, and some states require such
reporting and/or provide civil immunity for veterinarians making a report in
good faith (AVMA, 2013). More and more veterinarians, and shelter veterinar-
ians in particular, are receiving training in recognizing the physical signs of mal-
treatment. Thus, veterinarians are now poised better than ever before to provide
expert advice and testimony in animal maltreatment cases, and this expertise
will only continue to increase in sophistication and availability as the literature
in this area grows. Legal organizations, such as the Animal Legal Defense Fund
(see: http://aldf.org/), complement these efforts by lending their expertise when
requested by prosecutors.
D EFI N I N G T ER M S A N D C O N C EP TS
I N A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
Advancement of a field of study is improved by a consensus regarding the terms

and concepts used by those who contribute to the field. Literature in the field
of animal maltreatment, however, has yet to develop a consensual meaning for

some of its common and important terms and concepts, so that meaning in dif-
ferent references can sometimes be confusing. The law also has evolved in a way
that offers different meanings to a term across different jurisdictions. This final
section in the chapter discusses some ambiguities of definition in the animal
maltreatment field, and it concludes with some definitions of terms that will be
used repeatedly in this book.
Why the Language of Cruelty, Abuse,

and Neglect is Problematic
Various forms of animal maltreatment are described in criminal statutes within

each state in the United States. Yet offenses, their definitions, and their penalties
may have elements unique to individual jurisdictions. A representative list of
terms appearing in different state statutes is presented in Box 1.1 (Otto, 2010).
Most of these terms address prohibited acts, but a few describe or imply affir-
mative duties of care to animals. Many of these terms lack uniform, broadly
accepted, and clearly understood definitions. In particular, it is important to
note that two of the most common terms (i.e., “cruelty” and “abuse”) may at
times be interchangeable in their usage, and may also overlap in important ways
with the term “neglect.” One section of the California state statute (CAL. PENAL
CODE § 11199 [2009]) appears to make little distinction between them: “(2)
‘Cruelty,’ ‘abuse,’ and ‘neglect’ include every act, omission, or neglect whereby
unnecessary or unjustifiable physical pain or suffering is caused or permitted”
(Otto, 2010).
To add further confusion, these terms may be used to modify each other’s
meaning (e.g., “cruel neglect”). Even when terms are defined with reasonable
specificity, the definitions may vary in different states, whereas in other cases,
legislatures have not provided needed statutory definitions. When statutory defi-
nitions are absent, as Favre (2013) has discussed, courts may introduce their own
definitions when cases come before them.
From the perspective of the animal victim, the same term may encompass
clinically important differences with respect to suffering (e.g., neglect may
imply brief, inadvertent omission of care, resulting in acute but temporary dis-
comfort, such as being left out in the cold or rain without proper shelter), or
neglect may mean chronic suffering (e.g., from long-standing failure to provide
proper nutrition and a sanitary environment). Different terms may also apply
to the same outcomes (e.g., animals can die of neglect as well as from deliber-
ate killing).
As an additional complication, the consequences of a particular act or failure
to act may be dependent upon the species, breed, age, health, or other condition
of the animal. Thus, identical or very similar conditions may constitute maltreat-
ment for one animal but not for another due to differences in age, size, health,
body type, hair coat thickness, or species-specific husbandry needs. Some terms
Box 1.1
Prohibited actions that may be specified in state statutes
concerning animal maltreatment
Abuse
Cruelty
Mistreatment
Neglect
Cruel mistreatment
Cruel neglect
Torture
Killing
Abandoning
Injuring
Endangering
Causing suffering
Causing disability
Mutilating
Overworking
Overloading
Overdriving
Tormenting
Sexual acts/bestiality
Poisoning
Carrying (transporting) in a cruel manner
Fighting
Failing to provide [deprived of] necessary sustenance or veterinary care
Failing to restrain an animal from injuring itself or another
Adapted from Otto, 2010.
(e.g., overdriving, overworking, overloading) may seem difficult to conceptual-

ize because they were originally developed during 19th century to describe vari-
ous forms of maltreatment pertaining to working animals, particularly horses
(Arkow & Lockwood, 2013).
Finally, the meaning of individual terms may be modified and made further
complicated by the addition of qualifying language (e.g., unjustifiably, wan-
tonly, maliciously, intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, needlessly, unnecessar-
ily, or negligently) that appears firmly grounded in the mindset of the offender.
Combinations of terms reflecting both harms to animals as well as mindset of
the offender (e.g., “cruel neglect,” “cruel mistreatment,” “aggravated cruelty,”
“unjustifiable neglect,” “malicious injury”) make interpretation even more chal-
lenging. Placement of punctuation and conjunctions within statutes may also
further affect legal meaning (e.g., maliciously means “intentionally acting with a
depravity of mind AND reckless AND wanton disregard of life” vs. maliciously
“means intentionally acting with a depravity of mind OR reckless AND wanton
disregard for life” [Otto, 2010]).
The apparent attention to the mindset of the offender in much of the lan-
guage of animal maltreatment is understandable, given the historical links
of animal maltreatment with crimes considered expressions of moral vice, or
with more recent recognition that deliberate maltreatment of animals may
be a broader manifestation of violence in human society. Of course, from
the perspective of the animals who suffered and/or died as the result of mal-
treatment, the mindset of the perpetrator makes little difference. Mindset
may, however, be highly relevant when considering sentencing; disposition
of currently owned animals; imposition of restrictions on future ownership
or supervision of animal care to ensure the safety of animals, human family
members, or people in the community; or to answer other questions posed by
the court.
Attempts to Resolve the Language Conundrum
In the interest of standardizing discussion and decreasing confusion in the lan-

guage of animal maltreatment, various experts have proposed unifying schemes
or typologies. These efforts typically strive to account for the severity of mal-
treatment of the animal, the state of mind of the offender, or a combination
of both (Arkow & Lockwood, 2013; Ascione, 1993; Kellert & Felthous, 1985;
Lockwood, 2006; Rowan, 1993; Vermeulen & Odendaal, 1993). Although the
proposed schemes lack uniformity, in general, acts that are considered active or
sadistic (e.g., those committed intentionally and/or providing satisfaction for the
offender) are considered to reflect a greater degree of maltreatment, a more devi-
ant act, and/or an act of greater culpability than acts deemed more passive (e.g.,
acts of omission that may arise from ignorance or negligence).
Intuitively, this graded approach may seem sensible, but in practice the dis-
tinctions are not always so clear. For example, it is possible for animals to die
of neglect and for the neglect to be quite intentional. Thus, it is not accurate to
assume that an act described as “neglect” necessarily implies a lesser degree
of harm or a passive mindset. Some have suggested that cultural attitudes are
important when considering the meaning of these terms. For example, it has been
proposed that animal abuse should be defined as “non-accidental, socially unac-
ceptable behavior that causes pain, suffering, or distress to and/or the death of an
animal” (Ascione & Shapiro, 2009). However, Serpell (2009, p. 639) notes, “if one
cares about animals beyond their capacity to serve as sentinels for human vio-
lence, the social acceptability or unacceptability of a particular act of abuse is less
relevant than the probable degree of suffering inflicted on the victim of that act.”
Given these factors, it may not be surprising that no single system of nomen-
clature has emerged as predominant or universally applicable. Taking into
account the heterogeneity and number of state cruelty statutes in which legal
meaning of these various terms is ultimately grounded, and the impracticality

of aligning legal terminology across 50 states through legislative amendment,
achieving standardized terminology for animal maltreatment does not appear
to be on the horizon. Therefore, because of statutory usage in particular, as
well as the common use of terms such as “abuse,” “neglect,” or “cruelty” in the
literature, their use in this text is unavoidable. Nevertheless, when these terms
are encountered, it is important to be mindful of their context and also their
limitations.
Disentangling Concepts: Harm and Mindset
Although the primary goal of many forensic examinations is to assess various

aspects of the mindset of an offender, it is important to keep in mind that the
underlying reason for a court to order such an evaluation is the mistreatment
and suffering of sentient animal victims. Presumably, one of the underlying rea-
sons for a court to order evaluation of an offender is to fully understand the
relationship between his or her actions or inactions and the harms inflicted
on animal(s). This may not be intuitive for examiners who are unfamiliar with
animal suffering, how it may be assessed, and what it might mean for both the
offender and the animal victim. Thus, in various chapters in this text, we will
devote considerable time to ensure that animals are indeed “kept in mind” when
discussing their maltreatment.
We have already noted that both state statutes and various academic typol-
ogies of animal maltreatment may, to varying degrees, conflate terms about
harm and mindset. We also recognize that legally, when an offense is pros-
ecuted and an offender sentenced, the statutory language becomes determin-
istic. However, while reading this book, as well as when conducting a forensic
examination, we believe it may be useful to first disentangle these concepts
in order to better understand them individually (e.g., what happened to the
animal and what was the mindset of the offender when committing the crime),
before considering their joint effect on animals and drawing conclusions about
the offender.
Harm
We conceptualize harm to animals with respect to three factors: extent, sever-
ity, and duration. These categories, along with suggested metrics, are presented
in Table 1.2. This three-pronged approach allows harm to be characterized
along the entire spectrum, without the limitations of ambiguous or conflict-
ing terminology or entanglement with human motivation. Thus, having fewer
animals or fewer sites of injury on the body, less severe/painful injuries, and
shorter duration of pain and suffering would be consistent with lesser degree of
maltreatment, whereas having many animals involved or multiple areas of the
body injured, more severe or painful injuries, and pain inflicted or suffering
Table 1.2. Key Features of Harms to Animals Relevant to Forensic

Evaluation of Maltreatment Offenders
Feature Important metrics
Extent • How many different animals were injured or involved?
• How many of the Five Freedoms* were compromised or affected?
• How many body parts were injured or involved as a result of the
maltreatment?
Severity • Were multiple vs. single methods of injury/harm involved?
• What was the most painful/injurious physical harm observed?
• What was the most painful/injurious mental harm observed?
Duration • Over what period of time were the various harm(s) inflicted and
endured by the animal(s)
*The Five Freedoms are a series of quality of life indicators for animals described
elsewhere in this chapter. See Lockwood (2003) for a more extensive listing. Assessing
severity of injury is described more fully in Chapter 7. The metrics should be used in
conjunction with good clinical judgment. For example, having only one body part
involved in the maltreatment could well indicate significant harm if the injury was
severe.
endured over a longer period of time would be indicators of a greater degree

of maltreatment. These should be used as a guide and with good clinical judg-
ment, as severity of injury, for example, may well offset a factor such as only a
single body part being involved. Practicing mental health clinicians may find
it valuable to consult with experts in veterinary medicine, veterinary forensics,
animal behavior, animal law, and humane law enforcement to facilitate their
understanding of harms in individual cases that come before them.
Mindset
For purposes of considering the mindset of the human who is responsible for
harm when it occurs, the following three factors are important: intentionality,
pattern, and insight (Table 1.3). Each of these is relevant to any type of harm, as
well as to an offender’s suitability or capacity to own and provide adequate care
for animals (either the animals involved in the incident triggering an evalua-
tion or animals potentially under care or control of the offender in the future).
They are also in line with Lockwood’s more extensive list of 33 aggravating
conditions that he suggests may be indicators of further dangerousness, partic-
ularly when multiple conditions are present (Lockwood, 2003). These include
factors such as number and vulnerability of the victims, degree of planning or
premeditation, use of fire, need to overcome obstacles to inflict the harm, pos-
ing or display of the victim, multiple forms of injury to an individual victim,
victim bound or incapacitated to facilitate the abuse, and so on. Again, these
remain to be validated, and some may be difficult to operationalize from a
forensic evaluator’s perspective.
Table 1.3. Suggested Characteristics Relevant to Evaluating the Mindset

of an Animal Maltreatment Offender
Feature of
maltreatment Important metrics
Intentionality • Was the act premeditated or deliberate?
• Were the results of action(s) or failure(s) to act potentially
foreseeable?
• Was sadism a feature of, or was satisfaction derived from, the
maltreatment?
• Degree of physical interaction with the victim (e.g., direct,
hands-on contact vs. shooting from a distance)
Pattern • Was the maltreatment a single occurrence or part of a repeated
or escalating pattern of acts?
• If repeated, how long was the time interval between current and
previous acts?
Insight • What is the level of insight of the offender to the harm caused
and reasons for that harm (e.g., appreciation of cause and effect)?
• What functional abilities or deficits exist on the part of the
offender with respect to providing care and recognizing the
well-being of the animal(s) involved?*
*Functional abilities required to care for animals and populations of animals in par-
ticular are described in Chapter 6. See Lockwood (2003) for a more extensive listing.
These characteristics are provided as a guide for clinicians to consider, but have not
been validated in clinical samples.
Definitions Used in This Book
Animals and Owners
We acknowledge that animals are sentient beings and that humans are members
of the animal kingdom, and that both human and non-human animals may be
included under the umbrella of the term “animal” depending on the perspective
of the reader. For brevity, throughout this book we will use the term “animal” to
mean “non-human animals.”
We use the term “owner” in a generic sense to denote any individual who has
custody, control over, and/or responsibility for the care and well-being of animal(s).
We appreciate that the term “guardian” has been proposed in several localities and
enacted in the state of Rhode Island as a replacement for the term “owner” in order
to emphasize the special obligation humans have towards animals despite their legal
status as property and as an acknowledgment that animals are sentient, dependent
beings rather than inanimate objects. However, we use the term “owner” in this
book in order to be consistent with most statutory language.
Animal Maltreatment
In this text, when the term “animal maltreatment” is used, it is intended to encom-
pass any type of cruelty, abuse, torture, abandonment, or neglect, regardless of
the degree of underlying motivation or intent (or lack thereof) on the part of
the offender. This is consistent with the broadening of the term “child abuse” to
“child maltreatment” (Leventhal & Krugman, 2012). We feel this global term is
advantageous because it does not appear to be as burdened by inconsistent or
conflicting usage as are these other terms. It also allows us to discuss animal
maltreatment without being encumbered by differences in the statutory defini-
tion, or lack of definition, of a particular term across 50 different states in the
United States.
Specific Forms of Animal Maltreatment

One will note that several chapters in this book are titled or organized using
terms for various forms of animal maltreatment. Authors of various chapters
offer definitions of the forms of animal maltreatment addressed in their chap-
ters. In general, however, we have used the following concepts to organize the
book. Our choices, however, are not without their ambiguity, and reflect the dif-
ficulties in finding any absolute distinction that will cleanly differentiate differ-
ent forms of animal maltreatment.
We have chosen “animal cruelty” to label proactive human behaviors that cre-
ate physical or emotional pain for an animal. The term “proactive” refers to the
fact that behaviors under this definition constitute aggression to harm the animal
or to use animals in ways that may harm them. This includes what many will rec-
ognize as “physical abuse” (for example, unnecessary cutting, burning, beating,
and shooting of pets), as well as “sexual abuse” and “animal fighting.” Chapter 4
refers to these forms of animal cruelty as “intentional animal maltreatment.”
We use the term “animal neglect” to refer to human behaviors that create
harm for the animal because of failure to properly care for the animal. Behaviors
in this category would include failure to provide animals with necessary food,
water, grooming, sanitation, spatial and environmental conditions, protection
from the elements, and relief of pain and suffering. “Hoarding” is treated as a
subcategory of animal neglect. Chapter 6 will point out that the failure to pro-
vide for an animal’s needs, while often a result of ignorance or passive neglect,
can sometimes be intentional. The distinction between our concepts of “animal
neglect” and “animal cruelty,” therefore, has more to do with passive versus
aggressive ways to harm animals.
C O N C LU S I O N
This chapter has discussed the evolution of social concern for animals in Western
society, and has described seminal events and social conditions that collided
to influence modern sensibilities towards the treatment of animals. Although
efforts to protect the interests of animals themselves have been at times painfully
slow, iterative, inconsistent, and put forth with mixed motives, I believe that the
historical record is unambiguous in the progression, independent of any rela-
tionship with or value of animals to people, over time. As Webster (2005, p. 2)
has noted, “For most people, animal welfare is an expression of moral concern.
It arises from the belief that animals have feelings that matter to them, which
means that they should matter to us too.” If one agrees with the assumption that
legislation is a barometer of public concern on an issue, it seems self-evident that
society as a whole is aligned with Webster’s assertion. As Rollin (2007) describes,
as little as 30 years ago, there were few if any federal bills pertaining to ani-
mal welfare, but more recently at least 50 bills per year are introduced in the
U.S. Congress. In addition, over 2,000 bills were introduced in state legislatures
in 2004.
It is not surprising that social consensus about animal maltreatment may at
times appear to be ahead of the law. One reason for this discrepancy is that many
state statutes still retain antiquated 19th-century language. Statutes are often
amended iteratively, rather than completely rewritten, so it is possible to have
language spanning more than a century of lawmaking in different sections of the
same statute. Furthermore, important terms may be inconsistently defined and/
or overlapping, thus requiring interpretation during judicial proceedings. Other
terms, such prohibiting “unnecessary suffering,” may be deliberately vague. An
advantage of this ambiguity in terminology is it leaves open the possibility for
legal interpretations that are grounded in current science and modern notions
of our responsibility towards animals, their care, and their capacity for suffer-
ing. It is these notions that should guide forensic examiners in their assessment
of offenders. This will help ensure that the implicit societal intent underlying
animal maltreatment statutes and the social and moral status of animals are
accounted for in the forensic assessment process. The criminal justice process,
society, and the animals will be better served as a result.
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2
Law and Animal Maltreatment

SA NDR A R . SY LV E STE R A ND
ALEXANDER G. VON FRICKEN ■
The legal system is well-equipped to protect the rights of people who find them-
selves aggrieved by the criminal actions of others. It adapts and changes in order
to assure victims of crime have a voice in a court of law. Thirty years ago, the
Victims’ Crime Act was passed to protect the rights of crime victims as long as
they were of the human race. In contrast, the legal system is not yet equipped to
deal with crime victims who are not human.
This chapter addresses how animals are viewed in the legal system and how
perpetrators of animal maltreatment are dealt with throughout the United States.
We first discuss animals as property, as evidence, and as victims of crime. We
then describe the characteristics of statutes pertaining to animal maltreatment.
Within this context the chapter offers discussions of how “animal” is defined in
the law, how statutes vary in their definitions of maltreatment, and how animal
maltreatment sometimes becomes intertwined with domestic violence laws.
A N I M A LS AS PR O PERT Y, E V I D EN C E,
A N D V I CT I M S O F C R I M E
Understanding the criminal justice system’s response to animal maltreatment

begins with an understanding of the place animals hold in the entire legal sys-
tem. In the U.S. legal system, animals have the same level of importance as one’s
car or other possession. Animals are deemed property and are valued as such.
An example of this is found in the Code of Virginia (1950 as amended) wherein
pursuant to Section 3.2-6585:
Dogs and cats deemed personal property; rights relating thereto.—

All dogs and cats shall be deemed personal property and may be the
Law and Animal Maltreatment41
subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass. Owners, as defined in

§ 3.2-6500, may maintain any action for the killing of any such animals, or
injury thereto, or unlawful detention or use thereof as in the case of other
personal property. The owner of any dog or cat that is injured or killed
contrary to the provisions of this chapter by any person shall be entitled
to recover the value thereof or the damage done thereto in an appropriate
action at law from such person.
An animal control officer or other officer finding a stolen dog or cat, or
a dog or cat held or detained contrary to law, shall have authority to seize
and hold such animal pending action before a general district court or other
court. If no such action is instituted within seven days, the animal control
officer or other officer shall deliver the dog or cat to its owner.
The presence of a dog or cat on the premises of a person other than its
legal owner shall raise no presumption of theft against the owner, and the
animal control officer may take such animal and notify its legal owner. The
legal owner of the animal shall pay a reasonable charge as the local govern-
ing body by ordinance shall establish for the keep of such animal while in
the possession of the animal control officer. (1984, c. 492, § 29-213.95; 1987,
c. 488, § 3.1-796.127; 1988, c. 537; 1998, c. 817; 2008, c. 860).
The value placed on wildlife varies in each state. For example, Chapter 1501:13–16
under the Ohio Administrative Code assesses a scoring value of zero through
three in seven different criteria. The criteria range from the recreational enjoy-
ment a species provides, the endangered status of a species, and the educational
use provided by a species. Total scores determine the value of an animal with a
score of zero through three having a value of $20.00, and a score of 20.1 or higher
is valued at $2,500.00. Most states also use some system to assess fines for over-
fishing in order to preserve supplies.
This classification as “personal property” deprives pet caretakers and fam-
ily members from seeking protections for harmed animals. Restitution is often
a remedy sought by prosecutors in animal maltreatment cases. Unfortunately,
courts often assign inadequate monetary compensation for injured animals.
What is considered a fair market assessment of a companion animal’s worth is
often inadequate to compensate a pet owner for the losses incurred as a result of
death or injury.
The interrelationship of the criminal and civil systems in animal maltreat-
ment cases was recognized by Rebecca Huss in her 2008 essay on the Michael
Vick case (Huss, 2008). As part of the plea deal with the federal authorities, NFL
football player and admitted dogfighter Michael Vick was ordered to pay the
costs associated with the disposition of the dogs in the civil action. The costs
of the restitution included, but were not limited to, “all costs associated with
the care of the dogs involved, including if necessary, the long-term care and/or
the humane euthanasia of some or all of those animals” (U.S. v. Michael Vick,
2007, p. 4). It should be noted that Vick’s was a very high-profile case in which
the defendant had substantial means. This kind of restitution is not typical is
most cases.
The classification of animals as property creates problems for the court sys-
tem and the animals leading up to a trial. In criminal cases, it can mean that
the animals will be maintained as evidence until a criminal trial has concluded.
This is costly and can create a logistical nightmare for the state. The animals are
the best evidence of the criminal actions of the perpetrator. However, housing
in overcrowded animal shelters can cause extreme stress to already mistreated
animals. For example, researchers from The University of Bristol in the United
Kingdom recently studied the effects of kenneling on dogs. They found most
dogs suffered severe stress if not temporary mental illness from being kenneled
(Denham, Bradshaw, & Rooney, 2014). Saving a dog from an abuser may actually
have a negative impact on the animal if it means spending weeks if not months
or even years in a county shelter. Recognizing the hardship placed upon animals
taken into custody, some jurisdictions have started to engage in foster placement
relationships with local animal advocacy groups (Ellison, 2013). Authorities in
Prince William County, Virginia, seized 57 animals including livestock, dogs,
and poultry in a pending animal cruelty criminal case. They partnered with
local sanctuaries such as the Humane Society of Fairfax County to care for the
animals during the pendency of the criminal case. Recognizing the limits of the
criminal justice system and partnering with those who work with abused ani-
mals is one step toward helping the victims of animal maltreatment.
Not unlike a termination of parental rights civil hearing that often accom-
panies a criminal case of abuse and neglect of a minor, many states allow for a
civil procedure of ownership forfeiture to accompany a criminal case of animal
maltreatment. For example, § 3.2-6569 of the Code of Virginia titled “Seizure
and impoundment of animals; notice and hearing; disposition of animal; dispo-
sition of proceeds upon sale” requires a civil hearing within 10 days of the sei-
zure to determine whether the animal has been abandoned, cruelly treated, not
provided adequate care, or used/intended for use in dogfighting. The standard
of proof for this hearing is the same standard of proof required in a criminal
case and thus much higher than the usual civil case: the Commonwealth must
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This hearing allows a government to
permanently seize animals by terminating the owner’s rights. Again, the con-
certed efforts of the criminal system and the civil system work to safeguard the
animals. However, these statutes can be difficult to apply, and proceedings can
be protracted.
Just as children are appointed guardians ad litem in criminal justice settings,
the federal government allowed for the appointment of a special master during
the Michael Vick case to assist in the placement and care for the needs of the
animals seized during that criminal case. A civil hearing on the forfeiture of the
animals or appointment of a special master or foster placement with oversight is
an essential step in protecting animal victims. Yet this is far from routine prac-
tice. The use of a special master has not penetrated to any degree in other kinds
of cruelty cases, despite the potential utility and merit (Huss, 2008).
Seeking restitution from the defendant for the expenses incurred by a locality
during a case of animal maltreatment is a common disposition. It can be made
a condition of a defendant’s suspended sentence and probation. Some states
have begun to reflect the changes in attitudes towards animals by increasing
damages for injuries sustained as a result of animal cruelty (Virginia Code
Section 3.2-6569). Illinois enacted a law allowing for enhanced civil damages
in 2002. Pursuant to 510 ILCS 70/16.3: Civil actions, any person who has a
right of ownership in an animal that is subjected to an act of aggravated cru-
elty under Section 3.02 or torture under Section 3.03 in violation of this Act,
or in an animal that is injured or killed as a result of actions taken by a person
who acts in bad faith under subsection (b) of Section 3.06 or under Section 12
of this Act, may bring a civil action to recover the damages sustained by that
owner. Damages may include, but are not limited to, the monetary value of
the animal, veterinary expenses incurred on behalf of the animal, any other
expenses incurred by the owner in rectifying the effects of the cruelty, pain,
and suffering of the animal, and emotional distress suffered by the owner. In
addition to damages that may be proven, the owner is also entitled to punitive
or exemplary damages of not less than $500 but not more than $25,000 for
each act of abuse or neglect to which the animal was subjected. In addition,
the court must award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs actually incurred by
the owner in the prosecution of any action under this Section. The remedies
provided in this Section are in addition to other remedies allowed by law. In
an action under this Section, the court may enter any injunctive orders reason-
ably necessary to protect animals from any further acts of abuse, neglect, or
harassment by a defendant. The statute of limitations for a violation of this Act
is two years (Source: P.A. 95-868, eff. 8-20-08). Connecticut, Rhode Island,
New Jersey, Michigan, Oregon, California, and New York are among the states
that have considered or implemented initiatives to allow for enhanced dam-
ages (Tirrell & Wilson, 2005).
L EG A L D EFI N I T I O N S O F “A N I M A LS”
One of the largest hurdles facing animal maltreatment laws throughout the states
is a lack of uniformity in its definition of “animal.” The term “animal” exists
in the basic vocabulary of most children. Animals are easily and readily iden-
tifiable to children as any visible moving creature excluding plants. Webster’s
Dictionary defines animals as “any of a kingdom (Animalia) of living things
including many-celled organisms and often many of the single-celled ones (as
protozoans) that typically differ from plants in having cells without cellulose
walls, in lacking chlorophyll and the capacity for photosynthesis, in requiring
more complex food materials (as proteins), in being organized to a greater degree
of complexity, and in having the capacity for spontaneous movement and rapid
motor responses to stimulation” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). The term “animal”
derives from the taxonomic division known as the animal kingdom.
The animal kingdom covers a vast umbrella of living organisms not addressed
in animal maltreatment laws. Just as children and adults have different under-
standings of what makes an “animal,” so too does each state have its own defini-
tion of “animal” and case law interpreting these definitions. The more progressive
states have expansive statutes and definitions, while others have narrowly con-
strued statutes.
For the most part, the majority of states have broad definitions of the term
“animal,” which include all animals but humankind. This is commonly seen
written in the statutes as “all animals” or stated as “every dumb animal.” The
next most frequently encountered variation is the phrase “all vertebrates.”
Vertebrates are defined as any of a subphylum (Vertebrata) of chordates possess-
ing a spinal column that includes the mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and
fishes (Merriam Webster, n.d.). States such as Kansas, Missouri, Michigan, and
North Carolina adhere to this particular definition.
Certain states exclude a variety of species from their legal definitions of “ani-
mal.” The exclusions are seen in statutes in the form of “all animals but …” with
a defined exclusion list. Fish and “pests” are the most frequently excluded ani-
mals (Alaska 11.41.140, Arkansas 05-62-102, Georgia 16-12-4; Delaware 11-5-
1325; Virginia Code 3.2-6500, Georgia 16-12-4; Hawaii 711-1100). Iowa has a
very restrictive definition of “animal.” Iowa’s criminal statute does not include
livestock, “game,” furbearers, fish, reptiles, amphibians, or “nuisance wildlife”
under its “animal” definition (Iowa ST § 717B.1).
The definition of animal is just one of many definitions that play an important
role in animal maltreatment laws. State codes have expansive definition sections
that vary greatly from state to state. How a state defines “animal” in its statutes
plays a critical role in animal maltreatment law. If an injury occurs to a species
of animal that does not fall within the state’s definition of “animal,” the mal-
treatment statute would provide no protection or criminal consequences for the
actions that caused the injury. Consequentially, an act that is criminal in one
state may be legal in another.
A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T STAT U T ES
Animal maltreatment in the law consists of acts of cruelty or acts of neglect.

Maltreatment laws may prohibit specific direct physical acts that result in harm
or injury to an animal, or the failure to act or maintain a duty of care that results
in injury or harm to an animal.
Violations of animal maltreatment laws may result in misdemeanor or fel-
ony convictions or potentially a deferred disposition by the court. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary (1910):
A misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law

either forbidding or commanding it. This general definition, however, com-
prehends both “crimes” and “misdemeanors,” which, properly speaking,
are synonymous terms; though, in common usage, the word “crimes”

denotes offenses of a deeper and more atrocious dye; while smaller faults
and omissions of less consequence fall under the term “misdemeanors.” In
the English law, “misdemeanor” is generally used in contradistinction to
“felony”; and misdemeanors comprise “all indictable offenses which do not
amount to felony, as libels, conspiracies, attempts, and solicitations to com-
mit felonies,” And see People v. Upson, 79 llun, 87, 29 N. Y. Supp. 615; In re
Bergin, 31 Wis. 386; Kelly v. People, 132 111, 363, 24 N. E. 56; State v. Hunter.
67 Ala. 83; Walsh v. People, 65 111. 65, 16 Am. Rep. 569). A deferred disposi-
tion occurs when a judge takes the facts of the case under consideration and
then places certain restrictions and conditions upon the defendant for the
opportunity to have the violation dismissed.
Animal maltreatment includes, but is not limited to, intentional acts of cru-
elty that result in the harm of an animal. For example, Illinois’ cruelty statute
states, “No person or owner may beat, cruelly treat, torment, starve, overwork
or otherwise abuse any animal” (510 ILCS 70/3.01). Whether an instance of
animal maltreatment can be classified as a misdemeanor or a felony offense
depends on the state law. Most state animal cruelty laws reserve felony-level
charges for dogfighting, cockfighting, and “aggravated” cases that involve
“intentionally, knowingly or maliciously torturing, tormenting, beating or
cruelly neglecting an animal” (Phillips & Lockwood, 2013, p. 47). However,
other factors may elevate the level of the offense such as prior convictions, acts
done to threaten or intimidate others, or cruelty committed in the presence
of a child. Additionally, the animal victim, the severity of the harm done, and
the mindset of the individual involved may dictate whether a crime amounts
to a misdemeanor or a felony offense. Although all 50 states and the District of
Columbia currently have felony provisions for animal maltreatment (Phillips,
2014), some designate the maltreatment of any animal as a misdemeanor and
reserve felony status only for instances of abuse against domesticated animals
(Overcash, 2012).
Understanding animal maltreatment law becomes even more complex because
each state defines and punishes “maltreatment” differently. Additionally, most
states exempt socially sanctioned practices from animal cruelty laws even
when these practices may result in pain or death. The most common exemp-
tions involve “the practice of veterinary medicine, scientific research, generally
acceptable livestock husbandry and slaughter, hunting, trapping, pest control,
humane euthanasia and rodeos” (Lockwood, 2006, p. 16). What may appear as
a clear cut case of animal maltreatment in the eyes of a citizen becomes a gray
issue in the eyes of the law.
Felony animal maltreatment statutes are not uniform and need improvement
throughout the United States. The most frequent limitations placed on felony
status of animal maltreatment pertain to the type of animal abused. Whereas
misdemeanor crimes consist of incidents involving “animals” as defined by
statute, felonies are frequently restricted to crimes involving “companion
animals,” “domesticated animals,” “cats and dogs,” or “pets.” States such as

Arkansas, Alabama, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and Kentucky allow for fel-
ony convictions only for acts of cruelty against cats or dogs (AR 5-62-104; AL
13A-11-241; KY 525.135; PA § 5511; MS § 97-41-1). Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New York, Tennessee, Kansas, and Ohio limit felony status to acts
against companion or domestic animals. New York defines a companion ani-
mal as “any dog or cat, and shall also mean any other domesticated animal
normally maintained in or near the household of the owner or person who
cares for such other domesticated animal. ‘Pet’ or ‘companion animal’ shall
not include a ‘farm animal’ as defined in this section” (N.Y. AGM. LAW §350).
Kansas defines a “domestic pet” as any domesticated animal which is kept for
pleasure rather than utility (KS 21-6411). A maltreated animal must fall within
the specific category created by the state for an offender to receive felony status.
The implication of elevated felony treatment for certain animals is that statutes
address the harm suffered by human owners as opposed to the actual harm
suffered by the animals.
Animal maltreatment also takes place in the form of neglect. In its most
simple form, animal maltreatment by means of neglect is the failure to pro-
vide an adequate level of care towards animals. Failing to provide proper shel-
ter, food and water, or veterinary treatment can cause serious harm and even
death to an animal. When an individual takes possession of another living
creature, that individual assumes a legal duty of care to provide for that ani-
mal. Failing to provide the most basic of necessities is inhumane and therefore
criminalized.
Other acts of maltreatment include animal hoarding and abandonment.
Hoarding occurs when a person keeps far more animals than he or she can care
for and properly shelter. In addition to sanitation issues, mental health issues are
also often associated with incidents of animal hoarding. Animal abandonment
occurs when an owner or temporary caretaker of an animal leaves that animal in
a public or private place without intending to return for the animal and without
making provision for the animal’s continued care. A startling number of ani-
mals die every year when people move out of their residences and simply leave
the animals behind (ASPCA, 2014).
An act of neglect, although it involves inaction, does not necessarily mean
that the individual lacks the mens rea, or requisite intent, to commit the crime.
In fact, many cases of animal maltreatment that fall within the category of
neglect are very intentional acts in which the defendant meant or desired to
harm or punish a particular animal. A growing number of states do make
the distinction between simply failing to take adequate care and the inten-
tional withholding of care. For the states that contain felony neglect provi-
sions, in order to rise to a felony level, prosecutors must demonstrate that the
neglect occurred in a willful or intentional manner or as a subsequent offense
or resulted in death. Incidents that lack this requisite intent to do harm are
treated as misdemeanor offenses.
M A LT R E AT M EN T STAT U T ES AC R O S S
T H E U N I T ED STAT ES
Animal maltreatment is defined in various ways across the United States. The
range of definitions of animal maltreatment creates a large disparity in how
animal maltreatment crimes are treated in the country. The greatest disparity
between state statutes can be observed in punishments specified in animal mal-
treatment laws. A review of the laws in Illinois and Kentucky demonstrates this
disparity.
In the United States, Kentucky’s statutes are the most restrictive and provide
the least protection to animals. Kentucky provides only misdemeanor offenses
for intentional cruelty and intentional neglect to all animals (KY 525.130).
Kentucky reserves felony punishment only for instances involving the staged
fighting of four-legged animals or acts of torturing cats or dogs (KY 525.125). In
addition to being tortured, the statute requires serious injury or harm to the cat
or dog in order to amount to a felony. Kentucky statute also provides the bare
minimum protection to animal victims of neglect. Kentucky fails to define a
standard of care to apply when people are responsible for animals’ welfare. The
lack of a standard of care makes the actual prosecution and conviction of animal
neglect cases challenging. Additionally, the state has no felony penalty for neglect
or abandonment; it is currently a misdemeanor to neglect or abandon dogs and
cats. Kentucky also has no animal sexual assault provisions and does not require
any mental health evaluations for offenders. Courts do not restrict an abuser’s
ownership of more animals after a conviction. Kentucky only requires forfeiture
in instances involving fights for pleasure or profit (KY 436.610). Kentucky courts
do not have to force the abuser to surrender custody of the animal (KY 525.125).
According to the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF, 2013), Kentucky has the
weakest animal protection laws in the country.
As our knowledge and understanding of animal consciousness, psychologi-
cal well-being, and behavioral needs continues to develop, and societal views
towards animals evolve, so too have the state laws addressing animal maltreat-
ment. Statutes across the United States have been trending towards higher stan-
dards of care for animals and harsher punishments for violators. According to
ALDF’s 2013 U.S. Animal Protection Laws Rankings, Illinois has the most com-
prehensive animal protection laws.
Illinois’ (510 ILCS 70) Humane Care for Animals Act provides a model stat-
ute for animal maltreatment. Although the statute can be improved, it remains
the most comprehensive and protective law in the United States. As mentioned
earlier, except for a select few states, most animal maltreatment statutes define
“animal” in broad terms. The Illinois’ Humane Care for Animals Act provides
protection to most animals; it is not limited strictly to domestic animals. The
states also differ in the application of felony punishments for animal maltreat-
ment. Illinois’ Act provides felony penalties for cruelty, neglect and abandon-
ment, fighting, and sexual assault.
Animal owners in Illinois owe a clearly defined duty of care, which acts as the
bare minimum that an owner must provide for an animal. Section three of the
Illinois Humane Care for Animals Act states that an owner shall provide the fol-
lowing for every animal: “a sufficient quantity of good quality, wholesome food
and water; adequate shelter and protection from the weather; veterinary care when
needed to prevent suffering; and humane care and treatment” (510 ILCS 70/3.00).
Failing to provide this care to an animal would constitute the criminal offense
of animal neglect. Unlike the Kentucky statute, Illinois does not require neglect
to be a crime of intent. When intent is present, and serious injury occurs to
an animal, the Illinois statute elevates the crime and it becomes aggravated in
nature. Illinois provides increased felony punishment for repeat animal neglect
offenders and makes every single day of neglect a separate offense:
A person convicted of violating subsection (a) of this Section is guilty of a

Class B misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation of subsection (a) of
this Section is a Class 4 felony with every day that a violation continues con-
stituting a separate offense. In addition to any other penalty provided by law,
upon conviction for violating subsection (a) of this Section, the court may
order the convicted person to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evalua-
tion and to undergo any treatment at the convicted person’s expense that the
court determines to be appropriate after due consideration of the evaluation.
If the convicted person is a juvenile or a companion animal hoarder, the
court must order the convicted person to undergo a psychological or psychi-
atric evaluation and to undergo treatment that the court determines to be
appropriate after due consideration of the evaluation. 510 ILCS 70/Sec 3(d)
As noted in the statute, Illinois allows for court ordered mental health evalua-
tions for convicted individuals and mandates such evaluations for juveniles as
well as defendants considered “hoarders.”
Illinois’ cruelty statute states, “No person or owner may beat, cruelly treat,
torment, starve, overwork or otherwise abuse any animal.” Like its neglect stat-
ute, repeat offenders face felony convictions, and anyone convicted may face
court-ordered mental health evaluations (510 ILCS 70/3.01). Illinois also pro-
vides protection to animals in the form of an aggravated cruelty statute, which
automatically provides felony convictions for any intentional act that causes
a companion animal to suffer serious injury or death (510 ILCS 70/3.02(a)).
Animal torture mandates a psychological examination (510 ILCS 70/3.03).
Further protection is provided to the animal victims involved because Illinois
allows for pre-trial seizure as well as the complete forfeiture of the animals (510
ILCS 70/3.04). Courts may also include animals within protective orders, which
can minimize contact a domestic violence offender may have with an animal
victim (510 ILCS 70/16.3). The consequences of animal maltreatment also can be
affected by the type of offender (juvenile vs. adult) and the scenario in which the
maltreatment took place, specifically whether it was in the context of a domestic
violence episode.
I M P O RTA N T T R EN DS I N A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T L AWS
The past several decades have seen a number of trends in laws pertaining to ani-
mal maltreatment. These include special attention to juvenile offenders, to ani-
mal maltreatment in the context of domestic violence, and the influence of other
types of crime on animal maltreatment law.
Juveniles and Animal Maltreatment
In 2001, the United States Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) published a Juvenile Justice Bulletin, which
noted increasing interest in the relationship between animal cruelty or abuse
and serious violent juvenile offenders (Ascione, 2001). The Bulletin referenced a
study of nine school shootings in the United States in which 5 of the 11 perpetra-
tors had histories of animal abuse (Verlinden, 2000).
In 2012, the Animal Welfare Institute published a study entitled Animal
Cruelty Crime Statistics (Addington & Randour, 2012). Because federal crime
reporting databases did not mention statistics for acts involving animal cruelty,
the study focused on 18 states that receive information about animal cruelty.
Specifically, Addington and Randour reviewed arrestee data collection from
Ohio during the period of 2001 to 2011. Out of a total of 287 reports of cruelty,
61 involved offenders 19 years of age or younger. Eight of those cases involved
offenders under the age of 12.
The American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI), in association with
OJJDP and the ASPCA, published Animal Cruelty Prosecution: Opportunities for
Early Response to Crime and Interpersonal Violence (Lockwood, 2006). The paper
argued that as a potential predictor of future dangerousness in individuals, the
proper reporting and prosecution of juveniles involved in acts of animal cruelty
bears great importance. For example, a 10-year study of at-risk children showed
that those who were classified as cruel to animals between the ages of 6 and 12
were more than twice as likely as others to be referred to juvenile authorities for
a violent offense (Becker, Herrera, McCloskey, & Stuewig, 2004). Animal cruelty
has been identified as one of the earliest serious offenses which may provide the
opportunity for intervention at a stage where it may have preventive and positive
long term effects (Lockwood, 2006).
Juvenile cases follow a different course than adult criminal prosecutions.
The juvenile justice system is often viewed as remedial in nature. For example,
regarding juveniles, Virginia Code 16.1-227 states that:
“This law shall be construed liberally and as remedial in character, and the
powers hereby conferred are intended to be general to effect the beneficial
purposes herein set forth. It is the intention of this law that in all proceed-
ings the welfare of the child and the family, the safety of the community
and the protection of the rights of victims are the paramount concerns of
the Commonwealth and to the end that these purposes may be attained,
the judge shall possess all necessary and incidental powers and authority,
whether legal or equitable in their nature.”
In the Commonwealth of Virginia, juveniles are not arrested on warrants,

but are processed on petitions (Virginia Code Section 16.1-260). Juveniles are
not convicted of crimes, but adjudicated delinquent (Virginia Code Section
16.1-228). There are a number of dispositional alternatives for juveniles, which
are not available to adults who are convicted of crimes. Dispositions range from
house arrest, residential treatment, probation, counseling, continuing a case
for a period of time to be dismissed or reduced to a lesser crime if the juvenile
adheres to probation, to the more severe commitment to a locked facility for
an indeterminate period of time not to exceed age 21 or certifying the juvenile
for trial as an adult (Virginia Code Sections 16.1-269.1; 16.1-285.1). The juvenile
court considers various factors such as age, prior criminal record, social history,
family background, and school and educational information in determining an
appropriate sentence. In cases involving animal cruelty, at least in most jurisdic-
tions in the Commonwealth of Virginia, a psychological evaluation would be
critical to determining the appropriate disposition.
In Prince William County, Virginia, psychological evaluations of the juvenile
charged with animal cruelty are made part of the social history and report used
by the court for sentencing. There is no special mechanism for ordering such an
evaluation; it is performed by the court service unit psychologist and is done in
each case involving cruelty.
It is important to note that although juveniles in Virginia are charged with
the same offenses as adults who commit animal cruelty, their punishment does
not fall within the range of punishment allowed for adult offenders, owing to
the remedial nature of the court. As of 2006, no states have statutory provisions
allowing for the automatic waiver and transfer of a juvenile to the adult court for
juveniles charged with animal maltreatment (Lockwood, 2006).
Domestic Violence
Family pets are often used by perpetrators of domestic violence to control their
victims (Randour, 2011). Threatening to harm a pet if a victim leaves is but one
way an abuser can dominate his victim. Many victims of domestic violence will
not leave an abusive household if they cannot take their pets with them (e.g.,
Ascione et al., 2007). An inability to take a pet to a shelter or otherwise protect
the pet places the pet in jeopardy of becoming the target of the abuser in order
to punish the victim. In recognition of this dynamic, many states have expanded
the statutory definition of domestic violence. Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and
Tennessee specifically define domestic violence as including injury to animals
(Ariz. Rev. Stat § 13-3601; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann § 18-6-800.3(1); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 31-9-2-29.5; Nebraska Revised Statutes § 43-2922; Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 33.018(1)(e)(7); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-601(1)).
For example, Colorado’s statute defines “domestic violence” as:
“Domestic Violence” means an act or threatened act of violence upon

a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate
relationship. “Domestic Violence” also includes any other crime against
a person, or against property, including an animal, or any municipal
ordinance violation against a person, or against property, including
an animal, when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment,
intimidation, or revenge against a person with whom the actor is or
has been involved in an intimate relationship. (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann
§ 18-6-800.3(1).
Arizona provides that “domestic violence means intentionally or know-

ingly subjecting an animal under the control of a person to cruel neglect
or abandonment resulting in serious physical injury to the animal” (A.R.
S. 13-3601). The growing recognition by legislators of the link between
domestic violence, child abuse, and animal maltreatment is producing an
increase in changes that allow for animals to be included in domestic vio-
lence protective orders.
A number of jurisdictions may not include animal cruelty in their definition
of domestic violence, but they do allow for animals to become part of a domes-
tic violence protective order. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and
Puerto Rico ( A.R.S. 13-3601-02; Ark. Code 9-15-205; Calif. Section 632 Family
Code; C.R.S. 18-6-800.3-803; G.S.C.46b-15(b) and 46(b)-38(c) and 54-1(k);
H.R.S.586-4; 725 ILCS 5/112A-14; R.S. 46.2135(A)(7) and Children’s Code A rt.
1569 (A)(7); 19-A MRSA Section 4007(1) and 4011 (2); Ann. Code of Md. 4-501,
4-504.1, 4-505 &4-506; Section 49, Chapter 209A of the General laws; Minn. Stat.
581B.01 (6)(15); N.R.S. 33.018 and 33.030; P.L.2011 c. 21`3 C.2C:25-29;NY FAM
CT Section 842; S.L. 2009-425; 22 O.S. 2001 60.2€ & 22 O.S. 2001 1105(B); ORS
107.718; Tennessee Code 36-3-601(1) and 36-3-606(a); Section 85.021, Family
Code; 15 V.S>A> Section 1103; R.C.W. 26.50.060 and 26.50.110 (2009); WV
Code 48-27-503; Law No. 154 (2008) P.S. 2552) (American Humane Association
[AHA], n.d.). Virginia passed legislation in July 2014 allowing for animals to
be part of protective orders by granting the petitioner exclusive possession of
a companion animal in the recent amendments to VA Code 16.1-253. In their
monograph, “Understanding the Link” (Phillips, 2014), the National District
Attorneys Association advocates for the inclusion of animal-focused violence
in standard assessments and intake forms for child protective services, mental
health and domestic violence workers.
Similarities to Other Violent Crimes
The parallels between animal maltreatment prosecutions and the historic pro-
gression in the prosecution of other crimes involving interpersonal violence
shows the same potential for improvement, increased resources, and greater
awareness. Interpersonal violence “pertains to the intentional use of physical
force or power, threatened or actual, against another person or against a group
or community that results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury,
death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation” (Dahlberg &
Krug, 2002). Although Henry Bergh shined the spotlight on child abuse in
the United States, child abuse statutes and prosecutions did not experience an
overhaul in how they were handled until the 1980s. Like animal maltreatment
prosecution, elder abuse cases are also just now receiving additional attention
from the public, legislatures, and the criminal justice system. The common
threads amongst child abuse, domestic violence, elder abuse, and animal mal-
treatment cases are the complexity of dealing with victims who may not be
able to speak for themselves, a cycle of violence, and medical issues involving
victims. Advancements made in child abuse prosecutions have taught lessons
that can and should be applied to animal maltreatment prosecutions as well
as other interpersonal crimes. Animal maltreatment and elder abuse prosecu-
tions are still in their early period regarding response and available resources.
Concluding this section on trends in animal maltreatment laws, it is worth-
while to note that legislation is not the only ways in which laws evolve and
change. Judicial branches in every state also influence the body of animal mal-
treatment law through statutory interpretation and the creation of case law. The
involvement of the judicial branch creates even greater differentiation between
states. It also requires that anyone attempting to understand their state’s laws on
animal maltreatment must review not only the state’s statutes but also its courts’
interpretations of them in appellate cases.
D I S P O S I T I O N A N D S EN T EN C I N G
States vary in the disposition and sentencing of animal maltreatment. Two spe-
cial features of many animal maltreatment statutes are the potential to prohibit
a person from owning animals and the requirement of psychological counseling
for the offender.
Banning Ownership
One penalty for those convicted of animal maltreatment is the prohibition against
owning animals. Many states have yet to add this prohibition to their legislation.
The states that have included this prohibition as a dispositional alternative are
divided into two categories: states that give the courts discretion to ban future
ownership and states that mandate the forfeiture of the right to own animals.
The states that allow the courts discretion to ban ownership include Arkansas,
California, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia
(Arkansas Section 11.61.140; Cal. Penal Code Section 597, Section 11199; Florida
Section 828.12, 828.073; Idaho Section 25-2504; 510 ILCS Section 70/3.01-3.05;
Maine Section 17-1031;17-1027;7-4011; Maryland, Criminal Law 10-606, 10-604,
10-615; Minnesota Section 343.21, 343.235; Mississippi Section 97-41-2, 97-41-
15, 97-41-16; Montana Section 45-8-211, 45-8-217, 27-1-434; New Hampshire
Section 644:8; New York Ag & Markets Law Section 353, 353 a, 373, 374; Ohio
Section 959.02, 959.13, 959.131, 959. 132, 959.99; Pennsylvania 18 Pa Section
5511; Tennessee Section 39-14-202, 39-14-210, 39-14-212, Utah Section 76-9-301;
Vermont 13 V.S.A. Section 352, 352a, 353, 354; Virginia 3.2-6570; Wisconsin
Section 951.18, 951.02, 173.23; Wyoming Section 6-3-203;11-29-114; District of
Columbia Section 22-1001-1004 (The Humane Society of the United States, 2011).
Fewer states make banning of ownership mandatory, thus removing judicial
discretion. Delaware, Kansas, Oregon, West Virginia, and the Virgin Islands
require the banning of animal ownership with the time for the ban dependent
on the severity of the charge (Delaware 11 Del. C. 1325; 3 Del. C. 7905; Kansas
Section 21-4310; 23-4311; 23-4313; 23-4317; 21-6412; Oregon sections 167.315,
320, 322, 332, 334, 347, 350; West Virginia Section 61-8-19; 7-10-4; Virgin Islands
14 V.I.C. Section 181-185; 187). Michigan has a discretionary ban for a probation-
ary period but a mandatory ban for a second offense (Michigan Section 750.50;
50b). Nebraska also has a dichotomous statute which requires the banning of
future ownership for felony charges, but makes it discretionary for misdemeanor
charges (Nebraska Sections 28-1009, 1011, 1012, 1019). Washington State bans
ownership if the animal dies, but notes that if a ban is ordered it is limited to two
years for initial misdemeanor convictions and is permanent for felony or subse-
quent misdemeanor convictions (Washington sections 16.52-205; 207; 200). The
remaining states are silent with regard to future animal ownership. The wide
range of judicial temperament and opinion regarding the importance of pun-
ishing animal cruelty may warrant a shift towards removing judicial discretion
in favor of an outright ban on animal ownership for individuals convicted of
Psychological Counseling
A number of states currently provide as a part of a disposition psychologi-

cal or psychiatric evaluations and counseling for persons convicted of animal
cruelty. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 list the states that authorize psychological counsel-
ing and evaluations, respectively. Of the states that include a counseling com-
ponent in their penal code, only a few mandate an evaluation or counseling.
Furthermore, states frequently limit mandatory evaluation and counseling to
Table 2.1. State Statutes Regarding Counseling for Animal Maltreatment Offenders
State Statute Statute Terms Mandatory or
Permissive?
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1411 The court may order a person convicted of sexual contact or intercourse Permissive
(2014) with an animal to participate in counselling at the person’s expense.
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-62-104(c), Upon conviction for animal cruelty or aggravated animal cruelty, the Mandatory, if
(d) court shall order, if warranted, counseling or treatment. Costs to be borne warranted
by offender.
California CAL. PEN. CODE § 597(h) Court shall order counseling as a condition of probation. Mandatory
Colorado (1) Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-9-202(2) (1) Court may order a treatment program in addition to other penalties. Mandatory treat-
(a.5)(II), (III), (IV) (2) Mandatory treatment for 2nd offense. ment for 2nd offense,
(2) Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-202(2) permissive for
(3) Juveniles adjudicated as delinquent for committing animal cruelty may
(a.5)(V) juveniles
be required to complete anger management training or other treatment
(3) Colo. Rev. Stat. §
programs as determined by court.
19-2-918.5(1)
Delaware D.E. CRIM CODE, Title 11, § 1326 The court may require a person convicted of involvement in animal fight- Permissive
ing to attend and participate in an appropriate treatment program or to
obtain appropriate psychiatric or psychological counseling, or both. The
court may impose the costs of any treatment program or counseling upon
the person convicted.
District of D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1001(a)(2) The court may order an adult or youth offender to obtain psychological Permissive
Columbia (A), (a)(3) counseling, or to participate in an animal cruelty prevention or education
program, and may impose the costs of the program or counseling on the
offender.
Florida FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.12(2)(a) Anyone convicted of a felony animal cruelty offense which includes the Mandatory
knowing and intentional torture or torment of an animal that injures,
mutilates, or kills the animal shall be ordered to undergo psychological
counseling or complete an anger management treatment program.
Illinois (1) 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3 (1) Treatment may be ordered; required in cases where offender is a juve- Permissive, except
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.01 nile or animal hoarders. for sentencing for
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.02 (2) Treatment required in sentencing for animal torture. animal torture
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.03-1
(3) Counseling may be ordered.
(2) 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.03
(3) 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-35
Indiana IND. CODE § 35-46-3-12(f) The court shall consider ordering psychological, behavioral, or other coun- Mandatory
seling for offenders.
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. Upon a conviction for animal torture or bestiality, sentencing shall pro- Mandatory
§§ 717B.3A, 717C.1(3) vide for treatment according to terms required by the court. The offender
shall pay the costs.
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. Offenders convicted of “intentionally and maliciously killing, injuring, maim- Permissive
§ 21-6412(b)(1) ing, torturing, burning or mutilating any animal” or “poison[ing] any domes-
tic animal” may be ordered to complete an anger management program.
Louisiana (1) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. (1) On a first offense for simple cruelty to animals, the court may order Permissive for first,
§ 14:102.1.A.(2)(d) anger management treatment. On any subsequent simple cruelty mandatory for sec-
offenses, the order is mandatory. ond or aggravated
(2) LA. REV. STAT. ANN. (2) On any aggravated cruelty offense, the court shall order the offender to offenses
§ 14:102.1.B.(5) any subsequently recommended psychological treatment.
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL The court may order psychological counseling, to be paid by defendant, as Permissive
LAW §§ 10-604, 10-606 a condition of sentencing for animal cruelty.
MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL The court may order a person who knowingly attended a deliberately con-
LAW § 10-605 ducted dogfight or cockfight as a spectator to participate in and pay for
psychological counselling as a condition of sentencing.
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, The court may order psychiatric or psychological counselling of a defen- Permissive
§ 1031(3-B) dant convicted of animal cruelty at the defendant’s expense as a condition
of probation or as part of the sentence.
(continued)
Table 2.1. Continued
State Statute Statute Terms Mandatory or
Permissive?
Michigan (1) MICH. COMP. LAWS § (1) Court may order offender to have a mental health treatment if war- Permissive
750.50(5) ranted, at offender’s expense.
(2) MICH. COMP. LAWS § (2) Court may order counseling as a condition of probation.
750.50b(5)
Minnesota MINN. STAT. § 343.21, subd. 10(4) Court may order counseling upon conviction. Permissive
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-41-16(3) Court may order a person convicted of simple or aggravated cruelty to Permissive
(b)(ii)(1) dogs or cats to receive counseling, to be paid for by the offender.
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.111(3)(3) Court may order counseling for unlawful sex with animals. Permissive
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.416 Court may order defendant convicted of animal cruelty to undergo Permissive for adults,
counseling. mandatory for juve-
NEV. REV. STAT. § 62E.680 If a child is adjudicated delinquent for an unlawful act that involves cruelty nile offenders.
to or torture of an animal, the juvenile court is required to order the child
to participate in counseling or other psychological treatment,
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-17(g) A juvenile offender shall be ordered to receive mental health counseling. Mandatory for juve-
nile offenders
New N.M. STAT. ANN. § Court may order adult violators to participate in counseling; treatment is Permissive for adults,
Mexico 30-18-1(G),(H) mandatory for child violators. mandatory for juve-
nile offenders
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § Court may order those convicted of cruelty to a companion animal to Permissive
959.99(E)(6) undergo counseling, costs to be borne by offender.
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 167.350(4) Court may order participation in counseling or cruelty prevention pro- Permissive
grams at defendant’s expense.
Rhode R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-36 Court may order a psychiatric counseling, at offender’s expense. Permissive
Island
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-14-212, Upon conviction for aggravated cruelty or aggravated cruelty to livestock, Permissive
39-14-217 the court may require the defendant to undergo psychological counseling,
the cost to be borne by the defendant.
Texas (1) T
EX. CODE OF CRIM. (1) I f a judge grants community supervision to a person convicted Mandatory juvenile
PROC. ANN. § 42.12 of an offense under Section 42.09, 42.091, 42.092, or 42.10 of the offenders
penal code, the judge may require the person to attend a respon-
sible pet owner course sponsored by a municipal animal shelter.
(2) TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. (2) Court shall order juvenile offenders to participate in psycho-
logical counseling.
§ 54.0407
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. Upon conviction, court may order counseling at defendant’s expense. Permissive
§ 76-9-301(11)
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, Court may order counseling upon conviction; may order juvenile offend- Permissive
§ 353(b)(4) ers to undergo counseling; costs to be imposed upon defendant when
appropriate.
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 3.2-6570(A) Upon conviction, court may order counseling. Permissive
Washington WASH. REV. CODE Upon conviction, court may order participation in counseling at the defen- Permissive
§§ 16.52.200(9), 16.52.205(5)(b) dant’s expense.
West W. VA. CODE § 61-8-19(h)(2) Court may require offenders to complete an anger management program Permissive (anger
Virginia for perpetrators of animal cruelty. management only)
Table courtesy of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, last updated May 2015.
Table 2.2. State Statutes Regarding Mental Health Evaluations for Animal Maltreatment Offenders
State Statute Terms (Full Text) Mandatory or
Permissive?
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1411 (2014). Bestiality; classification; definition Permissive
***
A. A person commits bestiality by knowingly doing either of the following: 1. Engaging in oral sexual contact, sexual
contact or sexual intercourse with an animal. AZ-46 2. Causing another person to engage in oral sexual contact,
sexual contact or sexual intercourse with an animal.
B. In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of subsection A of this section, the court may order that
the convicted person do any of the following:
1. Undergo a psychological assessment and participate in appropriate counseling at the convicted person's own
expense.
2. Reimburse an animal shelter as defined in § 11-1022 for any reasonable costs incurred for the care and maintenance
of any animal that was taken to the animal shelter as a result of conduct proscribed by subsection A of this section.
Arkansas ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-62-103 (2013). Offense of cruelty to animals. Mandatory
****
(c) Any person who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to or is found guilty of cruelty to animals is guilty of an
unclassified misdemeanor and shall be:
(1) Fined no less than one hundred fifty dollars ($150) and no more than one thousand dollars ($1,000);
(2) Either:
(A) Imprisoned for no less than one (1) day and no more than one (1) year in jail; or
(B) Ordered to complete community service; and
(3)(A) Both:
(i) Ordered to complete a psychiatric or psychological evaluation; and
(ii) If determined appropriate, psychiatric or psychological counseling or treatment for a length of time prescribed
by the court.
(B) The cost of any psychiatric or psychological evaluation, counseling, or treatment may be ordered paid by the
person up to the jurisdictional limit of the court.
[Evaluations also required for 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and subsequent offenses and aggravated cruelty]
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-202 (2013). Cruelty to animals—aggravated cruelty to animals—neglect of Mandatory for
animals—offenses. pre-sentencing
**** evaluation
(II) In addition to any other sentence imposed for a violation of this section, the court may order an offender to
complete an anger management treatment program or any other appropriate treatment program.
(III) The court shall order an evaluation to be conducted prior to sentencing to assist the court in determining
an appropriate sentence. The person ordered to undergo an evaluation shall be required to pay the cost of
the evaluation, unless the person qualifies for a public defender, then the cost will be paid by the judicial dis-
trict. If the evaluation results in a recommendation of treatment and if the court so finds, the person shall be
ordered to complete an anger management treatment program or any other treatment program that the court
may deem appropriate.
(IV) Upon successful completion of an anger management treatment program or any other treatment program
deemed appropriate by the court, the court may suspend any fine imposed, except for a five hundred dollar man-
datory minimum fine which shall be imposed at the time of sentencing.
(V) In addition to any other sentence imposed upon a person for a violation of any criminal law under this title, any
person convicted of a second or subsequent conviction for any crime, the underlying factual basis of which has
been found by the court to include an act of cruelty to animals, shall be required to pay a mandatory minimum
fine of one thousand dollars and shall be required to complete an anger management treatment program or any
other appropriate treatment program.
(continued)
Permissive?
District of D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1001 (2013). Definition and penalty. Permissive
Columbia ****
(2) The court may order a person convicted of cruelty to animals:
(A) To obtain psychological counseling, psychiatric or psychological evaluation, or to participate in an animal
cruelty prevention or education program, and may impose the costs of the program or counseling on the person
convicted;
(B) To forfeit any rights in the animal or animals subjected to cruelty;
(C) To repay the reasonable costs incurred prior to judgment by any agency caring for the animal or animals sub-
jected to cruelty; and
(D) Not to own or possess an animal for a specified period of time.
(3) The court may order a child adjudicated delinquent for cruelty to animals to undergo psychiatric or psychologi-
cal evaluation, or to participate in appropriate treatment programs or counseling, and may impose the costs of the
program or counseling on the person adjudicated delinquent.
***
§ 22–1006.01. Penalty for engaging in animal fighting.
(a) Any person who: (1) organizes, sponsors, conducts, stages, promotes, is employed at, collects an admission fee for,
or bets or wagers any money or other valuable consideration on the outcome of an exhibition between two or more
animals of fighting, baiting, or causing injury to each other; (2) any person who owns, trains, buys, sells, offers to buy
or sell, steals, transports, or possesses any animal with the intent that it engage in any such exhibition; (3) any person
who knowingly allows any animal used for such fighting or baiting to be kept, boarded, housed, or trained on, or
transported in, any property owned or controlled by him; (4) any person who owns, manages, or operates any facility
and knowingly allows that facility to be kept or used for the purpose of fighting or baiting any animal; (5) any person
who knowingly or recklessly permits any act described in this subsection, to be done on any premises under his or
her ownership or control, or who aids or abets that act; or (6) any person who is knowingly present as a spectator at
any such exhibition, is guilty of a felony, punishable by a fine of not more than the amount set forth in § 22-3571.01,
imprisonment not to exceed 5 years, or both. The court may also impose any penalties listed in § 22-1001(a).
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4362 Mandatory
(a) When the Board of Pardons considers for recommendation to the Governor, for pardon or commutation of sen-
tence, any person who has been convicted of an act causing death (subpart B of subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this
title); sexual offenses (subpart D of subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this title); kidnapping and related offenses (subpart
E of subchapter II of Chapter 5 of this title); arson and related offenses (subpart A of subchapter III of Chapter 5 of
this title); home invasion; burglary in the first degree; burglary in the second degree; robbery (subpart C of sub-
chapter III of Chapter 5 of this title); offenses relating to children and incompetents (subchapter V of Chapter 5
of this title); cruelty to animals; abusing a corpse; unlawful use of an incendiary device, bomb or other explosive
device; abuse of children (Chapter 9 of Title 16); and distribution of a controlled substance to a person under age 18
(§ 4761 of Title 16); or for an attempt as provided by statute to commit any of these crimes, there shall be furnished
to each member of the Board of Pardons and to the Governor, in case recommendation for a pardon or commuta-
tion of sentence be made, a copy of the report of the psychiatrist and/or psychologist who have examined such
person, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Prior to consideration by the Board of Pardons of any application for a pardon or a commutation of sentence
made by any person who has been incarcerated for any of the crimes stated in subsection (a) of this section,
such person shall be examined by a psychiatrist or by a psychologist within a 12-month period immediately
preceding consideration of such person’s case by the Board of Pardons. The Commissioner of the Department
of Correction or the Commissioner’s designee may request the Director of the Delaware Psychiatric Center to
cause examination and studies to be made.
(c) Any psychiatrist or psychologist who, pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, examines any applicant for
a pardon or a commutation of sentence shall furnish to each member of the Board of Pardons a report contain-
ing their respective findings, opinions as to the mental and emotional health of the applicant, and opinions as
to the probability of the applicant again committing any crime if released. If the Board of Pardons recommends
a pardon or a commutation of sentence, a copy of any report submitted to the Board by any psychiatrist or psy-
chologist shall be provided to the Governor.
(d) If examination and clinical studies as provided in this section cannot be made at the correctional institu-
tion, the prisoner may be transferred, under adequate security safeguards, to the Delaware Psychiatric Center
for such examination and studies.
(continued)
Permissive?
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-4(d) Permissive
****
(d) Before sentencing a defendant for any conviction under this Code section, the sentencing judge may require
psychological evaluation of the offender and shall consider the entire criminal record of the offender.
Illinois 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3 (2013). Owner’s duties. Permissive,
A person convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. A second or subsequent violation is except for sen-
a Class 4 felony with every day that a violation continues constituting a separate offense. In addition to any other tencing for ani-
penalty provided by law, upon conviction for violating this Section, the court may order the convicted person mal torture
to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to undergo any treatment at the convicted person’s
expense that the court determines to be appropriate after due consideration of the evaluation. If the convicted
person is a juvenile or a companion animal hoarder, the court must order the convicted person to undergo a
psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to undergo treatment that the court determines to be appropriate
after due consideration of the evaluation.
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.01 (2013). Cruel treatment.
A person convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. A second or subsequent conviction
for a violation of this Section is a Class 4 felony. In addition to any other penalty provided by law, upon conviction
for violating this Section, the court may order the convicted person to undergo a psychological or psychiatric
evaluation and to undergo any treatment at the convicted person’s expense that the court determines to be
appropriate after due consideration of the evidence. If the convicted person is a juvenile or a companion animal
hoarder, the court must order the convicted person to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to
undergo treatment that the court determines to be appropriate after due consideration of the evaluation.
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.02 (2013). Aggravated cruelty.
****
(c) A person convicted of violating Section 3.02 is guilty of a Class 4 felony. A second or subsequent violation is a
Class 3 felony. In addition to any other penalty provided by law, upon conviction for violating this Section, the
court may order the convicted person to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to undergo
any treatment at the convicted person’s expense that the court determines to be appropriate after due consid-
eration of the evaluation. If the convicted person is a juvenile or a companion animal hoarder, the court must
order the convicted person to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to undergo treatment
that the court determines to be appropriate after due consideration of the evaluation.
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.03 (2013). Animal torture.
****
(c) A person convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a Class 3 felony. As a condition of the sentence imposed
under this Section, the court shall order the offender to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and
to undergo treatment that the court determines to be appropriate after due consideration of the evaluation.
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3.03-1 (2013). Depiction of animal cruelty.
****
(c) Any person convicted of violating this Section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. A second or subsequent
violation is a Class 4 felony. In addition to any other penalty provided by law, upon conviction for violating this
Section, the court may order the convicted person to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to
undergo any treatment at the convicted person’s expense that the court determines to be appropriate after due
consideration of the evaluation. If the convicted person is a juvenile, the court shall order the convicted per-
son to undergo a psychological or psychiatric evaluation and to undergo treatment that the court determines
to be appropriate after due consideration of the evaluation.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-35 (2013). Sexual conduct or sexual contact with an animal.
****
(f) In addition to the penalty imposed in subsection (e), the court may order that the defendant do any of the
following:
(3) Undergo a psychological evaluation and counseling at defendant’s expense.
(continued)
Permissive?
Iowa IOWA CODE ANN. § 717B.3A (2013). Animal torture. Mandatory
(1) For the first conviction, the person is guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor.
The sentencing order shall provide that the person submit to psychological evaluation and treatment accord-
ing to terms required by the court. The costs of the evaluation and treatment shall be paid by the person. In
addition, the sentencing order shall provide that the person complete a community work requirement, which may
include a work requirement performed at an animal shelter or pound, as defined in section 162.2, according to
terms required by the court.
(2) For a second or subsequent conviction, the person is guilty of a class “D” felony. The sentencing order shall
provide that the person submit to psychological evaluation and treatment according to terms required by the
court. The costs of the psychological evaluation and treatment shall be paid by the person.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717C.1 (2013). Bestiality.
****
3. Upon a conviction for a violation of this section, and in addition to any sentence authorized by law, the court
shall require the person to submit to a psychological evaluation and treatment at the person’s expense.
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6412(2013) Cruelty to animals. Mandatory
(b) Cruelty to animals as defined in: evaluation
(1) Subsection (a)(1) or (a)(6) is a nonperson felony. Upon conviction of subsection (a)(1) or (a)(6), a person shall be
sentenced to not less than 30 days or more than one year’s imprisonment and be fined not less than $500 nor more
than $5,000. The person convicted shall not be eligible for release on probation, suspension or reduction of sentence
or parole until the person has served the minimum mandatory sentence as provided herein. During the mandatory
30 days imprisonment, such offender shall have a psychological evaluation prepared for the court to assist the
court in determining conditions of probation. Such conditions shall include, but not be limited to, the completion
of an anger management program.
Louisiana LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.1.A. (2013) Cruelty to animals; simple and aggravated. Permissive for
**** first, manda-
(d) In addition to any other penalty imposed, the court may order a psychological evaluation or anger manage- tory for second
ment treatment for a first conviction of the crime of simple cruelty to animals. For a second or subsequent or aggravated
offense of the crime of simple cruelty to an animal, the court shall order a psychological evaluation or anger offenses
management treatment. Any costs associated with any evaluation or treatment ordered by the court shall be
borne by the defendant.
(5) In addition to any other penalty imposed for a violation of this Subsection, the offender shall be ordered to
undergo a psychological evaluation and subsequently recommended psychological treatment and shall be
banned by court order from owning or keeping animals for a period of time deemed appropriate by the court.
Any costs associated with any evaluation or treatment ordered by the court shall be borne by the defendant.
Maine Civil: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 4016 (2013) Permissive
****
D. The court, as part of the judgment, may order that the defendant submit to and complete a psychological eval-
uation for in camera review by the court.
Criminal: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1031(2013)
3-B. Penalties.
The following apply to violations of this section.
A. In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, the court shall impose a fine of not less than $500 for each
violation of this section. The court may order the defendant to pay the costs of the care, housing and veterinary
medical treatment for the animal including the costs of relocating the animal.
B. The court, as part of the sentence for a violation of this section, may prohibit the defendant from owning, possessing
or having on the defendant’s premises an animal or animals as determined by the court for a period of time, up to
and including permanent relinquishment, as determined by the court. A person placed on probation for a violation
of this section with a condition that prohibits owning, possessing or having an animal or animals on the probation-
er’s premises is subject to revocation of probation and removal of the animal or animals at the probationer’s expense
if this condition is violated. The court as part of the sentence may order, as a condition of probation, that the
defendant be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric or psychological counseling and, if it is determined
appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric or psychological counseling at the defendant’s expense.
(continued)
Permissive?
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.50(2013) Permissive
****
(5) If a term of probation is ordered for a violation of subsection (2), the court may include as a condition of that pro-
bation that the defendant be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric or psychological counseling and, if
determined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric or psychological counseling at his or her own expense.
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-41-16 (2013) Maliciously injuring dogs or cats. Permissive
****
(3) In addition to such fine or imprisonment which may be imposed:
(a) The court shall order that restitution be made to the owner of such dog or cat. The measure for restitution in money
shall be the current replacement value of such loss and the actual veterinarian fees, medicine, special supplies, loss of
income and other costs incurred as a result of actions in violation of subsection (2) of this section; and
(b) The court may order that:
(i) The reasonable costs of sheltering, transporting and rehabilitating the dog or cat, and any other costs directly
related to the care of the dog or cat, be reimbursed to:
1. Any law enforcement agency; or
2. Any agency or department of a political subdivision that is charged with the control, protection or welfare of dogs
or cats within the subdivision. The agency or department may reimburse a nongovernmental organization for such
costs, if the organization possesses nonprofit status under the United States Internal Revenue Code and has the pur-
pose of protecting the welfare of, or preventing cruelty to, dogs or cats.
(ii) The person convicted:
1. Receive a psychiatric or psychological evaluation and counseling or treatment for a length of time as prescribed
by the court. The cost of any evaluation, counseling and treatment shall be paid by the offender upon order of
the court, up to a maximum amount that is no more than the jurisdictional limit of the sentencing court.
2. Perform community service for a period not exceeding the applicable maximum term of imprisonment that may be
imposed for conviction of the offense.
3. Be enjoined from employment in any position that involves the care of a dog or cat, or in any place where dogs or
cats are kept or confined, for a period which the court deems appropriate.
Missouri MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.111(2013) Unlawful sex with an animal, penalties. Permissive
****
3. In addition to any penalty imposed or as a condition of probation the court may:
(1) Prohibit the defendant from harboring animals or residing in any household where animals are present during
the period of probation or if probation is not granted for a period of time not to exceed two years after the defen-
dant’s sentence is completed;
(2) Order all animals in the defendant’s possession subject to a civil forfeiture action under c hapter 513, RSMo; or
(3) Order psychological evaluation and counseling of the defendant at the defendant’s expense.
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. § 176A.416 (2013). Evaluations and counseling for offenses involving cruelty to animals; pow- Permissive
ers and duties of court.
1. As a condition of probation, the court may order a defendant who is convicted of a violation of c hapter 574 of
NRS that is punishable as a felony or gross misdemeanor to:
(a) Submit to a psychiatric evaluation; and
(b) Participate in any counseling or therapy recommended in the evaluation.
2. The court shall order a defendant, to the extent of the defendant’s financial ability, to pay the cost for an eval-
uation and any counseling or therapy pursuant to this section.
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 959.99(2013). Penalties. Permissive
****
(6) If a court has reason to believe that a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of section 959.131
[ED: a hoarding statute] of the Revised Code suffers from a mental or emotional disorder that contributed to the
violation, the court may impose as a community control sanction or as a condition of probation a requirement
that the offender undergo psychological evaluation or counseling. The court shall order the offender to pay
the costs of the evaluation or counseling.
(continued)
Permissive?
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 167.334 (2014). Evaluation of person convicted of violating ORS 167.333. Permissive
***
OR. REV. STAT. § 167.333 (2014). Sexual assault of animal.
(1) A person commits the crime of sexual assault of an animal if the person: (a) Touches or contacts, or causes an
object or another person to touch or contact, the mouth, anus or sex organs of an animal or animal carcass for
the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of a person; or (b) Causes an animal or animal carcass to
touch or contact the mouth, anus or sex organs of a person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual
desire of a person.
(2) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to the use of products derived from animals.
(3) Sexual assault of an animal is a Class A misdemeanor.
OR. REV. STAT. § 167.334 (2014). Evaluation of person convicted of violating ORS 167.333. Upon the conviction of
a defendant for violation of ORS 167.333, the court may order a psychiatric or psychological evaluation of the
defendant for inclusion in the presentence report as described in ORS 137.077.
Pennsylvania 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(2013). Cruelty to animals. Permissive
(i) A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he willfully and maliciously:
(A) Kills, maims, mutilates, tortures or disfigures any dog or cat, whether belonging to himself or otherwise. If a
person kills, maims, mutilates, tortures or disfigures a dog guide for an individual who is blind, a hearing dog
for an individual who is deaf or audibly impaired or a service dog for an individual who is physically limited,
whether belonging to the individual or otherwise, that person, in addition to any other applicable penalty, shall be
required to make reparations for veterinary costs in treating the dog and, if necessary, the cost of obtaining and
training a replacement dog.
(B) Administers poison to or exposes any poisonous substance with the intent to administer such poison to any dog
or cat, whether belonging to himself or otherwise.
(ii) Any person convicted of violating the provisions of this paragraph shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less
than $1,000 or to imprisonment for not more than two years, or both. The court may also order a presentence
mental evaluation. A subsequent conviction under this paragraph shall be a felony of the third degree. This para-
graph shall apply to dogs and cats only.
Rhode R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-36 (2013). Psychiatric counseling. Permissive
Island Any person found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this chapter may, in addition to any penalties imposed,
be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric or psychological counseling, and, if determined appropriate
by the court, to receive psychiatric or psychological counseling at his or her own expense.
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-212 (2013). Aggravated cruelty to animals; definitions; penalties. Permissive
****
(f) In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (d), the court may require the defendant to undergo psy-
chological evaluation and counseling, the cost to be borne by the defendant. If the defendant is indigent, the
court may, where practicable, direct the defendant to locate and enroll in a counseling or treatment program
with an appropriate agency.
***
(j) If a juvenile is found to be within the court’s jurisdiction, for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would be a
criminal violation involving cruelty to animals or would be a criminal violation involving arson, then the court
may order that the juvenile be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric or psychological treatment. If
the court determines that psychiatric or psychological treatment is appropriate for that juvenile, then the court
may order that treatment.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-217 (2013). Aggravated Cruelty to Livestock Animal.
****
(h) In addition to the penalty imposed by subsection (j), the court may require the defendant to undergo psy-
chological evaluation and counseling, the cost to be borne by the defendant. If the defendant is indigent, the
court may, where practicable, direct the defendant to locate and enroll in a counseling or treatment program
with an appropriate agency.
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-301 (2013). Cruelty to animals. Permissive
****
(11) Upon conviction under this section, the court may in its discretion, in addition to other penalties:
(a) order the defendant to be evaluated to determine the need for psychiatric or psychological counseling, to receive
counseling as the court determines to be appropriate, and to pay the costs of the evaluation and counseling;
(continued)
Permissive?
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 353 (2013). Degree of offense; sentencing upon conviction. Permissive
****
(b) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court may require a defendant convicted of a viola-
tion under section 352 or 352a of this title to:
(4) Participate in available animal cruelty prevention programs or educational programs, or both, or obtain psychi-
atric or psychological counselingv, within a reasonable distance from the defendant’s residence. If a juvenile is
adjudicated delinquent under section 352 or 352a of this title, the court may order the juvenile to undergo a
psychiatric or psychological evaluation and to participate in treatment that the court determines to be appro-
priate after due consideration of the evaluation. The court may impose the costs of such programs or counsel-
ing upon the defendant when appropriate.
West W. VA. CODE § 61-8-19 (2013). Cruelty to animals; penalties; exclusions. Mandatory for
Virginia **** probation
(h) (1) Notwithstanding any provision of this code to the contrary, no person who has been convicted of a violation
of the provisions of subsection (a) or (b) of this section may be granted probation until the defendant has under-
gone a complete psychiatric or psychological evaluation and the court has reviewed the evaluation. Unless the
defendant is determined by the court to be indigent, he or she is responsible for the cost of the evaluation.
Table courtesy of the Animal Legal Defense Fund, last updated May 2015.
juvenile offenders. For example, California and Indiana mandate counseling for
animal cruelty offenders (Cal. Penal Code Section 597, Section 11199; Ind. Code
§ 35-46-3-12(f)). Florida, Illinois, and Iowa mandate counseling for the torture
of animals, and Louisiana requires counseling for aggravated cruelty convictions
(Florida Section 828.12; 828.073; Illinois 510 ILCS Sections 70/3.01-3.05; Iowa
Section 717B.3A, B.1-4; Louisiana Section14:102.1 and 102.2). New Jersey, New
Mexico, Nevada, and Texas only require counseling for juvenile offenders (New
Jersey Section 4:22-17; New Mexico Section 30-18-1 and 1.2; Nevada Section
206.150; 574.100; 574.055; 62E.680; Texas Penal Code Section 42-.092; Health &
Safety Code 821.023; Family Code Section 54.0407). It is interesting to note that
West Virginia requires an evaluation occur before probation is authorized (West
Virginia Section 61-8-19; 7-10). However, this does not mandate counseling. If
the court orders counseling, the statute specifies it shall be “anger management
intervention” for perpetrators of animal abuse.
A few states specify anger management counseling. Most states, however,
do not identify the type of psychiatric evaluation required. In fact, most states
allow for discretion by the courts to order either a psychiatric or psychological
evaluation and do not specify the type of counseling. The accepted link between
domestic violence and animal cruelty should be reflected to a greater degree in
mandated counseling.
According to the ALDF (n.d.), Oregon was one of the first states to enact legis-
lation that sought to address the link between animal cruelty and interpersonal
violence. In 2003, Oregon passed a statute that made animal cruelty a felony if
the perpetrator had two or more prior convictions for domestic violence or if the
act of cruelty was committed in the presence of a child (Oregon 167.320). The
inextricable link between animal cruelty and other forms of interpersonal vio-
lence would seem to give rise to specific forms of counseling. However, very little
guidance is provided to the courts in most states as to what kind of evaluation is
needed and what kind of treatment is suitable.
C O N C LU S I O N
Animal maltreatment laws across the United States have been improving yearly
and are trending towards felony punishments for both cruelty and neglect, as
well as progressively including all animals rather than merely certain kinds.
Additionally, states are providing greater protection before and after an alleged
incident by requiring animal forfeitures as well as protective orders for animals.
Like laws in many other areas, animal maltreatment laws cover a broad spec-
trum of factors associated with offending. When addressing an issue of animal
maltreatment, the legal system takes into account such elements as the type of
offender, the species of animal victim, and the circumstances and severity of the
act. Each of these elements may affect the outcome of an incident throughout
the investigatory process to achieve the appropriate disposition. Increasingly,
criminal and civil courts are viewing animals as victims who can feel pain and
suffer, rather than property to be reimbursed.
AU T H O R N OT E
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions to research by Tiffany

Legette and Michael Mitchell.
R EFER EN C ES
ASPCA (2014, February 6). Animal Abandonment FAQ. Retrieved from: http://www.

aspca.org/blog/animal-abandonment-faq
Addington, L., & Randour, M. L. (2012). Animal Cruelty Crime Statistics: Findings from
a Survey of State Uniform Crime Reporting Programs. Washington, DC: Animal
Welfare Institute.
American Humane Association. (n.d.). Understanding the Link between Animal Abuse
and Family Violence. Retrieved March 13, 2014, from http://www.americanhumane.
org/interaction/support-the-bond/fact-sheets/understanding-the-link.html
Animal Legal Defense Fund (2013, December). 2013 U.S. Animal Protection Law
Rankings. Retrieved from http://aldf.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2013-United
-States-Animal-Protection-Laws-Rankings.pdf
Animal Legal Defense Fund (n.d.). Animal Cruelty and Domestic Violence. Retrieved
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animal-cruelty-and-domestic-violence/
Ascione, F. (2001, September). Animal Abuse and Youth Violence. Juvenile Justice
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(2007). Battered pets and domestic violence: Animal abuse reported by women expe-
riencing intimate violence and by non-abused women. Violence Against Women, 13,
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ting and animal cruelty in children: Family influences and adolescent outcomes.
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from: http://thelawdictionary.org/misdemeanor/
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report on violence and health. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.
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Ellison, P. C. (2013, May 15). What to do when property seized in a criminal case
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legal.1.costsofcare.pdf
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tistics. Retrieved from http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/abuse_neglect/facts/
animal_cruelty_facts_statistics.html
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mal_cruelty_06.pdf
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3
Building a Knowledge Base for

Legal and Social Concerns
about Animal Maltreatment
THOMAS GRISSO ■
Information provided in the other chapters in this book will show that a
science-based approach to developing an informed and effective response to ani-
mal maltreatment is underway. Research on the social problem of animal mal-
treatment has started to develop a knowledge base to advance our understanding
and response to problems in this area. The foundations are being laid, and much
more work will be added to it in coming years.
This chapter has two purposes. First, it describes what the knowledge
base for a subfield of animal maltreatment in forensic mental health might
look like after it has matured. Doing so, it also offers a guide for the types of
research that one might hope will develop across time. Three broad types of
research are offered as a way to classify a science-based field of knowledge in
this area and to generate questions for research. Some of that research already
exists, of course, while some topics are awaiting attention. The chapters in this
book review how far the field has come in beginning to build this knowledge
base. In this chapter the focus is more on sketching the bins and boxes that
might help to organize a hypothetical knowledge base for the area of animal
maltreatment.
The chapter’s second objective is to sketch some of the methodological prob-
lems the field has encountered or will encounter in performing research in this
area as we develop its knowledge base. Most of these problems are not at all
unique to this field. They can be anticipated based on the experience of other
fields of research. Here we consider those problems of research method in the
context of animal maltreatment research.
Building a Knowledge Base for Legal and Social Concerns about Animal Maltreatment75
GET TING OUR BE ARINGS
Chapter 1 outlined the history of animal maltreatment and its significance as

a social problem. The problem is complex in its content and scope, involving
various forms of animal neglect, animal cruelty, and animal sexual abuse. These
human behaviors are worth our attention for several reasons. First, they offend
our moral and ethical standards regarding the welfare of animals. Second, they
may represent a threat to humans, to the extent that maltreatment of animals
is related to aggression more generally. Third, their occurrence is frequent and
they have a significant economic cost, just as all crime places a burden on social
institutions to respond to it and to strive to prevent it.
Chapter 2 described current efforts by legislatures and courts to respond to
animal maltreatment in its various forms. Laws in this area have been in exis-
tence for many years, but they are in need of much guidance to further their
development. State statutes and courts, of course, are not society’s only means
for addressing a social problem like animal maltreatment. Federal and state gov-
ernment agencies often engage in initiatives that seek to control aberrant human
behaviors. They establish government policies that promote research, develop
services, and shape a community’s resources to prevent or respond to human
behaviors that threaten the welfare of the community and its citizens. Both
law and policy in this area need our attention. They need reliable information
regarding the causes and dynamics of animal maltreatment as human behaviors.
Three Broad Objectives
At the broadest level, the problem calls for information to inform three types
of responses to animal maltreatment. We refer to them as primary prevention,
control, and remediation.
Primary prevention refers to efforts to reduce the likelihood that people will
ever engage in animal maltreatment. Preventive efforts can take many forms.
For example, if we can identify childhood antecedents, we might be able to inter-
vene to reduce the likelihood of animal maltreatment behavior as an individ-
ual develops. Research that helps us understand animal maltreatment can also
serve prevention objectives if it leads to more effective policy-relevant campaigns
designed to enhance public awareness and social attitudes that might reduce the
incidence of animal maltreatment.
Control and remediation work together, at least in the best of circumstances.
Control refers to society’s efforts to identify the offending behavior when it
happens, and then to use legal means to restrict the person’s liberties in ways
that allow society to exercise interventions to prevent further incidents. One
of the primary means for doing this is with systematic remedial (therapeu-
tic) methods that target presumed causes of the offending behavior. We often
imagine that the purpose of taking control of violators of the law is to pun-
ish them. But as a method to control future human behavior, we have much
evidence that punishment is inadequate without attention to systematic inter-

ventions designed to change the offending behaviors involved and the motiva-
tions that drive them.
Developing laws, policies, court-based enforcement and remedial interven-
tions will depend on reliable information about the types of people who engage
in animal maltreatment as well as their motivations. Developing that informa-
tion will require research that can offer us a better understanding of animal mal-
treatment. The remainder of this book, therefore, describes how criminological,
psychological, and clinical research can best inform law, policy, and practice in
responding to animal maltreatment.
Two Legal Contexts for the Use of Science-Based Information
When we have science-based information with which to advise the law, we

can provide it in two ways: through policy-based consultation and through
case-based consultation. Policy-based consultation is provided to lawmakers and
those who determine policy. More effective laws are possible if they are informed
by science-based knowledge regarding various types of animal maltreatment
offenders.
Case-based consultation occurs when experts provide to courts relevant infor-
mation about an individual whose alleged offenses are being adjudicated by
a court. These consultants often are forensic mental health professionals who
perform an evaluation or study of an alleged offender. They assist the court in
determining the best ways to meet remediation objectives in light of this indi-
vidual’s motivations. Like policy-based consultation, case-based consultation
also requires a scientific base of knowledge.
Three Types of Research
Both policy-based and case-based consultation need to be fueled by three types

of scientific research—sociographic research, nomothetic research, and assess-
ment research.
In this context, sociographic research refers to studies that identify the scope
of the problem in society. Researchers need reliable information on the preva-
lence and nature of animal maltreatment in order to properly study it. It can
describe the general public’s definitions of animal maltreatment as well as
their attitudes about animal maltreatment. Sociographic research would also
reliably describe the victims of animal maltreatment. This body of knowledge
becomes especially important for two reasons. It informs the other areas of
research we will describe that focus on understanding animal maltreatment
offenders. And it can inform the public generally and policy-makers specifi-
cally. Thus it can serve a preventive function as well as motivation for pursu-
ing control and remediation efforts.
Nomothetic research refers to studies that seek reliable knowledge about the
nature and causes of animal maltreatment. What are the demographic features,
social circumstances, and psychological characteristics of animal maltreatment
offenders? How can we explain animal maltreatment? What types of interven-
tions work best to reduce future animal maltreatment offending? Both types
of consultation, policy-based and case-based, depend on reliable nomothetic
information about these features of animal maltreatment offenders. These are
the kinds of information that some studies are beginning to provide to experts
for use when they seek to guide law, policy, and the courts in addressing animal
maltreatment, as well as to build relevant interventions.
Assessment research aims to find reliable and useful ways to describe and
explain individual cases of animal maltreatment. Those who use this informa-
tion tend to be case-based consultants, typically forensic mental health profes-
sionals who assess individuals and advise the court that is making decisions
about the person. Assessment research therefore focuses on how to assess or
treat persons who are the focus of animal maltreatment cases and how to apply
general knowledge about animal maltreatment offenders to individual cases.
Case-based consultants need assessment tools that actually measure the behav-
iors and characteristics associated with animal maltreatment. Those tools might
be classified as “forensic assessment instruments” (Grisso, 2003), a special type
of clinical assessment tool that is shaped by legal definitions of the problem that
the case-based forensic consultant is asked to address. Developing these “foren-
sic animal maltreatment instruments” requires research to construct them to
meet legally relevant criteria and to establish their reliability and validity for
their intended purposes.
The remainder of this chapter considers these three broad types of research in
more detail. The discussions focus especially on features of research design that
will be especially important for building a sound knowledge base for the field of
B U I L D I N G A SO C I O G R A PH I C BAS E
FO R A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
Sociographic research describes the social context for the problem that other types
of research will seek to address. It describes the problem’s scope, how and where it
occurs in society, how society perceives it, its victims, and its costs. What do socio-
graphic studies in this area look like and what are their values and potential uses?
Topics for Sociographic Inquiry
Describing the scope of a social problem requires that we slice into it at a num-
ber of different angles, no one of which would provide a complete picture.
The following range of topics is not exhaustive but offers a view of the sources
of information that would provide a rich picture of what animal maltreatment
means in current society.
Prevalence
The most basic description of a problem is its prevalence. What can we learn
about the numbers of animals who are victims of animal maltreatment? How
does prevalence vary for different geographic regions of the country or areas
of different population density? What can we learn about historic trends in the
prevalence of animal maltreatment? Answering these questions poses some chal-
lenges. For example, to provide meaningful answers, we must carefully define
animal maltreatment in its various forms. We also need to find reliable sources
of data to answer the questions, which can be frustrating when dealing with the
uncertain quality of records across jurisdictions nationwide. Later chapters will
show that some researchers have begun to find ways to address these questions
regarding certain kinds of animal maltreatment, such as animal hoarding.
Victims
Some sociographic research should focus on information about the victims.
Can we describe prevalence of animal maltreatment for various species?
Given the size of various species populations in the nation, how does preva-
lence translate into proportion and therefore into the probability risk of abuse
or neglect for specific species? Can we develop a perspective on some of the
“dynamics” of animal maltreatment as it is experienced by the animal—for
example, the lengths of time that animals have endured hoarding-related
neglect when hoarding cases are identified? Some of these questions will be
difficult to study, especially at a nationwide level. But even studies of smaller
scope may provide some perspective on the victims at the heart of the social
problem, and later chapters will provide examples of studies that have suc-
ceeded in doing so.
Social Responses
The field needs a perspective on society’s current responses to animal maltreat-
ment. Laws, of course, are part of that perspective, and knowledge of their cur-
rent status is important. But equally important are the legal institutions and
processes that implement the law. How do courts currently adjudicate animal
maltreatment cases, and are there examples of courts that have developed inno-
vative ways of doing it? Beyond the law, society has developed a wide array of
institutions that seek to respond to animal maltreatment. What procedures and
practices now characterize our government institutions, ranging from federal
agencies that influence animal protection to municipal animal control offices?
What current responses are being made by the nation’s schools of veterinary
medicine? Who are the primary national and local non-profit animal welfare
advocacy organizations, and what is the scope and nature of their efforts that
aim to reduce animal maltreatment?
Costs
Part of the cost of animal maltreatment as a social problem is the pain and
suffering of victims and their human owners. But there is also a financial
cost. The financial cost of animal maltreatment is closely related to questions
of prevalence and our social response. Studying those topics alone, however,
does not provide a perspective on the actual financial impact. Economic sci-
ence has special research methods for translating social problems into esti-
mates of their financial burden on society. They can also estimate reductions
in cost if provided various hypothetical alternative responses to the social
problem.
Presumptions and Expectations

Sociographic research can seek to identify perceptions and attitudes that under-
lay society’s responses to animal maltreatment. Two ways of doing this can be
envisioned.
First, social institutions’ current responses to animal maltreatment may reflect
presumptions and expectations that guide their responses. For the agencies and
groups noted in “Social Responses,” what are their policies and professed philos-
ophies and objectives? Using logical analysis, it is sometimes possible to exam-
ine whether current policies are based on presumptions that are questionable or
faulty. Policies may be misguided, for example, if presumptions inherent in them
simply do not comport with known facts. Research of this type applies scientific
findings to analyze and refine existing policies.
The second type of research on presumptions and expectations can focus on
the general public. Later discussions in this book offer a number of observations
about public misconceptions regarding animal maltreatment. What do people
generally believe about animal maltreatment and for what reasons do they care
(or not care) about it as a social problem? This form of research can go well
beyond “opinion polling.” For example, do people make a distinction between
working animals and pets? Where do they see the balance between an animal’s
right to protection and an animal-owner’s right to control of property? This type
of research can identify the landscape of public opinion through which policies
and reform must travel. It can also identify how that landscape is configured
based on gender, race, age, socioeconomic status, geographic sectors, and politi-
cal philosophies.
The Value of Sociographic Studies
Studies of the scope of the problem can promote many objectives. Sociographic
studies can pave the way for other types of animal maltreatment research. Later
we will review other types of research that seek to understand people who engage
in animal maltreatment. Sociographic studies that identify prevalence and other
social parameters of animal maltreatment can be of great benefit for develop-
ing offender studies. Prevalence studies identify the “what, where and when” of
offending, all of which are important to begin to understand types of offenders.

