SUBJECT: POWER SYSTEM OPERATION AND CONTROL

SUBJECT CODE: 15EE81

SEMESTER: VIII

Module-1 10 hours

Introduction: Operating States of Power System, Objectives of Control, Key Concepts of

Reliable Operation, Preventive and Emergency Controls, Energy Management Centres.

Supervisory Control and Data acquisition (SCADA): Introduction to SCADA and its

Components, Standard SCADA Configurations, Users of Power Systems SCADA, Remote
Terminal Unit for Power System SCADA, Common Communication Channels for SCADA in
Power Systems, Challenges for Implementation of SCADA.

Unit Commitment: Introduction, Simple Enumeration Constraints, Priority List Method,

Dynamic Programming Method for Unit Commitment.

 Revised Bloom’s Taxonomy Level L1 – Remembering, L2 – Understanding, L4 – Analysing.

Introduction: 

Operating states of a power system

The Power System needs to be operationally secure, i.e. with minimal probability of blackout
and equipment damage. An important component of power system security is the system’s
ability to withstand the effects of contingencies. A contingency is basically an outage of a
generator, transformer and or line, and its effects are monitored with specified security limits.
The power system operation is said to be normal when the

power flows and the bus voltages are within acceptable limits despite changes in load or
available generation. From this perspective, security is the probability of a power system’s
operating point remaining in a viable state of operation. System security can be broken down into
TWO major functions that are carried out in an operations control centre:
Security assessment and (ii) security control.

The former gives the security level of the system operating state. The latter determines the
appropriate security constrained scheduling required to optimally attaining the target security
level. Before going into the static security level of a power system, let us analyze the different
operating states of a power system. The states of power system are classified into FIVE states:

1. Normal
2. Alert
3. Emergency
4. Extreme Emergency and
5. Restorative

Fig.1.1 below depicts these states and the ways in which transition can occur from one state to
another.
 Fig.1.1 Power system operating states

The operation of a power system is usually in a normal state. Voltages and the frequency of the
system are within the normal range and no equipment is overloaded in this state. The system can
also maintain stability during disturbances considered in the power system planning. The
security of the power system is described by Thermal, voltage and stability limits. The system
can also withstand any single contingency without violating any of the limits. The system transits
into the emergency state if a disturbance occurs when the system is in the alert state. Many
system variables are out of normal range or equipment loading exceeds short-term ratings in this
state. The system is still complete. Emergency control actions, more powerful than the control
actions related to alert state, can restore the system to alert state. The emergency control actions
include fault clearing,
excitation control, fast valving, generation tripping, generation run back-up, HVDC modulation,
load curtailment, blocking of on-load tap changer of distribution system transformers and
rescheduling of line flows at critical lines. The extreme emergency state is a result of the
occurrence of an extreme disturbance or action of incorrect of ineffective

emergency control actions. The power system is in a state where cascading outages and
shutdown of a major part of power system might happen. The system is in unstable state.

The control actions needed in this state must be really powerful. Usually load shedding of the
most unimportant loads and separation of the system into small independent parts are required.

Objective of the control

The objective of the control strategy is to generate and distribute power in an interconnected
system as economically and reliably as possible while maintaining the frequency and voltage
within permissible limits.

Changes in real power mainly affect the system frequency. Reactive Power however, is immune
to changes in frequency and mainly depends on voltage changes. Thus real and reactive power is
controlled separately. The Load Frequency Loop (LFC) controls the real power and frequency
and the automatic voltage regulator (AVR) controls the reactive power and voltage magnitude.

Today, in modern energy control centers the methods developed for control of individual
generations, and eventually control of large interconnections are of critical importance. Modern
Energy Control Centers (ECC) are equipped with on-line computers performing all signal
processing through the remote acquisition systems known as supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems.

Key Concepts of Reliable Operation

There are a number of reasons why reliability is an important product attribute, including:

Reputation: A company's reputation is very closely related to the reliability of its products. The
more reliable a product is, the more likely the company is to have a favourable reputation.
Customer satisfaction: While a reliable product may not dramatically affect customer satisfaction
in a positive manner, an unreliable product will negatively affect customer satisfaction severely.
Thus high reliability is a mandatory requirement for customer satisfaction.

Warranty costs: If a product fails to perform its function within the warranty period, not only the
replacement and repair costs will negatively affect profits, there may be an unwanted negative
publicity. Introducing reliability analysis is an important step in taking corrective action,
ultimately leading to a product that is more reliable.