Given that we cannot study all populations at once, we also can gain perspective
from sociographic studies regarding where to set our priorities.
Sociographic studies make it possible to identify the effects of our efforts across
time. The topics of sociographic studies described earlier all focus on the current
state of the problem. Doing so, they establish what evaluation researchers would
call a “baseline.” They identify the current nature and level of the problem. This
not only describes where we are starting, but allows us to identify our progress
sometime in the future. After our research on offenders has begun to have an
impact, and after we have improved our methods and interventions accordingly,
does a re-evaluation of prevalence and practices suggest that we have begun to
change the scope of the problem compared to the baseline when we began?
The results of sociographic research can be used as a basis for intervention.
One target for intervention is policy development in government agencies.
Sociographic results alone often will not be enough to provide confident advice
regarding how to change laws or policies for responding to animal maltreat-
ment offenders, but they can be enough to guide government policy regarding
financial support for animal maltreatment research. The other target is the gen-
eral public. Providing them with accurate information about the scope of ani-
mal maltreatment can increase their awareness of the social problem. This may
have some preventive benefits as well, to the extent that it changes the public’s
responses to animal maltreatment that they encounter in everyday life. More
broadly, public perception and concern often motivate government policies by
increasing government’s attention to the need for research and reform.
B U I L D I N G A N O M OT H E T I C R ES E A R C H
BAS E FO R A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T
Nomothetic research refers to studies that seek to understand the nature and
causes of animal maltreatment, as well as discovering ways to control and change
it. Its objective is reliable information to improve our understanding of how and
why animal maltreatment happens.
As a preliminary matter, we should presume that most of our research on the
nature and causes of animal maltreatment will have to focus not on animal mal-
treatment offenders in general, but on types of animal maltreatment. It seems
unlikely (and research in later chapters bears out) that persons who neglect or
hoard animals, persons who inflict intentional pain on them, and persons who
sexually abuse differ in substantial ways. “Animal maltreatment offender” is a
useful term when labeling a general area of social concern. Yet we should pre-
sume that the differences between the various classes of animal maltreatment
offender groups will be sufficiently great to warrant separate investigations for
various types of animal maltreatment offenders. As Chapter 1 suggested, the
field seems to have established the need to study at least three broad groups
of offenses: animal neglect, animal cruelty, and animal sexual abuse. As later
chapters will show, however, we may find that any of these groups can be subdi-
vided into more specific groups (for example, dividing animal neglect into “gen-
eral neglect” and “neglect related to hoarding”).
A consideration of other areas of social science research that have matured
(such as studies of violent aggression against humans) suggests that the field of
animal maltreatment research can aim to develop six broad types of nomothetic
research—descriptive, retrospective, comparative, prospective, risk-relevant,
and intervention studies. Many research studies will serve several of these pur-
pose at once, but it is convenient to use these divisions so that we can maintain
clarity about various purposes for our research.
Descriptive Studies
Description is the beginning of scientific study of any phenomenon. By description,

we mean identifying a group and describing the people in it as they are now, in the
present. This type of research sets aside questions of how people came to do what
they have done and what they might do in the future. Those questions are impor-
tant, but they come later. Good descriptive studies focus on the present characteris-
tics of the group. They might not explain the group’s behaviors or tell us what to do
about them, but their results will lead to hypotheses about those things. Descriptive
research is the foundation for all other research we care to do. Later chapters will
show that the field of animal maltreatment studies has made progress in building
descriptions of populations within each of the main types of animal maltreatment.
The first step in description is to form our study groups according to criteria
that we can define clearly and objectively. Where do such definitions come from?
Given that we are interested in studying animal maltreatment offenders, one pos-
sibility is to consider legal definitions. How does the law define “animal hoard-
ing?” How does it define “animal cruelty?” Using a legal definition as a criterion
for our study groups offers us a good chance for our results to be most easily
translated for use by the legal system and consultants who are advisors to it.
The first problem one encounters in using legal definitions of misbehaviors is
evident from Chapter 2. Often there is no single legal definition. Each of the 50
states has a somewhat different definition of most illegal behavior. One state’s
definition of “animal hoarding” might not be another’s. This problem is not
insurmountable. A comparison of states’ laws defining a specific offense often
reveals that their definitions have both similarities and differences. A working
definition can be developed for research purposes that capitalizes on the simi-
larities and sets aside the differences.
The second problem, though, is the tendency for the law’s definitions to be a
mix of objective and inferential criteria. For example, here is Illinois’ (510 IL.
COMP. STAT. 70/2.10) definition of a “companion animal hoarder:”
a person who (1) possesses a large number of companion animals; (2) fails to

or is unable to provide what he or she is required to provide under Section
3 of this Act; (3) keeps the companion animals in a severely overcrowded

environment; and (4) displays an inability to recognize or understand the
nature of or has a reckless disregard for the conditions under which
the companion animals are living and the deleterious impact they have on
the companion animals’ and owner’s health and well-being.
As researchers, we might be relatively confident about our ability to apply the

first three elements to define objectively our sample of animal hoarders. But what
shall we do with the fourth element? The “inability to recognize or understand”
something can only be inferred or interpreted. Perhaps we can identify some
objective criteria to define this “inability.” But consider Mississippi’s (§ 97-41-1)
definition of “animal cruelty:”
“any person[who] shall override, overdrive, overload, torture, torment,

unjustifiably injure, deprive of necessary sustenance, food, or drink; or cru-
elly beat or needlessly mutilate; or cause or procure to be overridden, over-
driven, overloaded, tortured, unjustifiably injured, tormented, or deprived
of necessary sustenance, food or drink; or to be cruelly beaten or needlessly
mutilated or killed …”
How shall we define whether a person has overdriven, unjustifiably injured,

cruelly beaten, or needlessly mutilated an animal? We might think we would
know it when we see it, but can we define it so that there would be no disagree-
ment among us if we independently saw it? If not, we cannot translate it into
research criteria to form our study groups.
Of course, we could form our animal cruelty study group on the basis of a
single objective criterion: whether a court determined that the individual met
the legal definition for conviction of animal cruelty. But persons arrested and
convicted for animal cruelty will not include many people whose animal cruelty
did not result in arrest or conviction. Moreover, our definition presumes that
courts themselves interpret such things with a high degree of reliability, a pre-
sumption for which we have no empirical evidence.
These problems are not at all insurmountable. And there are criteria that we
could use that are not derived from law. Our purpose at the moment is not to
solve the problem, but to point out that identifying the population to be studied
is among the most important parts of descriptive research.
Having formed the group according to our criteria, we choose the variables we
want to use to describe it. The most basic descriptive variables are demographic
(e.g., ages, genders, races, marital statuses, and economic and geographic cir-
cumstances), and sometimes these data are available in records from which we
obtain information about animal maltreatment cases. More complex descrip-
tions are possible, however, if we have access to the individuals representing the
groups we are studying. We can seek to describe the group according to its indi-
viduals’ current capacities, traits, behaviors, preferences, and clinical diagnoses.
Psychology and psychiatry provide us with a vast array of observational meth-

ods and psychological tests to accomplish descriptions on these variables. The
characteristics that we choose to describe should be based on theoretical notions
about the relation between psychological characteristics and the specific type of
animal maltreatment in question.
Finally, we can describe how people who engage in animal maltreatment
describe themselves. What do they believe led to their behavior? What reasons
do they give for it, and to what extent do they perceive it as wrong or problem-
atic? How do they perceive themselves and their relations to animals and other
humans? The importance of these descriptions cannot be overstated, because
they might provide insights that could not be discovered with demographic data
and standardized tests. These insights can lead us to speculate not only about
causes of their behavior, but also how we might begin to construct therapeu-
tic interventions (see intervention research later). Obtaining these data typically
will require the development of semi-structured interview procedures that will
offer flexibility to explore their responses yet sufficient standardization to assure
that we can make sense of our results when we look for similarities and differ-
ences across people within our offense group.
Retrospective Studies
Retrospective research examines the past experiences, circumstances, and

behaviors of people within our study groups. Were they exposed to human
or animal cruelty as children? Were they themselves the victims of cruelty or
neglect? What has been their history of mental health problems? When did they
first begin to engage in animal maltreatment and in any other form of harmful
illegal behavior? What were the responses of family or society to their animal
maltreatment when it first began? How might those responses have reinforced
their maltreatment behavior?
Retrospective studies often look for patterns or similarities in the history of
the individuals in an offender group, based on records or self-report. If we can
find such patterns, they might suggest hypotheses about causal pathways toward
the development of animal maltreatment. If further research supports those
hypotheses, such information can provide initial ideas for preventive strategies
and a foundation for developing assessment tools to identify whether animal
maltreatment offenders are likely to re-offend.
One of the most important aspects of retrospective research is obtaining reli-
able retrospective information. Often this is difficult because of weaknesses
with any of our sources. Health records may be sketchy or difficult to obtain.
Individuals’ and family members’ reports are prone to error related to faulty
memory or intentional bias. Arrest records may be fairly reliable, but they give
us a history of the animal maltreatment events for which the individual was
arrested, not the other possible maltreatment events that may never have been
detected.
As our descriptive and retrospective studies begin to identify the character-

istics of our study groups, we must expect that groups formed on the basis of a
particular type of animal maltreatment might be comprised of more than one
type of person. For many types of offenses, there is no strong reason to expect
that most of the people engaging in the offense will be of one type.
Descriptive and retrospective studies are a critical step in building the body
of research because they provide the basis for identifying causal explanations for
animal maltreatment. The following types of research begin to test those causal
explanations.
Comparative Studies
Comparative research is essential for the results of descriptive and retrospec-

tive research to provide their true benefits. Our descriptive or retrospective
research might find that many persons who engage in physical abuse of ani-
mals have some particular characteristic in common. But does that neces-
sarily distinguish them from others who do not physically abuse animals?
Research that compares them to other offenders who did not harm animals, or
to non-offenders, might find that the characteristic is found as often in their
cases as in persons involved in animal physical abuse cases. Or it might begin
to identify factors that appear in greater frequency within the group of inter-
est than in other groups.
When comparative research does find a factor that distinguishes one group
from another, that factor becomes a nominee for use in further research that
seeks to explain, predict, or remediate the behaviors of that group of animal mal-
treatment offenders. Those nominees are often useful in the next three types of
research.
Before moving to the other three types of nomothetic research, we can suggest
a few of the major questions that research will want to address as it accumulates
information from its descriptive, retrospective, and comparative studies on ani-
mal maltreatment:
• What is the relation of mental disorders to animal maltreatment? As will

be seen in later chapters, this has been the focus of several studies of
animal hoarders. This may be important for assessing future risk and for
therapeutic intervention.
• What is the relation of animal maltreatment to other types of offending?
Do certain types of animal maltreatment tend to correlate with other
offenses involving harm to humans? Is physical cruelty to animals pri-
marily in the class of general violence, or does it exist separately in most
cases? What is the reliability of the clinical observation that physical
cruelty to animals in childhood is a precursor of later violence toward
humans? Several research inroads have been made in this area, as will
be seen in a later chapter on the relation of animal cruelty to aggression

against humans.
• What motivates and facilitates animal maltreatment? How do those
who engage in it perceive their behavior? What are the positive
consequences—affective, cognitive, and material—that act as reinforcers
for various types of animal maltreatment?
Prospective and Risk-Relevant Studies
Prospective and risk-relevant studies are in a class together because they consider
future behavior and our ability to estimate its likelihood. Prospective research
typically begins by identifying a group of people who have been convicted of a
particular offense, then tracks them for a period of time (often a year or more) to
determine whether they re-offend. Those who do and do not re-offend are then
compared to determine whether they systematically differ on various descriptive
and retrospective factors.
This is the starting point for risk-relevant research, which refers to studies
that seek to develop reliable sets of factors that best estimate the likelihood
of future animal maltreatment offending. Using the results of prospective
studies, risk-relevant research identifies those factors that best distinguished
re-offenders from non-re-offenders, then applies those factors to predict
re-offense outcomes for a new set of offenders in another prospective study. If
they succeed, those factors then become variables that can be used to develop
assessment tools, which we will consider later when discussing assessment
research.
We know from past research on aggressive and illegal behaviors in general
that we should not expect to achieve a high degree of accuracy in our efforts to
use risk factors to predict future offending. Judging from that body of research
(e.g., Andrade et al., 2001; Quincy et al., 1998; Reiss & Roth, 1993):
• We should only try to assess risk of animal maltreatment re-offending,

not risk among those who have never offended.
• We should be satisfied with efforts to identify level of risk—that is, that a
person is in a low, moderate, or high probability risk group—rather than
trying to identify whether a person will or will not re-offend.
• We should expect that even a high risk group has only a 50%–70%
chance of re-offending.
There are many reasons for these limits to our capacities, but primarily, we
simply cannot account for all the variables that might influence re-offending.
Some of them are psychological factors that we have not detected or have been
unable to measure. In addition, human behavior is not simply a function of the
individual’s characteristics, but is influenced also by situational variables that are
unpredictable: unexpected stressors, unanticipated fortunate events that redirect

an individual’s life. Moreover, our measure of outcome is often a re-arrest, which
involves many variables regarding detection and police management of cases
for which we cannot account in our risk assessments. Nevertheless, the field of
risk of recidivism for general offending has accomplished much that is of value,
and there is no theoretical reason to expect that studies of animal maltreatment
re-offending cannot do the same.
Intervention Studies
Intervention refers to anything we might do to change the frequency of animal

maltreatment. Intervention research seeks to develop potential interventions
and determine empirically whether they meet our objectives. One might think
immediately of treatment interventions to alter the offender’s behavior, but there
are several types of intervention that the field might wish to develop and test for
their value.
Altering the public’s awareness and attitudes is one type of intervention that
might reduce animal maltreatment. Research on this intervention would focus
on strategy. What message, in what form, best achieves attitude change regard-
ing the social problem? How effective or ineffective are the current approaches of
animal advocacy organizations? Could they be improved?
Social controls in response to animal maltreatment constitute a primary form
of intervention. Included in this category are methods for detection and appre-
hension of animal maltreatment offenders, how those cases are processed in
the legal system, and forms of restrictions and punitive consequences assigned
to cases that are adjudicated. The purpose of social control is to reduce future
offending by providing sanctions that will deter potential future offenders or
will restrict the liberties of offenders (so that they will not have the opportunity
to re-offend and can be subjected involuntarily to interventions that may change
their behavior). Implementing these interventions is the job of police officers,
probation officers and social workers, courts, and correctional programs. One
type of intervention research in animal maltreatment would examine the effec-
tiveness of current social controls and test the effectiveness of different ways of
exercising society’s control.
Finally, our research is very likely to seek effective therapeutic interventions.
The term “therapeutic” does not necessarily mean “treatment for disorders” or,
indeed, even “therapy.” It refers to the application of a structured method, by one
who is competent to apply it, aimed at altering an individual’s behavior for the
benefit of the individual. In this sense, therapeutic interventions come in many
forms, ranging from psychopharmacological interventions to methods that alter
a family’s functioning for the benefit of one of the family members. Within this
range are interventions that use cognitive behavioral therapy methods, which
can readily be adapted to the modification of specific problem areas like animal
maltreatment.
Whatever the intervention, it should draw upon the results of all of the other
types of animal maltreatment research for its basis. Those areas of research iden-
tify which offenders, with what characteristics, are more or less likely to need
therapeutic intervention. They can provide the logic for constructing therapeutic
methods focused specifically on the nature of animal maltreatment offenders
of various types. Ultimately all such forms of therapeutic intervention must be
examined for their value—that is, their ability to actually change behavior. Data
from prospective studies offer a baseline with which the success of interventions
can be tested.
The Importance of Motives and Integrity in Research
Before leaving this discussion of nomothetic research, it is important to com-

ment on our motives for doing it and how those motives may influence our work.
The field of animal maltreatment research and practice is substantially driven by
a concern for the victims. We perceive them as helpless, worthy of respect, and
therefore worthy of our care. Advocacy for animals is a large part of our motiva-
tion. As researchers, this is both our strength and a liability. Its great value is that
it enables us to persevere in the interest of a worthy cause. Its liability is that our
zealous desire to promote this cause can be responsible for bias in our research.
It also can create public skepticism about the credibility of our research results.
This dilemma of “advocacy research” requires special care to allow us to avoid
motivated bias in our research results or their interpretation and to assure that
the results will be received by the public as credible.
The information that we produce must be different from much of the infor-
mation about animal maltreatment to which the public often is exposed. We
are awash in information about animal maltreatment, ranging from statistics
to emotionally charged photographic and anecdotal descriptions of its hor-
rors. How do we conduct research that distinguishes it from advocacy-driven
propaganda?
Grisso and Steinberg (2005) outlined a number of specific guidelines for
avoiding the pitfalls of advocacy research. In general, their perspective offers
the following suggestions when translated to the present area of research. The
animal maltreatment research we envision should seek no particular conclusion.
It should begin with the motive to find what is true, not what we believe is true.
Our zeal and convictions may provide the passion for our search. But if our vic-
tims are worthy of respect, they are worthy of our greatest efforts to determine
to “get it right,” not merely to find a convenient answer. So our search must be
conducted dispassionately.
Credibility is assured by use of rigorous design and methods. We must be
thorough in our search for all sources of data, including sources that may dis-
prove our expectations. We must obtain our samples in ways that reflect the
true diversity of humans and animals. If we test hypotheses, we must design
our studies not in a way that will “prove our hypothesis,” but in a way that will
allow our hypotheses to be proved wrong. We should be as eager to discover our
misconceptions as to confirm our beliefs.
These are matters that make the scientific enterprise different from the advo-
cacy agenda. Neither is superior to the other, but they have different advantages,
and the advantage of the scientific method is the credibility of the information it
contributes to society’s effort to solve a social problem.
AS S ES S M EN T R ES E A R C H TO B U I L D
M E T H O D S FO R C L I N I CA L FO R EN S I C
A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T E VA LUAT I O N S
Research will be needed to build reliable and useful methods to describe and
explain individual cases of animal maltreatment. Typically the people who use
these research results will be mental health professionals who assess individ-
uals. They may do this in clinical settings, but in this book we are especially
interested in those who do evaluations of individuals for forensic purposes—to
advise courts when they are making decisions about the person. The assessment
research of interest, therefore, focuses on how to evaluate persons who are before
courts on animal maltreatment charges and how to apply general knowledge
about animal maltreatment offenders to individual cases.
Chapter 10 offers guidance for “Conceptualizing Forensic Animal
Maltreatment Evaluations.” The present discussion is preparation for the more
specific analyses in that chapter. What are the general types of research that will
be needed to advance the development of a specialized forensic field of assess-
ment to meet the needs of the legal system and the animal maltreatment offend-
ers about whom it makes decisions?
To answer this, we can draw on a large body of work made available to us dur-
ing the past 30 years regarding the development of the field of forensic mental
health assessment (e.g., Grisso, 2003; Heilbrun, 2001; Melton et al., 2007). That
work has focused on building assessment methods for use in evaluating violent
offending, sex offending, and offending by persons with mental illnesses. It has
given rise to specialized assessment instruments to respond to a variety of legal
concerns, such as the risk of violent re-offending, competence to stand trial,
competencies in civil legal questions (such as competence related to questions of
the need for guardianship), and malingering. Attention to what has been learned
in the development of those forensic assessment methods offers some general
guidance for developing a field of forensic animal maltreatment evaluation.
Learning What the Law Wants to Know
The development of any assessment tool begins with a clear definition of its pur-
pose. What do we want it to measure, and to address what decision? In clinical
contexts, typically this will be determined by what clinicians need to know to

treat a person. Forensic assessment tools begin in the same way, but they derive
their answer from a forensic rather than clinical context. What does the law need
to know in order to make good decisions about individuals?
Learning what the law needs to know depends on the point in the legal process
during which the relevant decision will be made. Typically, forensic clinicians
are not asked to testify about matters pertaining to a trial on an individual’s
guilt (unless the person’s plea is Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity). Most forensic
clinical questions arise in the pre-trial phase (e.g., competence to stand trial)
or after a person has been found guilty, when the question of “disposition” is
raised. Disposition refers to sentencing, as well as any conditions regarding pro-
bation or therapeutic intervention that the court is authorized to order. But we
need research to determine what courts believe they need at that point. Are they
interested in the person’s level of risk for future animal maltreatment offend-
ing? Do they want to know the individual’s treatment potential? Are they con-
cerned about the person’s capacities to care for animals, related to the question
of whether to allow the individual to retain possession of an animal? Or are they
concerned with the individual’s potential for violence toward other humans?
Each of these hypothetical questions suggests instruments that are entirely
different from each other. Based on our experience in other areas of forensic
assessment, a tool to assess risk is unlikely to provide sufficient information
about treatment potential, and a tool to assess treatment potential is not likely
to describe whether the person currently has specific abilities necessary to care
for an animal. Research to determine what type of tool is needed can range from
analyses of law to surveys of attorneys and judges in the legal system.
Developing Measurable Concepts
Typically, an answer to the court’s “referral question” will require further inter-
pretation to arrive at meaningful concepts to be measured. For example, imagine
that courts require a way to determine an individual’s capacities to care for ani-
mals. Rarely will the law define what that means or, if it does, it will describe the
concept only in very broad terms.
Modern law, however, will not decide the matter of a person’s capacities to
perform a particular role (like animal caregiver) on the basis of clinical or per-
sonality characteristics (Grisso, 2003). The fact that a person has a major mental
disorder, or possesses certain personality characteristics, will not be sufficient to
make a legal determination that a person is not competent to care for animals or
that animals in their care are at risk. The court will require a description of the
person’s functioning: what the person actually knows, understands, believes, or
can do that is related to animal caregiving.
Given this, our task is to arrive at a set of relevant abilities that can repre-
sent the concept of an adequately functioning animal caregiver. That itself is a
topic for research, which may involve arriving at a reasonable consensus among
behavioral and medical animal experts regarding the necessary abilities to rep-
resent the concept. As later chapters will show, that sort of consensus is begin-
ning to arise.
Translating Concepts into Operational Definitions
A forensic assessment instrument is made up of stimuli to which a person

responds to arrive at data that can be scored and interpreted. The stimuli or
items in the instrument are intended to represent the construct that the tool
measures. If the concept is a set of abilities for animal caregiving, the scores
on the tool represent the degree of capacity of the individual. If they represent
risk of future re-offending, the scores represent the individual’s propensity for
re-offending. The tasks on the tool are “operations” that define or represent the
concept “animal caregiving” or “re-offending propensity.”
Finding the best stimuli (test items) to represent the concept typically draws
upon the nomothetic research discussed earlier, as well as theories about human
behavior. Research at this stage often examines whether the items work together
in such a way that they seem to be measuring a concept in common, and whether
the tool can be scored reliably across examiners.
Validating the Tool
When a prototype tool is developed, a great deal of research is needed to deter-

mine whether the items produce scores that actually seem to represent the con-
cepts they are intended to measure. Do people who score high or low on the tool
actually tend to behave in other situations as one would expect based on the
concept the tool claims to measure? In other words, is the test “valid?” Validity
is always relative. There is no expectancy that any tool will achieve its goals with
a high degree of accuracy. It must simply do better than chance or better than
clinical estimates that do not include use of the tool. Research on validity does
not tell us the tool is “valid,” but rather its degree of dependability and degree of
potential for error when applied to individual cases.
This description of research to develop assessment methods for use in forensic
evaluations has been greatly simplified. The purpose has been merely to sketch
the types of studies involved, not the complexities of conducting them. We will
offer another level of detail for this topic in Chapter 10.
C O N C LU S I O N
This chapter has provided an “anatomy” of a knowledge base for an area of

research aimed at social policy and practice, adapted for application to the field
of animal maltreatment. Later chapters in this book will show that the field has
begun to develop a scientific body of knowledge in several of the categories in
this knowledge base. They will also reveal areas in which more work is needed.
Not all of these areas can be tackled at once, so we must establish some priori-
ties. Sociographic studies tend to proceed independent of other developments in
the field, but nomothetic and assessment areas of inquiry often build on them-
selves in the order that they were described in this chapter. Most fields of sci-
ence will require some basic descriptive, retrospective, and comparative studies
before much can be done in areas of prediction and intervention. Development
of assessment methods must proceed cautiously lest they make commitments
that may later be considered ill-advised as our empirical knowledge of the nature
and causes of animal maltreatment becomes clearer.
The process has begun, but based on the progress of other fields of scientific
study related to forensic mental health issues, it will take several decades to
mature. Getting there, of course, requires that we simply take each next step as it
presents itself and persevere.
R EFER EN C ES
Andrade, J., O’Neill, K., & Diener, R. (2001). Violence risk assessment and risk manage-
ment: A historical overview and clinical application. In J. Andrade (ed.), Handbook
of violence risk assessment and treatment (pp. 3–39). New York: Springer.
Grisso, T. (2003). Evaluating competencies: Forensic assessments and instruments.
New York: Kluwer Acadamic/Plenum.
Grisso, T., & Steinberg, L. (2005). Between a rock and a soft place: Developmental
research and the child advocacy process. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent
Psychology, 34, 619–627.
Heilbrun, K. (2001). Principles of forensic mental health assessment. New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum.
Melton, G., Petrila, J., Poytress, N., & Slobogin, C. (2007). Psychological evalu-
ations for the courts: A handbook for mental health professionals and lawyers.
New York: Guilford.
Quincy, V., Harris, G., Rice, M., & Cormier, C. (1998). Violent offenders: Appraising
and managing risk. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Reiss, A., & Roth, J. (eds.) (1993). Understanding and preventing violence. Washington,
DC: National Research Council.
SECTION II
Theory and Research

on Animal Maltreatment
4
Understanding Animal
Cruelty and Sexual Abuse
LACEY LEVITT ■
Animal maltreatment has increasingly been recognized as a serious social

problem, especially because research has indicated that it is frequently associ-
ated with the maltreatment of humans (Arluke, Levin, Luke, & Ascione, 1999;
Merez-Perez & Heide, 2003; Miller & Knutson, 1997; Tallichet & Hensley, 2004).
Despite this apparent linkage, little is known about the characteristics and
offending patterns of individuals convicted of animal maltreatment. Few studies
have examined their sociodemographic characteristics, personality attributes, or
criminal histories.
This chapter describes what is known about individuals who commit various
types of intentional animal maltreatment. It explores existing research and theo-
ries of motivation for three classes of intentional maltreatment: physical abuse of
animals, the sexual abuse of animals, and animal fighting. The research on physi-
cal abuse, however, is presented in two sections, one for adults and the other for
juvenile and family-related animal maltreatment.
Perceptions of what constitutes animal cruelty or abuse have varied histori-
cally and culturally (Boat, 1999), changing as our understanding of animals’
needs changes (Ascione & Shapiro, 2009). Accordingly, research in the area has
focused on intentional maltreatment that is widely socially rejected such as the
unnecessary cutting, burning, beating, and shooting of pets and other socially
desirable animals, or as summarized by Ascione (1993): “socially unaccept-
able behavior that intentionally causes unnecessary pain, suffering, or distress
to and/or death of an animal” (p. 228). This definition notably excludes certain
forms of animal maltreatment that are socially sanctioned, such as vivisection
and factory farming (which involves, for example, confining sows to small, metal
gestation crates).
96 T H E ORY A N D R E S E A RC H ON A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M E N T
In this chapter, the term “physical animal cruelty” includes, but is not lim-
ited to, the intentional beating, hitting, kicking, stomping, throwing, choking/
strangling, suffocating, hanging, stabbing, shooting, poisoning, and drowning
of an animal. It also includes burning an animal with fire, fireworks, or caustic
substances. Finally, it encompasses mutilation or torture, though definitions of
the latter will vary.
Sexual abuse of animals has received considerably less scholarly attention.
Sexual abuse of an animal, often referred to as “bestiality,” includes a wide
range of sexual behaviors such as vaginal, anal, or oral penetration; fondling;
oral-genital contact; and penetration using an object (Beirne, 1997).
McMillan (2005, 2009) has argued that we should include emotional maltreat-
ment, or causing an animal distress, in discussions of animal cruelty, particu-
larly in light of the proliferation of recent research demonstrating the complexity
of animals’ emotions and the connection between emotional well-being and
physical health. Emotional abuse may include, but is not limited to, isolating an
animal, depriving him of mental stimulation or freedom of movement, or reject-
ing, abandoning, or terrorizing him.
PH YS I CA L C R U ELT Y TO A N I M A LS: ST U D I ES O F A D U LTS
This section reviews research on animal physical cruelty among adults and is
followed by a similar section reviewing research on juveniles and family-related
animal abuse. It is organized according to various populations that have been
studied, including the general population, animal abusers generally, animal
abusers with various disorders (psychiatric, substance abuse, psychopathy), and
incarcerated adults. There is some overlap of content across these topics because,
while they are grouped according to their sample populations, they sometimes
provide information related to other population characteristics. For example, a
study beginning with a general population may provide information regarding
the relation of physical animal cruelty to people’s criminal histories or to various
mental disorders.
Physical Abuse of Animals in the General Population
Importantly, because the FBI did not begin collecting data on animal cruelty
offenses in their National Incident-Based Reporting System until 2015 (Wisconsin
Department of Justice, 2014), the data will not be available until at least 2017,
and local studies were not aggregated, there is not yet a national estimate of the
incidence or prevalence of animal cruelty (Schmitt, 2014). However, in the first
study of its kind, Vaughn and colleagues (2009) examined sociodemographic
and psychiatric correlates of animal cruelty in the United States. As part of the
National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, they com-
pleted 43,093 structured psychiatric interviews of adults living in households
Understanding Animal Cruelty and Sexual Abuse97
and group settings (such as shelters and college dormitories) across the country.
Animal cruelty was assessed with an item embedded in the antisocial personal-
ity disorder interview module. All respondents were asked: “In your entire life,
did you ever hurt or be cruel to an animal or pet on purpose?” Respondents who
answered yes were defined as having a history of animal cruelty. Results revealed
that 1.8% of the individuals interviewed reported having hurt or been cruel to an
animal on purpose. Males, younger persons, and individuals with lower income
levels were more likely to report having committed animal cruelty during their
lifetimes. Moreover, the prevalence of all antisocial behaviors was higher among
individuals who had committed animal cruelty compared to those who had not.
Those who reported having committed animal cruelty were disproportionately
likely to report robbing or mugging another person, fire-setting, and harassing
or threatening someone.
Although the aforementioned study is important, we do not have a stable or
reliable estimate of prevalence of animal cruelty in the general population. Such
an estimate is not easy to obtain. Although there exist estimates of animal mal-
treatment among college students (Flynn, 1999; Henry, 2004; Miller & Knutson,
1997), there is no reason to believe that college students are representative of
the “general population.” Prevalence may vary geographically. Studies differ
in their definition of “animal cruelty” and in how they ask the question. And
self-reported incidents of animal cruelty may vary because of surveying condi-
tions that offer more or less protection from anonymity. In addition, animal cru-
elty may be underreported because of the social undesirability of the act (Wilson
& Norris, 2003) and because it is often a solitary, secretive activity others may not
be aware of (Felthous & Kellert, 1987). The field will be limited in its ability to
identify the relation of animal cruelty to various pathological conditions without
a general population benchmark.
Research on Animal Abusers
Gullone (2011) points out that antisocial behaviors such as stealing, burglary,
vandalism, sexual assault, and violence co-occur such that the presence of one
form of antisocial behavior predicts the presence of others. Animal cruelty is
one form of antisocial behavior. Therefore, she argues, it should be considered
an indicator of other forms of antisocial behavior and violence. The research
described here suggests that among individuals investigated for animal cruelty,
one often finds other forms of criminal behavior as well. In what is apparently
the first study to examine a sample of animal abusers, Hutton (1983) investigated
23 families who, according to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Animal
Cruelty, had a history of animal abuse and neglect. Of those families, 19 (82.6%)
were known to local social service departments and 14 (60.8%) were known to
the local probation department for reasons other than animal abuse. More spe-
cifically, eight of the families involved children at risk, five involved physical vio-
lence, and five involved child neglect. In addition, the types of abuse perpetrated
upon the animals paralleled those perpetrated on the humans in the home.
Hutton concluded that “animal abuse may be symptomatic of similar dynamics
within the larger family group” (p. 446) but acknowledged that “abuse” was not
properly defined in his study.
Clarke (2002) reviewed the criminal histories of 200 individuals with a record
of animal abuse in New South Wales, Australia. Police databases revealed that
the individuals had an average of four different types of criminal offenses each;
only two of the 200 had convictions solely for animal cruelty. Many had been
arrested for assault (61.5%) including domestic violence. Seventeen percent of
the animal abusers were also arrested for sexual abuse, and animal abuse was a
better predictor of sexual assault than previous convictions for firearms offenses
or homicide.
In another study of Australian offenders, Gullone and Clarke (2008) exam-
ined the criminal histories of animal cruelty offenders arrested between 1994
and 2001. The majority of animal abusers were male, and the peak period of
offense occurred between the ages of 18 to 25. When compared with all offenders
in the Statistic Services Division of Victoria Police Department’s records unit,
the animal offenders appeared more violent. More specifically, 25% of the ani-
mal abuse offenders committed crimes against a person compared to 8% of the
other offenders. The authors concluded that “there appears to be a greater likeli-
hood that people alleged to have abused animals will engage in offenses against
the person, including violent crimes, when compared to all alleged offenders”
(Gullone & Clarke, 2008, p. 315). The Australian findings support Osgood,
Johnston, O’Malley, and Bachman’s deviance generalization hypothesis (1988),
which holds that a variety of deviant behaviors are positively correlated with one
another because one form of deviance leads to involvement in others or because
various forms of deviance have the same underlying causes. Individuals who
commit animal maltreatment would thus be likely to commit other forms of
deviant behavior as well.
Arluke and colleagues (1999) examined the criminal records of 153 ani-
mal abusers who had been investigated by the Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (MSPCA). Sixty-nine percent of the cruelty
incidents involved dogs, 22% involved cats, and 9% involved other animals. The
researchers compared the animal abuse group, which ranged in age from 11 to
76, to 153 control participants matched by gender, socioeconomic status, age, and
residence. Findings indicated that animal abusers were significantly more likely
to be involved in other forms of criminal behavior, including violent offenses.
Seventy percent of the animal abuse group committed at least one offense com-
pared to only 22% of the control participants. Moreover, 37% of the animal abus-
ers had committed a violent crime compared to only 7% of the control group.
Thus, animal abusers were 3.2 times more likely to have a criminal record and
5.3 times more likely to have a violent criminal record than matched control
participants. They were also four times more likely to be arrested for property
crimes, 3.5 times more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and 3.5 times more
likely to be arrested for disorderly behavior. Interpretations of this study are
limited by the fact that nearly three-fifths of the participants were under the age
of 21, so that implications of the study across the adult age span are uncertain.
Also, the authors relied solely on state computerized criminal records, and there-
fore some of the individuals in the control group may have committed acts of
animal cruelty for which they were not charged.
Arluke and colleagues (1999) found that animal abuse was no more likely
to precede than follow other criminal offenses, including violent ones, in the
criminal histories of animal abusers. In other words, offenders did not appear
to be “graduating” from animal cruelty to interpersonal violence. However,
the authors noted that offenders may have committed multiple acts for which
they were not arrested, thus the temporal sequence of their offending cannot
be assured. If the offenders were not graduating from animals to humans, the
authors speculated that the offenders could be graduating from distant to inti-
mate targets, such as being abusive towards individuals in the community and
then towards one’s own dog. Alternatively, of course, animal abuse may desen-
sitize a perpetrator to suffering, serve as a rehearsal for abuse of humans, and
embolden the perpetrator if his acts went undetected, all of which could pave the
way for interpersonal violence.
Sergeant Brian Degenhardt of the Chicago Police Department conducted a
statistical summary of offenders charged with animal cruelty (2008). Degenhardt
examined 332 Chicago Police Department arrest records (over a period of three
consecutive years) of individuals charged with crimes against companion ani-
mals. He found that 91% of the animal abusers were male, 41% were between the
ages of 18 and 24, 33% were between the ages of 25 and 34, and at least 59% were
confirmed members of criminal street gangs. Eighty-six percent of the cruelty
offenders had two or more other arrests in their history, 70% had been arrested
for other felonies, and 65% had been arrested for battery. Thirty-six (13%) of the
animal abusers were convicted sex offenders: 11 were convicted of sexual assault
by the use of force, and 7 committed predatory sex offenses involving victims
age 12 or younger. In addition, 70% had been arrested for illegal narcotics, most
commonly for selling, delivering, or trafficking. Degenhardt concluded that ani-
mal abusers “regularly victimize humans with their criminal activities” (p. 2).
Unfortunately, although Degenhardt claimed to have selected a control group
of offenders with no animal cruelty arrests, the report did not include compara-
tive arrest data for the control group. The study also did not report percentages
of each type of animal cruelty offender included in the study (e.g., how many of
the animal abusers were convicted of dog-fighting as opposed to animal torture).
In conjunction with a FBI study of the criminal histories of animal cruelty
offenders, Levitt (2011) reviewed the arrest reports and criminal histories of
150 adult males who were arrested for animal cruelty, animal neglect, or ani-
mal sexual abuse between 2004 and 2009. Records indicated that a minimum
of 41% of the offenders in the sample were arrested for interpersonal violence
at least once, 18% were arrested for a sex offense such as rape or child molesta-
tion, and 28% were arrested for another interpersonal crime, most commonly
violating a restraining order or harassment. Significant relationships emerged
between physical abuse of animals (e.g., beating, drowning) and the follow-
ing variables: subsequent arrest for an interpersonally violent offense, assault
of a spouse or intimate partner, and substance abuse; 38% of active offenders
had been arrested for domestic violence and 64% had a history of substance
abuse. Finally, approximately one-third of those who had been arrested for
sexually assaulting an animal were also arrested for sexually assaulting a per-
son. This study was limited by the use of nonrandom sampling and the lack of
a control group.
Although the aforementioned studies have examined the criminalities of
animal cruelty perpetrators, there are limitations in this literature. First, some
of the research is not widely available. Clarke’s initial data were part of an “in
confidence” research publication that was not released to the public because
it contained sensitive law enforcement information (Gullone & Clarke, 2008).
Degenhardt’s (2008) study was also unpublished and, as previously mentioned,
omitted information regarding the control group and frequencies of various
types of animal cruelty incidents. Secondly, most of the studies were limited to
specific geographic regions. For example, Arluke and colleagues’ well-designed
1999 study focused only on cruelty incidents investigated by the MSPCA in
Massachusetts. Hutton (1983) and Gullone and Clarke’s (2008) studies focused
exclusively on cruelty offenders outside of the United States. Levitt’s study
(2011) included the Criminal Justice Information Systems record of offenders
for only six months to a maximum of five years following their arrest for animal
maltreatment; the offenders may have committed other crimes which were not
included on the criminal histories readily available to the FBI. Nevertheless,
as a body, these studies suggest that clinicians investigating persons charged
with animal cruelty should routinely seek information about other types of
offending as well.
Research on Mental Health and Substance Use Disorders
Approximately 32 state statutes include a provision recommending or mandating

that animal cruelty offenders undergo counseling (National District Attorneys
Association, 2013). This reflects society’s and the law’s presumption that animal
cruelty often represents a psychological problem. However, very few studies have
examined the relationship between mental health or substance use disorders and
physical or sexual abuse of animals.
There is relatively little mention of animal cruelty in diagnostic classifica-
tion systems. Animal cruelty is listed explicitly as a criterion only for conduct
disorder in the DSM-5 (2013). Bestiality and zoophilia (a sexual preference for
animals) are subsumed under paraphilia not otherwise specified in the Manual.
They were eliminated as formal diagnostic classifications in the revised third
edition (DSM-III-R) because both were thought to coexist with other clinically
significant problems and almost never to be the only disorder for which indi-
viduals would otherwise qualify (Cerrone, 1991).
Personality and Substance Abuse Disorders

Gleyzer, Felthous, and Holzer (2002) compared 48 criminal defendants who had
histories of repeated, substantial animal cruelty with 48 criminal defendants
who lacked such a history. Those in the control group were selected from the
files of criminal defendants also undergoing forensic evaluations within the
same calendar year and were matched for sex, race, and age but apparently not
for type of criminal history. The authors relied on retrospective forensic chart
review (which reflected multiple interviews with each defendant) to classify the
subjects; any subject with some history of animal abuse or neglect who did not
meet the threshold definition for substantial cruelty to animals was not included
in either group. The two groups differed significantly in the prevalence of antiso-
cial personality disorder, antisocial personality traits, and polysubstance abuse
and dependence, with greater prevalence rates in the group with animal cru-
elty histories. Given that substance abuse can increase one’s impulsivity and
reduce one’s control over aggressive behavior, its association with animal cruelty
is perhaps unsurprising. The animal cruelty acts of individuals with borderline
personality disorder may be a function of their impulsivity and explosive anger
(Yokoyama, 2008).
Using a community sample, Vaughn and colleagues (2009) found that indi-
viduals who reported having been cruel to animals frequently suffered from life-
time alcohol abuse and had a family history of antisocial behavior. In terms of
psychiatric disorders, the largest adjusted odds ratios were found for conduct
disorder and antisocial personality disorder. Significant, albeit smaller, associa-
tions were found for pathological gambling, obsessive-compulsive personality
disorder, and histrionic personality disorder. The authors noted that chronic
alcohol use, pathological gambling, conduct disorder, and antisocial and his-
trionic personality disorders are characterized by self-control deficits in which
emotional and cognitive dysregulation are common.
Schwartz, Fremouw, Schenk, and Ragatz (2012) explored the psychological
characteristics of animal abusers in an article entitled, “A Psychological Profile of
Male and Female Animal Abusers.” They asked college students if they had ever
intentionally hurt an animal (with exclusions for hunting and a few other situa-
tions) or forced animals to fight. The 29 (predominately white) college students
who reported two or more incidents of animal cruelty were compared to a con-
trol group matched on age and gender. The results of self-report questionnaires
revealed that animal abusers had more previous criminal behaviors and were
more likely to bully than the control group. They also had the highest scores on
the Power Orientation criminal thinking scale, meaning that they have a strong
desire for power and control; offenders who score high on this scale typically show
an outward display of aggression in an attempt to control their external environ-
ment and try to achieve a sense of power by manipulating others (Knight, Garner,
Simpson, Morey, & Flynn, 2006). Differences in empathy and in personality traits
were expected but did not emerge. Female animal abusers scored significantly
higher than female controls on total criminal thinking scores as well as on Power
Orientation and Justification subscales; justification refers to a thinking pattern
characterized by the offender minimizing the seriousness of antisocial acts and by

justifying actions based on external circumstances (Knight et al., 2006). Female
animal abusers also were found to be more likely to bully (83% compared to 33%),
and exhibited lower scores on measures of perspective taking and empathy than
female controls. Although the study produced intriguing results, the variety of
motives for and methods used to harm animals, even for the narrow population
studied, suggest multifaceted offender personalities rather than a single profile.
Psychopathy
Kavanagh, Signal, and Taylor (2013) asked respondents to complete an online
questionnaire measuring “the Dark Triad” (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and
psychopathy), attitudes towards animals, and acts of animal cruelty. Their sam-
ple consisted of 227 adults, the majority of whom were Australian and female;
psychopathy was measured with the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale III. Higher
levels of psychopathy were modestly correlated with having intentionally killed
a stray, feral, or wild animal for no good reason, and having intentionally hurt or
tortured an animal for the purpose of causing pain. The authors concluded that
the callous and manipulative attitudes and behaviors toward others that charac-
terize the Dark Triad are applicable in relations with both humans and animals.
Other Forms of Disorder

Yokoyama (2008) theorized the relationship between animal maltreatment and
a variety of other psychiatric disorders. First, individuals with depression may
neglect their pets’ needs due to their own low energy and psychomotor retar-
dation. In countries such as Japan, depressed individuals who perceive their
pets as family members have included them in “double suicides” (or alterna-
tively refrained from suicide because of their pet). Anxiety and specific phobias
may lead to the abuse of a specific type of animal. Individuals with factitious
disorders such as Munchausen syndrome by proxy may deliberately harm an
animal in order to elicit sympathy from others. Sensory integration disorders
may account for some instances of cruelty. For example, according to one study
of citizens of five countries, Americans were found to be most sensitive to noise
made by pets (Namba, Kuwano, Schick, Açlar, Florentine, & Da Rui, 1991).
In summary, we do not know whether people with various types of major men-
tal disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, mood disorders) have any
greater prevalence of animal abuse than those who do not have such disorders.
There is some evidence that people with antisocial personality disorders, conduct
disorders, or substance abuse histories have a higher prevalence of animal abuse.
Animal Cruelty among Incarcerated Populations
Several studies have relied on retrospective accounts of childhood and adoles-

cent cruelty to animals provided by incarcerated males. In these studies, inmates
disproportionately endorse having committed such cruelty (e.g., Hensley &

Tallichet, 2009; Merz-Perez, Heide, & Silverman, 2001).
Kellert and Felthous (1985) classified male inmates in federal prisons in Kansas
and Connecticut on levels of aggression, using prison counselors’ assessments
of the inmate’s documented, observed, and self-reported behavior in prison.
They found that 25% of the chronically aggressive inmates reported five or more
animal cruelty incidents in childhood compared to less than 6% of the less
aggressive criminals and 0% of the community sample. In other words, child-
hood cruelty toward animals occurred to a significantly greater degree among
aggressive criminals than among nonaggressive criminals or noncriminals. The
aggressive inmates also reported more extreme forms of cruelty, such as stoning
animals. Finally, paternal violence and alcoholism were significantly more com-
mon in the childhoods of those with histories of animal cruelty.
In this same study, Kellert and Felthous’ (1985) interviews with inmates
revealed nine motivations for inmates’ cruelty toward animals. First, some sub-
jects were cruel in an attempt to control an animal or shape his behavior. For
example, one subject rubbed his dog’s anus in turpentine to deter the dog from
entering a chicken-coop. Second, some subjects engaged and even delighted in
intense cruelty to retaliate against an animal for a presumed wrong; for example,
one subject burned a cat who had scratched him. Third, some subjects engaged in
violent or sadistic conduct against an animal to satisfy a prejudice against a spe-
cies or breed, frequently cats, whom they shot, burned, or mutilated indiscrimi-
nately. Fourth, subjects occasionally were cruel to animals in order to use the
animals to express their own violent, aggressive behaviors toward other people
or animals. For example, one subject fed his dog gunpowder so the dog would be
“tough” (i.e., prepared for aggressive behavior). Fifth, some subjects killed ani-
mals to enhance their own aggressiveness or impress others with their capacity
for violence. For example, one subject reported killing animals in an unspecified
“outrageous fashion” to impress his fellow motorcycle gang members.
Others used cruelty to animals as an expression or way of communicating
with a specific person. Some inmates were cruel to animals to shock people and
generate amusement. Inmates sometimes engaged in cruelty to animals in order
to retaliate against another person, often by harming the other person’s pet.
Subjects’ animal cruelty sometimes represented a displacement of hostility or
frustrated aggression from another person—often an authority figure the sub-
ject hated but feared—to an animal. For example, one subject described beating
animals as revenge for the beatings he endured. Finally, some subjects inflicted
injury, suffering, or death on an animal in order to derive pleasure from caus-
ing injury or suffering: “Sadistic gratification was sometimes associated with the
desire to exercise total power and control over an animal, and may have served
to compensate for a person’s feelings of weakness or vulnerability.” Kellert and
Felthous note that motivation to mistreat an animal is typically multidimen-
sional, and most subjects exhibited a variety of the aforementioned motivations.
Merz-Perez, Heide, and Silverman (2001) compared 45 inmates with histories
of violent offenses to 45 inmates in the same maximum security prison who had
no violent offenses in their criminal histories. Fifty-six percent of the violent

inmates endorsed having committed past acts of animal cruelty on a self-report
measure compared to 20% of the nonviolent inmates. Furthermore, 26% of the
violent offenders endorsed having abused a companion animal compared to 7%
of the nonviolent offenders (all three of whom reported dogfighting). The authors
noted that in some cases the past cruelty acts reported by the violent offenders
resembled their instant or most serious offense (e.g., forced sodomy).
Tallichet and Hensley (2004) surveyed 261 male inmates in three prisons in
a southern state. They found that inmates who committed recurrent childhood
animal cruelty were more likely to be convicted of recurrent adult acts of vio-
lence against humans. In a replication study, Hensley, Tallichet, and Dutkiewicz
(2009) surveyed 180 male inmates in southern medium and maximum-security
prisons. They found that those who had committed repeated acts of animal cru-
elty in childhood were more likely to have engaged in repeated acts of interper-
sonal violence as adults. Inmates who had drowned or had sex with animals
during their youth were also more likely to have been convicted of later repeated
acts of interpersonal violence.
Overton, Hensley, and Tallichet (2012) surveyed 180 male inmates in one
medium- and one maximum-security southern correctional facility; 103 had
engaged in animal cruelty in childhood or adolescence. Inmates who had com-
mitted recurrent animal cruelty as youths were more likely to have committed
recurrent adult violence toward humans; results were statistically significant at
the .05 level. Unlike Hensley and Tallichet (2008), who found that the commis-
sion of childhood animal cruelty for fun was a statistically salient motive for
predicting later recurrent violence against humans, Overton and colleagues’
analyses revealed that none of the motives for committing childhood animal
cruelty predicted later recurrent violent crimes toward humans.
In Australia, Alys, Wilson, Clarke, and Toman (2009) compared 20 incarcerated
male sexual homicide offenders, 20 male sex offenders (who did not commit homi-
cide) from an outpatient treatment program, and an age-matched control group of
20 male college students. Sexual homicide offenders were significantly more likely
to have committed animal abuse, both during childhood and adolescence, than
the sex offenders and college students. They reported significantly more frequent
animal cruelty than the controls as well. Almost all (19 out of 20) of the homi-
cide offenders reported abusing animals compared to none of the sex offenders.
Childhood animal cruelty was a significant predictor for antisocial behavior (e.g.,
stealing, destroying property, cruelty to children) for the sexual homicide offend-
ers and especially for the college students. According to Davis and Schlesinger
(2013), serial sexual murderers report a history of cruelty to cats in particular, per-
haps because “cats are generally considered a female symbol” (p. 272).
Animal cruelty in childhood has been documented not only for individuals
convicted of murder but for those convicted of rape and of child molestation.
For example, Tingle, Barnard, Robbins, Newman, and Hutchinson (1986) found
that 47.6% of persons convicted of rape and 27.9% of those convicted of child
molestation reported having been cruel to animals in childhood or adolescence.
More recent research has explored this behavior with a closer examination
of the context in which it was occurring. In their study of 269 male sex offend-
ers in Colorado prisons, Simons, Wurtele, and Durham (2008) found that 38%
of child sexual abusers reported engaging in sexual contact with animals dur-
ing childhood, compared to 11% of rapists. In general, the child sexual abusers
reported a more heightened sexualized childhood; they were more likely than
rapists to have been sexually abused and exposed to pornography. Sixty-eight
percent of rapists reported engaging in acts of childhood cruelty towards ani-
mals, compared to 44% of child sexual abusers. Rapists reported generally more
violent childhoods; they were more likely than child sexual abusers to have
experienced physical and emotional abuse and parental violence. The average
age of onset for sexual contact with animals for child sexual abusers was 12
whereas the average ago of onset for cruelty to animals among rapists was 10.
The average age of onset of sexual offending was 14 for child sexual abusers and
16 for rapists, suggesting that the maltreatment of animals may precede inter-
personal sexual offending.
We must be careful not to conclude from these results that all children who
sexually or physically abuse animals will become sex offenders, or that child-
hood animal abuse invariably predicts future sexual offending. Among all of
those children who abuse animals, perhaps only a minority become sex offend-
ers. Yet Simons, Wurtele, and Durham’s study provides important information
about the constellation of factors accompanying animal maltreatment that may
signal a particularly at-risk juvenile as well as the need for secondary prevention
for youth manifesting these developmental risk factors.
O’Grady, Kinlock, and Hanlon (2007) also examined the developmental
experiences of prison inmates, represented in this study by 183 drug-abusing
men and women in Maryland. Interviews revealed that 30.1% (n = 55) of the
inmates deliberately hurt animal(s) during their youth. Moreover, a childhood
history of torturing animals was significantly related to later violent crime. Of
the 55 participants who had deliberately hurt animals as a child, only one inmate
(1.8%) had no history of violent crime, while 29 (52.7%) inmates had attempted
to or committed murder. Thus, within a population of inmates, a history of tor-
turing animals as a child was strongly related to membership in the murder or
attempted murder group. Torture of animals was also related to early engage-
ment in criminal activity (on average, prior to age 10) and a high degree of family
deviance (parent or sibling substance abuse, criminal activity, and/or abuse of
other family members). Results from studies of this type do not mean that tor-
turing animals predicts later murder convictions. It means that they are related
within a prison population, but this would not likely be the case if one began
with a general community sample.
Levin and Arluke (2009) reviewed the histories of 44 serial killers who had
tortured their victims. Among them, 73% had reportedly also injured or killed
animals and 55% tortured the animals they abused. At least 18 of the 24 serial
killers who tortured animals did so using the same methods they used for tor-
turing their human victims such as decapitation or strangling, and the majority
(71%) tortured animals they did not know, just as serial killers typically target
strangers. The authors point out that many “normal” individuals report a his-
tory of harming animals in childhood and opine that perhaps it is incidents of
animal abuse in which a socially valued, anthropomorphized animal such as a
cat or dog is tortured in a “hands on” manner that predicts subsequent violence
against humans.
Along these lines, Felthous and Kellert (1986) suggested that among youth
who perpetrate childhood animal cruelty, the nature of it may be qualitatively
different (e.g., severity, frequency, type of animal) for those who graduate to
adult offending and those who do not. For example, it is not uncommon for
boys to play with BB guns and bows and arrows, particularly in certain geo-
graphic regions. Animals often become the target, though the boys’ intent
was not to inflict pain on the animal whose suffering may be an afterthought.
Likewise, Dadds, Turner, and McAloon (2002) noted that certain dimensions
or features of childhood cruelty to animals may be meaningful in evaluating
aggressive individuals. These features include direct involvement, variety of
cruelty acts, variety of species victimized, victimization of socially valued spe-
cies (e.g., pets), lack of self-restraint, motivations for cruelty (e.g., causing pain
versus seeking a caregiver’s attention), enjoyment of the animal’s pain, and
lack of remorse. The nature and frequency of animal cruelty behavior in the
childhoods of violent offenders compared to non-offenders has not been stud-
ied extensively.
Finally, special mention should be made of studies examining the so-called
“homicidal triad” of symptoms—enuresis, fire-setting, and cruelty to ani-
mals. It has long been claimed that if these are exhibited in childhood, they
are predictive of aggressive violent crimes in adulthood. This triad was widely
utilized by clinicians in the prediction of dangerousness during the 1970s and
early 1980s (Diamond, 1974; Monahan, 1981) and exemplified in the histo-
ries of serial killers such as Ken Bianchi (one of the “Hillside Stranglers”)
and Richard Chase (the California “Vampire Killer”) (Stone, 2001). It was first
examined by MacDonald (1963), who studied 100 patients of the Colorado
Psychopathic Hospital admitted for making homicidal threats. He found that
the childhood triad of animal cruelty, firesetting, and enuresis was “often
encountered” in the “very sadistic patients” (pp. 126–127) and concluded that
it was “an unfavorable prognostic factor in those who threaten homicide”
(p. 130). However, in a later study he did not find it to be a useful predictor
of future violence (1968). In a retrospective study, Hellman and Blackman
(1966) compared 31 prisoners charged with aggressive crimes to 53 prison-
ers charged with nonaggressive crimes. Twenty-three (74%) of the former had
the full triad while only seven of the latter had the full triad and eight more
had a history of part of the triad (28%). Langevin and colleagues (1983), on
the other hand, found that the triad was not a useful predictor of homicide in
their study. Because of the methodological limitations of these studies, firm
conclusions regarding the validity of the triad in predicting future violence
cannot be determined at present.
R ES E A R C H O N A N I M A L C R U ELT Y BY A D O L ESC EN TS
According to the National School Safety Council, the U.S. Department of

Education, the American Psychological Association, and the National Crime
Prevention Council, animal cruelty is a warning sign for at-risk youth and an
indicator that those youth pose a potential risk to others (Randour, 2004). This
position is likely based in part on the experiences of law enforcement personnel.
For example, in their seminal FBI study of 28 convicted sexual homicide perpe-
trators, Ressler, Burgess, and Douglas (1988) found that 36% of them had abused
animals in childhood and 46% had done so in adolescence. Serial killers such as
Jeffrey Dahmer, who impaled dogs’ heads, frogs, and cats on sticks, and Albert
DeSalvo, the “Boston Strangler,” who trapped dogs and cats in orange crates
and shot them with arrows in his youth (Merz-Perez & Heide, 2004), recounted
animal torture as their first violent act (Melson, 2013). Likewise, several of the
“school shooters” who killed classmates and school personnel during the 1990s
and 2000s had a history of abusing animals (Verlinden, Henson & Thomas,
2000), particularly anthropomorphized species (dogs and cats) in an up-close
and personal manner such as strangulation, bludgeoning, or beating to death
(Arluke & Madfis, 2014). For example, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, who killed
12 classmates and a teacher at Columbine High School, reportedly used to brag
about mutilating animals (Arluke & Madfis, 2014; Petersen & Farrington, 2007).
Studies of Animal Cruelty and Delinquency in Adolescence
Recent studies have explored whether a history of animal cruelty in childhood

serves as a marker for severe maladjustment and criminal behaviors. Lucia
and Killias (2011) examined data from the 2006 Swiss National Self-Reported
Delinquency Survey, which was completed by more than 3,648 students in the
seventh, eighth, and ninth grades, most of whom ranged in age from 13 to 16.
They found a lifetime prevalence of animal cruelty of 12%; 17% of boys and 8%
of girls reported having intentionally harmed an animal. Children who admit-
ted having maltreated animals had a three times higher likelihood of commit-
ting serious violent acts such as robbery, snatching/mugging, or assault with
injury. That is, 7.8% of those who admitted having mistreated an animal com-
mitted serious violence compared to 1.9% of those without a known history of
animal cruelty; likewise, 24.1% of those who admitted having mistreated an ani-
mal committed minor violence compared to 11.5% of those without a known
animal abuse history. The odds ratios for animal cruelty were particularly strong
for vandalism (OR 3.35) and for serious violence (OR 3.16), but far less so for
minor violence (OR 1.47) and nonviolent offenses, suggesting that animal cru-
elty is associated with offenses that have a component of violence, aggression, or
anger. However, the results are limited by the authors’ inclusion of insects into
the list of animals maltreated; separate analyses of those who harmed or killed
only vertebrates were omitted.
Also using a community sample, Henry (2004) surveyed 169 college students
and found that those who reported perpetrating animal cruelty had significantly
higher scores on a delinquency measure than those who did not report a history
of animal cruelty. In other words, they were significantly more likely to report
greater involvement in a variety of antisocial behaviors, both within the previous
year and over the course of their lives.
Becker, Herrera, McCloskey, and Stuewig (2004) used a prospective design
to investigate relationships among family risk factors, childhood firesetting
and animal cruelty, and adolescent delinquency. Results from their sample of
children in a battered women’s shelter revealed that animal cruelty was not
associated with a referral to juvenile court, but it was related to self-report
measures of nonviolent (r = 0.14, p < .05) and violent (r = 0.19, p < .01)
delinquency.
Using prospective data from a longitudinal study, Walters (2014) analyzed
interviews with 1,336 culturally diverse individuals between ages 14 to 19 who
had been adjudicated delinquent in Philadelphia or Phoenix; most of the youth
were male. Walters found that when pre-baseline covariates (age, sex, race,
early onset of behavior problems) were controlled, childhood animal cruelty
was related to subsequent aggressive and non-aggressive (income) offend-
ing, though effect sizes were modest. There was evidence that the relationship
between animal cruelty and subsequent offending was mediated by several cog-
nitive and personality variables, particularly hostility and callousness. Walters
concluded that results were congruent with a deviance generalization inter-
pretation of the relationship between animal cruelty and offending, wherein
cruelty toward animals is conceptualized as a symptom of low self-control or
general deviance.
However, as previously mentioned, a single and fairly minor animal cru-
elty act alone may have little value in predicting future serious offending,
because it appears to be fairly common in American boys. For example, in a
study of college students, Flynn (1999) found that 34.5% of the 84 males (and
9.3% of females) reported engaging in at least one act of animal cruelty in
childhood/adolescence. Yet Myers, Burgess, and Nelson’s (1998) study of 14
incarcerated juveniles who committed or attempted sexual homicide found
that 29%, about the same prevalence as among Flynn’s general sample, had
a history of cruelty to animals. Of the 299 predominantly male Iowa prison
inmates surveyed by Miller and Knutson (1997), 36 reported having killed a
pet, 98 reported having killed a stray, and 49 reported having hurt an animal
in childhood or adolescence. For comparison purposes, the authors then sur-
veyed 308 undergraduates (57% of whom were female), and found that 20.5%
endorsed having engaged in at least one act of animal cruelty in childhood;
10 reported having killed a pet, 44 reported killing stray animals, and 30
reported intentionally inflicting pain on an animal in order to tease or tor-
ture them. Finally, one study using an anonymous survey found that 10% of
male adolescents and 9% of female adolescents admitted committing animal
cruelty (Ascione, 2001).
Additional research is needed regarding the utility of using animal abuse in

a general child or adolescent population as an indicator of later delinquency in
clinical or forensic applications. Even if it is more frequent among youth who
later are delinquent, no research has yet shown the level of false positives that
would occur if we used animal abuse as a “marker” for later delinquency. The
review does suggest the possible value of animal abuse history as a factor in dif-
ferentiating among types of youth who are already known to have engaged in
violent or non-violent delinquencies.
Psychiatric Disorders in Adolescents and Animal Cruelty
Conduct Disorder
A history of animal cruelty has been found in 29.4% of boys with conduct disor-
der (Loeber, Keenan, Lahey, Green, & Thomas, 1993). Indeed, animal cruelty is
highly indicative of conduct disorder. One study using data gathered from 440
children and adolescents who had been referred to mental health clinics found
that positive predictive power (PPP) for cruelty to animals was .82, meaning that
82% of children displaying animal cruelty (per the report of adults close to them)
received a conduct disorder diagnosis (Frick et al., 1994). This finding suggests
that animal cruelty does not exist in isolation but is typically but one of a constel-
lation of deviant behaviors.
It is important to interpret those results with caution. Considered together,
these studies suggest that most conduct-disordered youth (70%) do not engage
in animal abuse. However, when one encounters a preadolescent or adolescent
who has been referred to a mental health clinic (typically because of some serious
behavior disorder) and who is cruel to animals, the chances are 80% that he or
she meets criteria for conduct disorder. Note also that this does not suggest that
cruelty to animals in adolescence is necessarily related to later antisocial behav-
ior in adulthood. Most youth with conduct disorder do not receive a diagnosis of
antisocial personality when they reach adulthood.
The early onset of conduct disorder (e.g., prior to age 10) is typically associated
with a poorer prognosis (APA, 2013). Cruelty to animals, then, may be a par-
ticularly important warning sign because it is one of the earliest reported symp-
toms of conduct disorder. In clinical samples, the median age of onset of animal
cruelty reported by parents is 6.5 years, meaning that it is observed earlier than
bullying, cruelty to people, vandalism, or fire setting (Frick et al., 1993). Notably,
children in clinical samples who are cruel to animals exhibit more symptoms of
conduct disorder than other children; animal cruelty may be a marker of a sub-
group of youth with conduct disorder who have a poorer prognosis (Luk, Staiger,
Wong, & Mathai, 1999).
To examine the utility of individual DSM-IV CD symptom criteria in
predicting the progression from conduct disorder to antisocial personal-
ity disorder, Gelhorn, Sakai, Price, and Crowley (2007) used a national
representative sample of adults (who had been interviewed in person as

part of a larger study). They found that cruelty to animals significantly dis-
criminated between those with clinical and subclinical conduct-disordered
behaviors (based on retrospectively reported criteria): 18% of males in the
conduct-disordered group endorsed having harmed an animal intention-
ally, compared to 5.5% of the subclinical group. However, cruelty to animals
was not useful in discriminating between transient and persistent antisocial
behavior.
Using a high-risk community sample (the children of mothers in bat-
tered women’s shelters) and a comparison group, Becker, Stuewig, Herrera, &
McCloskey (2004) found that children ages 6 through 12 who were cruel to
animals were more likely to be diagnosed with conduct disorder and attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder than children without a history of animal cruelty
That is, 29% of “cruel children” were diagnosed with conduct disorder compared
to 7.2% of noncruel children, and 54.8% of cruel children were diagnosed with
ADHD compared to 27.7% of noncruel children. These differences were sta-
tistically significant. Dadds and colleagues (2004) examined the prediction of
animal cruelty in a sample of 1,333, mostly Caucasian Australian children ages
three through nine and their caregivers. The factors with unique and significant
prediction were education of the mother, conduct problems, and hyperactivity.
The authors concluded that because two of the biggest predictors of animal abuse
were conduct problems and hyperactivity, cruelty may be due in part to poor
impulse control.
Children who demonstrate proactive aggression (that is, premeditated instru-
mental aggression such as animal cruelty) are at higher risk for later delinquency
than those with reactive aggression only. In this respect as well, cruelty to ani-
mals is a possible marker for a subgroup of conduct disorder that has a poor
prognosis (Dadds, Turner, & McAloon, 2002). About one-third of children with
conduct disorder continue to show behaviors in adulthood that meet criteria for
antisocial personality disorder (Duncan & Miller, 2002). As noted earlier, about
30% of youth with conduct disorder have engaged in animal cruelty. Thus with
further study, animal cruelty among conduct disordered youth might be found
to be of help in distinguishing conduct disordered youth who will or will not
continue their offending in adulthood.
Other Psychiatric Disorders in Juveniles

High incidence of animal cruelty has also been found in juvenile populations
with attachment disorders (Ascione, 2001; Baldry, 2003), attention deficit hyper-
activity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, depression (Becker, Stuewig,
Herrera, & McCloskey, 2004), polysubstance abuse and dependence, and per-
sonality disorders including antisocial personality disorder (Gleyzer, Felthous,
& Holzer, 2002). However, more research is needed in all of these areas before
formal associations can be made because it is unclear whether animal abuse is
any more prevalent in these disorders than in general populations.
Family and Social Variables Associated

with Childhood Animal Cruelty
Witnessing aggression between parents or caregivers may be a form of observa-

tional learning through which children learn violent problem-solving behav-
iors (Ascione, 1993). Children may imitate their parents’ fighting by abusing
their pets. DeViney, Dickert, and Lockwood found that pets were abused or
neglected in 60% of families known to engage in child maltreatment, and 26%
of the children abused or were cruel to their pets. Moreover, in 88% of fami-
lies displaying child physical abuse, pet abuse was also present (compared to
the 34% in families displaying child sexual abuse or neglect). The relationship
of a youth to the perpetrator who is being observed appears to mediate the
youth’s likelihood of committing similar subsequent acts. Those who observed
a friend, relative, parent, or sibling abuse an animal reported significantly
higher levels of animal cruelty while those who observed a stranger abuse an
animal reported lower levels (Thompson & Gullone, 2006). Along similar lines,
Hensley and Tallichet (2005b) found that male inmates who witnessed a friend
or family member hurt or kill an animal were significantly more likely to fre-
quently engage in animal cruelty compared to those who witnessed another
person (e.g., a stranger) commit the act. Likewise, Baldry (2003) found that
exposure to animal cruelty, particularly at the hands of parents or peers, is a
particularly strong factor for subsequent acts of animal cruelty perpetrated by
the juvenile observer.
In addition to parental animal abuse, family risk factors for animal cruelty
include physical abuse, corporal punishment, sexual abuse, and exposure to
domestic violence (Duncan & Miller, 2002). Becker, Herrera, McCloskey, and
Stuewig (2004) found that animal cruelty among children ages 6 through 12 was
associated with paternal (r = 0.19) and maternal harsh parenting (r = 0.14). Dadds
et al. (2004), on the other hand, found that harsh and inconsistent parenting
style was not associated with childhood cruelty to animals in a large sample of
Australian youth after controlling for other factors. In an Italian study, verbal
abuse on the part of the mother was associated with animal cruelty for boys
but not for girls, while physical abuse by the father was associated with animal
cruelty for girls but not for boys (Baldry, 2005). In his sample of college students,
Flynn (1999) found that the frequency of being spanked by fathers was posi-
tively related to perpetrating animal abuse for males; nearly 60% of males who
received corporal punishment more than 20 times from their fathers had abused
an animal. Moreover, nearly 60% of males who were physically punished as teens
by their fathers perpetrated animal abuse, compared to 23% who were not hit
as teens by fathers. No patterns emerged for males spanked by their mothers
or females spanked by either parent. Flynn agreed with DeViney, Dickert, and
Lockwood’s speculation (1983) that children who are physically harmed by their
parents may employ “scapegoating,” inflicting violence on their powerless pets.
He also pointed to the “cultural spillover” theory which maintains that the more
exposure an individual has to socially acceptable violence, the more likely he is

to engage in socially unacceptable violence (Straus, 1994).
In a study of conduct disordered children in a residential treatment center,
children who were cruel to animals had significantly greater histories of child
abuse, both physical and sexual, than children who were not (Duncan, Thomas,
& Miller, 2005). Similarly, in a study of seriously mentally ill adolescent inpa-
tients, Ascione (2001) found that parental reports of cruelty to animals were
35% for sexually abused boys and 27% for sexually abused girls compared to 5%
for nonabused boys and 3% for nonabused girls. In another study, Ascione and
colleagues surveyed maternal caregivers of 6- to 12-year-old children who had
been sexually abused (and referred to a clinic) about their children’s behavior
(Ascione, Friedrich, Heath, & Hayashi, 2003). The reported prevalence of cruelty
to animals was more than five times higher for the sexual abuse (17.9%) and
psychiatric comparison (15.6%) groups than for the normative group who did
not have a history of sexual abuse (3.1%). Yamazaki (2010) found that a sample
of maltreated, institutionalized Japanese youth were significantly more likely to
report witnessing and committing more severe animal cruelty than a group of
nonmaltreated elementary-age youth. Sexually oriented adult murderers who
were sexually abused in childhood or adolescence were significantly more likely
than non-abused murderers to report a history of cruelty to animals (Ressler,
Burgess, Hartman, Douglas, & McCormack, 1986).
Currie (2006) found that Canadian mothers who reported that their chil-
dren were exposed to domestic violence were almost three times more likely to
report that their children were cruel to animals compared to a matched sample
of mothers who did not report domestic violence (17% vs. 7%, respectively).
Likewise, in a nonclinical Italian sample, Baldry (2005) found that youth age 9
to 12 who reported exposure to interparental violence were three times as likely
to have abused animals as their peers who were not exposed to such violence.
Fifty-nine percent of those who witnessed their father physically abusing their
mother endorsed having been cruel to an animal compared to 33% of those who
had not witnessed this. Sixty percent of those who witnessed their mother being
violent toward their father endorsed having been cruel to an animal compared to
34% who had not witnessed this. Ascione (1998) found that 32% of women resid-
ing in a domestic violence shelter reported that one of their children had hurt
or killed a family pet. Estimates of the number of children in domestic violence
homes who have witnessed animal abuse range from 29% in Australia (Gullone,
Volant, & Johnson, 2004) to 61% (Carlisle-Frank, Frank, & Nielsen, 2004) and
67% (Ascione et al., 2007) in the United States.
Other parental factors have been associated with increased rates of ani-
mal cruelty. Among them are low parental education levels (Dadds, Whiting,
Bunn, Fraser, Charlson, & Pirola-Merlo, 2004; Dadds, Whiting, & Hawes, 2006;
Flynn, 1999), a physically and/or emotionally unavailable father (Felthous,
1980; Hellman & Blackman, 1966), paternal alcoholism (Felthous, 1980; Tapia,
1971), and residence in rural areas (Hensley & Tallichet, 2005a). However, more
research is needed to determine whether these relationships can be generalized

or are specific to the single studies that reported them.
Theories about Family Violence and Animal Maltreatment

As the preceding section suggests, several studies (e.g., Ascione, Friedrich, Heath,
& Hayashi, 2003; Flynn, 2000a) have demonstrated that animal abuse may be a
reliable marker for other forms of family violence, including domestic violence
and child abuse. For example, a 2001 study conducted by the Humane Society of
the United States involving 1,677 official and unofficial reports of deliberate ani-
mal cruelty revealed that 89% of the cases also involved domestic violence, 67%
involved child abuse, and 50% involved elder abuse (Arkow, 2003). The results of
these studies are sufficiently consistent that a number of theories have arisen to
explain the relationship.
DeGue and DiLillo (2009) identified several explanations for this link between
animal cruelty and family violence. Some “homes may be prone to generalized
physical violence—with lines blurred between victims and perpetrators” (DeGue
& DiLillo, 2009, p. 1051). The family dynamic may be one in which vulnerable
or dependent household members are devalued. Abusing an animal, particu-
larly one to whom the child is bonded, may be a form of emotional abuse and a
means of intimidating, controlling, scaring, or upsetting children. Child abus-
ers may harm animals or threaten to do so in order to frighten or manipulate
children into complying with the abuse or agreeing to keep it secret. Children, in
turn, may abuse animals to redirect their aggression and cope with their victim-
ization. Their ability to do so may reflect the lack of parental supervision often
associated with child neglect and abuse. Consistent with social learning theory,
children may also be reenacting the animal cruelty they witnessed in the home
or with peers.
Febres and colleagues (2014) theorize that the overrepresentation of animal
abuse in adulthood among domestic batterers may represent these individuals’
propensities toward maladaptive coping strategies (such as the use of aggres-
sion) across settings. They point out that those who perpetrate interpersonal
violence and those who perpetrate animal cruelty endorse characteristics in
common, such as antisocial traits, problems with impulsivity, low empathy,
and involvement in other illegal behaviors. To that list, Walters (2014) added
callousness-unemotionality and interpersonal hostility and hypothesized that
perhaps those two mediate the relationship between animal cruelty and general
offending.
DeViney, Dickert, and Lockwood (1983) believe that “triangling” frequently
occurs within domestic violence families wherein pets are mistreated as a way of
hurting another family member. They pointed to the fact that 88% of individu-
als in their study who had physically abused their children also had records for
animal abuse. Coston and Protz (1998) conceptualized this behavior as a “peck-
ing order of aggressive acts” in which violence and a lack of empathy was passed
down from the head of household through the child and down to household
animals (p. 154). As a result of this intergenerational transmission of cruelty,

children in violent homes may abuse their siblings and pets (Ascione, 1993).
Intimate Partner Violence and Animal Cruelty

Pets are frequently abused by men who batter their partners. Seventy-one percent
of the 38 women interviewed in a battered women’s shelter in Utah reported that
their partners had threatened to harm or kill their pet, and 57% reported that
their partners had actually harmed or killed their pet (Ascione, 1998). Quinlisk
(1999) anonymously surveyed 72 women in Wisconsin domestic violence pro-
grams, 62 of whom reported having pets in the home. Of those 62, 49 (68%)
reported that there was violence directed toward the animal(s), and two others
reported that their partners threatened to kill or give away the pets. Twenty of the
43 battered women interviewed in a South Carolina shelter reported that their
abuser had harmed or threatened to harm their pets (Flynn, 2000b). Fifty-three
percent of women in a New York domestic violence shelter reported that their
partners had physically harmed their pets (Carlisle-Frank, Frank, & Nielsen,
2004). In a study of 151 primarily Hispanic women in two South Texas domestic
violence shelters, 36% reported that their partners had threatened, harmed, or
killed their pets (Faver & Cavazos, 2007). Walton-Moss, Manganello, Frye, and
Campbell (2005) analyzed data from a large, case-control 11-city study. Cases
were women who had survived an attempted homicide (n = 183) or proxies of
women who did not (typically mothers, sisters, or friends) (n = 220). A randomly
selected control group of nonabused women was also used. Five partner charac-
teristics were associated with abuse, one of which was threat or actual abuse of
a pet. Of those five risk factors, partner pet abuse had the largest effect for risk
of intimate partner violence (AOR 7.59, p = .011); women who reported partner
pet abuse were 7.59 times more likely to be victims of severe intimate partner
violence than women whose partners did not abuse animals.
Logan, Shannon, and Walker (2005) examined battering experiences of 450
women who had obtained protective orders against their intimate partners.
Thirty-six percent of the rural women and 19.6% of urban women reported
that their partners had threatened or harmed their pets. It should be noted that
compared to urban women, rural women more often reported that their partner
had been violent toward the couple’s children, threatened the woman’s life, and
threatened her with weapons. The idea that animal cruelty in domestic violence
relationships may be indicative of a particularly high-risk relationship was also
suggested in a study by Simmons and Lehmann (2007) with a sample of 1,283
women seeking services at an urban domestic violence shelter. As reported by
the women, significantly more men who abused the family pets sexually had
assaulted, raped, and stalked their partners compared to men who did not abuse
the family pets.
Ascione and colleagues (2007) compared a convenience sample of 101 women
in domestic violence shelters in Utah to 119 women in the community who indi-
cated that they had not been physically abused by a partner. When queried, 52.5%
of the abused women reported that their partner had threatened to harm or kill
their pet compared to 12.5% of women in the community group. Moreover, 54%
of the abused women reported that their partner had actually harmed or killed
their pet compared to 5% of the women in the community. The majority (66.7%)
of the abused women’s children reported having seen or heard one of their pets
hurt. Overall, 22.8% of the abused women reported that concern for their pet
delayed them from seeking refuge in a domestic violence shelter; among women
whose pet(s) had been abused and threatened, 34.3% had delayed seeking refuge.
The strongest predictors of threats to pets were the Conflict Tactics Scale’s Minor
Physical Violence and Verbal Aggression subscales whereas the strongest predic-
tors of actual harm to or killing of pets by a partner were the women’s shelter
or nonshelter status and the Severe Physical Violence subscale of the Conflict
Tactics Scale. According to DeGue (2011), this suggests that the severity of ani-
mal cruelty may increase as a function of the increasing severity of interpersonal
violence.
Loring and Bolden-Hines (2004) studied women who had had a pet in the
past year and were clients of a family violence center specializing in emotional
and physical abuse of adults who had legal charges. The women lived in rural
and urban areas, mostly in the southern United States. Their ages and family
incomes ranged considerably. Each met criteria for posttraumatic stress disor-
der. Fifty-four of the 72 women (75%) reported that their batterer had abused
their pet. Twenty-four of the women reported that their partner harmed a pet
in order to force the women to commit an illegal act(s) including robbery, fraud,
and/or drug-trafficking. All 24 coerced women reported committing the illegal
act(s) so that her pet would not be hurt (Loring & Bolden-Hines, 2004).
In another study involving a criminal population, researchers interviewed 38
incarcerated men in Utah who had a violent intimate relationship in which a
pet was present. Fifty-five percent of these men acknowledged abusing or kill-
ing the pet (Ascione & Blakelock, 2003). Those who acknowledged pet abuse
also reported higher rates of forcing their partner to engage in anal and/or oral
sex, firesetting, and punching, kicking, or biting others. Jorgenson and Maloney
(1999) also queried abusive men about their treatment of pets in the home. Only
1% of the 1,354 males surveyed acknowledged committing animal cruelty, a fig-
ure that stands in contrast to the much greater percentage of battered women in
the study who reported that their partners had abused the family pet(s).
A significant percentage of battered women delay fleeing to a shelter out of
concern for the welfare of their companion animals. Proportions vary from 18%
(Ascione, 1998; Flynn, 2000b), 33% (Volant, Johnson, Gullone, & Coleman, 2008),
and 43.5% (Fitzgerald, 2005) to 48% (Carlisle-Frank, Frank, & Nielsen, 2004).
The relationship between domestic violence and animal abuse is evident in
other countries as well. In Australia, researchers matched a group of 102 women
utilizing domestic violence services in Victoria to a comparison group of 102
women in the community whose relationships were not abusive. Approximately
53% of the women in the domestic violence group reported that their part-
ner had abused their pet compared to none of the women in the comparison
group. Forty-six percent of the battered women reported that their partners
had threatened to harm their pets compared to 5.8% of the women who were
not abused (Volant, Johnson, Gullone, & Coleman, 2008). However, because
this study, like the aforementioned American studies, used narrow recruitment
methods, they may not be representative of all domestic violence victims. A 2012
New Zealand study involved a survey of 203 Women’s Refuge clients (current or
former domestic violence victims). Of these, 36.5% reported that a pet or other
animal had been injured or killed some time in their violent relationship, most
commonly within the past two years. In approximately 90% these instances, it
was the woman’s abusive partner who had harmed the animal(s). Approximately
one-third of survey respondents reported having stayed in the relationship either
“somewhat” or “completely” out of fear that their partner would injure their ani-
mal (Roguski, 2012).
Two Canadian studies also examined the treatment of pets in domestic
violence households. The Ontario SPCA surveyed 111 women in 30 domestic
violence shelters in the province who had pets in the past year. Of those, 44%
reported that their partner had abused or killed one or more of their pets; 43% of
the women reported that concern over their pet’s welfare prevented them from
leaving the abusive situation sooner (Daniell, 2001). McIntosh (2001) surveyed
65 women in a Calgary domestic violence shelter who reported having had one
or more pets in the past year. Of those, 47% reported that their partner hurt or
killed a family pet; 25.4% delayed coming to a shelter due to concern for their
pet(s). As in other studies, many of the women reported that their children had
witnessed the abuse of family pets and some expressed concern that their chil-
dren had harmed or killed animals themselves.
Most of the studies described here concerned women who eventually sought
refuge in battered women’s shelters. It is worth noting that women with even
stronger attachments to their pets may be underrepresented in these studies
because of their reluctance to go to shelters, most of which prohibit animals
(Long, Long, & Kulkarni, 2007). In addition, factors such as socioeconomic sta-
tus and social support networks influence whether a woman will seek refuge in
a shelter (McPhedran, 2009). Thus, much less is known about animal cruelty in
the homes of domestic violence victims who have remained with their batterer
or sought safety with friends or relatives (Ascione et al., 2007).
Examinations of animal abuse behaviors among domestic batterers typi-
cally focus on abuse by men. However, Febres and colleagues (2012) surveyed
87 women arrested for domestic violence, most of whom were Caucasian. A
history of animal abuse (which the authors conceptualized as encompassing
threats, neglect, and physical cruelty) was overrepresented in the sample: 17%
committed at least one act of animal abuse since age 18, compared to the 0.28%
prevalence rate reported in the general population (Vaughn et al., 2009). Women
who reported committing animal abuse as an adult showed moderately higher
rates of psychological aggression and physical assault perpetration against their
partners, relative to women who did not report a history of animal abuse. In a
parallel study of 307 primarily Caucasian men arrested for domestic violence
in Rhode Island, Febres and colleagues (2014) found that 41% reported having
committed animal abuse since age 18, compared to the 1.5% prevalence rate in
the general population (Vaughn et al., 2009). Psychological and physical inti-
mate partner violence (overall and severe), antisocial traits, alcohol use, total
adulthood animal abuse, and physical animal abuse were all positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with each other. However, adulthood animal abuse was not
significantly associated with overall psychological aggression or severe physi-
cal aggression above and beyond antisocial personality traits and alcohol use
(Febres et al., 2014).
Child Abuse
DeViney, Dickert, and Lockwood (1983) surveyed the treatment of animals in 53
families in which children had been physically or sexually abused or neglected.
A social services staff member who worked with the family interviewed an adult
or teenager in the family home so that he or she could observe interactions with
pets directly. Based on the families’ self-report and caseworkers’ observations,
the researchers determined that pets had been abused in 60% of the families,
most frequently by both parents. Children had clearly been physically abused in
19 of the families; in 17 of those 19, animals were also abused. The authors noted
that 50% of the animal abusers with more than one pet differentiated between
their “good” pet and their “bad” pet, a theme that is common in child abuse
cases (DeViney, Dickert, & Lockwood, 1983).
Child molesters may threaten or actually harm their victims’ pets in order
to coerce the child into remaining silent about the abuse (Adams, 1994; Arkow,
2007). Abusers may physically harm animals in order to intimidate, control,
frighten, or upset children who they are not molesting as well (DeGue & DiLillo,
2009). Parents may also force children to participate in the abuse of a pet in order
to “toughen them up” (Loar, 1999).
DeGue and DiLillo (2009) surveyed 860 college students, the majority of whom
were white and female. Victims of family violence were significantly more likely
to report experiencing animal cruelty as a witness or perpetrator than nonvic-
tims, with 26.8% of victims reporting exposure to animal abuse. Specifically,
participants who witnessed animal abuse were significantly more likely to report
a history of child physical abuse, emotional abuse, and severe domestic violence
than participants who did not witness it. Witnessing and perpetrating animal
cruelty increased the odds of child abuse or domestic violence exposure by 1.5 to
2 times. Further, individuals who reported abusing animals were more likely to
report a history of sexual abuse, physical abuse, and neglect than nonperpetra-
tors. In sum, approximately 60% of individuals who witnessed or perpetrated
animal abuse also experienced family violence. The authors concluded that ani-
mal cruelty may prove a reliable marker for other forms of family violence as
child maltreatment or domestic violence may be present in many or even the
majority of homes in which animals are abused.
Brennen and colleagues (2010) surveyed 993 adults in the Bahamas, approxi-
mately half of whom lived with pets. Violence was used to train pets in approxi-
mately one quarter of the homes with pets, and pets were intentionally harmed
in 14.6% of homes. In 272 of the homes where there were both pets and chil-
dren, 11.4% contained domestic violence, child abuse, and pet abuse. Pets
were hit as a means of discipline in 54.5% of the homes in which spanking
was considered abuse compared to 23.5% of the homes in which spanking was
not considered abuse. Furthermore, in 45.5% of the homes in which spanking
was considered abuse, the abuser was the same person who hit the pet (compared
to 7.9% in homes in which the spanking was not considered abuse). The authors
concluded that people who harm pets could be at a higher risk of harming chil-
dren and may need counseling.
Girardi and Pozzulo (2012) surveyed child protection workers in Ontario,
Canada about the significance of animal cruelty when completing child protec-
tion investigations. Of the 78 workers who completed the online questionnaire
(reflecting a low response rate), 28% endorsed directly observing caregivers
(mostly fathers and stepfathers) physically harming animals during investiga-
tions in the past year, and 45% reported directly observing children doing so. In
addition, 44% endorsed observing evidence (e.g., visible injuries) that an animal
had been abused, and 95% endorsed observing evidence of animal neglect dur-
ing the investigations in the previous year.
Elder Abuse
As with child abuse, many of the same factors place dependent, elderly adults
and companion animals at risk for abuse. Dependent elders require substantial
supervision. Their limited mobility and/or physical maladies may lead to bore-
dom, frustration, and, consequently, complaining. Incontinence may be the
breaking point that propels the caregiver towards abusive behavior (Loar, 1999).
Abusers’ drug and alcohol abuse may also play a part, as may the social status of
both groups: elders and animals are typically looked down upon by others, an
attitude which facilitates abuse (Rosen, 1995).
Ascione asserted that some caregivers may abuse their elderly parent’s pet as
a way to punish their parent for abusing them when they were children (Rosen,
1995). Alternatively, an individual may abuse or threaten to harm an animal
in order to intimidate an elderly person into signing over assets or property.
According to Rosen (1995), “Pets and grandmas get bloodied, neglected and
raped for the same reasons: greed, anger, frustration and ignorance” (p. 2). The
elderly person may be dependent on the abuser (financially or otherwise) and
thus reluctant to report the abuse (Petersen & Farrington, 2007).
Lockwood (2002) argues that pets are typically more visible victims than mis-
treated elderly persons. The presence of a mistreated pet, then, can signal that an
older person may be suffering as well (Rosen, 1995).
In 2001, the Humane Society of the United States and the National Center on
Elder Abuse distributed questionnaires to Adult Protective Service caseworkers
and supervisors nationwide regarding animal cruelty and elder abuse. Of the
nearly 200 respondents, 35% reported that clients talked about pets having been
threatened, injured, killed, or denied care by a caregiver. More than 45% of the
respondents reported that they have encountered evidence of abuse or neglect
of animals when visiting clients. Approximately 92% reported the coexistence

of animal neglect and a client’s inability to care for him or herself. Finally, more
than 75% of respondents noted that clients’ concern for their animals’ welfare
affected decisions about interventions or additional services such as housing
(Lockwood, 2002).
Boat and Knight (2000) also queried Adult Protective Services case managers
about their experiences with elderly clients who had pets. The six case manag-
ers most often reported having observed companion animals being neglected by
their elderly “owners.” However, the workers noted that animal neglect tended
to be a symptom of the elder’s inability to take sufficient care of him- or herself.
Rarely, they stated, was the animal the only one suffering. As a result of these
and similar findings, Ascione and Peak (2009) developed a protocol for assessing
animal welfare issues in the lives of elder adults as well as a follow-up protocol
for cases in which elder adults have expressed concern about the welfare of their
animals.
A N I M A L S E X UA L A B U S E
The sexual abuse of animals includes a wide range of sexual behaviors such
as vaginal, anal, or oral penetration; penetration using an object; oral-genital
contact; and fondling. In their sample of 28 cases of sexual abuse of small
animals (53 dogs, 4 cats, and 1 rabbit) in the United Kingdom, Munro and
Thrusfield (2001) found that most involved either penile penetration or
insertion of a foreign object (such as a broomstick or knife) into the animal’s
vagina or rectum. They concluded: “the range of injuries in abused animals
reported here mirrors, by and large, the spectrum identified in human vic-
tims” (p. 336).
According to Beirne (1997), this abuse may be conceptualized as inter-
species sexual assault because the human has power and control over the
animal including most aspects of the animal’s welfare. In this way, the sex-
ual abuse of a pet is arguably akin to the sexual abuse of a dependent child.
Also like children, animals are unable to consent to humans in a clear
and unambiguous manner (Beirne, 1997). A proclivity for exploiting them
may ref lect a preference for abusing those who are unable to voice con-
sent or opposition (Sandnabba, Santtila, Nordling, Beetz, & Alison, 2002).
Nearly half of all states in the United States require individuals convicted
of having sex with animals to register as sex offenders (National District
Attorneys Association, 2014), which could suggest that lawmakers believe
that individuals who sexually assault animals pose a risk to humans. It
is also illegal to create, sell, distribute, or exchange “animal crush vid-
eos,” sexual fetish films that typically depict women, often in high-heeled
shoes, torturing and killing small animals (Tallichet & Hensley, 2013;
Williams, 2014).
Prevalence
The sexual abuse of animals may be more common than one might think, at least
among certain populations. For example, in a 1991 prevalence study, Alvarez and
Freinhar found that 6 of the 15 male psychiatric patients (40%) queried endorsed
having had sex relations with an animal. Based on their study of 5,300 men,
Kinsey et al. (1948) estimated that 8% of white American males had engaged in
sex with animals; however, Kinsey’s nonrandom sampling and aggressive inter-
view style call into question the generalizability of his results (Beirne, 2001). In a
sample of 267 college students, 2.4% of the male sample reported having engaged
in sex with an animal (Flynn, 1999). Sexual contact with animals may particu-
larly common in regions in which it is more culturally accepted and/or in rural
areas. Zequi and colleagues (2012) questioned 118 penile cancer patients and
374 controls from mostly rural Brazilian cities. One hundred and seventy-one
(34.8%) of the men reported having had sex with animals, and 29.8% reported
having had sex with animals with a group of men. The majority of subjects (60%)
practiced sex with animals for over one to five years, and mares and donkeys
were the most commonly abused.
It is important to note that prevalence rates of animal sexual abuse may be
underreported, even among offender populations. For example, when English,
Jones, Patrick, and Pasini-Hill (2003) interviewed 180 convicted sexual offenders,
mostly males convicted of crimes against children, approximately 4% acknowl-
edged having had sex with animals. However, after a polygraph administration
and treatment process, 36% admitted to having had sex with animals. Likewise,
in a survey of 32 juveniles adjudicated for “severe contact” sexual offenses, 37.5%
endorsed having had sex with animals on a true-false questionnaire but 81.2%
admitted to having had sex with animals during a polygraph administration
(Schenk, Cooper-Lehki, Keelan, & Fremouw, 2014). According to Maher and
Pierpoint (2012), recent community samples of individuals reporting that they
have had sex with animals indicate that the majority are male, Caucasian, single,
and with at least a college-level education.
Types of Animal Sexual Abusers
Scholars have differentiated between various types of sexual abusers of ani-

mals. Sexual contact with animals is often referred to as bestiality. However,
“zoophiles” are sexually fixated on animals; animals are their preferred sexual
partners (Beetz, 2005; Beirne, 1997). “Zoosexuals” report having an emotional
as well as sexual attraction to or a relationship with an animal (Beetz, 2004).
The advent of the Internet has led to the development of a online zoophile com-
munity in which individuals share information and pornography via websites,
chat rooms, and mailing lists and receive validation for their sexual practice.
Pedophiles engage in very similar activities online (Durkin, Forsyth, & Quinn,
2006). Adams (1995) likened zoophiles to child sexual abusers in that they often
view the sexual acts as consensual and mutually enjoyable.
Zoosadists derive sexual pleasure from sadistic activities with an animal such
as torture. Necrozoophilia, also known as necrobestiality, involves a sexual
attraction to dead animals. Aggrawal (2011) also differentiated between “oppor-
tunistic zoosexuals,” who would be content with sex with humans but partake
in sex with animals if the opportunity arises, and “classic zoophiles,” who prefer
sex with animals over sex with humans. He identified a subclass of the latter as
“regular zoophilia by proxy,” wherein an individual may force his or her partner
to engage in a sexual act with an animal. Aggrawal based these and other pro-
posed classes of zoophilia on a 10-tier classification of necrophilia.
Motivations for Animal Sexual Abuse
Animal sexual assault may be perpetrated by adolescents who have easy access
to animals and seek to experiment with them. Particularly in rural, agricultural
areas, adolescents may lack other outlets for their sexual urges and/or become
aroused by the sight of animals having sex with one another (Kinsey, Pomeroy, &
Martin, 1948; Kinsey, Pomeroy, Gebhard, Martin, 1953). Males may satisfy their
sexual urges with animals when females are not present or sexually available
(Nagaraja, 1983). Youth may also engage in such behavior out of cruelty, in order
to show off for other boys, to learn sexual techniques they could later use on girls,
or simply out of curiosity (Beirne, 1997).
Individuals may sexually abuse animals because they feel isolated (Cerrone,
1991), embarrassed, insecure, or fearful of rejection (Beetz, 2004). They may
become accustomed to exploiting or controlling others for their own sexual
gratification (Humane Society of the United States, 1999). In a study of 93 adults
who reported having sexual relationships with animals, half acknowledged forc-
ing an animal into sexual contact, 9% admitted to forcing a human to participate
in a sexual act he or she did not want to do, and 3% admitted to raping another
person (Miletski, 2002). In their study of 51 chronic zoophiles, Peretti & Rowan
(1982) found that the zoophiles had difficulty relating to other humans. The men
explained that they did not have to spend time or money on their interaction
with animals. Rather, the interactions were simple, straightforward, and free of
pretense. Some of the men viewed human social interactions as basically super-
ficial and opted for a sexual outlet instead of enmeshment in a relationship. They
could engage in various sexual practices such as anal penetration without having
to persuade their partner or worry about their own performance. Some reported
using animals to act out rape or other sadistic experiences. These motives may
also be those of patrons of animal brothels in which tourists pay to have sex with
dogs, horses, and other animals. Such establishments have reportedly sprung up
in the United States (Sullivan, 2010) and abroad in countries such as Denmark
(e.g., King, 2014; Nadeau, 2012).
There are still other theories regarding the motivations for sexually abusing
animals. Individuals who have been sexually abused may act out their abuse on
animals in an attempt to gain a sense of control. Some may derive sexual gratifica-
tion from inflicting pain and suffering while sexually abusing animals (Adams,
1995). Animal sexual abuse, like rape, can be “the eroticization of violence, con-
trol, and exploitation” (Humane Society of the United States, 1999, p. 1). According
to Merz-Perez and Heide (2003) violent sexual activities such as the sexual abuse
of animals occurs when “sexuality and aggression have become developmentally
fused, and the two are mutually inclusive in the psyche of the offender” (p. 66).
The offender’s violence towards others, including animals, leads to a sexual release
and sometimes escalates to killing (Wright & Hensley, 2003). In fact, some foren-
sic texts argue that interspecies sexual abuse “typifies the early lives of serial kill-
ers in the form of cruelty to animals (called ‘zoosadism’)” (Williams & Weinberg,
2003, p. 524). In particular, sexual intercourse with small animals that frequently
die from injuries may be sadistically motivated. In cases reflecting “zoosadism,”
the animal is intentionally killed during the sexual act (e.g., breaking the neck
of a chicken), and the animal’s contractions while dying heighten the offender’s
sexual arousal (Beetz, 2004; Sandnabba et al., 2002). In other instances, killing
the animal sexually gratifies the offender, who may masturbate over or with the
animal’s corpse (Beetz, 2005). The offender may use an animal as a surrogate or
practice object in place of or in preparation for the murder of a human (Beetz,
2008). Finally, the motivation for sexually abusing animals may be financial. For
example, an offender may have or facilitate sex with an animal in order to manu-
facture pornography to sell (Maher & Pierpoint, 2012).
Animal Sexual Abuse among Juvenile Sex Offenders
Perhaps because animal sexual assault is thought to occur most commonly

among adolescents, existing studies have tended to focus on juvenile popu-
lations. In a study of 485 adolescent males being evaluated as possible sex
offenders, Zolondek, Abel, Northey, and Jordan (2001) found that 5% reported
sexual behavior with animals. The average age of onset was 10.8 years, and the
average number of acts reported was 11.6. In his sample of 5,475 adolescent
males who had committed child sexual abuse, Abel (2008) found that 12% of
the adolescent abusers who themselves had been sexually abused also sexually
abused animals compared to 5% of the adolescent abusers who had not been
sexually abused. A study of 141 persistently aggressive and highly sexualized
youth in the United Kingdom revealed that 4.3% of the index offenses (the
offenses an individual is referred for) involved animals (Bladon et al., 2005).
Frazier (1998) found that 37% of her sample of 30 sexually violent juvenile
offenders had sexually abused an animal. Estimates of animal sexual abuse
among juveniles with (or suspected of) sex offenses, therefore, have been
4.3%, 5%, 12%, and 37%.
Duffield, Hassiotis, and Vizard (1998) examined a select group of 70 juvenile

sex offenders with a history of interspecies sexual abuse who were sent to a psy-
chiatric center for juvenile sexual offenders. All had poor relationships with their
parents, several of whom were abusive. Many of the youth had been sexually
abused by more than one person at a time. They displayed aggressive behav-
iors, indiscriminate object attachments, isolation from their peers, and in some
instances developmental delays. In most cases, their sexual acts with animals
were carefully planned: they targeted, isolated, and groomed pets just as they did
other children. Violating animals was but one of their sexually abusive behaviors.
Fleming, Jory, and Burton (2002) surveyed offenders from midwestern juve-
nile institutions. The 24 youth who reported having committed sexual offenses
against animals indicated significantly less positive family communication and
a less positive family environment than did youth who had sexually offended
only against humans. They also had suffered significantly more emotional
abuse and emotional neglect than those who had sexually offended only against
humans, but not more physical or sexual abuse. The authors suggested that juve-
niles who engage in sexual activity with animals come from families with more
severe problems and more emotional abuse than other sexual offenders. They
may consequently be attempting to resolve attachment conflicts and anger prob-
lems, release tension, and attain sexual gratification through the sexual abuse of
animals.
Wochner and Klosinski (1988) reviewed the histories of 1,502 aggressive chil-
dren and adolescents who received treatment at a German university’s psychiatry
department. Twenty-three of the boys and two of the girls were identified as zoo-
sadists, those who derive sexual pleasure from torturing or otherwise causing an
animal to suffer. According to the authors, “the age distribution of the zoosadists
showed an increased incidence in 13, 17 and 18 year olds which is connected with
problems of puberty, group constraints and proving virility” (p. 59). Compared
with a control group of aggressive youth, the zoosadists demonstrated organic
brain damage (secondary to pregnancy or delivery complications), an overtaxing
upbringing by their parents, and the absence of a positive father figure. One third
of the zoosadists presented with additional sexual behavior disorders.
The Relation between Interspecies Sexual

Abuse and Interpersonal Offending
Although there is a dearth of research of animal sexual abuse among

community-based samples (Beetz, 2004), a few studies have examined sexual
experiences with animals among criminal populations. Hensley, Tallichet, and
Singer’s 2006 study of 261 adult male inmates revealed that those who acknowl-
edged having engaged in interspecies sexual abuse (n = 16) in childhood were
significantly more likely to have committed violent crimes against humans
than those who had not engaged in such practices. The authors theorized that
these results support studies showing that those who engage in sexual acts
with animals demonstrate a tendency to aggress against other humans. They

concluded that “the sexual abuse of animals in youth may be predictive of later
interpersonal violence in adults” (p. 921), though this assertion is speculative
considering their subsample consisted of only 16 offenders. In a replication
study, Hensley, Tallichet, and Dutkiewicz (2010) surveyed adult male inmates
at one medium- and one maximum-security prison in a southern state. They
found that the inmates who engaged in childhood bestiality (n = 23) were more
likely to commit adult interpersonal crimes on two or more occasions than those
who had not engaged in bestiality in childhood (n = 157). The authors concluded
from both sets of results that childhood bestiality may be a potential precursor
to adult interpersonal violence, particularly when the bestiality began at a young
age (Henderson, Hensley, & Tallichet, 2011). During interviews with 45 violent
and 45 nonviolent male offenders in a maximum security prison, Merz-Perez,
Heide, and Silverman (2001) found that three of the violent offenders endorsed
having had sex with an animal in childhood compared to none of the nonviolent
offenders.
In a study mentioned previously, Fleming, Jory, and Burton (2002) sur-
veyed 381 offenders from three midwestern juvenile institutions. One hundred
and sixty-one reported committing sexual offenses against humans only, one
reported committing sexual offenses against animals only, and 23 reported hav-
ing committed sexual offenses against both humans and animals. The authors
concluded that psychological propensity to coerce an animal into sexual activity
is arguably related to the ability to force humans to do the same, explaining why
juveniles who abuse animals are more likely to commit interpersonal violence
(Duffield, Hassiotis, & Vizard, 1998; Fleming, Jory, & Burton, 2002).
In a study of over 1,000 convicted white male sex offenders, Gebhard, Gagnon,
Pomeroy, & Christenson (1965) found that one-third of the sex offenders who
had committed non-incestuous sexual abuse of female minors (n = 27) reported
having had sexual intercourse with animals after the onset of puberty. The inci-
dence of animal sexual contact among various other types of sex offenders in the
study ranged from 8% to 24%. Ressler and colleagues’ 1986 study of 36 sexually
oriented murderers revealed that 23% expressed an interest in sexual contact
with animals; 40% of the murderers who had been sexually abused in childhood
reported having engaged in sexual contact with an animal compared to 8% who
had not been abused. In a study of 299 inmates in an Iowa prisoner classifica-
tion center, most of whom were male, Miller and Knutson (1997) found that 22
(7%) had watched someone have sex with an animal, 16 (5%) had touched an
animal sexually, and nine (approximately 3%) reported having had sexual inter-
course with an animal. Questionnaires obtained from 5,063 male sex offenders
revealed that 8.6% of them endorsed having had sex with an animal (Abel &
Osborn, 2000).
Finally, Abel (2008) examined a sample of 44,202 adult males evaluated for
sexual misconduct. He found that sex with animals was the single largest risk
factor and strongest predictor of increased risk for committing child sexual
abuse. It predicted a larger increase in risk of child sexual abuse the younger the
offender was when he started engaging in sexual behavior with animals. Abel
concluded that both juveniles and adults who engage in sex with animals should
be evaluated for sexual interest in children.
In conclusion, extant research suggests that the sexual abuse of animals is an
underestimated and often overlooked phenomenon. Longitudinal outcome stud-
ies that include normative, clinical, and offender populations are needed before
firm conclusions can be reached about whether the sexual abuse of animals in
youth predicts later interpersonal violence and/or sexual offending.
A N I M A L FI G H T I N G
The practice of causing animals to fight for purposes of entertainment deserves

special consideration as a form of intentional maltreatment, largely because the
potential motivations for this cruelty to the animals may be quite different from
the physical and sexual forms of maltreatment reviewed earlier. A few studies
have provided information on dogfighting and cockfighting.
Dogfighting
In a dogfight, two dogs, typically pit bulls, are placed in a pit and made to fight
until one cannot or will not continue. Spectators bet on which dog will be
declared the winner. The fights typically last one to two hours. Dogs suffer inju-
ries including broken bones, puncture wounds, and severe bruising. According
to the Humane Society of the United States (2009), many dogs die of blood
loss, shock, dehydration, exhaustion, or infection hours or days after the fight.
Training dogs for a fight often involves cruelty; it may include putting cocaine on
their dogs’ gums, injecting them with steroids, forcing them to run with heavy
chains around their necks, using cats or smaller animals as bait, and then aban-
doning or killing the worst-performing dogs (Hollandswoth, 2009). Variations
of dogfighting include “trunking” in which two dogs are placed in the trunk
of a car. Fighters close the trunk, let the dogs fight, and bet on which dog will
survive. After several minutes, they pop the trunk and declare a winner (e.g.,
Hartman, 2011). Hog-dog fighting involves siccing dogs on wild boars in closed
pens (Green, 2013).
Participating in a dog fight is a felony in every state, but being a spectator
is classified as a misdemeanor in some states (Hoffman & McGinnis, 2009).
Dogfights often involve other crimes such as illegal gambling, narcotics pos-
session, weapons possession, conspiracy, money laundering, and racketeering
(Davis, 1997). Children are sometimes present (Humane Society of the United
States, 2009). Due to the underground nature of dog fighting and the lack of
enforcement, very little information is available about the actual prevalence of
dog fighting. Moreover, little scientific research about the nature, causes, and
correlates of dog fighting exists (McClure & Lum, 2011).
In one of the few studies undertaken on dogfighters, Forsyth and Evans (1998)
interviewed 31 men who bred and fought dogs in Louisiana and Mississippi.
They found that the dogfighters in their sample used some of the neutraliza-
tion techniques—defense mechanisms used to rationalize and counter the nega-
tive impact of deviant behavior—identified by Sykes and Matza (1957): denial
of injury, condemnation of the condemners, and appeal to higher loyalties.
Specifically, many argued that the dogs were natural fighters who were bred for
and enjoyed combat; that people who condemn dogfighting are hypocrites who
attend boxing matches and horse races; and that dogfighting is a time-honored
tradition carried on by good and respectable people.
According to Gibson (2005), dogfighters come from virtually all walks of life
and engage in dogfighting on very different scales. Professional fighters operate on
a national or even international level within highly clandestine networks. Many
are wealthy, breed generations of skilled “game dogs,” publish trade journals for
dogfighting enthusiasts, maintain websites, and organize well-organized, covert
fights. The Humane Society of the United States estimates that there are 40,000
people in the United States involved in professional dogfighting (Gibson, 2005;
Hollandsworth, 2009). Gibson distinguishes these professionals from mid-level
fighters, whom she characterizes as “hobbyists, enthusiasts, or fanciers.” They
typically remain within a specific geographic network where they are acquainted
with other fighters and return to specific venues repeatedly. They may include
respected figures in the community and/or those with extensive criminal back-
grounds. The third group identified by Gibson is street fighters whom she char-
acterizes as violent criminals, often gang members, who organize and attend
fights to gamble and traffic drugs. Dogs are an extension of each member’s status
within the gang. It is important to note that these typologies should be used
with caution as they are only conjectures until empirically evaluated (McClure
& Lum, 2011).
Cockfighting
Like dogfighting, cockfighting is illegal in every state in the United States.

Cockfighting is a “blood sport” in which two similarly sized roosters bred
for aggressiveness are placed in a small enclosure and encouraged to fight.
Cockfights typically take place in cockpits, which are round areas enclosed by
wood, plexiglass, or chicken wire (Hawley, 2009). Many cockfighters argue that
roosters are naturally territorial and prone to fights with other males, but in
nature these fights are usually brief and do not involve serious injury (American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, n.d.). Cockfighters sometimes
inject birds with illegal drugs, steroids, or vitamins (e.g., amino acids) to increase
their aggressiveness. Black salve (a corrosive herbal paste) may be administered
to their wounds (Kennedy, 2012).
Most cockfights are bloody affairs that end in the death of at least one of the
chickens. Roosters have a hard spur on the back of each leg. Cockfighters trim
or cut off these spurs and affix gaffs—artificial metal spurs often made of sharp
spikes, knives or razor blades—in their place (Saal, 2014). Knives called “slash-
ers,” which result in quicker and more bloody fights, are sometimes used instead
gaffs; it is not uncommon for both birds to die during slasher matches (Kennedy,
2012). Gaff-style fights can take up to 45 minutes, and birds usually suffer deep
puncture wounds to the lungs and other internal organs (Kennedy, 2012).
Because of the lack of academic research on cockfighting, very little is known
about the “gamers” themselves (Green, 2013). According to Hawley (1993), cock-
fighters view their birds as symbols of bravery, resistance, and sexual potency,
but not as friends or companions. Individuals from all social strata attend cock-
fights but rural, poor agriculturalists are overrepresented (Darden & Worden,
1996). In general, attendees are thought to be involved in other illicit activities
including drugs, weapons possession, and gambling, which begins before the
fight and continues throughout. For example, following a 2014 cockfighting bust
in New York, the largest in the state’s history, the Press Office of the New York
State Attorney General released the following statement:
“These fights can be dangerous for entire communities, as they are often linked
to weapons, drugs, gambling and other crimes, and they encourage partici-
pants to engage in other acts of animal cruelty and to disregard animal suffer-
ing. Disturbingly, children are often present during cockfights. This promotes
insensitivity toward animal suffering and enthusiasm for violence” (para. 11).
C O N C LU S I O N
Perhaps the most basic outstanding question in this field concerns the prevalence of
animal cruelty and animal sexual abuse in the general population. Without know-
ing the general prevalence of such behavior among normative groups of children,
adolescents, and adults, we cannot assert that animal abuse in any particular group
(e.g., psychopaths, delinquent youth) is elevated. Furthermore, without knowing if
the incidence is elevated, we cannot draw firm conclusions about the relation of
psychopathy, delinquency, and other phenomenon to animal maltreatment.
Extant research on animal maltreatment offenders is somewhat limited in
scope, and few studies have used as their sample those arrested for causing harm
to animals. Studies of this nature are useful because some offenders may under-
report perpetration of animal maltreatment on self-report measures or during
interviews (Jorgenson & Maloney, 1999). Collateral information is important to
obtain. Researchers should examine behavioral correlates of animal maltreat-
ment in these offenders, especially those associated with lower self-control such
as alcohol abuse, low educational attainment, unstable employment history, and
gambling (Green, 2002). Particular attention should be paid to the offenders’
family and relationship patterns (e.g., child abandonment). Animal maltreat-
ment offending among females, and corresponding behavioral correlates, must
also be studied. Existing studies have focused almost exclusively on males.
In terms of methods, qualitative analyses of animal maltreatment incidents

may highlight themes that have been overlooked. Interviews might be tailored
so as to allow for functional analysis of the animal maltreatment incident.
The offenders could be queried about their motivations, any precipitating
stressors, the possible presence or involvement of peers (Schwartz, Fremouw,
Schenk, & Ragatz, 2012) or significant others, and the offenders’ thoughts
and emotional state before and immediately following the offense. Interviews
with household members would likely elucidate relationships between animal
maltreatment and other forms of abuse (e.g., domestic violence) in the home.
Prospective longitudinal studies are needed “to investigate the prevalence and
frequency of animal cruelty at different ages, the importance of animal cru-
elty as a risk factor for later violence … and the processes by which animal
cruelty may lead to adult violence” (Petersen & Farrington, 2007, p. 38). Such
studies should have large representative samples of the population in terms of
racial and ethnic origin, geographic location, and other factors; they should
use random samples of the general population as well as institutionalized and
other clinical samples.
Research examining the relation between animal maltreatment and other
forms of violence can also inform treatment. Febres and colleagues (2014) point
out that for many assaultive men, aggression is a pervasive way for them to inter-
act with others across settings; that is, they may be physically assaultive towards
intimate partners, children, and animals. Recognition that their aggression is
widespread suggests that interventions focused on more general cognitive and
behavioral propensities including anger control, social information processing,
and alcohol use may be more effective than those focused solely on, for example,
intimate partner violence.
Animal maltreatment research has focused mainly on animal cruelty offenses.
More studies are needed on other forms of abuse including the sexual abuse
of animals. Research using clinical, nonclinical, and offender samples that
examines motives for animal sexual abuse, types of and relationship to animals
abused, and the association (or lack thereof) with other types of criminal offend-
ing is needed. Regarding dogfighting, more complex ethnographic and quantita-
tive analyses are needed (McClure & Lum, 2011). Research should also explore
the degree to which the link between animal cruelty and interpersonal violence
extends to those involved in dogfighting or cockfighting.
As this review has made clear, much remains unknown about individuals’
intentional maltreatment of animals. Future research focused on their psycho-
pathology might inform treatment. Whether traditional treatment modalities
such as those designed for child sex abusers would be effective for perpetrators
of animal sexual abuse is unknown. As the well-being and interests of (certain)
animals are increasingly awarded consideration in our society, we might expect
the scientific community to respond with an increased attention to the causes
and dynamics of animal maltreatment, both related and unrelated to interper-
sonal violence.
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5
The Relation of Animal

Maltreatment to Aggression
E M I LY PAT T E R S O N - K A N E ■
Animal maltreatment has long been of interest in criminology and forensic psy-
chiatry and psychology because of its suspected relation to aggression in gen-
eral and crimes against humans in particular. Is there a relation between animal
maltreatment and greater risk of aggression against others? The mere fact that
a greater proportion of persons with crimes against people have animal abuse
histories does not answer this question, because it is possible that most people
who maltreat animals do not harm humans. This chapter reviews the empirical
evidence and examines whether there are ways in which animal maltreatment
offers warnings about later general aggression and criminal behavior.
PU B L I C AT T I T U D ES TOWA R DS A N I M A L A B U S ER S
The true significance of animal maltreatment in criminology, forensic psychiatry,

and psychology is often difficult to assess. Animal abuse is a largely surreptitious
activity that is difficult to empirically document in a representative manner. The
importance of animal abuse is sometimes downplayed relative to crimes with
human victims (Vollum, Buffington-Vollum, & Longmire, 2004), and sometimes
overemphasized because it provokes powerful emotional responses in animal
lovers (Ellis, 2009). These conflicting forces can lead to considerable confusion
in trying to determine just how animal abuse should be understood as a social
problem, and the degree to which it may be potentially predictive of crimes
against humans (Patterson-Kane & Piper, 2009).
The following chapter outlines some of the intuitive beliefs held about animal
abuse and its relation to other deviant and or violent behaviors, then outlines
the correlations found in the literature, and discusses the possible importance of
The Relation of Animal Maltreatment to Aggression141
abuse type and severity in predicting the extent to which the abusive behavior
may be generalized. One of these beliefs labels the person who engages in ani-
mal maltreatment a “moral monster” (Douard & Schultz, 2012; e.g., Alexander,
Garfield, & Easton, 1882) or “psychopath” (Blackburn, 1988), a person of partic-
ularly poor moral character (Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011). This
connection is exploited in fiction and entertainment where animal abuse is used
as a characterization shortcut to show that a character is a villain (a.k.a., the
“kick the dog” trope; TVtropes.org, 2014).
Public condemnation of animal abusers tends to be more severe than of those
who attack adult humans, but shares some characteristics with attitudes towards
child abusers (Levin & Arluke, 2013). This same general type of moral condem-
nation is shown (to a much larger degree) towards perpetrators of other par-
ticularly transgressive crimes such serial sexual assault and serial murder, and
to large-scale atrocities such as genocide, and more recently terrorism (Finkel,
2006). It also comes into play with crimes not inevitably connected with causing
suffering such as bestiality (Vollum, Buffington-Vollum, & Longmire, 2004) and
cannibalism (Foucault, 2003).
The intuitive understanding of animal abuse as a moral crime at some point
on this scale leads naturally to a suspicion that animal maltreatment may be an
indicator of a person whose deviant behavior may rapidly or inevitably escalate
(e.g., the “violence graduation” hypothesis; see Arluke, Levin, Luke, & Ascione,
1999; Wright & Hensley, 2003). This is a proposition for which there is consider-
able case study and anecdotal evidence (Johnson & Becker, 1997).
Other traits associated with the moral monster include that the perpetrator
was born with this quality, that their cruelty is indiscriminate, and that they
are incurable (see: Skeem et al., 2011). The community response to crimes
that provoke strong emotions is to condemn and seek to shun the perpetra-
tor by exclusion or via incarceration (Foucault, 2003). This can lead to an
emphasis on severe sentences (Nichols & Knobe, 2007) of retribution that
signal moral repugnance rather than focusing on reducing lifetime offend-
ing (Brimer, 2008). Animal abuse is typically an exception to this punitive
approach; however, there is evidence of a recent move towards felony convic-
tions and campaigns to create animal abuse offender registries (see Nowicki,
2010; Sauder, 2000).
There is also a tendency to want certainty when it comes to predicting immoral
crime commission and recidivism. For example, during the 1980s and 1990s, dis-
proportionate faith in unreliable “warning signs” of abuse (Cozolino, 1989) led
to a spate of false convictions and the promulgation of the myth of widespread
satanic ritual abuse (Victor, 1993). Now we see similarly tenuous warning signs
relating to animals, such as owning a pit bull (Barnes et al., 2006) as a predictor of
criminality. And while current efforts to broaden the opportunities to continue
confinement of perpetrators of sexual crimes after their sentence is completed
are often based on the belief that sexually violent criminals are highly recidivist,
empirical research suggests that they are rearrested at a similar rate to perpetra-
tors of other offenses (Douard, 2007). Although it is important to understand
142 T heory and R esearch on A nimal M altreatment
that some animal abusers may currently, or eventually, target other animal and
human victims—it is equally true that many (perhaps most) will not re-offend.
When responding to a person’s first detected act of animal abuse, the assess-
ment of dangerousness (specifically whether their future behavior will harm the
well-being of others) exposes us to two potential errors. If we overestimate their
dangerousness, we may be reacting in ways that are unfair and increase the likeli-
hood of the person’s aggression, such as through custodial sentences which may,
in some cases, serve to increase future criminal behavior (Gendreau, Cullen, &
Goggin, 1999). If we under-react, we risk failing to prevent future violence. Thus,
the actual incidence of different types of animal abuse and its correlation with
other abuse types is important to understand in deciding when and how to inter-
vene with any given subject.
I N C I D EN C E A N D C O R R EL AT I O N S
The Incidence of Animal Maltreatment in the General Population
The first step in this process is to understand just how rare or commonplace
animal abuse is in the wider community. The underlying incidence of a behavior
begins to allow us to judge how unusual, and thus to some extent how abnor-
mal, animal abuse is as a crime in its own right. The relative prevalence of the
behavior also contributes directly to probabilities that underlie false-positive and
false-negative rates.
In order to determine the incidence of animal abuse in general control or nor-
mative populations, there needs to be an agreed-upon definition of the behav-
ior in question. The form of animal maltreatment most commonly researched is
animal abuse, often defined as: “Socially unacceptable behavior that intention-
ally causes unnecessary pain, suffering, or distress to and/or death of an ani-
mal” (Ascione, 1993, p. 228). This definition or something similar is used in the
studies discussed below. By far the most common data collection method used
is self-reporting via a survey tool. This definition is designed for screening popu-
lations, and is similar to “violence” as the category of abuse of humans except
that it is more specific. That is, this widely accepted definition of animal abuse
includes only physical harm and not threats or psychological intimidation (c.f.
human violence, see Krug, Mercy, Dahlberg, & Zwi, 2002). As such, it is focuses
on intentional actions that physically damage the animal victim, rather than the
nature of the perpetrator’s psychological motivation.
Until recently, studies of animal abuse very rarely included a control group
(of people known to be nonviolent towards humans) and were almost never con-
ducted with a general community sample, perhaps on the assumption that ani-
mal abuse simply was not perpetrated by “normal” people. However across 13
studies (Baldry, 2003, 2005; DeGue & Delillo, 2009; Felthous, 1979; Flynn, 1999,
2002; Henry, 2004, 2006; Kellert et al., 1985; Kellert & Felthous 1985; Levin &
Arluke, 2009; Salter et al., 2003) measuring the incidence of at least one prior
act of animal abuse in known nonviolent or ostensibly normal control popu-

lations (e.g., students, community members), the average find was 27%. Based
on findings of this type, Henry and Sanders (2007) write “it appears that some
participation in animal abuse may be considered normative among American
males” (p. 121).
But an immediate note of caution is introduced by the wide variation in results
found across the studies, from 0% to 72%. This range suggests that factors that
vary between these studies radically affect the outcomes. One possible culprit
is geographical region. For example, a study of 1,558 students and community
members in the Bahamas returned a rate of 63%. This high rate may reflect dif-
ference between cultural norms of the Bahamas in relation to North American
and European data sets. On the other hand, the highest percentage found was by
Kellert and Felthous (1985) in a North American sample (Kansas/Connecticut).
Therefore other factors are also clearly influential.
Study design factors are also implicated in this variance. It is also evident
that broader definitions (such as including abuse of insects) are associated with
higher prevalence. For example, limiting the definition of maltreatment to abuse
of cats and dogs, physical violence, or intentionally cruel conduct excludes many
types of behavior that foreseeably lead to animal suffering or unnecessary death.
Cruelty of these more severe types occurs generally closer to the 1% to 2% level
(see Levin & Arluke, 2009).
When the data in these studies are weighted according to sample size, the
overall incidence falls to 5%, due mostly to one very large study by Vaughn et al.
(2009) with 43,093 subjects that found only 1.8% of respondents answer in the
affirmative to the question “In your entire life, did you ever hurt or be cruel to
a[n]‌animal or pet on purpose?” It may be that the design of this study did not
encourage the level of introspection or honesty needed to identify deliberate acts
of abuse that were not sadistic, leading to under-reporting. For example animal
abuse was the subject of only a single question in the context of a large and broad
survey and was presented in the context of a scale measuring psychological dis-
order. So while the exact prevalence of animal abuse in a typical community
remains something of an unanswered question, this does not prevent the study
of the co-occurrence of animal abuse (when it is detected) with other types of
violent conduct.
Back-Correlations from Violence against

Humans to Prior Animal Abuse
The second issue to address is whether people known to have been violent against
humans are more likely to have a history of animal abuse. Case studies are often
presented to show how many serial murderers have a history of animal abuse
and are indiscriminately callous towards both human and non-human animals.
However, case studies that do not fit that pattern are rarely cited to provide some
balance to the anecdotes provided. For example, serial killer Carl Panzram
wrote: “These two things are I am sorry that I have mistreated some few animals
in my life-time and I am sorry that I am unable to murder the whole damed [sic]
human race.” This is an example of a serial killer who apparently felt extreme
enmity to all humans, but no apparent generalization to non-human animals,
though he did harm them. So, case studies and anecdotes can be rallied for and
against linking crimes against human and non-human animals.
If we turn to more empirical studies that identify populations of people who
have been violent against humans and investigate whether they have prior acts
of animal abuse, again a high degree of variance is found. Figure 5.1 shows 12
research studies in which the presence or absence of a history of animal abuse
was determined through self-report, clinical or criminal histories, or a combina-
tion of these methods. This determination was made for two matched samples of
people, one with a history of violence against humans, and one without (selec-
tion details as per Patterson-Kane & Piper, 2009; with additional studies added
to the analysis).
Synthesis forest plot

Measure (CI) Weight % P value
0.35 (0.14; 0.55) 5.22% 0
–0.1 (–0.48; 0.28) 1.33% 0.6
0.34 (0.05; 0.63) 1.72% 0.02
0.18 (0.06; 0.29) 9.94% 0
0.11 (–0.05; 0.27) 3.3% 0.19
0.07 (0.01; 0.14) 7.68% 0.02
–0.17 (–0.38; 0.04) 5.29% 0.12
0.14 (–0.09; 0.37) 2.06% 0.24
0.13 (–0.03; 0.29) 5.7% 0.1
0.36 (0.17; 0.54) 6% 0
0.01 (–0.1; 0.11) 11.95% 0.91
0.49 (0.38; 0.59) 14.5% 0
0.52 (0.43; 0.62) 13.74% 0
0.03 (–0.12; 0.18) 11.55% 0.69
0.22 (0.18; 0.26) 100% 0
–1 –0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5

rd
Figure 5.1 The correlation between violent conduct and previous animal abuse in
matched violent and nonviolent populations.
Studies included in chronological order: Hellman & Blackman, 1966; Sendl &
Blomgren, 1975; Felthous & Yudowitz, 1977; Felthous, 1979a; Lewis et al., 1983;
Langevin et al., 1983; Paitich, Orchard, Handy, & Russon, 1983; Kellert & Felthous,
1985; Santtila & Haapasalo, 1997; Salter et al., 2003; Merz-Perez & Heide, 2004; Henry
and Sanders, 2007; Ascione et al., 2007; Volant et al., 2008; & Harness, 2011.
Meta-analysis was performed using MIX-Pro using risk-difference association

and a fixed effects model and determined that people with a history of violence
against people were significantly more likely to have a history of animal abuse
than matched groups with no history of violence (34% vs. 21%, rd = .22 z = 10.9,
p < .0001).
So the validity of asserting this back correlation (“those known to have com-
mitted violence against humans are more likely to have also maltreated ani-
mals”) should be recognized. However, it needs to be placed in context with two
other very important pieces of information from the same meta-analysis: (a) the
effect size of 0.2 is between small and medium, and (b) a majority of the indi-
viduals with a history of violence against humans were not shown to have a his-
tory of animal abuse. On the other hand, it may be difficult to accurately detect
a prior history of animal abuse in some subjects because it was never detected or
disclosed—leading to some underestimation of the real correlation.
Correlations that are significant but apply to a minority of subjects are not
uncommon. For example, children who abused animals were more likely to have
been maltreated themselves when compared to a control group; however, most
of the children who had abused an animal had not been maltreated (McEwen,
Moffitt, & Arseneault, 2014). As such, if animal abuse by a child always raised
suspicions of child abuse, these suspicions would be wrong more often than they
were right. And the same would be true when looking for animal abuse in the
history of violent offenders.
In addition to this, it must be noted that the rate at which violent offenders
have committed animal abuse provides no valuable information about the rate
at which animal abusers will go on to be violent offenders, as it does not allow us
to know how many animal abusers do not take this path.
Correlations between Animal Maltreatment

and Violence against Humans
Even if we assume animal abuse falls at the lower end of the available estimates,
2% to 10%, it is reasonable to suspect that many people who commit at least one
act of animal abuse do not go on to be seriously violent against people (the “false
positive effect,” Levin & Arluke, 2009). Indeed, the forward facing prediction
(“than animal abusers will be violent to human in the future”) has proved dif-
ficult to demonstrate.
There is evidence to suggest that violent offenders may be indiscriminate as to
who they victimize, but also may be very selective. In a significant proportion of
households where violence occurs, there is only one victim type (e.g., domestic
partner, children, or pet animals; Brennen et al., 2010). In fact, some researchers
have noted a web of intercorrelations between deviant behaviors in which animal
abuse and violence against humans are not uniquely associated. For example,
in a study by Walters (2013), animal abusers showed a similar elevated risk of
offending in both violent and nonviolent ways.
Currently, a focus is often placed upon animal abuse by children predicting

serious assaults against people in the future. Although it is completely legitimate
to consider this possibility, it must be placed within the overall web of offending
that may be occurring. Not only future but current offending against humans,
as well as potential victim and observer roles should all be given consideration
(Baldry, 2003). For example, animal abuse is similarly linked to co-occurring
victimization of same-age children, including siblings (Henry & Sander, 2007;
Khan & Cook, 2008).
In a great many cases this pattern reappears: A lesser offense is often found
in the history of people who commit a greater offense. But when you consider
all of those who commit the lesser offense, most do not escalate (for example,
between peeping toms and stranger rape; Schlesinger & Revitch, 1999; and gen-
erally between youth delinquency and becoming an adult criminal). Hence, any
conclusions about individuals must be drawn on further investigation, based on
professional judgment, and treated with an appropriate degree of skepticism.
AG G R AVAT I N G FACTO R S
One of the major considerations in this assessment process should be factors

that increase the seriousness of the animal abusing behavior. These include how
much the abuse deviates from norms in the surrounding community, and the
intensity and frequency of the abuse.
Illegality and Deviance from Cultural Norms
Many commentators attempt to include actions such as killing animals in the

context of hunting and farming within the category of animal maltreatment
or crime. Such argument is logical in that, from the animal’s point of view,
pain is pain and death is death. However, there are considerable psychologi-
cal differences for the human agent performing these actions (Beirne, 2002;
Clifton, 1994; DeAngelis, 1998; Prunty & Apple, 2013). For example, a farmer
who surgically removes a piglet’s testicles and tail, even without anesthetic
as is commonly the case, can do so with the belief that this is done to benefit
the net welfare of the animal, in that (under conventional farming housing
conditions) these immediately painful procedures prevent future and poten-
tially far more serious injuries from mounting and tail biting. This mind-
set, although open to question, is quite different from that of a person who
mutilates an animal in the field purely for their own convenience or grati-
fication. Therefore, it is not surprising that researchers often find that hunt-
ers or farmers do not differ from controls on measures such as propensity
for violence (Carlisle-Frank, Frank, & Nielsen, 2004; Flynn, 2002; Richards,
Signal, & Taylor, 2013). The exceptions are illegal types of hunting such as
thrill killing and spotlighting (Green, 2002; Hutchinson & Dalke, 2011), and
slaughterhouse workers (Dillard, 2008; Richards, Signal, & Taylor, 2013). In
general, however, animal maltreatment that is legal and has widespread social
acceptance tends to have little or no association with criminal forms of vio-
lence against animals or people.
Most cultures have recognized categories of animals that may be killed
inhumanely without widespread disapproval, such as swatting flies, using
glue traps for rodents (who subsequently starve to death), or culling wild
wolves. The animals excluded from moral consideration will vary consider-
ably according to culture and be correlated in some cases with the perceived
dangerousness of the animals (e.g., predatory animal or disease-related pests).
Education about animals of different types, even when it is devoid of any
explicitly humane or anti-cruelty material, tends to improve the attitudes of
people towards these animals perhaps by fostering the development of moral
sensitivity (Kahn, 2006).
Many aggressive acts straddle a zone that is typically legal but morally
contested or given different moral status in different communities, such as
equestrian sports (Campbell, 2013), bullfighting (Grana et al., 2004) and
spanking children (Fielding et al., 2011). And some types of livestock farming
have become contested by groups who suggest abuse is endemic on “factory”
farms (Prunty & Apple, 2013). Likewise, various kinds of hunting and trap-
ping have been a subject of open debate and struggle for public acceptance
between a cruel/killing narrative or natural/conservation/sport paradigm
(Peterson, 2004).
The division between normal and deviant violence clearly changes over time.
In the past it would be considered quite normal to go to view an execution of
humans and/or animals in staged fights. Today, fighting (e.g., boxing) remains
widely accepted, animal fighting is largely but not entirely criminalized, and the
idea of viewing a human execution purely for entertainment is almost unthink-
able. A case can be made for the views of harm and killing being prima facie
undesirable, but the greatest psychological difference seems to appear between
those who abstain or limit themselves to legal and socially acceptable formats,
versus those who do not. To the extent that any of these activities becomes
deemed deviant by wider society, its relation to other forms of abusive behavior
is likely to change.
When dealing with specific cases, one must consider whether the perpetrator
is performing an act they know to be considered “bad” by their own immediate
community. If not, this “normative” abuse generally warrants an educational
approach to correct pro-abuse social learning that may have occurred at a
young age (Tiplady & Start, 2013), and its linkages to other types of maltreat-
ment may follow cultural lines. For example, the “macho personality” has been
associated with violence against women (Parrott & Zeichner, 2003) and animals
(Grandin, 1988)—however, the degree of co-occurrence has not been empirically
established.
The Role of Animal Maltreatment Severity
There is evidence that aggressive behaviors are often under the control of both
personal morals and interpretations of social expectations and these two may
differ, such as in the famous Milgram experiments where the immorality of
hurting people was placed in conflict with the instructions of a trusted author-
ity (a scientist at a prestigious university) (Milgram, 1974; Kahn, 2006). Social
unacceptability and/or illegality can be seen as one element that makes animal
maltreatment more severe. But there are other severity factors such as frequency,
victim type, and whether the maltreatment involves prolonged physical contact
with the animal.
To support the importance of severity as a refining factor, there is mounting
evidence that multiple cases of animal maltreatment are more likely to be signifi-
cant when it comes to predicting current or future maltreatment of people. For
example, Henry and Sanders (2007) found that those who had abused animals
two or more times were more likely to be involved in bullying (as a victim or per-
petrator) but those who abused once were indistinguishable from non-abusers.
Felthous and Kellert (1986) found that only more “substantial” types of animal
abuse (defined as deliberate, repeated acts causing serious harm to vertebrate
animals) distinguished violent criminals from other groups. Under this prin-
ciple, some types of abuse (e.g., manual strangulation, certain forms of animal
sexual abuse) that involve prolonged contact might be considered innately severe
(Hensley, Tallichet, & Dutkiewicz, 2010).
Similar results relating the role of severity have been found in relation to other
violent behaviors, which also exist on a continuum where milder forms of the
behavior are not strongly correlated with other forms of violence and criminal
behavior. For example, this has been shown in relation to violence (Meloy, 2006),
domestic violence (Fowler & Western, 2011), fire setting (Del Bove & MacKay,
2011), and spanking children (Brennen et al., 2010).
In other areas this pattern has not yet been found, but the groundwork of
establishing that the behavior has mild and severe forms is being laid. Even
“immoral” crimes exist in forms where suffering is caused to the victims and
forms where it is not (e.g., via fantasy or role play) (re: necrophilia and bestial-
ity; Aggrawal, 2009, 2011). Thus, one can posit that someone may be described
as only “mildly pathological” or not criminally dangerous even when it comes
to these highly transgressive motivations, depending on where they fall on the
spectrum of their disorder. It can even be argued that one of the most cru-
cial traits of people more inclined to cruelty and sadism exists in mild forms
in most normal people. One example is the experience of “schaudenfreude”—
taking pleasure in the misfortunes of others (especially those we envy; Cikara
& Fiske, 2013).
In developing a “link” narrative, defining the scope of the two behaviors being
linked is important. Statistically speaking, the concept of a meaningful correla-
tion of this type depends on the assumption that two types of offending spring
from a common attribute found in the target population (the nature of which
is currently unclear but has been posited to relate to personality traits and/or
psychological disorders). This assumption seems to be increasingly unsupported
in many areas. An immediate response to this realization would be to identify
subsets with a more homogenous nature between which correlation with predic-
tive strength may be found—such as animal abuse of a severe type and/or an
intentional, especially sadistic, motivation (Levin & Arluke, 2009).
OV ER A L L AG G R ES S I O N
Aggression and associated emotional extremes (Camperio Ciani, 2000) have an

adaptive function, but this is arguably of decreasing significance in relation to
the socially accepted behavior and careers in the modern world. However, based
on evolutionary argument, humans still have a normal propensity to aggres-
sion, and during childhood and adolescence individuals develop an internalized
understanding of when and how to express aggression in neutral or prosocial
ways, often associated with a period of transgressive behavior. The commission
of a single act of animal abuse may not relate to measures of overall aggres-
sion (Febres, 2012). However, when animal abuse is repeated, these links likely
become much stronger. Thus, attention should be paid to the nature of abusive
acts in determining their potential role as an indicator of an ongoing pattern
of violent or otherwise deviant behavior. Research into factors contributing to
desistence versus escalation, especially during adolescence, would be valuable in
detecting potentially dangerous offenders, and also developing effective humane
educations and therapeutic tactics for high-risk populations and individuals.
Theories, Conditions, and Mechanisms
Animal abuse and human violence have been attributed to underlying personal-
ity traits such as low self-esteem, aggressiveness, or impulsivity, and a history
of animal cruelty during childhood was significantly associated with antiso-
cial personality disorder, antisocial personality traits, and polysubstance abuse
(Gleyzer et al., 2002). The involvement of animal maltreatment often occurs as
part of a suite of antisocial behaviors. There is sometimes an expectation from
the lay public or the courts that these diagnoses will assist in the assessment and
prediction of dangerous behavior—and thus the treatment (or where necessary
containment) of the person (Skeem et al., 2011)—but this use may contribute to
a false positive effect (Buchanan & Leese, 2001; Farnham & James, 2001; Grisso
& Appelbaum, 1992). Thus the prediction of dangerousness must be recognized
as an exceedingly difficult task with serious consequences for the individual and
for society.
The cognitive sciences have a relative poor record of successfully pre-
dicting behavior, including dangerous (e.g., violent, criminal) behav-
ior. Some approaches to this problem, although they persist in the public
awareness due to being televised dramas like Criminal Minds, should be con-
sidered obsolete—for example “The Triad” which posits that animal cruelty,
bed-wetting, and fire setting are associated with each other and future violent
behavior which was a plausible- hypothesis that empirical study was never
able to substantiate (Heath, Hardesty, & Goldfine, 1998; Langevin, et al., 1983;
Slavkin, 2001).
Violence Graduation versus General Deviance
Of particular note in the study of animal maltreatment as a sentinel crime is

the discussion of whether animal maltreatment precedes and reliably predicts
violence against people. Although this graduation can be traced in some cases,
offending can be found with various trajectories involving deviant behavior and
victimization of people and animals as well as property crimes and self-abuse.
Thus the graduation hypothesis is not supported (Arluke et al., 1999).
The preponderance of evidence suggests that deviant behavior generalizes
in a relatively idiosyncratic manner, whereby various kinds of disadvantage,
victimization, and perpetration are weakly to moderately linked and indi-
vidual victim/offender histories will be highly idiosyncratic. So while links
occur, they should be referred to in the plural form (DeGrue & DeLillo, 2009)
rather than suggesting a unique prominence for the connection between ani-
mal abuse and serious violent crimes against humans. In this area, this pattern
is typically referred to as “general deviance” or “general deviance syndrome”
(McGee & Newcomb, 1992). The language of “deviance,” however, still tends
to align with ideas of congenital defect—that the offender is a “deviant.” An
alternative is offered by the equivalent concept of “general strain theory”
(Agnew, 1992). which focuses on the environmental and cognitive situations
that incline people towards violent and criminal behavior. In this framework,
the degree of stress (of various types) placed upon the individual is recog-
nized to increase the overall incidence of antisocial or violent conduct they
may demonstrate—while recognizing that individuals vary considerably in
their resilience and how they express these behaviors. This combined with
the increasing subdivision of deviant behavior by types that reflect differ-
ences in motivation lean towards acknowledging that a functional analysis
of the individual is necessary in order to understand the extent and meaning
of their behavior, as group-level predictions remain suggestive but unreliable.
So although animal abuse should signal that a person may present a risk to
the community and/or demonstrate a pattern of antisocial acts, this must be
considered a hypothetical and open-ended possibility until investigated. Any
given prediction about a specific kind of co-occurring or future offending is,
statistically speaking, more likely to be wrong than right, and yet the chance of
this hypothesis being confirmed is undoubtedly higher than in a non-abusing
control subject.
L ES S - ST U D I ED M A LT R E AT M EN T SC EN A R I O S
This chapter is written predominantly in relation to spontaneous and violent ani-

mal maltreatment. Neglect and emotional abuse have somewhat different quali-
ties, and specific types of abuse, such within a workforce (e.g., by farm, shelter,
or abattoir workers) or large-scale neglect of animals associated with hoarding
have idiosyncratic features best understood by considering specialist research
and reviews. It is also the case that delineating abusers of a severe and violent
type implies a need to consider the implication of animal abuse in other places
on the spectrum. One example is the role of gender.
In old texts, one would often find consideration of females (and children) rele-
gated to a section near the back entitled “abnormal psychology.” And now within
the realm of abnormal psychology it continues to be the case that females are
not as well studied or described by models developed predominantly based on
the behavior of delinquent male youths and criminal male adults. This is largely
because overt acts of violent maltreatment are easier to discover, prosecute, study,
and otherwise attempt to understand, and females are considerably less likely to
carry out animal maltreatment of this type (Patterson-Kane & Piper, 2009).
Females are more likely to be equally represented with males in neglect and
maltreatment that is nonviolent in nature, such as hoarding (Herzog, 2007;
Huizinga et al., 2004). Females may also be more inclined to hide abuse of vari-
ous types and so evade detection (Piper, 2003).
Females with a history of animal maltreatment may generally fit well within
the categories and correlations developed from a largely male dataset (e.g., Febres
et al., 2012). However, it seems likely that there are abuser typologies more com-
mon with females that are not currently well understood (see Schwartz et al.,
2012; c.f. Walters, 2013). This division of opinion about whether offending by
females may or may not significantly differ from offending by males in motiva-
tion or outcome is apparent in other discussions of violent or antisocial behavior
and related psychiatric conditions (e.g., Belanger, 2009; Skeem et al., 2011).
C O N C LU S I O N
Every person and animal has the potential to exist in the context of multiple vic-
tim and perpetrator relations. For example, ownership of a pit bull-type dog kept
as a “status” dog may, in certain contexts, indicate a person more likely to show
antisocial behavior (Ragatz et al., 2009, c.f. Egan & MacKenzie, 2012), the dog
may be used to attack and intimidate others (animal and human), and the dog
may simultaneously be the victim of irresponsible ownership, neglect, or abuse
(Maher & Pierpont, 2011).
Many factors contribute to a tendency towards false positives when estimat-
ing dangerousness of animal abusers, including a relatively low overall inci-
dence and widespread misunderstanding as to the nature of the underlying
correlations. Care should be taken to consider explanations other than sadistic

motivations, such as deviance at the level of extant culture/subculture or intel-
lectual disability; such explanations or contributory factors might suggest differ-
ent motivations and thus different assessments and indicated interventions. The
development of sub-typing may assist in this process so long as these subtypes
are arrived at empirically and do not perpetuate morally based assumptions.
At this more specific level, it remains possible—and some would say
likely—that the graduation hypothesis does in fact apply more reliably in linking
certain types of animal abuse to certain types of future offending against people.
A subtype of escalators has been suggested in other areas of crime such as sexual
offending (Belanger, 2009; Stermac & Hall, 1989). But in casting too broad a net,
this relationship can be obscured by the inclusion of many only mildly disor-
dered or essentially normative people whose foray into antisocial behavior was
low in severity or brief in duration; for example, occurring during childhood/
adolescence as relatively isolated events.
In the absence of alternative explanations, any case of animal abuse should,
rather unsurprisingly, be considered a deviant behavior with potential associa-
tions with other current and future deviant behaviors, as established by further
investigation. Interventions should focus on preventing re-offending, and practi-
tioners should be alert to the damaging effects that may result from labeling the
perpetrator a moral monster.
In truth, the question has always been how to respond to animal abusers first
in urgency and degree, but then also in type of approach. For example, one of the
first people to draw academic attention to the “the Link” was cultural anthro-
pologist Margaret Mead, who wrote “A failure of punishment here … can be as
fatal or possibly even more fatal, than too violent punishment” (1963). And by
this token it would be a mistake for an excess of caution to lead to a lack of action.
As described by Walters (2014) the nature of the animal cruelty-subsequent
interpersonal offending relationship is “general rather than specific” (p. 9). That
is, because multiple forms of deviance at various ages are all intercorrelated,
childhood animal maltreatment may relate to adult violent offending without
those two variables being connected in a unique or distinctive way. However,
this general mesh of antisocial violence does exist and will be expressed in indi-
vidual offenders to varying degrees.
Animal abuse distinguished by features that increase its severity should be
considered to place a person in a higher-risk category that may indicate the
co-occurrence and/or future propensity towards other types of violence or crim-
inal offending, and the possibility of past and current victimization (Felthous &
Kellert,1986; Henry & Sanders, 2007; Levin & Arluke, 2009). This factor must be
considered in the context of all other relevant factors in arriving at an overall risk
assessment. And this risk should create a feeling of urgency for properly deter-
mining the degree and type of maladaptation, developing approaches to treating
the offender, and protecting the community including the animals remaining in
the offender’s custody.
This area of study would benefit greatly from more research in the areas of
resiliency and desistance that might be used to assist populations of people
who live under situations where animal abuse and other antisocial behaviors
are prevalent. It has become recognized that violent and antisocial behavior
may be interconnected in complex and sometimes intergenerational cycles. It
should therefore be a natural corollary that humane, empathetic, and therapeu-
tic responses need to be as generalized and encompassing as possible and not
reserved only for the immediate victim of a given attack.
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6
Understanding Animal
Neglect and Hoarding
G A RY PAT R O N E K A N D JA N E N . N AT H A N S O N ■
Neglect as a form of animal maltreatment is characterized by ambiguity in

its definition and by heterogeneity in its consequences for animals. The term
“neglect” is often used in statutes (as well as in conversation) to denote forms of
maltreatment that are presumably less severe and/or lacking intent, even though
this is not always the case. Indeed, both severe suffering and intent may well be
present in situations labeled as “neglect.” This confusion is understandable, since
clearly there are forms of unintentional maltreatment that differ substantially
from intentional maltreatment, and in ways that are relevant from a forensics
perspective.
Most reported neglect could reasonably be categorized as failure(s) to provide
animals with necessary food, water, grooming, sanitation, spatial and environ-
mental conditions, protection from the elements, and relief of pain and suffer-
ing. Nevertheless, it is critical to recognize that these failures may occur from
very deliberate decisions to withhold necessities, as well as from what has been
described as passive or unintentional lapses by owners or caregivers. From the
starving animals’ perspective, it matters little whether the offender was simply
too preoccupied to provide food, water, shelter, and veterinary care; whether the
offender was compromised by financial, physical, cognitive, or emotional limita-
tions; or whether the person quite intentionally withheld these basic necessities.
Regardless of intent, the pain and suffering for the animal remains the same.
Explanations for neglect are numerous and varied. For example, one owner
may be temporarily overwhelmed and fail to provide proper care due to compet-
ing obligations for child care, employment, a major health problem, or family
emergency, whereas another simply cannot be bothered to regularly attend to
basic husbandry due to disinterest, thoughtlessness, or laziness. Examples of the
latter include owners who intentionally abandon care of a pet to go on vacation,
leaving the animal tied in a yard or confined in the home without adequate food
or water or provision for regular checks for safety and well-being. By compari-
son, there are situations where a parent may have delegated pet care to a child
or irresponsible adult, and failed to supervise that individual’s performance.
Finally, some owners may honestly not understand what care is necessary and/
or fail to recognize diseases or medical conditions causing suffering and requir-
ing veterinary attention or other intervention.
There are also cases where needed steps to prevent suffering are not taken
because the owner does not have the monetary resources to provide veterinary
care; because they may be reluctant to seek veterinary care to avoid receiving
news of a poor prognosis; or perhaps because they fear being chastised for wait-
ing too long. Other times, due to intense attachment, owners may be in a state
of denial when, due to old age, disease, or infirmity, an animal has reached the
end of his life. In these cases, animals may suffer greatly because the owner is so
deeply bonded she cannot bear the thought of euthanasia. Alternatively, there
have been situations when owners recognized a medical problem but chose an
unsatisfactory course of action, such as an unproven home remedy, an inappro-
priate human pharmaceutical, or an ineffective recommendation they found on
the Internet. Animal hoarding, which will be discussed in some depth in this
chapter, represents a form of severe maltreatment that does not fit any of these
patterns, being characterized by a deep bond for the animals in conjunction with
a profound lack of insight into their suffering and even death (Patronek, 2008).
Given this substantial variability in both etiology and mindset, it would be
incorrect to assume that all neglect is of similar severity, or reflects a less conse-
quential suffering for animals than other types of maltreatment. Intentionality,
pattern, and insight must all be assessed in each situation and not assumed.
Furthermore, although each of these reasons, explanations, or justifications
may have different implications with respect to the offender’s mindset, none are
exculpatory under animal maltreatment statutes.
In this chapter, we first examine several forms of neglect (husbandry-related
“routine” neglect, deliberate and economically motivated neglect, and
caregiver-fabricated illness in which medical problems are created or exac-
erbated by the owner). Then we consider hoarding in greater depth, includ-
ing its legal, behavioral, and clinical features, as well as theoretical models for
understanding it.
H U S BA N D RY- R EL AT ED “ R O U T I N E” N EG L ECT
As commonly understood, this form of animal maltreatment is the most fre-

quent type encountered by humane investigators (Arluke, 2004). Studies of
these cases are lacking, because they may be more likely than cases of inten-
tional abuse or neglect to be resolved outside of the criminal justice system,
where records, if they exist, are either not likely to contain this information or
to be inaccessible. These cases tend to reflect situations that raise concern and
Understanding Animal Neglect and Hoarding161
are reported to authorities because the conditions are easily observed by neigh-
bors, visitors to the property or passersby. Examples include a thin animal, a
dog tied outside with no or inadequate shelter from the elements, animals with
no observable water or food bowl, matted haircoat, untrimmed nails or hooves,
animals appearing to be limping or having visible untreated injuries, or animals
whose posture and manner suggest illness, injury or discomfort.
How these cases are handled after reporting varies with each agency, but they
often take a very predictable path. The first step involves determining whether
the complaint has any validity (e.g., is the information recent, first-hand, reli-
able, and is the alleged violation within the jurisdiction of the agency and under
the scope of the law). Investigators will visit the home or site of the complaint,
determine if an actionable problem exists, assess the duration and severity of the
lapses in care, try to ascertain the reasons, and prescribe a course of corrective
action. The majority of these complaints are resolved through a voluntary cor-
rection of the conditions (Arluke, 2004). In some cases, this may be achieved
through education because there is a genuine lack of knowledge on the part of
the owner (e.g., “I didn’t realize my dog needed to have a dog house” or “I didn’t
realize her nails were so overgrown because her hair is so long”) and in other
cases because the owner is made aware that more serious enforcement will fol-
low if they fail to comply. Thus, this type of situation may be less likely to reach
prosecution and require forensic evaluation.
Nevertheless, extreme situations do occur which rightly challenge any notion
that the neglect can be construed as a benign lapse. For example, certain breeds
of dogs require regular grooming in order to maintain a healthy coat and skin.
Failure to do so can result in a cascade of ill effects, and every humane investiga-
tor has encountered dogs so severely matted that when finally shaved, the hair
was sufficiently entangled that the removed material could nearly stand on its
own, mimicking the shape of the animal it originated from. These cases may
be accompanied by a terrible odor due to extensive skin infection and/or tis-
sue necrosis, corneal ulceration or damaged eyeballs, lameness from ingrown
nails, deep perianal infection from chronic fecal impaction in the hair around
that area, and urine scalding on the skin. Conditions this extreme could easily
take months to evolve, legitimately challenging any suggestion that a competent
owner could simply fail to notice or that the situation could have developed as an
honest mistake by an otherwise attentive caregiver.
Therefore, in cases of neglect, it becomes critical to explore and assess a per-
son’s understanding of proper animal husbandry and whether he or she has
the mental and/or physical capacity to provide adequate care, for that animal
or any others, now and into the future. In any case of maltreatment, if one
animal is at risk, others may be at risk as well, even if apparently healthy at the
time of the investigation. The most vulnerable and therefore first to suffer may
be the weakest, youngest, or oldest, or those exposed to the conditions the
longest. Since neglect of animals may co-occur with child, dependent adult,
elder, or self-neglect, for example, it is important to consider the entire family
situation.
Familiarizing oneself with the standards of care for various types of animals
and understanding the specific lapses that brought the person to the attention
of the legal system are important here. Factors that could be useful to explore
include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:
• Previous history with this and other pets, including reasons for acquisi-
tion, duration of ownership, reasons for animals leaving the household,
and veterinary care
• What is the person’s relationship with this pet and others in the house-
hold? Why does the individual have this pet and what is his or her func-
tion in the family setting?
• Is there a mentally competent adult responsible for care of pet?
• How long may the conditions causing concern have been present?
• Were there significant life events for the individual around the time that
the animal’s neglect appears to have begun?
• What types of lapses in care or recognition of problems were necessary
for the conditions to develop?
• What is the person’s level of insight into the situation and condition of
the animal(s)?
• What is the level of concern for the animal(s)?
• Is the animal(s) being physically abused as well?
• Are any people in the home at risk, and/or have there been visits from
adult or child protective services agencies?
When considering all of these factors, it is vital to determine whether explana-

tions or excuses (as described in Vaca-Guzman & Arluke, 2005) are at all plausible
(e.g., as in the case of a very thin dog, with other indicators of care being satisfac-
tory) that the owner claimed he or she did not recognize. Was it because the dog
had an unusually thick haircoat and the owner never touched the dog and felt
the protruding bones? What was the reason for the thin condition—insufficient
food, poor quality or inappropriate diet, inability to access food that was pro-
vided due to infirmity or competition from other animals, untreated internal
parasitism, or other medical condition such as oral disease? Lack of dental care
can be a form of neglect, but some owners may not have opened a dog’s mouth
and have an opportunity to notice disease. This is one reason that periodic vet-
erinary examination is important for welfare. It may be helpful to review any
records of veterinary care—was care provided, and if not, why not? If so, were
recommendations followed, and if not, why not? What is the condition of other
animals in same environment?
In some cases, animals may be cared for improperly because they are regarded
in a purely utilitarian manner. An example here would be poorly cared-for guard
dogs used to discourage trespassers or prevent burglary and theft. This may also
be observed when aggressive dogs are used to support criminal activities, such as
manufacturing or distribution of illegal drugs.
Neglect can occur with species other than those commonly kept as housepets.
For example, there are numerous cases of groups of horses being left to forage on
their own for food in pens or pastures lacking any grass. Without provision of an
adequate amount of hay and/or grain, animals lose body condition and gradu-
ally starve. These situations will likely have other forms of neglect present—often
stalls will be deep in manure from not being cleaned, hooves will be overgrown
from lack of regular trimming and cause a distorted posture with pain and lame-
ness, and teeth will be overgrown, preventing adequate grinding of any food
material that may be present.
When evaluating these explanations, it is also essential to be mindful of breed-
and species-related differences. Acceptable husbandry for farm animals, wildlife,
birds vs. mammals, or exotic animals may vary substantially due to differences
in biology and behavior. An environment that is appropriate for one animal
may be dangerous for another. For example, some animals may be housed out-
doors even in winter, providing they have adequate food, good body condition,
and hair coat, whereas others would suffer and/or die in the same conditions.
Micro-environment must also be taken into account, as even within the same
room or building, placement of cages may affect temperature, ventilation, or
exposure to heat or cold. It is impossible to comprehensively review this material
here. Thus, it would be advisable to review whatever court records are available
and whenever possible, to consult the veterinarian involved in the case to fully
understand the requirements for care for a particular type or species of animal(s)
and how far conditions may have deviated from the norm in a given situation.
D EL I B ER AT E A N D EC O N O M I CA L LY
M OT I VAT ED N EG L ECT
The motivation for deliberate neglect can overlap with other kinds of intentional
cruelty, such as a desire to inflict pain and deriving satisfaction from animal suf-
fering. For further information on those types of cases, see Chapter 4. However,
there are many kinds of neglect that may not be accompanied by the kind of
enjoyment of pain and suffering an offender might derive from deliberately tor-
turing an animal, but that reflect such an egregious degree of indifference to eas-
ily foreseeable adverse consequences for an animal that any notion of husbandry
lapses or ignorance as an excuse should be rejected out of hand. An example
might include failure to provide an adequate diet, resulting in starvation, which
would occur over an extended period of time and reflect conscious decisions to
ignore the animal.
Abandonment is a form of deliberate neglect, but the motivation may vary
with the circumstances. Some owners have abandoned animals rather than take
them to a shelter because they fear the risk of euthanasia or perceived embarrass-
ment, trouble, or expense of surrendering to a shelter. It is possible that they may
believe that either some Good Samaritan in the neighborhood may take the pet
in, or the pet will at least for a time be able to fend for him or herself. However,
other owners have simply moved away and left animals locked inside homes,
basements, garages, or pens, or chained outside without food or water and no
provision for care. Although both acts are illegal, these are clearly different situ-
ations with respect to motivation, intent, and range of outcomes for animals.
Leaving a dog in a hot car is an example of neglect that clearly involves a
deliberate choice, even if the owner failed to appreciate the immediacy of the
potential consequences. Some owners clearly do not understand how rapidly
temperatures in a car, even with windows cracked, on a warm day can reach
lethal levels. However, there are also cases where the decision to leave an animal
in such circumstances can reflect recklessness, given the prevailing environmen-
tal conditions (e.g., a hot day and car parked in direct sunlight, which would be
intolerable for a person sitting in such conditions for more than a minute or two).
Unfortunately, the same errors in judgment occur all too frequently with human
children, and every year children die as a result.
Various forms of egregious medical neglect also occur. A common condition
discovered by authorities are dogs with a collar deeply embedded into the skin
and tissue of the neck. This can occur when a collar or chain is placed on the
dog as a puppy, and never again checked or adjusted as the dog grows to adult
size. In the worst cases, muscles in the neck may be severed by the constriction,
and the wound may be inflamed and seeping due to secondary infection with
bacteria or insect larvae. Failure to notice such a condition suggests either gross
indifference or isolation of the dog from any type of regular human contact.
Although maltreatment statutes do not require that any specific veterinary care
be provided in the case of a medical condition, they do require prompt relief of
suffering, either through appropriate veterinary care or euthanasia. Therefore,
failure to have obvious wounds or skin conditions addressed, failure to repair a
broken leg, failure to provide relief from an externally visible cancer, or allow-
ing an animal to suffer from a severe chronic lameness could all be construed as
medical neglect resulting in unnecessary suffering.
Significant neglect could also occur when animals are utilized as a source of
revenue and owner/sellers attempt to maximize profits by providing substandard
care. Examples of this would be some commercial dog breeders referred to as
“puppy mills” or certain types of roadside zoos, petting zoos, animal auctions,
or other kinds of animal exhibits. In order to monitor animal health and ensure
minimal levels of care, wholesale dog breeding operations are regulated by the
USDA. Until recently, direct-to-consumer sales have been exempt from USDA
oversight under the theory that people would only be able to purchase these dogs
from a retail pet store, where the conditions could be directly observed. However,
the Internet made it easier for wholesale breeders to sell directly to consumers,
thereby bypassing the requirement for USDA regulation, a loophole that has now
been closed. Importantly, substandard commercial breeders can still be pros-
ecuted under state animal cruelty statutes. Similarly, so-called “backyard breed-
ers” may raise smaller numbers of dogs under substandard conditions, and their
motivation also appears largely economic in that they do not appear to be par-
ticipating in dog shows or breeding dogs with the express purpose of winning
competitions. There have also been cases of neglect where pet store owners sim-
ply locked the doors and walked away from a failing business, or just simply
chose not to provide needed food and water or to relinquish animals they could
not care for to a local animal shelter. In some cases, live animals have been found
discarded with trash. There have been agricultural cases where owners could
no longer afford the cost of feed, and large numbers of farm animals were left to
starve. Dogs kept for illegal dogfighting where income is derived from wagering
on the fights might also be the victims of neglect, in addition to the suffering
from the actual fighting. Cockfighting is another example where neglect may
occur. Horses often represent a source of income for the owner (e.g., urban car-
riage rides, riding stables leasing horses to the public by the hour or providing
lessons, pony rides at fairs and events) and thus economically motivated neglect
can occur in these situations as well.
CA R EG I V ER- FA B R I CAT ED I L L N ES S
An unusual and likely uncommon form of medical maltreatment of animals is

caregiver fabricated illness (previously referred to as Munchausen syndrome by
proxy, a term which has recently fallen out of favor in human medicine), which
we mention here because it does not readily fit into any other category of animal
maltreatment. The warning signs are similar in veterinary medicine to what has
been reported in human medicine (Bass & Glaser, 2014; Flaherty et al., 2013).
Signs veterinarians must be attuned to include an owner who brings her ani-
mal in repeatedly for an unusual and perplexing string of strange maladies that
defy explanation and do not appear to follow the course of any known disease
or condition (Munro & Thrushfield, 2001). The key sign that the owner may be
responsible for the illness or problem is that the animal’s condition or symptoms
improve while hospitalized and away from the owner (because the owner may
have been administering toxic substances to the animal or interfering with a sur-
gical site). It is unclear what might prompt such behavior, but it seems plausible
that a driving force may be the reward derived from sympathy and attention she
receives from staff, and the praise for her commitment as a caregiver and her
dedication to her pet.
A N I M A L H OA R D I N G AS A D I ST I N CT I V E
FO R M O F N EG L ECT
Animal hoarding is a unique form of animal maltreatment in that it is now men-

tioned in the description of Hoarding Disorder (300.3 [F42]), which was added
to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), thereby
establishing it as associated with a recognized mental illness (APA, 2013).
Animal hoarding often presents distinctive psychological components, whereas
the aforementioned forms of neglect are not necessarily associated with mental
illness. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to this severe
and challenging form of animal maltreatment, which has a poorly characterized,
perplexing, and potentially severe psychopathology.
In this section we will discuss common misconceptions about animal
hoarding and the challenges of addressing it through the legal system under
current animal cruelty statutes. We will review the clinical features of animal
hoarding for the three best-described types (overwhelmed caregiver, rescue
hoarder, exploiter hoarder); how animal hoarding compares to object hoard-
ing; what is known or suspected about its etiology as an attachment-related
disorder rooted in trauma; and how deficits in mentalization as a result of
impaired attachment processes may be one mechanism by which this behav-
ior is sustained. Finally, important points to consider during the forensic eval-
uation process will be noted, many of which will be applicable to other forms
of neglect as well.
The Challenges of Animal Hoarding
Animal hoarding may be the most difficult form of animal maltreatment for the
legal system to address precisely because of the overwhelming and poorly under-
stood contribution of mental health issues, and the paradoxical relationship
between professed good intentions and terrible consequences for animals (Berry
et al., 2005; Patronek, 2008; Schwalm, 2009). It also differs in the large number of
animals potentially involved in a given case (dozens are typical, but hundreds are
not unusual). Historically, cruelty statutes were developed primarily to address
individual acts of maltreatment, which tend to occur comparatively acutely,
versus the collective gradual neglect of populations of animals whose suffering
intensifies over a long period of time without a clear point of onset (Schwalm,
2009). In hoarding, large numbers of animals suffer gradually from a series of
incremental, additive, and intertwined failures of care and decision-making defi-
cits that deprive them of factors essential to animal well-being (“Five Freedoms”),
leading to injury, disease, suffering and death. As identified by their original
developers (FAWC, undated), the Five Freedoms are:
1. Freedom from Hunger and Thirst—by ready access to fresh water and
a diet to maintain full health and vigor.
2. Freedom from Discomfort—by providing an appropriate environment
including shelter and a comfortable resting area.
3. Freedom from Pain, Injury, or Disease—by prevention or rapid diag-
nosis and treatment.
4. Freedom to Express Normal Behavior—by providing sufficient space,
proper facilities, and company of the animal’s own kind.
5. Freedom from Fear and Distress—by ensuring conditions and treat-
ment which avoid mental suffering.
The “Five Freedoms” are similar to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, in that they
progress from defining basic physical necessities to more subjective but equally
important components of welfare such as freedom from fear and emotional
distress and the affirmative need to express normal, species-specific behavior.
Although some of these concepts may not have been specifically articulated
when maltreatment statutes were written, they may legitimately be covered
under the umbrella of commonly used terms such as “needless suffering.” This
could potentially provide a mechanism for ensuring that interpretation of laws
remains aligned with evolving concepts of animal welfare.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that law enforcement officials may be reluctant
to bring charges solely due to issues involving the more subjective aspects of the
“Five Freedoms.” Although animal hoarding clearly can be successfully prose-
cuted under current animal cruelty statutes, as Figure 6.1 illustrates, prosecution
often does not occur until considerable animal suffering has occurred. Mental
suffering due to excessive crowding, prolonged confinement, and deprivation of
‘Five Freedoms’ for Animal Welfare