Repeat business: A concerted effort towards improved reliability shows existing customers that a
manufacturer is serious about its product and committed to customer satisfaction. This type of
attitude has a positive impact on future business.

Cost analysis: Manufacturers may take reliability data and combine it with other cost information
to illustrate the cost-effectiveness of their products. This life cycle cost analysis can prove that
although the initial cost of a product might be higher, the overall lifetime cost is lower than that
of a competitor's because their product requires fewer repairs or less maintenance.

Customer requirements: Many customers in today's market demand that their suppliers have an
effective reliability program. These customers are conscious of the benefits of reliability analysis
from their own experiences.

Competitive advantage: Many companies will publish their predicted reliability numbers to help
gain an advantage over their competitors who either do not publish their numbers or have lower
numbers.

Preventive and Emergency Controls

Power system security is more and more in conflict with economic and environmental
requirements. Security control aims at making decisions in different time horizons so as to
prevent the system from undesired situations, and in particular to avoid large catastrophic
outages. Traditionally, security control has been divided in two main categories: preventive and
emergency control. In preventive security control, the objective is to prepare the system when it
is still in normal operation, so as to make it able to face future (uncertain) events in a satisfactory
way. In emergency control, the disturbing events have already occurred, and thus the objective
becomes to control the dynamics of the system in such a way that consequences are minimized.
Preventive and emergency controls differ in many respects, among which we list the following

types of control actions: generation rescheduling, network switching reactive compensation,

sometimes load curtailment for preventive control; direct or indirect load shedding, generation
shedding, shunt capacitor or reactor switching, network splitting for emergency control.

Uncertainty: in preventive control, the state of the system is well known but disturbances are
uncertain; in emergency control, the disturbance is certain, but the state of the system is often
only partially known; in both cases, dynamic behavior is uncertain.

Open versus closed loop: preventive control is generally of the open loop feed-forward type;
emergency control may be closed loop, and hence more robust with respect to uncertainties.

In the past, many utilities have relied on preventive control in order to maintain system security
at an acceptable level. In other words, while there are many emergency control schemes installed
in reality, the objective has been to prevent these schemes as much as possible from operating,
by imposing rather high objectives to preventive security control. As to any rule, there are
exceptions: for example controlled generation shedding has been used extensively in Northern
America to handle transient stability problems; in the same way, corrective control has been used
in many systems as an alternative to preventive control in the context of thermal overload
mitigation. Nowadays, where the pressure is to increase trading and competition in the power
system field, preventive security control is being considered as an impediment to competition; in
turn, this breeds strong incentives to resort less on preventive control and more often on
emergency control. The objective of this paper is essentially twofold: first, to concentrate on
transient stability control, both preventive and emergency, and describe a general methodology
able to realize convenient tradeoffs between these two aspects; second, to suggest means of
integrated security control, coordinating various types of security (steady-state, voltage and
transient stability).
The general methodology used to design transient stability control techniques relies on the
transient stability method called SIME. In what follows, we first describe the fundamentals of
SIME, and then concentrate on the advocated control techniques.

Energy Management Centres

The energy control center (ECC) has traditionally been the decision-center for the electric
transmission and generation interconnected system. The ECC provides the functions necessary
for monitoring and coordinating the minute-by-minute physical and economic operation of the
power system Maintaining integrity and economy of an interconnected power system requires
significant coordinated decision-making. So one of the primary functions of the ECC is to
monitor and regulate the physical operation of the interconnected grid. Most areas today have a
two-level hierarchy of ECCs with the Independent System Operator (ISO) performing the high-
level decision making and the transmission owner ECC performing the lower-level decision-
making.

ECC Components
The system control function traditionally used in electric utility operation consists of three main
integrated subsystems: the energy management system (EMS), the supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA), and the communications interconnecting the EMS and the SCADA
(which is often thought of as part of the SCADA itself). The rest of the figure indicates the
EMS. We will describe each one in the following subsections We distinguish EMS from
distribution management systems (DMS). Both utilize their own SCADA, but for different
functions. Whereas EMS/SCADA serves the high voltage bulk transmission system from the
ECC, the DMS/SCADA serves the low voltage, distribution system from a distribution dispatch
center. We are addressing in these notes the
EMS/SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data acquisition (SCADA): 

Introduction
One of key processes of SCADA is the ability to monitor an entire system in real time. This is
facilitated by data acquisitions including meter reading, checking statuses of sensors, etc that are
communicated at regular intervals depending on the system.