From From
From pain, fear From To express
hunger, injury, and dis- normal Quality of
Quality of life thirst disease distress comfort behavior caregiving and
results:
High Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Competent Care
Animal welfare
Good Yes Yes Yes +/– +/– safeguarded
Borderline Yes +/– +/– +/– No

Borderline Care
Intervention threshold: evaluate Animals at risk
competency to provide care
Poor +/– +/– No No No

Incompetent Care
Animal suffering
A life not present
No No No No No
worth living
Cruelty typically
prosecuted
+/– means the Freedom in question is present sometimes, as opposed to never or always.
Figure 6.1 Relationship of presence of the Five Freedoms for animal welfare to quality
of life for animals.
Source: Arluke, A., & Patronek, G. J. (2013). Animal hoarding. In M. P. Brewster and
C. L. Reyes (Eds.), Animal Cruelty: A multidisciplinary approach to understanding.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Figure 2, page 208. Reprinted with kind
permission from Carolina Academic Press.
the opportunity to exhibit normal species-specific behaviors often precedes fail-

ure to receive food, water, and necessary medical care. For all of these reasons, by
the time the situation reaches the level where prosecution for cruelty is pursued,
quality of life has deteriorated substantially, and suffering may be significant and
protracted for large numbers of animals.
As Berry et al. (2005) and Moore (2005) have noted, cruelty laws fail to
account for the status of animals as victims. Instead, law enforcement authori-
ties are required to treat seized animals primarily as evidence. This can some-
times result in denying them needed veterinary care, on the pretext that such
care would alter their status as evidence. Therefore, the animals may experience
a prolonged period of secondary victimization by the very system that should be
protecting their interests. Prosecuting a case involving hundreds of animals as a
series of individual offenses (failure to provide water, failure to provide a sanitary
environment, failure to provide veterinary care for each animal) also ignores
the collective nature of the crime against a population of animals and how the
whole may indeed be worse than the sum of its parts. Furthermore, prosecution
can fail to protect currently “healthy” animals who may not be the subject of the
criminal charges. Nevertheless, these animals are already suffering simply by
being subject to the detrimental environment the other animals experienced and
certainly are at risk of future harm if they remain in those conditions.
Unlike prosecutions for other forms of cruelty, in animal hoarding there
may be no doubt whatsoever about who is involved or responsible. Indeed, the
offender is likely to proudly proclaim her care and dedication to the animals
as a defense. As a recent volume edited by Oakley et al. (2012) illustrates, the
concept of pathological altruism (e.g., that good intentions can indeed go very
wrong and serve the needs of the giver far more than those of the receiver) is not
well appreciated. Consequently, courts often struggle with the issue of intent and
motivation. This is not an easy contradiction to understand and does suggest the
presence of significant metacognitive defects on the part of hoarders.
When professed intent is so at odds with the reality of the situation for ani-
mals, and without an understanding of the contribution of psychopathology,
courts and prosecutors may accept, with little further investigation, a defen-
dant’s claims of good intentions and love for her animals, despite implausible
explanations such as blaming an acute incident (e.g., a health problem or family
emergency) for conditions that clearly took months or even years to deteriorate
to their present state. These excuses and justifications have been reviewed by
Vaca-Guzman and Arluke (2005). Of course, the issue of providing excuses in
the face of bad behavior is not unique to animal issues (Snyder, 1985). However,
the profound and genuine expressions of love and concern for the animals on the
part of the offender are particularly difficult for courts to reconcile with the det-
rimental environmental conditions and level of suffering and/or death experi-
enced by the animals.
Another challenge in these cases is that courts (and prosecutors) may have a
very limited appreciation of what constitutes suffering for animals when there
is not overt torture or similar action. Thus, courts may weigh sympathy for the
defendant over the consequences of maltreatment for the animal victims, or con-
clude that without intent, the particular statute has not been violated (Schwalm,
2009). Defense attorneys may well argue for return of some or all of the animals
to the offender’s care. Furthermore, when the defendant claims to be a shelter,
rescue, or hospice, due to confusion over these terms and entities, courts may fail
to critically examine whether the situation is in any way rehabilitative or there is
any evidence that the needs of animals (as opposed to the needs of the offender)
are being considered. The lack of understanding on these points impedes the
trial process itself, as well as the critical sentencing and disposition decisions to
be made after the trial.
Evidence to date suggests that whatever the short-term outcome of the case
may be, animal hoarding has a very high recidivism rate, perhaps approaching
100% (Berry et al., 2005). This may be because the mental health issues that ren-
dered the defendant incapable of providing adequate care are not addressed by
fines, removal of some or all of the animals, community service, or jail. It is even
more troubling when, due to this failure to appreciate the situation in light of
what may be significant limitations in a person’s capacity for care, decisions are
made that either return animals to this high risk environment, or fail to protect
other animals who may not have been the subject of the criminal charges. With
regard to the sentencing of animal hoarders, in most states, counseling is not
mandatory. In those circumstances where counseling is court-mandated, it is
not known whether the treatment is provided by a mental health professional
knowledgeable about animal hoarding behavior. Indeed, there are few experts
in this area. Object hoarding is a treatment-resistant condition typically requir-
ing a protracted course of therapeutic intervention by an experienced therapist
(Steketee & Frost, 2007). Frost et al. (2011) suggest that the hoarding of animals
may reflect an even greater lack of insight and more complex psychopathology
than object hoarding. To date, there are no tested or generally accepted pro-
tocols for treating animal hoarders, and it is unknown to what degree, if any,
techniques such as cognitive behavioral therapy that have been used with some
success in object hoarding will be transferable. There is no evidence that recom-
mendations that the perpetrator seek unspecified “counseling” are likely to be
effective. Therefore, it seems safe to say that any notion of “quick fix” treatments
should be considered very skeptically.
Legislative Dilemmas
As mentioned earlier, a major dilemma in animal hoarding is that the offender

may meet the psychiatric criteria for definition of a mental health condition
(Hoarding Disorder 300.3 [F42]) that could indicate serious impairment in one’s
ability to provide proper animal care, long before successful prosecution for ani-
mal maltreatment is an option (Patronek & Ayers, 2014). In terms of legislative
solutions to animal hoarding, Schwalm (2009) has elaborated on the conundrum
posed by the differences in clinical vs. legislative definitions of the problem, and
thus the wording of any legislative solution must be considered very carefully.
The language in DSM-5 (300.3 (F42)) closely follows a previously published
definition (Patronek, 1999). It states “Animal hoarding can be defined as the
accumulation of a large number of animals and a failure to provide minimal
standards of nutrition, sanitation, and veterinary care and to act on the deterio-
rating condition of the animals (including disease, starvation, or death) and the
environment (e.g., severe overcrowding, extremely unsanitary conditions).” The
use of the term “large” seems appropriate for clinical use, but could create some
conflict with legal requirements (Schwalm, 2009).
At the time of this writing, only two states (Hawaii and Illinois) have language
about hoarding in their animal cruelty statutes (neither of which is considered to
be a model to replicate), which read as follows:
Illinois (2001) 510 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.70/2.10. This legislation amended
the Illinois Humane Care for Animal Act [66] to define a “companion animal
hoarder” as [A]‌person who (a) possesses a large number of companion animals;
(b) fails to or is unable to provide what he or she is required to provide under
Section 3 of this Act [food and water, adequate shelter and protection from
whether, veterinary care, and human care and treatment]; (c) keeps the compan-
ion animals in a severely overcrowded environment; and (d) displays an inabil-
ity to recognize or understand the nature of or has a reckless disregard for the
conditions under which the companion animals are living and the deleterious
impact they have on the companion animals’ and owner’s health and well-being.
Hawaii (2009) Haw. Rev. Stat. § 711-1109.6. This legislation amended the
penal code to specifically criminalize animal hoarding as follows:
(1) A person commits the offense of animal hoarding if the person

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly;
(a) Possesses more than fifteen dogs, cats, or a combination of dogs
and cats;
(b) Fails to provide necessary sustenance for each dog or cat; and
(c) Fails to correct the conditions under which the dogs or cats are
living, where conditions injurious to the dogs’, cats’, or owner’s
health and well-being result from the person’s failure to provide
necessary sustenance.
(2) Animal hoarding is a misdemeanor.
As Schwalm (2009) argues, these laws are fundamentally redundant as they tie
the definition of one (hoarding) to the other (animal cruelty). Thus, as currently
conceptualized, other statutes will already have been violated by the time condi-
tions for animal hoarding were fulfilled. In particular, Schwalm (2009) points out
the problems inherent with subjective language and blurring of human behav-
ioral requirements and numerosity (i.e., how the number of animals is specified
or not). Schwalm (2009) also notes that language in most anti-cruelty statutes
has already withstood constitutional challenges, but new language regarding
numerosity has not (e.g., a “large” number). A “bright line” number in a statute
would certainly avoid any issues of vagueness, but we cannot think of how one
could rationally derive such a number that would clearly identify a hoarding
situation.
General Features of Animal Hoarding
The environmental effects of animal hoarding have been described elsewhere

(Castrodale et al., 2010; HARC, 2002; Patronek, 1999) and parallel those observed
in object hoarding, with the added contribution that derives from the presence
of populations of animals and accumulation of their bodily waste and potential
for transmission of zoonotic diseases. The health and safety ramifications should
be obvious—piles of feces on floors and coating other surfaces in human living
spaces, floors soaked with urine, ammonia and dust-laden atmosphere, exten-
sive clutter and crowding, and/or lack of working toilets, electricity, and plumb-
ing. These conditions are not unlike those reported for severe domestic squalor
(Snowdon et al., 2007). There have also been many cases where the corpses of
dead animals are left to decay in whatever location they died, or systematically
tagged and stored in freezers, attics, and outbuildings. Of course not every situ-
ation approaches this extreme, but many do, and most, if not all, share some of
these features by definition. An exception may be a “rescuer hoarder” (described
later) or breeder hoarder, who may have a primarily economic motivation and
who does not live with the animals, but keeps them separate from his or her
dwelling. The effect of these conditions on the animals will be covered in more
detail in Chapter 7.
In an attempt to better characterize animal hoarders, and to explore the het-
erogeneity of these situations, the Hoarding of Animals Research Consortium
(HARC)1 convened an expert workshop in 2006. Findings included a proposed
typology of hoarding. Characteristics that were observed among hoarders who
were subjects of HARC research activities and/or counseling intervention case-
work, or who were encountered through the professional activities of the work-
shop participants, were used to develop the typology. The predominant features
of this typology (recognizing that every situation is unique and there may be
considerable overlap in some cases) are presented in Table 6.1 (Patronek, Loar,
& Nathanson, 2006). As detailed for each type, we found important differences
with regard to intentionality, pattern, and insight. These factors substantially
affect the feasibility of intervention and the potential for rehabilitation counsel-
ing. The most difficult types for crisis intervention, counseling and remediation
are the rescuer and the exploiter hoarders, with the rescuer hoarder customarily
adamantly asserting the intention to save the animals from homelessness and/
or euthanasia given her/his loving care, regardless of the self-sacrifice this may
involve (e.g., alienation of family and friends; financial hardship; negligence or
ignoring of one’s own daily needs for food, clothing, or personal maintenance).
This element of the semblance of self-sacrifice is not as apparent with the over-
whelmed caregiver. Casework conducted with rescuer hoarders enabled us to
Table 6.1. Typology of Animal Hoarding
Overwhelmed caregiver Rescuer hoarder Exploiter hoarder
Exhibits some awareness of problems with ani- Has strong sense of mission to save animals, Most difficult or problematic type to deal with
mal care; more reality-based than other types which leads to unavoidable compulsion Acquires animals purely to serve own needs
Finds problem triggered by a change in circum- Fears death (of animals and self) and (e.g., for absolute control, demonstration of
stances or resources—social, economic, and/ opposes euthanasia expertise)
or medical; (e.g., loss of spouse who helped care Starts with adequate resources for Tends to have sociopathic characteristics and/
for animals, onset of illness or disability, loss of animal care or personality disorder
job or income) Acquires animals actively rather than Lacks empathy for people or animals; indiffer-
Makes an initial effort to provide proper care but passively ent to the harm caused to animals or people
eventually gets overwhelmed and is unable to Believes he/she is the only one who can Tends toward extreme denial of the situation
solve problems effectively; doesn’t know how to provide adequate care; the initial Rejects authority or any outsider’s legitimate
get out from under rescue-followed-by-adoption pattern is concern over animal care
Experiences a gradual decline in animal caretak- replaced by rescue-only care Believes his/her knowledge is superior to oth-
ing capacity Number of animals gradually overwhelms ers; adopts the role of expert with extreme
Has a strong attachment to animals as family capacity to provide minimal care need to control
members Finds it hard to refuse requests to take more Has superficial charm and charisma—very
Has fewer issues with authorities and/or need to animals articulate, skilled in crafting excuses and
control animals or property Avoids authorities and/or impedes explanations, and capable of presenting an
Tends to minimize rather than deny the problems their access appearance that conveys believability and
Finds attachment to animals a bigger issue than Is not necessarily socially isolated; may work competence to officials, the public, and the
control with an extensive network of enablers media
and be more engaged in society, therefore
less amenable to intervention via social
services
Tends to be withdrawn and isolated, possibly due Is manipulative and cunning
to physical infirmity Is self-concerned and narcissistic
Allows intervener to gain entry, client more Lacks guilt, remorse, or social conscience
likely to respect the system and comply with Acquires animals actively rather than passively
recommendations Demonstrates predatory behavior—will lie,
Is less deliberately secretive cheat, steal without remorse and poten-
Acquires animals passively tially has a plan to use these tools to achieve
Has self-esteem linked to role as a caregiver own ends
Needs guardianship in many cases Plans to evade the law and beat the system,
Has more tendency towards AXIS I psychologi- such as dispersing animals to other animal
cal disorders (AXIS I includes all mental health hoarders or friend
conditions (i.e., mood disorders, psychotic dis-
orders, with the exception of personality disor-
ders and mental retardation)
note: This table was constructed from text published in Patronek, G. J., Loar, L., & Nathanson, J. N. (Eds.). (2006). Animal hoarding: Structuring
interdisciplinary responses to people, animals, and communities at risk. Retrieved from http://www.tufts.edu/vet/hoarding/pubs/AngellReport.pdf
delve more deeply into their histories and thereby evolve a theoretical trajectory
of behavioral development.
Clinical Features of Animal Hoarding
Much of what we know or assume about animal hoarders is derived from the
considerably more extensive literature about object hoarding, which indeed was
sufficiently robust to identify hoarding as a new disorder in DSM-5. A compara-
tive study of animal vs. object hoarding indicates that both are characterized by
intense urges to save the animal or object, and extreme difficulty with parting
(Frost et al., 2011; Patronek & Ayers, 2014). Both exhibit lack of insight into the
conditions and both have strong beliefs about responsibility and control as well
as intense attachment. Our experience with animal hoarders is consistent with
that described for object hoarders (Landau et al., 2011) in that both report trau-
matic life events. As we will describe later, this is believed to heavily influence
the development of animal hoarding. There are some discrepancies about gender
differences in treatment samples vs. community samples of object hoarding, but
women are overrepresented in animal hoarding (HARC, 2002; Patronek, 1999;
Patronek & Ayers, 2014). The lack of insight in animal hoarding may be even
more severe than in object hoarding. Due to the sanitary issues that necessarily
accompany the collection and maintenance of animate beings in a limited space,
animal disease, and/or the presence of animal carcasses, the impact on the envi-
ronment and public health may be more severe.
Neglect of self and/or others is a common, although not universal, feature of
animal hoarding (Nathanson, 2009). As previously indicated, there are some
cases where the hoarder does not share the same living space as the animals.
Since self-neglect is not always apparent upon meeting an animal hoarder
outside her/his home, the hoarder’s private life and home conditions must be
examined to rule this out. At first, it might be the observer’s reaction to assume
that the individual is enduring unsafe, unsanitary, unhealthy conditions due to
“self-sacrificing” (as noted earlier) because of having devoted one’s focus exclu-
sively on the animals. However, Nathanson’s long-term work with self-neglecting
elders in general, as well as with animal hoarders, has found that even when
the person is offered resources to improve personal and home care, nutrition,
and even financial assistance, these betterments are often rejected. Resistance to
help may be complicated by cognitive as well as emotional factors. Nathanson
(2009) has cited Bozinovski’s (2000) theory of “continuity of self and control”
(which is applied to elder self-neglecters), as being relevant to the animal hoard-
ers who refuse intervention and assert their positive identity as a “rescuer” and
deny that conditions for themselves or their animals are harmful or otherwise
unsatisfactory.
As yet, there are no published studies summarizing the findings of psychologi-
cal/psychiatric evaluations of animal hoarders. However, the presence of numer-
ous comorbid psychological disorders has been reported for object hoarders
(Frost et al., 2011). Regardless, the shocking environmental conditions and the
profound lack of insight into the suffering of the animals seem to be prima facie
evidence that something is terribly wrong. As mentioned earlier, object hoarders
are considered a difficult and treatment resistant population, although there are
studies indicating some success with cognitive behavioral therapy, mostly with
patients with the motivation to seek help (Gilliam et al., 2011; Muroff et al., 2014;
Pollock et al., 2014; Tolin et al., 2007). Few animal hoarders appear to volun-
tarily seek help or mental health treatment, which may not be surprising due to
their frequent social isolation, extreme lack of insight and denial, and the emo-
tional dependency they have on the animals. Whether that may change now that
hoarding disorder may now be reimbursable by health insurance as a result of
listing in DSM-5 is unknown. Nevertheless, at present there are no published,
tested therapies specifically for animal hoarders, and it is unknown how effective
strategies used for object hoarders might be applied to this subgroup.
What is it that hoarders tell us (and the courts) in defense of their actions?
Despite the differences among the various types of hoarders described in the
typology (Table 6.1), what hoarders consistently say is that they love their ani-
mals, that they are providing care (sometimes rehabilitative care or hospice
care), and that they are innocent of any wrongdoing with regard to deficien-
cies in the animals’ conditions or violations of human health and housing codes
(despite living conditions deemed unfit for human habitation and sick, dying,
and dead animals present). Indeed, it is not uncommon for hoarders to repre-
sent themselves as legitimate humane societies, SPCAs, pet rescue operations,
“no-kill” shelters, pet hospice, and so on. In an ideal world, it would be possible
to reject such claims out of hand. But given the fragmented and unregulated
nature of these various animal care activities across the United States, it is unfor-
tunate that the distinctions are not always so clear. Recently, the Association of
Shelter Veterinarians published a set of guidelines for animal care that attempt
to remove some of the ambiguity about what constitutes acceptable medical and
behavioral care for animals in population settings (Newbury et al., 2010). That
document was endorsed by major animal welfare organizations in the United
States and Canada, and provides a benchmark for courts and forensic evaluators
to refer to when considering animal needs and care issues.
A major challenge to effective intervention with an animal hoarder is how
to reconcile their statements and deeply held beliefs that fall so far from objec-
tive, verifiable reality by any reasonable standard. A critical difference between
animal hoarding and most other types of animal maltreatment is that there is
a strong human-animal bond. As odd as it may seem, this attachment does not
always end with death. It is not uncommon for hoarders to let animals die, avoid
acknowledgment of death, and to resist removal of corpses or to ask for return of
remains after legal proceedings are concluded. This bond must be acknowledged
and explored in order to gain some understanding of this behavior.
In the next section, we will discuss the nature and importance of the
human-animal bond and the functions animals may serve when a “normal”
bond is present. To that end, we will review seminal work by Brown describing
how companion animals may function as selfobjects (i.e., something within a

person’s environment that helps build a sense of self-esteem, well-being, and
cohesion) (Brown, 2004, 2007, 2011). Third, we will describe some typical case
histories of hoarders to illustrate the role of physical and emotional trauma and
provide evidence for attachment deficits that could predispose them to the devel-
opment of this condition, as well as personality disorders that may greatly com-
plicate intervention. Finally, we will present a theoretical model (Nathanson &
Patronek, 2011; Patronek & Nathanson, 2009) that incorporates these principles
to explain how animal hoarding may evolve from commonly reported anteced-
ent events, often reaching back into childhood.
Importance of the Human-Animal Bond

The positive aspects of the human-animal bond are well-recognized (Beck &
Katcher, 1996), which is not surprising considering that 36% of U.S. house-
holds live with 70 million dogs and 30% live with 74 million cats (AVMA,
2012). Consumers spent over $53 billion on their pets in 2013 (APPMA, 2014).
Indeed, the importance and influence of pets may begin in early childhood.
Research indicates that children may perceive pets as special friends, derive
emotional support from pets, and create relationships likely to be readily avail-
able, highly reliable, comforting, and lasting (Katcher & Beck, 1983; Melson,
2003; Triebenbacher, 1998). Pets are often treated as confidants with no risk of
being betrayed or negatively judged. Animal companions may be instrumen-
tal for developing nurturance skills in children and facilitating family com-
munication (e.g., children may express feelings or concerns to the pet rather
than directly to the parents) (Katcher & Beck, 1983; Melson, 2003; Rynearson,
1978; Triebenbacher, 1998). However, as Nathanson (2009; citing Rynearson,
1978) suggests, children in dysfunctional families may use the pet, who is
consistently receptive as an object of love and care, as a means of escape and
a substitute for human relationships, particularly when parents are absent,
rejecting, or otherwise abusive. Indeed, Kurdek (2009) has recently shown that
adults may develop formal attachment bonds with their dogs, turning to them
rather than friends or family members other than romantic partners in times
of stress.
Patronek and Nathanson (2009) found that many hoarders in general, and
rescue-type hoarders in particular, reported having had relationships with pets
during childhood, adolescence, or young adulthood, which would be considered
normal, healthy, and functional. However, the sense of safety, security, and sta-
bility provided by pets often occurred in the context of dysfunctional relation-
ships with primary caregivers causing the child to experience profound pain and
suffering. The majority of the cases of rescuer hoarders reported absent or incon-
sistent parenting, and chaotic environments characterized by early childhood
physical, emotional, or sexual abuse, and/or domestic violence. For some, pets
in the immediate household (or found elsewhere with friends and neighbors)
became a dependable refuge from which to derive consolation, safety, and plea-
surable activity.
The lack of consistent, satisfactory caregiving on the part of primary caregiv-

ers in one’s childhood would be expected to create what Bowlby (1988) called an
“insecure base” and a disordered attachment style. This would adversely affect
the individual’s future ability to derive ongoing positive attachments and rela-
tionships with peers and/or partners. For an excellent review, see Shaver and
Mikulciner (2005). This personal history in general might not be sufficient to
cause functional relationships with animals becoming dysfunctional and degen-
erating into hoarding. However, in our experience, a “triggering event,” such
as a major crisis, loss, and a related complicated or traumatic grief response
(Prigerson et al., 1997) have been reported or observed with rescuer hoarders as
a preceding and potentially contributory factor. These elements have appeared
to culminate in the individual’s futile effort to achieve identity, self-esteem, and
control via animals—three driving forces often characteristic of these cases.
Animals as Selfobjects
Brown has explored the nature of the human-animal bond and attachment from
a psychodynamic perspective, grounded in concepts of self psychology (Brown,
2004, 2007, 2011). In this section, we will summarize the theoretical approach
she has put forth to explain some of the underpinnings of a “normal” bond,
as well as the similarities between self psychology and attachment theory, and
then move to her more recent application of these concepts specifically to animal
hoarding (Brown, 2011).
Briefly, Brown (citing Wolf, 1988) describes the self as a psychological con-
struct “that is the core of personality and gives a person a sense of well-being,
self-esteem, and general cohesion” (Brown, 2004, p. 69). Elsewhere, she reinforces
how important it is that people receive responses from the environment to pro-
mote this sense of self throughout life (Brown, 2011). She further describes how
a person’s experience with a companion animal can provide these important
selfobject functions, helping sustain the self and potentially fulfilling traditional
human types of support (2007, 2011). Within this conceptual framework, Brown
takes great care to emphasize that it is the person’s beliefs and thoughts about
this relationship, and not necessarily what the animal is experiencing or how the
animal feels, that determine the selfobject function (Brown, 2007). Finally, she
notes that of the three possible selfobject types (mirroring, twinship, idealizing),
there is evidence that relationships with animals have more twinship features
(i.e., providing a likeness of the self in another) (Brown, 2011), something quite
uncommon among human relationships. She then suggests that this may leave
more room for projection of human emotions onto the animal, as they are unable
to disagree with a person’s interpretation of their needs, wants, or state of wel-
fare. Consequently, the loss of a pet who provides a selfobject function may be
substantially more impactful than that of an animal who is not a selfobject. This
may explain the extent to which many hoarders go to conceal their activities,
avoid help (e.g., volunteers), and elude supervision or enforcement.
In her third paper in this series, Brown (2011) applies these concepts of self
psychology to stimulate our thinking about the psychology of animal hoarders.
In common with attachment theory, appropriate nurturing and mirroring expe-

riences with parents during infancy are essential for development of a “secure,
cohesive self” and ability to self-regulate emotional states (Brown 2011, p. 178).
When needs are not met during this critical period, disorders of the self and
attachment can result. Brown emphasizes that when a companion animal fulfills
a selfobject function, the reliance on that animal can be quite intense and crucial
to well-being, with the loss of that animal creating a sense of fragmentation,
disintegration, and depression. As an added nuance, Brown describes the dif-
ference between an archaic and mature selfobject relationship, with the primary
difference being the “ability to empathize with the selfobject and see them as
independent others with needs and lives separate and different from one’s own”
(Brown, 2011, p. 180). Thus, individuals with archaic selfobject relationships
would see the animals only as extensions of themselves and lack the ability to
empathize with them or to understand what they feel or need, or be able to prop-
erly care for them. As captives in a one-sided relationship that does not require
the same level of effort as human relationships, the animals are always avail-
able to meet the person’s needs, which could include “an all-or-nothing” level
of emotional support (Brown, 2011, p. 182). Finally, Brown concludes that true
altruism is impossible “for people functioning only at archaic levels of selfob-
ject experience,” which requires both awareness of the other as well as empathy
(Brown, 2011, p. 184). The seriously impaired ability to empathize may impair
a hoarder’s ability to recognize pain, hunger, suffering, and death. Of course,
being out of touch with reality, either intermittently or chronically to varying
extents, could also indicate other psychological disorders. Brown also empha-
sizes the relative lack of importance of subjective reality in a person’s perception
of a selfobject function. It is what the person believes that is paramount, which
could help explain how an animal hoarder may in fact be able to derive support
from dead animals, often being unable to part with them and storing their bod-
ies in some manner. Other examples of the disconnect between hoarders’ beliefs
and subjective reality would include believing the animals love them, that they
are grateful for being “rescued,” or are happy and healthy in their surroundings
despite ample evidence to the contrary (e.g., disease, psychological suffering, and
death on a massive scale).
Of course, it remains to be established from psychological assessments of ani-
mal hoarders to what extent this theoretical analysis applies. We believe it is
consistent with our own trauma/attachment-centered explanatory model, as well
as with work (to be described in a later paragraph) by Fonagy and colleagues on
the adverse effect of attachment deficits on mentalization ability (Allen, 2006;
Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; Fonagy et al., 2002). With this in mind, evaluating
and assessing a person’s capacity to care for animals takes on new urgency, as
the implications of this hypothesis are that their ability to provide care for more
than a few animals (if any at all) without careful and regular external monitor-
ing is doubtful, at least until these profound psychological deficits are repaired.
As we have mentioned previously, there are no proven treatment protocols for
animal hoarding, and there is ample evidence that the deficits present may be
extremely resistant to any intervention, particularly without long-term commit-

ment to therapy, cooperation, and support.
Mentalization Deficits in Animal Hoarding

Recently, the Henderson House Workgroup (Patronek & Weiss, 2012) explored
the application of Fonagy and colleagues’ work in mentalization theory as a way
to further understand the apparent cognitive dissonance/dissociation, resis-
tance to treatment, and recidivism that characterizes animal hoarding. Indeed,
mentalization deficits may be one mechanism by which animal hoarding is
sustained (Patronek & Weiss, 2012). What is mentalization? Mentalization has
been described as a form of emotional knowledge that involves being able to
appreciate the reality of others, and as a dynamic skill whose performance is
particularly compromised in the context of intense emotions associated with
attachment relationships (Allen & Fonagy, 2006; Bateman & Fonagy, 2006;
Fonagy et al., 2002; Fonagy & Target, 2006). When impaired, mentalization can
be deficient or absent, or in other cases distorted. As we understand it, this has
considerable overlap with Brown’s discussion of archaic selfobject relationships,
whereby the reality of others cannot be appreciated and instead is defined by a
projection of the person’s own beliefs and thoughts (Brown, 2011). Allen (2006,
p. 6) describes how adults with a history of childhood attachment trauma often
have an acquired failure to understand how others (people and animals) think
and feel.
Bateman & Fonagy (2006) also emphasize that deficits in mentalization asso-
ciated with disordered attachment are a core problem in borderline personality
disorder. This is relevant because of the prevalence of self-reported attachment
trauma among animal hoarders, the readily observed traits (grouped under Axis
II in earlier versions of DSM) consistent with personality disorders, and appar-
ent deficits in mentalization encountered during law enforcement visits and/or
counseling sessions involving animal hoarders.
To explain the apparent disconnect between a person’s thoughts and observ-
able reality, Allen (2006) describes how distortions in mentalizing can take two
opposite forms—a “concrete stance” in which people are oblivious to others’
mental states, or a distorted posture in which they misread the minds of oth-
ers and have unrestrained imagination and projection. We have seen evidence
of both, often operating simultaneously, in cases of animal hoarding, and thus
do not believe these are mutually exclusive mechanisms. Thus, according to
this approach, animals can be ascribed any mental state the person wishes—as
Brown might say, “the animals love me,” “the animals are happy and healthy
here,” and so on regardless of their physical reality. The person may have a lack
of awareness of states of distress or make their own rules about what constitutes
distress, and may engage in expressing absolute certainty about the thoughts and
feelings of others (Allen & Fonagy, 2006; Brown, 2011). Following this thread,
seeing an animal in a cage is real, safe, and secure—imagining they are unhappy
or feeling distressed is not possible. This again is consistent with Brown’s (2011)
explanation of archaic selfobject functioning, in which the animal becomes an
extension of the person without the animal having a separate identity (Brown,
2011). Hoarders would thus be unable to distinguish between their own emo-
tional state and that of the animals, and the person’s feelings would naturally
supersede objective reality. Consequently, the offender may misread the relation-
ship or situation as being gratifying to the animal and become oblivious to their
frustration, distress, and even death.
Mentalization theory also has implications for sentencing and disposition
decisions after a legal proceeding, particularly when counseling is mandated.
According to Fonagy et al. (2011), it is important that therapists avoid demand-
ing a level of mentalizing from a patient that is beyond the patient’s ability to
reach. A relatively high level of metacognition (i.e., the ability to reflect upon
one’s own thought process or that of others) is required before a patient’s own
thinking can be challenged and distinguished from reality. This points again to
concerns about mandating specific, unproven, ad-hoc therapies, particularly if
framed as a quick-fix. All evidence suggests that, given the longstanding nature
of the hypothesized underlying psychopathology, even in an ideal situation
with a cooperative and receptive patient, this would be a challenging long-term
therapeutic undertaking with many uncertainties with regard to its course and
outcome.
Illustrative case histories

Barry Yeoman, drawing on in-depth interviews with lawyers and veterinar-
ians involved in the case, describes the case of Barbara Woodley and her more
than 300 dogs (Yeoman, 2009). He describes the four buildings where the dogs
were held as having a stench so powerful that it provoked gagging. The captive
dogs were stacked in wire cages, and those on top defecated and urinated on
those below. Urine scalding of skin and eyes was a common sequelae. Barbara’s
son maintained that his mother adored her dogs, and became so attached she
could not sell or adopt them. She referred to the dogs as her children who never
talked back to her and loved her for who she was. A heart attack contributed
to her inability to provide proper care for so many. After entering her home
under another court order, investigators found similar squalor, accumulations
of feces, and stench as seen in the four outbuildings. Barbara was reported as
making lunch and apparently exhibiting no acknowledgment of the extremely
unsanitary conditions. Civil and criminal proceedings against Barbara began
in March 2005, with her lawyer arguing she and her husband had not violated
state laws because “They had never kicked, shot, poisoned, or starved their dogs.”
Veterinary testimony countered with the assertion that one does not need to
“put cigarettes out on a dog for it to be cruelty.” After Barbara’s criminal convic-
tion, appeals continued until October 2007, when the dogs were finally allowed
to be adopted into permanent homes. Including legal appeals, the case lasted
three years (2005–2007), with Barbara passing away shortly thereafter. There was
never any acknowledgment on Barbara’s part that anything was wrong, and it
was speculated that the stress of those three years of litigation contributed to
her death.
Arluke & Killeen (2009) provide a much more personal look in their recount-
ing of the story of a different Barbara—Barbara Erickson. Unlike other descrip-
tions of animal hoarders, this one provides the perspective of the hoarder herself.
They begin her story in January 2003, when sheriff’s deputies discovered over
500 diseased and emaciated dogs, most of whom were crammed into a small,
unheated, rented, two-bedroom home that Barbara shared with her husband.
Barbara’s reaction to the investigation was to declare her love for her “babies.”
Barbara is described by an acquaintance as intelligent, well-read, and good at
reading other people, but also as clever and manipulative. By her own accounts,
which the authors admit are as difficult to verify as they are to refute, as a child
Barbara was sexually molested for years by her grandfather, with her two dogs
either being her sole source of solace afterwards, or in one case, interrupting the
abuse by biting the grandfather. She describes trauma, a profound sense of loss,
and increased vulnerability when (as a result of the bite) her parents sold the two
dogs, whom she indicates were her only friends. By the age of 15, Barbara reports
also being raped by an older farmhand as well as by her own father. Impregnated
and unmarried, she was left alone in a barn to endure a difficult labor. Barbara
maintained her father disposed of the baby without her consent or knowledge,
and that she never even knew whether it was a boy or a girl. Shortly thereaf-
ter, she was forced into marriage to the same farmhand. Her mother eventually
abandoned the family, and the other children were placed into foster care. In full
disclosure, it is important to mention that Barbara also claimed to have been
a Navy nurse, and to have attended both veterinary school and law school at
various times. It is of course hard to know what is fact and what is fiction in this
deeply disturbing tale, which likely contains delusional elements, but the themes
of trauma, abuse, and safety/security provided by pets are consistent with other
hoarders’ stories.
The potential contentiousness of hoarding cases is well known among humane
law enforcement, highlighting other important characteristics of many offend-
ers. One of the most well-documented cases is that of Vikki Kittles, whose
activities spanned decades and a geography ranging from the southeast to the
northwest (ALDF, undated; Marquis, 1996). With a criminal history that began
in 1985 in Florida, she surfaced in Oregon in 1993 with 116 sick and dying dogs
in a school bus, where she was prosecuted for animal cruelty. Her trial began in
December 1994 and lasted five weeks, purportedly costing the county $150,000.
The defendant was described as enormously manipulative, forcing the court to
go through extradition proceedings, firing seven court-appointed attorneys, fil-
ing hundreds of self-styled legal motions, and having four judges remove them-
selves from the case (ALDF, undated; Marquis, 1996). Sadly, she also managed to
maintain control of the confiscated dogs during this ordeal by winning a court
order to withhold needed medical treatment on the grounds that the dogs were
“evidence” that should not be altered during the case (see Moore, 2005, and
Berry et al., 2005 for a discussion of this issue). Sentenced to serve four months in
jail, Kittles chose to serve an additional two months rather than cooperate with
court-mandated counseling. Following release, there are reports of her pattern
of behavior continuing in various jurisdictions in Wyoming for at least another

decade (ALDF, undated).
Again, these are but a few well-documented examples, and many more exist.
The key elements of these stories are also consistent with our own experience
with animal hoarders. While the cruelty and suffering that occurs may not be
intentional, the actions leading to this suffering were anything but accidental. It
should also be noted that while epidemiologically there is evidence that animal
hoarding is overrepresented in people of lower socioeconomic status, it is by no
means restricted to that group. Nor is it an issue of intellect, as many hoarders
are described as highly intelligent, and indeed there are examples (albeit only a
few) of veterinarians and human health and other professionals exhibiting this
behavior. Frost and Steketee (2010) recount the story of a psychiatrist who not
only apparently was a cat hoarder herself, but engaged her patients both in caring
for her cats and in accumulating their own collections of animals.
Despite what may indeed be some very profound psychological deficits, some
hoarders may exhibit a very sophisticated level of functioning in their ability to
surreptitiously obtain pets, resist intervention, elude authorities, set up nonprofit
entities as a screen to legitimize their activities, and manipulate the legal system
in a pro se fashion to their own ends when threatened. Prosecution for violation
of animal maltreatment statutes is often the only way to intervene to help the ani-
mals and interrupt the hoarder’s behavior. This approach, however, likely has little
deterrent effect on recidivism, other hoarders, or potential hoarders. Without a
more proactive option to intervene at an earlier stage before a prosecutable crime
has occurred, as the law allows in cases of alleged child maltreatment, prosecution
will remain the only option for people who resist voluntary improvements.
E X PL A N ATO RY M O D EL O F A N I M A L H OA R D I N G
In the absence of published studies reporting key psychiatric features of ani-

mal hoarders, we have attempted to develop a preliminary understanding of
the developmental psychology of animal hoarding through our own experience
in crisis intervention and case management. What we know directly of animal
hoarders comes from interviews and analysis during our pilot studies (Arluke et
al., 2002; Vaca-Guzman & Arluke, 2005; Frost et al., 2000; Steketee et al., 2011),
court-ordered assessments and rehabilitation counseling sessions, published case
histories (Arluke & Killeen, 2009; Yeoman, 2009), trial transcripts, reports from
investigating officers and humane society personnel (Patronek, 1999; HARC,
2002, Berry et al, 2005, and (importantly) from statements made by hoarders
themselves. We have also drawn upon the literature of object hoarding, and have
extrapolated from the fields of trauma, attachment studies, and addiction stud-
ies, where we have recognized similarities and noteworthy overlap in case histo-
ries and phenomenology (Agrawal et al., 2004; Bowlby, 1988; Cassidy and Mohr,
2001; Cromer et al., 2007; Flores, 2004; Lee, 2006; Levy, 2005; Lyons-Ruth et al.,
2006; Page, 2001; Rynearson, 1978).
In our experience, the themes that consistently emerge are those of (a) unsta-
ble or neglectful, abusive, absent, and/or inconsistent parents or guardians,
often with very chaotic, transient lifestyles; (b) trauma (often multiple, severe
traumatic events such as sexual assault, parental abandonment); (c) difficulty
establishing and maintaining stable interpersonal relationships as an adult; and
(d) complicated grief following the death of close family members or significant
others. Major loss in general (not only due to death) is prominent in case histo-
ries. It is well-established in the scientific literature that events and experiences
such as these do create a fertile soil for disordered attachment, personality dis-
orders, addictive behaviors, and other mental health problems (Cassidy & Mohr,
2001; Flores, 2004; Lyons-Ruth et al., 2006; Page, 2001; Young, 2005). We see no
reason to believe that these factors would have any less relevance when expressed
as animal hoarding. Thus, we offer the following theoretical model (Figure 6.2)
to draw together these various factors into a unified conceptual framework.
Early childhood experience (neglectful, abusive, inconsistent parenting);

and/or genetic, fetal, psychosocial, environmental factors
Poor insight, emotional

‘Fertile Soil’ for mental Disordered attachment
instability, impulsivity, health problems style; impaired
chaotic internal and mentalizing ability with
external lives respect to attachment
Human relationships inadequately buffering stressful life relationships
events; emotional pain, loneliness, fear of abandonment
Animals provide a conflict-free Triggering events:

relationship, acceptance, crisis, trauma
dependability, availability
Self-reparative efforts Heightened sense Coping skills insufficient;
via relationships with of identity, self- caregiving capacity
animals; reflect back esteem, control exceed
desirable self-image
Failure to meet
Compulsive, excessive
animals’ needs; +/–
caregiving of animals;
dissociation
control-based strategies
Animal neglect +/– Self-neglect
Figure 6.2 Conceptual model of animal hoarding.

Note: Original figure was published as Figure 8.1 on page 108 in Nathanson, J., &
Patronek, G. (2011). Animal hoarding: How the semblance of a benevolent mission
becomes actualized as egoism and cruelty. In B. Oakley, A. Knafo, G. Madhavan, &
D. Wilson (Eds.), Pathological Altruism (pp. 107–115). New York, NY: Oxford University
Press. It was then modified and published with permission from Oxford University
Press USA in: Arluke, A., & Patronek, G. J. (2013). Animal hoarding. In M. P. Brewster
and C. L. Reyes (Eds.), Animal Cruelty: A multidisciplinary approach to understanding.
Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Figure 2, page 208. This version, Figure 6.2,
has an additional modification whereby “Axis II traits” has been deleted since the
DSM-5 no longer has the axes designation.
The self-reinforcing nature of animal hoarding must be understood in order to

appreciate why recidivism seems to be so universal and the behavior so resistant
to intervention. One analogy is to consider hoarders as having long-standing
emotional and developmental needs for which they seek fulfillment exclusively
by way of their accumulation and control of animals—in essence, a separate
world or domain is created. Removal of the animals may improve hoarders’ liv-
ing conditions by way of safety, sanitation, and related health benefits, but it does
nothing to restore the sense of emotional well-being that was derived from this
created “refuge.” Considering the profound role animals play in a hoarder’s life,
it should not be surprising that repeating the behavior, even after fines or impris-
onment, is the norm rather than the exception. In this context, the work of Flores
(2004) provides further insight, framing addictive behavior as a manifestation of
disordered attachment.
Given these circumstances, it is easy to imagine the distress experienced by a
hoarder when contacted by officials regarding the animals in their care, know-
ing that any intervention poses a threat to maintaining control. Typical com-
munication and negotiation techniques may not work well with this population
(e.g., pointing out what is wrong and expecting understanding from someone
who cannot appreciate the knowledge or perspective of others). What remains
unclear is why, in the context of these predisposing conditions (“fertile soil” in
Figure 6.2) some people manage to avoid dysfunctional coping strategies, some
seek refuge in the company of animals and become animal hoarders, and others
pursue a path of other self-harming addictive, compulsive behaviors.
C O N S I D ER AT I O N S FO R E VA LUATO R S
Adult Protective Services workers responding to reports of self-neglect encoun-

ter hoarding cases wherein the person is living in the midst of several feet of
food, old clothes, scavenged items, newly purchased bargains, and other gar-
bage. Reporters of these cases (i.e., family members, neighbors, first responders)
frequently state that given such conditions, the hoarder would not be consid-
ered competent to manage her own affairs; reporters may insist that “some-
one has to do something” (contrary to the individual’s self-determination).
Different jurisdictions have approached this dilemma in a variety of ways.
However, when animals (or human dependents) are involved, the legal aspects
of the situation change considerably. Whereas a person may have broad lati-
tude to live as he or she chooses without interference from society, the right of
self-determination becomes substantially altered when dependent, vulnerable
individuals are involved. Self-determination is additionally supplanted when
there are violations of codes for public health, safety, and housing. It may be
illegal to keep animals in conditions in which a person would be legally allowed
to live themselves.
Similar to child care, caring for animals is very situation-dependent. The func-
tional abilities necessary to provide adequate care for 30 healthy pets are vastly
different from those required to care for 300 animals who may be in need of
rehabilitative or hospice care. From a parenting perspective, perhaps an analogy
would be the caregiving requirements associated with a single, well-adjusted,
healthy foster child in a two-parent family versus the requirements of several
special needs children having a variety of medical and behavioral disorders and
being cared for by a single person.
Assessing functional capacity for animal care should have some familiar ele-
ments. Indeed, if one looks at the work of Budd (2001) and Azar et al. (1998) in
assessing parenting competency, or at other work (Appelbaum, 2007; Grisso &
Applebaum, 1998) in assessing competency to make medical treatment decisions
(a task that looms large when caring for populations of potentially debilitated ani-
mals accumulated under the guise of hospice or rehabilitation), there are many
similarities. Areas of overlap between parenting and medical treatment competen-
cies that might be relevant in competency to care for animals include the following:
• Providing physical care (feeding regularly, feeding appropriate amounts,

feeding fresh, palatable food and water, ensuring each individual has
access to food and water provided without competition from other ani-
mals, being able to observe each individual to detect any lack of appetite
or failure to thrive),
• Maintaining hygiene (providing appropriate grooming; maintaining a
properly ventilated, sanitary environment free of trash, bodily waste,
insects, or rodents),
• Protecting from hazards (ensuring young or otherwise vulnerable indi-
viduals are properly supervised; ensuring there are no dangerous condi-
tions in the environment such as sharp edges, electrical cords, broken
glass, toxic substances, and so on; ensuring that individuals share living
spaces only with others who pose no threat to their safety),
• Providing necessary preventive and remedial health care (getting appro-
priate vaccinations; prompt recognition of illness or injury; recognizing
likely outcomes of conditions and ensuring prompt treatment),
• Ensuring an appropriate social and emotional environment (ability for
sufficient exercise and engagement in normal behavioral repertoire, rec-
ognition of signs of stress and mental deterioration, companionship of
other animals, especially those of the same species),
• Demonstrating the ability to exercise reasonable judgment in decision
making, with due consideration of consequences of actions such as tak-
ing in more animals when providing care is already challenged, allow-
ing internal and external parasites and infectious disease outbreaks to
expand unchecked and untreated), and
• Providing meaningful interaction with others that meets the subjects’
needs (as opposed to those of the provider).
A basic framework for considering how intentionality, pattern, and insight

may be assessed with respect to animal maltreatment is presented in Box 6.1.
Box 6.1
Items to consider when evaluating capacity to care for animals
Intrinsic capacity of the situation*

• Are the resources (human, physical, financial) aligned with the number,
species, and needs of the animals in that particular situation?
• Physical environment—is quality and quantity of space adequate or are
animals crowded without space to lie down or fully stand up?
• Opportunities for exercise and socialization vs. extended
confinement
• Provision of necessary veterinary care
• Sufficient time/staff to ensure each animal is observed daily and any
problems identified
• Daily provision of nutritious, clean food and fresh water
• Are conditions sanitary, uncrowded, with ample light and fresh air?
• Is the population healthy?—a healthy individual does not exclude an
unhealthy population
• Are there animals with special needs (geriatric, medical, hospice,
neonatal)?
• How do the facilities and practices compare to the norms in the
community?
Caregiver functional abilities

• Ability to access, understand, retain, and consistently apply important
information about animal care
• Acknowledgement of medical conditions, prognosis, consequences of
treatment, and failure to treat
• Degree of insight into sources and expression of animal stress and dis-
comfort as well as how to relieve them
• Judgment and reasoning about husbandry and medical
treatment options
• Appreciation of consequences of choices (cause and effect)
• Timely provision of care to prevent and relieve pain and suffering
• Ability to identify and empathize with animals’ true living conditions
Caregiver history and intentions

• Previous history of animal care infractions or problems
• How did animal caregiving start and progress?
• Training and experience with quality animal care
• Are efforts and actions consistent with claims of helping animals?
• Are the actions primarily intended to benefit the caregiver or
the animals?
(continued)
• What role does control play in decisions about animal intake and
adoption?
• Attitude towards accepting help or change
• Willingness to use, and success with, available resources
(e.g., volunteers)
• Stability/transparency if an organization (e.g., 501c3) is under control of
the person
*For detailed information, consult Guidelines for Standards for Animal Care in Animal
Shelters, Newbury et al., 2010
Conceptual areas to explore include the intrinsic capacity of the situation,

the requirements of the specific population of animals, the caregiver’s func-
tional abilities, and the caregiver’s history (including previous infractions
or problems with authorities over animal care). By applying these concepts
along with the principles of the Five Freedoms, it should be possible to iden-
tify a “safety threshold” for animals in any given situation, and when this
threshold is not met, to make recommendations that can bring the animal
population into alignment with a person’s functional abilities. Making opti-
mal recommendations may require consultation with a shelter veterinarian
experienced in the care of populations of animals. In some cases, these rec-
ommendations may include downsizing the number of pets, sterilization of
remaining pets to prevent reproduction, moratorium/prohibition of further
animal intake, and a period of extended monitoring by animal care authori-
ties. In other cases, the lack of insight may be so severe, the presence of com-
plicating comorbid conditions so intractable, and the number and condition
of the animals so far beyond the person’s capacity for care that control or
ownership of animals in any form should be prohibited in order to protect
safety and welfare and prevent further violations of animal maltreatment
statutes.
Intent to harm will typically be difficult to establish because, by definition,
intent in the narrowest sense is absent in animal hoarding. However, this should
not become an exculpatory issue. As Favre and Tsang (1993) has noted, People v.
Tinsdale (which is consistent with majority opinions) established that a person is
guilty when suffering was a foreseeable by-product of their conduct. Regardless,
despite lack of any professed intent to harm, animal hoarding is characterized by
a multitude of very deliberate, carefully thought-out actions to acquire and main-
tain animals, often coupled with firm resistance to offers of help, even as condi-
tions deteriorate and animals die. Indeed, hoarders often engage in considerable
duplicity to avoid authorities and oversight of their care. An important exception
here with respect to insight is the breeder-hoarder whose primary motivation
for keeping animals (often dogs) in substandard conditions is that of profit from
selling the animals or their offspring. We have little specific information about
this sub-category of hoarder, but suspect that they would have considerably more
insight into the conditions and much less attachment to individual animals.
As with child care assessments, it may be helpful for any assessment concern-
ing animal care to be conducted on site. In many cases, this will be the hoarder’s
home. By the time an evaluation is ordered, the animals will likely already have
been removed (whether by the authorities or by the hoarder who has “temporar-
ily” hidden the animals in other locations). However, other animals may have
been left in the person’s care, and the premises may well still be in the conditions
found at the time of the seizure, thus there would still be value in viewing those
conditions in person. If on-site assessment is not practical, then a detailed review
of investigative reports and photos should be conducted. Ideally, as noted previ-
ously in this chapter, the forensic evaluator should also consult with or request a
situational assessment preferably from the veterinarian involved in the case. It is
important to note that in 2013, shelter medicine was approved by the American
Veterinary Medical Association as a specialty of veterinary medicine. These dip-
lomates will have a high degree of training in the care of populations of animals,
and will also be familiar with law enforcement procedures.
In all cases, determinations of competency or capacity to provide proper
animal care should be made based upon the entirety of the situation and not
on individual healthy animals the person may wish to single out (perhaps
they still appear healthy because they are more recent arrivals) and/or because
those animals may not have been part of the criminal charges. It is also criti-
cal to obtain information about criminal history, including prior infractions
related to animals, since the recidivism rate in animal hoarding is believed
to be very high. Checking one national, albeit incomplete, pet abuse database
(http://www.pet-abuse.com) is also worthwhile, as it is not uncommon for a
person to move from a jurisdiction where the individual has been investigated
or successfully prosecuted to another jurisdiction where they may be at lesser
risk of discovery. Nevertheless, lack of finding a report of animal-related
crimes does not mean they did not occur, since reporting of these offenses is
irregular and inconsistent across jurisdictions. There is a movement now to
establish animal abuse registries for convicted offenders (similar to sex abuse
registries) in some states. Courts have an obligation to be sure that animals
are not left in a situation where they may become at risk in the future simply
because of a change in geography.
C O N C LU S I O N
In closing, we offer the following summary of points that have been made in this
chapter on neglect and hoarding.
• Neglect can take many forms and arise from either intentional or unin-
tentional omission of necessary care. It should not be globally regarded
as a lesser form of maltreatment.
• Although neglect can arise from “honest mistakes,” temporary lapses in

otherwise adequate care, and lack of understanding about animals and
their needs, it may also be intentional, reckless, and/or an indicator of
significant psychopathology.
• Understanding the nature of the human-animal bond, the conditions
of the environment in which animals and/or the hoarder live, and being
familiar with working theories about the potential contributions of dis-
ordered attachment and trauma to animal hoarding are important for
forensic evaluation.
• Lack of insight and mentalization deficits on the part of animal hoarders
may indicate the offenders’ inability to accurately assess animal health
and well-being, to make appropriate husbandry decisions, and/or to care
for any animals adequately.
• Hoarders are generally a very treatment-resistant population, and
research is needed to clarify the range and extent of underlying psycho-
pathology, as well as what treatments, if any, may be effective. Until that
information is available from appropriate clinical studies, it is important
to beware and recognize the pitfalls of ad hoc, untested remedies for
what appears to be a complex pathology.
• The offender’s criminal history, demands of the current caregiving
situation, degree of insight, ability to empathize with animals, cogni-
tive functioning, and psychological diagnoses all influence whether a
specific number and type of animal can be safely left in an offender’s
care at the time of the evaluation or at points in the future. Options may
include limiting the number of animals, requiring monitoring of their
care by an outside agency, or in some cases, bans on ownership.
N OT E
1. By way of background, HARC was an interdisciplinary consortium that included

experts in object hoarding, forensic psychiatry, social work, veterinary medicine,
and humane law enforcement, who collectively collaborated from 1997–2006 to
explore the problem of animal hoarding. Various subgroups of individuals continue
to work on this issue at the time of this writing. See http://vet.tufts.edu/hoarding/
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SECTION III
Responding to Animal
Maltreatment
7
Understanding the Effects
of Maltreatment on Animal Welfare
L I L A M I L L E R A N D G A RY PAT R O N E K ■
The suffering experienced by animal victims should be understood and taken

into account during sentencing and disposition of a criminal case and during
the forensic evaluation of an offender. In this chapter, we review evidence from
mainstream biomedical science establishing that animals are capable of experi-
encing somatic (physical) pain as well as various types of psychological suffering,
comparable in many ways to that experienced by people.
In Chapter 1, the concepts of the Five Freedoms were introduced as a way to
evaluate the full spectrum of animal welfare, ranging from the absence of nega-
tive states such as hunger, thirst, physical discomfort, fear, and distress, to the
presence of positive states of emotional and psychological well-being. By review-
ing what is currently known about the physiological, neurological, and psycho-
logical consequences for animals when different elements of the Five Freedoms
are deficient or absent, we will show how an animal’s physiological and behav-
ioral responses can be used to indicate suffering as a result of various forms of
maltreatment. We will demonstrate how a substantial body of evidence from
animal models used in biomedical research has helped confirm similarities in
the physiological, behavioral, and emotional responses to pain and other adverse
stimuli between animals and people. We will also explain, using examples, how
certain common types of maltreatment may cause physical and emotional suf-
fering. Finally, we will show how comparison to similar conditions in humans
can help us better understand what animals may experience from various forms
of maltreatment, and how this information can provide much needed clarity to
legal terms such as “cruelty,” “abuse” and “unnecessary suffering.”
198 R E S P ON DI N G T O A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M E N T
T H E E VO LU T I O N O F A N I M A L W EL FA R E
SC I EN C E A N D C O G N I T I V E E T H O LO GY
The concept of animal welfare itself is not new, but animal welfare is a fairly recent
field of academic inquiry, with the bulk of dedicated degree courses, textbooks,
research departments being established and scientific literature being published
mostly in the last 25 to 30 years (Fraser, 2008; Green & Mellor, 2011; Mellor
et al., 2009). The volume of literature continues to increase, and there are now
academic journals devoted specifically to the topic (e.g., Animal Welfare, Journal
of Applied Animal Welfare Science, Journal of Animal Ethics, ILAR (Institute
for Laboratory Research) Journal, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental
Ethics, to name a few). Animal welfare also is frequently discussed in other
peer-reviewed publications such as the Journals of the American, Canadian and
Australian Veterinary Medical Associations; Applied Animal Behaviour Science;
Behavior and Brain Sciences; and the Journal of Veterinary Behavior: Clinical
Applications and Research, among others; and in numerous textbooks published
by leading authorities (Appleby et al., 2011; Grandin, 2010; Hulse et al., 1978;
Maple & Purdue, 2013; Wasserman et al., 2006).
Prior to the 20th century, there was both a scientific and common-sense notion
that animals had the capacity to have feelings, and that those feelings mattered
(Baars, 2005; Duncan, 2005; Panksepp, 2005). Indeed, Darwin’s 19th-century
text, The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (see https://archive.org/
details/expressionofemot1872darw) demonstrates that the existence of affective
states in animals was often assumed. Unfortunately, 20th-century positivism in
science, which along with behaviorism dominated thinking in psychology and
ethology, inhibited the scientific study of phenomena that could not be directly
observed (Kirkden & Pajor, 2006). Thus, observed differences in animal behav-
ior were believed to be related to differences in the environment producing vari-
ous conditioned responses, rather than reflecting actions arising from conscious
mental states (Duncan, 2006). Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that
animals’ mental states or feelings were downplayed in assessments of welfare
(Duncan, 2006).
Consequently, for much of the 20th century, the dominant orientation toward
animal welfare was biological functioning. If an animal was in good physical
health, growing well, and successfully reproducing, then he or she was deemed
in a state of good welfare (Green & Mellor, 2011; Moberg & Mench, 2000; Rollin,
2003). This was largely an agricultural (production) animal focus, and thus
emphasized factors measurable in existing animal husbandry systems such as
reproductive output, and meat, egg, milk, and wool production. Nevertheless,
primarily in the field of animal science, a large literature developed in what is
known as “preference testing,” demonstrating that it was scientifically possible
to establish that animals have wants, and to determine what those wants are by
how hard they are willing to work to fulfill those wants (Dawkins, 1980; Duncan,
2005; Fraser et al., 1993; Mench & van Tienhoven, 1986). Preference testing may
Understanding the Effects of Maltreatment on Animal Welfare199
have kept open a scientifically palatable, albeit narrow, window to explore the
affective states of animals during this time.
A major shift in attitudes began during the last quarter of the 20th century,
when Griffin’s 1976 book, The Question of Animal Awareness: Evolutionary
Continuity of Mental Experience, helped launch the field of cognitive ethology.
Fox’s (1968) Abnormal Behavior in Animals was also groundbreaking and intro-
duced similar concepts applied to farm animals (Fraser, 1968) and zoo animals
(Meyer-Holzapfel, 1968). Over the next few decades, a burgeoning scientific lit-
erature in animal cognition has finally put to rest the notion that animal behav-
iors were simply the result of conditioned responses, and a much more holistic
view of welfare has emerged. As but one example, the scientific journal Animal
Cognition was established in 1998. Notably, on July 7, 2012, a prominent group
of neuroscientists issued the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (http://
fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf), stating:
“The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism

from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that
non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neu-
rophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to
exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indi-
cates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates
that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals
and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess
these neurological substrates.”
Green and Mellor (2011) note how, beginning in the mid-1990s, there has been
increasing recognition that affective states must also be included when evaluat-
ing welfare. This orientation has progressed rapidly. More recently, entire books
have been published on animal cognition, sentience, and the implications for
welfare (Bekoff et al., 2002; Griffin, 2001; Wynne & Udell, 2013). Mehta and
Gosling (2008) have discussed how personality can be measured in animals, and
provide guidelines for cross-species comparative studies.
Animal welfare has been established as a field of study at various veterinary
colleges and/or in departments of animal sciences at Michigan State University,
Purdue University, Tufts University, University of California at Davis, University
of Pennsylvania, Iowa State University, and Washington State University, as well
as at the Universities of Guelph and British Columbia in Canada and at a number
of universities in the United Kingdom. In addition, graduate programs with ani-
mal welfare faculty can be found at Colorado, Ohio, and Kansas State universi-
ties, Rutgers University, Texas A&M, Texas Tech, and the universities of Georgia
and Maryland (Siegford, 2014).
In veterinary medicine, animal welfare was established in 2012 as a boarded
specialty, on a par with other fields such as surgery or internal medicine.
Veterinary specialties in animal welfare have also been established in Australia,
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere in Europe. In establishing

the American welfare specialty, it was reported that there are 81 journals that
frequently contain articles relating to animal welfare and hundreds of volumes
indexed under animal welfare in veterinary libraries (Beaver, 2010). A search of
the term “animal welfare” on Google yields tens of millions of hits.
Assessment for qualify of life (QOL) is now being actively explored in vet-
erinary care settings to ensure that affective states are accounted for when
making medical treatment decisions (Yeates & Main, 2009). Although defini-
tions and measurement instruments are still under discussion, various scales
for evaluating pain and quality of life have been developed. Villalobos created
a QOL scale for veterinarians to provide to clients to help them when facing
end-of-life and hospice care decisions for their companion animal pets (AAHA,
2007; Villalobos, 2007). Quality-of-life topics appear regularly in veterinary,
animal behavior, and animal science journals and textbooks, including articles
on QOL in general (Kirkwood, 2007; McMillan, 2000, 2002; Reid et al., 2013;
Scott et al., 2007; Taylor & Mills, 2007; Wemelsfelder, 2007; Wojciechowska &
Hewson, 2005), QOL and euthanasia (Rollin, 2006), and QOL in animals with
a variety of medical conditions, including heart disease (Freeman et al., 2012;
Oyama et al., 2008), cancer (Brown et al., 2009; Iliopoulou et al., 2013; Lynch
et al., 2011; Yazbek & Fantoni, 2005), diabetes (Niessen et al., 2010), spinal cord
injury (Budke et al., 2008), chronic pain (Wiseman-Or et al., 2004), and Fanconi
syndrome (Yearley et al., 2004). One of the first pain scales to be validated in
veterinary patients was the Glasgow Composite Pain Scale for assessment and
quantification of acute pain in dogs, followed by a pain scale for cats (University
of Glasgow, 2008). Colorado State University has a similar tool for evaluating
pain in cats that encompasses psychological and behavioral elements (Hellyer,
Uhrig, & Robinson, 2006).
Not surprisingly, Green and Mellor (2011, p. 264) conclude that today, “most
scientists now accept that the sophisticated central nervous systems of mammals
can support conscious mental experiences and few would question whether such
animals could have subjective experiences or feelings.” They also note that the
“significance attributed to animals’ subjective experiences and affective states
has increased so that today they are firmly established as an essential part of the
scientific understanding of what animal welfare represents” (Green & Mellor,
2011, p. 270). As Duncan indicates, welfare is not simply a lack of disease, stress
or negative feelings; appreciating the role of animals’ feelings has gone from
being seen as a necessary component of welfare to perhaps being the primary
component (Duncan, 1993, 2006). Duncan and Dawkins (1983) believe that wel-
fare must include the ideas that the animal (a) is in physical and mental health,
(b) is in harmony with their environment, (c) is able to adapt to the environment
without suffering, and (d) has feelings that must be taken into account.
Anyone studying animal welfare soon understands that it is a very complex
subject that is not easily defined or assessed (Broom, 2007; Hewson, 2003). It is
doubtful that there will soon be a single or simple definition of animal well-being
or welfare that is acceptable to everyone, and perhaps that is not necessary. Most
important is to understand what animals need for their physical and behavioral
well-being and to identify conditions and situations where their needs are not
met and unnecessary pain and suffering ensue.
Bateson (2004) has indicated that the following may be helpful in assessing
welfare:
• Degree and kind of physical injury

• Extent to which the animal has needed to chronically engage homeo-
static mechanisms to adapt to its environment that would normally
operate in response to acute stressors
• Measurement of physiological states that would typically be characteris-
tic of suffering in humans
• Measurement of the animal’s preferences
• Consideration of the conditions to which the animal is adapted and its
normal social structure
C O M P O N EN TS O F W EL L- B EI N G I N A N I M A LS
In order to provide for animals’ well-being, their basic physical and emotional
needs must be met so they may function normally and maintain a state of physi-
cal and psychological homeostasis (McMillan, 2002). Homeostasis refers to a
dynamic state of psychological and physiologic equilibrium or balance wherein
vital physiologic parameters are all maintained in a range that is optimally sup-
portive of well-being and survival (McMillan, 2005).
The basic physical needs for animals include food, water, and appropriate
environment/shelter to provide the correct temperature/humidity, ventilation,
air, and light conditions for the species. However, simply providing food and
water is not adequate to assure an animal’s well-being; the food must be of suffi-
cient quantity and quality to provide complete and balanced nutrition, and water
should be clean (McMillan, 2005). Furthermore, an appropriate environment
should also be safe, sanitary, and large enough for animals to perform their nor-
mal behaviors. Maltreatment can usually be readily identified when these basic
physical needs are not met, as evidenced by the animal’s body condition (e.g.,
debilitation, emaciation, and dehydration).
At a minimum, the basic emotional needs of animals include social com-
panionship, mental stimulation, predictability, controllability of one’s life and
environment, and skills for coping with stress and challenges (McMillan, 2002).
While some might wonder about an animal’s need to control his or her life, it
has been clearly established that a sense of control is a critical component of
mental well-being and is one of the most reliable predictors of positive feelings
of well-being and health. Control provides animals with the ability to express
normal behaviors (one of the Five Freedoms), affects outcomes of importance
to them, and decreases the intensity of unpleasant feelings. Without control,
animals may develop severe emotional distress (McMillan, 2005). Indeed, it has
been argued that lack of control constitutes one of the most profound stressors
for animals (Newbury et al., 2010).
Safety is also an important component of animal welfare, and lack of safety
can compromise physical as well as mental health. Safety could be compromised,
for example, if the physical environment poses a risk of injury to an animal (e.g.,
wire floors that cause injuries to feet or dilapidated enclosures that could allow
an animal’s head or limb to be trapped). Allowing an animal to be housed with
aggressive or stronger animals who prevent access to food, water, or comfortable
resting places is another example of an environment that may be physically and
emotionally unsafe. Poor sanitation and filth (e.g., excessive accumulations of
feces, urine, soiled bedding, and garbage) can be a major cause of animal distress
and discomfort. In addition, poor sanitation contributes to conditions that facil-
itate the spread of respiratory, gastrointestinal, infectious, and other diseases
and debilitating health conditions.
Compared to evaluating physical needs, determining if an animal’s emo-
tional needs have been met is less straightforward. Pacing, circling, whirling,
self-mutilation, flank sucking, depression, withdrawal, feigned sleep, and bar
biting are just a few of the abnormal behaviors that can be observed in vari-
ous species when their emotional needs have not been met. However, although
the absence of abnormal behaviors does not necessarily mean that the animal
is emotionally healthy, it is one of the most commonly used methods in some
venues, such as animal shelters for assessing animal welfare.
SO U R C ES O F S U FFER I N G FO R A N I M A LS
In this section, we will discuss in detail three major sources of suffering in ani-
mals: suffering from physical pain, suffering from stress and distress, and suffer-
ing from compromised mental, behavioral, and emotional well-being.
Physical Pain
Physical pain is the most obvious source of suffering. The considerable attention
within the scientific community to pain in laboratory animals has been carefully
chronicled by Carbone (2004; 2012). It was natural for pain to be a topic of signif-
icant scientific study because use of animals for biomedical research may entail
deliberate infliction of pain to achieve scientific goals. If for no other reason, it
was important for scientists to understand the impact of pain on the outcome of
the research itself.
There is important history to be mindful of here, as attitudes towards ani-
mal pain have progressed rapidly within the scientific community. In a previ-
ous chapter, the influence of Cartesian philosophy, which rejected the notion of
“felt pain” in animals, was discussed. The persistence of the Cartesian view may
not be so surprising when one considers that in the 1860s, when anesthesia was
available for major (and very painful) human surgery such as limb amputation,
it was reportedly withheld from certain classes of people (e.g., immigrants, the
poor, “blacks,” the uneducated, and alcoholics) because they were thought to
be comparatively insensitive to pain compared to others (e.g., “whites”, women,
and the wealthy) (Weary et al., 2006). Indeed, even Darwin was not immune to
such false beliefs, stating that Hindus were intrinsically able to withstand more
pain than Englishmen (Darwin, 1965). During the 20th century, there was a
time when analgesia was withheld from human infants undergoing open-heart
surgery, which was performed using only paralytic drugs, partly because of the
belief that infants were incapable of “feeling” pain (Rollin, 1997).
Even within the veterinary profession, providing routine analgesia for pet
animals undergoing surgical procedures is largely a phenomenon of the past 10
to 20 years and continues to be the subject of ongoing debate, especially with
respect to routine husbandry procedures performed in agricultural practice,
such as dehorning of cattle or castration of newborn piglets. In fact, the Museum
of the City of New York has a letter in its archives from the dean of what was
the Lexington Avenue Veterinary College to ASPCA founder Henry Bergh stat-
ing that anesthesia is not needed for animals because they do not feel pain (S.
Zawistowski, personal communication, April 4, 2014). The first scientific confer-
ence on animal pain was held in 1982, and focused on what Rollin (1987, p. 1222)
refers to as “the plumbing of pain” (i.e., the neurocircuitry) rather than the moral
or subjective aspects of feeling pain. Rollin (2011, 2012) notes that in 1982, when
he was called upon to testify before Congress, a search of the scientific literature
yielded only two papers on analgesia for laboratory animals, with one of them
being a paper bemoaning the lack of literature on the topic. In contrast, by 2009,
a similar search revealed over 11,000 citations (Rollin, 2011).
A large body of research has unequivocally established that the neurocircuitry
of pain is nearly identical in all mammals (Gregory et al., 2013; Silverman, 2008).
Indeed, some aspects of reaction to a painful experience are so reliably reproduc-
ible that several species of animals are widely used in preclinical pharmaceuti-
cal development studies as models of human pain (Eckert, 2011; Gregory et al.,
2013; Whiteside et al., 2013). Specific areas of investigation where animal models
have been used include (but are not limited to) acute pain (Xu & Brennan, 2011),
central pain (Davoody et al., 2011), osteoarthritis pain (D’Souza et al., 2011; Piel
et al., 2014; Teeple et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2013), sickle cell disease pain (Cain
et al., 2012), orofacial pain (Krzyzanowska & Avedaño, 2012; Ono et al., 2012),
neuropathic pain (Wilkes et al., 2012), pain from spinal cord injury (Nakae et al.,
2011); bone cancer pain (Brown et al., 2009; Currie et al., 2013; Lozano-Ondoua
et al., 2013), herpetic pain (Kuraishi & Sasaki, 2014), lower back pain (Kim et
al., 2011; Strong et al., 2013), muscle pain (Kehl & Fairbanks, 2003; Pratt et al.,
2013), neuropathic pain (Gao & Zeng, 2014), visceral pain (e.g., pancreatitis)
(Westlund & Vera-Portocarrero, 2012; Zhao et al., 2013); gastrointestinal pain
(Farrell et al., 2014), fibromyalgia pain (Desantana et al., 2013; Green et al., 2011),
whiplash pain (Winkelstein, 2011), chemical and itch pain (Lamotte et al., 2011);
endometriosis pain (Arnold et al., 2011), headache pain (Andreou et al., 2010),
and chemotherapy-evoked peripheral neuropathy pain (Authier et al., 2009).
Interestingly, social support in animals (as in people) may also serve to buffer
pain (Martin et al., 2014).
Since no single model of pain perfectly replicates the human response, the
scientific response to the limitations of existing pain models has been to attempt
to improve them through increased emphasis on measuring the affective com-
ponents, as opposed to moving away from animal models (Mogil et al., 2010;
Zhang et al., 2011). Thus, refinement of these models often involves incorpora-
tion of behavioral assessments to capture the critical affective measures of pain
(Gregory et al., 2013) as these are considered essential to better understand the
effect of pain on function and quality of life in humans (Barrot, 2012; Cobos &
Portillo-Salido, 2013; Eckert, 2011; Gregory et al., 2013; Whiteside et al., 2013;
Zhang et al., 2011).
The notion that animals experience pain in many of the same ways as humans
is now well-established in public policy as well as in the scientific literature.
Indeed, the Federal Animal Welfare Act and closely aligned NIH (National
Institutes of Health) Guide for the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals, which
governs federally funded laboratory research (enshrined in law as part of the
1985 Health Research Extension Act), defines a painful procedure in animals
as “any procedure that would reasonably be expected to cause more than slight
or momentary pain and/or distress in a human being to which that procedure
is applied” (USDA, 2011). Veterinarians are also advised when assessing pain in
their patients that it is highly likely that animals experience pain similarly to
humans (AAHA/AAFP, 2007). Even the casual observer will note that many of
the signs of pain in animals are similar to the nonverbal signs of pain in humans.
Some signs that an animal is experiencing pain include increase in heart rate,
respiratory rate, blood pressure and body temperature; decrease in activity lev-
els; restlessness or hiding; changes in personality or facial expression; abnormal
vocalizing such as grunting, whimpering, hissing, or squealing; dilated pupils;
changes in appetite or bowel and urinary habits; licking or biting an injured area;
scruffy haircoat as a result of decreased grooming; or withdrawal or flinching
in response to touching the injured area. Some species may sweat excessively
(horses), hypersalivate (rodents), or grind their teeth (rabbits). Dogs experienc-
ing pain may show increased aggression (AAHA/AAFP, 2007; ACVAA, 2014).
Of course, only a limited number of species are actually used in laboratory
research, but this is primarily for reasons of convenience, cost, and the advan-
tage of a large baseline literature on species such as rodents, primates, and dogs.
It does not mean that other species do not experience pain in a similar fashion.
Silverman (2008, p. 466), speaking as a laboratory animal veterinarian, argues
that we have no biological reason to assume that “the degree of pain experienced
is proportionate to the level of sentience.” Silverman (2008, p. 467) concludes
that “the moose, the mouse, and the monkey are all sentient, and when it comes
to alleviating pain, they all deserve equal ethical consideration from the labora-
tory animal science community.” By this logic, it would seem that species should
be equally irrelevant when considering the effect or impact of pain as a result of

Stress and Distress in Maltreatment
Stress is a normal part of everyday life for both humans and animals that can
never be totally eliminated. Like animal welfare, well-being, and quality of life,
the definitions of stress and distress are the subjects of much ongoing debate
despite decades of research. It is possible that, despite innumerable studies and
the widespread use (and misuse) of the term, a universally acceptable definition
or assessment method of stress will remain elusive, at least for the foreseeable
future. This has led some researchers to even doubt the usefulness of the concept
(Wielebnowski, 2003). Moberg & Mench (2000) have reviewed many aspects of
stress and its implications for welfare.
Stress has been loosely defined as complex and incompletely understood
somatic, emotional, and cognitive responses to novel, challenging and threaten-
ing stimuli, as well as many other energy-demanding events (Riley, 1981). Many
researchers would agree that stress is any real or perceived perturbation to an
organism’s physiological homeostasis or psychological well-being (NRC, 2008).
For purposes of this chapter, however, it is helpful to restrict usage of the term
“stress” to perturbations that are detrimental to an animal’s health or well-being.
Distress, by comparison, is usually used to only describe the detrimental
effects of stress responses and certain stressors on animal health and well-being
(Wielebnowski, 2003). Distress is encountered when an animal’s normal coping
and adaptive processes fail to return the animal to physiological or psychological
homeostasis (Carstens & Moberg, 2000), or when acute stress occurs repeatedly
or over a prolonged period without allowing the body enough time to cope or
recover (Wielebnowski, 2003).
There is no single type of stress stimulus or response, and the common “fight
or flight” phrase often used to describe the stress response in emergency situa-
tions has been more accurately characterized as a “fight, flight or freeze” response
(Moberg, 1987). The stress response is actually a well-organized, diverse array of
different patterns of physiologic changes that may vary according to the source,
type, intensity, and duration of the stress (McMillan, 2005, p. 97). The adverse
effects of stress on the body can be attributed to the stress itself and the actual
stress response.
The maltreated animal is subject to a variety of stressors, including but not
limited to the following: pain; excessive cold or heat; electric shock; water, food,
and sleep deprivation; disease; injury; anxiety; fear; lack of control of one’s envi-
ronment; confinement; isolation; lack of choice; boredom; and conflict; all of
which can have a detrimental effect on health. Whenever a stressor is of long
duration, as is often the case for the maltreated animal, the stress response
diverts resources from other biological activities that are critical to health and
well-being, including the immune system. The immune system response is
mediated by various hormones and neurotransmitters as well as the autonomic

nervous system. The response is also affected by the type, duration, and inten-
sity of the stressor; and the species, strain, age, and gender of the animal (NRC,
2008). With that said, it is well known that repeated or chronic stress and distress
lead to the increased secretion of catecholamines and cortisol. Chronic activa-
tion of these hormones can harm the immunological, gastrointestinal, cardio-
vascular, musculoskeletal, nervous, urinary, hemolymphatic, and reproductive
systems (McMillan, 2005), and contribute to detrimental metabolic responses
that promote several health problems, including dehydration, depression, insu-
lin resistance, and ulcers (Greco, 1991; Moberg, 1985). Research has also shown
that the functional capacity of leukocytes from stressed animals is suppressed,
leading to a decrease in the animal’s capacity to cope with stress (NRC, 2008).
The effects of stress on health are real. For example, studies suggest envi-
ronmental stress plays a significant role in feline idiopathic cystitis, just as it
is believed for its human counterpart, interstitial cystitis (Buffington, 2011).
Veterinarians who work in animal shelters are well aware that stress can cause the
recrudescence of the herpes virus that causes upper respiratory disease in cats,
contributing to the difficulty in controlling outbreaks in these facilities. The field
of psychoneuroimmunology is now providing additional key mechanistic evi-
dence about other ways in which stressors—and the negative emotions that they
generate—can be translated into physiological changes (Glaser & Kiecolt-Glaser,
2005). Animal models used to study stress-related psychopathology in people
have shown that there are neurochemical messengers called neurotropins (NGF:
nerve growth factor; BDNF: brain-derived neurotropic factor) involved in adap-
tation to stress in animals and people (Alleva & Santucci, 2001; Cirulli & Alleva,
2009). Stress is increasingly reported to be associated with immunosuppression
(Khansari et al., 1990; Reiche et al., 2004; Tournier et al., 2001), leading to an
increased susceptibility to a wide variety of diseases and conditions too numer-
ous to mention, including cancer.
C O M PR O M I S ED M EN TA L / B EH AV I O R A L / EM OT I O N A L
W EL L- B EI N G
It is now very clear that animal well-being extends beyond the absence of injury,
disease or somatic pain. The importance of the presence of positive welfare states
is also now being recognized as part of well-being (Mellor, 2015a, b; Yeates,
2008). Green and Mellor (2011) list feelings such as anxiety, fear, boredom, help-
lessness, and loneliness as examples of negative states of welfare, and identify
positive welfare states with feelings such as satiety, vitality, reward, contentment,
curiosity, and playfulness. In support of this, scientific research has confirmed
that the basic features of the mammalian brain show considerable structural
and genetic homology across species, and that the anatomical and functional
neural underpinnings of affective states are ancient (as opposed to arising from
only higher cortical structures) (Baars, 2005; Panksepp, 2005, 2011). In the 21st
century, many scientists are now actively engaged in developing ways to measure
emotional constructs in animals, as opposed to denying that they exist (Leliveld
et al., 2013; Panksepp, 2005, 2011). This represents a major shift in scientific
thinking.
As Carbone (2005) notes, the boundaries of what counts as science are sub-
ject to change and are influenced by social attitudes and politics, which them-
selves may change over time (Green & Mellor, 2011). Today, we see scientific
thought once again aligning more with common-sense notions about animals,
which originally contributed to enactment of maltreatment laws in the late 19th
century. Consequently, as mentioned previously, there is growing acceptance
that mental well-being must be considered in any discussion of animal wel-
fare, and that absence of these positive states can constitute suffering (Yeates,
2008). Vermeulen & Odendaal (1993) suggested a typology of companion animal
abuse that proposed that mental abuse should be considered animal maltreat-
ment, including both active abuse in the form of instillation of fear, anguish
and anxiety, and passive neglect in the form of deprivation of love and affection.
Indeed, McMillan and Rollin (2001, p. 1723) have argued that mental states are
the “single most important consideration in animal well-being.” They support
their argument by detailing the extent to which animals’ subjective experiences,
including stress and suffering, have been widely explored in the fields of com-
parative psychology, cognitive ethology, and neurosciences.
Gregory (2004) takes on the issue of dismissing the presence or absence of
certain types of suffering due to insufficient proof. He argues that absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence, and that any attempt to dismiss concerns
about suffering in a particular situation requires logical arguments. He concep-
tualizes various negative mental and emotional states in a series of progressively
more subjective categories (see Table 1.1), with the ones listed on the right having
greater complexity than those on the left. Therefore, when discussing suffering
for a given animal of a given species, he emphasizes the critical importance of
being clear which form of suffering is being considered (Gregory, 2004). Instead
of rejecting the existence of affective experiences in animals, Gregory suggests
that future research questions will revolve around how they vary in different
species and how to measure and describe mental experiences in animals. He sug-
gests one way out of the dilemma of inferring what an animal thinks or feels is
similar to what the USDA has already concluded for pain—to look at the human
experience, which is the only one we can know fully, to consider what these vari-
ous experiences might mean for the animals in similar situations. Additional
support for this approach is provided by the American College of Veterinary
Anesthesia and Analgesia, which advises veterinarians who are assessing pain
and suffering in their patients that it is generally assumed that if a procedure
is painful in humans, then it must also be painful in animals (ACVAA, 2014).
Recommendations for multimodal pain management in animals are readily
available (Lamont, 2008).
Some of the most compelling research about the sophistication and importance
of animals’ mental states has been performed to illuminate our understanding
of the psychobiology and treatment of numerous human affective disorders

(Edwards & Koob, 2012; McKinney, 2001; Redei et al., 2001). Examples include
eating disorders (Gutierrez, 2013; Jahng, 2011), anxiety disorders (Barros et al.,
2008; Cryan & Sweeney, 2011; Kumar et al., 2013; Reus et al., 2014), psychogenic
cardiovascular disorders (Nalivaiko, 2011; Ueyama et al., 2011), post-traumatic
stress disorder (Chen et al., 2012; Goswami et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2012;
Yamamoto et al., 2009; Zoladz et al., 2012), stress-related psychopathology
(Scharf et al., 2012; Qi et al., 2010; Walker et al., 2008); obsessive-compulsive
disorder (Korff & Harvey, 2006), severe life stress (Schiavone et al., 2013),
early life stress (Lyons et al., 2010); developmental psychopathology (Nelson &
Winslow, 2009), and depression (Abelaria, 2013; Barkus, 2013; Castagne et al.,
2010; Duman, 2010; El Yacoubi et al., 2007; Harro, 2013; Henn & Vollmayr, 2005;
Mitchell & Redfern, 2005; Nollet et al., 2013; Pryce & Seifritz, 2011; Venzala et al.,
2013; Yan et al., 2010). There is even limited work in animal models for certain
traits associated with suicide in humans (e.g., aggression, impulsivity, irritabil-
ity, and hopelessness and helplessness; Crawley et al., 1985; Malkesman et al.,
2009; Preti, 2011a, b). Because no animal model can perfectly replicate a human
psychological condition, many animal welfare advocates assert that such studies
are unnecessary and uninformative. However, as with animal models of somatic
pain discussed earlier, there is sufficient faith within the scientific community in
the utility of this approach that efforts continue to refine the validity of animal
models, as opposed to discarding them (Gould & Gottesman, 2006; Hodes, 2013;
Hoffman, 2013; Kaffman & Krystal, 2012; Lampis et al., 2011).
We offer these examples not to support their validity or argue for the use of
any animal model to study a human disease or disorder, but to show how wide-
spread within the scientific community the belief is that animals can experi-
ence adverse affective states, and that those experiences can be measured. In
particular, we draw attention to the large body of literature on animal models of
depression (only a tiny fraction of which is cited here), because the methods used
to induce a depression-like state in animals are used to predict a human response
to antidepressant drugs. This seems to be a prima facie indication that scientists
agree that affective states in animals share some key similarities with the same
states in people.
How else might this be relevant to the issue of animal maltreatment? At least
some of the methods (e.g., learned helplessness, deprivation of maternal contact,
sleep deprivation, tail suspension test, or the forced swim test) (Abelaria et al.,
2013; Castagné et al., 2010; Duman, 2010) used to induce a depressive state in
animals rely upon exposure to inescapable or uncontrollable stress, which may
be either physical or psychosocial or both (Fuchs, 2005; Warren et al., 2013).
Other types of experimental models used to induce acute or chronic stress
include forced and inescapable immersion and or/restraint in cold water, isola-
tion in a cold environment, immobilization, pain (e.g., electric shocks, surgically
induced bone fractures), food-deprived activity, isolation, exposure to predators,
alterations in light exposure, noise exposure, and human threats (Barros et al.,
2008; Jaggi et al., 2011; Khasar et al., 2005). The negative effect of various forms
of social or behavioral stress, which can result in fear and anxiety, on animals
have also been studied (Barros et al., 2002; Barros et al., 2008; Golden et al., 2011;
Hassan et al., 2013; Saavedra-Rodriguez & Feig, 2013). Many of the conditions
(or conditions very similar) described here can be encountered in a case of ani-
mal maltreatment.
It is critical to emphasize that as harmful as some of these experiences are for
animals during a scientific study, for purposes of standardizing the experimental
conditions, typically only a single or very limited number of stressful exposures
may exist, the exposure to these stressful conditions is often of very limited dura-
tion, and the animals are carefully monitored throughout. Analgesics may also be
used if such use would not interfere with the experimental results, and protocols
using a terminal endpoint (e.g., waiting for a natural death from the intervention or
disease as opposed to euthanasia when animal showed signs of suffering) would be
very critically reviewed by supervising authorities due to the potential magnitude
of the suffering endured. By contrast, in a community animal maltreatment situa-
tion, there may be sources of stress, pain, or discomfort that would not be encoun-
tered in an institutional or laboratory setting, such as adverse weather conditions,
sexual abuse, assault, intentional fighting, or other conditions that could result in
more severe pain and distress. Furthermore, in a community maltreatment situ-
ation, the harmful exposure may be constant and the animal may suffer multiple
stressors and adverse exposures (physical, behavioral, psychosocial) simultane-
ously. In the case of animals used in contemporary agricultural production, the
exposure to stressful conditions and adverse environments (i.e., overcrowding,
restriction of movement, lack of control, etc.) may be lifelong.
Use of animals as models of human conditions extends to understanding
human affective experiences, such as attachment and emotion. One classic
example was the work in experimental psychopathology on animals (mainly
monkeys) by psychologist Harry Harlow in the mid-20th century. Harlow’s work
was controversial because he routinely used harmful techniques such as mater-
nal deprivation, long-term infant isolation, artificial mothers who assaulted the
babies, and the so-called “Pit of Despair” (an inverted, metal pyramid with slip-
pery sides in which bonded monkey babies were isolated to induce the symp-
toms of depression) (Blum, 2002). This research is considered by many to be an
example of needless animal cruelty because of the suffering inflicted on mothers
and infants through isolation and deprivation of the critical infant-mother bond
to prove an already well-known and obvious point. As Blum (2002) describes,
Harlow’s carefully controlled experiments were influential in changing the pre-
vailing conventions in human psychology (and resulting child-rearing dogma)
dictating that closeness, touch and physical expressions of maternal nurturing,
such as cuddling and soothing an infant, were undesirable and likely to produce
weak, fearful, insecure children. Indeed, as Blum (2002) describes it, these ani-
mal experiments were critical in bolstering the claims of some progressive human
physicians (including the “father” of attachment theory, John Bowlby), whose
careful observations of neglected, isolated, touch-deprived children languishing
and dying in hospitals and orphanages were dismissed by many of his peers as
being unscientific. Today, precisely because of the emotional harm they inflict,
techniques such as social isolation, sleep deprivation, and maternal separation
in animals continue to be used to mimic severe life stress in people and to study
brain changes believed relevant in survivors of war and child abuse (Schiavone
et al., 2013). As an indicator of how far we have progressed in appreciating the
importance of affective states, animal emotions now represent the frontiers of
cognitive neuroscience. Animal models have been developed for social-affective
neuroscience research (Colonnello et al., 2011) to facilitate the study of empa-
thy (i.e., ability to share affective experiences), which has traditionally been con-
sidered to reflect higher cognitive and affective processes (Panksepp & Lahvis,
2011; Panksepp & Panksepp, 2013) and a uniquely human trait (Mogil, 2012).
Research has now shown that even witnessing traumatic or distressing events
being experienced by another animal is a potent stressor capable of inducing
measurable neurobiological changes in the observer animal (Ben-Ami Bartal et
al., 2011; Warren et al., 2013).
Neuroscience research has demonstrated that animal emotions are actually
grounded in very primitive neural circuitry, meaning that emotions are a core
feature of mammalian evolution, and not restricted to a handful of higher mam-
mals (Panksepp, Leliveld et al., 2013). Leliveld and colleagues (2013) indicate that
(possibly excepting fish) all vertebrates appear to share a similar evolutionary
asymmetry in patterns for emotional processing in the brain: the right hemi-
sphere is dominant for negative emotions and the left hemisphere is dominant
for positive emotions. Evidence for right hemisphere dominance for fear and
aggression and left hemisphere dominance for response to food rewards is sup-
ported by studies in chickens, horses, dogs, cats, pigeons, cattle, and sheep. In
the future, close observation for indicators of right or left hemisphere dominance
(e.g., ear position or tail wagging [Siniscalchi et al., 2013]) may provide an addi-
tional window into animals’ emotional response to certain stimuli or conditions.
The successful use of various human pharmacologics such as fluoxetine, clomip-
ramine, and alprazolam to treat anxiety, phobias, and compulsive behaviors in
dogs and cats is further evidence of a common neural circuitry. Scientists have
indicated that one goal of future affective neuroscience research will be to con-
firm how pharmacological manipulation in animals might modify particular
types of emotional feelings in people (Coenen et al., 2011).
In summary, although there are certainly important nuances with respect to
recognizing and defining suffering for purposes of regulating scientific research
using animals, these are not likely to be important in the context of either inten-
tional or unintentional animal maltreatment. Nevertheless, psychological and
emotional suffering remains challenging to address. There remains a disconnect,
or at least a lag, between what science and common-sense notions accept about
suffering and what is expressed in public policy. Although prosecution for animal
maltreatment may include mention of psychological or emotional suffering, to
date we are not aware of any case prosecuted exclusively on those grounds. Even
in the field of child protection, until very recently, emotional abuse, although
perhaps the most common form of child abuse, was under-recognized and often
not the focus of child protection services investigations (Barnett et al., 2005;
Glaser, 2002; Trickett et al., 2009). That, however, appears to be changing, with
an increasing literature confirming the prevalence (Stoltenborgh et al., 2012) and
defining characteristics of emotional abuse in children (Baker & Maiorino, 2010;
Glaser, 2011; Slep et al., 2011; Tonmyr et al., 2011), as well as distinguishing this
from poor parenting (Wolfe & McIsaac, 2011).
In a later section, we will describe a landmark case showing how emotional/
psychological suffering may co-occur with forms of physical maltreatment in an
animal and how they may be taken into account during legal proceedings.
U N D ER STA N D I N G S U FFER I N G
I N CAS ES O F M A LT R E AT M EN T
Because it is so critical to this chapter, it is worth repeating that freedom from

suffering is one of the Five Freedoms (see Chapter 1), and the infliction of or
allowance of needless or unnecessary suffering constitutes one of the common
components of many statutory definitions of animal maltreatment. Despite
arguments to the contrary, suffering is a legitimate scientific concept because
there are objective, measurable and behavioural ways of understanding what
matters to animals (Dawkins, 2008).
Lack of welfare and suffering can be measured by the development of ste-
reotypic behaviors and changes in stress hormones, skin temperatures, vocal-
izations and heart rates evaluated in the context of the animal’s environment
and circumstances; most importantly, the actions an animal would take to
change the state he or she is in may be the most accurate determinant of suf-
fering (Dawkins, 2008; McMillan, 2005). The issue of physical pain has been
adequately covered in an earlier section, as federal regulatory policy has estab-
lished that if a condition would be deemed painful for a person, it should be
deemed painful for an animal. Thus, actions such as beating, shooting, cut-
ting, burning, and drowning should all be evaluated as one would evaluate
those events if committed upon a person. A recent review has summarized the
adverse effects of respiratory compromise and resulting air hunger, which can
arise from numerous diseases as well as from deliberate acts such as drowning
or suffocation (Beausoleil & Mellor, 2014). Animal suffering can also result
from a variety of environmental and psychological stressors, which in some
cases may be obvious and in other cases not so obvious to untrained observers
(Morgan & Tromborg, 2007; Wielebnowski, 2003).
For some readers it may be helpful to make analogies to suffering in humans
to better grasp its impact on animals. In humans, suffering covers a wide range
of different emotional states such as fear, boredom, exhaustion, cold, pain, grief,
hunger, and thirst, all experiences that are considered unpleasant (Dawkins,
1990; McMillan, 2005, p. 50) and which humans would avoid if possible. (See
Table 1.1 for a list of negative emotional and mental states.) In most cases, the
unpleasantness has to be prolonged and/or severe to be considered suffering
(McMillan, 2005). For example, most people would agree that being cold or hun-
gry for a few minutes is uncomfortable or unpleasant, with true suffering being
reserved to describe a more prolonged or extreme state. McMillan (2005, p. 50)
goes on to describe suffering in animals as a “range of states indicated by a variety
of physiological and behavioral symptoms but having in common that the ani-
mals are seen to take steps to change their states in some way, either by following
an innate response or, even more convincingly, by learning to perform arbitrary
tasks such as pressing a lever conveniently provided for them by humans to bring
about some change in their environments.” Suffering is compounded by the mal-
treatment circumstances that limit options and behavioral responses.
Drawing on Morgan and Tromborg’s (2007) thorough review, as well as from
publications by McMillan (2002, 2005), Newbury et al. (2010) and other experts,
factors that cause animal suffering are explained here.
Neglect and Untreated Disease
Neglect (discussed in more detail in Chapter 6), which is commonly defined

in statutes as the failure to provide appropriate food, water, and shelter, is the
most common manifestation of animal maltreatment encountered by veterinar-
ians (Sinclair et al., 2006). Although any species may be affected, dogs, cats, and
horses are among the companion animal species that most commonly are vic-
tims of neglect, suffering from starvation, dehydration, and internal and external
parasites, in addition to respiratory and many other disease conditions. There
are a number of species-specific manifestations to be aware of. For dogs, a severe
and unfortunately all too common form of neglect is having a collar embed-
ded in the neck. This occurs as a result of the collar being placed on their neck
when they are puppies and never being loosened as they grow. As the neck tissue
becomes constrained and eventually lacerated by the tightening collar, there is
severe pain and infection, serious disfigurement and interference with the ability
to move the head and swallow, often resulting in malnutrition and dehydration
(Merck, 2007).
Dogs who are forced to fight, especially in illegal, organized dogfighting rings,
(including but not limited to pit bull type breeds and their mixes) are also simul-
taneously victims of maltreatment and neglect. These dogs are typically teth-
ered with short, heavy chains around their necks that are intended to help build
muscle mass while severely restricting their movement and preventing contact
with other dogs. They are often housed in dirty, substandard conditions that
expose them to inclement weather. As a result of fighting, they may have multiple
bite wounds in various stages of severity and healing, skin infections and other
lesions and injuries, including bone and tooth fractures.
Cats are common victims of deliberate cruelty or animal hoarding (see
Chapter 6 for more detail), often living in small cages or free roaming indoors
in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions and suffering from malnutrition, exter-
nal parasites such as fleas and ear mites, ringworm, and respiratory and other
untreated diseases. Horses provide a unique concern because of the multiple roles
they play in society as work, entertainment, and companion animals. For example,
in New York, felony animal maltreatment laws only apply to companion animals.
Thus, if a horse used as a working animal is mistreated, that act cannot be pros-
ecuted as a felony. However, for the same maltreatment of the same horse who is
used as a companion, felony provisions could apply. Companion animal horses are
increasingly encountered as victims of neglect when there is an economic down-
turn that has impacted the owner’s ability to provide adequate care. Thus, emacia-
tion resulting from starvation (either due to lack of sufficient or appropriate food
and/or lack of needed dental care) and lameness from deformed feet (as a result of
lack of necessary veterinary and hoof care), are common features of equine neglect.
The failure to provide necessary veterinary medical or surgical care to address
suffering from disease, injury, or disability is considered grounds for charges of
maltreatment in many states. There are too many disease conditions that result in
pain and suffering to enumerate them all here, but many are commonly encoun-
tered in maltreated animals. For example, the intense pruritis that occurs as a
result of external parasites such as mange mites and fleas often results in severe
skin disease and infection if left untreated; the animal’s desperate attempts to
alleviate their discomfort by scratching and biting their skin actually inflict
more damage. The pain associated with dental disease may result in an animal’s
inability to eat, resulting in weight loss and poor health. Respiratory diseases can
result in painful coughing, difficulty breathing, and thick nasal discharges that
can dry up and clog the nares, further compromising normal breathing. In cats,
upper respiratory diseases caused by herpes and calici viruses can cause pain-
ful ulceration of the tongue, mouth, and eyes; the mouth lesions interfere with
eating and contribute to malnutrition, and the eye lesions, in addition to being
painful, may be severe enough to result in a loss of vision or even necessitate
removal of the eye. The physiological mechanisms that mount an inflammatory
and immune response may cause an animal to “feel” ill and thus suffer, much as
a person might when afflicted with the flu (Webster, 2005).
Lack of Grooming
Lack of grooming is frequently overlooked as a source of suffering, but it

can result in severe matting of the fur, especially in older or obese cats or
long-coated dogs, who may be unable to groom themselves properly. The
extensive matting of the fur results in painful tension on the skin and com-
promises the animal’s ability to thermoregulate. The matted fur can also trap
dirt and moisture and cause pruritis and skin infections, and contributes to
constipation, fecal impactions, and soilage of the fur with feces if it blocks
the animal’s anus. In very severe cases, the matting can compromise blood
circulation and result in potentially gangrenous lesions on the extremities.
This can also predispose to invasion of tissues by insect larvae. Untrimmed
hair around the face of certain breeds of dogs and cats can obscure vision and
create painful eye lesions. Maltreated dogs and cats are often found with over-
grown and ingrown nails that cause painful foot lesions and infections. Lack
of trimming and proper care of the hooves of cattle and horses commonly
result in painful foot disease and lameness.
Housing and Environment
Many jurisdictions in the United States acknowledge and address the impact of
environmental factors on animal suffering by simply including failure to provide
shelter that would protect animals from adverse weather conditions (i.e. exces-
sive cold, sun, wind, and rain) in their maltreatment statutes. Empirical research
has identified many other environmental sources of stress for animals (Morgan
& Tromborg, 2007; Wielebnowski, 2003). These include crowding and confine-
ment restricting normal movement; exposure to noise, artificial, non-natural
lighting, uncomfortable temperatures and surfaces such as tile, wire or concrete,
arousing odors (e.g., of predators or chemicals); absence of normal soothing
odors; reduced retreat space and inability to hide from a perceived threat; han-
dling by or forced proximity to humans (especially if they are unfamiliar) or to
predator species; reduced natural feeding opportunities due to set meal times;
dependence on people or competition from cage or pen mates for access to food;
maintenance of animals in abnormal social groups; and other restrictions of
limiting normal behavior.
Further consistency across different situations and animal populations is
evidenced by studies in animal shelters revealing sources of stress for cats,
including many of those already listed, especially altered routines; interactions
with unfamiliar people, environments, and animals; and inability to hide or
employ normal behavioral responses (Hennessy, 1998, 2013; McCobb et al.,
2005). Poor cat housing, including the lack of appropriate distance between
the litter box, food and resting area, and lack of hiding places and perches
to achieve elevation have been identified as one of the major animal welfare
issues contributing to feline suffering and disease in shelters by the Association
of Shelter Veterinarians (Newbury et al., 2010). Many of the same sources of
stress already described for animals housed in zoos, laboratories, and shelters
have been described for farm animals as well. Transportation presents a unique
situation, but the stressors are the same because it places many farm animals
in crowded and novel environments and forces contact with and restraint by
unfamiliar people.
Improper Temperature
In nature, animals generally live in environments to which they are biologically

suited, and they will migrate away from those environments when conditions
become unsuitable. Animals in captivity may be kept in environments for which

they are unadapted, and thus their welfare depends on humans’ ability to ensure
temperatures are maintained within a normal physiological range for that animal
(rather than for human caretakers). This may not be nearly as simple as it seems
because even within a given species, temperature tolerance may vary consider-
ably by size, body shape, body condition, age, health status, and coat thickness.
For example, an adult, healthy, well-fed, and/or heavy-coated animal may be able
to be comfortable in conditions where a juvenile, elderly, poorly fed, thin-coated,
or unhealthy animal of the same species would suffer. Constant or extreme fluc-
tuations in temperature and humidity can also serve as a source of stress and
discomfort. For companion animals, breed can be a significant complicating
factor—consider the effect of a hot, humid environment on a short-faced dog
breed such as a bulldog whose anatomy already hampers effective respiration
even under optimal conditions. Animals must also be able to access a suitable
environment when it is available, and not be pushed out by stronger, older, or
more aggressive pen mates, for example.
In any kind of group housing situation, microclimate must also be consid-
ered, as the temperature in a cage in one room may be very different from that
in another room at the same facility. Cages closer to the floor, ceiling, windows,
or doors may have conditions very different from those away from these loca-
tions. Exposure to direct sunlight or shade, and amount of ventilation will also
affect microclimate, sometimes substantially. Different surfaces may also reflect
or absorb heat differently. In summary, temperatures in the microenvironment
may differ greatly from those in the ambient environment. It is the temperature
and humidity in the immediate vicinity of the animal, not the room or location
as a whole that matters. Many animals depend on having an adequate diet to
regulate their body temperature, so a poorly fed animal may be less able to do so
in colder temperatures. Failure to take into account all these factors regarding
appropriate temperature regulation can result in animal suffering exhibited by
excessive shivering or panting, heat stroke, and even death.
Excessive or Inappropriate Noise
Sound levels in natural environments do not approach the noise present in artifi-
cial environments. This takes on added importance when considering that com-
pared to humans, animals have a much enhanced ability to detect a wider range
of frequencies, and thus sounds may be very disturbing to animals even if barely
audible to people. Stress can be caused by loud, sudden, or continuous noise, which
is ubiquitous in man-made environments, arising from hard, acoustically reflec-
tive surfaces, machinery, cage cleaning, introduced music and television, heating
and ventilation systems, vehicles, flickering of fluorescent lights and buzzing of
ballasts, and noise from visitors and other animals (e.g., dogs barking). Studies
have shown that being yelled at in a loud voice increases an animal’s heart rate and
is highly aversive (Grandin, 2005). Sudden, intermittent, and high-pitched noises
can cause agitation and excitement in pigs and cattle. In summary, continuous or
prolonged exposure to loud noise can damage hearing and have a serious detri-
mental impact on the physical and psychological health of animals.
Unsuitable Lighting
The fact that exposure to some sunlight is essential for good health is often over-
looked when evaluating welfare. Attention is usually paid to providing animals in
captivity with opportunities to seek shade, but if they are housed indoors, they may
have limited opportunities to enjoy sunshine. Some animals, such as sea lions, just
enjoy relaxing and basking in the sun for hours each day, and can suffer if deprived
of that opportunity (G. Davis, personal communication, April 2, 2014). In lieu of
natural sunlight, artificial light sources are often employed. But research has linked
exposure to unnatural lighting conditions with adverse effects on health and behav-
ior (Hollwich & Dieckhues, 1980; Sharon et al., 1971). The timing of light cycles
(which should be different for diurnal, nocturnal, and crepuscular animals), inten-
sity of light, and frequency and wavelengths of artificial light in captive environ-
ments often do not match natural conditions. Both constant and irregular lighting
can disrupt circadian rhythms (as an analogy, think of jet lag in people). Fluorescent
bulbs may flicker at a rate that is imperceptible to humans but disruptive to animals.
Cage size and location within a room or facility may further influence the light that
an individual animal actually receives. Poor lighting will result in the refusal of
some farm animals to enter a facility due to fear (Grandin, 2005).
Noxious Odors
Many species depend heavily on olfactory information from their environment

and chemical communication for normal social and reproductive behavior. For
example, dogs emit a variety of scents in urine, through scent glands between
their toes and anal region, and via pheromones. They establish their identity and
social status through scent marking. They use their sense of smell in food selec-
tion, and it plays an important part in their sense of taste. An interest in sniffing
the ground is a sign of good behavioral health in dogs (Miller, 2015). However,
the odor of a traditional or potential predator can be a source of stress that can be
measured physiologically by increases in stress hormones, blood pressure, and
anxious and defensive behavior. Indeed, this phenomenon is so well-recognized
in rats that it is used as a tool to reliably induce an experimental stress response.
Animals may also be able to detect and become aroused by the odors of stress
responses from other members of their own species. Research has shown that
cattle and pigs would not enter an area where an animal had been highly stressed,
and rats would avoid blood from stressed animals (Grandin, 2005). Conversely,
removal of normal scent marking during cage cleaning may be stressful and
confusing, and may inhibit some normal behaviors. Thus, shelters, veterinary
hospitals, and boarding kennels will often provide a blanket or item of clothing
with familiar scents when boarding a pet to reduce stress.
Improper Bedding and Resting Places
A large body of literature involving many species indicates that there are strong
species-specific preferences for bedding, footing, and resting places (Gonyou,
1994; Mench & van Tienhoven, 1986; Van der Weerd et al., 1997). Bedding for an
animal must be comfortable, clean, and absorbent. The breed and age of animal,
housing, flooring, and population density will dictate the type and amount of bed-
ding needed (University of Amherst, 2005). Appropriate bedding (e.g., straw, hay,
sawdust, wood shavings, shredded newspaper, blankets) adds to animal comfort,
especially on hard surfaces and in cold temperatures, and increases welfare, espe-
cially for very young, older, debilitated, and sick animals. It also helps prevents the
formation of sores and ulcers, especially over bony protuberances. Preliminary,
unpublished research by the University of California into the housing of dogs in
shelters indicates they have a strong preference to have their resting area at a dis-
tance from areas where they urinate and defecate (S. Newbury, personal commu-
nication, May 21, 2014). In confinement situations, the choice of these materials is
often dictated by cost and convenience for people, and not for meeting the needs
of animals. Thus, inappropriate materials for a particular species can promote
disease and be a source of considerable physical discomfort and chronic stress.
Emotional/Psychological Maltreatment
Earlier in this chapter we reviewed the extensive scientific evidence for adverse
emotional states in animals. Despite the increasing acceptance of the impor-
tance of mental or emotional well-being as an integral part of an animal’s
welfare, emotional maltreatment is not typically explicitly mentioned in state
animal cruelty statutes, nor to our knowledge, has a case of criminal animal
maltreatment ever been prosecuted solely on the grounds of emotional abuse (R.
Lockwood, personal communication, September 25, 2014). However, most states
have some provision about “unnecessary suffering” or wording to that effect in
their statutes, which seems to leave the door open with respect to how suffering
is defined. Furthermore, emotional maltreatment is often intertwined with vari-
ous forms of physical maltreatment and cruel husbandry conditions as further
described in the section on confinement.
Lack of Appropriate Contact with People
Different species and different individuals within species have different

needs for socialization and contact, as well as different “flight distance” to
people. For some animals, certain types of contact with people may indeed
be a form of positive enrichment and reduce stress, whereas for others, peo-
ple are a source of stress. For example, positive contact with humans for just
20 minutes has been shown to reduce stress levels in some dogs in shelters
(Hennessy et al., 1997; Hennessy et al., 1998). This may be influenced by the
type of previous experience an animal has had with people. So if an animal
has never had contact with people (such as with feral cats), is fearful of a
person, or has had a prior bad experience, routine handling and husbandry
could be a significant source of stress. Morgan and Tromborg (2007) also
emphasize that husbandry activities people consider “routine” may be any-
thing but routine for animals, often provoking behaviors believed to be indi-
cators of stress.
Confinement, Isolation, and Crowding
Social companionship in the form of play, mutual grooming, and physical con-
tact with conspecifics is associated with normal behavior and pleasurable feel-
ings in many animals. Therefore, social isolation is a source of stress for some
species and has been used in a research setting as a reliable inducer of stress.
When isolated, social animals (such as dogs) may develop abnormal behav-
iors such as pacing, weaving, circling, bar biting, self licking and mutilation,
and tail and flank sucking. Inadequate mental stimulation or boredom, which
is seen when animals are confined in isolated, monotonous, or unstimulat-
ing environments, can lead to distress that may cause more suffering than
physical pain (McMillan, 2002). Research has even demonstrated that some
animals will expend more effort to gain access to a social companion than
for food. Again, it is important to emphasize that generalizations may not
always be inappropriate, and each animal must be considered as an individual
whose wants and needs have also been shaped by experience. Mixing unfa-
miliar animals together randomly is a source of stress for many species, as is
excessive crowding with others. For example, the crowding that is found in
multiple hen battery caging has been associated with decreased broodiness,
increased aggression, and a form of hysteria in certain genetic strains of poul-
try (Underwood, 2002).
As Morgan and Tromborg (2007) note, many of the adverse stimuli described
in this section are also present in nature, but a key difference is that, in nature,
animals generally have the opportunity to avoid or escape from stressful or
uncomfortable conditions, or adjust activity in some way. In captivity, they
become much more dependent on the environment humans have provided for
them, and thus lack control over key elements of their lives.
Lack of control over events in one’s environment and restriction of move-
ment due to limited space can be a considerable source of stress for animals,
whether a polar bear used to roaming hundreds of miles being kept in a
zoo enclosure, or a pet cat or dog used to being in a home or yard but now
confined to a small cage. Close confinement prevents animals from engaging

in species-specific behavior and may result in disturbed and injurious behav-
iors and stereotypies (Wiepkema & Koolhaas, 1993). However, there may also
be cases where larger is not better; for example, a prey species hunted in open
spaces may be more stressed with greater space. There is no compelling evi-
dence that simply enlarging a space without providing enrichment and social
engagement will result in increased activity or better welfare for dogs housed
in shelters. Quality or complexity of space—and the type of behavioral activi-
ties it allows or inhibits—may also be of considerable importance. For exam-
ple, lack of opportunity for concealment/hiding has been demonstrated to
decrease welfare; it is considered so important for cat health that the ASV
Guidelines for Standards of Care in Animal Shelters recommends that all cats
must have a hiding place in their primary enclosures to minimize their stress
(Newbury et al., 2010).
In a landmark civil case (Ray & Harrison vs. Jambbas Ranch Tours, Inc., et al.,
2012), a court in North Carolina explicitly took mental suffering into account,
granting a permanent injunction by consent in the case of a bear, Ben, who had
been confined to a small 12’ x 22’ concrete and chain link cage and was dem-
onstrating stereotypic pacing behavior. The injunction removed Ben from the
custody of his owner and allowed him to be placed in a more appropriate envi-
ronment in a sanctuary. Under “Findings of Fact,” the Court listed, among oth-
ers, the following:
1. The size of the cage in which Ben was confined was too small to ade-
quately meet Ben’s needs, causing him physical pain and suffering.
2. Bears suffer especially from being forced to live in close confine-
ment because of their high intelligence, complex needs, and wide
natural range.
3. One of the reasons that bears suffer especially from living in small
spaces is that inhumane confinement prevents them from engaging in
species-typical behaviors that are essential to their physical and psycho-
logical health.
4. Forcing Ben to live in the cage is the functional equivalent of forcing a
human to live in a small closet.
5. The concrete and chain link cage in which the Defendants confined Ben
has never afforded Ben protection from harassment or annoyance.
6. Animal scientists agree that sensory deprivation causes captive bears to
suffer.
7. Internationally renowned bear experts have provided credible, sworn
testimony in affidavits that Defendants subjected Ben to psychological
suffering and physical pain.
8. By subjecting Ben to conditions that have resulted in his exhibition of
abnormal, stereotypic behaviors, Defendants placed Ben at great risk for
permanent and irreversible psychological damage.
C O N C LU S I O N
We have demonstrated in this chapter how scientific thinking has evolved from an
intuitive acceptance that animal minds differed more in degree than in kind from
humans in the late 19th century, to rejecting notions of animal sentience and affec-
tive states for much of the early to mid-20th century, to embracement of the exis-
tence of subjective states in animals in popular as well as scientific culture as we
enter the 21st century. Initially, modern efforts to understand and improve welfare
focused primarily on aspects of somatic pain, and federal policy governing animal
research now states that if something would produce pain in people it should be
assumed to do so in animals. Given this policy, in conjunction with the extensive
amount of evidence demonstrating the equivalence of pain in humans and ani-
mals, it seems only reasonable to use the human experience of similar events when
trying to understand the impact of maltreatment on animals. This would mean
that the consequences of deliberately inflicting an injury, causing unnecessary suf-
fering, or failing to prevent or treat a disease should be interpreted to have similar
implications for an animal that they would for a person.
Importantly, popular as well as scientific thought has come to embrace the
idea that animals can experience a wide range of subjective and affective states
that may greatly influence their well-being. Indeed, much of the scientific work
providing the support for this concept has been done to better understand com-
plex aspects of human neuroscience and psychobiology, and not for the direct
benefit of the animals themselves, making those findings much less subject
to bias by people inclined towards sentimentality towards animals. We now
recognize that conditions commonly observed in animal maltreatment cases,
such as pain, untreated disease or injury, crowding, intensive confinement,
inhibition of normal movement, inability to exhibit normal species-specific
behaviors, lack of proper social environment, and a wide variety of environ-
mental stressors can indeed cause unnecessary, chronic, preventable suffering
for animals. Today, rather than denying the affective component of animal
welfare, an increasing body of scientific work has been devoted to finding bet-
ter ways to measure it.
Aspects of biomedical research, normal veterinary and agricultural practice,
and even certain entertainment venues such as rodeos are often exempt from mal-
treatment statutes, not because there is no suffering or pain inflicted on animals,
but because they remain socially sanctioned for now. As Carbone (2005) notes,
dogs, who may be our most protected and beloved non-human family members,
“lose” the rights and privileges society accords to pets once they become the
subject of biomedical research despite the fact that neither their physical and
emotional needs or their capacity to suffer has changed. There are no similar
competing obligations interfering with our obligation to ensure good welfare
for domestic or companion animals in community settings. Furthermore, even
for socially sanctioned activities exempt from maltreatment statutes, numerous
trade organizations and regulatory bodies have responded to the evolving social
consensus of greater concern for animals by establishing voluntary guidelines
and policies geared towards acknowledging sentience and preventing or limiting

unnecessary suffering when possible (see Introduction, Newbury et al., 2010, for
a complete list).
In conclusion, society has resoundingly asked us to do better in our treat-
ment of animals. What is important during a forensic evaluation of an animal
maltreatment offender is to ensure that we remain mindful of the animals’ suf-
fering and maltreatment that triggered the need for the evaluation. Examiners
should learn to appreciate the various forms of suffering that occurred, to
appreciate where on a continuum of suffering they may lie, and to gauge their
impact on the animal(s)—all are necessary to fully understand the mindset of
the offender and advise courts on critical issues such as sentencing and dispo-
sition decisions that provide for the safety of those victims, and other animals
under the potential control of, or who may come in contact with, the offender.
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8
Social Responses to Animal

Maltreatment Offenders
Neglect and Hoarding
CAT H E R I N E R . AY E R S , M A RY E . D OZ I E R ,

A N D C H R I S T I A N A B R AT I OT I S ■
Animal hoarding is considered a manifestation of hoarding disorder (HD) in the

most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Health
Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The DSM-5 criteria
for HD as they appear in DSM-5 are as follows:
(A) Persistent difficulty discarding or parting with possessions, regard-

less of their actual value.
(B) This difficulty is due to a perceived need to save the items and the
distress associated with discarding them.
(C) The difficulty discarding possessions results in the accumulation of
possessions that congest and clutter active living areas and substan-
tially compromises their intended use. If living areas are unclut-
tered, it is only because of the interventions of third parties
(e.g., family members, cleaners, authorities).
(D) The hoarding causes clinically significant distress or impairment
in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning
(including maintaining a safe environment for self and others).
(E) The hoarding is not attributable to another medical condition
(e.g., brain injury, cerebrovascular disease, Prader-Willi syndrome).
(F) The hoarding is not better explained by the symptoms of another
mental disorder (e.g., obsessions in obsessive-compulsive disor-
der, decreased energy in major depressive disorder, delusions in
Social Responses to Animal Maltreatment Offenders: Neglect and Hoarding235
schizophrenia or another psychotic disorder, cognitive deficits in

major neurocognitive disorder, restricted interests in autism spec-
trum disorder).
Unfortunately, in animal hoarding cases, the saved “items” are animals. Animal
hoarding is an understudied psychiatric illness that has significant health con-
sequences for animals, responders, community members, and the individuals
who hoard (Frost, Patronek, & Rosenfield, 2011). Animal neglect, defined as the
inability to provide basic care for animals (Nathanson, 2009), often occurs in
cases involving animal hoarding, but the two are not synonymous. Although
animal neglect is often viewed as a component of animal hoarding (Reinisch,
2008), animal hoarding as a mental disorder is likely to have many differences
from the colloquial use of the term “animal hoarding.” Similar to how individu-
als with hoarding disorder continue to have the mental disorder even if third
parties have removed the clutter, individuals with animal hoarding may have
the same urges to save animals and difficulty re-homing them even when the
animals that they own are not being neglected. They may have a spouse or a fam-
ily member who limits the number of animals owned and helps to maintain the
habitats of the animals.
While community responders have all seen the consequences of animal neglect,
little is known about the psychiatric features of individuals who neglect their ani-
mals. The following chapter will review the known characteristics of hoarding
disorder, the animal hoarding subtype, and then focus on evidence-based inter-
ventions for individuals who suffer from this psychiatric condition. We will also
review the characteristics and legal ramifications of animal neglect, and discuss
implications for future research in both animal neglect and animal hoarding.
C H A R ACT ER I ST I C S O F A N I M A L
H OA R D I N G A N D N EG L ECT
There have been two initial descriptive studies about animal hoarding, although
whether these studies were investigating cases of individuals who would meet
the criteria for the animal hoarding subtype of hoarding disorder, or neglected
their animals but are not suffering from HD, is unclear.
The Hoarding of Animals Research Consortium (HARC) provided descriptive
information on 54 animal hoarding cases as described by animal control agen-
cies and humane societies (Patronek, 1999). With respect to demographic infor-
mation on the individuals with animal hoarding in this report, 76% were female
and 46% were over the age of 60. The average number of pets was well beyond
normative animal ownership; the median number of animals was 39, and four
of the cases involved over 100 animals. A follow-up report in 2002 detailed more
descriptive information (HARC, 2002). Reports from animal shelters, social ser-
vice agencies, police, health departments, or other municipal agencies detailed
71 cases. Results were consistent with the previous report in that the sample
included largely females (83.1%). However, there was a wide range of ages—from
10 to 91. Over 70% of individuals were unmarried (single, widowed or divorced).
Interestingly, in all cases, there was evidence of object hoarding as seen by
items such as newspapers, books, and clothing accumulation, adding credence
to the assertion that these cases were of individuals suffering from hoarding
disorder. These individuals also evidenced poor sanitation, which resulted in
impaired activities of daily living (ADLs) in the afflicted individuals, such as dif-
ficulties with grooming/bathing, meal preparation, and moving about the house.
Findings indicated problems of “self-neglect” and neglect of others/animals
defined by poor nutrition, lack of medical care, and poor personal grooming/
care. However, self-neglect and ADL impairment is hard to differentiate with-
out diagnostic work-up; therefore, these results should be interpreted cautiously.
Unfortunately, community protocols for dealing with these cases are relatively
nonexistent, as evidenced by findings that there was little to no social service
follow-up when offenders exhibited low levels of mental competency, such as
inability to care for themselves. Because of the inadequate standards for deal-
ing with mental health in the community, the cases of animal hoarding involv-
ing possible cognitive impairment appeared to slip through the cracks. This is
alarming due to the severe health and sanitation problems and potential for dis-
ease transmission associated with animal hoarding.
Without a full psychiatric evaluation, it is hard to differentiate owners of mul-
tiple animals from individuals with animal hoarding problems. In a qualita-
tive and quantitative study of individuals who met criteria for animal hoarding
(n = 16) and individuals who owned large numbers of animals (e.g., 20 or more)
but did not meet criteria for animal hoarding (n = 11), the two samples evidenced
both similarities and differences (Steketee et al., 2011). Both groups reported
similar levels of stressful life events, emotional reactivity to animal death, beliefs
about caretaking, animal rescue behaviors, and attachment towards their ani-
mals (Steketee, et al., 2011). However, individuals who meet criteria for animal
hoarding reported increased problems with social relationships, history of a cha-
otic living environment in childhood, and social and occupational impairment.
Although this investigation was preliminary, it does start to shed light on the
features and impairment of individuals who hoard animals.
There are no formal studies of animal neglect compared to animal hoarding.
However, these concepts are closely tied, as those with animal hoarding may
neglect their animals (HARC, 2002; Patronek, 1999; Worth & Beck, 1981). The
DSM-5 states, “animal hoarding may be a special manifestation of hoarding dis-
order. The most prominent differences between animal and object hoarding are
the extent of unsanitary conditions and the poorer insight in animal hoarding”
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Unfortunately, there have been no
large characterization studies to investigate the psychological features of indi-
viduals who hoard animals as the result of a mental illness such as HD.
The majority of individuals who are not mental health professionals may
view the term animal hoarding as synonymous with animal neglect. This can
be evidenced even in legal documents. In Hawaii, there is a law which makes
“animal hoarding” a misdemeanor; however, the animal hoarding is described

in terms of the effect on the animals (Haw. Rev. Stat.), which is more congruent
with animal neglect than animal hoarding specifically. Animal hoarding, as a
subtype of hoarding disorder, is about the effect and impairment the hoarding
symptoms have on the individual, not the animals. Although cases of animal
hoarding also involve animal neglect, the two are not synonymous, and many
of the cases of animal neglect, despite the number of animals involved, do not
necessarily involve the psychological condition of hoarding disorder, subtype
animal hoarding.
Epidemiology of Animal Hoarding
We do not fully understand the scope and prevalence of animal neglect and
the animal hoarding subtype of hoarding disorder as there have not been any
large-scale epidemiological studies. Although animal hoarding is a psychiatric
condition, it would not likely be entered into medical record systems. This is
due to the fact that hoarding disorder is a newly defined psychiatric condition,
and record systems have not yet incorporated this new diagnosis. Further, if
animal hoarding were recorded, it would be noted as hoarding disorder only,
because animal hoarding is a subtype of hoarding disorder. Further, there is not
a national mental health database for recording animal hoarding or neglect cases
(Berry et al., 2005).
Although we believe that most cases of animal hoarding would result in ani-
mal neglect, it is possible that there are individuals who would meet the psychi-
atric criteria of HD, animal-hoarding subtype, yet the conditions of the animals
are not severe enough for prosecution. By contrast, multiple animals may meet
the criteria for HD, but due to an individual’s resources, social support system,
number of animals, low HD symptom severity, and/or level of insight, the con-
ditions fall within local standards of animal care or remain undetected. Thus,
tracking and cataloging individuals with hoarding and/or animal neglect and
hoarding is challenging.
Two separate methods of extrapolation (surveys of animal shelters and munic-
ipal health officers) have been used to estimate the incidence of animal hoard-
ing/neglect in the U.S. population. Interestingly, both estimates are fairly close
in magnitude, ranging from 700 (Patronek, 1999) to 2,500 (Frost et al., 2000),
although they used remarkably different strategies. Patronek (1999) used the
incidence of animal hoarding cases observed in 10 animal shelters across the
country to estimate both the mean [median] number of animal hoarding cases
per 1,000 animals handled in animal shelters (0.27 [0.80] cases) and the num-
ber of animal hoarding cases per 100,000 persons living in the service area of
those animal shelters (0.80 [0.25] cases). This data suggested that 700 to 2,000
cases in the United States each year are identified with possible animal hoarding.
The median number of animals in each case was 39, meaning that a significant
number of animals in the United States each year are possibly subject to neglect
by individuals meeting criteria for animal hoarding (Patronek, 1999).
In contrast, Frost et al. (2000) surveyed municipal health officers from the state
of Massachusetts regarding the number of hoarding complaints they received
and the frequency with which the hoarding complaints involved animals. Based
on the data from Massachusetts municipal health officers, Frost et al. (2000) con-
cluded that for every 100,000 people in the population, there will be slightly less
than three complaints (~2.8) made regarding animal hoarding (8.5 per 100,000
people for hoarding overall); thus, in the United States there are approximately
2,500 complaints made to municipal health officers every five years as a result of
possible animal hoarding. These estimates are based on crude data, but serve to
illustrate the magnitude of animal hoarding in the U.S. population.
Animal Hoarding, Neglect, and Psychiatric Status
Very little is known about the neuropsychiatric status of individuals who meet
criteria for the animal hoarding subtype of hoarding disorder or who are guilty
of animal neglect. This lack of information is not surprising given that research
on object hoarders was initially obtained from self-referred samples linked to
established research programs to study obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g.,
Black et al., 1998; Saxena et al., 2002; Seedat & Stein, 2002). Individuals who
hoard or neglect animals would likely be fearful of reporting their symptoms
due to legal repercussions and the potential loss of their animals.
Early cases of animal hoarding led psychiatric researchers to conceptual-
ize it with a number of psychiatric conditions. Proposals to categorize animal
hoarding with delusional disorder (Patronek & Nathanson, 2009), substance
use disorders (Lockwood, 1994), dementia (Patronek, 1999), and dysfunctional
attachment (Patronek & Nathanson, 2009) were made before animal hoarding
was formally categorized within hoarding disorder. Given animal hoarders’
clear lack of insight regarding the poor state of their animals, delusional disorder
was initially seen as a useful model for conceptualization (HARC, 2000). This
was fueled by evidence that those who hoard animals often failed to acknowl-
edge the state of their living environment. Addiction models were also seen as a
plausible conceptualization due to the urges to acquire another animal with an
inability to resist “rescuing” animals, denial of the problem, and preoccupation
with animals (Lockwood, 1994). Lockwood also noted excuses for the behavior,
isolation from society, claims of persecution, and neglect of personal and envi-
ronmental conditions. Further, animal hoarding behavior may also be a sign of
dementia in some individuals (Patronek, 1999). This is further supported by the
large minority (26%) of individuals suspected of animal hoarding that eventu-
ally necessitate conservatorship or residential care, as found in one case series.
Over time, the available research on animal hoarding and what we now know
about HD has expanded such that it makes sense to conceptualize this condition
a subtype of HD.
Mental health clinicians may assume that those who hoard animals have
multiple psychiatric comorbidities (Frost et al., 2011). Surprisingly, Steketee and
colleagues (2011) did not find more mental health symptoms in individuals sus-
pected of animal hoarding than in people who owned large numbers of animals.
However, no formal psychiatric evaluation was conducted by a qualified mental
health clinician, these results were based on self-report, and the study involved
a very small sample size. Anecdotal evidence suggests high comorbidity with
personality, delusional, mood, or anxiety disorders (e.g., Patronek & Nathanson,
2009). A more accurate estimate of psychiatric comorbidity prevalence rates
remains to be seen as no comprehensive large-scale investigations have been
conducted.
The psychiatric status of those who neglect animals is unclear. Although
we believe that some of those who neglect animals may suffer from animal
hoarding, it is possible (and in fact common) to have very few animals and
neglect them. Those who fail to provide care to their animals may be impacted
by a variety of psychiatric conditions, in addition to hoarding disorder. First,
they may not have the capacity to care for their animals because they may be
suffering from a mental illness or neurodegenerative disease. In these cases,
individuals lack the cognitive skills or insight to provide basic care. It also
is possible that an individual may not be caring for their animals due to the
severity of a mood or substance use disorder. Again, symptoms of the psy-
chiatric illness such as loss of interest (depression) and lack of insight into
problematic behaviors (addiction) could impact, although not cause, animal
neglect.
Although not yet investigated, certain personality disorders, such as antisocial
personality disorder, may also affect the likelihood of animal neglect. Antisocial
personality disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of disregard for,
or violation of, the rights of others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Although typically thought of in regard to relationships with humans, this can
clearly occur in relation to animals, such as in the case of conduct disorder, a
precursor to antisocial personality disorder (American Psychiatric Association,
2013). These cases might be seen in neglectful breeders who demonstrate little
concern over the welfare of their animals, in addition to manifesting neglect of
human relationships.
Animal Hoarding and Hoarding Disorder
The current version of the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) speci-

fies that animal hoarding may be a manifestation of HD. This is supported by
research demonstrating that 80% of individuals who hoard animals also hoard
objects (Patronek, 1999), and many may meet the DSM-5 criteria for HD (Frost
et al., 2011). The common criteria shared by HD and the animal hoarding sub-
type include urges to save and difficulty discarding, with the distinction being
that in HD, the individual has urges to save and difficulty discarding objects,
whereas in the animal subtype, the individual has urges to save and difficulty
re-homing animals. It is yet to be determined whether individuals who have dif-
ficulty with animal hoarding as well as object hoarding represent the majority of
animal hoarding cases or if there is a clear distinction between cases of animal
hoarding only or animal and object hoarding.
Similarities between individuals with HD and those with the animal hoarding
subtype may include gender (both populations are largely female; HARC, 2000;
HARC, 2002; Saxena et al., 2002) and marital status (both populations are likely
to be single or unmarried at the time of evaluation; Patronek, 1999; Samuels
et al., 2008). However, there is a lack of definitive research for either population,
and some studies have refuted the finding of gender differences in HD (Mueller,
Mitchell, Crosby, Glaesmer, & de Zwaan, 2009).
There may also be a similar mechanism of origin for both HD and animal
hoarding. Research on the onset of compulsive hoarding of objects suggests that
the hoarding may be preceded by traumatic or stressful events (Hartl, Duffany,
Allen, Steketee, & Frost, 2005; Samuels et al., 2008; Landau, Iervolino, Pertusa,
Santo, Singh, & Mataix-Cols, 2011), possibly including physical abuse (Tolin et al.,
2010). There is currently no research on the onset of animal hoarding. However,
personal anecdotes suggest that traumatic or stressful life events may also pre-
cede the onset of animal hoarding (Patronek & Nathanson, 2009). Unfortunately,
all studies of events preceding the onset of compulsive hoarding—of objects or
animals—are limited to self-reports based on the individuals’ recall of events.
Despite the intense and devastating nature of anecdotal reports of trauma, no
conclusions about the antecedents of animal hoarding can be made without firm
data, especially considering the tenuous reliability of memories of past trauma
(Loftus, 1993). Although asking corroborating witnesses about past trauma
of the afflicted individual, such as interviewing the members of organizations
like Children of Hoarders, could yield interesting information, such data may
be invalid and based on the wording of the questions asked (Loftus, 1975).
Longitudinal studies of the events preceding the onset of hoarding behaviors are
needed in order to confirm the theory of trauma as a precursor to HD or clini-
cally significant animal hoarding. Such studies could be conducted in adden-
dum to larger longitudinal investigations of psychiatric traits. Unfortunately,
there are no alternative methods by which to garner a clear understanding of the
causal forces contributing to the development of animal hoarding.
Although there is a dearth of validated information about the presentation of
animal hoarding, there are several hypothesized differences between animal and
object hoarding (Frost & Patronek, 2011). The health consequences of hoarding
are judged to be more severe when the individual hoards animals than when the
individual hoards objects only (Frost et al., 2000). This is hypothesized to be true
for the severity of health consequences that are both public and private in nature
(Frost, Steketee, & Tolin, 2011). A possible explanation for the increased sever-
ity of health consequences from animal hoarding is the nature of the hoarded
thing: hoarded animals create waste (e.g., excrement, shed fur, uneaten food)
that can create more hazardous living situations than would be caused by object
waste alone (e.g., used food containers, newspapers) (Castrodale et al., 2010;
Frost et al., 2000).
One possible refutation of the theory that animal hoarding has harsher conse-
quences than object hoarding is that most of the research on animal hoarding is
based on cases that are severe enough to have warranted the attention of govern-
mental authorities (Otto, 2012). Individuals who hoard animals but are able to
maintain sanitary conditions and do not neglect the animals, possibly through
the assistance of a third party, such as a spouse, are not likely to draw the atten-
tion of the police and so have gone unaccounted for in the current research avail-
able on animal hoarding. Without early intervention, these cases are likely to
develop signs of animal neglect and become more resistant to treatment.
Similarly, individuals who hoard animals may resist seeking treatment for fear
of legal consequences. There is also evidence to suggest that even once individu-
als who hoard animals have initiated treatment, whether voluntarily or by legal
requirement, they are frequently resistant to the intervention (Nathanson, 2009).
PSYC H O LO G I CA L AS S ES S M EN T O F A N I M A L H OA R D I N G
Although there are a growing number of validated measures for assessing HD,
there has not yet been a formal investigation of the best way to assess patients for
the criteria necessary to qualify them for the HD subtype of animal hoarding.
Therefore, the most empirically valid methodology to employ when determining
the appropriate diagnosis for a patient who may have the animal hoarding sub-
type of HD is to first evaluate if they meet criteria for HD and then to evaluate
the extent of the animal hoarding symptoms and any possible animal neglect.
Further, as with any psychological assessment, it is important to obtain infor-
mation from as many sources as possible, including a clinical interview with
the individual, visiting the individual’s home to objectively determine the living
conditions of both the individual and the animals, and information from friends
and family of the individual. An evaluator should also be mindful that the indi-
vidual might have cognitive impairment. In such cases it may be necessary for
the person to undergo a formal neuropsychological evaluation. Finally, although
some barriers to assessment, such as reluctance due to embarrassment or fear of
being prosecuted for animal neglect, may be unique to animal hoarding, other
potential obstacles to a proper evaluation of the client are more general, such as
time constraints or medical comorbidities.
When evaluating an individual who might have HD with or without the
animal hoarding subtype, there are a number of validated self-report and
clinician-administered measures from which to choose. It is important to note
that these measures were designed and validated for assessing object hoard-
ing. It is yet undetermined if these measures will be helpful in animal hoard-
ing situations where object hoarding may or may not be present. Self-report
measures for evaluating the cognition-related symptoms of HD include the
Saving Inventory-Revised (SI-R) scale (Frost, Steketee, & Grisham, 2004) and
the Hoarding Rating Scale (HRS; Tolin, Frost, & Steketee, 2010). The SI-R is a
23-item measure with three subscales: excessive acquisition, difficulty discard-
ing, and clutter. The SI-R has been well validated for assessing HD symptoms
in middle-aged adults (Frost et al., 2004). The HRS is widely used as a screen-
ing questionnaire but has not been well validated (Tolin et al., 2010). Although
the SI-R and the HRS are focused on the symptoms and impairment caused by
object hoarding, the cognitions about acquisition and difficulty re-homing of
animals are similar to the cognitions about objects held by individuals with HD
without the animal hoarding subtype. Clinicians may want to administer the
SI-R and the HRS twice in order to query for the symptoms and impairment
related to both object and animal hoarding.
The most efficient screening tool for in-person evaluations of HD is the
Clutter Image Rating (CIR) scale (Frost, Steketee, Tolin, & Renaud, 2008), a
self-report measure used primarily to evaluate the clutter levels of a patient’s
home. The CIR uses a series of pictures of increasing clutter levels for the three
main rooms of a house (kitchen, bedroom, and living room) and asks individu-
als to select the photos that most accurately reflect the amount of clutter in
their rooms. The CIR has proven to be both reliable and valid. Test-retest reli-
ability has been established through wait-list controls in treatment outcome
studies (Frost, Ruby, & Shuer, 2012; Muroff, Steketee, Himle, & Frost, 2010),
and internal consistency has been demonstrated repeatedly to be particularly
high, especially for a 3-item measure (αs ranging from 0.77 to 0.91; Dimauro,
Tolin, Frost, & Steketee, 2013; Tolin et al., 2010). Concurrent criterion validity
has been demonstrated by strong relationships between clinician and partici-
pant ratings of the participant’s home (DiMauro et al., 2013; Frost et al., 2008;
Tolin et al., 2010), and the CIR is able to discriminate between individuals
with and without compulsive hoarding (Gordon, Salkovskis, & Oldfield, 2013;
Grisham, Norberg, Williams, Certoma, & Kadib, 2010). The CIR is a useful tool
for establishing the level of clutter in the homes of animal hoarders, although
future research may yield an adjusted CIR that is designed to assess the types of
clutter found in the homes of animal hoarders (e.g., animal excrement, cages,
litter boxes) as well as the “clutter” caused by the animals themselves. In other
words, a measure could be used to depict what an excessive number of animals
in a home looks like.
The two most widely used clinician-administered measures for assessing
HD are the UCLA Hoarding Severity Scale (UHSS; Saxena, Ayers, Dozier, &
Maidment, 2015) and the Structured Interview for Hoarding Disorder (SIHD;
Nordsletten et al., 2013). Although the SIHD has been well-validated and was
designed to assess the DSM-5 criteria of HD (Nordsletten et al., 2013), the UHSS
has not yet been properly validated. The SIHD is an important tool for clinicians
to utilize in order to determine if individuals meet the criteria for the animal
hoarding subtype of HD or if the individuals are engaging in animal neglect
without a mental disorder as the primary contributing factor. As research into
the presentation of animal hoarding continues, it may be beneficial to add a spe-
cific animal hoarding subtype section to the SIHD.
Finally, impairment caused by HD can be evaluated using the Activities of

Daily Living–Hoarding (ADL-H) scale (Frost et al., 2013). The ADL-H was
designed to measure the impairment in daily function and household safety
specifically caused by excessive clutter as a result of HD and may be beneficial
when evaluating the impairment caused by the animal hoarding subtype of HD.
Adjustments to the ADL-H may also need to be made in order to make the mea-
sure more specific to individuals with animal hoarding without comorbid object
hoarding.
Because animal hoarding may result in the presence of squalor, the Home
Environment Index (HEI; Rasmussen et al., 2014) may also serve as an important
assessment instrument. This 24-item measure is intended to assess the presence
of personal and domestic filth caused by the symptoms of HD and can be useful
in assessing the symptoms of personal hygiene and home cleanliness caused by
animal hoarding behaviors.
Using validated measures such as the SI-R, CIR, SIHD, ADL-H, and the HEI
will allow clinicians to both evaluate the initial presentation of symptom severity
and to track the progress of patients over the course of treatment in an objective
manner.
I N T ERV EN T I O N S FO R A N I M A L H OA R D I N G
Adult Protective Services
Animal hoarders typically do not initiate treatment and are resistant to

treatment, so the first mental health workers with whom they are likely to
come into contact may be government authorities such as adult protective
services (APS). A 2001 survey of APS employees from around the United
States (N = 170) found that although 92% had observed potential evidence of
animal hoarding (operationalized here as a combination of self- and animal
neglect), fewer than 25% reported that they knew how to report the neglected
animals appropriately (Nathanson, 2009). Further, only 19% of respon-
dents indicated that they had been trained on recognition of animal neglect
(Nathanson, 2009).
Four potential issues may serve as explanations for the low rates of training or
policies for reporting animal neglect and abuse in APS (Nathanson, 2009). First,
APS workers may assume that humane law enforcement will take control of the
cases involving animals. The APS employees may feel reluctant to become involved
in a situation in which they not only are untrained about the basics of evaluating
animal care, but also know that there is a more appropriate agency that could deal
with the situation. Second, APS workers may believe that if an individual can be
proven competent, that he should be allowed to determine the manner in which he
lives, whereas cruelty statutes in state laws may make the same conditions illegal
for animals. This may be especially true in regions of the country that may con-
sider personal liberties to be of a greater value.
Third, individuals working for APS may not be aware of how to evaluate the
health of a relationship between an individual and their companion animal.
Because APS workers are not trained in discriminating functional and dys-
functional human-animal interactions, they may not know they need to report
a case, what information is needed, how to properly assess, where to report and,
more importantly, how to mend the relationship that may be damaged as result
of a report. Finally, APS may have conflicting objectives with animal humane
societies, wherein APS workers are more concerned with the welfare of humans
and humane society workers are more concerned with the welfare of animals.
Humane society workers may be unsure how to intervene if a hoarder refuses
help, particularly if APS or other human services personnel are not involved
in a case or unwilling to cooperate. Indeed, APS employees may be reluctant to
intervene in situations involving both self and animal neglect. Finally, it is also
possible that APS workers may be less likely to report cases of animal abuse, the
disclosure of which is not mandated in most jurisdictions, for fear of jeopardiz-
ing their therapeutic alliance with the individual or because of a lack of familiar-
ity with what constitutes reportable cruelty. These hypotheses about the lack of
governmental involvement in cases of animal neglect are not empirically proven
to be barriers to intervention; more research is needed to fully understand the
dearth of resources for identifying and assisting with cases of animal neglect
and potential animal hoarding. Ultimately, the best course of action is to iden-
tify cases of animal hoarding or general animal neglect early on, to differentiate
the two, and to help the individuals find the appropriate intervention to prevent
future cases of animal abuse.
Regardless of the specific barriers to appropriate intervention services for indi-
viduals who hoard animals, many communities are starting to realize that action
needs to be taken. One such solution is the creation of task forces composed of
government officials, animal welfare professionals, and mental health workers
(Patronek, Loar, & Nathanson, 2006). The interdisciplinary task force serves as a
way to moderate the response of the governmental authorities in order to allow
the animal protection services and mental health workers to be a more active
part of the intervention. This increases the cooperativeness of the individual and
decreases the chance of recidivism by increasing the likelihood of appropriately
identifying cases of animal hoarding and helping those individuals to receive
mental health interventions before legal actions are taken. Unfortunately, there
is currently no validated screening tool for parsing out cases of animal neglect
and cases of animal hoarding.
Psychotherapy
Reasons that research into effective treatment interventions for individuals who
hoard animals can be difficult to conduct may include the stigma associated
with animal hoarding and the low insight displayed by most of the afflicted indi-
viduals. Other barriers to research include the low priority placed on animal
hoarding by funding agencies such as the National Institutes of Mental Health;

the relatively low numbers of cases in a geographical area, which limits the num-
ber of available study participants; and the difficulty in identifying cases appro-
priate for psychiatric interventions.
Although there have been no empirical trials of interventions for indi-
viduals suffering from the animal hoarding subtype of HD, there are many
evidence-based approaches based on related disorders, such as interventions
geared toward HD (see Steketee and Frost, 2007) that can be adapted for use and
serve as a starting point for designing evidence-based interventions. Similar to
psychotherapeutic treatments of HD, therapy for animal hoarding may take a
longer course of treatment than other mental disorders. The course of treatment
for HD is typically between 20 and 26 sessions. This longer course of treatment is
necessary in order to incorporate the essential components of the interventions,
including changing the individual’s cognitions about saving and re-homing ani-
mals as well as exposure to the re-homing of current pets and preventing the
acquisition of new animals.
Because animal hoarding pervades the individual’s home, it may be important
to conduct assessments of animal hoarding in that home in order to properly
evaluate the number and living conditions of the animals involved. Similarly, the
clinician should evaluate the potential costs or benefits of conducting different
sessions in a patient’s home or in a clinic. For example, a clinician may want to
role-play surrendering animals with a patient in the safety of a clinic before pro-
gressing to in vivo exposure sessions of actually re-homing the patient’s animals.
The following is an outline of a potential treatment plan for hoarding dis-
order based on the tenets of cognitive-behavioral therapy (Beck, 1995) and an
exposure-based approach to hoarding disorder (see Ayers et al., 2014) for indi-
viduals willing to engage in treatment. An intervention for animal hoarding
should start with one to two sessions of motivational interviewing, during which
the clinicians and the patient would discuss the individual’s values, goals, and
the pros and cons of continuing with the treatment. Motivational interviewing
can also be used to address the low insight that is frequently found in individuals
who hoard animals. The next 5 to 10 sessions should focus on the individual’s
reasons for saving animals and why they have chosen to maintain such a large
collection of pets instead of re-homing the animals when the burden of care
became too much for them to adequately manage on a daily basis. The therapist
should also incorporate a discussion of why most individuals choose to keep
fewer pets and the cost to the well-being of the animal, in addition to more typi-
cal cognitive-behavioral skills, such as cognitive restructuring and relaxation
exercises. Finally, the last 10 to 15 sessions should focus on an exposure to refus-
ing the acquisition of new animals and to re-homing current pets.
The exposure sessions begin with a discussion of what exposure exercises
are and the rationale behind them. Once the patient feels comfortable with the
idea of beginning exposure exercise, the clinician should introduce the idea
of a fear hierarchy. A fear hierarchy in animal hoarding includes two compo-
nents: (a) fear of not acquiring animals (e.g., going for a week without looking
online for animals to adopt, going for a week without driving to animal shel-
ters, taking stray animals to a shelter instead of to their home, actively refusing
animals that are offered to them); and (b) fear of relinquishing animals (e.g.,
giving them to friends or family, having a rescue group come to the home to
collect animals, dropping off animals at a shelter). When an individual’s fears
are based in reality (e.g., they are the only person who can care for the animal),
they should still undergo exposure exercise of those fears to help them realize
that the outcome is not catastrophic. A part of that includes thought exposures
to the realistic idea, such as that taking an animal to a shelter will lead to the
animal’s death. Exposures should start with the smallest fears (such as not
looking at craigslist and starting to re-home animals to friends and family)
and eventually continue in intensity until the patient is able to successfully
resist their greatest fears (such as not accepting animals as gifts and allow-
ing a shelter to take all of their current pets). Finally, the treatment interven-
tion should conclude with one to two sessions about maintenance and relapse
prevention.
A successful intervention could result in two possible outcomes, depending
on the needs of the individual. For some individuals, only total abstinence of
pet ownership will allow them to maintain a non-hoarded household. However,
other individuals who hoard animals may be able to successfully maintain a small
number of pets without digressing into their previous animal hoarding behav-
iors, similar to alcoholics who are able to control their drinking. However, these
situations are purely theoretical and no such outcomes have yet been observed.
In the second situation, an individual should be able to demonstrate their ability
to maintain a pet-free household for a pre-established period of time, such as six
months or a year, before reintroducing animals into their household. This would
help the individuals to establish their sense of identity without pets. In an ideal
scenario, the mental health clinician would be able to conduct this intervention
slowly, without a large-scale removal of the animals before the individual is ready,
but the suffering of the animals in his or her custody may make this impossible.
Mental health clinicians should work with local humane societies to maximize
the well-being of the animals during the intervention while also emphasizing
the need to allow the individual to dictate the pace of the re-homing of the pets
when possible.
Unfortunately, as with all mental disorders, the patient must have a degree of
insight into their problem for therapeutic progress to take place, and patients
who are resistant to enter therapy may not respond to the same methods as
more agreeable clients. This further emphasizes the importance of beginning
all interventions for animal hoarding with one to two sessions of motivational
interviewing, which will help patients to better identify their goals. For example,
if an individual’s value is taking care of animals and their goal is to save ani-
mals, the clinician can discuss whether their current lifestyle is providing the
optimal level of care to their pets or if their pets would be better served in a
non-hoarded household. More research needs to be done on the effect of edu-
cating animal hoarders on the ramifications of their behaviors. Because those
who hoard animals tend to report that they feel as though they are saving the
animals they acquire and wish to keep the animals because they feel responsible
for them, it may be beneficial to begin all animal hoarding interventions with
a session that is entirely devoted to education on animal welfare and how their
current behaviors may actually be hurting the animals they desire to help. This
would include answering questions about the welfare of the animals in alter-
native environments, such as what happens to animals that may be euthanized
because of health issues or lack of homes, and a discussion of how part of the
intervention will be problem solving alternative solutions (e.g., re-homing pets
through rescue groups or taking animals to no-kill shelters and crowd funding
for pets’ health care needs).
Competency for Animal Care
Although legal guidelines are not always up to date with current mental health
findings and recommendations, it is important for clinicians and animal activ-
ists to consider the long-term goals for patient care. One theoretical issue to con-
sider in the context of animal hoarding is that of competency. In the future,
an alternative to immediately pursing legal action towards individuals who are
displaying signs of animal hoarding is to determine if the individual is compe-
tent to care for any animals. This may be especially important for older adults
who may have had a change in their cognitive status that affected their ability to
care for animals. Thus, cases of animal neglect may be neither cases of animal
hoarding nor willful neglect but may instead be caused by incidental neglect of
animals as a result of an impairment or disability on the part of the owner that
limits their ability to appropriately care for the animal. Before prosecuting the
individual for animal neglect or cruelty, it is important to establish the cause of
the individual’s behaviors. The level of executive functioning required to com-
petently care for animals may be similar to that required for medical decision
making (Appelbaum, 2007) and child care (Budd, 2001). Assessing individuals
for animal care competency would help to distinguish between individuals who
are willfully neglecting their animals, individuals who suffer from a mental dis-
order (i.e., animal hoarding), and individuals who cannot care for their animals
because of cognitive issues.
C O N C LU S I O N
Although there has been an increased interest in hoarding in the media and
as demonstrated by the addition of HD to the DSM-5, there have been no
large characterization studies of individuals meeting the DSM-5 criteria for
the animal hoarding subtype of hoarding disorder. What is known gener-
ally comes from case studies in which the criteria used for the diagnosis
of animal hoarding, and its distinction from animal neglect, are unclear.
Thus, estimates of the prevalence of animal hoarding are tied to prevalence

estimates of animal neglect. More research is needed to characterize ani-
mal hoarding as a distinct subtype of HD and to differentiate it from cases
of willful animal neglect or unintentional neglect resulting from physical
impairment due to old age or disability. Because the willful neglect of ani-
mals is a serious crime, it is extremely important to establish the cause of the
neglect, whether due to a mental disorder, such as HD, or due to deliberate
disregard of the animals’ well-being, in order to determine the best course of
action on the part of mental health and law enforcement personnel. With the
addition of HD as a disorder in the DSM-5, individuals suffering from HD
who hoard animals should be given the opportunity to receive appropriate
treatment interventions.
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9
Social Responses to Animal