A well planned and implemented SCADA system not only helps utilities deliver power reliably
and safely to their customers but it also helps to lower the costs and achieve higher customer
satisfaction and retention.

SCADA – Why do we need it?

If we did not have SCADA, we would have very inefficient use of human resources and this
would cost us. In today’s restructured environment SCADA is critical in handling the volume of
data needed in a timely fashion Service restoration would involve travel time and would be
significantly higher.

Basic Components of SCADA System

Fig.1.2 shows the basic Components of SCADA System.A basic SCADA system consists of
following components:

1. Human Machine Interface

2. Supervisory System
3. Remote Terminal Units
4. Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs)
5. Communication Infrastructure
6. SCADA Programming
 Fig.1.2 Basic Components of SCADA System

1. Human Machine Interface

It is an I/O device that allows a human operator to control the process data. This is achieved by
linking SCADA’s databases and software programs for providing management information like
detailed schematics, scheduled maintenance, data diagnostics and logistic information. The
operating personnel can also see the graphical representation of data.

2. Supervisory System

This system acts as a communication server between the HMI software in control room
workstations and its equipment like PLCs, RTUs, sensors etc.

Smaller Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems have only a single PC that serves as a
supervisory or master system. Larger Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems have
multiple servers, sites for disaster recovery and distributed software applications. The servers are
configured as dual-redundant or hot-standby formation for continuously monitoring server
failure.

3. Remote Terminal Units

This system contains physical objects that are interfaced with Remote Terminal Units (RTUs).
These electronic devices are controlled by microprocessors and are used for transmitting
recorded data to the supervisory systems. They also receive data from the master system in order
to control the connected objects.

They are also called as Remote Telemetry Units.

4. Programmable Logic Controllers

PLCs find their use in the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system through sensors.
They are attached to the sensors in order to convert the sensor output signal into digital data.

They are preferred over RTUs because of their configuration, flexibility, affordability and
versatility.

5. Communication Infrastructure

Generally, a combination of direct wired connection and radio is used in Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition systems. However, SDH/ SONET can also be used for larger systems like
railways and power stations.

Among the compact SCADA protocols, few recognized and standardized protocols deliver
information only when the RTUs are polled by the supervisory station.

6. SCADA Programming

SCADA programming in HMI or master station is used for creating diagrams and maps that
provide vital information during process or event failure. Most of the commercial Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition systems use standardized interfaces in programming. C language
or derived programming language is generally used for such programming.

User of SCADA in Power System

As the power system deals with power generation, transmission and distribution sectors,
monitoring is the main aspect in all these areas. Thus the SCADA implementation of power
system improves the overall efficiency of the system for optimizing, supervising and controlling
the generation and transmission systems. SCADA function in the power system network
provides greater system reliability and stability for integrated grid operation.

SCADA for Power Generating Stations

With the use of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) hardware and powerful bus
communication links along with SCADA software and hardware’s in power generating stations,
delivering an optimal solution for each and every process operation is flexible with advanced
control structures. The below figure shows the SCADA structure in power generation where it
supervises several operations, including protection, controlling and monitoring. The functions of
SCADA in power generation include

 Continuous monitoring of Speed and Frequency

 Geographical monitoring of coal delivery and water treatment processes
 Supervising the status of circuit breakers, protective relays and other safety related
operations
 Generation operations planning
 Active and reactive power control
 Turbine protection
 Load scheduling
 Historical data processing of all generation related parameters

SCADA for Power Distribution System

Fig.1.3 shows the SCADA for Power Distribution SystemPower distribution system deals with
transmission of electric power from generating station to the loads with the use of transmission
and distribution substations. Most of the power distribution or utility companies rely on manual
labor to perform the distribution tasks like interrupting the power to loads, all the parameter
hourly checking, fault diagnosis, etc. The implementing SCADA to the power distribution not
only reduces the manual labor operation and its cost but facilitates automatic smooth operations
with minimizing disruptions.

SCADA Application for Remote Industrial Plant

The main goal of this project is to process and control the working of industrial machinery by
using SCADA.