Maltreatment Offenders
LISA LUNGHOFER ■
Over the past century, significant changes have occurred in the social accept-
ability of abusing one’s spouse or children. Once legally sanctioned behaviors
are now illegal, and social service systems have been developed to protect vul-
nerable women and children. The evolution of social responses to animal abuse
has not been as rapid; indeed, much work remains to be done. Key questions
are: What can we learn from social responses to spousal and child abuse that
can inform efforts to promote the humane treatment of human and non-human
animals alike? How have differences in the evolution of responses to each of
these social problems resulted in different outcomes? What lessons can we draw
from these comparisons that will facilitate improvements in social responses to
animal abuse?
Key elements of the evolution of social responses to child abuse and domes-
tic violence include involvement of the federal government, systematic col-
lection and use of data to address the issues, implementation of policies and
practices across systems that hold perpetrators accountable, and development
of evidence-based psychological interventions. As such, they provide an impor-
tant lens with which to examine social responses to animal abuse, and consider
policy and practice alternatives to improve those responses.
This chapter begins with an analysis of these important questions and then
moves on to discuss research on animal abuse in the context of families and in
the lives of children, legislation to address the issue, and intervention models.
The chapter concludes with a proposed research agenda, which includes discus-
sion of the challenges to evaluating treatment models and key questions that
must be answered about the scope of the problem of animal abuse and the effects
of policy and practice to address it.
SO C I A L R ES P O N S ES TO C H I L D M A LT R E AT M EN T
The animal welfare and child welfare movements have common origins. In 1866,
Henry Bergh founded the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals (ASPCA). He convinced the New York legislature to pass an anti-cruelty
law and give the newly founded Society the authority to enforce it. Bergh’s
ASPCA provided a model for communities across the country to form similar
anti-cruelty organizations.
Bergh’s work did not end with animals; he also played a pivotal role in raising
awareness of child maltreatment. In 1874, neighbors noted the apparent abuse
of a young girl named Mary Ellen Wilson. Although laws prohibiting excessive
physical discipline of children did exist in some jurisdictions and New York had
a law that allowed for removal of a child who was suffering from neglect, city offi-
cials did not intervene. It was not until a caring neighbor was urged to appeal for
Mary Ellen’s safety to Bergh that the case was taken to court, and Mary Ellen’s
mother was found guilty of assault. As a result of this pivotal case, the New York
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children was incorporated in 1875.
In 1877, representatives of 27 anti-cruelty organizations from 10 states came
together to found the American Humane Association, which initially was dedi-
cated to ensuring humane treatment for working animals and livestock in tran-
sit. The following year, child welfare was added to the Association’s agenda. For
the next 85 years, private charitable institutions were the primary providers of
protection for children, which typically involved placement in a shelter that pro-
vided care for basic physical needs.
It was not until the 1960s that the federal government became involved with
child welfare. As a result of the publication of pediatrician Henry Kempe’s article
“The Battered Child Syndrome” (Kempe et al., 1962), the issue of child maltreat-
ment received unprecedented national media attention. Policy-makers, schol-
ars, and the public became increasingly concerned about child maltreatment.
Research on child abuse and neglect began in earnest and the issue began to
be included in medical school curricula. In 1962, Congress amended the Social
Security Act to include Child Protective Services and mandated that states make
child welfare services available. As a result, the government played an increas-
ingly important role in child welfare, and by 1967 all states had child maltreat-
ment reporting laws.
In 1974, the first major federal legislation addressing child maltreatment was
passed, which fundamentally changed—and over the past 40 years has pro-
moted the evolution of—social responses to child abuse and neglect. The Child
Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) (Public Law 93-247), which
was amended several times and reauthorized in 2010, provides federal fund-
ing to states in support of prevention, assessment, investigation, prosecution,
Social Responses to Animal Maltreatment Offenders: Cruelty and Sexual Abuse253
and treatment services; provides grants to public agencies and nonprofit orga-
nizations, including Indian tribes and tribal organizations, for demonstration
projects; specifies the federal role in supporting research, evaluation, techni-
cal assistance, and data collection; establishes the Office on Child Abuse and
Neglect; mandates the Child Welfare Information Gateway; and provides a min-
imum definition of child abuse and neglect (Child Welfare Information Gateway,
2011). The financial and other resources provided as a result of CAPTA have
played a critical role in the development of policy and practice to address child
maltreatment.
“CAPTA and the work that it has engendered are understood best in the
context of politics, cultural events, and societal changes. Over four decades,
CAPTA has progressed from responding primarily to the occurrence and
effects of child maltreatment to focusing more on risk, protection, and pre-
vention. This evolution has included broad recognition of the need for a
multidisciplinary approach and development of vital cross-system part-
nerships.” (National Child Abuse and Neglect Training and Publications
Project, 2014, p. iii)
CAPTA’s emphasis on the provision of grants for research and demonstra-

tion projects has been critical to increasing knowledge about the causes, nature,
extent, consequences, prevention, identification, and treatment of child abuse
and neglect. As a result, researchers have identified common parental risk fac-
tors, including substance abuse, mental illness, domestic violence, and child
conduct problems, that lead to child maltreatment (Barth, 2009). Evidence-based
interventions such as HOMEBUILDERS (Kirk & Griffith, 2002) and parent-child
interaction therapy (Chaffin et al., 2004) have been developed to address these
risk factors and improve child well-being.
In 1990, the Administration for Children and Families of the Department of
Health and Human Services took another important step by establishing the
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data System (NCANDS), which aggregates
and publishes statistics from state child protection agencies (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services; Administration for Children and Families;
Administration on Children, Youth and Families; Children’s Bureau; 2013).
Development of this system to track the incidence of child abuse and neglect
provided policy-makers, state child welfare officials and the public with data to
measure the results over time of states’ efforts to respond to child maltreatment.
NCANDS data show that sexual abuse declined 62% from 1992 to 2009, and
physical abuse decreased 56% during the same period (Finkelhor et al., 2010).
Several factors have been suggested to explain the decline, including an increase
in the number of child welfare caseworkers, improvements in law enforcement
response to the issue, greater willingness of prosecutors to try cases and seek
maximum penalties, public support for both the prevention of child abuse and
holding child abusers accountable for their actions, and federal funding to con-
duct research on risk and protective factors and to support the development of
new mental health treatment programs for children and families (Finkelhor &
Jones, 2006). As discussed later, these factors—including the availability of data
to track progress over time—are equally salient to efforts to address animal abuse.
SO C I A L R ES P O N S ES TO D O M EST I C V I O L EN C E
The evolution of social responses to domestic violence provides another impor-

tant context in which to compare and contrast responses to animal abuse.
Historically, wife or partner abuse was widely accepted. With the women’s move-
ment in the 1970s came increased awareness of domestic violence as a crime
deserving of the criminal justice system’s attention (Erez, 2002). Grassroots
advocates, in particular, argued for the need to look at the criminal justice sys-
tem continuum as it related to domestic violence—from the laws prohibiting
marital violence and sexual assault, to police enforcement of those laws, to pros-
ecution of offenders, to adjudication, and finally to punishment and/or treatment
of batterers. This criminal justice continuum mirrors that needed for effective
responses to animal abuse.
Despite the efforts of feminists in the 1970s, federal legislation was not enacted
for another 20 years. In 1994, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), part of
the federal Crime Victims Act, was passed (P.L. 103–322) (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Administration on Children, Youth and Families,
2012). VAWA funds services for victims of rape and domestic violence, allows
women to seek civil rights remedies for gender-related crimes and provides
training to improve the criminal justice system response in domestic violence
cases. VAWA has been credited with improving responses to domestic violence
by helping to engage law enforcement, the judicial system and social services;
providing federal leadership to improve services and supports at the state and
local level; promoting enactment of new federal crimes related to domestic vio-
lence, sexual assault, and stalking; and identifying promising practices designed
to stop abuse.
The federal government is also now playing a role in tracking the incidence
of intimate partner violence in order to provide benchmarks to assess progress
in reducing it. Begun in 2010, the CDC’s National Intimate Partner and Sexual
Violence Survey (NISVS) is an ongoing, nationally representative telephone sur-
vey that collects detailed information on sexual violence, stalking, and intimate
partner violence from adult women and men in the United States (Black et al.,
2011). This is the first ongoing survey focused on intimate partner violence as
a public health issue. By tracking the prevalence of intimate partner violence,
identifying groups most at risk, describing perpetrators’ behavior patterns and
documenting the public health consequences, more effective social and legal
responses can be crafted.
Despite the progress that has been made in system-level responses (e.g., law
enforcement, criminal justice) to domestic violence, at the individual level,
batterer intervention programs remain controversial. Evaluations of these pro-

grams have produced inconsistent findings. Two meta-analyses (Babcock et al.,
2004; Feder & Wilson, 2005) found that batterer intervention programs pro-
duced modest or minimal effects. There is no consensus on the extent to which
the programs actually reduce recidivism or change attitudes about domestic vio-
lence. The growing emphasis on evidence-based practice and the lack of empiri-
cal evidence of the effectiveness of batterer intervention programs have raised
questions about the utility of mandating participation.
C H I L D W EL FA R E, D O M EST I C V I O L EN C E, A N D A N I M A L
A B U S E: W H AT CA N W E L E A R N FR O M S I M I L A R I T I ES
A N D D I FFER EN C ES I N SO C I A L R ES P O N S ES?
Comparison of the evolution of social responses to child welfare, domestic vio-

lence and animal abuse reveals both important differences and similarities.
The Role of the Federal Government
As discussed, the involvement of the federal government was a key milestone

in social responses to child abuse and domestic violence. Although the federal
government became involved with animal welfare during the 1960s and 1970s,
the involvement differed significantly from its involvement with the welfare of
women and children. Specifically, federal involvement in animal welfare has
been much more limited, with responsibility delegated almost exclusively to
the states. For example, the Laboratory Animal Welfare Act (AWA), which was
passed in 1966 and broadened in 1976, becoming the Animal Welfare Act, was
never intended to protect animals in community settings or to prevent cruelty.
Instead, the Act applies to some animals in research laboratories and animal car-
riers, handlers, dealers, breeders, and exhibitors.
Although the AWA prohibited animal fighting ventures that involved
interstate or foreign commerce, it was not until 2008—in the wake of the
Michael Vick case—that the AWA was amended to make it a federal felony
to sponsor, exhibit, buy, sell, deliver, possess, train or transport an animal
for participation in an animal fighting venture. In 2014, in response to grow-
ing awareness of the effects of witnessing animal abuse on children and the
co-occurrence of animal fighting and other types of criminal behavior, the
federal Animal Fighting Spectator Prohibition Act was passed, making it a
felony to knowingly bring a child under the age of 16 to an animal fight and
a misdemeanor to knowingly attend an animal fight. Although these laws are
first steps toward greater federal involvement in the protection of animals, it
is important to note that the acts have never included any funding to support
states’ provision of services, research on evidence-based intervention models,
or development of reporting and investigation systems, key results of federal
involvement with child welfare and domestic violence that led to improve-
ments in social responses.
Collection of Data to Inform Policy and Practice
The absence of a federal role in the collection of data on animal abuse is another
important difference between the evolution to date of social and legal responses
to animal abuse and violence directed at women and children. As discussed ear-
lier, as the federal government became more involved with domestic violence
and child welfare, data collection systems were developed to promote a better
understanding of the scope of those problems and track progress in addressing
them. Representative, national-level data on animal abuse, on the other hand,
are nonexistent.
There currently is no systematic process to collect and track animal cruelty
data. Each jurisdiction handles enforcement of animal cruelty laws differently,
with enforcement provided by local police, sheriffs, humane law enforcement, and
animal control officers. Because animal cruelty crimes have not been included
as a separate category in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) or National
Incident-based Reporting System (NIBRS), these crimes have not been tracked
at the local level. NIBRS was developed in the 1980s to provide detailed informa-
tion on each incident reported to police, including characteristics of victim(s)
and offender(s), the relationship between the victim and offender, crimes com-
mitted, injuries at the incident scene, weapons used, arrests made, and incident
location (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004). The
crime statistics generated by the UCR and NIBRS are a critical source of infor-
mation that lawmakers and law enforcement use to make decisions about both
policy and practice. In the absence of statistics on animal abuse, there are no
data on the scope of the problem, correlates or the effectiveness of strategies to
prevent or reduce animal cruelty.
Efforts have been underway for several years to address this issue by including
animal abuse in the UCR. In June 2014, a key internal FBI committee respon-
sible for proposing changes to the UCR program rules unanimously passed two
resolutions that amend the UCR program to expand its scope to include crimes
against animals. In September 2014, the director of the FBI approved the change,
and animal cruelty data will—for the first time—begin to be collected systemati-
cally in January 2016 (Manning, 2014).
The Role of the Criminal Justice System
Several challenges are common to the criminal justice system response to animal
abuse and domestic violence. These include the likelihood that defendants will
be charged with misdemeanors rather than felonies, the low priority assigned
to these cases by the criminal justice system, failure to take the cases seriously,
and the discretion of prosecutors to drop prosecution of misdemeanor cases due

to resources and other issues (Animal Legal Defense Fund, n.d.). As described
later in this chapter, several factors further complicate the prosecution of animal
abuse cases, including prosecutors having little experience with such cases and
reliance on law enforcement officers to gather sufficient evidence, particularly
given that the victim in these cases cannot speak.
Coordinated Community Response
One of the most important aspects of the evolution of social responses to child
maltreatment and domestic violence is the increased emphasis on both issues
as community as opposed to private or individual problems. With recogni-
tion of these issues as community problems came growing awareness that it
was unlikely that a single organization or system could intervene effectively.
Successfully addressing child maltreatment and domestic violence requires a
multidisciplinary approach that involves diverse professionals working together.
It also involves recognition that these issues often co-occur. As a result, coor-
dinated responses to both domestic violence and child maltreatment have been
developed. The coordinated response seeks to engage police, prosecutors, judges,
probation officers, social workers, advocates, and mental health professionals in
developing and implementing interagency protocols that improve responses to
family violence.
Development and implementation of such coordinated responses was spurred
by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges in collaboration
with a group of experts on child maltreatment and domestic violence. Together
they developed Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence & Child Maltreatment
Cases: Guidelines for Policy and Practice—also known as “the Greenbook”
(Schechter & Edleson, 1999). Published in 1999, the Greenbook offers a com-
prehensive set of recommendations designed to help dependency courts and
child welfare and domestic violence agencies better serve families experienc-
ing violence. Following publication, federal and private partners came together
to support a multi-site demonstration project in which child welfare agencies,
community-based domestic violence providers, and dependency courts worked
together to implement the Greenbook recommendations in collaboration with
law enforcement, probation and parole, prosecutors, health care providers, chil-
dren’s advocates, mental health providers, domestic violence survivors, and other
community-based groups. The Greenbook continues to serve as a road map for
interagency collaboration to protect vulnerable children and families (National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, n.d.).
As discussed later in this chapter, although some strides have been made, this
type of coordinated effort is largely lacking in response to animal abuse. This is
particularly true with respect to enforcing animal cruelty laws and prosecuting
animal abuse offenders, which is important because people who abuse animals
are unlikely to participate in treatment voluntarily. Intervening with people who
abuse animals requires a coordinated effort, which involves identifying offend-

ers and holding them accountable for their actions, and regularly including
questions about relationships with animals in assessments conducted by a wide
range of professionals, particularly those with whom children interact. These
types of coordinated efforts began to gain some momentum in the 1990s with
the publication of research studies that offered a compelling reason for the public
and the criminal justice and social service systems to care about animal abuse.
A N I M A L A B U S E: A G R OW I N G B O DY O F K N OW L ED G E
During the 1990s, interest in animal abuse began to grow in fields outside of ani-
mal welfare. Interest was spurred by development of a body of research indicating
that animal abuse is related to other violent and antisocial behavior. A number
of studies have focused on animal abuse in the context of family violence and
animal abuse witnessed and perpetrated by children.
Animal Abuse in the Context of Family Violence
There is a growing body of evidence supporting the notion that perpetrators of

domestic violence use abuse of pets as a tool to control their victims. For exam-
ple, two studies (Ascione et al., 2007; Volant et al., 2008) compared samples of
women who were living temporarily in a domestic violence shelter with com-
parison groups of women who had not experienced domestic violence. More
than 50% of women in the domestic violence samples reported that their part-
ner had threatened to hurt or kill pets compared to less than 13% of women in
the comparison groups. Batterers who also abuse pets have been found to use
more forms of violence and controlling behaviors, and to be more dangerous
than batterers who do not abuse pets (Simmons & Lehmann, 2007). A study
that included 427 women who had experienced intimate partner violence and a
randomly selected control group that had not experienced such violence found
that perpetrators of intimate partner violence were more likely to not have
graduated from high school, have abused alcohol or drugs, be described as
having fair or poor mental health, and have abused or threatened to abuse pets
(Walton-Moss et al., 2005).
Threats of or actual harm to pets have been cited as reasons women delay leav-
ing abusive relationships. Several studies have found that 20% to 30% of women
entering a domestic violence shelter report that concern for the safety of their
pets affected their decision to leave their abuser (Ascione et al., 2007; Faver &
Cavazos, 2007; Faver & Strand, 2003; Flynn, 2000).
Women who have experienced domestic violence also report that their chil-
dren were affected. In one study, 62% of women interviewed in a domestic vio-
lence shelter reported that their children had witnessed the abuse of the pet
(Ascione et al., 2007), and in another study 19% of women who experienced
domestic violence reported that their children had abused an animal (Gullone
et al., 2004). Currie (2006) also found that children who had been exposed to
domestic violence were nearly three times more likely to engage in animal abuse
than children in a matched comparison group who had not been exposed to
domestic violence.
Animal Abuse and Children
Children’s exposure to animal abuse—either as a witness or a perpetrator—has

been found to be an important risk factor. A study of 281 secondary school students
(Thompson & Gullone, 2006) found that just over 57% of participants reported
witnessing animal abuse, most often by a stranger. Those who witnessed abuse
reported committing acts of cruelty significantly more often than those who did
not. If the individual observed abusing animals was a friend, relative, parent or
sibling, the levels of abuse reported were significantly higher, whereas those who
reported observing an abusive stranger had significantly lower levels of cruelty.
Frequency of witnessing cruelty also appeared to play a role, with those who fre-
quently witnessed abuse reporting abusive behavior significantly more often.
Baldry (2003) compared animal-abusing and non-animal-abusing youth in a
large, nonclinical sample (n = 1,392). She found that animal-abusing youth were
more likely to have witnessed animal cruelty perpetrated by their peers or parents,
and report more overall exposure to parental violence, than youth who did not
abuse animals. In fact, witnessing animal abuse was the only significant predictor
of perpetrating animal cruelty when compared with exposure to physical, sexual,
or emotional abuse; neglect; and domestic violence. Holding family violence expo-
sure constant, the perpetration of animal abuse was more than eight times greater
among those who witnessed animal cruelty than among those who did not.
There is growing awareness of animal abuse as a marker for children’s mal-
adaptive behavior. In 1987, animal cruelty was added to the criteria for conduct
disorder (CD) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Diagnosis of conduct disor-
der requires consideration of four categories of behavior: (a) aggression toward
people or animals; (b) destruction of property without aggression toward people
or animals; (c) deceitfulness, lying, and theft; and (d) serious violations of rules.
Behavior in at least three of these categories over the past year, with at least one
of the characteristics shown in the last six months, is required for diagnosis.
Children who exhibit any of these behaviors before the age of 10 are considered
to have childhood-onset conduct disorder, which tends to persist. Some estimates
suggest that up to 40% of children diagnosed with early-onset conduct disorder
will be diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder as an adult (Kazdin, 1995).
Children who do not display any of the behaviors prior to 10 years old are consid-
ered to have adolescent-onset conduct disorder, which is less likely to persist and
is characterized by fewer aggressive behaviors and more normative peer relation-
ships (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).
Studies since the addition of animal cruelty to the DSM criteria for conduct
disorder suggest that animal abuse is related to a constellation of violent and
antisocial behaviors, including bullying (Gullone & Robertson, 2008; Henry
& Sanders, 2007) and juvenile delinquency (Henry, 2004). Animal abuse has
been found to appear early in the development of conduct disorder—even ear-
lier than symptoms such as bullying and fire setting—and thus may be a criti-
cal indicator of children’s risk for delinquency (Frick et al., 1993; Miller, 2001).
A meta-analysis of 60 studies found that animal abuse could be used to discrimi-
nate between children with severe and mild conduct problems (Frick et al., 1993).
Given the prevalence of conduct disorder among adjudicated adolescents (Teplin
et al., 2002) and the link between childhood animal cruelty and aggressive and
violent interpersonal behavior in adulthood (Arluke et al., 1999; Ascione, 1992,
2001; Felthous & Kellert, 1987; Flynn, 1999; Gleyzer et al., 2002; Lockwood &
Hodge, 1986), early identification and intervention with young animal abusers
may be critical to preventing future delinquency and violence.
L EG I S L AT I O N
As discussed in Chapter 2, legal responses to animal cruelty have evolved signifi-

cantly over the past 25 years. In 1990, only seven states identified some acts of
animal cruelty as felonies. As of March 2014, all 50 states have felony-level provi-
sions in their animal cruelty statutes (Berry, 2014). With growing awareness of
the co-occurrence of animal abuse and other forms of antisocial behavior, legis-
latures began to consider laws designed to increase the likelihood that perpetra-
tors of animal abuse would be identified and receive intervention.
Cross-Reporting Laws
Mandated reporting laws exist for all forms of family violence, including abuse
of children, spouses/intimate partners, elders, and animals. These laws vary,
however, by state, mandated reporter, and type of abuse required to be reported.
For example, in response to the federal Child Abuse and Treatment Act and in
order to qualify for federal funding under the Act, all 50 states passed man-
datory child abuse and neglect reporting laws (National Conference of State
Legislatures, 2014). All states require certain professionals to report sus-
pected child abuse, and some states require “any person” to report (Randour
& Davidson, 2008). Laws regarding mandated reporting of elder and intimate
partner abuse vary more widely by state (U.S. Department of Health and
Humane Services, National Center on Elder Abuse, Administration on Aging,
n.d.). Until recently, veterinarians were the only mandated reporters of ani-
mal abuse, and only in some states (American Veterinary Medical Association,
2014). In recognition of co-occurring maltreatment of animals, children and
adults within the family, some states have instituted cross-reporting mandates
(National District Attorneys Association, National Center for the Prosecution

of Animal Abuse, 2014).
Each state has its own language and definitions pertaining to reporting and
cross-reporting maltreatment, including who “must” or “may” report within or
between categories. Professions represented in cross-reporting mandates include
animal protection workers, veterinarians, child protection workers, adult protec-
tion workers, and domestic violence service providers. No state has comprehen-
sive cross-reporting among all of these professions. Of the 45 states that do have
cross-reporting laws, only 15 states mandate that veterinarians “must” report ani-
mal abuse, and an additional 7 indicate that veterinarians “may” report animal
abuse. In nine states child protection workers “must” report animal maltreatment,
with an additional two states having provisions specifying that they “may” report.
Only six states require that adult protection workers “must” report, and two indi-
cate they “may” report animal abuse. No state requires domestic violence workers to
report animal abuse (National District Attorneys Association, National Center for
the Prosecution of Animal Abuse, 2014) even though, as described earlier, several
studies have found an association between domestic violence and animal abuse.
There is little empirical evidence of the effects of cross-reporting laws because
little research has been undertaken. It is also unclear to what extent mandated
reporters actually report animal abuse—or, for that matter, suspicions of other
types of abuse. Schafer, Hays, and Steiner (2007) found that 49% of the 174 ther-
apists surveyed indicated that they agreed or strongly agreed that they would
support a law that permitted practitioners to report animal abuse. Only 29% of
the therapists, however, supported a mandate to report. Studies of mandated
reporters of child and elder abuse have found inconsistency in understanding
of what constitutes a reportable suspicion and instances of suppressed report-
ing (Levi, Brown, & Erb, 2006; Rodriguez, Wallace, Woolf, & Mangione, 2006).
Moreover, professionals who are legally mandated to report child maltreatment
often fail to do so (Alvarez, Kenny, Donohue, & Carpin, 2004).
These inconsistencies may be further perpetuated by a lack of training. One
study of 46 state child welfare agencies found that only about 17% of those agen-
cies trained child protective service staff to recognize and assess for animal abuse
(Risley-Curtiss, Zilney, & Hornung, 2010). Not surprisingly, the same study
found that only 26% of states reported at least some cross-reporting. Other bar-
riers to cross-reporting may include difficulties coordinating between or among
agencies and poor communication and/or confusion about what to report, and
to whom (Long & Kulkarni, 2013). As discussed in the final section of this chap-
ter, research is needed to better understand the barriers to and facilitators of
cross-reporting and the effects of those policies.
Pets in Protection Orders
In response to growing recognition of the co-occurrence of domestic violence

and animal abuse, 29 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation
that includes provisions for pets in domestic violence protection orders (Wisch,
2014a). Awareness of women’s concerns about the safety of their pets has led
domestic violence shelter staff to recognize that lack of a safe place for pets may
be a barrier to leaving an abusive home. As a result, some domestic violence shel-
ters offer safe haven programs that provide shelter for companion animals either
on-site or in collaboration with local animal welfare organizations. The Animal
Welfare Institute’s Safe Havens Mapping Project for Pets of Domestic Violence
Victims is working to create a comprehensive state-by-state list of sheltering ser-
vices available for companion animals who are at risk due to domestic violence
(n.d.). These safe havens operate using a variety of models. Some place animals
in foster homes while others rely on humane societies or veterinarians to provide
temporary placement for pets.
Recognizing that some victims of abuse would not consider entering a shel-
ter without their pets, attorney and animal advocate Allie Phillips created the
Sheltering Animals and Families Together (SAF-T) program, which provides
domestic violence shelters with specific guidance on how to house families
together with their pets (Phillips, 2012). The SAF-T Start-Up Manual describes
three housing options designed to safely house pets on-site at a domestic violence
shelter: (a) housing pets in the resident’s room, (b) housing pets in a separate
room that can accommodate individual crates, and (c) housing pets in a secure
and sheltered outdoor kennel.
Animal Abuse Registries
The introduction of legislation to establish public web-based animal abuse regis-

tries, similar to sex offender registries, is another strategy that has been proposed
as a way to prevent people who have been convicted of animal abuse from hav-
ing contact with animals. For example, animal shelters and pet dealers may be
required to check the registry before placing an animal. As of November 2014,
animal abuse registry legislation has only been passed in New York. In 2010,
Suffolk County, New York, became the first jurisdiction in the world to enact
such a registry. Rockland and Albany counties in New York adopted registries
in 2011, and in 2010 New York City became the largest jurisdiction to approve
an animal abuse registry (Animal Legal Defense Fund, 2014). These registries,
however, are not without controversy. Opponents argue that a large propor-
tion of people who abuse animals—particularly people who hoard or neglect
animals—would be better served by receiving mental health treatment or educa-
tion on the proper care of animals.
Sexual Abuse of Animals
As of November 2014, 34 states have laws prohibiting bestiality, with half cat-
egorizing these crimes as misdemeanors and half categorizing them as felonies.
In states that do not have laws prohibiting bestiality, the act may be addressed
in child protection or obscenity laws (Wisch, 2014b). Historically, sexual abuse
of animals was prohibited under sodomy or “crimes against nature” laws.
More recently, states have begun to include bestiality in animal cruelty codes.
Recognizing the diversity and reach of media, some states have included provi-
sions that prohibit the photographing or filming of sexual acts with animals.
Oregon and California statutes refer to the “sexual assault of an animal,” raising
the question of an animal’s ability to consent to sexual acts and the possibility
of offenders’ names being included in sexual assault registries (Wisch, 2014b). In
fact, as of August 2014, a conviction for committing bestiality or forcing another
person to commit the act triggers sex offender registration in 26 states (National
District Attorneys Association, National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse,
2014). In addition, bestiality is almost universally included in the definition of
child pornography, which also triggers sex offender registration.
Psychological Evaluation and Counseling

for People Convicted of Animal Abuse
As studies documenting the relationship between animal abuse and other types
of antisocial behavior became more well known in the late 1990s, states began
to enact laws allowing judges to order psychological evaluation and counsel-
ing for people convicted of animal abuse. The AniCare assessment and treat-
ment approach, which is discussed in more detail later, was published in 1999 in
response to the first law, which was passed in California, that allowed courts to
order counseling (Jory & Randour, 1999). It was developed under the auspices
of the Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PSYETA), an orga-
nization dedicated to reducing animal suffering and abuse, which recognized
the lack of any psychological treatment approach tailored to people who abuse
animals.
As Chapter 2 indicates, approximately one-half of states have laws authorizing
or requiring psychological evaluations of individuals convicted of certain forms
of animal abuse, and more than half have laws authorizing or requiring coun-
seling for those convicted of certain forms of animal abuse. Very few have laws
regarding both psychological evaluation and counseling for adults and juveniles.
More have laws regarding evaluation and counseling for adults, though most are
discretionary. Despite evidence that suggests animal abuse may be an indicator
of other problems for youth, only a few states have laws regarding evaluation and
counseling for juveniles. Evaluation and counseling are mandatory in only two
of these states, Nevada and New Mexico.
Although progress has been made in passing laws regarding evaluation
and counseling for people convicted of animal abuse, much work remains to
be done. In states where evaluation and counseling are either mandatory or
discretionary, there is little information about the evaluation or counseling
to which people convicted of animal abuse are actually referred. Given that
many of these laws have been passed relatively recently, many judges may be
unfamiliar with them. The discretionary nature of the majority of these laws
leaves open the possibility of inconsistent interpretation and implementation.
Judges’ lack of awareness coupled with the lack of available treatment options
specifically related to animal abuse reduce the likelihood that an evaluation
will be conducted and counseling will be offered if it is determined to be
needed.
There are also important empirical questions to be answered regarding the
circumstances under which counseling is appropriate. There currently is no evi-
dence of the effectiveness—or ineffectiveness—of interventions for people who
have abused animals. Research questions that must be answered include: For
whom and in what types of cases is counseling effective? Are there people for
whom or types of cases in which counseling is not advisable because it is likely
to be ineffective? If so, what are the characteristics of those cases? Are juveniles
more likely to benefit from counseling than adults? How does a therapist deter-
mine when a client who has abused animals has successfully completed treat-
ment? On what basis does a therapist determine that a person who has abused
animals is unlikely to be safe around animals and should be required to forfeit
them? Answering these questions should be part of a comprehensive research
agenda to better understand and more effectively address animal abuse.
I N T ERV EN T I O N M O D ELS
Despite growing awareness of the relationship between animal abuse and other
forms of antisocial behavior, few clinical interventions exist that are designed
specifically to treat people who have abused animals. In fact, there are cur-
rently only two interventions in the United States specifically for people who
have abused animals and, for the reasons that will be described, neither has been
evaluated. AniCare is a psychological treatment model that includes separate
approaches for clinicians working with adults and children (Jory & Randour,
1999; Shapiro et al., 2014). Children and Animals Together (CAT) Assessment
and Diversion program is a psycho-education program, which draws on AniCare
Child (Risley-Curtiss, n.d.). Other intervention models include the Animal
Welfare Court in Tucson, Arizona, which also draws on AniCare Adult, and pre-
vention programs such as Project POOCH, Project Second Chance, and Lifetime
Bonds that focus on high-risk youth who have likely been exposed (at least as a
witness) to animal cruelty.
Bestiality
It must be noted that the interventions discussed here are intended for people
who have witnessed or perpetrated animal cruelty, but not necessarily for people
who have engaged in bestiality or the sexual abuse of animals. The sexual abuse
of animals remains a taboo subject on which there is little data. What happens to
perpetrators remains largely if not completely unknown.
Jenny Edwards of Chandler Edwards, an organization that provides assistance
and training for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, veterinarians, mental
health professionals, and academics on animal sexual assault cases, explains,
“Because we know so little about bestiality, or its impact on animal victims, there
are few resources available for animal welfare, mental health, veterinary1, or legal
professionals. There are no diagnostic or treatment protocols to assist mental or
medical professionals when encountering a human who prefers sexual contact
with animals to sexual contact with other humans” (personal communication,
March 2014).
The most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ([DSM-5],
American Psychiatric Association, 2013) classifies bestiality as a paraphelia, a
sexual feeling or behavior that may involve sexual partners that are not human,
have not consented to sexual relations, or that involve suffering by one or both
partners. Referred to as zoophilia in the DSM-5, it is listed as a paraphelia “not
otherwise specified” and, as with other paraphelias, treatment is not recom-
mended unless it interferes with the individual’s normal functioning or other-
wise causes distress. Zoophilia is typically associated with other paraphelias,
and when treatment is indicated, protocols may follow interventions for other
paraphelias.
Treatment options specifically for zoophilia include cognitive therapy, aver-
sion therapy, and drug regimens (LeVay, Baldwin, & Baldwin, 2012). Cerrone
(1991) advocated a multicomponent approach to treating zoophilia that involves
social assertiveness training, sex education, and frequently family therapy as
well. Miletski (2001) advised therapists to explore zoophile clients’ history of
childhood victimization and also assess for anxiety, depression, social isolation,
and suicidal ideation.
The Importance of Assessment
A thorough assessment is a necessary first step in working with adults or chil-

dren who have perpetrated or witnessed animal abuse. Animal abuse, like other
forms of violence, is often a complex phenomenon with no single etiology. The
circumstances of, and motivations for, animal abuse vary widely. People who
abuse animals vary with respect to the severity and chronic nature of their
abuse, their economic motivation, reactive versus instrumental aggression, the
extent to which other types of violence are also perpetrated, and the presence of
comorbid conditions such as addictions and personality disorders. As such, fac-
tors to be considered during the assessment phase include severity, recurrence
of and motivations for the abuse; subcultural and familial contexts; psychologi-
cal insight; comorbid conditions; acceptance of responsibility; and willingness
to change. Dr. Shapiro, one of the developers of the AniCare model (discussed
later), recommends a framework for categorizing animal abusers, selecting

treatment components, and assessing prospects for successful treatment and the
advisability of future animal possession. He writes:
“The framework suggests that individuals with major mental illnesses (e.g.,
major affective disorders, psychosis, and organic brain damage) require
psychopharmaceutical and/or residential treatment. Those with sub-
stance abuse disorders generally require treatment for that problem first.
Dogfighting is a form of abuse that often has a strong subcultural com-
ponent, which may make it less susceptible to therapeutic intervention,
although values clarification or induced empathic experience of the suffer-
ing of abused animals may be effective. People who are involved with animal
abuse in the context of commercial ventures may not require psychologi-
cal intervention. On the other end of the spectrum, for single instances of
abuse and milder forms of abuse—particularly by juveniles—education,
psycho-education, a group-based diversion program, and/or parental guid-
ance may be sufficient, rather than psychotherapy” (Shapiro et al., 2013).
The co-occurrence of substance abuse and animal abuse may warrant special
attention. For example, Vaughn and colleagues (2009) found that individuals
who reported having been cruel to animals frequently suffered from lifetime
alcohol abuse. Using a sample of 150 men arrested for animal maltreatment,
Levitt (2011) found that 38% were intoxicated at the time of arrest. Moreover,
there was a significant relationship between substance abuse and physical abuse
of animals; at least 64% of those who had beat or otherwise physically abused
an animal had a history of substance abuse. As such, screening for substance
abuse should be part of a comprehensive assessment of people who have abused
animals. Conversely, screening for animal abuse should be considered when
conducting substance abuse screening. Similarly, research on the relationship
between family violence and animal abuse suggests that animal abuse should be
included in domestic violence assessments, and vice versa.
To date, assessment of children’s relationships with animals has received
much greater attention than assessment of adults’ relationships with animals.
A number of tools have been developed to assess children’s treatment of animals.
These are reviewed in Chapter 11 of this volume. Those instruments address a
range of factors that should be considered in assessing a child who has abused an
animal, including severity (e.g., degree of injury, frequency, duration, number of
species), culpability (e.g., degree of planning, acted alone versus in a group, over-
came obstacles in order to engage in abuse), motivation (e.g., curiosity, fear of
animal, peer pressure, pleasure from inflicting pain, sexual arousal), attitudes/
beliefs (e.g., unaware of needs of animals, following cultural practices, beliefs
about appropriate ways in which to discipline animals), emotional intelligence
(e.g., level of empathy, ability to express feelings, ability to form relationships),
family history (e.g., history of physical/sexual abuse, domestic violence, neglect,
animal abuse), and mitigating circumstances (e.g., accepts responsibility, feels

remorse, able to form bonds with animals).
The combination of these factors will determine the child’s appropriateness
for treatment and guide the therapeutic approach. The importance of thorough
assessment cannot be overstated. Understanding the context in which the behav-
ior is exhibited is critical to tailoring treatment appropriately. For example, a
six-year-old child who has demonstrated a pattern of repeatedly killing birds
and cats, acts alone, engages in premeditated abuse, and shows no remorse will
require a different level of intervention than a six-year-old child who pulled
a dog’s tail on two occasions, stopped the behavior when the dog yelped, and
expressed regret for having hurt the dog.
It is also important to understand the broader context in which children’s
abuse of animals occurs. As discussed previously, there is evidence to suggest
that animal abuse co-occurs with other antisocial behavior. Children who have
witnessed or engaged in animal abuse should be screened for exposure to other
types of violence and trauma, and should also be assessed to determine if a clini-
cal diagnosis is warranted (DeGrue & DiLillo, 2009). If a child has other mental
health needs, he or she may be referred for additional therapy.
Given the potential impact of witnessing animal abuse, it is important
to obtain information on situations in which a child may have seen animal
cruelty, including the relationship of the child to the animal; the type and
severity of the abuse and who was involved; how many times it occurred; the
type of victim(s), the victim’s response, and the response of the perpetrators
and other witnesses; what if anything bothered the child most about what
happened; the child’s role in witnessing the abuse, the child’s response to
witnessing the incident (e.g., anxiety, nightmares, signs of trauma); fear of
retaliation if the child discusses the event; and what happened as a result
of the incident (e.g., was anyone held accountable?) (Shapiro et al., 2014).
Additionally, disclosure that a child witnessed animal abuse may mandate a
report to child protective services as harming an animal in front of a child is
defined as a form of child abuse in some states (National District Attorneys
Association, 2014).
AniCare
The AniCare Model of Treatment for Animal Abuse is the first professionally
developed psychological intervention program for animal abusers over the age of
17. It was originally adapted from Intimate Justice Theory, which was developed
for clinical intervention with perpetrators of domestic violence (Jory, 1998; Jory
& Anderson, 1999). Based on a cognitive-behavioral treatment model, AniCare
Adult was developed as an approach that mental health professionals could inte-
grate into their practice, adapting it to individual therapist’s clinical approaches
and the needs of their clients.
The AniCare Approach

As originally conceived (Jory & Randour, 1999), AniCare was based on three
key principles: (a) establishing accountability, (b) creating an environment of
challenge, and (c) establishing a context for change. Based on feedback from cli-
nicians, a growing body of literature on the psychology of animal abuse, and
innovations in therapeutic approaches, a second edition of AniCare is currently
under development. The revised version will replace the focus on account-
ability with a more eclectic theoretical framework that integrates attachment,
cognitive-behavioral, and attachment theories. Recognizing the complexity of
animal abuse cases, the second edition will also emphasize the importance of
tailoring interventions to the specific aspects of each case.
Originally published in 2002 with a second edition published in 2014 (Shapiro,
Randour, Krinsk, & Wolf, 2014), AniCare Child is the first assessment and treat-
ment approach focused specifically on juvenile cruelty to animals. The approach
is intended to be used by mental health professionals, including clinicians asso-
ciated with private agencies, domestic violence organizations, hospitals, and
schools. AniCare Child also may be useful to other professionals who work with
children, including teachers, probation officers, child welfare caseworkers, and
social workers. For children who are referred due to an incident of animal abuse,
AniCare Child will likely be the primary focus of treatment. Clinicians may also
use aspects of the approach as an adjunct to therapy with children being treated
for issues other than animal abuse. AniCare Child draws on several theoretical
perspectives, including attachment, cognitive-behavioral and psychodynamic
theories.
The AniCare Child treatment approach is focused on four key areas: (a) estab-
lishing a connection with the child; (b) helping the child to identify and express
feelings, and to develop empathy; (c) helping the child to develop self-management
skills; and (d) working with parents. In all phases of treatment, animals and the
child’s relationship with them are critical. Attitudes toward animals, beliefs
about them, and behavior with them are explored through discussion, exercises,
and projective techniques, including puppets, play, and drawing.
Lessons Learned from the Dissemination of AniCare

A fundamental challenge to intervening with people who abuse animals is iden-
tifying them. While data on treatment referral sources are lacking, it may be
assumed that—as with most criminal behaviors—a substantial segment (if not
the majority) of people entering treatment for animal abuse do not do so volun-
tarily. Moreover, unlike victims of other forms of family violence, such as inti-
mate partners and children, animals cannot speak. People who abuse animals
are unlikely to volunteer information about the abuse; they must be caught or
otherwise identified. For adults, the most common means of identification is an
arrest.
Figure 9.1 illustrates the most likely path to treatment of an adult who has
abused an animal. Each step on the path includes assumptions that must be met
in order for that person to enter treatment. First, societal and cultural views of
Societal/Cultural
Views of Animals
Legislation/Policy
Law Enforcement
Justice System
Mental Health System/

Services
Figure 9.1 The Path to Treatment for Adults who Abuse Animals.
animals must promote the adoption of legislation that values animals and man-
dates legal consequences for those who violate animal cruelty statutes. Next, law
enforcement must be knowledgeable of those statutes and committed to enforc-
ing them. Law enforcement must also be adept at collecting the evidence a pros-
ecutor requires to prosecute an animal abuse case. Prosecutors then must be
committed and have the resources to successfully prosecute the case. Assuming
the case is prosecuted and a conviction is won, the judge must be aware of the
psychological assessment and counseling laws in his or her jurisdiction, the
importance of intervening, and the availability of trained therapists with exper-
tise in treating people who have abused animals. Not surprisingly, referrals to
treatment are made in very few cases.
Initially, dissemination of the AniCare model focused on AniCare-certified
trainers conducting workshops across the country to train clinicians to integrate
the approach into their practice. While initial feedback from the mental health
professionals who attended the workshops was excellent, longer-term follow up
revealed that clinicians were not using the model, mainly because animal abuse
cases were not being referred to them.
Based on the lack of cases being referred to AniCare-trained therapists, the
Animals and Society Institute (the organization under the auspices of which
the AniCare approach was developed) decided to focus on the “demand” for
therapists to treat people who had abused animals. Using Figure 9.1 as a start-
ing point, a conceptual framework (see Figure 9.2) was developed that shows the
continuum and diversity of factors and stakeholders that must align in order
for a person, particularly an adult, to receive treatment as a result of abusing an
animal. The framework allowed for identification of key barriers and challenges,
and strategies to address them.
Considering the model from left to right, one of the first challenges identified
was a lack of awareness about the relationship between animal abuse and other
antisocial behavior among professionals from a variety of disciplines. As a result,
opportunities are regularly missed to ask questions about exposure to animal
abuse as a witness or a perpetrator. For example, a national study of social work
practitioners found that only 33% of social workers asked about animal abuse in
the course of their client assessments, and 69.7% reported they knew little about
treating clients who abuse animals (Risley-Curtiss et al., 2010). Similarly, despite
Identification Intervention
Awareness of Prosecution of animal abusers Judicial decision making

correlation between • State laws (animal cruelty, protection • Knowledge of animal laws
animal cruelty and orders) • Knowledge of and conﬁdence in
other forms of • Ability of police to collect evidence treatment options
violence • Resources (prosecutors willing and
Assessment equipped to prosecute cases) • Willingness to impose penalties
• Domestic violence
protocols • Decision about the animal(s)
• Child welfare
• Animal welfare
• Veterinarians Identification
• Law enforcement of animal Treatment Punishment
• Prosecutors abusers • Completion of • Type (incarceration,
• Judges treatment community service,
Cross reporting
• Doctors • Fideliy of restitution)
treatment • Duration
• Therapists
Short-term
Outcomes
• Self-report
• Development • Educate of change
of and • Strengthen judges • Therapist
• Development (evaluation assessment
training on laws
of and and
Link cross- • Train Recruit,
training on counseling
training for reporting prosecutors train, and
assessments laws,
all policies and police retain
Long-term
• Policies on intervention
Outcome
stakeholder • Ongoing on best therapists
use of options)
groups oversight practices Recidivism
assessments
Inputs
Figure 9.2 Conceptual Framework: AniCare and Rapid Response.

the research findings on the relationship between animal abuse and family vio-
lence, many domestic violence hotlines and shelters do not ask regularly about
pets. Asking children who have been exposed to domestic violence about their
experiences with animal abuse, as either a witness or a perpetrator, provides a
critical opportunity to intervene.
In the absence of standardized assessment and cross-reporting protocols, get-
ting caught breaking a law is the most likely route by which an adult will receive
treatment. Law enforcement officers, however, are often ill-equipped to enforce
animal cruelty laws, particularly in jurisdictions in which the laws are in agri-
cultural statutes instead of the penal code. Even if law enforcement officers know
the laws, they can only enforce the laws that exist. Most violations of animal cru-
elty laws are misdemeanors, which typically result in no more than a “slap on the
wrist” of the offender. It is unlikely that such cases will result in a judge ordering
a defendant to receive assessment and treatment.
Another challenge is that prosecutors may decide not to prosecute cases. The
Animal Legal Defense Fund (2014) suggests several reasons that prosecutors
may be reluctant to pursue charges. First, some jurisdictions simply have more
cases than they have the resources to prosecute. In these situations, prosecu-
tors are more likely to take cases they are confident they can win. In some cases
prosecutors may not feel passionately about animals and choose not to pursue
those cases. Other prosecutors may simply be unsure about prosecuting an ani-
mal abuse case. Finally, if law enforcement officers are not skilled at gathering
evidence in animal abuse cases, prosecutors may not have sufficient evidence to
successfully prosecute a case.
As discussed earlier, judges are critical to ensuring that people, particularly
adults, who abuse animals are referred to treatment. Judges must be aware of
their mandate or discretionary power to order psychological evaluations and
counseling, and have access to clinicians who are skilled in treating people who
have abused animals.
Clearly, as shown in Figure 9.2, all stakeholders on the continuum need to
be informed, committed, and have resources to respond to animal abuse cases.
While legislation and policy are important starting points, professionals from
a range of disciplines must be prepared and willing to act to ensure that people
who abuse animals are identified, held accountable, and participate in inter-
ventions that decrease the likelihood of recidivism. The path from adoption of
anti-cruelty laws to effective mental health treatment for perpetrators of abuse is
long, and there are many opportunities along the way to lose cases.
Identification of key challenges has facilitated development of strategies to
address them. The first strategy is focused on educating professionals from a
range of disciplines about the relationship between animal abuse and other anti-
social behavior, the types of questions they should ask their clients about experi-
ences with animals, and resources to which they may refer anyone about whom
they have concerns. Trainings have been held for prosecutors, judges, probation
officers, law enforcement, domestic violence service providers, child welfare pro-
fessionals, social workers, and mental health professionals.
A second strategy focuses on encouraging changes in policy and practice that

will result in institutionalized and systemic change. For example, development
of assessment protocols and policies regarding their inclusion in intake protocols
used by a range of systems (e.g., domestic violence, child welfare, juvenile justice)
are critical to ensuring that questions about animal abuse are asked routinely.
These routine questions will facilitate identification of individuals who might
benefit from more in-depth assessment and possibly treatment to prevent future
or continued animal abuse. Cross-reporting protocols that facilitate sharing of
information across systems may also be important to identifying and interven-
ing with people who have abused animals, though as discussed, more research is
needed on their effectiveness.
Although asking adults routine questions about animals is important, focus-
ing on identifying children who have witnessed or engaged in animal abuse may
provide an even more critical opportunity to provide early intervention and
prevention services. Standardized questions about exposure to animal abuse
should be included in intake and assessment instruments used by a wide array
of systems, including child welfare, juvenile justice, and schools. In fact, pre-
liminary findings from assessments of children referred from child protective
and juvenile justice systems to the CAT program, which is described later, show
that in addition to abusing animals, these children have extensive histories of
trauma and exposure to multiple stressors such as parental substance abuse and
incarceration, poverty, and bullying. Identification of children who have abused
animals may provide an opportunity to address not only the animal abuse, but
also a wide range of other issues and challenges the child may face.
Children and Animals Together (CAT) Assessment

and Diversion Program
The Children and Animals Together Assessment and Intervention Program

(CAT) is the only other program in the United States designed specifically to
intervene with children who have abused animals. Developed by Dr. Christina
Risley-Curtiss and her colleagues in the social work department of Arizona State
University, the trauma-based program aims to prevent future animal abuse by
children who have previously engaged in animal cruelty (Risley-Curtiss, n.d.).
The program draws on AniCare Child, but is a psycho-education program as
opposed to therapy. Risley-Curtiss developed the program in 2008 after being
approached by a juvenile probation officer who was looking for an intervention
for a child who had abused a kitten. The probation officer was seeking a diversion
program that focused specifically on animal abuse and could find no appropriate
intervention in Phoenix, Arizona.
Since initial development, the program has undergone several revisions.
For example, Risley-Curtiss recognized that repetition is important. Shorter
sessions, and more of them, have been found to be more effective than fewer,
longer sessions. As a result, the program, which originally consisted of nine
weekly two-hour sessions, is now 14 weeks long and includes one to one-and-a-
half-hour sessions each week. Inclusion of the child’s caregiver was also identi-
fied as essential to ensure lessons are reinforced in the home. The participation
of each child’s parent or guardian is now required. Finally, the inclusion of an
animal behaviorist is an important addition recently made to the program. The
animal behaviorist helps children and adults transfer cognitive empathy (i.e., the
ability to look at a picture and describe what a child or animal may be feeling) to
real-life empathy (i.e., the ability to read a dog or cat’s behavior in real time and
respond appropriately).
Risley-Curtiss describes the program this way:
“CAT’s intervention and treatment philosophy is guided by ecological sys-

tems theory, a major tenet of social work practice. Rather than utilize a
purely psychological framework to focus on the diagnosis of an individual
child or youth, the “person-in-environment” approach of social work prac-
tice emphasizes the ways in which children and families live in and interact
with their environments. Thus, each child who is referred to CAT receives
an in-home assessment from a master-level social worker, the core compo-
nent of CAT’s holistic approach to intervention. Each assessment includes
a clinical evaluation of juvenile animal cruelty, which explores any cultural
support or non-support for acts of animal cruelty, as well as the motiva-
tion for, duration and severity of such acts. An extensive exploration of
the child’s family history also occurs, with an emphasis on the presence or
absence of child abuse, domestic violence and elder abuse” (personal com-
munication, March 2014).
Based on the assessment findings, a decision is made about the child’s appro-
priateness for the CAT program. Children who have extensive trauma and ani-
mal abuse histories are referred to more intensive therapeutic services. For some
children, CAT is an adjunct to other therapies. Children accepted into CAT par-
ticipate, with at least one parent or guardian, in 14 weekly sessions held at the
Arizona Animal Welfare League. The program includes humane education and
therapeutic activities designed to help children be accountable and take respon-
sibility for their actions towards animals. Under close adult supervision, chil-
dren interact with shelter animals, helping them to build empathy and practice
nurturing skills. Currently, children and youth are referred to the program from
child protective and juvenile justice service systems.
Animal Welfare Court
The Pima County Animal Welfare Court was established in 2012 by Pima
County Justice of the Peace Maria Felix after she presided over a particularly
egregious case of animal abuse (Smith, 2012). One of several specialty courts
in Pima County, the court hears misdemeanor cases involving animal-related

issues. In its first year, the court heard nearly 200 cases.
Based on the severity of the case, the Pima County Attorney’s Office decides
whether to refer the case to the Animal Welfare Court or to the Superior Court.
More serious violations, including felonies, are referred to the Superior Court.
One deputy Pima County attorney is assigned to the court to prosecute cases,
along with six defense attorneys.
A unique aspect of the court is that in addition to fines, probation, and possible
jail time, defendants who are convicted of animal-related offences are required
to participate in counseling offered by Perception Counseling, a Pima County
mental health provider that developed interventions based on the AniCare
approach. Perception Counseling offers two programs, depending on the sever-
ity of the offense. The Animal Treatment Offender Program (ATOP) is a group
therapy program for offenders that have intentionally committed animal abuse
(Debra Lowther, personal communication, April 2014). Prior to beginning the
group, each defendant receives a thorough clinical assessment to ensure that
s/he is appropriate for the group and does not require more intensive one-on-
one therapy. Depending on their needs and progress, defendants attend from
16 to 52 sessions. Examples of issues addressed in ATOP include social condi-
tions encouraging abuse, sociocultural issues, the abused animal’s perspective,
accountability, personal responsibility, respect, the relationship between ani-
mal abuse and substance abuse, the effects of animal abuse on children, anger
control, stress management, communication, conflict resolution, reciprocity
between animals and people, empathy, nurturance, and attachment.
The other program is Animal Cruelty Education (ACE), a four-hour education
program for defendants whose offenses involved unintentional cruelty. These
defendants are more likely to have neglected their animals (e.g., failed to provide
adequate shelter, used an illegal dog tie-out) (Debra Lowther, personal commu-
nication, April 2014). ACE focuses on humane education and helping the defen-
dants to understand and better meet the needs of their companion animals.
Prevention and Early Intervention Programs
There are a number of programs that pair shelter dogs with youth in secure
detention facilities. Although these programs are not designed specifically for
children who have abused animals, they are focused on youth who are at risk
of engaging in antisocial behavior and who may have witnessed animal abuse,
including dogfighting.
One of the earliest of these programs, Project POOCH, began in 1993 in the
MacLaren Youth Correctional Facility in Woodburn, Oregon (Deaton, 2005).
Shelter dogs who otherwise would have been euthanized are housed in ken-
nels at the correctional facility. Youth are responsible for all aspects of the dogs’
care, including feeding, walking, training using positive reinforcement, groom-
ing, and helping to find them new homes. Through the program, youth learn to
manage their own behavior, develop healthy relationships, and acquire occupa-
tional skills. Staff reports that program participants show a reduction in aggres-
sion, growth in leadership skills, and improvement in the ability to work with
others.
Project Second Chance began in 1999 in a secure facility for juveniles in
New Mexico and includes an adaptation of the AniCare approach (Harbolt &
Ward, 2001). During the month-long program, youth spend three weeks caring
for, feeding, and training shelter dogs. Like AniCare, the program emphasizes
accountability with respect to helping the youth to recognize and take responsi-
bility for abusive behavior; challenging youth to examine the causes and conse-
quences of their behavior; and establishing a context for changing behavior. The
behavioral change is focused on the development of empathy through exercises
that help the youth to imagine how others might perceive an experience. For
example, in the “Be the Dog” exercise, the juvenile assumes the role of their dog,
answering questions as the dog would and expressing the dog’s feelings. By see-
ing the world from the dog’s eyes, participants learn to recognize that the dog
experiences feelings, fears, and happiness just as he or she does. The participants
also keep journals describing their experiences in the program and write a letter
to their dog’s adopter explaining how to care for the dog.
Lifetime Bonds, which is based on a positive youth development (PYD) frame-
work, is a program for adolescent males ages 13 to 17 who are in secure detention
at the Illinois Youth Center (IYC). The program began in 2009 as a collaboration
among the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ), Chicago Animal Care
and Control, and Safe Humane Chicago, a nonprofit helping youth learn nonvio-
lent, compassionate ways of interacting.
Unlike Project POOCH and Project Second Chance, dogs in the Lifetime
Bonds program are not housed at the youth facility. Instead, Safe Humane
takes dogs from Chicago Animal Care and Control to IYC each week or the
boys come to the shelter. The program uses a mentoring model in which the
boys work closely with adult volunteers to bond with, socialize, and train
shelter dogs, saving their lives and making them more adoptable. Based on a
positive youth development conceptual model, Lifetime Bonds provides youth
opportunities to: (a) participate in structured activities, (b) develop skills,
(c) form prosocial relationships with adults and peers, and (d) engage in efforts
that benefit the community. Lifetime Bonds’ goal is to help court-involved
youth develop the assets needed to avoid re-offending and become produc-
tive, engaged citizens. The 12-week program involves weekly, 60- to 90-minute
sessions.
The key objectives of the Lifetime Bonds program include: (a) teaching youth
dog handling and training skills using only positive, reward-based reinforce-
ment; (b) helping youth learn and practice communication skills by interpret-
ing dogs’ body language and responding appropriately and compassionately;
(c) developing a sense of social responsibility by educating youth about animal
abuse and population issues and allowing them to give back to the community
by saving dogs’ lives; and (d) educating youth about animal-related jobs. One of
the unique aspects of Lifetime Bonds is that upon completion of the program
and release from IYC, graduates are offered paid internships with Safe Humane
Chicago’s Court Case Dogs program, helping to socialize and advocate for dogs
who are victims in animal abuse cases.
R ES E A R C H AG EN DA
Research on the effectiveness of interventions for people who have abused ani-
mals is scant. Ideally, randomized control trials—the gold standard of research
design—would be undertaken to determine whether or not there is a causal
relationship between the treatment and outcomes of interest. Once treatments
are identified that produce desired outcomes, comparative effectiveness studies
could be done to identify which treatments are most effective and under what
circumstances. As discussed earlier, one of the key challenges is that people do
not seek treatment voluntarily for abusing animals. As a result, the number of
cases available for study is limited; the sample size for evaluation is simply too
small. Until the number of cases being referred for treatment increases substan-
tially, it will be challenging to conduct rigorous evaluations of treatment models.
Moreover, it will be difficult to identify new interventions, as the lack of demand
creates a disincentive for development of alternative treatment approaches.
Although the use of experimental design in the evaluation of treatment pro-
grams for people who have abused animals is not imminent, there remain impor-
tant research and practice questions that can—and should—be answered in
the shorter term. In fact, there is much we do not know about the scope of the
problem of animal abuse and the effects of policy and legislation to address it.
Answering these questions will provide the foundation for developing effective
interventions and policies to support them. Key questions about the scope of the
problem include:
• How prevalent is animal abuse (i.e., how much of a demand can we rea-
sonably expect for treatment programs)?
• Is there any evidence that dog bites are an indicator of animal abuse?
What are the implications for identifying people who abuse animals?
• How many cases of animal abuse are prosecuted annually? To what
extent do prosecutions vary by state or other factors? What are those
other factors?
• In what proportion of prosecuted cases are defendants convicted?
• What differences are there among people who commit various types of
abuse (e.g., dogfighting for profit versus hurting an animal in a domestic
violence case versus running a puppy mill)? What are the implications
of these differences with respect to identification, prosecution, treatment
and expected outcomes?
Key questions with respect to the effect of legislation and policies include:
• Do states in which counseling is mandatory have better outcomes (i.e.,

lower recidivism) than other states?
• In states where counseling is mandated, what treatment are judges
requiring? How do they make those decisions? How frequently is treat-
ment actually received and what is the duration of the treatment?
• Do states with cross-reporting requirements have better outcomes than
other states? If so, what are the differences? Are there unintended conse-
quences? If so, what are they?
Development of best practices to address barriers to identification of people

who abuse animals is also an important next step. As people who abuse animals
are identified, descriptive studies examining the array of factors related to the
abuse (such as severity, culpability, attitudes/beliefs, associated trauma, mind-
set) will be critical. The importance of collecting comprehensive assessment data
cannot be underestimated. We cannot assume that “one size fits all” with respect
to treating people who have abused animals. Effective interventions must be tai-
lored to the range of factors underlying the abuse.
Although AniCare and its adaptations are currently the primary treat-
ments for people who abuse animals, it is important to develop new treatment
approaches that are grounded in theory and include well-articulated conceptual
frameworks. The conceptual framework provides an overview of the underlying
logic of the treatment approach, including the outcomes anticipated and how
those outcomes are logically related to treatment components. A key question
is: What outcomes do we expect as a result of treatment? Certainly, reduced
recidivism is important, but we know little about the likelihood of recidivism
in the absence of treatment. Moreover, assuming recidivism is a long-term out-
come, what short-term changes do we expect in clients that will predict reduced
recidivism? Longitudinal studies that include assessment of both short- and
longer-term outcomes will facilitate understanding of the changes in attitudes,
beliefs, knowledge and skills that promote the humane treatment of animals.
Equally important is using these outcome data to understand for whom or in
what types of cases counseling is not advisable because it is likely to be ineffec-
tive. Treatment may not always be appropriate; sometimes the best response may
be removal from society via incarceration. Research is also needed to determine
on what basis a therapist should conclude that a client who has abused animals
has successfully completed treatment.
In developing and testing new interventions or treatment strategies, it is also
important that we avoid recreating the wheel: How can we address animal abuse
in the context of other empirically validated treatment approaches such as bat-
terer intervention and bullying prevention? Finally, it is important to encourage
professionals—therapists and non-therapists alike—to think about animal abuse
as they think about other forms of violent and antisocial behavior. This includes
routinely asking questions about relationships with animals, considering the
continuum of those relationships from adaptive to maladaptive, and providing
interventions targeted to various points on the continuum.
A public health model focused on primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention

provides a useful framework in which to consider the continuum of strategies to
prevent abuse. Primary prevention strategies, which are designed to reduce the
incidence of animal cruelty and neglect in the general population and strengthen
the bond between people and their animals, might include evidence-based
humane education programs. Secondary prevention strategies decrease the prev-
alence of the problem of animal cruelty among high-risk groups. These strate-
gies, like Lifetime Bonds, might be implemented with youth who have witnessed
animal abuse such as dogfighting. Tertiary prevention strategies like AniCare
are focused on intervening with people who have abused animals and preventing
the repetition of that behavior. Interventions designed to address all three levels
of prevention must be developed and tested.
Finally, it will be important to avoid examining treatment effectiveness in iso-
lation. The evolution of social responses to domestic violence and child abuse
suggests that we must consider how a coordinated community response to ani-
mal abuse offenders encourages and supports treatment. Evaluation efforts must
include collection and analysis of data on the process by which individuals enter
treatment. It will be important to examine how cases are identified, how they
move through the legal or social system, how laws and other policies affect cases,
and how decisions are made about treatment, including identifying any system-
atic selection bias in treatment decisions.
C O N C LU S I O N
Clearly there are many questions to be answered. Rigorous evaluation of treat-

ment models for people who abuse animals can be done. We can certainly design
experiments to test the hypothesis that treatment produces desired outcomes.
The bigger challenge, however, is improving the social and legal response to ani-
mal abuse, and fostering a coordinated community effort to identify those who
abuse animals and hold them accountable for their actions.
N OT E
1. Chandler Edwards developed a client interview questionnaire for veterinarians who

suspect sexual abuse of an animal. The form is published in Tiplady, Catherine,
Animal Abuse: Helping Animals and People, CABI: Wallingford, Oxfordshire, UK,
2013; pp. 219–221.
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SECTION IV
Forensic Evaluations In Animal

Maltreatment Cases
10
Conceptualizing Forensic Animal

Maltreatment Evaluations
LACEY LEVITT AND THOMAS GRISSO ■
The statutes of many states provide, permit, or mandate that judges order mental
health evaluations of persons convicted of various forms of harm to animals
(Phillips, 2013). These evaluations can be considered “forensic” in nature because
they are ordered by courts and used for disposition of legal cases. Some clini-
cians have begun to explore assessment methods for certain specific types of
evaluations in animal maltreatment cases (see Chapter 11). Yet, to our knowl-
edge, this chapter is the first published treatise designed to identify and explore
animal maltreatment evaluations for the courts as a potential field of forensic
assessment. We will refer to assessments of that type as “forensic animal mal-
treatment evaluation” (FAMEs).
Some clinical and educational professionals perform FAMEs for the courts.
We know of no literature that describes the frequency of such evaluations.
Chapter 11, however, describes a number of assessment tools that have been
developed in recent years for use in clinical evaluations or evaluations for the
courts. The emergence of these tools suggests the beginning of a subfield of
forensic mental health assessment involving FAME.
This field is in its infancy. An emerging field of forensic assessment must have
an initial structure to conceptualize its purpose and methods. At minimum, that
structure should have several features that are essential for any form of forensic
evaluation (Grisso, 2003).
First, it must have a clear definition of the legal question that the court expects
the evaluation to address. No forensic evaluation can begin, be designed, or reach
its conclusion without a clear statement of the forensic question that is related to
the legal definition that the court must apply to its decision.
288 F O R E N S I C E VA L U A T I O N S I N A N I M A L M A L T R E A T M E N T C A S E S
Second, the field must develop concepts that will guide and structure the foren-
sic assessment. What psychological constructs and assessment approaches are
relevant for addressing the forensic questions?
Third, the constructs must be translated into things we can measure. If the legal
definition refers to a “capacity to care for animals,” what are the behaviors that
constitute “care for animals” and how can we observe, measure, and analyze
them to address the law’s questions? Evidence-based practice requires assess-
ment methods for which we can examine and demonstrate their reliability as
well as the degree to which they measure what they claim to measure.
Finally, the field must have at least the beginnings of a foundation of relevant
research—in this case, research on animal maltreatment—with which forensic
examiners can interpret the results of their observations of the examinee. This
final requirement for a forensic evaluation field—a research foundation—has
emerged, as evidenced in previous chapters. But the first, second, and third of
these criteria regarding FAMEs are at an earlier stage of development.
This chapter begins by examining the forensic questions that FAMEs are
expected to address. We will find that at present, when the law calls for forensic
evaluations in animal maltreatment cases, it provides very little guidance regard-
ing what the courts want to know. In the absence of clear statutory guidance, we
will suggest some possible ways to frame the relevant questions for various types
of animal maltreatment cases.
Then the chapter addresses the second need: concepts that could be useful in
translating what the law wants to know into things that are observable and there-
fore assessable. This discourse is seriously hampered, of course, by the current
lack of guidance from statutes regarding what the law wants to know. But edu-
cated guesses are possible. In that analysis, we draw on concepts that have been
useful in other types of forensic assessment, exploring their potential to assist
in the future development of concepts to guide FAMEs. Might other subfields of
forensic mental health assessment, such as child custody and child neglect, have
concepts that FAME can borrow and adapt?
Finally, the third criterion—developing assessment methods—will be explored
briefly. As noted earlier, FAME methods have begun to appear, and these will be
described more fully in Chapter 11. In the present chapter, we will remain at a
more general level regarding the work that might be involved in developing the
types of assessment methods that are likely to be needed as FAME aims to build
a portfolio of specialized tools.
D EFI N I N G T H E L EG A L A N D FO R EN S I C Q U EST I O N S
Identifying the relevant forensic questions for FAMEs must begin with a review of
state statutes pertaining to such evaluations. At present, 24 states have statutes autho-
rizing or directing judges to order evaluations of those convicted of animal cruelty,
neglect, fighting, or sexual abuse. Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 lists those states. Evaluations
are mentioned in states in every geographic region in the United States, but there are
Conceptualizing Forensic Animal Maltreatment Evaluations289
concentrations of states in the Southeast (e.g., Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, South

Carolina, Virginia) and Midwest (e.g., North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, Indiana) that do not include provisions for evaluations in
their animal cruelty statutes.
Table 2.2 shows that there is considerable variability in the manner in which
these states provide for such evaluations. The majority of states that permit or
mandate evaluations do so in cases of active physical abuse of an animal. Yet
some states provide for evaluations for a wide range of types of animal maltreat-
ment, whereas other states limit such evaluations to only one or two types of
maltreatment. Moreover, some of them mandate such evaluations while others
merely permit them. Interestingly, a few states call for evaluations of juveniles
only, and two limit evaluations to cases involving particular types of animals.
Although not directly relevant for this discussion of evaluations, some states
that do not have provisions for evaluations permit judges to require adults con-
victed of certain forms of animal cruelty to undergo mental health counseling
(e.g., California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington). States with such statutes tend to have relatively
strong animal protection laws, suggesting that these statutes may be an expres-
sion of a state’s tendency to view animal maltreatment (or at least the maltreat-
ment of companion animals) as an issue that should be taken seriously.
Underlying laws concerning at least some of these evaluations is the notion
that people who harm animals may have an increased likelihood of doing harm
to humans. For example, the executive director of the Mississippi Psychiatric
Association publicly voiced support for a 2011 bill that would allow the court to
order convicted animal cruelty offenders to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and
counseling (Ladner, 2011). She argued that such a measure is necessary to “dif-
fuse a person who would abuse an animal before a heinous action is taken toward
a human being” (p. 1). Similarly, a board-certified forensic psychologist testified
before the Ohio House Criminal Justice Committee on behalf of Ohio House Bill
25, which allows the Court to require psychological assessment for juveniles who
have been adjudicated for animal cruelty. He cited “the well-documented link in
the scientific literature between animal cruelty and serious emotional and behav-
ioral problems in youth” in arguing for the bill’s passage (Kukor, 2011, p. 1).
Some states explicitly identify the purpose of the psychological evaluation of
an individual convicted of animal maltreatment. For example, Rhode Island’s
GEN. LAWS § 4-1-36 holds, “Any person found guilty of violating any of the pro-
visions of this chapter may, in addition to any penalties imposed, be evaluated
to determine the need for psychiatric or psychological counseling, and, if deter-
mined appropriate by the court, to receive psychiatric or psychological counsel-
ing at his or her own expense.” Yet in most states, exactly what courts want to
know when they order such evaluations is unclear, as statutes allowing or man-
dating evaluations are typically vague. For example, § 16-12-4(d) of Georgia’s
Annotated Code indicates only that before sentencing a defendant for animal
cruelty or neglect, “the sentencing judge may require psychological evaluation
of the offender and shall consider the entire criminal record of the offender.”
Similarly, Arizona’s REV. STAT. § 13-1411 permits the court to order any person
convicted of bestiality to “undergo a psychological assessment and participate in
appropriate counseling at the convicted person’s own expense.”
We must take a closer look at the relevant laws in order to begin to understand
what courts might wish to know when ordering evaluations in these areas. To
what extent do the laws frame the reasons for FAMEs? If they do not, do we
know enough regarding judicial concerns in animal maltreatment cases for us to
speculate about the information that they wish to obtain when such evaluations
are ordered? We will examine these questions for animal neglect cases, then ani-
mal cruelty and animal sexual abuse cases.
Reasons for Evaluations in Animal Neglect Cases
Animal neglect is the failure to provide basic care for an animal in one’s cus-
tody, care that is necessary for that animal to thrive. Definitions of animal
caretakers (who might be subject to evaluations) vary by state. For example,
Maine’s REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3907 defines “owner” as a person own-
ing, keeping, or harboring a dog or other animal, and “keeper” as a person
in possession or control of a dog or other animal. According to the statute, a
person becomes the keeper of a stray domesticated animal, other than a dog
or livestock, if the person feeds that animal for at least 10 consecutive days.
Other states’ statutes are less specific. Utah’s CODE ANN. § 76-9-301 does not
define an “owner” but indicates that “custody” means “ownership, possession,
or control over an animal.”
Most states’ criminal statutes define a minimum standard of care requiring
that an animal caretaker provide water, food, shelter, and veterinary care, viola-
tions of which are typically classified as misdemeanors. Some statutes explicitly
outlaw animal abandonment as well (Animal Legal Defense Fund, undated).
In animal neglect cases, local animal care and control or humane agencies will
typically attempt to educate the offender to provide proper care. If education
proves ineffective, the offender may be cited under local ordinances. Gross, will-
ful, cruel, or malicious neglect occurs when the offender intentionally or know-
ingly withholds sustenance necessary to prevent dehydration and starvation.
These cases, which often involve large numbers of animals or which cause death
or serious physical harm to animals, may result in misdemeanor or even felony
charges (Lockwood, 2006).
As Table 2.2 illustrates, 13 of the 24 states that allow or direct judges to order
animal cruelty offenders to undergo a psychological evaluation do so in cases of
criminal animal neglect. When the state has provisions for evaluations in animal
cruelty evaluations, the provision allowing for the evaluation in neglect cases
frequently is the same as for cruelty cases. For example, Louisiana’s REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:102.1 indicates that in cases of animal cruelty or neglect, “the court
may order a psychological evaluation or anger management treatment for a first
conviction of the crime of simple cruelty to animals. For a second or subsequent
offense of the crime of simple cruelty to an animal, the court shall order a psy-
chological evaluation or anger management treatment.”
Statutes typically do not distinguish differences between types of maltreat-
ment in terms of what the court wants to know. Even in cases in which the statute
delineates the purpose of the evaluation, it does not distinguish a different evalu-
ation purpose or question for neglect offenders than for those who have been
charged with animal cruelty. For example, Michigan’s COMP. LAWS § 750.50(5)
statute reads: “The court may order a person convicted of violating subsection
(2) [animal cruelty or neglect] to be evaluated to determine the need for psychi-
atric or psychological counseling and, if determined appropriate by the court, to
receive psychiatric or psychological counseling.”
The statutes thus fail to help us understand how evaluations of animal neglect
offenders might differ from evaluations of animal cruelty offenders. In both
cases, the evaluator frequently lacks a specific referral question and, when such a
question is provided (e.g., whether the offender needs mental health counseling),
there are no guidelines for how an evaluator might make that determination.
There is no mention of what methods he or she might rely upon or what criteria
he or she should use.
So it is unclear what judges wish to know when they order evaluations of ani-
mal neglect offenders. What would judges be likely to say they want to know if
we were to ask them? It is likely that their answers would be related to practical
disposition decisions they must make as a consequence of a conviction for ani-
mal neglect. Courts have a variety of potential ways to respond to animal neglect
cases. Might the individual be permitted to retain custody of any of the animals,
or should all animals be forfeited to the state or local animal rescue groups?
What about the other animals in the home who are not the subject of charges?
For a variety of reasons including a desire to avoid issuing dozens of charges,
animal control officers may charge only a handful of the potentially actionable
offenses, but the animals for whom no charges were issued may also be subject to
neglect or abuse. Child welfare professionals generally assume that all children
in the home are at risk for maltreatment.
What are the parameters, if any, for restoration of a safe home (Weiss, 2010)?
For example, does the individual require periodic unannounced visits by a
humane officer to inspect the care and condition of any animal(s) permitted to
remain in the individual’s custody? Should the individual’s spouse or family
members be permitted to obtain custody of the animals? Offenders have been
known to simply transfer “ownership” to a spouse, relative, or friend in order
to retain control over the animals. Should the individual be prohibited from
acquiring other animals within a specified time period? Does the individual
have a mental illness that prohibits him or her from adequately caring for the
animals in his custody?
Let us consider what questions would lead logically to a judicial decision about
a disposition in animal neglect cases. We nominate the following possibilities.
First, courts might seek an explanation for the animal neglect before approach-
ing the question of possible recidivism and potential remediation. As discussed
in Chapter 6, “reasons” for people’s animal neglect may be quite varied, but
there are two broad categories: people whose incapacities lead to neglect, and
people for whom the neglect is a consequence of indifference or even malice.
(And some neglect offenders might fall into both categories.) In the first broad
category are offenders who, despite the fact that they may genuinely value their
animals, neglect them due to incapacities such as severe mental illness, signifi-
cant cognitive deficits, or non-aggressive personality disorders. Sometimes they
may be unaware of their inability or failure to meet the animals’ needs despite
significant disease, suffering, and death. Hoarders may fall into this category.
The second category of neglect offenders are cognizant and capable of animal
care, yet are indifferent to the suffering of the animals in their custody. Some
may purposely neglect animals (e.g., starve them or lock them outside in frigid
temperatures) in order to punish them for perceived misbehavior. These two
types of animal neglect offenders differ characterologically, are likely to present
differently upon evaluation, and generally would require different dispositional
approaches and offer different prospects regarding remediation.
Second, the court might seek an estimate of the likelihood that the person will
engage in neglect in the future. They may expect clinicians to make “predictions”
about future animal neglect, based on the individual’s clinical or personality
characteristics as well as the person’s past history of animal neglect. Clearly,
though, much research would be needed to offer empirically verified estimates
of the likelihood of future neglect based on clinical data.
Third, courts might want clinicians to determine whether there is something
that can be done to reduce the likelihood of future animal neglect. Dispositional
options generally will fall into three categories:
• Changing the offender in a way that reduces the likelihood of future

neglect
• Restricting the offender’s access to or custody of animals
• Controlling the conditions under which the offender has contact or cus-
tody of animals.
The latter can take many forms: for example, assurance that a relative or other
family member will care for the animal, restricting the number of animals, and/
or establishing a process of periodic inspection by a local animal welfare authority.
Later in this chapter we discuss the possibility that concepts used for assess-
ments in the area of child protection may offer a framework for thinking about
animal neglect evaluations.
Reasons for Evaluations in Animal Cruelty Cases
Nineteen states (see Table 2.2) provide for evaluations of persons convicted of

animal cruelty. Statutes typically do not describe the reason for these evalua-
tions. Colorado’s Section 18-9-202(B)(III) is perhaps unique in explicitly stating
the purpose of mandatory presentence evaluations of animal cruelty offend-

ers: “The court shall order an evaluation to be conducted prior to sentencing to
assist the court in determining an appropriate sentence.” Although the statute
makes the purpose of the evaluation clear, it does not provide guidance on the
type of information that would inform sentencing.
In the absence of any literature to reveal the courts’ concerns, we pose three
possible concerns that courts might have when ordering evaluations of those
convicted of animal cruelty. We consider these for adults and for juveniles.
Concerns in Adult Cases
First, judges might have questions about whether it is safe to return the animal to
the person’s custody. In some cases, this might include the question of removing
other animals from the person’s custody; animals that were not victims of the
criminal charges are sometimes left in an unsafe environment. Were the animals
the offender physically abused neglected as well? Should the offender formally be
prohibited from acquiring other animals within a specified time period?
Second, some statutes (e.g., Colorado) include provisions for counseling and
anger management programs. Courts might seek information on whether the
offender needs mental health treatment and, if so, the type of treatment that is
indicated. Does the offender have a substance abuse problem that contributed
to the offense and that warrants treatment? Does the offender have difficulty
controlling anger or impulses? Would the offender benefit from an anger man-
agement program? What is the offender’s degree of insight into his behavior and
how likely is it that he will benefit from an insight-oriented therapy?
Finally, courts might seek information on whether the offender’s animal cru-
elty signals an increased risk that the person might harm people. Several studies
(see Chapter 4) have demonstrated that animal abuse may be a reliable marker
for other forms of family violence including domestic violence and child abuse.
The court may wish to know whether the animal cruelty offender is at risk of
abusing an intimate partner or children in the offender’s custody.
Sometimes the animal cruelty offense itself has implications for interpersonal
relations. Did the offender abuse the animal in an attempt to intimidate or pun-
ish an intimate partner or child? Is this other person at risk? If the animal cruelty
offense was committed to punish or intimidate another person, a condition of pro-
bation might include a prohibition against contacting that person. In an effort to
protect victims of domestic abuse, several states now include pets in protection
orders (e.g., Steinberg, 2011). What are the offender’s beliefs about discipline? How
does the offender typically punish the animals and children in the offender’s care?
Particularly in cases of animal torture, does the offender have sadistic traits?
Concerns in Juvenile Cases
Several states make special provisions allowing or requiring evaluations of
juveniles convicted of animal cruelty or provide for counseling for those juveniles.
For example, pursuant to Vermont’s STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 353(b)(4), the court
may order a juvenile adjudicated delinquent of animal cruelty or aggravated

animal cruelty “to undergo a psychiatric or psychological evaluation and to par-
ticipate in treatment that the court determines to be appropriate after due consid-
eration of the evaluation.” Presumably the courts in New Jersey, New Mexico, and
Washington (see Table 2.2) also seek information on whether the juvenile needs
mental health treatment and, if so, the type of treatment that is indicated.
Courts sometimes may presume that youth who engage in animal cruelty
present an increased risk of harming another person, a concern with some sup-
port from research linking childhood animal cruelty to adult offending (see
Chapter 6). From a psychological perspective, a relevant question is whether the
juvenile manifests other symptoms of conduct disorder, particularly callous and
unemotional traits. If the juvenile participated in the cruelty in the presence of
or in concert with other youth, the evaluator will likely wish to determine the
juvenile’s role in the abuse. Was the juvenile a “leader” or “follower”? Did the
juvenile abuse the animal in order to intimidate younger children? The evaluator
will likely wish to question the juvenile about thoughts of harm to others and
access to weapons such as hunting rifles.
Research suggests that juvenile animal cruelty can sometimes represent dis-
placed hostility and aggression on the part of the youth who suffers or witnesses
abuse (Muscari & Brown, 2010). Given the relationship between childhood
abuse and juvenile animal cruelty offending, judges may want to know whether
the juvenile offender is a victim of physical and/or sexual abuse or a witness to
domestic violence. Discovery of such abuse will obviously require appropriate
referrals and intervention.
Other reasons that courts might request evaluations specifically for juveniles
in animal cruelty cases may be similar to those in adult cases. For example, the
court may wish to know about the juvenile’s relationship or interaction with
other animals, including family pets, to determine whether the juvenile has a
pattern of cruelty to animals and to assess whether the animals remaining in the
home should be removed for their own protection.
Reasons for Evaluations in Animal Sexual Abuse Cases
Currently eight states permit or mandate psychological evaluations for individ-

uals convicted of sexually abusing an animal (see Table 2.2). As with statutes
directing evaluations for cruelty or neglect offenders, statutes typically do not
describe the reason for evaluations of animal sexual abusers, but aspects of the
statutes provide some clues.
For example, of the eight states permitting or mandating such evaluations,
Arizona, Iowa, Oregon, and Missouri statutes explicitly state that the sexual assault
of an animal is a crime regardless of whether the animal is alive or dead. Statutes in
Colorado, Illinois, Maine, and Rhode Island contain no such provision, suggesting
that the law applies only when the animal victim is alive. One might conclude that
Arizona, Iowa, and Missouri outlaw sexual contact with animals not only because
of harm to the animal victim, but because of the depravity inherent in the con-
duct. Interestingly, these three states provide for psychological evaluations only for
animal sexual abusers, not for those guilty of animal cruelty or neglect. This could
suggest that the purpose of the law in these states is to punish the deviancy of the
offender rather than the mistreatment of an animal.
In the absence of any literature to reveal the courts’ specific reasons for evalua-
tions in sexual abuse cases, we pose two possible concerns that might offer guid-
ance for clinicians until further research can identify more clearly what courts
want to know in these cases.
First, judges might be concerned about the psychological well-being of individ-
uals engaging in a bizarre and socially unacceptable sexual act, ordering evalua-
tions primarily to assess their treatment needs. Some statutes include provisions
for counseling (e.g., Maine), and courts might seek information on the type of
treatment that is indicated.
Second, courts may wish to know whether the offender’s sexual abuse of animals
signals an increased risk that the person might sexually offend against other humans,
especially children. For this reason, the evaluator will wish to determine whether
the offender has a history of sexual and/or physical offending against humans.
Various types of paraphilia tend to be comorbid in some cases (Kafka & Hennen,
2002), so it is not illogical to conclude that those who have sexually abused animals
may have committed other criminal sexual acts. Moreover, sexual assault of an
animal often causes pain or death for the animal (Lockwood, 2006), so there may
be overlap between animal physical abuse and animal sexual abuse.
In assessing the animal sexual abuser, it will be important for the evaluator
to determine whether the individual caused, coerced, or forced another person
to engage in sexual behavior with the animal. Alternatively, was the offender
caused, coerced, or forced into such behavior? Abusive men sometimes force
their intimate partners to engage in sexual activity with animals (Ascione
et al., 2007).
Reasons for Evaluations in Animal Fighting Cases
As Table 2.2 illustrates, four states permit evaluations of animal cruelty offenders

convicted of animal fighting. The District of Columbia CODE ANN. § 22-1015,
for example, defines fighting as “an organized event wherein there is a display of
combat between two or more animals in which the fighting, killing, maiming,
or injuring of an animal is a significant feature, or main purpose, of the event.”
The most common forms of animal fighting in the United States are dogfight-
ing and cockfighting, both of which are illegal in all 50 states (Animal Legal
Defense Fund, 2009). Because animal fights often involve gang and other crimi-
nal activity such as illegal gambling, narcotics possession, weapons possession,
conspiracy, money laundering, and racketeering (Davis, 1997), courts may wish
to know about the other enterprises in which the offender is engaged and his
general degree of antisociality.
Evaluators tasked with assessing those involved with animal fighting are
advised to keep in mind that such individuals often subject dogs to ongoing
neglect and cruelty during training. According to the Animal Legal Defense
Fund (2009), dogs are frequently forced to wear heavy chains and run on tread-
mills; fed steroids, stimulants, and/or narcotics; left outside without shelter;
starved to increase aggression or qualify them to “make weight” in a contract
fight; and subjected to crude ear cropping and amateur treatment for fighting
injuries. Losing dogs or those that refuse to fight are often killed by shooting,
hanging, drowning, or electrocution. Inquiries should also be made into whether
the offender has brought a child to a fight in the past; animal fighting is report-
edly used to initiate youth into a culture of violence (Gibson, 2005).
Summary
As we look across these areas of animal maltreatment, we can identify some

common themes about the possible questions that courts might want forensic
evaluations to address. We arrive at four general questions. We number and label
these so that we may refer to them in the remainder of the chapter.
1. Causal Question: What are the reasons for the person’s animal maltreat-
ment? Courts may presume (correctly) that answers to this question will
inform the other purposes.
2. Recidivism Question: What is the likelihood that this person will engage
in animal maltreatment again? Courts may presume that forensic evalu-
ations can provide an estimate of the likelihood of future maltreatment
of the current animal victim or of other animals.
3. General Public Safety Question: Does the person’s animal maltreatment
have implications for future offending other than animal maltreatment?
Courts may presume that animal maltreatment is a signal that the
individual might engage in other harmful behaviors, especially those
involving danger to humans.
4. Remediation Question: If the likelihood of future animal maltreatment
or danger to humans is serious, can anything reasonably be done to
reduce the likelihood? And if so, what intervention would be necessary?
Does the court have options at its disposal to reduce future harm, and
what is the likelihood that they will be effective?
D E V ELO PI N G C O N C EP TS A N D M O D ELS
TO G U I D E E VA LUAT I O N S
If these are the forensic questions, a field dedicated to advancing FAMEs must
develop appropriate concepts and models to guide the evolution of relevant assess-
ment methods. In this section, we explore the potential to develop conceptual
guidance for FAMEs in animal neglect cases, then in animal cruelty and sexual
abuse cases, regarding the four questions. In doing so, we borrow concepts that
have served well in other areas of forensic mental health assessment. The areas
from which we borrow include child custody and child neglect forensic assess-
ments, assessments for legal competencies, and assessments to estimate the like-
lihood of future offending. We conclude not with a fully developed conceptual
model for FAMEs, but with a set of promising conceptual approaches to guide
the field’s further exploration of a foundation for FAMEs.
Conceptualizing Assessments for Animal Neglect
The Causal Question in animal neglect cases is likely to be seen by courts as an

evaluation of the psychological characteristics of individuals that can explain
their animal neglect. Based on models in other areas of forensic mental health
assessment, we suggest that this presumption should be augmented to include
two concepts. We call them the “functional concept” and the “contextual con-
cept.” Both of these concepts have a significant history in forensic assessment
that has been described in detail by Grisso (2003).
The Functional Concept

We have said that the court will be interested in an evaluation of the “charac-
teristics of the individual” as a way to address the Causal Question—the reason
for the person’s animal neglect. Courts are likely to presume that this refers to
the individual’s personality traits, cognitive capacities (e.g., developmental dis-
abilities), and diagnoses of clinical conditions of psychopathology (with varying
degrees of insight). Based on research described in other chapters, these charac-
teristics of the individual undoubtedly are important for building a causal pic-
ture of the individual’s animal neglect.
Special consideration should be given to adding another conceptual feature to
forensic evaluations specifically involving animal neglect. As described earlier
in this chapter, many of the courts’ concerns in these cases focus on whether it
is safe for the individual to continue to have custody of animals and, if so, under
what conditions. This question and others arising in animal neglect cases are
much like questions asked in child custody, child neglect, and termination of
parental rights cases (Budd, Connell & Clark, 2011; Fuhrmann & Zibbell, 2011).
Modern law pertaining to the custody of children has recognized a “functional
approach” to such questions. Whatever the person’s diagnostic condition, what
is the person actually able to know, understand, believe, and do that is relevant
for caring for children? What specific deficits exist in the person’s functional
abilities to care for a child? Rather than using personality traits and diagnostic
conditions to infer what the person can and cannot do in raising a child, this
approach directly assesses what they can and cannot do.
We suggest that this functional approach to addressing questions about the
custody of children may be applied profitably to evaluations for animal neglect.
There is a body of knowledge (such as The Guidelines for Standards of Care in

Animal Shelters by Newbury et al., 2010) that provides a reference for what is
required to care for animals. Conceptually, employing this functional approach
would require including in the forensic assessment a way to identify what the
individual knows, understands, believes, and can do regarding taking care of
animals. If there are deficits in these abilities, then an evaluation of the person’s
psychological traits, cognitive abilities, and clinical diagnostic conditions can be
used to explain the deficits.
This approach to forensic assessments of human capacities related to legal
questions has been thoroughly developed and described by Grisso (2003). In that
reference, Otto and Edens (2003) apply Grisso’s model to the development of
concepts and assessment methods for examining functional parenting abilities
associated with forensic questions of child neglect. This can offer a guide for
development of animal care abilities in forensic evaluations involving animal
neglect. Later we will consider what methods might be developed to directly
assess a person’s animal care abilities.
The Contextual Concept

Courts understandably wish to know about the characteristics of an individual
that are related to animal neglect. But the Causal Question—“What are the rea-
sons for the person’s animal maltreatment”—requires more than an evaluation
of the individual. Psychology and psychiatry (whether general or forensic) rec-
ognize that human behavior is a consequence of a person functioning within a
social context. A person’s abilities, psychological traits, and clinical characteris-
tics usually play a strong role in explaining why they behave the way they do. But
a great deal of human behavior is also explained by the environment in which
they live and with which they interact, the influences of social relations on their
behavior at a given time, and opportunities (or the lack of them) that are offered
for offending.
Given this perspective, more is needed to address the causal question than
information about the individual’s abilities, psychological characteristics, and
clinical condition. One also needs “contextual” information about the social,
familial, or community context with which the individual interacts and in
which the individual’s behavior occurs. Therefore, FAMEs typically will require
an evaluation of the characteristics of the individual, an evaluation of the indi-
vidual’s social context, and an integration of both types of information aimed at
explaining the individual’s past animal maltreatment.
Assessing the social context opens up many avenues for assessment. What is
the person’s home environment like? Who else in the family might have been
contributing to the person’s animal neglect? In domestic neglect cases involving
the family member who is charged and the neglected child, often we can better
understand the dynamics of the neglect by understanding the special needs of
the neglected child. When an animal is the victim, what can we learn about the
individual’s neglect by understanding the specific animal that was neglected?
We will consider these potentials further in a later section of this chapter on

implications for assessment.
Together with the “functional concept,” the “contextual concept” focuses us on
analyses that are found in forensic evaluations in termination of parental rights
cases. Specifically, it allows for a comparison of the parent’s abilities in relation
to the particular needs of the child (Grisso, 2003; Otto & Edens, 2003). Like
children, animals vary in the degree to which they are in need of various care-
giving abilities. For example, those with health problems may require particular
attention to their unique nutritional or medical needs. Likewise, children’s and
animals’ developmental stages also affect the requisite caregiving competencies.
Newborns (whether child or animal) require different care than those in their
sixteenth year of life. Also, a parent may be able to parent one child sufficiently
but be overwhelmed by multiple children (Budd, Connell, & Clark, 2011). Thus
courts can consider the (in)congruency between the examinee’s parenting abili-
ties and the unique needs and characteristics of the particular child whose wel-
fare is in question (Otto & Edens, 2003).
This is central to answering other questions that courts are likely to want to
address—the Recidivism Question and the Remedial Question. Under what con-
ditions could the person better care for an animal? Are there animals the person
could care for, and animals she could not, given her deficits? Are there structured
conditions in which her deficits could be less damaging? For example, could a
woman with borderline intellectual functioning charged with neglect of 10 cats
be considered competent to care for two cats with structured, ongoing assistance
from others? Or do her cognitive deficits suggest that her sentence should include
a lifetime prohibition against “owning” any animals?
Conceptualizing Assessments for Animal

Much of our description of the functional and contextual concepts in animal

neglect evaluations might be applied to animal cruelty and animal sexual abuse
evaluations as well. A major difference in the purpose of these evaluations, how-
ever, is that abilities and capacities are of less concern in cruelty and abuse cases
than in neglect cases. Cruelty cases tend less often to ask questions about the
ability to care for an animal, and more often about the propensity to harm an
animal (or a person) in the future. As such, the Recidivism Question in cru-
elty cases relates more to motivations than to capacities, and the Public Safety
Question takes on substantially greater significance.
In this regard, a concept of “future risk of cruelty to animals” may be rel-
evant to develop for animal cruelty and animal sexual abuse cases. A simi-
lar concept is found in other areas of forensic evaluation. Perhaps the most
extensively developed subfield of forensic mental health evaluations focuses
on assessment for “risk of violence” (Heilbrun, 2009; Hoge & Andrews, 2010).
The word “violence” refers to serious offending that harms others physically.
But as an area of research, this subfield has developed sophisticated methods
for assessing the risk of future offending of various kinds, including any ille-
gal behavior (e.g., “arrest”), harmful aggression, serious harmful aggression
(e.g., “violent assault”), and specific types of aggression such as sexual offend-
ing. Their purpose is to estimate the likelihood that a person will re-offend in
any of these ways.
This subfield has a 40-year history that can offer FAME conceptual guidance
as it begins to develop ways to assess the likelihood of future animal cruelty
re-offending. Notice the word “re-offending.” Almost all violence risk assess-
ment methods have been developed to estimate future offending by people who
have already offended. Both theoretically and empirically, our experience tells us
that developing a method to assess future offending for people who have never
offended is unlikely to produce useful results. We can infer that there would be
little value in seeking methods to assess animal cruelty or sexual abuse among
persons who have never engaged in the behavior.
The general forensic subfield of violence risk assessment offers several recom-
mendations that might be applied when we consider the prospects for developing
assessment methods to identify the likelihood of animal cruelty or animal sexual
abuse re-offending. They are the fallacy of predictions, the need for evidence-based
risk factors, attention to population diversity, and the importance of risk manage-
ment in risk assessment.
Making Estimates, not Predictions

One of the most important lessons from the field of risk assessment is the need to
carefully conceptualize what we can expect any assessment method to do by way
of arriving at conclusions about future risk. We know without a doubt, for exam-
ple, that we should not try to predict whether or not a person who has engaged in
animal cruelty will do so again. This dichotomous way of thinking about the risk
assessment task—the person will or will not—has long been known to produce a
high degree of error. The base rate of most aggressive behaviors is not high, and
when this is the case, a “prediction that the person will re-offend” has a greater
likelihood of being wrong than right (Monahan, 1981).
The goal of the field of risk assessment, therefore, is estimating the relative
likelihood of future re-offending. For example, a reasonable goal for assessment
of people who have engaged in animal cruelty is to determine whether they are
less likely, more likely, or much more likely than most animal cruelty offenders
to engage in future animal cruelty. In other words, we can seek methods that
place cases in a range from low to moderate to high risk, with the latter being
“high” relative to the full set of cases, regardless of whether the probability of
re-offending for the “high” group represents a high absolute probability.
In such assessment systems, we do not know whether an individual in the
“high” group will or won’t engage in animal cruelty again. But we know that the
individual is similar to a group that is the most likely to re-offend, compared to
the full range of animal cruelty offenders. This is a proper objective, given the
limits of prediction associated with relatively low-base-rate behaviors. In esti-

mating risk among animal cruelty offenders, it will be particularly important
not to rely solely on re-arrest data, as incidents of animal maltreatment are much
more likely to go undetected than incidents of interpersonal violence (because of
animal victims’ inability to report their victimization).
Evidence-Based Risk Factors

When the subfield of violence risk assessment began, clinicians were using their
own theoretical and clinically driven efforts to make risk estimates. Eventually
the subfield went in another direction. Using large samples of people who had
offended, and following those samples for several years, research found reliable
variables that distinguished those who eventually re-offended from those who
did not. Using this method, the subfield found “factors”—such as demographic,
behavioral, or personality characteristics—that were successful in separating
offenders into relatively low, moderate, and high probabilities of re-offending.
When used in clinical cases, these empirically based risk factors were found to
outperform clinicians’ judgments based on unstructured interviews and clinical
theoretical interpretations.
Experience suggests that FAMEs aimed at estimating the likelihood that
animal cruelty offenders will re-offend, whether against animals or humans,
should adopt the evidence-based risk factor approach to those assessments.
Estimates of risk of re-offending based on general clinical judgment or theo-
retical variables for which there is no evidence of their validity fall short of
current standards for expert testimony in forensic work in the twenty-first
century. Until this can be remedied, we will have to do the best we can on the
basis of our best clinical judgment, while recognizing and being open about
our limitations.
Population-Based Approach
The field of risk assessment has found that different risk assessment tools are
needed for different populations. The reason for this is almost self-evident when
one considers the range of people who engage in any given harmful behavior.
Heilbrun (2009) explains that often different factors are needed to identify future
risk of harm by persons of different ages, genders, mental health status, and loca-
tion (referring to places from which population samples are drawn—for example,
the community vs. an incarcerated population). It is likely that animal cruelty
and sexual abuse of animals occur for different reasons across these population
types, and we should not expect a single set of risk factors to do well for all types
of animal cruelty offenders.
Risk Management
In recent years, the field of risk assessment has evolved to encourage methods
that do not merely estimate the likelihood of future harmful behavior, but
also offer prospects for responding to persons with a high risk of re-offending.
Ultimately we wish not only to know that a person has a greater likelihood
of repeating animal cruelty, but also ways in which we can mitigate harm
and decrease its likelihood. Similarly, we would like to be able to determine
whether a person’s degree of risk has changed across time (for example, after
some therapeutic intervention). Attending to risk management as an objective
encourages the development of assessment methods that can inform us not
only about the likelihood that an animal cruelty offender will re-offend, but
can provide suggestions for modifying conditions that are augmenting the
risk as well as indicators as to whether those modifications are decreasing risk
for a given individual.
Summary
The concepts and models described in this section certainly are not exhaus-
tive. Our purpose has been merely to offer a starting point for thinking about
the early development of assessment methods for animal neglect and ani-
mal cruelty. A great deal more work will be required not only to identify the
questions that the courts ask and the information they need to address them,
but also to translate those into concepts that can guide animal maltreatment
assessments. As those efforts progress, we can then begin to develop assess-
ment methods, and we turn now to some suggestions for getting started on
that task.
TOWA R D AS S ES S M EN T M E T H O DS A N D TO O LS
Moving from concepts and models to the development of specific tools requires
an additional process of translation aimed at operationalizing the concepts. We
will consider the nature of that process here, and Chapter 11 will offer an over-
view of initial efforts with this objective.
Building Tools for Animal Neglect Assessment
We suggested earlier that animal neglect assessments may take a functional

approach to addressing questions about individuals’ capacities as custodians
of animals. Conceptually, this would require including in the forensic assess-
ment a way to identify what the individual knows, understands, believes, and
can do regarding taking care of animals. Here we discuss some of the work that
would be needed to translate this intent into methods and tools for use in animal
neglect evaluations.
Defining Relevant Abilities for Animal Care

The process of developing assessment methods to identify human capacities and
abilities relevant to forensic questions has been described generally in Grisso
(2003). In Grisso’s book, Otto and Edens (2003) describe the process that has
been used by developers of child custody evaluation methods to identify knowl-
edge, abilities, and skills that seem necessary while caring for children. This is
the type of process that will be necessary to build tools to assess people’s abilities
to care for animals.
The process can begin by identifying the essential needs of animals for both
their survival and their healthy development. Is the individual cognizant of the
animal’s needs for food, water, adequate shelter (i.e., housing that is safe, sani-
tary, temperature-controlled and of sufficient size), veterinary care, and adequate
stimulation, including exercise?
As previously mentioned, Newbury et al. (2010) provide a reference for iden-
tifying animals’ needs and what is required to care for animals. Given that type
of guidance, one might be able to translate such “elements of animal care” into
the functional abilities around which one could build a structured assessment
of a person’s animal-care strengths and deficits. Budd et al. (2011) and Otto and
Edens (2003) provide many examples of how this has been done for purposes of
child-caring abilities. Certainly a person’s knowledge of animals’ needs would
constitute one set of abilities that would be required. But merely knowing what
the animal needs does not assure that a person can or will execute the behaviors
that are necessary to meet those needs. Thus one anticipates that an inventory of
relevant abilities in this context would include cognitive factors (e.g., the ability
to remember when and how to engage in animal caregiving tasks), psychological
factors (e.g., the insight necessary to realize and act on deficits in one’s care-
giving), and attitudinal factors (providing the motivation to engage in animal
caregiving tasks).
Constructing the Abilities Assessment Instrument

Once the relevant abilities and attitudes are identified, the test developer then
translates these into items that reflect or represent them. Ideally the items are
constructed in a way that provides quantifiable data, allowing for later research
to provide scores, scales, and norms as well as the development of research on the
validity (actual meaning) of the scores for accurately describing animal caregiv-
ing capacities and deficits.
Part of the process of developing such tools is deciding on appropriate formats
for their administration. Some tools use structured interviews that include the
relevant items as interview questions. Hypothetical animal caregiving situations
can be proposed to elicit the individual’s reactions. In some cases, caregiving
tasks can even be simulated, requiring performance of the relevant skills. The
animal caregiving assessment field can borrow from a wide range of formats for
tools assessing legally relevant functional abilities in other areas, including com-
petence to stand trial, guardianship evaluations, and parenting capacity evalua-
tions (all reviewed in Grisso, 2003).
Building Tools for Animal Cruelty and Sexual Abuse
We suggested earlier that animal cruelty and animal sexual abuse assessments
might seek to develop ways to measure a concept, “future risk of cruelty to ani-
mals,” using risk factors to estimate the likelihood of future re-offending. Ideally
the assessment methods also would include features that would guide risk man-
agement to reduce future offending or to mitigate its seriousness. The following
identifies some of the more important features of risk assessment tools, although
our coverage is not comprehensive.
Defining Risk Factors

There are two broad ways to identify potential risk factors for use in risk assess-
ment tools. One is theoretical and the other empirical.
Translated to the development of animal cruelty risk assessment, the
theoretical approach begins with an explanatory theory that claims to
account for animal cruelty, then draws from that theory a set of measurable
characteristics—past behaviors, clinical conditions, personality features—that
are consistent with the theory. For example, the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised
(PCL-R: Hare, 2003) was derived from a theory that presumes that there is
a personality type with a higher risk of engaging in chronic and persistent
illegal behaviors. The hypothesized characteristics of psychopaths were care-
fully defined, and the PCL-R was constructed to measure those characteris-
tics. Across time, substantial research identified the exceptional value of these
characteristics in estimating likelihood of future re-offending. Applied to
animal cruelty, a theoretical approach would not require a single theory. One
could construct separate theories for various presumed types of animal cruelty
offenders (e.g., a theory of animal sexual abuse), leading eventually to special-
ized assessment tools.
The alternative is to take an empirical approach to identifying potential
risk factors for animal cruelty, and this can take two routes. One is to conduct
research that allows us to identify the historical, clinical, and personality factors
that reliably distinguish persons who have engaged in animal cruelty (generally,
or some specific form of it). The other is to make the initial presumption that
factors known to be related to harmful aggression against humans may also be
useful in estimating the likelihood of aggression against animals. This approach
would borrow on the accumulation of research on general risk of aggression as
its starting point.
Whether we identify potential animal cruelty variables theoretically or empir-
ically, we must then test the selected variables prospectively before we settle on
them as “risk factors for animal cruelty.” This type of research begins with a
population of persons known to have engaged in animal cruelty, identifies them
on each of the variables, then follows them for some period of time to determine
whether (and which) factors have statistical power (when used in combination)
to identify re-offending. This will be more difficult when applied to the question
of animal abuse recidivism, however, because often animals can suffer and die
with no record of their passing.
Constructing the Risk Assessment Instrument

The process of developing an animal cruelty risk assessment tool requires a num-
ber of decisions beyond the identification of risk factors. The field of forensic risk
assessment suggests the following considerations.
As noted earlier, one of the desirable features of forensic risk assessment
requires going beyond estimates of future re-offending to provide guidance
for risk management. This includes efforts to provide guidance for changing
the likelihood of an individual’s future re-offending, as well as ways to assess
changes in that likelihood across time (e.g., after some therapeutic intervention).
This leads us to consider the inclusion of certain features in risk assess-
ment tools for animal cruelty. One is to attend to selection of a combination
of “static” and “dynamic” risk factors. Static risk factors are factors that do
not change. If a risk factor in an assessment tool is “age at first offense,” that
factor will be the same for a person no matter how many times across their
adolescent or adult years they are re-evaluated. The factor might work well
in contributing to an estimate of future re-offending. But what if we wish to
reassess a person to determine if the risk of their future harmful behavior has
been reduced by their maturation, a change in their life circumstances, or a
therapeutic intervention? An assessment method based primarily on static
risk factors will be of no use for that purpose, because it will not allow for any
changes in the person that might have reduced (or increased) their risk. At
least some of the factors included in the tool should be dynamic—things that
can change in a way that lowers or raises risk.
The second consideration to improve risk management is to follow the trend
in general forensic risk assessment toward the development of tools that use
the “Risk/Needs/Responsivity” approach (Hoge & Andrews, 2010; Vincent,
Guy, & Grisso, 2012). The risk-need-responsivity (RNR) model states that the
risk and needs of the individual should determine the strategies appropri-
ate for addressing the individual’s criminogenic factors. High-risk offenders
should receive intensive treatment whereas low-risk offenders should receive
minimal treatment. This approach also presumes that the factors that iden-
tify higher risk also represent an individual’s needs, and that if those needs
are addressed, it should reduce future offending. Examples might be men-
tal health needs or various life stressors (interpersonal relations, economic
stresses) that increase anger and aggression. These can then become targets
for intervention with the individual. “Responsivity” refers to the person’s
amenability to change, including personal strengths. Including items in a tool
that identify responsitivity factors contributes to an estimate of future pros-
pects for re-offending, as well as suggestions for building on the individual’s
strengths to meet intervention goals.
A broader question in constructing risk assessment tools for animal cruelty
is a consideration of the general format of the tool. The field of forensic risk
assessment has produced two dominant formats: an actuarial approach and

a structured professional judgment approach (see Heilbrun, 2009, for further
explanation). An actuarial approach uses items that can be scored with a high
degree of reliability, producing factor scores that are combined using statisti-
cal algorithms, to classify a person in a risk category. The examiner engages
in a minimal amount of judgment in assigning scores and no judgment at all
(no interpretive process) in arriving at the classification of low, moderate, or
high risk. A structured professional judgment approach to risk assessment
emphasizes the value of offering structure like an actuarial tool (every evalu-
ation employs the same items and the same procedure), as well as scores or
ratings. But the process does not produce a final “risk score” and the final
judgment about risk is not the product of an algorithm. Examiners use their
own judgment, based on their consideration of all of the item low/moderate/
high scores, to arrive at a level of risk.
Both approaches have benefits and liabilities (see, for example, Conroy &
Murrie, 2007, for a discussion of this). But substantial research has found that
one can achieve similar levels of reliability and validity with both approaches.
Moreover, the structured professional judgment approach allows examiners to
adjust their estimates for cases in which idiosyncratic features of a given case,
with very probable relevance for future risk, are not included in the standardized
factors used by the tool.
C O N C LU S I O N
As the field of forensic animal maltreatment evaluations evolves, specialized ani-

mal maltreatment assessment tools will be an important feature of its growth.
These, of course, will not stand alone. Mental health professionals already have
a significant armory of tools to measure various cognitive, personality, and
psychopathological characteristics of individuals that will be useful in assist-
ing courts to understand the causes of animal maltreatment. Yet it will greatly
benefit by the development of forensic tools designed especially around the ques-
tions that the courts ask in such cases.
As we conclude this chapter, we note that our main aim has been to convey
this: the development of assessment concepts and methods in this area need
not start from scratch. Indeed, the field should not imagine that it is “unique”
merely because it is exploring an application of mental health evaluations to new
questions in legal contexts involving animal maltreatment. The modern field of
forensic assessment offers about 40 years of experience in the development of
assessment instruments designed specifically to address questions raised in legal
forums. The field of FAME can experience accelerated growth by borrowing on
that experience, rather than setting out on the journey as explorers unaware that
there are maps of the terrain.
R EFER EN C ES
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from: http://aldf.org/article.php?id=927
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13, 354–373.
Budd, K, Connell, M., & Clark, J. (2011). Evaluation of parenting capacity in child pro-
tection. New York: Oxford University Press.
Conroy, M., & Murrie, D. (2007). Forensic assessment of violence risk: A guide for risk
assessment and risk management. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Davis, S. E. (1997, November). Blood sport: Dog fighting is big business in California,
and just about impossible to stop. California Lawyer, 17, 44.
Fuhrmann, G., & Zibbell, R. (2011). Evaluation for child custody. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Gibson, H. (2005). Dog fighting detailed discussion. Animal Legal and Historical
Center, Michigan State University College of Law: East Lansing. Retrieved
from: http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ddusdogfighting.htm
Grisso, T. (2003). Evaluating competencies: Forensic assessments and instruments
(2nd ed.). New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
Hare, R. (2003). The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (second edition). Toronto,
ON: Multi-Health Systems.
Heilbrun, K. (2009). Evaluation for risk of violence in adults. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hoge, R., & Andrews, D. (2010). Evaluation for risk of violence in juveniles.
Kafka, M. P., & Hennen, J. (2002). A DSM-IV Axis I comorbidity study of males
(n = 120) with paraphilias and paraphilia-related disorders. Sex Abuse, 14,
349–366.
Kukor, T., (2011, May 25). Testimony Given Before the Ohio House Criminal Justice
Committee. Retrieved from http://www.ohpsych.org/wp-content/uploads/testi-
mony/5.25%20testimony.pdf
Ladner, A. A. (2011, January 26). Letter to Mississippi Fighting Animal Cruelty
Together (MS-FACT). Mississippi Psychiatric Association.
Lockwood, R. (2006). Animal cruelty prosecution: Opportunities for early response to
crime and interpersonal violence. Alexandria, VA: American Prosecutors Research
Institute. Retrieved from: http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/animal_cruelty_06.pdf
Monahan, J. (1981). Predicting violent behavior: An assessment of clinical techniques.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
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sics: A guide for nurses and other health care professionals. New York: Springer.
Newbury, S., Blinn, M. K., Bushby, P. A., Cox, C. B., Dinnage, J. D., Grifﬁn, B., …
Spinde, M. (2010). The guidelines for standards of care in animal shelters. Apex,
NC: Association of Shelter Veterinarians. Retrieved from http://www.sheltervet.org/

assets/docs/shelter-standards-oct2011-wforward.pdf
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cies: Forensic assessments and instruments (pp. 229–307). New York: Kluwer
Academic/Plenum Publishers.
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victed animal abusers. Alexandria, VA: National District Attorneys Association,
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Animal%20Abusers%20-%20February%202013.pdf
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justice: A guidebook for implementation. National Youth Screening and Assessment
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ers. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 38, 251–257.
11
Methods for Forensic Animal

Maltreatment Evaluations
PHILIP TEDESCHI ■
This chapter describes concepts and methods for completing comprehensive

forensic animal maltreatment evaluations (FAMEs). It focuses on the structure
of the evaluation and its clinical features, and includes a review of instruments
available for enhancing the clinician’s data collection process.
The information shared in this chapter is based substantially on firsthand
experience completing forensic animal maltreatment evaluations at the Institute
for Human-Animal Connection located in the Graduate School of Social Work
on the campus of the University of Denver, where faculty, researchers, and grad-
uate students have been performing these specialized evaluations since 2008.
This is one of the first works to describe such evaluations, but other sources are
reviewed where relevant, as well as descriptions of specialized assessment tools
that are emerging for use in FAMEs.
Over the course of completing many FAMEs, it has become increasingly clear
that individualized evaluations are a critical activity and good investment in
community safety and public health. It is the exception that we evaluate an indi-
vidual engaged in abuse toward an animal without uncovering coexisting issues,
often significant mental health problems, family risk dynamics, or other clinical
variables. Having the courts request specialized FAMEs establishes the impor-
tance of providing an adequate continuum of treatment options to respond to
the evaluations’ findings and recommendations.
T H E C O N T E X T FO R FO R EN S I C A N I M A L
M A LT R E AT M EN T E VA LUAT I O N S
In our practice in Colorado, requests for FAMEs most frequently emanate from
the criminal justice system and specifically are requested as a post-disposition
and pre-sentence evaluation from either the district attorney’s office or probation
office charged with generating a pre-sentence plan for the courts. The evalua-
tions are referred from the courts as post-conviction, pre-sentence, and disposi-
tional evaluations.
Legal Considerations
In Colorado, as in many states, the statutes define animal abuse and require ani-
mal abuse evaluations for individuals charged with criminal animal cruelty. It
has been our experience that in many municipal- and state-level cases, there is
a failure to order these evaluations. In our research related to this failure, many
officers of the court indicate that because of a lack of available and qualified
evaluators and treatment providers, they do not request even mandated FAMEs.
Cost associated with the evaluation and a minimization of the seriousness of
animal abuse also contribute to this lack of response.
The statutory language and authority for the completion of FAMEs is defined
differently from state to state. In Colorado the relevant statute is CRS 18-9-202
Part 2, section III:
The court shall order an evaluation to be conducted prior to sentencing to

assist the court in determining an appropriate sentence. The person ordered
to undergo an evaluation shall be required to pay the cost of the evaluation,
unless the person qualifies for a public defender, then the cost will be paid
by the judicial district. If the evaluation results in a recommendation of
treatment and if the court so finds, the person shall be ordered to complete
an anger management treatment program or any other treatment program
that the court may deem appropriate.
In Colorado, statutory language favoring anger management treatment inac-

curately presumes that the cause of animal maltreatment necessarily involves
deregulated anger. Many other states’ statutes inappropriately assume that ani-
mal abuse most frequently is the result of a loss of temper and out-of-control
reaction or impulse. This generalization encourages premature assignment to
interventions such as anger management classes as a resolution for the problem.
The overt identification of anger management in the statutes speaks to the lack
of understanding of the myriad causative factors influencing abuse toward ani-
mals and default assumption that animal abuse is most frequently due to a loss
of control.
Methods for Forensic Animal Maltreatment Evaluations311
It can be an uncomfortable conclusion to recognize that frequently animal

abuse is a calculated act. Without question, anger problems are prominent in
some animal abuse cases, but other problems are equally likely reasons for the
abuse, underlining the need for specialized evaluation and improved under-
standing of this behavior.
In youth, for example, conduct disorder or low social competence factors are
often more common associations with animal abuse. Animal cruelty may be
an early indicator of aggressive or antisocial tendencies for some youth or may
be associated with maltreatment in the child’s environment that is being “acted
out” on animals (Ascione & Maruyama, 2010). For other children, animal cru-
elty may be symptomatic of mental health issues or reactions to trauma expe-
riences (Dadds, Whiting, & Hawes, 2006). Most young children go through
normal stages of curiosity and exploration of their natural environment as they
learn about the world around them. Some very young children cause injury or
death to insects and small animals because they lack knowledge and/or under-
standing regarding the consequences of their behaviors. In instances where
children lack intent to cause harm and/or lack understanding of the conse-
quences to the animal, the behaviors are not generally considered maladap-
tive. It is important that parents and caregivers understand that, although not
maladaptive, the child’s behaviors still present a danger to animals and may
require more supervision of the child with animals. In some cases, the safest
course of action for the child and the animal may be to discontinue the child’s
interactions with the animal. Deliberate acts of violence toward animals by
young children are often indicators of significant levels of psychological and
emotional disturbance and call for a thorough animal cruelty “offense specific”
evaluation and therapeutic intervention (Ascione & Murayama, 2010).
In many cases, animal abuse alerts us to family violence concerns. Violent
individuals may exploit the connection of their human victim(s) to their animals
and use it to force their human victim(s) into submission and/or silence, or to
exact revenge. It is not uncommon for perpetrators of intimate partner violence
to threaten, harm, or kill their partner’s companion animals (Ascione, 2007).
Animal cruelty is included in the definition of domestic violence in the Colorado
statute, and animals can be included as protected property under both civil and
criminal protection orders (WomensLaw.org, 2014). Additionally, animal abuse
by a parent or caregiver has implications for determining the “best interests of
a child” and child endangerment considerations in parenting and custody mat-
ters. Comprehensive assessment is critical in making accurate decisions at every
stage of the process including investigation, arrest, filing of cases, disposition,
and consequences or interventions that are required.
Cultural Concerns
The clinical assessment of animal abuse must take into account cultural dif-
ferences in peoples’ relations with animals. Defining animal abuse is often
more complex than defining abuse toward humans. There is no universally

accepted, normative and non-pathological way to interact with animals.
Completion of FAMEs challenges us to recognize the importance of social
norms and the risk of the dominant culture imposing beliefs that fail to fully
take into account the practices of other cultures. As the criminal justice sys-
tem embarks on the process of condoning or condemning various practices
and making professional opinions available to the courts in regard to animal
abuse, we must continually seek culturally relevant approaches and accurate
tools to inform this process.
We also must recognize that animal abuse and studies of the impact of abuse
on the developing child, the family system, and the community requires that
we not ignore, minimize, or deflect the seriousness of animal abuse, as it clearly
is a risk factor across cultures and an issue worthy of concern in its own right.
Recognition that animal abuse is a potential signal of other serious coexisting
mental health problems necessitates the use of sensitive, comprehensive, and
standardized methods for assessment of individuals who have engaged in seri-
ous or chronic animal cruelty in order to assist in the formation of appropriate
recommendations (Boat, 1995).
T H E PU R P O S E O F FO R EN S I C A N I M A L
M A LT R E AT M EN T E VA LUAT I O N S
FAMEs have three primary purposes. First, they seek to identify criminal,
behavioral, mental health, and trauma-based issues relevant to understanding
the cause and the emergence of the animal abuse behavior. In some cases, animal
abuse does not appear to be associated with identifiable diagnostic features. In
these cases, lack of diagnostic causative factors should be documented because
these clients maybe more appropriate for standard consequences such as fines,
incarceration, and restitution as the primary intervention.
Their second purpose is to provide an accurate estimate of the likelihood and
circumstances for continued abuse behavior (both toward the animal victim and
other animals) and community safety concerns. Although we have limited tools
to formally assess this likelihood, one of the primary purposes of the FAME is
the assessment of risk.
Third, FAMEs aim to provide recommendations for type and focus of treat-
ment and level of supervision. Some clinical information can even be relevant to
assist the court in deciding on restitution and fines (e.g., the degree of suffering
of the animal or the animal’s owner who was not the perpetrator).
Our clinic has developed a way to conceptualize the range of dispositions or
interventions that are used across animal maltreatment cases, based on risk and
level of intent. Shown in Figure 11.1, the response continuum visually depicts
and underscores the importance of multiple relevant factors, including risk
and harm done to the animal evaluated, in order to make recommendations
related to the appropriate level of intervention. This diagram can be used as a
Response Continuum
ity
a bil
ulp
Post Incarceration
rc
Level of harm
supervision, treatment
RISK LEVEL
o
nd/ Jail, community corrections, prison
ta
ten
o f in Mandated treatment, supervised probation,
ree animal specific conditions of probation
D eg
Arrest, court ordered evaluation, possible treatment,
seizure of animals, bonding for cost of care
Citations, fines, community service, etc
Educate and advise
Level of intervention
Figure 11.1 Response Continuum for Animal Maltreatment Cases.
source: Response Continuum (2013, Colorado Link Project) Retrieved from http://
coloradolinkproject.com/supervision-issues-and-recommendations/
multidimensional way of conceptualizing the key variables that may influence a

clinical conceptualization of the client.
In our evaluations, we determine risk level of the offender based on the use of
validated risk assessment criteria. It is useful to avoid using only static risk factors,
which are historical behaviors and experiences that have previously occurred
and will remain unaltered over time (absent new information). Special atten-
tion should be placed on dynamic risk factors, which include current behaviors,
thoughts, feelings, attitudes, interactions, and relationships, which can change
over time. Treatment is generally directed towards dynamic factors, which can
be reassessed periodically, allowing an adequate period of time between assess-
ments to note change.
T R A I N I N G A N D S K I L LS FO R FO R EN S I C
A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T E VA LUAT I O N
In our clinic in Colorado, the effort to train qualified and willing professionals to
evaluate or provide treatment in animal abuse cases is underway but remains a
challenge, especially in rural areas. This effort must continue if we are to develop
not only information for the court, but also community resources that allow
clinical recommendations to be implemented.
There are very few specialized evaluators locally or nationally to perform
FAMEs, and our hope is that one of the outcomes of this book is to encour-
age more professionals to gain expertise in this area of forensic evaluation. It is
also one of the outcomes of the specialized academic training for students at the
University of Denver’s graduate school of Social Work and Graduate school of
Professional Psychology. Some evaluators and treatment providers report that
working with the issue of animal abuse is too disturbing and refuse these assign-
ments. In time, we hope that formalized training will ready a greater number of
professionals to evaluate and provide treatment and that responding to animal
abuse will become an area of competence for mental health practitioners across
disciplines and academic training programs.
Future education of mental health professionals to perform FAMEs should
consider the range of knowledge and skills that are needed. Conducting FAMEs
requires familiarity with standardized forensic clinical skills and tools, and the
evaluator should be equipped with the following skills and knowledge:
• Understanding of the animal cruelty laws in the particular jurisdiction

where the abuse or neglect took place.
• Understanding of the needs of animals and how to recognize their dis-
comfort, suffering, and stress.
• Understanding of the potential legal and dispositional outcomes and
intervention resources, including what will happen to the animal
victim(s) and any other animals in the home.
• Knowledge about child and adult normative development and
psychopathology.
• Familiarity with child and adult diagnostics and mental health screen-
ing and assessment.
• Familiarity with risk assessment methods and related tools,
including specialized tools that are emerging for use in animal
maltreatment cases.
• Understanding of the concept of the connection between animal cruelty
and interpersonal violence and related understanding of animal abuse
typologies and causative factors.
• Familiarity with the nature of the human-animal bond.
• Skills for clinical interview with the individual (child or adult) and their
social support network, including their family.
The public and the legal system itself also need education. Too often, little
or no formal evaluation is ordered performed, and the criminal disposition
may involve no intervention, a fine, or a mild consequence such as community
service. Public and legal reactions to animal abuse are often inconsistent. On
the one hand, the system sometimes seems to minimize the danger, as when
community service consequences require the offender to work at a local animal
shelter. At other times the reaction is over-sensationalized, as when media react
as though all animal abuse is a direct path to future serial murder or extreme
violence. Specialized cross-training for law enforcement, animal control and
humane law enforcement, veterinarians, and veterinary technicians is needed
to ensure an understanding of the importance of careful forensic investigation
and documentation. Detailed information significantly improves the accuracy

of these evaluations.
Training law enforcement and humane law enforcement personnel about the
significance of collecting evidence and careful documentation of the case can
be very useful for improving examiners’ abilities to obtain information for their
evaluations. Although some clients are willing to disclose details of the animal
abuse incident and their personal history, many other clients are highly decep-
tive or in denial and make a substantial effort to mislead the evaluator. In many
cases this is because the animal abuse and the subsequent investigative inquiry
expose other concerns.
C O N D U CT I N G FO R EN S I C M EN TA L
H E A LT H E VA LUAT I O N S
At the Institute for Human Animal Connection, these evaluations generally

occur over the course of three to five clinical meetings; they can be performed in
a traditional clinical setting or a correctional holding environment. We do not
recommend these occur in the home of the client due to safety considerations
for the evaluator, although information related to the functioning within the
home would without question be useful. Any visit to the home is done only in
conjunction with an official visit accompanied by law enforcement, humane law
enforcement, or probation officers.
Ideally, FAMEs involve an in-depth structured clinical interview.
The evaluator should clearly state the purpose of the interview at the outset
and exactly who will have access to the completed report. Evaluators should
disclose their professional credentials, review clients’ rights, and ask clients to
sign a standard agreement to participate. The client should be informed if their
disclosure poses the risk of additional criminal charges or consequences, and
they should be encouraged to make contact with legal counsel as necessary so
that their right to avoid self-incrimination can be protected. It may be advisable
to have clients sign a waiver of confidentiality that overtly confirms that any
additional illegal behavior, including but not limited to additional instances of
animal abuse or neglect, will be formally reported. Do not agree to keep infor-
mation secret or “off the record.” As with other evaluations, juveniles should be
offered opportunity for assent to the evaluation, and legal guardians should also
sign the consent to participate.
Ideally, these interviews should be performed as predisposition assessments so
that information can be made available to the court and treatment intervention-
ist for consideration. This, however, should not be the endpoint of assessment
because prior to sentencing, individuals who are facing potential legal conse-
quences are likely to withhold information relevant to accurate risk and treat-
ment planning.
A general caution throughout the evaluation is to ensure that the FAME
evaluator remains independent and objective. This is not always easy, given the
nature of animal maltreatment cases. Also, as in any other forensic evaluations,

examiners should have access to all the necessary parties involved in the case, as
well as all necessary records.
Obtaining the Relevant Data
A typical FAME in our clinic involves the following procedures:
• Case file review of the index offense including forensic veterinary

findings
• Review of the animal victim’s veterinary history
• Review of the offender’s criminal history, academic and employment
history, and social and emotional functioning
• Client interview/observation
• Mental status exam
• Boat Inventory on Animal Related Experiences (BIARE, described later)
• Psychological testing
• Intelligence testing (as needed)
• Trauma assessment
• Diagnostic animal abuse typology consideration
• Animal abuse risk assessment (discussed later)
• Collateral interviews with the offender’s family members, and other rel-
evant persons
• Assessment of the offender’s family
As with any professional evaluation, establishing an honest and open relation-

ship with the client will assist in a more accurate outcome and improve response
if treatment is required. It generally improves the outcome of these assessments
to be direct and confirm that the client understands all questions that are being
asked. Every client should be treated with respect and generally approached
nonconfrontationally no matter how horrible and graphic the abuse. If the cli-
ent is expressing some form of discomfort and anxiety, discuss it directly. It is
appropriate for the interviewer to remain in control of the interview in order to
gather the important information. If a client is refusing to answer questions or is
unwilling to proceed with the evaluation, one can stop the interview, document
the client’s reason for terminating the interview, and include this in the report
to the court.
There are significant differences in the completion of a formal evaluation
with a minor as compared to adult clients. Every effort must be made to
ensure that the youth, not just the youth’s parents, understands the process
and the questions being asked. An additional factor (to be discussed later),
especially related to young clients’ chronological or developmental maturity,
is whether they understand that the behavior they engaged in was wrong.
Sometimes referenced as culpability, each client will carry differing degrees
and understanding of the illegality of their behavior, the legal definitions,

and the possible seriousness and consequences. For example, someone in a
neglect case may fail to recognize that the neglect can result in animal abuse
charges under municipal or state statute. Evaluators may be called upon to
identify clients with limited capacity and competency where culpability is
impaired.
It can be useful to monitor examinees’ nonverbal responses to interview ques-
tions. Animal abuse can carry significant levels of social stigma and often elicits
a shame-based response, so the examiner must avoid expressing shock or disgust
during the interview. Even among seasoned forensic evaluators, if they have not
had experience with animal maltreatment cases, they may have a strong reaction
to dealing with animal abuse cases. Allowing clients to observe these reactions
can often make it more difficult to obtain accurate information. As might be
expected, working with abuse issues can impact us as evaluators and we may
experience secondary traumatic stress. Exposure to animal abuse can have this
impact. We must not ignore the importance of self-care and the need to discuss
the impact these cases have on us.
Examiners’ questions should attempt to elicit details regarding the what,
where, who, when, and how. Motivation for the behaviors should be asked
directly without expressing opinion about the client’s beliefs and attitudes. Many
clients will not completely disclose the scope of their animal abuse behaviors
and may underreport and minimize the harm done including the frequency and
intentionality. A careful review of collateral information and following up with
others who know the client is critical. Every effort should be made to find cor-
roborating sources of information to compare against the client’s self-report. In
the absence of verified history, this may be the only way to ensure the accuracy
of the client’s self-report.
Asking Questions about Animals
Active inquiry and observations about the relationships between people and ani-
mals often yield valuable information about people’s behaviors and the dynam-
ics in their environments. Evaluators should be well versed in understanding
the dynamics of the human-animal bond. Recognition of the unique and varied
relationships people have with their animals often yields important perspectives
that inform the FAME. Many domestic violence victims have pets, and those
pets often suffer harm, and sometimes death, at the hands of the perpetrator.
When speaking with children, it is advisable to ask them questions about their
experience with pets and other animals. By asking about animals in the home,
family violence can be identified earlier, making intervention more likely to
succeed, and safeguarding the welfare of children, pets, and their families. The
manner in which people interact with and care for animals in their environment
may provide critical information regarding risk and protective factors related to
both public safety and human welfare.
Asking about animals may provide information that identifies incidents or

patterns of violence toward humans and animals. Among the behaviors of rele-
vance are acts of harm or violence, threats or coercive behaviors, attitudes or acts
of callousness, neglect of humans and/or animals, lack of awareness regarding
proper care of humans and/or animals, verbal and emotional abuse, and safety
issues or hazards. It is critical for an evaluator to learn to elicit discussion and
ask questions to illuminate the internal family attitudes, values, and relation-
ship with animals. Dr. Barbara Boat highlights many questions in her Animal
Related Experiences Inventory (Boat, 1995), which readers are urged to consult as
an example of the types of questions these inquiries require.
Clinical Domains of the FAME
We recommend attention to several “domains” of functioning during the evalu-

ation. Many of these domains are of interest in a variety of kinds of forensic
psychological evaluations. The following descriptions of these domains explain
specifically how they are relevant in animal abuse cases.
Cognitive Functioning
This domain is used to determine if there is evidence of impairment in cogni-
tive functions, processing difficulty, or the presence of an emerging cognitive
disorder. In many cases, we find that impaired cognitive functions may have
contributed in some manner to the individual’s abuse or neglect of the animal.
In a recent evaluation of an 18-year-old client who was referred for an assessment
after throwing rocks at a neighbor’s dog, a consistent history of cognitive impair-
ment was established by a review of educational records. Throughout his entire
academic history, he was referred for placement in specialized classes due to
difficulty learning, impairment in long- and short-term memory, and difficulty
processing academic material. He also was identified as requiring specialized
support following incidents in which he appeared to be ill-equipped to prob-
lem solve interpersonal interactions and conflicts; he experienced frustration,
had difficulty with age-appropriate behavior and making friends, and reacted
aggressively to classmates. With respect to the crime, he indicated that he had
become increasingly frustrated with his neighbor’s dog that would bark, dig
holes under the fence, and was “getting on my nerves.” Additionally, he started
to have intrusive and repetitive thoughts about harming his neighbor and the
animal involved.
Personality and Mental Health

This domain is intended to determine if there is an acute or prior history of men-
tal illness or emotional instability. It has been our experience that many vio-
lent behaviors directed at animals stem from untreated mental health problems
(Tedeschi, 2013). In assessing clients’ current mental health, standardized tools
are recommended. In most cases, this is an especially important domain. There

are numerous mental health conditions that can contribute to engaging in ani-
mal abuse. A pet may be in harm’s way because of family violence, and cases
of neglect can also signal acute and chronic mental health issues. Discussed in
significant detail earlier in the book is the typology of collector/hoarders. These
hoarding cases reflect varying degrees of mental health instability and are often
very lethal for animals. Mental health issues are also salient in cases of physi-
cal and sexual abuse of animals. For example, a woman evaluated earlier this
year who severely beat her boyfriend’s dog was found to be suffering from major
depression, was isolated, and was experiencing challenges with substance abuse,
although she was not impaired by substances at the time of the offense. Her
expression of anger directed at her boyfriend’s dog also reflected her relationship
challenges.
Social/Developmental History
This domain is intended to elicit information relevant to understanding the cli-
ent’s social and interpersonal functioning. Significant social and relational dif-
ficulties are often risk factors in the psychological profiles of animal abusers.
In most FAMEs we recognize the significance of historical and developmental
factors. There are many ways that history can serve as a contributing factor. One
of the most common ways is based on an individual’s learned behavior of gen-
erational influences. For example, it is not uncommon to find persons who have
been taught and encouraged since childhood to act in abusive ways toward spe-
cific animals; the learned behavior becomes the typical way of interacting with,
disciplining, or discarding a particular animal.
Individual Functioning/Developmental Competence

Sensitivity to maturity and developmental considerations is important. This
will assist in making developmental sense of the actions of clients at different
ages, developmental levels, and differing culpability levels. It also assists in
making appropriate age and developmentally sensitive dispositional recom-
mendations. This is critical in defining intervention and treatment priorities
as well.
Current Family Functioning

This domain is important for assessing the client’s ability to succeed in coun-
seling. Families that understand the severity of the issue and hold the individ-
ual accountable will improve prognosis and reduce the likelihood of further
animal cruelty by exerting an influence on the client to engage in treatment
This can usually be determined by asking the clients questions related to their
families’ reaction. It can be important to be specific because family mem-
bers may have differing attitudes and values. We have evaluated clients whose
behaviors were described by one parent as part of the skills of tracking, trap-
ping, snaring, and killing acquired through family hunting trips, whereas
another family member expressed shock and dismay because the animal
harmed or killed was a domestic animal and would never be targeted in hunt-
ing. Families that deny the relevance of the problem and normalize the behav-
ior are dramatically increasing the likelihood of additional abuse activity and
lack of involvement in treatment. This appears to be established through rein-
forcement of family norms and attitudes.
Sexual and Deviancy Issues

The emerging evidence that animal are not infrequently the victims of sexually
abusive behavior necessitates that evaluators be prepared to evaluate the issues of
sexual deviancy, particularly as it relates to animals. New research suggests that
the sexual abuse of animals is strongly correlated with sexual abuse of humans.
For example, etiological research conducted at the Colorado Department of
Corrections suggests that bestiality is associated with child sexual abuse among
male and female sexual offenders (Simons et al., 2007). In addition, witnessing
domestic violence as a child is a strong predictor of crossover paraphilia (rape
to child sexual assault) and intimate partner violence (Heil, Harrison, English,
& Alhmeyer, 2009). It has been our experience in the completion of both sexual
offense evaluations and animal cruelty evaluations that animals can be victims
of sexual abuse that appears to parallel the offense characteristics of both moles-
tation and aggressive rape. For example, in some cases the offender idealizes and
creates a distorted view of the animal as an object of affection and may believe
the animal is soliciting and voluntarily participating in the interaction. In such
cases, there appears to be no significant physical injury to the animal. These
cases differ qualitatively from aggressive sexual assaults in which there is physi-
cal control, harm, and severe injury to the animal victim.
Employment/Academic Functioning
This domain is important as an indicator of stability. In many cases in which an
individual is engaging in animal abuse, there are significant difficulties in their
performance and relationships in either work or school environments. This may
also be a predictor of treatment issues such as difficulty fitting in, making and
keeping friends, bullying, secondary depression, and overall social competence.
Animal abuse can also be an indicator of increased financial stressors presenting
with increased frustration and limited coping skills.
Delinquency, Antisocial and Behavioral Issues

This domain focuses on whether the animal abuse indicates the presence of other
antisocial and disruptive behavior. In the DSM-5’s criteria for conduct disorder
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013), physical cruelty to animals is listed
among the criterion “aggression toward people and animals.” Animal abuse is
also listed as an aspect of antisocial behavior in the World Health Organization’s
International Classification of Diseases (Lewchanin & Randour, 2008). Animal
abuse is frequently correlated with antisocial personality disorder and conduct
disorder. For example, Ascione (1993) reported that between 14% and 22% of
adolescent delinquents at youth correction facilities in Utah admitted to tortur-

ing or hurting animals. Research to date has not focused on the prevalence and
frequency of animal abuse as a symptom of conduct disorder; but one study esti-
mated that animal abuse could be found in as many as 25% of those diagnosed
with conduct disorder (Arluke, Levin, Luke, & Ascione, 1999).
Protective Factors
An important concept in risk assessment is the measurement of the presence of
protective factors. These are factors that suggest the possibility of better outcomes
for cases. Protective factors include such things as a supportive and involved fam-
ily or other functional support system. It might also include school or employment
stability and access to mental health services. Protective factors are frequently
dynamic variables that can be increased through effective treatment and support,
strengthening protective is often easier than reducing risk factors. Individuals with
few protective factors, significant isolation, and poor social support represent a
substantially greater risk for poor outcomes and increased risk of recidivism.
Empathy and Awareness of Victim Impact

Empathy and the capacity to understand and feel others’ experience authenti-
cally has been identified as an important inhibitor to abusive behavior (Ascione,
2005). Although it remains complicated to evaluate, it has been beneficial to
establish the client’s capacity for recognition of harm and suffering. In many
cases, clients understand the animal’s sentience and capacity for suffering. In
many other cases, clients seem to be completely unclear as to why they should
have any feelings regarding their treatment of the animal or why others would
find their behavior concerning. In some of our most serious cases, we see lev-
els of callousness and low empathy. At the extreme, there is recognition, enjoy-
ment, and arousal of the suffering involved. In one recent case, the offender’s
own phone records, texts, and film of the drowning of a kitten, which he even-
tually sent to his girlfriend, documented this sentiment. He stated, “You know
the feeling when you are having really intense sex? You feel euphoric and just
don’t care what else is going on. A huge natural high! That’s why killing is
addictive. I haven’t had that feeling in so long and am pissed it is already over”
(Communication from Pike’s Peak Humane Law Enforcement Arrest Warrant,
1994). Lack of empathic regard for the animal harmed, high callousness, and low
remorse are important indicators of increased risk for future harm to people and
animals and an important focus of intervention.
Substance Abuse
Substance abuse appears to be highly correlated with the acceleration of all types
of violence, thus it becomes very important to assess its role in animal cruelty
and abuse cases. It is recommended that evaluators use standardized substance
abuse measures. In a recent case, a highly intoxicated individual was sitting in
a lawn chair in his driveway, called animal control to come get a neighbor’s dog
that had wandered into his yard, and warned that he would shoot the dog if not
removed immediately. Then, while on the phone with the dispatcher, he pro-
ceeded to shoot the dog. During evaluation, it was determined that the individ-
ual routinely engaged in serious alcohol abuse and had other criminal offenses
related to this problem including several citations for driving under the influ-
ence. Assessment of his alcoholism and other substance use was a critical factor
for determining appropriate intervention.
Offense and Abuse Characteristics

This domain is intended to provide clear, concise information about the nature,
frequency, severity, and scope of the animal abuse behavior. Use of the Boat
Inventory of Animal Related Experiences can be useful for completion of this
domain, as is the Animal Abuse Risk Assessment Tool (reviewed later in this
chapter).
Supervision and Legal Issues

The supervision and legal factors domain allows the evaluator in making state-
ments about the availability of effective support, accountability, and need for
supervision. Probation, parole, and the court in general are in need of guidance
on what kinds of supervision considerations are most critical. Use of diagnos-
tic typological criteria can be helpful in determining intervention priorities. In
addition, consideration should be given to further contact with animals, abil-
ity to remain in possession of the animal(s), or ability to acquire a new animal.
Conclusions about the safety and supervision of animals in the individual’s home
are just a few of the supervision and accountability issues. In a serious case of
animal abuse that resulted in one of the longest prison terms for animal abuse in
Colorado to date, the client was released on parole but allowed to move into his
home with the companion dog who had been present when the individual had
tortured and killed several puppies. This type of oversight and lack of special-
ized supervision remains common. Probation and parole officers require train-
ing on animal cruelty including its link to interpersonal violence. All evaluations
should attempt to understand the client’s social network because it is likely that
those persons close to the client may be able to help supervise them and improve
success. They also have the potential and the ability to undermine intervention
and supervision plans, particularly if they have minimized the offense and the
offender’s need for treatment.
Risk Assessment
In FAMEs conducted in our clinic, the evaluators utilize the Animal Abuse Risk
Assessment Tool (AARAT), developed at the University of Denver (Tedeschi,
2000). The AARAT is comprised of a specific set of risk criteria that were derived
originally from the risk factors established by Dr. Randall Lockwood of the
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA).
We know from the science of risk and threat assessment that the most reli-
able long-term indicators of risk for re-offense are found to be static, historical
variables that are immune to the effects of intervention such as the number and
nature of previous offenses and developmental history. Dynamic factors that may
respond to intervention can be considered short-term or risk-mitigating factors
because of their ability to change in response to various influences (i.e., partici-
pation in treatment, lifestyle stability, mental health stability, support, and the
quality of supervision). Risk assessment can provide much useful information in
decisions involving safety planning, treatment planning, disposition, and super-
vision issues. Psychological measures can identify characteristics and patterns
related to certain strengths, risks, and needs, leading to general estimates that
a person is low, moderate, or high in level of risk compared to other offenders.
However, they should not be expected to make accurate predictions that a person
will or will not re-offend.
Typological Considerations
There have been attempts to organize taxonomies of individuals engaging in ani-

mal abuse, but there remains vigorous debate on the benefits and potential risks
in placing labels on animal abuse behavior. It seems desirable to not unnecessar-
ily define or label people as problems. However, for the sake of both humans and
animals who share the need for safety, the seriousness associated with harming
animals and people suggests that we should begin to develop typologies with the
aim of testing their validity.
Animal abuse occurs for many different reasons and by a diverse set of indi-
viduals across, race, gender, age, and levels of functioning. Developing typologies
with which we can classify individuals who maltreat animals may improve our
risk determinations, placement decisions, and step-down strategies after place-
ment. Some individuals engaged in animal abuse pose a greater risk for chronic
abuse behaviors, crossover behaviors and the development of deeply ingrained
patterns of behavior or problems.
Diagnostic typologies are used in the evaluations performed by our Institute
for Human-Animal Connection. The typology we have developed based on our
experience in assessing and treating animal abuse cases is shown in Form 11.1.
The three types are criminogenic (with antisocial features), traumagenic (with
features of traumatization) and psychogenic (with features of psychiatric disor-
der). Each has theoretically different implications for potential future risk and
treatment.
M E AS U R ES AS S ES S I N G I N D I V I D UA LS’
M A LT R E AT M EN T O F A N I M A LS
Ideally, clinicians doing FAMEs would have validated assessment instruments to

supplement their clinical interviews and review of records, thus offering an objec-
tive base for their opinions and recommendations. Unfortunately, though, there
are few tools for evaluating adults convicted of animal cruelty. Moreover, the
Form 11.1. DIAGNOSTIC SCEENING TYPOLOGIES CHECKLIST
Case No: Age: Gender: M / F Date:

Criminogenic Features
1. Presents as convincing or charming, with few indicators of vulnerability. ◻
2. Presentation or history of manipulative or controlling behavior. ◻
3. Displays jealousy, dislike, or animosity towards victim. ◻
4. Has been physically cruel, or caused physical pain or injury to persons or ◻
animals.
5. Bullies, threatens, or intimidates others. ◻
6. History of fights, aggression, or property destruction. ◻
7. Family history of aggression, criminal conduct, and/or chemical dependency. ◻
8. Has used a weapon against others. ◻
9. Illegal drug use or abuse, or early use of alcohol. ◻
10. Parental emotional and disciplinary inconsistencies (double messages). ◻
Traumagenic Features
1. Has experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that ◻
involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or threat to the physical
or sexual integrity of self or others.
2. Reactive avoidance of stimuli that arouse recollections of trauma (e.g., ◻
thoughts, feelings, conversations, activities, places, people).
4. Intense psychological distress and/or behavioral reactivity upon exposure to ◻
internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble an aspect of traumatic
event.
5. Noticeable regression from normally expected levels of personal, social, ◻
and intrapsychic stability and competencies, response to stimulation from
trauma-related issues.
6. Behavior may represent the reenactment or resolution of traumatic events. ◻
7. Youth reports images, thoughts, dreams, illusions, flash back episodes, or a ◻
sense of re-living the experience; or distress on exposure to reminders of the
traumatic event.
8. Youth demonstrates a reduction from normal levels of awareness and appro- ◻
priate responsiveness to his or her surroundings (appears dazed or disorga-
nized) when trauma issues are triggered.
9. Youth shows elevated symptoms, when compared to his or her normal func- ◻
tioning, of anxiety or increased arousal (e.g., difficulty sleeping, irritability,
poor concentration, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response, motor
restlessness).
10. Difficulties with sleep or appetite (excess or avoidance). ◻
Psychogenic Features
1. Low birth-weight or IQ relative to siblings or peers. ◻
2. Diagnosis of developmental or autistic disorder. ◻
3. Bizarre or inappropriate affect (not including flat affect, or elective ◻
withdrawal/avoidance).
4. Present or past intervention with psychotropic medications. ◻
5. History of psychiatric hospitalization. ◻
6. Family history of mental illness or psychiatric hospitalization. ◻

7. History of unusually difficult pregnancy or childbirth. ◻
8. Inability to develop stable relationships due to perceptual inaccuracies ◻
around relationships and interactions with others (difficulties not due to
emotional/traumatic resistance, or hostility).
9. Social role as a scapegoat or outcast. ◻
10. The youth is displaying significant difficulty or impairment in social, educa- ◻
tional, family, or other important area of functioning.
Completed by:
This screening instrument was developed by Philip Tedeschi.
ones that are available have had insufficient research to determine their reliability
and validity. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review the existing measures that
examiners are using, especially with the hope that there will be future research to
determine their validity. Until then, these tools at least offer structured methods
that improve the consistency of data collection across cases and examiners.
Evaluations of Adults in Animal Cruelty Cases
AniCare Model of Treatment for Animal Abuse

The AniCare model (Shapiro, 1999) is the first professionally developed, compre-
hensive psychological intervention program for animal abusers over the age of
17. It is based on a validated intervention for perpetrators of domestic violence.
AniCare includes a pre-treatment (and identical post-treatment) questionnaire
to help clinicians focus therapy on specific concerns. The questionnaire is a
clinical tool intended to systematically gather information on factors motivat-
ing the client to abuse animals, the types of abuse committed, the intensity of
the abuse committed, and animal abuser’s attitude toward therapy. Questions
include whether the client accepts responsibility for his treatment of animals,
exhibits some understanding of how his family of origin influenced his behav-
ior and attitudes towards animals, and expresses some capacity to nurture and
empathize with an animal. Because clients may be defensive about their behavior
and attitudes, the questionnaire is completed by the therapist. The questionnaire
contains 24 questions, each of which consists of a five-point Likert scale ranging
from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree; clinicians indicate their level of agree-
ment with each item after considering the client history, severity and frequency
of the action, and the attitude exhibited by the client. The scores are then totaled,
and the clinician is asked to provide an overall assessment of the individual on a
scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating mild problems with a promising outcome and
10 indicating severe, intractable problems with little chance of improvement.
Factors in the Assessment of Dangerousness in Perpetrators

of Animal Cruelty (FADPAC) (2003)
The FADPAC was developed by Dr. Randall Lockwood of the American Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). It is intended to evaluate “the
significance of an individual’s involvement in a particular act of animal cruelty
as an indicator of dangerousness or possible risk for involvement of future acts
of violence against others.” The 33 factors are based in part on threat assessment
criteria used by the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime as well
as on studies on animal cruelty offenders and habitual violent offenders. The
factors include victim vulnerability (small, harmless or non-threatening ani-
mals), number of victims, severity of injury inflicted, duration of abuse, degree
of premeditation, past history of positive interactions with an animal victim,
mutilation or dismemberment, documenting the act through photographs or
video-recording, strong positive affective changes during the animal cruelty act,
and lack of insight into the motivation for the animal abuse. Lockwood opines
that more than 5 aggravating factors should be cause for serious concern and
more than 10 can indicate a high potential for committing serious acts of vio-
lence against people.
Animal Abusers Interview and Risk Assessment Tool (AARAT)

The AARAT was designed by Philip Tedeschi (2000) of the University of Denver
School of Social Work and the Institute for Human-Animal Connection. It is an
individualized assessment tool used to identify and estimate the level of risk posed
by an animal abuse offender utilizing a structured domain matrix. These clinical
criteria are identified as correlated with elevated risk, and based on extensive clini-
cal experience and strategic review of risk factors, estimations can be made of an
individual’s overall risk. This tool has not been empirically tested to offer demon-
strations of its degree of validity and numerical scoring capabilities. The findings
and utility of this approach should be viewed as having approximately the same
utility as clinical judgment and interview protocols, although it does offer a struc-
ture that may improve the consistency of data obtained in the interview.
Evaluations of Juveniles in Animal Cruelty Cases
AniCare Child: An Assessment and Treatment

Approach for Childhood Animal Abuse
The child version of Anicare was created by Dr. Mary Lou Randour, Susan
Krinsk, and Joanne L. Wolf (2001) to assist clinicians in assessing and treating
juvenile animal cruelty offenders. AniCare Child outlines several factors to
consider when assessing juvenile animal cruelty. First, the severity of the cru-
elty (e.g., degree of injury, frequency, duration) and the “extent of culpability”
(e.g., awareness of extent of animal suffering, degree of planning) indicate the
level of intervention that may be necessary. The psychodynamics and motiva-
tion for the cruelty (e.g., instrumental vs. reactive aggression) offer insight into
the psychological makeup of the child and influence the type and timing of
the interventions. For example, reactive acts of cruelty may focus on enhanc-
ing impulse control and problem-solving skills. Additionally, assessing the
child’s attitudes and beliefs about animals can help the clinician understand
what misconceptions (e.g., prejudice against a particular species) need to be
addressed. An assessment of the child’s level of emotional intelligence includ-
ing capacity for empathy and ability to form attachments is also indicated.
Evaluators are directed to examine the juvenile’s family history for domestic
violence, child abuse, neglect, witnessing animal abuse, and harsh discipline.
Finally, “mitigating circumstances” such as the juvenile’s expression of remorse
and willingness to assist law enforcement is considered. Information should be
obtained from multiple sources including parents, other relatives, school per-
sonnel (e.g., teachers, guidance counselors), and social workers (if applicable).
Medical, court, psychiatric, and school records should be reviewed.
Clinical Assessment of Juvenile Animal Cruelty

This tool, developed by Dr. Shari Lewchanin and Ellen Zimmerman (2000),
informs treatment of juvenile animal cruelty offenders to “prevent further esca-
lation of violence.” It includes an interview form to use with the juvenile and an
interview form for use with his family. Both are intended to gather background
information about the child, his or her experience with pets, the animal cruelty
incident, and “environmental information” (e.g., alcohol and drug use; fireset-
ting; stealing; discipline in the home). Following the gathering of this informa-
tion, the authors suggest several instruments the evaluator may use to integrate
the data. They emphasize the importance of assessing the severity of the animal
cruelty act, the juvenile’s culpability (understanding of and responsibility for
one’s actions), and the juvenile’s resilience and readiness for change.
Children and Animals Assessment Instrument

Developed by Ascione et al. (1997), this is a semi-structured interview designed
to obtain information on animal maltreatment and intended for use with chil-
dren over age four and their parents. The examiner can use the instrument to
score several dimensions of cruelty to animals including severity (the degree of
intentional pain/injury caused to the animal), frequency (the number of separate
cruel acts), duration (the period of time over which cruelty occurred), recency (the
most current acts), diversity across and within categories (the number of types
and number of animals within a type that were abused), animal sentience level
(ability to feel or be conscious), covert (the child’s attempts to conceal cruelty),
isolate (individual versus group cruelty), and empathy (indications of remorse or
concern for the injured animal). Ascione describes a method for converting these
ratings to numerical scores (zero through three for each item) in which higher
scores indicate more severe, problematic cruelty. Scores on the CAAI could range
from zero (no instances of cruelty to animals) to 30 (severe, chronic, and recent
cruelty toward a variety of animals and a concurrent lack of empathy).
The Cruelty to Animals Inventory

The Cruelty to Animals Inventory (CAI; Dadds et al., 2004) was developed as a
brief self- and parent-report measure of F. R. Ascione’s (1993) nine parameters of
cruelty (described earlier). Scoring criteria for the CAI were converted to Likert
scales. Each item offers a negative response such as “I have never hurt an ani-
mal” to allow a total score of zero for children who reported never having dis-
played intentional cruelty to animals. In addition to the nine Likert-type items,
a free-response question (item 10) asks the reporter to describe an incident or
pattern of cruelty. Responses to this item are scored from zero to three according
to a specified coding system to obtain a score for severity. Total possible scores
for the CAI range from 0 (no instances of animal cruelty) to 39 (severe, chronic,
and recent cruelty to a range of animals with the child showing no empathy).
Two versions of the CAI were developed to create a child report and a parent
report of cruelty to animals.
Boat Inventory on Animal-Related Experiences

This is a 20-item oral interview guide. It was designed by Dr. Barbara Boat (1998)
of the University of Cincinnati to assess whether animal-related trauma, cruelty,
or support are part of an individual’s history. The questions may help children
disclose their own abuse as well as the abuse of a pet. Boat’s Inventory includes
questions regarding pet “ownership,” pets as sources of support, pet loss, wit-
nessing and committing animal cruelty, use of animals to control or coerce
another, sexual interactions with animals, and fears of animals. The Childhood
Trust Survey on Animal Related Experiences (Boat, 2008) is an abbreviated ver-
sion of Boat’s Inventory. It is a 10-item screening questionnaire that asks about
experiences of pet “ownership,” attachment, loss, cruelty, and fears related to
pets and other animals.
The P.E.T. Scale for the Measurement of Physical

and Emotional Tormenting Against Animals
Developed by Baldry (2003), this is a self-administered scale to measure physi-
cal and emotional abuse against animals among adolescents. The scale measures
different dimensions of animal abuse, ranging from mild to severe: bothering,
tormenting, hitting, harming, and being cruel to an animal. It is designed to
assess the prevalence and frequency of directed and witnessed cruelty to ani-
mals. Respondents are asked to indicate Never, Hardly Ever, Sometimes, Often,
or Very Often to a series of questions such as: “Have you ever tormented animals,
for example by not letting them sleep, or by removing the food when eating?” and
“Have you ever been cruel to them, enjoying yourself by seeing the suffering?”
Two other measures are worthy of mention. The Children’s Attitudes
and Behaviors Towards Animals (Guymer, Mellor, Luk, & Pearse, 2001) is a
parent-report questionnaire designed to detect childhood cruelty to animals.
Parents are asked to respond to questions such as, “My child has harmed other
people’s pets” and “My child has shown pleasure when harming animals.”
The Children’s Treatment of Animals Questionnaire (Thompson & Gullone,
2003) assesses the degree to which children’s behavior toward nonhuman ani-

mals is humane. It consists of 13 items that reflect activities and behaviors that a
child may engage in with a companion or other animal. Also, because of its pop-
ularity, it should be noted that the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL; Achenbach,
1991) contains an item (#15) that concerns whether the child is or is not cruel to
animals.
C O N C LU S I O N
Crimes against animals reflect a wide array of behaviors, level of seriousness, and
actions harmful to animals including intentional or unintentional omissions of
care. The underlying causative factors are also diverse. Despite this diversity and
in many ways due to the array of behaviors on the continuum of criminal con-
cern, we need to understand with some accuracy what has occurred and why. In
addition, we must continually emphasize that animal abuse is illegal and that
it causes harm to sentient beings. In our current efforts to understand the most
effective and proactive ways to intervene in serious violence, careful examina-
tion of violence toward animals can serve as a warning of potential violence
directed at people (Ascione, 1993).
Every perpetrator of animal cruelty presents with unique and individual-
ized diagnostic factors and typological considerations. Although untested, the
inclusion of a reliable, routine, and comprehensive evaluation of such offend-
ers could improve public safety outcomes in every community. This chapter has
defined important clinical domains that should be included in all comprehen-
sive FAMEs, with attention to developmentally sensitive assessment tools to help
determine the context and seriousness of the abuse, level of responsibility, caus-
ative factors, diagnostic considerations, and risk for continued abusive behavior.
Animal abuse is almost always a signal of other problems, and FAMEs can serve
as a meaningful early intervention to detect the risk of future violence toward
people and animals.
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=C.R.S.+18-9-202
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mal cruelty: Assessment, treatment, community needs, and policy considerations.
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research, and application. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 422–439.
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Brunswick, ME: Biddle Publishing Company.
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of Animal Cruelty. Retrieved from: http://coloradolinkproject.com/wp-content/
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12
Practice and Ethics in Forensic

Animal Maltreatment Evaluations
TERRY KUKOR, DANIEL DAVIS, AND KENNETH WEISS ■
Forensic mental health professionals who perform forensic animal maltreat-

ment evaluations in the future will face certain practice demands that will be,
if not unique, at least different in some respects from performing evaluations in
other areas of criminal or civil forensic practice. Competent and ethical profes-
sional practice requires ways to access new knowledge in one’s field, find other
professionals in the same field who can stimulate one’s thinking and fine-tune
practical skills, and develop relations with courts, attorneys, animal protection
agencies, veterinary experts in animal welfare, shelter medicine and forensic
investigation, and animal behavior specialists, as well as offenders.1 Certain eth-
ics guidelines for forensic practice will have somewhat different applications in
this area of forensic assessment. This chapter, then, begins to build a framework
for practicing competently and ethically when performing forensic animal mal-
treatment evaluations.
At the time of this writing, the field of animal maltreatment evaluations is in
an early stage of development, such that what we regard as essential resources at
any one point in time will very likely mature and become more robust over time.
In addition to keeping abreast of emergent empirical literature, the forensic prac-
titioner who is interested in animal maltreatment evaluations would do well to
be familiar, if not fluent, with the resources noted in this chapter and throughout
this book.
There are a number of published resources available that seek to set mini-
mum standards in psychological practice. One of the easiest ways to access
an up-to-date version of a wide variety of these published resources is via Ken
Pope’s website (http://kspope.com), which also contains an extensive list of
links to resources related to ethical issues and professional practice standards
(http://kspope.com/ethcodes/index.php). One portion of Dr. Pope’s website that
Practice and Ethics in Forensic Animal Maltreatment Evaluations333
should be of particular interest to those doing forensic evaluation is the “Forensic

Assessment Checklist” (http://kspope.com/assess/forensics.php).
The essence of the forensic assessment is a four-step process: (a) identification
of the legal question to be illuminated by the mental health expert (e.g., is the
apparent animal maltreatment behavior due to psychopathology?); (b) under-
standing of the legal standards, if any, that govern the adjudication of the legal
question (e.g., if there is significant psychopathology, is there a diversion pro-
gram instead of criminal prosecution?; (c) documentation of the psychological or
psychiatric findings that might support a conclusion consistent with local legal
models; and (d) synthesis of the clinical findings to support an answer to the
legal question in light of the local standards for adjudication. As we have noted,
there is no shortage of resources on how to frame forensic questions or how to
carry out assessments generally. The salient gaps in resources are in the following
domains: (a) our ability to use the typology or differential diagnosis listed above
to offer guidance to the court; (b) procedures to offer relevant treatment in addi-
tion to or in lieu of punishment alone; and (c) training for professionals willing
to undertake court-ordered treatment of offenders.
An additional consideration is the development of evidence-based practices
(i.e., practices that are endorsed by expert consensus and/or empirical support)
that can be applied to examinees and will offer guidance to courts while pro-
tecting animal victims. For example, the emerging literature suggests that the
phenomenon of animal hoarding is based on a model of a would-be rescuer
having a break in empathy, causing cruelty instead of nurturance (Nathanson &
Patronek, 2012). The situation, known more broadly as “pathological altruism,”
may involve deep-seated problems in psychological development; for example,
self-object differentiation and overidentification with helpless animals. Because
these types of personality problems are difficult to treat and mandated treatment
is not conducive to true compliance, there are inherent problems in effecting
interventions (Patronek & Nathanson, 2009). As Patronek & Nathanson (2009)
observe, “When a treatment plan is initiated, it may be further complicated by
a plethora of cognitive impairments, including lack of insight, poor abstract
reasoning, difficulty understanding cause and effect, poor problem solving
skills, and difficulty organizing, planning, and executing a task” (p. 280). Since
“pathological altruism” is a construct and not a diagnosis, it can be construed
as a final common pathway for a variety of developmental and symptomatic
conditions. These may include personality disorders (for example, borderline),
early psychological trauma, depression, and psychosis. Thus, there would be no
generic or cookie-cutter approach to animal maltreaters. Instead, we recom-
mend at minimum a careful diagnostic assessment, which would inform an
intervention plan. It is premature to suggest what form treatment of animal
maltreaters might take, since numbers are small and there is no gold standard.
However, it is apparent that therapeutic approaches must address diagnosis,
replicability, time and budgetary constraints, and future safety. These consid-
erations suggest practical and useful dimensions on which best practices might
be developed. However, at this early stage of conceptual development in the
forensic animal maltreatment literature, there are few readily identifiable best
practices available.
According to Phillips and Lockwood (2013), writing for the National District
Attorneys Association, 26 states have laws addressing court-ordered psychologi-
cal evaluations and 32 states have laws for court-ordered treatment for convicted
animal abusers. The compendium of laws for each jurisdiction can be down-
loaded from the National District Attorneys Association (2013) and the Animal
Legal Defense Fund (2012) [see also, Otto, 2007]. From the perspective of pros-
ecutors, it has been recommended that offenders be referred to remedial pro-
grams relevant to the problems (not simply anger management) and that experts
in psychology may be utilized to advise the court at sentencing (Phillips &
Lockwood, 2013). We find this to be a position that is both protective of the ani-
mal victims and compassionate toward mental health needs of the perpetrators.
Nevertheless, we have no statistics on the frequency, let alone the effectiveness,
of clinicians’ input in diagnostic, forensic, or dispositional matters. Thus, before
legislatures and prosecutors can meaningfully be approached on reform, we will
need data based on current implementation of animal-maltreatment laws.
As we seek to shape a field of forensic animal maltreatment evaluation, we
will need to face three broad types of questions: ethical issues, potential for bias
in your evaluations, and our general approaches to evaluations. These form the
outline for this chapter.
E T H I CA L C O N S I D ER AT I O N S
The ethical principles followed by psychiatrists working within legal sys-

tems derive from those of the American Medical Association (AMA) (2003),
the American Psychiatric Association (APsychiA) (2013), and the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law (AAPL) (2005). The ethical principles and
code of conduct for psychologists (American Psychological Association [APA],
2002, including the 2010 amendments) guide the professional activities of
psychologists (http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/index.aspx). Forensic practice
guidelines for forensic work done by psychologists have been established by the
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychology (SGFP) (American Psychological
Association, 2013).
A direct and concise expression of some of the difficulties faced by mental
health professionals working within legal systems are anticipated in commen-
tary to the AAPL guidelines’ preamble: “Forensic psychiatrists practice at the
interface of law and psychiatry, each of which has developed its own institutions,
policies, procedures, values, and vocabulary. As a consequence, the practice of
forensic psychiatry entails inherent potentials for complications, conflicts, mis-
understandings and abuses.” With an appreciation for the sometimes daunting
challenges faced by the forensic clinician, the Specialty Guidelines for Forensic
Psychology were developed with the specific goals of improving the quality of
forensic psychological services; enhancing the practice and facilitating the
systematic development of forensic psychology; encouraging a high level of qual-

ity in professional practice; and encouraging forensic practitioners to acknowl-
edge and respect the rights of those they serve.
It is essential for those conducting assessments of individuals charged with
endangering or maltreating animals to maintain role integrity and to acknowl-
edge that they are not necessarily for or against these persons and that they do
not have the final say in their disposition. The main role of forensic profession-
als in this context is to educate courts and law enforcement about the mental
health dimensions of abusive or neglectful behavior. The behavior in question
is not always easily dichotomized into sick versus bad, and may have subcul-
tural components that are not obvious. For example, it has been observed that a
core dynamic of some animal hoarders begins with subjectively altruistic behav-
ior that grows to pathological proportion (Nathanson & Patronek, 2012). The
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists (SGFP) (American Psychological
Association, 2013) call attention to the need for evaluators to be cognizant of
individual differences in the interpretation of data.
Consent
The AAPL guidelines (2005) call for consent of the evaluee, the disclosure of any
loss of confidentiality, reporting findings with honesty and striving for objectiv-
ity, and accurate representation of credentials. The SGFP guidelines (American
Psychological Association, 2013) contain similar considerations. The following
remarks track these elements as they arise in the course of assessments of indi-
viduals accused of animal maltreatment.
How does the evaluee come to the consultation? The first key point is
whether the evaluee is being examined by court order or by the request of
the evaluee’s attorney. Almost invariably, the assessment has been ordered
by the court, often as part of a statutory procedure (Animal Legal Defense
Fund, 2012). In this context, the evaluee’s understanding about the nature and
purpose of the evaluation and agreement to participate is perhaps best under-
stood as “informed assent.” That is, because the evaluator is operating under
the authority of a court order, “consent” in a strict sense is not necessary. In
such circumstances, “assent,” which implies understanding but not necessar-
ily permission, is a better fit. However, should the examiner be proceeding
with an evaluation solely at the request of the evaluee’s attorney, then the con-
cept of “consent” does apply. Consent becomes a concept relative to context,
in that failure to comply may correctly be viewed as evidence of culpability.
More important from the professional’s point of view, reluctance to partici-
pate is a negative indicator of psychological mindedness, inability to accept
culpability, and willingness to enter rehabilitation in any form. Nevertheless,
the evaluator must inform the person that the assessment has been ordered,
that there is no absolute requirement of disclosure, and that failure to par-
ticipate may influence the outcome. The last point should never be done with
too ominous a tone, as that would appear coercive. Of course, the person also
must be notified that whatever is disclosed will be shared with the court and
attorneys.
Finally, the details of our consent/assent explanation (aptly described by
Heilbrun, 2001, as “notification of purpose”) may differ significantly based upon
the phase of the legal proceedings. Consider, for example, whether the animal
maltreatment evaluation takes place before or after the issue of guilt has been
determined. The two contexts are very different in terms of the parameters of
the notification of purpose. If before, the examiner will need to tell the evaluee
something of the effect that “anything you say about the offense with which you
are charged can be used against you in court, because I will be telling the court
about it.” Absent specific statutory protections against such self-disclosures being
admissible on the issue of guilt, defense counsel may very well have advised eval-
uees to say absolutely nothing about the events leading up to or at the time of the
criminal act with which they are charged.
However, even if defense counsel places no such restrictions on the evaluee’s
participation, is it ethical to take what amounts to a spontaneous confession
from an examinee in a forensic evaluation, then write it up in our psycho-
logical report? We think not. This situation may be akin to what happens in
evaluations of competency to stand trial, where among other things, as part of
a capacity to assist assessment, the examiner needs to evaluate the defendant’s
capacity to disclose pertinent details of the alleged offense to counsel. In such
situations, many examiners do not record the content of the examinee’s side
of the story, though may well note the extent to which it is coherent, orga-
nized, detailed, and time-sequenced. A similar approach may be useful in
animal maltreatment evaluations that take place before the issue of guilt has
been determined. That is, in such a context the ethical examiner would be
wise to avoid prompting disclosures about the act(s) charged that may not be
excluded by statute from considerations of guilt. If the evaluation is taking
place after the issue of guilt has been determined, then there is obviously less
concern about soliciting details that may be used against the evaluee. Even
in such situations, however, the critical distinction between evidence that is
probative versus prejudicial is still essential to consider.
An additional consideration in the forensic evaluation of animal mal-
treatment concerns the fact that the examinee’s side of the story often is the
only one available, because the animal victim(s) obviously cannot talk and
other persons might not have been present. This raises unique and difficult
questions. For example, does this change or expand what can or should be
included in the report with regard to his description of the offense charged?
How can evaluators compensate for the fact that there will not be a victim
statement in assessing the seriousness of the examinee’s behavior and other
important aspects of the situation? Although there are no easy answers to
such questions, we recommend that reports include a descriptive account of
the acts(s) charged, allowing the readers to draw their own conclusions about
the impact on the animal.
Confidentiality
Individuals referred for court-ordered mental health assessments often have no

history of counseling, particularly to the extent that they are hoarding rather
than mistreating animals in some other fashion. Indeed, the individuals encoun-
tered are likely to have flown under the radar of mental health systems, similar to
object hoarders. Conversely, individuals referred for forensic evaluation of ani-
mal maltreatment who have engaged in overt and intentional physical cruelty of
animals may well have diagnosable mental disorders and have come into contact
with mental health professionals.
As such, care must be taken to distinguish a forensically oriented assess-
ment from a therapeutically aimed examination. Evaluees must be told that the
results of the assessment may affect their freedom and rights, and that personal
information may be distributed to interested parties. This does not mean that,
once consent has been obtained, the evaluator has carte blanche to record and
distribute all manner of detail about that person. In fact, the examiner should
be clear with evaluees about to whom the report will be available and how it may
and may not be used by those individuals. In some jurisdictions forensic evalua-
tions are considered the property of the court that ordered them. If this conven-
tion is also true in the jurisdiction where the animal maltreatment evaluation
is being performed, that means that there may be a variety of interested parties,
including the evaluee him/herself, that would need to approach the court to
obtain a copy. This idea that the evaluee may not be automatically entitled to
a copy of the report is quite different than in a HIPAA clinical context and
should be noted up front. Of course, if the evaluation has been requested by the
evaluee’s attorney (as in an ex parte evaluation; ex parte meaning for one side or
the other), the rules are different, and dissemination of the report would be up
to that attorney. In practice, some circumspection must be exercised to prevent
the dissemination of irrelevant but potentially damaging personal information.
It is best to inform the evaluee that there may be questions of a personal nature
that can be declined.
An additional consideration is what to tell persons who provide collateral
sources of information. We recommend that the forensic examiner provide a
clear explanation about the nature and purpose of the examination to all col-
lateral contacts, and respect that some such individuals may not wish to pro-
vide collateral information once they understand that they may be quoted in
the report. In the event that the examiner is doing an evaluation in an ex parte
manner, it would be wise to obtain the evaluee’s formal informed consent to
contact specific sources of collateral information. If collateral contacts do agree
to be interviewed, great care should be taken not to identify any information
about the evaluee beyond that which is necessary to explain the context of the
evaluation. This is consistent with the generally accepted “minimum necessary”
principle that guides non-authorized but legally mandated disclosures (e.g., duty
to warn or protect) that mental health clinicians deem necessary. For example,
we recommend that the examiner begin with a broadly defined explanation that
the court has ordered a mental health evaluation of the evaluee. Subsequent
questions that are posed to collateral contacts about the evaluee’s risk-relevant
behaviors and attitudes towards animals may lead to questions about what the
evaluee is accused of having done. Unless such information is already a matter of
public record, the examiner should avoid answering such questions.
The examiner should also be prepared to handle requests from collateral
sources of information to say something “off the record” or “in confidence.”
From a practical point of view, it is unwise to extend such assurances as sources
of information must be clearly documented in one’s report. Additionally, there
is a significant concern about agreeing not to use some reported information,
if for no other reason than it raises a question about how one would practically
“unring the bell” (i.e., how one would know that such information was not exert-
ing tacit influence on one’s opinion).
Honesty
Reporting the findings of a mental health assessment is a matter that has real
implications for a real person, not a perfunctory action of sorting out types of
offenders. Psychopathology should not be inferred simply from the presence of
hoarding or abuse or from the degree of harm committed. An honest assessment
is one that is reasonably comprehensive. Components can include the face-to-face
clinical assessment, psychometric testing (e.g., an objective assessment of person-
ality such as the MMPI-2 or MMPI-2-RF), and home visits to the site of the alleged
abuse. Both AAPL (2005) and the SGFP (American Psychological Association,
2013) guidelines discourage drawing conclusions about persons not examined
unless reasonable efforts to do so have failed. In doing the assessment in a thor-
ough manner—not just a checklist of symptoms—the evaluator will be in a posi-
tion to explain the behavior to the justice system in a nonjudgmental manner.
Multiple Relationships
As noted several times in this chapter, it may very well take some time for sup-
ply to meet demand in terms of the numbers of professionals with the knowl-
edge, skill, and interest to do forensic work involving animal maltreatment.
This suggests that occasions may arise in which the court asks examiners who
have done evaluations to then accept the same examinee as a treatment refer-
ral after the case has been adjudicated. Accepting such a referral in these cir-
cumstances raises ethical concerns, sometimes called the “wearing two hats”
problem (Strasburger, Gutheil & Brodsky, 1997). Simply stated, being a person’s
therapist may reduce objectivity when testifying, and testifying may disrupt the
therapeutic relationship. While not formally unethical for psychiatrists, the situ-
ation is to be avoided.
The AAPL and SPFP guidelines describe multiple relationships as existing

when the forensic practitioner is in a professional relationship with an individual
and, at the same time or at a subsequent time, had a different role. The reason
such arrangements pose ethical concerns is that the evaluation and treatment
relationships have fundamentally different roles for the professional. The thera-
peutic role is guided by core values of trust, helping, and advocacy, while the
evaluation role is guided by values of neutrality and objectivity. Greenberg and
Shuman (1997) have characterized the friction between such roles as reflecting
an “irreconcilable” conflict. The SGFP suggest that the ethical forensic practitio-
ner should strive to recognize and avoid the potential conflicts of interest and
threats to objectivity inherent in such situations.
There are, of course, situations in which such conflicts are simply unavoid-
able. The SGFP indicate that when there are no practical alternatives to provid-
ing either concurrent or sequential treatment and forensic assessment services,
the ethical practitioner should make potential risks and benefits known to all
interested parties while also seeking both professional consultation and judicial
review/direction. The goal of such efforts is to minimize the potential negative
impact associated with such circumstances.
Objectivity
The AAPL and SGFP guidelines exhort us to strive for objectivity. What does
this mean? First, it means being true to the values shared by forensic profession-
als in relation to legal matters of an adversarial nature. The AAPL guidelines
state: “The adversarial nature of most legal processes presents special hazards
for the practice of forensic psychiatry. Being retained by one side in a civil or
criminal matter exposes psychiatrists to the potential for unintended bias and
the danger of distortion of their opinion. It is the responsibility of psychiatrists
to minimize such hazards by acting in an honest manner and striving to reach
an objective opinion.”
Implicit in this is the importance of minimizing harm to the evaluee by virtue
of any distortions we may import. Simply stated, we must leave our biases behind
when we do forensic assessments. The pathos created by appreciating the harm
done to the animal victims is a powerful source of potential countertransfer-
ence bias. In order to accurately assess an individual’s psychopathology and con-
vey an uncolored narrative, the ethical forensic professional will be mindful of
negative feelings and overcome them. Playing amateur prosecutor, for example,
defeats the principle of objectivity. In cases that are particularly horrific (e.g.,
prolonged torture of animals), this may be easier said than done. Such cases can
reasonably be expected to stir up intense feelings in the examiner, which may
pose a significant threat to the ability to be objective.
In such situations where pathos for animal victims might interfere with objec-
tivity, the examiner ought to consider declining the referral. An apt analogy
might be the examiner who declines an evaluation concerning child sexual

abuse because of an intense emotional reaction, which would raise a concern
about visceral bias. At very least, in such situations the ethical examiner should
pursue a consultation with a trusted colleague in which such admittedly dif-
ficult questions can be safely and thoughtfully examined. We know of no easy
answers to such situations where there are seemingly unresolvable obstacles to
being dispassionate in the face of gross animal abuse, each of which may pose
unique potential challenges to one’s objectivity. A sensible precautionary course
of action involves a two process steps: (a) careful monitoring of one’s affective
reactions to the details of the case, and (b) consultation on whether to take refer-
rals that evoke strong negative feelings. We will have more to say about protec-
tions against bias in a later section of this chapter.
Ethical Issues in the Evaluation of Juveniles
Some states that permit and/or mandate forensic animal maltreatment evalu-
ation restrict these assessments to juveniles. In addition to the general ethical
issues pertinent to forensic evaluation noted earlier, there are several impor-
tant ethical considerations that should be accounted for when the examinee is
a juvenile.
First, in terms of the notification of purpose, care needs to be taken to ensure
that any developmental limitations on the youth’s cognitive capacity are consid-
ered. For example, youth that are relatively younger (e.g., pre-adolescents) may
not have had prior experience with court-ordered evaluations and may make
unwarranted assumptions that the evaluator is in a helping role. This may be
especially likely for youth who have prior experience in mental health treatment.
The examiner should not underestimate the associational power of such things
as credentials on the wall, particularly for youth whose thinking may be con-
crete in nature. Additionally, younger children may exhibit the kind of acquies-
cence to authority and reluctance to acknowledge not understanding something
that are often seen in persons with intellectual disabilities. The point here is
that the ethical examiner should take care to ensure that explanations about the
nature and purpose of the evaluation, including confidentiality limitations, are
explained simply and that the youth’s understanding of such explanations is ver-
ified. Because the individual being evaluated is a legal minor, such explanations
need to include the appropriate legal guardian(s) as well, as these individuals will
likely be an important source of collateral information that may be included in
the report.
Second, in some cases, it may be advisable to administer a forensic assessment
instrument or a psychological test. For example, in evaluations in which there
is a suspected response style (e.g., malingering), it would be prudent practice
to address the concern with an instrument appropriate to the circumstances.
Practical considerations in making such assessment decisions are covered
elsewhere in this volume. From an ethical point of view, the availability and
relevance of normative data pertinent to reliability and validity is an essential

consideration. Specifically, if assessment tools are not properly validated or there
are concerns about relevant normative data, the examiner would be wise to con-
sider either different tools or not using them nomothetically.
Credentials and Requisite Skill
Court-ordered assessments potentially can be done by a variety of mental health

professionals, with different backgrounds, experiences, methods, and biases.
This is not to say, however, that any professional with experience in mental health
assessment would necessarily be qualified to do such evaluations. The Specialty
Guidelines for Forensic Psychology note that one must have an adequate founda-
tion of knowledge, training skill, and experience to do specific types of evalua-
tions. For example, one might be highly skilled at child custody evaluations and
yet not have the requisite competencies to do an evaluation of competency to
stand trial. Similarly, one might be competent to perform many types of forensic
evaluations yet not necessarily competent to perform forensic animal maltreat-
ment evaluations. One need only examine the table of contents for this book to
see that there is in fact a substantial set of knowledge and skill that would be nec-
essary to perform a forensic evaluation of animal maltreatment in a competent
and ethical manner.
This begs the question, of course, of how one might know when one is in pos-
session of the necessary competencies. The various ethical guidelines noted
here do not offer specific proscriptions for making such determinations beyond
pointing towards a broadly defined base of knowledge and skill. At the very least,
attaining competency in this area should include specialized training, supervi-
sion/consultation, and becoming familiar with the full range of conceptual and
practical issues described in other chapters in this volume. For example, there is
a large and growing body of literature about individuals who hoard animals, and
to undertake an evaluation of such individuals without knowledge of various
motivations and psychopathology that can be associated with animal hoarding
would be ethically indefensible.
Assuming that there is some reasonably defined “minimum necessary” set
of knowledge and skill raises a related issue. Since forensic animal maltreat-
ment evaluations are in an early stage of development compared to other areas
of forensic assessment, how exactly does a cadre of suitably knowledgeable and
skillful examiners become established that is sufficient to meet the referral need?
At least at the outset, we can reasonably assume that very few mental health
professionals will have the requisite knowledge, skill, and experience in this area
to provide a competent and ethical evaluation. When demand for competent
evaluators exceeds supply, what is one to do? Do such exigencies mean that we
compromise our ethical standards in order to accommodate the needs of the
court to do evaluations in this area? We do not think so. Consider the follow-
ing medical analogy. Who among us would expect to walk into the office of our
outpatient primary care physician and demand cardiac surgery? Although we

may have great trust in our physician to provide “routine” outpatient care for a
wide variety of illnesses and maladies, there would be no reason to believe that
this physician would have the knowledge or skill (not to mention the necessary
medical equipment and support) necessary to safely and effectively perform such
a procedure. To demand such a procedure in this context is obvious folly.
The point here is simply that willingness and availability alone do not consti-
tute competency, and proceeding in the absence of such competency may well do
more harm than good. For those with a serious interest in performing forensic
assessments of animal maltreatment, this will likely mean saying “no” to refer-
rals as one gains the necessary competencies. Even as such competencies are
being developed, we believe there is wisdom in “wading in slowly” (i.e., accepting
cases sparingly until one gains experience and refines skill).
Evaluators should be familiar with a wide range of psychopathology and be
able to connect it, if applicable, to the behavior in question. This is especially
true in light of the recent inclusion of hoarding disorder within the newly formu-
lated section of the DSM-5, “OCD and Related Disorders” (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013b). It is interesting to note that animal hoarding is listed as an
associated feature of hoarding disorder and that among the specifiers is a range of
insight (good or fair, poor, or absent/delusional). The forensic professional should
have the clinical skills to distinguish hoarding disorder from other conditions
that may give rise to animal maltreatment, for example, psychoses and neuro-
cognitive disorders, as noted above. If specialized neuropsychological or other
psychometric assessments are required for accuracy, then the court needs to be
aware of the limitations of the tests if not performed. The Specialty Guidelines for
Forensic Psychology (American Psychological Association, 2013) suggest consid-
ering a collegial consultation, even when expertise is present, in complex or dif-
ficult cases. This advice should seriously be considered in animal-maltreatment
situations, wherein understanding the offenders is at the frontier of knowledge.
Part of due diligence in presenting one’s credentials is to determine the degree
to which the subject matter is within the scope of training and experience.
Though it is a simple matter for a licensed psychologist, for example, to be prof-
fered as an expert in court or to assist in evaluation of an offender, the balance of
the ethical question is whether the expert requires specialized knowledge in the
area of capacity to house and care for animals in a humane and lawful manner.
Because of the dearth of literature on the use of mental health experts in animal
abuse/rights cases, we can offer only general guidelines at this point. It would
be speculation for a mental health professional to assume that the assessment of
specific capacities (for example, how decisions are made about what constitutes
reasonable living environments for animals) is a transferable skill from another
area (for example, parenting or making medical treatment decisions). On the
other hand, any otherwise-qualified mental health professional should be able to
conduct and testify about a diagnostic assessment.
The problem then becomes a matter of a scientific basis for correlating diag-
nostic types with animal-care capacity or understanding the boundaries between
pet accumulation and maltreatment. In the easiest cases, such as intellectual dis-
ability (formerly mental retardation), capacity can be approximated or a categor-
ical statement made. In other areas, such as schizophrenia or autism spectrum
disorder, there is less scientific information to guide the testimony. This does
not mean that experts should not testify, only that pronouncements should be
modest and in keeping with general capacity guidelines. In addition, the expert
might want to confer with other experts, such as a veterinarian, shelter profes-
sionals, and animal-protection advocates. In this manner, the focus will remain
on the animal victims.
M I T I G AT I N G B I AS I N E VA LUAT I O N S
Both the SGFP and AAPL guidelines emphasize the critical importance of objec-
tivity in forensic evaluation. One of the most significant threats to objectivity is
bias. Black’s Law Dictionary defines bias as, “A predisposition to decide a cause or
an issue in a certain way” (Black, 1990). Bruner (1975) noted that a combination
of cognitive factors (e.g., expectations) and contextual factors combine with emo-
tional factors (e.g., needs and motives) to both determine and distort what people
notice and how they interpret what they see and hear. In this way, prior experi-
ences and individual beliefs can form the conditions in which biases can cloud
objective judgment. Research shows that people readily recognize confirmation
bias and related biases in others, but not in themselves (Pronin, Gilovich, &
Ross, 2004).
There are many different types of bias and strategies for minimizing the influ-
ence of bias on judgment (Croskerry, 2002, 2003), and the wise forensic practitio-
ner would do well to become familiar with them. For our purposes, we identify
three that are most pertinent to animal maltreatment evaluations. The first con-
cerns visceral bias, which refers to a tendency for affective sources, either positive
or negative, to influence decision making. It is very common for adults to have
had pets as a child and/or to have pets now, and anecdotal evidence would indi-
cate most such experiences were very positive. Some might argue that although
sheer exposure alone in the media has desensitized us to interpersonal violence,
the same is not true for acts of violence against animals. That is, it would be
considered normative for animal maltreatment to evoke feelings of outrage and
indignation, and such feelings could sway the examiner via visceral bias to be
less than objective when evaluating an individual who is charged with such acts.
Adding further fuel to this bias would be the view held by many individuals that
animals are by their very nature more “innocent” than would-be human victims,
who are sometimes viewed as being to blame for eliciting violence. This is an
all-too-common dynamic in domestic violence situations, in which the victim is
often led to believe that his or her behavior is somehow to blame for the perpetra-
tor’s violence.
The second type of bias is the fundamental attribution error, which refers
to the tendency to overemphasize person-centered factors and minimize the
contribution of contextual factors when making explanatory attributions about

others. In the context of animal maltreatment evaluations, this bias could sway
the unwary examiner to overlook and/or underemphasize important contextual
factors and over-focus on explanatory factors that are psychological in nature
(e.g., “This examinee is simply antisocial.”). Ideally, the examiner will temper
trait-based explanations with an analysis of situational dynamics.
A third source of bias concerns confirmation bias, which refers to a tendency to
look for and/or be more sensitive to data that tend to confirm one’s initial impres-
sion/hypothesis. This bias is not unique to animal maltreatment evaluations, but
it might combine with visceral bias, leading us away from a thorough collection
and an objective consideration of evaluation data. There are some potentially
useful strategies to minimize the impact of this bias. Specifically, the examiner
can seek to identify data that are inconsistent with one’s initial hypothesis and
seek to account for them. Second, one might identify data that one would expect
to see if one’s initial hypothesis were true and then carefully examine the base of
the data to see if such data were missing. Lastly, it can be helpful to identify data
one would expect to see if one’s initial hypothesis were false, and then review the
available evidence to see if such data are present.
A variation of confirmation bias that should be of particular concern to exam-
iners doing ex parte evaluations is known as allegiance bias, which refers to a ten-
dency to interpret data favorably to the side that hired the examiner. A study by
Murrie et al. (2013) found that forensic examiners who believed they were work-
ing for the prosecution tended to rate sexually violent offenders as being at higher
risk of re-offending than did forensic examiners who thought that they had been
hired by the defense. This finding could be reasonably extrapolated to situations
in which the examiner may be paid by or even selected by the examinee.
It is not, of course, sufficient to simply identify potential sources of bias.
There is empirical evidence that simple awareness of the source of cognitive
bias is insufficient by itself to prevent a person from being trapped by biases
(Ariely, 2008; Cialdini, 2001). The more difficult task is to take affirmative steps
to minimize the influence of bias on one’s judgments and opinions. Shuman
and Zervopoulos (2010) recommend that forensic examiners actively challenge
each plausible alternative explanation (i.e., generate reasons why your conclu-
sions may be wrong and why another possibility may be correct) by explaining
the case data in the context of each hypothesis. In other words, decision mak-
ing can become more objective when seasoned by preemptive self-criticism. A
variation of this tactic involves vigorous consideration of the opposite, which
Arkes (1991) has suggested can be an effective way to reduce the impact of some
cognitive biases.
Issues related to bias are not restricted to the examiner and to sources of collat-
eral information. The ethical examiner in forensic animal maltreatment evalua-
tion should also consider and address potential bias associated with who retained
the evaluator. For example, although the evaluation may be court-ordered, if the
examinee has been ordered to pay for (or even seek out and select) the exam-
iner, there can be a not-insignificant pressure or incentive to produce an opinion
favorable to the examinee. In this regard, forensic examiners who have prior
work experience doing ex parte evaluations should be familiar with even subtle
ways in which such arrangements can lessen one’s objectivity. The well-worn but
apt forensic maxim that in doing ex parte forensic evaluations, it is one’s time,
not one’s opinion, that is for sale should certainly be mutually understood and
agreed upon by all parties at the outset of the evaluation.
Finally, in the interests of minimizing bias and safeguarding objectivity in the
most thorough and even-handed manner possible, the examiner should care-
fully take into account the interests of the animal(s) that have been mistreated.
We are the first to admit that such a perspective may strike some as surprising,
and may evoke a bewildered sense of, “How am I supposed to do that?” among
forensic examiners new to this area. We submit that the question is not unlike
accounting for the best interests of other victims of abuse or neglect. We cer-
tainly do not intend to equate animal victims with children, or with older or
otherwise vulnerable adults who are victims of maltreatment. However, from a
clinical point of view, advocating for the unspoken needs of those who are most
vulnerable represents a value and practice that are embraced by many who do
forensic evaluations of victims.
Moore (2005) advances cogent arguments for affording animals protections
similar to those granted to other crime victims. From a legal perspective, a rea-
sonable argument can be made that animal anti-cruelty legislation has been
enacted to protect animals for their own sake rather than merely for advancing
the interests of the state. He notes also that the definition of “crime victims,”
while varying among the states, often goes beyond the person against whom a
criminal offense has been committed. For example, some states include govern-
ment agencies, neighborhood associations, corporations, and estates as poten-
tial victims, which would seem to establish a legal precedent for entities other
than human beings to be regarded as victims. Including protections for animals
as crime victims could be construed as a natural progression in the develop-
ment of legal thinking about and protection for victims. For example, laws have
been enacted in Spain and Switzerland in which animals have been accorded
a status beyond that of property. Importantly, Moore argues that maltreated
animals are voiceless and without legal advocates, and that law enforcement
methods and the legal protections afforded to victims of crime can and should
be extended to animals.
A concrete expression of this perspective can be seen in the highly publi-
cized case involving Michael Vick. In April 2007, the Surry County Sheriff’s
Department seized 53 pit bulls from Vick’s residential property in Virginia.
According to the facts set forth in court documents, these dogs had been sub-
jected to violent dogfights. As the case progressed, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia appointed Rebecca Huss as the “guard-
ian/special master” of the dogs. The court reasoned that much like human vic-
tims of abuse, the dogs needed an advocate to represent their best interests
during litigation. As described by Huss (2008), the court asked her, among other
things, to make difficult recommendations about whether each dog should be
euthanized (as a result of its inability to interact safely with humans and/or other
animals) or given a second chance at life in a new home. This is but one example
of how one court responded to the many challenges associated with identifying
and advocating for the best interests of maltreated animals. Legislatively, bills
have been introduced over the years that have tried to mandate such provisions
by statute, but to our knowledge, at the time this manuscript was being prepared
none has yet been formally enacted into law.
One of the more difficult decisions that a court may face is what to do with vic-
tims of animal maltreatment, and whether or not to limit future animal owner-
ship on the part of the examinee. Patronek (personal communication, 2014) has
begun framing such considerations as “safety decisions.” To clarify, consider the
following example. Assume that an individual has been found guilty of mistreat-
ing some but not all of the animals in his/her possession. Should those animals
who have not been mistreated remain with the individual in question? Should
that individual be allowed to obtain new animals? While currently there may not
be well-established assessment practices for addressing such issues, we strongly
recommend that the questions be asked and considered from a risk assessment/
management perspective.
A PPR OAC H ES TO AS S ES S M EN T
In addition to the ethical and bias questions discussed thus far, practice obviously
will be influenced by the models and methods that we can develop to perform
forensic assessments for animal maltreatment. This section offers general guid-
ance on how we can best develop those methods. It discusses the value of critical
thinking, drawing from general principles of forensic mental health assessment,
conceptual issues, existing models for animal maltreatment assessments, and
the admissibility of assessment evidence.
Critical Thinking
Although taking steps to minimize the impact of bias may help us avoid “getting
it wrong,” there are many additional steps that can and should be taken to “get
it right.” These steps are perhaps best understood under the rubric of critical
thinking. There are many different definitions of critical thinking, which can be
found in academic, business, and philosophical settings. Many of these defini-
tions focus on the key elements of the disciplined process of thinking that the
critical thinker uses to assess the validity of a claim. Most contemporary writers
in this area describe critical thinking as encompassing both skills and disposi-
tions, and the reader interested in a comprehensive account is referred to Facione
(1990).
For our purposes, a good working definition of critical thinking is offered by
Wade and Tavris (2005), who describe it as “the ability and willingness to assess
claims and make objective judgments on the basis of well-supported reasons and
evidence rather than emotion or anecdote.” These authors have conceptualized
critical thinking as a process based upon eight tenets or premises: (a) ask questions,
be willing to wonder; (b) define your terms; (c) examine the evidence; (d) analyze
assumptions and biases; (e) don’t oversimplify; (f) consider other interpretations;
(g) avoid emotional reasoning; and (h) tolerate uncertainty. The recommended
approach for practice that incorporates critical thinking is simply that animal mal-
treatment evaluations account for and be inclusive of these tenets.
In terms of practical application of these premises, The Critical Thinking
Company (http://www.criticalthinking.com) suggests that there are 15 key abili-
ties or tasks essential to thinking critically, each of which is summarized below
along with specific operational recommendations that may be useful in animal
maltreatment evaluations:
1. Focus on a question: In animal maltreatment evaluations, as in all

other forensic evaluations, it is critical to have clarity on the question(s)
being asked and whether or not there are statutory components to the
question. In the case of animal maltreatment evaluations where the rel-
evant statute may be vague, the examiner would do well to solicit input
from the court that ordered the evaluation. While such a step may not
always be useful, if there is an unstated expectation about the evalua-
tion, it is better to know it than not.
2. Analyze arguments: A well-crafted argument should contain clear con-
clusions with a clear foundation in credible and relevant evidence.
3. Ask/answer questions of clarification and/or challenge: One of the
more useful exercises in critical thinking involves successively asking,
“How do I know that?”
4. Evaluate the credibility of a source: A competent forensic evaluation
should be based upon multiple data points from multiple sources, and
we should be able to speak to the reliability of those sources.
5. Observe, and judge observation reports: In addition to our observa-
tions, the reported observations of others need to be carefully evaluated
for possible bias.
6. Deduce, and judge deduction: Critical thinking applies to the language
we use, and when making or judging deductions, caution is called for
when interpreting the terminology of logic such as negation, double
negation, necessary and sufficient, and so on.
7. Induce, and judge induction: When making and judging generaliza-
tions, care should be taken regarding the adequacy of our behavioral
sampling. When doing the same with conclusions, the evidence upon
which the conclusions are based must be consistent with the facts, and
legitimate efforts should be made to obtain and evaluate evidence that
supports competing hypotheses.
8. Make and judge value judgments: These tasks must be made in such a
way that alternatives are considered and weighed.
9. Define terms and judge definitions: When constructing arguments to

support a claim, terms should be defined, and where relevant, behav-
iorally anchored.
10. Identify unstated assumptions: This step is essential in helping the
courts follow our logic and understand the inferences made in reach-
ing our conclusions.
11. Consider and reason from premises, reasons, assumptions, posi-
tions, and other propositions with which we disagree or about which
we are in doubt: The key aspect of this task involves due consideration
of reasonable competing hypotheses.
12. Integrate the other abilities and dispositions in making and defend-
ing a decision: Critical thinking should reflect clarity in stating the
question or concern, organization in working with complexity, dili-
gence in seeking an adequate range of relevant data, and reasonable-
ness in applying clinical data to the legal criteria.
13. Proceed in an orderly manner appropriate to the situation: One way
to accomplish this task is to use a reasonably detailed critical-thinking
checklist to ensure that proper analytic steps, including monitoring
one’s own cognitive process, have been taken.
14. Be sensitive to the feelings, level of knowledge, and degree of sophis-
tication of others: One way to think about applying this task is in the
context of Helibrun’s (2001) maxim to keep jargon to a minimum and,
when it must be used, to explain it.
15. Employ appropriate rhetorical strategies in discussion and presenta-
tion: The skillful forensic examiner would do well to be familiar with
logical fallacies (e.g., begging the question, non-sequitur, equivoca-
tions, etc.) and avoid them in one’s thinking and writing.
Attending to Principles of Forensic Mental Health Assessment
Although specific assessment tools and techniques can reasonably be expected

to change over time as the field matures, what is likely to abide are the guiding
principles of forensic mental health assessment (FMHA), which were initially
set forth by Heilbrun (2001) and more recently articulated by Heilbrun, Grisso,
and Goldstein (2009). These principals help establish a standard of practice for
forensic evaluation, and as such the forensic evaluations of those accused of mis-
treatment of animals should certainly be consistent with them. A summary list
of these principles follows, along with a discussion of the principles with the
highest degree of applicability to animal maltreatment evaluations.
1. Be aware of the important differences between clinical and forensic

domains;
2. Obtain appropriate education, training, and experience in forensic

specialization;
3. Be familiar with the relevant legal, ethical, scientific, and practice lit-
eratures in FMHA;
4. Be guided by honesty and striving for impartiality, disclosing limita-
tions and support for one’s opinions;
5. Control potential evaluator bias through monitoring case selection,
continuing education, and consultation with colleagues;
6. Be familiar with specific aspects of the legal system, especially com-
munication, discovery, deposition, and testimony;
7. Do not become adversarial, but present and defend your opinions
effectively;
8. Identify relevant forensic issues;
9. Accept referrals only within area of expertise;
10. Decline referral when evaluator impartiality is unlikely;
11. Clarify the evaluator’s role with the attorney;
12. Clarify financial arrangements;
13. Obtain appropriate authorization;
14. Avoid playing the dual roles of therapist and forensic evaluator. In
the case of animal maltreatment evaluations, having provided treat-
ment services to the examinee or his/her associates would constitute
grounds for declining to do an evaluation;
15. Determine role to be played within forensic assessment if referral is
accepted;
16. Select and employ a model to guide data gathering, interpretation, and
communication;
17. Use multiple sources of information for each area being assessed. As
is the case in any good forensic evaluation, the broader and deeper the
pool of relevant evidence considered (e.g., police reports, photographs
of the animal victim, reliable and knowledgeable third-party collater-
als, etc.), the better;
18. Use relevance and reliability (validity) as guides for seeking informa-
tion and selecting data sources;
19. Obtain relevant historical information;
20. Assess relevant clinical characteristics in relevant, reliable, and
valid ways;
21. Assess legally relevant behavior;
22. Ensure that conditions for evaluation are quiet, private, and
distraction-free;
23. Provide appropriate notification of purpose and/or obtain appropriate
authorization before beginning;
24. Determine whether the individual understands the purpose of the
evaluation and associated limits on confidentiality;
2 5. Use third-party information in assessing response style;

26. Use testing when indicated in assessing response style;
27. Use case-specific (idiographic) evidence of clinical condition, func-
tional abilities, and causal connection;
28. Use nomothetic evidence of clinical condition, functional abilities, and
causal connection;
29. Use scientific reasoning in assessing causal connection between clini-
cal condition and functional abilities;
30. Carefully consider whether to answer the ultimate legal question;
31. Describe findings and limits so that they need change little under
cross-examination;
32. Attribute information to sources;
33. Use plain language; avoid technical jargon;
34. Write report in sections, according to model and procedures;
35. Base testimony on the results of the properly performed FMHA;
36. Prepare (meet with the attorney prior to testimony, become thor-
oughly familiar with report findings, highlight points of testimony,
anticipate challenges upon cross-examination);
37. Communicate effectively;
38. Control the message (use both substantive mastery and stylistic effec-
tiveness to assert and emphasize important points in response to
cross-examination).
Conceptual Issues in Shaping Animal

Maltreatment Assessments
As in all forensic assessments, clear distinctions must be drawn between foren-

sic and therapeutic assessment. Assessments that address animal maltreatment
for the courts are no different in that regard. The general ethical and concep-
tual principals of any forensic assessment apply equally to animal maltreatment
assessments. As such, Heilbrun, Grisso, and Goldstein (2009) note that general
clinical (or therapeutic) assessments address treatment issues such as diagnosis
and interventions. These evaluations have their focus on the best interest(s) of
the identified client or patient. In contrast, forensic mental health assessment
(FMHA) assists the legal decision maker, typically a trier of fact such as a judge
or magistrate, in making a decision. This could be about specific questions like
functional capacities relative to a legal process; or other determinations such as
mental state at the time of the offense or risk for future negative behaviors.
Heilbrun, Grisso and Goldstein further point out that this distinction has
critical implications for clinicians providing FMHAs. First, beyond general
clinical knowledge, the forensic clinician must have knowledge and experience
relative to translating or understanding the law’s perspective of human behavior
into constructs that can be addressed in mental health assessment. Secondly,
in a clinical assessment, the allegiance of the examiner is to the person being
examined. However, in a FMHA, the primary allegiance is to the legal authori-

ties and not the examinee. This critical distinction results in multiple ethical and
professional challenges for the examiner.
Specifically, FMHAs differ from therapeutic assessments (Melton et al.,
2007) in terms of scope (the forensic assessment commonly addresses a limited
legal question), importance of client’s perspective (in a forensic assessment, the
“client” is the referral source); voluntariness (forensic examinees are seen by
request or order by legal authorities) and autonomy (the examinee has limited
input, if any, in to the question assessed; rather the assessment is determined by
the legal question). In addition consideration must be given to threats to validity
(forensic assessments have a much greater risk of unconscious or deliberate dis-
tortion); relationship and dynamics (the forensic assessment is not in the “help-
ing” role but may be adversarial and requires more distance by the examiner)
and, lastly, pace and setting (clinical assessments may be less determined by
time, and forensic assessments often have strictly mandated time-frames).
Finally, as pointed out by Heilbrun et al. (2009), while clinical assessments are
intended to inform other clinical professionals, FMHAs are in effect a transla-
tion of clinical terms into a non-clinical context, typically a very specific one
that is framed by the legal question that occasioned the referral by the court.
This last implication poses especially difficult challenges to the forensic profes-
sional (termed by one of the authors as being similar to attempting to waltz to
rap music). Courts typically make determinations in a dichotomous and abso-
lutist manner. Mental health assessments typically result in multifactorial and
probabilistic findings, where recommendations may be contextual (e.g., pro-
vided in the context of development level). The translation from one model to
another that preserves the scientific and ethical integrity of the assessment into
meaningful and useful data for the court is an often difficult but essential task
for the forensic clinician.
All assessments, regardless of type, must follow a model that provides useful,
valid, and reliable information. In the specific case of FMHAs, psychological
tests, if utilized, must not only meet appropriate professional standards such as
the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (American Educational
Research Association, 1999), but instruments utilized must meet relevant legal
standards such as Frye (1923) or Daubert (1992) or other evidentiary screening
tests depending upon the jurisdiction of the examination. Within that context,
while testing may play an important role in forensic assessment, it is not manda-
tory and, if misused, can lend an air of false objectivity and/or precision at best,
and misleading information at worst. Any test or instrument used in a forensic
context must assess a construct that is specific to the legal question and must do
so in a manner that is valid and reliable. Validity must be specific to the legal
question, and the instrument must have been peer reviewed and have available
critical data such as the test manual and the normative data of the instrument.
In addition, measures of response style such as exaggeration or minimization
are critical in a forensic setting. We would suggest that some form of the fol-
lowing introductory paragraphs be included in each assessment where testing
is utilized to explain to the referral source the nature and limitations of psycho-
metric assessment.
Psychodiagnostic testing can offer valuable clinical information about
a defendant that is empirically grounded, as test responses are statisti-
cally compared to various normal, clinical, and/or criminal groups.
Interpretations of psychological tests are hypotheses and should not be used
in isolation from other information gathered for a particular evaluation. The
interpretive statements that are offered below are actuarial, research, and
clinically based inferences revealed by test scores and patterns.
Test results are probabilistic in nature and should be interpreted cau-
tiously. Given that test results address current functioning, it is impossible
to tell from test results alone if the patterns, symptoms, or deficits revealed
preexisted the events in question, if they were present during the events in
question, or are the sequelae of the events. Test results should ultimately be
interpreted within the context of multiple sources of data and the current
legal context.
Models for Animal Maltreatment Assessments
Structured models of assessment for use in a forensic context differ from those
developed for use in a strictly clinical setting. However, clinical assessment
techniques, for example, the MMPI-A or MMPI-2 (Pope et al., 2006) or the
MMPI-2-RF (Ben-Porath, 2012), will often be a valuable component to a forensic
assessment, so long as the data are interpreted within the forensic context. To
assist in this conceptualization (as discussed in Heilbrun et al., 2009), Melton
et al. (2007) distinguish between clinical assessment instruments that do not
typically yield information relevant to the forensic question, forensically rele-
vant instruments that were developed for a clinical purpose but can address con-
structs that can be valuable in a forensic context, and specific forensic assessment
instruments that are developed to provide information specific to litigation.
An excellent example of a clinical assessment model is AniCare Child
(Randour et al., 1999). This model asks the treating clinician to use multiple
sources of data to assess both the child’s relationship to animals and the act of
maltreatment itself across multiple dimensions. The model is a compilation of
other therapeutic sources and while providing case illustrations, does not have
outcome data for them. Randour suggests that the child be assessed in the fol-
lowing domains: severity of abuse, culpability including developmental aspects,
psychodynamics and motivation, attitudes and beliefs, emotional intelligence,
family history, and mitigating circumstances. As a clinical model without nor-
mative data in the manual, this model is best conceptualized as a heuristic model
for conceptualization of assessment domains.
Instruments such as the Child Behavior Checklist, the Achenbach-Conners-
Quay Behavior Checklist (Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000), or the MMPI family
of tests can be seen as providing forensically relevant information. Specific

to the ACQ, a sample of 2,600 males and females referred to mental health
clinics were compared to a non-referred control sample. In the non-referred
sample, the rate for animal cruelty ranged from 0% to 6% for girls and 4% to
13% for boys. In the clinic-referred sample, the rate for animal cruelty in girls
was 7% to 17% and 18% to 34% for boys. Although the MMPI-A does have
an item pertaining to animal treatment, to date and to our knowledge, there
have been no specific studies on animal cruelty using this instrument. The
MMPI, however, for both adolescents and adults, can be an extremely valuable
source of data on personality functioning, level and type of psychopathology,
and response style that meets Daubert standards. Use of empirically validated
instruments can be extremely valuable in providing objective information
concerning the examinee that can assist in responding to the legal questions
addressed. There may be circumstances, as noted, when psychometric assess-
ment is not indicated if there are no valid and empirically supported ratio-
nales for use of a particular instrument in reference to the specific forensic
question. However, in situations where over- or under-reporting of symptoms
is in question—the use of psychometric instruments may be very helpful, if
not essential.
To date, there is no empirically validated forensic assessment instrument
for animal maltreatment. Hopefully, as this field of scientific inquiry matures,
models such as AniCare or the promising AARAT assessment tool that is being
developed at the University of Denver may help fill this void. Until we have
such validated tools, the forensic clinician must draw upon principals derived
from existing forensic assessment models and utilize a forensically informed
model of assessment. When so doing, it is ethically incumbent upon the assess-
ing clinician to inform the referral source of the rationale for the model(s)
chosen, the limitations of the assessment, and subsequent data, opinions, and
recommendations.
A forensically informed model should first address empirically supported risk
factors found in risk assessments of violence in youth and adults, and should
encompass both static (i.e., unchanging) and dynamic (fluid, responsive to con-
text and intervention) factors. The assessment must focus upon both persono-
logical and contextual characteristics of the examinee. The risk factors addressed
must be those which have, it all possible, been linked in the research to animal
violence and should address both present risk and those factors that might be
addressed therapeutically to lower the risk of recidivism.
In that there are only limited data available, the court must be informed of
the limitations of the subsequent findings. Opinions must be offered only on
the basis of empirically grounded knowledge. Clearly, while sometimes very
difficult to acknowledge, the only appropriate answer to a question posed by
the court for which there are no data is to acknowledge that, as a profession,
we simply don’t know the answer with a reasonable degree of certainty and
that supposition and conjecture is at best unfounded, and at worst harmful
and unethical.
Attending to Cultural Differences
Beyond psychometric and contextual considerations, assessment of animal

maltreatment, as is the case in any assessment, must be considered within
a cultural context. In the specific case of animal maltreatment, the exam-
iner must be aware of cultural factors and influences upon the person being
assessed. Specifically, attitudes towards animals vary keenly depending upon
the culture of the examinee as well as the function of that animal within that
sociocultural context. As an illustration, there may be considerable variation
in how a specific animal is perceived in a rural or urban setting. An ani-
mal may be considered livestock and treated in a manner that would be quite
different if the very same animal was considered to be a companion animal.
Although there are most probably certain core values regardless of setting
(e.g., avoidance of undue pain and suffering), variation will most certainly be
seen in what is thought to be appropriate or inappropriate depending upon
setting.
Accordingly, in addition to fundamental tenets of clinical and forensic assess-
ment, the forensic assessor of animal maltreatment cases must be especially
cognizant of potential cultural influences upon the examinee and the assess-
ment itself. In much the same manner, the examiner must be aware of his or
her cultural and personal beliefs and perceptions and how these may impact the
ability to provide objective assessment. Needless to say, cultural attitudes associ-
ated with any particular racial and/or ethnic background should not be taken
as exculpatory. By way of analogy, even though domestic violence and physi-
cal abuse of a child may be regarded differently in another culture, they remain
unacceptable and illegal in the United States. Such cultural considerations about
animal maltreatment may be, however, critical to address from a therapeutic
point of view.
As an illustration, cases have been reported in which a livestock worker has
mistreated animals in a manner beyond what would be normative or usual prac-
tices. While in some instances cattle or sheep may be prodded or herded, the use
of physical violence or implements that result in pain are seen as unacceptable
practice. Some cases have reached the level of prosecution because an accepted
community standard has been breached and individuals have been convicted.
The forensic clinician, if uncertain as to the degree of potential inappropriate
treatment or possible abuse, could consult with other disciplines, such as veteri-
narians or professional trade associations, for further guidance.
Questions about the Admissibility of Assessment Evidence
Similar to our comments on the ethical aspects of credentials, there must be

congruence between the expert witness’s education, training, and experience,
on the one hand, and the subject matter, on the other. As a threshold matter
for courts, the potential expert should have something to aid or guide the court
in determining a matter that is beyond the ken of the average person (jurors
and judges), and forms the basis for evidentiary rules following Federal Rule
702 (the Daubert test [1992]). The function of the court as “gatekeeper” would
be to ensure that the proposed testimony has a reliable scientific basis and that
its helpfulness to the trier of fact outweighs any prejudicial effect on the jury.
All expert witnesses must be aware of the test for admissibility of scientific tes-
timony in their respective jurisdictions, as not all adhere to Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE). While it is unlikely that there would be an evidentiary challenge
to a simple matter of a mental health professional testifying about the results of
a diagnostic examination that addresses the court’s concerns about, say, disposi-
tion, other issues may be on the horizon. The principle one is in the application
of novel assessment instruments that purport to measure specific capacities or
to make predictions. Thus, for example, if one were to develop an instrument
to determine the number of cats that could safely be housed by a person with
schizophrenia, there could be a challenge to the reliability of such a determina-
tion under FRE 702. In jurisdictions relying on “general acceptance” of a novel
scientific test (the Frye test [1923]), such an instrument may be barred.
At this stage in the evolution of diagnostic and capacity instruments in the
area of animal cruelty, the field should be open to testimony from mental health
professionals relying on general principles of human psychopathology and adap-
tation. However, it is not known whether the capacity question will lead to reli-
able quantitative analysis and recommendations. The expert witness may have to
address the court on whether the evaluee should be totally “abstinent” from pet
ownership (12-step model of addiction) versus a dimensional approach that looks
at actual capacity (a child-protection model). In the absence of published stan-
dards and guidance, the testifying expert may need input from animal-welfare
and animal-behavior professionals. Since courts will be relying on guidance
from mental health professionals, it is unlikely, in our view, that their testimony
will be barred if they stay within the domain of what is generally known about
human behavior. Novel theories, techniques, or measurements will have to be
addressed as they arise. In Daubert jurisdictions, where general acceptance is not
required, the question would be whether the testimony’s helpfulness to the court
is supported by some research or literature.
The job of assuring that courts have proper information from forensic
animal maltreatment evaluations is a job not only of the courts, but also of
individual examiners. The challenges in forensic assessment of animal mal-
treatment are many. A task this complex requires knowledge and skill to be
applied with diligence to be done properly. To assist the forensic examiner, we
offer a series of self-assessment questions that may provide a useful focus for
doing so.
The following questions are offered to forensic examiners to help them
decide if they and their methods are qualified for the particular issues raised
in various animal maltreatment evaluation cases. At the beginning of this
chapter, we noted the challenges and hazards of professional work being done
in an area that is relatively new, and suggest that the reader reference the other
content in this volume as a good standard against which one could measure
one’s readiness to do these evaluations. As for specific training and experi-
ence, at this point in the development of forensic evaluation of animal mal-
treatment, it is difficult to nail down credentialing. Although it would not be
prudent for just anyone to do these challenging evaluations, that is a generic
concern. Recognizing that there are no clear answers to these questions, they
are offered to assist the animal maltreatment examiner in self-assessment of
one’s own practice.
1. Do I have the proper credentials, experience, and training?

2. Do I have an adequate basis of knowledge?
3. Am I familiar with the limitations of knowledge associated with both
research and practice?
4. Am I familiar with the applicable rules, procedures, mores, and expec-
tations associated with the referring court?
5. Was my evaluation consistent with prevailing best practice standards?
6. Did I ask the right assessment questions?
7. Is the scope and depth of data that I gathered adequate?
8. Did I account for possible sources of error and/or bias?
9. Did I evaluate the possibility of malingering?
10. Have I accounted for the examinee’s cultural background?
11. Did I describe data limitations?
12. Am I using instruments that have proper empirical support?
13. Did I note relevant interpretive caveats associated with psychological
testing?
14. Have I accounted for data that do not support my opinion?
15. Has my data analysis been guided by critical thinking?
16. Have I considered the data against the backdrop of the proper statu-
tory standards?
17. Does my evaluation identify relevant risk factors that might be
addressed therapeutically to lower the risk of recidivism?
18. Does my assessment meet the relevant admissibility rules for expert
witness testimony?
19. Do I need to seek consultation?
20. Have I answered, within the boundaries of empirically grounded
knowledge, the court’s question(s)?
C O N C LU S I O N
In summary, competent and ethical forensic evaluations of animal maltreat-

ment require specialized knowledge and skill. Although professional practice
standards are in the very early stage of development, the prudent foren-
sic examiner would do well to be familiar with what we know—and don’t
know—about the behavioral patterns and motivations regarding those who
mistreat animals. It is particularly important to be knowledgeable about

known associations with interpersonal violence, including abuse of children
and the elderly. Although there are some resources to guide assessment, as
might be expected from a relatively new and emerging literature, so too are
there significant limitations in these resources. The AAPL and SGFP guide-
lines both call for and describe a number of essential considerations regarding
the ethical and professional contours of the evaluation. In addition, the wise
forensic practitioner will take affirmative steps to ensure that one’s evaluation
reflects critical thinking and minimizes bias. Approaches to assessment of
animal maltreatment that incorporate the principles of forensic mental health
assessment are strongly recommended. Finally, the professional evaluation
of animal maltreatment must be grounded firmly by relevant legal issues,
including any relevant statutory provisions for the evaluation as well as rules
for admissibility of evidence.
N OT E
1. In terms of nomenclature that refers to the person being examined, terms such as
“offender” would be appropriate for post-conviction evaluations, while terms such
as “defendant” would be a better for pre-adjudication evaluations. More neutral
terms such as “evaluee” or “examinee” could be used in evaluation reports associ-
ated with either phase.
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INDEX
Note: Page numbers followed by the italicized letters b, f, n and t indicate material

found in boxes, notes and tables.
AAPL (American Academy of Psychiatry Adult Protective Services, 118–119, 184,

and Law), 334–335, 339 243–244
AARAT (Animal Abusers Interview and Advocacy, in judicial proceedings,
Risk Assessment Tool), 326, 353 12. See also Special masters,
AARDAS (Animal Abuse Registry appointment of
Database Administration Affective disorders, 208, 266
System), 22–24 Affective states, 198–200, 208, 220
Abandonment. See Animal Aggrawal, A., 121
abandonment Aggression
Abel, G. G., 122, 124–125 evolutionary argument for, 149
Abnormal Behavior in Animals role of gender, 151
(Fox), 199 theories, conditions and mechanisms
Abuse classification, 23t of, 149–150
ACE (Animal Cruelty Education), 274 violence graduation vs. general
Achenbach-Conners-Quay Behavior deviance, 150
Checklist, 352–353 Aggressive behavior
Activities of Daily Living (ADL), impair- interspecies sexual abuse and, 123
ment of, 236 role of severity in, 148
Activities of Daily Living-Hoarding substance abuse and, 101
(ADL-H) scale, 242 ALDF (Animal Legal Defense Fund)
Actuarial approach, to forensic animal on animal fighting, 296
maltreatment evaluations, 306 Animal Protection Laws Rankings, 47
Addington, L., 49 compendium of laws, 334
Administration for Children and as prosecutor resource, 12, 26
Families of the Department of on reluctance to pursue charges, 271
Health and Human Services, 253 Allegiance bias, 344
Adolescents, research on Allen, J. G., 179
family and social variables, 111–119 Altruism
psychiatric disorders (various), as impossible, 178
109–110 pathological, 168, 333
in studies of animal cruelty, 107–109 Alvarez, W. A., 120
362 I n d e x
Alys, L., 104 role of severity in, 148–149

American Academy of Psychiatry and violence against humans and, 143–146
Law (AAPL), 334–335, 339 Animal abuse registries, 188, 262
American College of Veterinary Animal Abuse Registry Database
Anesthesia and Analgesia, 207 Administration System
American Humane Association, 252 (AARDAS), 22–24
American Medical Association Animal abusers, public attitudes
(AMA), 334 towards, 140–142
American Prosecutors Research Animal Abusers Interview and Risk
Institute (APRI), 49 Assessment Tool (AARAT),
American Psychiatric Association 326, 353
(APA), 107, 334 Animal care, defining abilities for, 303
American Society for the Prevention of Animal caretakers, definition of, 290
Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA). Animal cognition, 199
child protection movement and, 15 Animal cruelty. See also Animal abuse
enforcement of maltreatment See also Family risk factors, for animal cru-
laws, 9–12 elty; Legal responses, to animal cruelty
origins of, 252 antisocial behaviors and, 97, 104
role of the NYPD and, 11 building assessment tools for, 304–306
American Veterinary Medical forensic evaluation/assessment,
Association (AVMA), 26, 188 292–294, 299–302, 327
Analgesia, use of, 203. See also Pain incarcerated populations and, 102–106
Anger management treatment juvenile histories of, 49–50
court ordered/consideration of, observational learning and, 111
293, 310 research on adolescent offenders,
state statutes regarding, 54–55t, 57t, 107–109
59t, 64–65t, 71, 290–291 Animal Cruelty Crime Statistics
AniCare Child, 264, 268, 272, (Addington and Randour), 49
326–327, 352 Animal Cruelty Education (ACE), 274
AniCare Model of Treatment for Animal Cruelty Prosecution:
Animal Abuse Opportunities for Early Response to
approach, 268 Crime and Interpersonal Violence
conceptual framework, 265–266, 270f (Lockwood), 49
development of, 267 Animal cruelty statutes, animal hoard-
lessons learned from, 268–269, 271–272 ing in, 170–171. See also Animal
in ordered assessments, 263 protection legislation
Animal abandonment Animal exhibits, 164
classification of, 23t Animal fighting. See also Blood sports
as maltreatment, 32 acceptance of, 147
motivations for, 163 cockfighting, 126–127
occurrence of, 46–47 dogfighting, 125–126
statutes regarding, 51, 290 forensic animal maltreatment evalua-
Animal abuse, See also Animal cruelty tions in, 295–296
definition of, 142 Animal Fighting Spectator Prohibition
incidence in general population, Act, 255
142–143 Animal hoarding. See also Interventions
path to treatment, 269f for animal hoarding
I n d e x 363
vs. animal neglect, 160, 236–237 Illinois example, 47–48

assessing capacity for care, 185–188 juvenile justice systems and, 49–50
cats as common victims, 212–213 Kentucky examples, 47
clinical features of, 174–176 trends in, 49–52
companion animal hoarders, 81–82 Animal maltreatment subfield
considerations for evaluators, 184–188 development
defense of actions, 175 development of, xv–xvii
demographic information, 235–236 forensic evaluation/assessment, xx–xxi
epidemiology of, 237–238 social and legal context for, xvii–xviii
explanatory model of, 182–184 social responses, xix–xx
females and, 151 theory and research, xviii–xix
as form of neglect, 165–166 Animal pain
gender differences in, 174 avoidance of, 19–20
general features of, 171, 174 management of, 19, 207
health consequences of, 240–241 as source of suffering, 202–205
as hoarding disorder manifestation, Animal protection legislation
239–241 animal hoarding solutions, 169–171
husbandry-related “routine,” 160–163 as barometer of social concern, 33–34
illustrative case histories, 180–182 child protection links, 14–16
legal system challenges, 166–169 historical acts, 6–8
legislative dilemmas, 169–171 influence of pets on, 17
as mental disorder/illness, 165, in post-war period, 16–18
234–235 property-based legacy, 5
mentalization deficits in, 179–180 social context for 19th century
object hoarding, similarities with, 182 reforms, 12–12
occurrence of, 46 in the United States, 8–9
psychiatric status, 238–239 Animal protection movement,
psychological assessment of, 241–243 development of, 8
self-neglect in, 174 Animal Related Experiences Inventory
self-reinforcing nature of, 184 (Boat), 318
trauma/stressful events and, 240 Animals
treatment protocols, lack of, 178–179 legal definitions of, 43–44
typology of, 172–173t legal status of, 11–12
Animal law, as profession, 18–19 as personal property, 40–44
Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) as selfobjects, 177–179
on animal fighting, 296 Animals and Society Institute, 269
Animal Protection Laws Rankings, 47 Animal sexual abuse, See also Bestiality
compendium of laws, 334 among juvenile sex offenders,
as prosecutor resource, 12, 26 122–123
on reluctance to pursue charges, 271 building assessment tools for, 304–306
Animal Machines (Harrison), 20 forensic animal maltreatment evalua-
Animal maltreatment laws tions in, 294–295, 299–302
disparity across states, 47–48 interspecies abuse, 123–125
disposition and sentencing, 52–53 motivations for, 121–122
enforcement of, 9–12, 25–26 prevalence, 120
felony/misdemeanor range of behaviors, 96, 119
distinction, 44–46 types of abusers, 120–121
364 I n d e x
Animal shelters admissibility of assessment evidence,

guidelines for care, 21 354–355
stress from overcrowding in, 42 aggravating factors, 146–149
Animal Treatment Offender Program conceptual issues in, 350–352
(ATOP), 274 critical thinking steps, 346–348
Animal victims. See also Suffering, cultural differences, attending to, 354
sources of models for, 352–353
sentencing and disposition decisions specific assessment tools, 348–350
and, 197, 221 terms of nomenclature in, 357n1
use of special masters, 42, 345–346 Assessment research
Animal welfare defined, 77
academic inquiry into, 198–201 measureable concept
assessment of, 201 development, 89–90
as field of study, 199 operational definitions, 90
focus on biological functioning, 198 purpose of, 88–89
understanding suffering, 197 tool validation, 90
well-being in animals, 201–202 Association of Shelter Veterinarians,
Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 17–18, 21 21, 175
Animal welfare court, 273–274 ATOP (Animal Treatment Offender
Animal Welfare Institute, 49 Program), 274
Anticruelty legislation. See Animal pro- Attachment disorders, 110, 177, 179, 183,
tection legislation 183f, 184, 189
Antisocial behaviors Attachment theory/trauma, 177–178, 179
animal cruelty and, 97, 104 Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
in juveniles, 110 (ADHD), 110
Anxiety, physical abuse of animals AVMA (American Veterinary Medical
and, 102 Association), 26, 188
Applied Animal Behaviour Science, 198 AVMA Model Veterinary Practice
APRI (American Prosecutors Research Act, 26
Institute), 49 AWA (Animal Welfare Act), 17–18, 21
APsychiA (American Psychiatric AWA (Laboratory Animal Welfare
Association), 334 Act), 255
Arizona Animal Welfare League, 273 Ayers, C., xi, xix
Arkes, H. R., 344 Azar, S. T., 185
Arluke, A., 98–99, 100, 105, 168, 181
Ascione, F. R., 95, 112, 118, 119, 327, 328 Bachman, J. G., 98
ASPCA (American Society for the “Backyard breeders,” 164
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). Baldry, A. C., 112, 259, 329
child protection movement and, 15 Barnard, G. W., 104
enforcement of maltreatment Bateman, A., 179
laws, 9–12 Bateson, P., 201
origins of, 252 “The Battered Child Syndrome”
role of the NYPD and, 11 (Kempe), 252
Assessment, approaches to. See also Bear baiting, 6. See also Animal fighting
Forensic animal maltreatment Becker, K. D., 108, 110
evaluations (FAMEs) Bedding, as factor in suffering, 217
I n d e x 365
Behavioral well-being, compromised Bureau of Chemistry, 13

state of, 206–211 Burgess, A. W., 107, 108
Behavior and Brain Sciences, 198 Burton, D., 123, 124
Beirne, P., 119
Bentham, Jeremy, 7 Cambridge Declaration on
Bergh, Henry, 9, 15, 52, 203, 252 Consciousness, 199
Berry, C., 168 Campbell, J. C., 114
Bestiality, See also Animal sexual abuse Capacity for care, evaluation of, 169,
diagnostic classification of, 100 185–188
intervention models, 264–265 Carbone, L., 19, 202, 207, 220
Bias Caregiver-fabricated illness, 165
definition of, 343 Cars, animal left in, 164
interests of animals, 345–346 Carson, G., 4, 6
types of, 343–344 Cartesian philosophy, 202. See also
Biblical teachings, 4 Descartes, Renee
Biomedical research industry Case-based consultation, 76
animal sales to, 17 Causal questions, in forensic evalua-
maltreatment statutes and, 220 tions, 296–298
transformation of, 18 Chandler Edwards (organization),
Black Beauty (Sewell), 13 265, 278n1
Blackman, N., 106 Chicago Animal Care and Control, 275
Black’s Law Dictionary, 44–45 Chicago Police Department, 99
Blood sports. See also Animal fighting Child abuse, treatment of animals and,
attempts to outlaw, 7 117–118. See also Family risk factors,
historical legacy of, 6 for animal cruelty
Blum, D., 209 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Boat, B. W., 119, 318, 328 Act (CAPTA), 252–253
Boat Inventory on Animal-Related Child Behavior Checklist, 352–353
Experiences, 328 Childhood bond with animals,
Body of Liberties (Puritan animal pro- 176–177
tection legislation), 6–7 Childhood cruelty toward animals. See
Bolden-Hines, T. A., 115 also Family risk factors for animal
Bowlby, J., 177 cruelty
Bozinovski, S. D., 174 adolescent studies of, 107–109
Brambell, F. W. R., 20 among incarcerated populations,
The Brambell Report, 20 102–106
Bratiotis, C., xi, xix conduct disorder and, 109–110
Breeder hoarder, 171, 187. See also Childhood exposure to animal abuse,
Animal hoarding 259–260
Breeding operations, 164 The Childhood Trust Survey on Animal
Brennen, S., 117 Related Experiences, 328
Brown, S-E., 177–178, 179 Child maltreatment, legislation address-
Brown Dog Riots (1907), 13 ing, 252–253
Bruner, J. S., 343 Child molesters/sexual abusers
Budd, K. S., 185, 303 childhood animal cruelty and,
Bull baiting, 6, 7–8. See also Animal 104–105
fighting threats from, 117
366 I n d e x
Child protection/animal protection Comparative research/studies, 84–85

links, 14–16, 52 Compassion and cruelty, tension
Child Protective Services, 252 between, 4
Children and Animals Assessment Competency of care issues, in animal
Instrument, 327–328 hoarding, 247, 319
Children and Animals Together (CAT) Concentration Camp for Dogs (Life
Assessment and Diversion pro- magazine), 17
gram, 264, 265–266, 272–273 Condemnation, of animal abusers, 141
Children of Hoarders Conduct Disorder (CD)
(organization), 240 animal abuse/cruelty and, 22, 100,
Child Welfare Information Gateway, 253 109–110, 311, 320–321
Child welfare services, 252 antisocial personality disorder
Christenson, C., 124 and, 239
Civil damages, in animal maltreatment diagnosis of/criteria for, 259–260
cases, 43 juvenile manifestation of
Clark, J. P., 98, 100, 104 symptoms, 294
Clinical Applications and Research, 198 Confinement, as factor in suffering,
Clinical Assessment of Juvenile Animal 218–219
Cruelty (tool), 327 Confirmation bias, 344
Clinical domains of forensic animal Conflict Tactics Scale, 115
maltreatment evaluations (FAMEs) “Continuity of self and control” theory
cognitive functioning, 318 (Bozinovski), 174
current family functioning, 319–320 Control, of animal maltreatment, 76
delinquency, antisocial and behavior Costin, L. B., 15–16
issues, 320–321 Coston, C. T. M., 113
empathy/awareness of victim Costs, in sociographic research, 79
impact, 321 Counseling. See also Forensic animal
employment/academic maltreatment evaluations (FAMEs)
functioning, 320 of animal hoarders, 169
individual functioning/developmen- as legal response to cruelty, 263–264
tal competence, 319 provision of, 53, 71
offense/abuse characteristics, 322 state statutes regarding, 54–57t
personality and mental health, 318–319 Crime Victims Act, 254
protective factors, 321 Criminal histories, of animal abusers,
risk assessment, 322–323 98–99. See also Physical abuse of
sexual and deviancy issues, 320 animals
social/developmental history, 319 Criminalization, of animal
substance abuse, 321–322 hoarding, 170
supervision and legal issues, 322 Criminal Justice Information
Clutter Image Rating (CIR) scale, 242 Systems, 100
Cockfighting, 126–127, 165. See also Criminal Minds (television show), 150
Animal fighting Criminogenic features, in diagnostic
Cognition, animal, 199 screening, 324–325f
Companion animals. See Pets. Critical thinking, in assessments,
Cognitive ethology, 198–201 346–348. See also Assessment,
Companion animal hoarder, 81–82, 170. approaches to
See also Animal hoarding Critical Thinking Company, 347
I n d e x 367
Crowding, as factor in suffering, Disease, untreated, 212–213

218–219 Disordered attachment, 110, 177, 179, 183,
Crowley, T. J., 109 183f, 184, 189
Cruelty and compassion, tension A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and
between, 4 Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals
Cruelty to Animals Act (1835), 8 (Primatt), 19
The Cruelty to Animals Inventory, 328 Distress, in maltreatment, 205–206
Cultural norms, illegality and deviance Dog breeding operations, 164
from, 146–147 Dogfighting, 125–126, 165, 212. See also
“Cultural spillover” theory, 111–112 Animal fighting
Currie, C. L., 112 Domestication of species, 4–5
Domestic violence. See also Family risk
Dadds, M. R., 106, 110, 111 factors, for animal cruelty
Damages, in animal maltreatment animal abuse in, 258–259
cases, 43 animal maltreatment and, 50–51, 112
“The Dark Triad.” See “The Triad” intimate partner violence studies,
Darwin, Charles, 13, 198, 203 114–117
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, “Double suicides,” 102
Inc., 351, 355 Douglas, J. E., 107
Davis, D. L., xi, xxi Dozier, M., xi, xix
Davis, L. S., 104 Duffield, G., 123
Dawkins, M. S., 200 Duncan, I. J. H., 200
DeCoux, E. L., 5 Durham, R. L., 105
Degenhardt, Brian, 99, 100 Dutkiewicz, E. L., 104, 124
DeGue, S., 113, 115, 117
Deliberate neglect, 163–165. See also Economic motivations, for neglect,
Neglect 163–165
Delinquency in adolescence. See also Edens, J., 298, 303
Childhood cruelty toward animals Edwards, J., 265
animal cruelty and, 107–109 Effective Intervention in Domestic
Conduct Disorder, 109–110 Violence & Child Maltreatment
Delusional disorder, 238 Cases: Guidelines for Policy and
Depression/depressive states Practice, 257
in animals, 206, 208, 239, 265, 319, Elder abuse, pet abuse links to, 118–119
320, 333 Emotional abuse of animals, as
in juveniles, 110 cruelty, 96
physical abuse of animals and, 102 Emotional needs, of animals, 201
Descartes, Renee, 6. See also Cartesian Emotional well-being, compromised
philosophy state of, 206–211
The Descent of Man (Darwin), 13 Enforcement, of animal maltreatment
Descriptive research, 81–83 statutes, 9–12, 25–26
Deviance vs. violence graduation, 150 English, K., 120
DeViney, E., 111, 113, 117 Environmental factors, in suffering,
Diagnostic screening typologies check- 214–215
list, 324–325f Epidemiological data/research
Dickert, J., 111, 113, 117 AARDAS database, 22–24
DiLillo, D., 113, 117 categories of offenses, 23t
368 I n d e x
Epidemiological data/research (Cont.) Febres, J., 113, 116, 128

complaint-to-prosecution ratio, 24 Federal Animal Welfare Act, 204
data gaps, 21–22 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
frequency of abuse, 24 22, 96, 99, 107, 256
“LINK” issues, 25 Federal government involvement,
underreporting in, 22 255–256
Erickson, B., 181 Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), 355
Erskine, Lord, 7 Felix, M., 273
Ethics/ethical issues. See Practice and Felthous, A. R., 101, 103, 106, 143, 148
ethics, in forensic animal maltreat- Female animal abusers, 101–102, 151, 235
ment evaluations Fighting. See Animal fighting
Evaluation metrics. See also Forensic animal “Fight or flight,” 205
maltreatment evaluations (FAMEs) Five Freedoms for Animal Welfare,
assessing functional capacity (for 20–21, 31t, 166–167, 197
care), 185–188 Fleming, W., 123, 124
for maltreatment offenders, 31t, 32t Flores, P., 184
Evans, R. D., 126 Flynn, C. P., 108, 111
Evidence, seized animals as, 11–12 Fonagy, P., 178, 179, 180
Expectations, in sociographic Food and Drug Administration, 13
research, 79 Forensic animal maltreatment evalu-
Experimental psychopathology, 209 ations (FAMEs). See also Clinical
Exploiter hoarder. See Animal hoarding domains of forensic animal mal-
Exposés, of animal abuse, 17 treatment evaluations (FAMEs)
The Expression of Emotion in Man and actuarial approach, 306
Animals (Darwin), 13, 198 adult cases, 293
in animal cruelty cases, 292–294
Factors in the Assessment of in animal fighting cases, 295–296
Dangerousness in Perpetrators of in animal neglect cases, 290–292,
Animal Cruelty (FADPAC), 326 297–299
FAMEs (forensic animal maltreatment in animal sexual abuse cases, 294
evaluations). See Forensic animal asking questions about animals in,
maltreatment evaluations (FAMEs) 317–318
Family risk factors for animal cruelty. assessment measurements, 323, 325
See also Childhood cruelty toward building assessment tools for,
animals 302–303
child abuse, 117–118 clinical domains of, 318–323
domestic violence, 112 conduct/performance of, 315–316
elder abuse, 118–119 cultural concerns, 311–312
intimate partner violence and, 114–117 emerging tools of, 287–288
observational learning, 111 evaluation of adults, 325–326
parenting styles, 111 evaluation of juveniles/juvenile cases,
theories on, 113–114 293–294, 326–329
Family violence, animal abuse in con- legal considerations, 310–311
text of, 258–260 obtaining data/procedures for,
Farm Animal Welfare Committee, 20 316–317
Favre, D., 7, 8, 187 purpose of, 312–313
Fear hierarchy, in animal hoarding, 245 response continuum, 313f
I n d e x 369
“Risk/Needs/Responsivity” Guidelines for Standards of Care in

model, 305 Animal Shelters, 21, 219
screening checklist, 324–325f Gullone, E., 97, 98, 100
in sexual abuse cases, 294–295,
299–302 Harlow, H., 209
state statutes pertaining to, 287–288 Harm
structured professional judgment concept/metrics of, 30–31
approach, 306 intent to, 187
training and skills for, 313–315 Harrison, Ruth, 20
typological considerations, 323 Hassiotis, A., 123
Forensic Assessment Checklist, 333 Hawaii’s animal cruelty statutes, 170
Forsyth, C. J., 126 Hawley, F., 127
Fortas, Abe, 17 Health consequences of hoarding,
The Four Stages of Cruelty 240–241
(Hogarth), 5–6 Heide, K. M., 103, 122, 124
Fox, M. W., 199 Heilbrun, K., 301, 348, 351
Frazier, M. R., 122 Hellman, D. S., 106
Freinhar, J. P., 120 Henderson House Workgroup, 179
Fremouw, W., 101 Henry, B. C., 108, 143, 148
Frost, R. O., 169, 182, 238 Hensley, C., 104, 111, 123, 124
Frye, U., 114 Herrera, V. M., 108, 110
Frye v. U.S., 351 Historical perspective, on human ani-
Fundamental attribution error, 343 mal relations, 3–6
Hoarding. See Animal hoarding
Gagnon, J., 124 Hoarding disorder (HD)
Gebhard, P., 124 animal hoarding as form of, 239–241
Gelhorn, H. L., 109 characteristics of, 235–237
Gender, role of criteria for, 234–235
in animal abuse, 151 Hoarding of Animals Research
in animal hoarding, 174 Consortium (HARC), 171,
General deviance vs. violence 189n1, 235
graduation, 150 Hoarding Rating Scale (HRS), 242
Gerry, Elbridge T., 15 Hogarth, William, 5–6
Gibson, H., 126 Hog-dog fighting, 125. See also Animal
Girardi, A., 118 fighting
Glasgow Composite Pain Scale, 200 Holzer, C. E., 101
Gleyzer, R., 101 HOMEBUILDERS (intervention), 253
Goldstein, A., 348 Home Environment Index (HEI), 242
Gosling, S. D., 199 Homeostasis, as measure of well-being,
Graduation, of violence, 141, 150, 152 201–202
Green, T. C., 199, 200, 206 “Homicidal triad” of symptoms. See
“The Greenbook,” 257 “The Triad”
Gregory, N. S., 207 Hot cars, animals left in, 164
Griffin, D. R., 199 Housing and environmental factors, in
Grisso, T., ix, xviii, xx, 87, 297, 298, suffering, 214
303, 348 Human-animal bond, importance of,
Grooming, lack of, 213–214 176–177
370 I n d e x
Human-animal relations, historical per- Adult Protective Services, 243–244

spectives on, 3–6 competency of care issues, 247, 319
Humane Care for Animals Act (Illinois outcomes of, 246
statute), 47–48 psychotherapy, 244–247
Humane societies, enforcement of mal- Intimate partner violence. See also
treatment laws, 10 Family risk factors, for animal
Humane Society of the United States, cruelty
113, 118, 125, 126 animal cruelty and, 100, 114–117
“Humanity Dick” (Richard Martin), 8 social responses to, 254–255
Husbandry, 5 Intrinsic behaviors (telos), 20–21
Husbandry-related “routine” neglect, Isolation, as factor in suffering, 218–219
160–163
Huss, R., 41, 345 Jambbas Ranch Tours, Inc., et al, Ray &
Hutchinson, D., 104 Harrison vs., 219
Hutton, J. S., 97–98, 100 Jasper, J. M., 14, 18
Johnson, Lyndon, 18
Illinois’ animal maltreatment laws, Johnston, L. D., 98
47–48, 170 Jones, L., 120
Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice Jordan, A., 122
(IDJJ), 275 Jorgenson, S., 115
Incarcerated populations, animal cru- Jory, B., 123, 124
elty among, 102–106 Journal of Veterinary Behavior, 198
Infant-mother bond, in animals, 209 Journals of the American, Canadian
Institute for Human-Animal and Australian Veterinary Medical
Connection, 309, 315 Associations, 198
Intent to harm, 187 The Jungle (Sinclair), 13
Interests of animals, as subordinate to Juvenile offenders
humans,’ 4 animal cruelty histories of, 49–50
International Veterinary Forensic animal sexual abuse and, 122–123
Sciences Association, 26 clinical assessment tool for, 327
Interspecies abuse, 123–125. See also conduct disorder in, 294
Animal sexual abuse evaluation of, 293–294, 326–329,
Intervention models. See also 340–341
AniCare Model of Treatment for psychiatric disorders in, 110
Animal Abuse
animal welfare court, 273–274 Kavanagh, P. S., 102
for bestiality, 265 Kellert, S. R., 103, 106, 143, 148
Children and Animals Together Kempe, C. H., 26, 252
(CAT) Assessment and Diversion Kenneling, effects on dogs, 42
program, 264, 265–266, 272–273 Kentucky’s animal maltreatment
examples of, 264 laws, 47
importance of assessment, 265–267 Killeen, C., 181
prevention and early intervention, Killias, M., 107
274–276 Kinsey, A. C., 120
research agenda, 276–278 Kittles, V., 181
Intervention research, 86–87 Klosinski, G., 123
Interventions for animal hoarding Knight, J. C., 119
I n d e x 371
Knutson, J. F., 108, 124 Logan, T., 114

Krinsk, S., 326 Loring, M. T., 115
Kukor, T., xii, xxi, 289 Lucia, S., 107
Kurdek, L.A., 176 Lunghofer, L., xii, xx
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act MacDonald, J. M., 106

(AWA), 255 Maher, J., 120
Laboratory research, assessment of pain Maloney, L., 115
in, 204 Manganello, J., 114
Lack of grooming, 213–214 Martin, Richard ("Humanity Dick"), 8
Langevin, R., 106 Martin’s Act, 8
Lansbury, Coral, 12–13 Massachusetts Society for the
Lascaux, cave paintings at, 3–4 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Law. See Animal law, as profession; (MSPCA), 98, 100
Animal maltreatment laws; Animal Matza, D., 126
protection legislation McAloon, J., 106
Legal responses, to animal cruelty. See McCloskey, L. A., 108, 110
also Intervention models McIntosh, S., 116
animal abuse registries, 262 McMillan, F. D., 96, 207, 212
bestiality prohibition, 262–263 Mead, Margaret, 152
cross-reporting laws, 260–261 Meat Inspection Act, 13
evaluation and counseling, 263–264 Meatpacking industry, 13
protection orders, 261–262 Medical neglect, 164
Legal system, animals’ place Mehta, P. H., 199
in, 40–44 Mellor, D., 199, 200, 206
Legislation. See Animal protection Mental health evaluation, state stat-
legislation utes regarding, 58–70t. See also
Lehmann, P., 114 Evaluation metrics; Forensic
Leliveld, L. M. C., 210 animal maltreatment evaluations
Levin, J., 105 (FAMEs)
Levitt, L., ix, xviii, xx, 99, 100, 266 Mental health professionals. See
Lewchanin, S., 327 Practice and ethics, in forensic ani-
Life, 17 mal maltreatment evaluations
Lifetime bonds, 264, 275–276 Mentalization theory, 179–180
Lighting, as factor in suffering, 216 Mental well-being, compromised state
The LINK, 25 of, 206–211
Livingston, M., 4, 5, 21 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
Lockwood, R. Daubert v., 351, 355
on aggravating conditions, 31 Merz-Perez, L., 103, 122, 124
Animal Cruelty Mikulincer, M., 177
Prosecution: Opportunities for Early Miletski, H., 265
Response to Crime and Interpersonal Milgram experiments, 148
Violence (Lockwood), 49 Miller, K. S., 108, 124
on animal hoarding, 238 Miller, L., xii, xix
on court-ordered evaluations, 334 MMPI family of tests, 352–353
FADPAC development, 326 Monro, H. M. C., 26
on pet abuse, 111, 113, 117, 118 Moore, A., 168, 344
372 I n d e x
Moral condemnation, of animal explanations for, 159–160, 162–163

abusers, 141 forensic animal maltreatment evalua-
“Moral monster,” traits of, 141 tions in, 290–292
Morgan, K. N., 212, 218 inaction vs. intentional acts, 46
Motivations legislative/prosecutorial issues, 12
for inmate cruelty toward psychiatric status, 238–239
animals, 103 as suffering, 212–213
for neglect, 163–165 Nelkin, D.
Munchausen syndrome by proxy, 102, 165 on animal sentience, 18
Munro, H. M. C., 119 on sentimental
Murrie, D., 344 anthropomorphism, 14
Myers, W. C., 108 Nelson, J. A., 108
Neuroscience research, 210
Nathanson, J. N., xii, xix, 174, 176 Newbury, S., 212, 303
National Center for the Analysis of Newman, G., 104
Violent Crime, 326 New York City police department
The National Center for the Prosecution (NYPD), 11
of Animal Abuse, 12 New York Society for the Prevention of
National Center on Elder Abuse, 118 Cruelty to Children, 15, 252
National Child Abuse and Neglect Data NIBRS (National Incident-Based
System (NCANDS), 253 Reporting System), 96, 256
National Council of Juvenile and Family NIH (National Institutes of Health)
Court Judges, 257 Guide for the Care and Use of
National District Attorneys Association Laboratory Animals, 204
(NDAA), 12, 334 NISVS (National Intimate Partner and
National Epidemiologic Survey on Sexual Violence Survey), 254
Alcohol and Related Conditions, 96 Noise levels, as factor in suffering,
National Incident-Based Reporting 215–216
System (NIBRS), 96, 256 Nomothetic research
National Institutes of Health (NIH) comparative studies, 84–85
Guide for the Care and Use of defined, 77
Laboratory Animals, 204 descriptive studies, 81–83
National Intimate Partner and Sexual intervention studies, 86–87
Violence Survey (NISVS), 254 motives/integrity in, 87–88
Necrobestiality, 121 prospective and risk-relevant
Necrozoophilia, 121 studies, 85–86
Neglect retrospective studies, 83–84
animal hoarding as form of, 165–166, types of, 81
236–237 Northey, W., 122
building assessment tools for, Noxious odors, as factor in suffering,
302–303 216–217
caregiver-fabricated illness, 165
conceptualizing assessments for, Observational learning, childhood ani-
297–299 mal cruelty and, 111
definition/categories of, 159 “OCD and Related Disorders”
as deliberate and economically moti- (DSM-5), 342
vated, 163–165 Odendaal, J., 207
I n d e x 373
Odors, as factor in suffering, 216–217 Phillips, A., 334

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Physical abuse of animals. See also
Prevention (OJJDP), 49 Animal abuse; Animal cruelty;
Office on Child Abuse and Neglect, 253 Animal sexual abuse
The Old Brown Dog: Women, Workers, diagnostic classification of, 100
and Vivisection in Edwardian in general population, 96–97
England (Lansbury), 12–13 incarcerated populations and, 102–106
Old Testament prohibitions, 4 mental health/substance abuse disor-
O’Malley, P. M., 98 ders and, 100–102
On the Origin of Species (Darwin), 13 research on abusers, 97–100
Oppositional defiant disorder, 110 socially unacceptable behaviors, 95
Osgood, D. W., 98 term usage, 96
Otto, R., 298, 303 Physical needs, of animals, 201
Overton, J. C., 104 Physical pain, of animals
avoidance of, 19–20
Pain management of, 19, 207
avoidance of, 19–20 as source of suffering, 202–205
management of, 19, 207 Pierce, C. A., 10
as source of suffering, 202–205 Pierpoint, H., 120
Pain scales, 200 Pit bulls
Parental animal abuse. See Family risk in dogfighting, 125, 212
factors, for animal cruelty in Michael Vick case, 345
Pasini-Hill, D., 120 ownership of, 141, 151
Pathological altruism, 168, 333 Police, enforcement of maltreatment
Patrick, D., 120 laws, 9–11
Patronek, G. J., ix, xvii, xix, 176, 237 Policy-based consultation, 76
Patterson-Kane, E., xii, xviii Pomeroy, W., 124
Peak, T., 119 Pope, K., 332
“Pecking order of aggressive acts,” 113–114 Pornography, animals used in, 122
People v. Tinsdale, 187 Positive youth development (PYD), 275
Perception Counseling, 274 Pozzulo, J. D., 118
Peretti, P. O., 121 Practice and ethics, in forensic animal
Personality disorders maltreatment evaluations. See also
in juveniles, 110 Assessment, approaches to
physical abuse of animals and, 101–102 confidentiality, 337–338
Personal property, animals’ classifica- consent, 235–236
tion as, 40–44 credentials/requisite skills, 341–343
Pets development of evidence-based
in domestic violence/abusive house- practices, 333
holds, 50–51, 114–117, 258–259 ethical considerations, 334–335
in “double suicides,” 102 evaluation of juveniles, 340–341
as family members, 16–18 four-step assessment process, 333
human-animal bond, 176–177 honesty, 338
P.E.T. Scale for the Measurement of mitigating bias in, 343–346
Physical and Emotional Tormenting multiple relationships in, 338–339
Against Animals, 328–329 objectivity, 339–340
Pet stores, neglect in, 164–165 practice guidelines, 334–335
374 I n d e x
“Preference testing,” 198–199 Psychotherapy, as animal hoarding

Presumptions, in sociographic intervention, 244–247
research, 79 Public awareness/attitudes, 86
Prevalence, in sociographic research, 78 Pulteney, William, 7
Prevention strategies. See “Puppy mills,” 164
Intervention models Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), 13
Price, R. K, 109 PYD (positive youth development), 275
Primary prevention, 75
Primatt, Humphrey, 19 Quality of life (QOL) scale, 200. See also
Principles of Morals and Legislation Five Freedoms for Animal Welfare
(Bentham), 7 The Question of Animal Awareness:
Prisoners, physical abuse of animals Evolutionary Continuity of Mental
and, 102–106 Experience (Griffin), 199
Professional practice standards. See Quinlisk, J. A., 114
Practice and ethics, in forensic ani-
mal maltreatment evaluations Ragatz, L. L., 101
Project POOCH, 264, 274, 275 Randour, M. L., 49, 326
Project Second Chance, 264, 275 Ray & Harrison vs. Jambbas Ranch Tours,
Property-based opposition to maltreat- Inc., et al, 219
ment, 5. See also Animal protection Recidivism questions, in forensic evalu-
legislation ations, 296, 299
Prospective and risk-relevant Religious traditions/teachings, 4
research, 85–86 Remediation, of animal
Protective orders, animals as part of, 51 maltreatment, 76–77
Protz, B. M., 113 Remediation questions, in forensic
Psychodiagnostic testing, 352 evaluations, 296
Psychogenic features, in diagnostic “Rescuer hoarder,” 171, 172–173t. See also
screening, 324–325f Animal hoarding
Psychological assessment, of animal Research, types of, 76–77. See also
hoarding, 241–243 Assessment research; Nomothetic
Psychological counseling and evalu- research; Sociographic research
ations. See also Forensic animal Research institutions
maltreatment evaluations (FAMEs); animal sales to, 17
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic guidelines on pain, 19
Psychology (SGFP) transformation of, 18
provision of, 53, 71 Responsivity, meaning of, 305
statutes regarding, 54–57t, 58–70t Ressler, R. K., 107
“A Psychological Profile of Male Restitution, in animal maltreatment
and Female Animal Abusers” cases, 43
(Schwartz, Fremouw, Schenk, and Retrospective research, 83–84
Ragatz), 101 Revenue, animals as source of, 164
Psychologists for the Ethical Treatment “Risk/Needs/Responsivity”
of Animals (PSYETA), 263 model, 305
Psychopathy, physical abuse of animals Risk-relevant research, 85–86. See
and, 102 also Animal Abusers Interview
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised and Risk Assessment Tool
(PCL-R), 304 (AARAT); Family risk factors,
I n d e x 375
for animal cruelty; “Risk/Needs/ in forensic animal maltreatment

Responsivity” model evaluations, 317
Robbins, L., 104 by inmates, 103–104
Rollin, B. E. in retrospective studies, 83
on animal protection legislation, 34 Self-Report Psychopathy Scale III, 102
animals’ instinctive natures, 4 Swiss National Self-Reported
on animal well-being, 207 Delinquency Survey, 107
on attitudes toward pain, 203 underreporting in, 127
domestication of species, 4–5 Sentencing and disposition decisions
on pain discussion, 19 in animal hoarding cases, 169
telos concept, 20–21 mentalization theory and, 180
Rosen, B., 118 suffering of animal victims and,
Rowan, M., 121 197, 221
Royal Society for the Prevention of Sentience
Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), of animals, 18–21, 199
8, 9, 97 Bentham on, 7
Serafino, L., 12
Sacrifice, of animals (religious), 4 Serial killers, animal abuse history of,
Sadistic activities, 121, 122 104–107, 143–144
Safe Humane Chicago, 275 Serpell, J., 29
Safety, of animals, 202 Severity, role in animal maltreatment,
“Safety threshold” identification, 187 148–149
Sakai, J. T., 109 Sewell, Anna, 13
Sanders, C. E., 143, 148 Sexual abuse of animals. See Animal
Saving Inventory-Revised (SI-R) scale, sexual abuse; Bestiality
241–242 Shannon, L., 114
“Scapegoating,” 111 Shapiro, K., 265–266
Scent marking, 216–217 Shaver, P. R., 177
Schenk, A., 101 Sheltering. See Surrendering to a
Schlesinger, L. B., 104 shelter
“School shooters,” animal abuse Shelter medicine, 188
and, 107 Shuman, D., 344
Schwalm, J., 169, 170 Signal, T. D., 102
Schwartz, R. L., 101 SIHD (Structured Interview for
Science-based responses to animal Hoarding Disorder), 242
maltreatment, 75–76 Silverman, I. J., 103, 124, 204
Self-determination, right of, 184 Simmons, C. A., 114
Selfobjects, animals as, 177–179 Simons, D. A., 105
Self-reporting Sinclair, U., 13
in AniCare model, 270f Singer, S. D., 123
of animal hoarding, 179, 239, Slasher matches. See Blood sports
240–242 Social-affective neuroscience
of child abuse, 117 research, 210
by college students, 97, 101 Social controls, to animal
as data collection method, 22, maltreatment, 86
142, 144 Social isolation, as factor in suffering,
in family risk factors, 108 218–219
376 I n d e x
Social justice movements, animal pro- maltreatment evaluations

tection connection, 12–16 (FAMEs), 306
Social responses. See also Legal Stuewig, J., 108, 110, 111
responses, to animal cruelty Subfield development, for animal
to animal abuse, 251–252 maltreatment
to child maltreatment, 252–254 development of, xv–xvii
community responses, 257–258 forensic evaluation/assessment,
criminal justice system role, 256–257 xx–xxi
data collection for, 256 social and legal context for,
to domestic violence, 254–255 xvii–xviii
federal government role, 255–256 social responses, xix–xx
in sociographic research, 78–79 theory and research, xviii–xix
Social Security Act, 252 Substance abuse disorders
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty animal abuse and, 101–102, 266
to Animals (SPCA), 8, 10. See in juveniles, 110
also American Society for the Suffering, animals’ capacity for, 7, 197,
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 211–212
(ASPCA). Suffering, sources of
Sociographic research compromised mental/behavioral/
defined, 76 emotional well-being, 206–211
topics for, 77–79 confinement, isolation and crowding,
value of, 79–80 218–219
Sound levels, as factor in suffering, emotional/psychological
215–216 maltreatment, 217
Special masters, appointment of, 42, housing and environmental
345–346 factors, 214
Specialty Guidelines for Forensic improper bedding/resting
Psychology (SGFP), 334–335, 339, places, 217
341, 342 improper temperature, 214–215
Sports Illustrated, 17 lack of appropriate contact, 217–218
Standards for Educational and lack of grooming, 213–214
Psychological Testing, 351 measurement of, 211
Starvation, 163, 212, 213, 290 neglect, 212–213
Statutes. See Animal law, as profession; noise levels, 215–216
Animal maltreatment laws; Animal noxious odors, 216–217
protection legislation physical pain, 202–205
Steinberg, L., 87 stress and distress, 205–206
Steketee, G., 182, 239 understanding suffering, 211–212
Stigma unsuitable lighting, 216
in animal abuse, 317 untreated disease, 213
in animal hoarding, 244 Surrendering to a shelter, 163, 246
Stress and distress, in maltreatment, Swiss National Self-Reported
205–206 Delinquency Survey, 107
Structured Interview for Hoarding Sykes, G. M., 126
Disorder (SIHD), 242 Sylvester, S., xii, xvii
Structured professional judgment Symptoms, “homicidal triad” of. See
approach, in forensic animal “The Triad”
I n d e x 377
Tallichet, S. E., 104, 111, 123, 124 UCLA Hoarding Severity Scale

Taylor, N., 102 (UHSS), 242
Tedeschi, P., xiii, xx, 326 “Understanding the Link” (National
Telos, fulf illment of District Attorneys Association), 51
animals,’ 20 –21 Uniform Crime Report (UCR), 256
Temperature, as factor in suffering, Untreated disease, 212–213
214–215 U.S., Frye v., 351
Terms and concepts, definition of
animal abuse, 142 Vaca-Guzman, M., 168
animal maltreatment, 32–33 Vaughn, M. G., 96, 101, 143, 266
animals and owners, 32 VAWA (Violence Against Women
felony/misdemeanor Act), 254
distinction, 44–46 Vermeulen, H., 207
harm concept, 30–31 Veterinary medicine
legal def initions of animal welfare study in, 199–200
animals, 43–44 assessment of pain in, 204
mindset concept, 31–32 societal changes reflected in, 16–17
problematic language, 27–29 Vick, Michael, 41–42, 255, 345
prohibited actions in state Victims, in sociographic research, 78
statutes, 28b Villalobos, A., 200
standardization efforts, 29–30 Violence against humans
Therapeutic interventions, 86 back-correlations between animal
Thrusfield, M. V., 26, 119 abuse and, 143–145
Tingle, D., 104 forward facing predictions of, 145–146
Tinsdale, People v., 187 Violence Against Women Act
Toman, P., 104 (VAWA), 254
Tong, L. J., 26 “Violence graduation” hypothesis, 141,
Torture of animals, childhood animal 150, 152
abuse and, 105–106 Virginia’s juvenile justice
Traumagenic features, in diagnostic system, 49–50
screening, 324–325f Visceral bias, 343
Trauma/stressful events, as precursor to Vivisection, 13
animal hoarding, 240 Vizard, E., 123
“The Triad,” 102, 106, 150 Von Fricken, A. G., xiii, xvii
“Triggering events,” 177, 183f
Tromborg, C. T., 212, 218 Walker, R., 114
“Trunking,” 125. See also Animal Walters, G. D., 108, 113, 145, 152
fighting Walton-Moss, B. J., 114
Tsang, V., 8, 187 “Warning signs,” of abuse, 141–142
Turner, C. M., 106 Webster, J. 33–34
Turner, J. Weiss, K. J.,, xiii
on blood sports, 7 Well-being in animals, components of,
on changing attitudes toward 201–202
animals, 13–14 Wheller, E., 14–15
human-animal kinship, 13 Wilberforce, William, 8
human-animal relations, 3–4 Wilson, M. E., 14–15
on sympathy for pain, 19 Wilson, P., 104
378 I n d e x
Wochner, M., 123 Zequi, S. D., 120

Wolf, J. L., 326 Zervopoulos, J., 344
Women. See Domestic violence; Female Zimmerman, E., 327
animal abusers Zolondek, S., 122
Woodley, B., 180 Zoophilia
Wurtele, S. K., 105 diagnostic classification of,
100, 265
Yamazaki, S., 112 fixation on animals, 120–121
Yokoyama, A., 102 Zoosadists, 121, 122, 123

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EDITED BY L ACEY LEVITT

© Oxford University Press 2016

Foreword by Kirk Heilbrun vii

SECTION I Social and Legal Context for Animal Maltreatment

SECTION II Theory and Research on Animal Maltreatment

SECTION III Responding to Animal Maltreatment

SECTION IV Forensic Evaluations in Animal Maltreatment Cases

As I begin this Foreword, I am sitting by a fire surrounded by three dogs, all

Many of the pioneers in the analysis, assessment, and treatment of animal

Thomas Grisso, PhD, ABPP (Forensic), a clinical psychologist, is professor

Catherine Ayers, Ph.D., ABPP (Clinical), is a psychologist at the VA San Diego

Philip Tedeschi, M.S.W., is executive director of the Institute for Human-Animal

Developing a subfield of forensic mental health committed to responding to ani-

The promise of an animal maltreatment subfield of forensic mental health is its

against humans in particular. After careful inspection of the existing research

S ECT I O N III: R ES P O N D I N G TO A N I M A L M A LT R E AT M EN T

Society responds to animal maltreatment cases through its legal authority to

first on relevant characteristics of such cases that require consideration when

S ECT I O N I V: FO R EN S I C E VA LUAT I O N S

This book seeks especially to contribute to the development of effective and

Social and Legal Context

Society’s attitudes toward non-human animals (hereafter referred to as “ani-

H I STO R I CA L PER S PECT I V ES

or Crueltie” and required resting of “Cattel” when being driven (Livingston,

ESTA B L I S H M EN T O F A N I M A L PR OT ECT I O N

• Ordinary rights approach—used by the majority of jurisdictions.

arrest, but may investigate complaints of animal maltreatment, execute

C O N N ECT I O N O F A N I M A L PR OT ECT I O N

The Social Context for Late 19th-Century Reforms

• A drive to reform the manners of the lower classes

The Related Child Protection Reform

T H E P O ST-WA R PER I O D: T H E PE T AS FA M I LY M EM B ER

shifts. Freshmen classes entering veterinary school are now overwhelmingly

welfare of a sentient being—avoidance of pain and fulfillment of telos—are cen-

Telos is a concept Rollin (2007, 2011) has discussed in depth. In lieu of a

There is considerable evidence that awareness of the importance of the Five

The existing data on the epidemiology of animal maltreatment provide a general

might be logged and reported. Epidemiological research on animal maltreat-

Table 1.1. U.S. Animal Abuse Classifications

exists documenting how animal maltreatment may be part of a web of aggres-

When animal maltreatment can be confirmed, when it appears to be uninten-

Criminal prosecution certainly has an important place in the effort to dis-

Advancement of a field of study is improved by a consensus regarding the terms

of animal maltreatment, however, has yet to develop a consensual meaning for

Why the Language of Cruelty, Abuse,

Various forms of animal maltreatment are described in criminal statutes within

(e.g., overdriving, overworking, overloading) may seem difficult to conceptual-

Attempts to Resolve the Language Conundrum

In the interest of standardizing discussion and decreasing confusion in the lan-

meaning of these various terms is ultimately grounded, and the impracticality

Disentangling Concepts: Harm and Mindset

Although the primary goal of many forensic examinations is to assess various

Table 1.2. Key Features of Harms to Animals Relevant to Forensic

endured over a longer period of time would be indicators of a greater degree

Table 1.3. Suggested Characteristics Relevant to Evaluating the Mindset

Definitions Used in This Book

Specific Forms of Animal Maltreatment

Environmental Protection Agency (2013). Ag 101. Demographics. Retrieved from

Law and Animal Maltreatment

Understanding the criminal justice system’s response to animal maltreatment

Dogs and cats deemed personal property; rights relating thereto.—

subject of larceny and malicious or unlawful trespass. Owners, as defined in