Fig.1.3 SCADA for Power Distribution System

SCADA Application Diagram for Remote Industrial Plant

The multiple mechanisms in the industries are unable to control manually. So, for controlling
these mechanisms efficiently, it is necessary to adopt a technology namely SCADA

In this project, temperature sensors are used to collect temperature constantly and to send it to

the microcontroller which is interfaced with the PC.If the temperature exceeds the predefined
temperature limits, then the microcontroller sends a signal to the relay driver which in turn
activates the relay to turn the lamps on or off. If this system fails, then an AV alarm generates
from the PC using high-limit and low-limit features.

Hence, the mechanisms of industries can be controlled more efficiently and safely by using
SCADA, which is more economical and time saving technology.

Wireless SCADA

The main intention of this project is to process and control the working of industrial machinery
by using SCADA wirelessly.

Fig.1.4 Wireless SCADA

Fig.1.4 shows the wireless SCADA system. The multiple mechanisms in the large-scale-remote
industries are difficult to control manually. So, for controlling these mechanisms efficiently, a
technology namely wireless SCADA ( supervisory control and data acquisition) is required. In
large-scale wireless industries, by using wireless SCADA, you can monitor all the processes and
control the factors which are affecting them.

In this project, a remote plant operation is undertaken to operate the remote plant. Here,
temperature sensors are interfaced properly to the 8051 microcontroller. The data which is
received from the temperature sensors is continuously sent over 2.4GHz transmitter wirelessly to
the microcontroller. Then, it is received by the 2.4GHz USB type receiver which is connected to
a PC.

At the front end, a data-acquisition system is loaded on the computer which takes these values
and displays them on its front panel and also logs them in the database. One can set parameters
such as set point, a low and high limit on the computer screen. When the sensor’s temperature
goes away from set point, then the microcontroller sends command to the related relay. The
lamps connected through the relay contacts are turned on or off. If this system fails, then an AV
alarm will be generated on the PC using high limit and low limit features.

Hence, the mechanisms of large scale remote industries can be controlled more efficiently and
safely using wireless SCADA, which is more economical and time-saving technology.

Thus, this is all about the SCADA applications in power systems. SCADA is used in the industry
with the perfect “Man Machine Interface”. It has solved many problems related to supervision,
monitoring, controlling and data acquisition. It has manifold applications like Distribution
Management, Energy Management, Power Plant Management, Oil and Gas Distribution System.
SCADA has also enabled grid monitoring by virtue of which power can be bought & shared on a
national basis. So the application of SCADA is beneficial to the Indian power sector as well.
Leave your comments about this article in comment section.

A remote terminal unit (RTU) is a microprocessor-controlled electronic device that interfaces

objects in the physical world to a distributed control system or SCADA (supervisory control and
data acquisition) system by transmitting telemetry data to a master system, and by using
messages from the master supervisory system to control connected objects. Other terms that may
be used for RTU are remote telemetry unit and remote telecontrol unit.

An RTU monitors the field digital and analog parameters and transmits data to the Central
Monitoring Station. It contains setup software to connect data input streams to data output
streams, define communication protocols, and troubleshoot installation problems.

An RTU may consist of one complex circuit card consisting of various sections needed to do a
custom-fitted function or may consist of many circuit cards including CPU or processing with
communications interface(s), and one or more of the following: (AI) analog input, (DI) digital
(status) input, (DO/CO) digital (or control relay) output, or (AO) analog output card(s).

An RTU might even be a small process control unit with a small Data Base for PID, Alarming,
Filtering, Trending functions and so on complemented with some BASIC (programming
language) tasks. As it is used in pipeline, grid guarding systems, or for example in the Biosphere
II project. Key in such environments it can operate under harsh conditions for example from -50
to 70 degrees Celsius, switch its IO system only on when needed. For example, it communicates
via RS485 or wireless communication links in a multi-drop configuration. In this type of
configuration it is a remote unit that collects data and performs simple control tasks. It does not
have moving parts and uses extremely low power and is often solar powered.

Power supply

A form of power supply will be included for operation from the AC mains for various CPU,
status wetting voltages and other interface cards. This may consist of AC to DC converters where
operated from a station battery system.

RTUs may include a battery and charger circuitry to continue operation in event of AC power
failure for critical applications where a station battery is not available.

Digital (status) inputs

Most RTUs incorporate an input section or input status cards to acquire two state real-world
information. This is usually accomplished by using an isolated voltage or current source to sense
the position of a remote contact (open or closed) at the RTU site. This contact position may
represent many different devices, including electrical breakers, liquid valve positions, alarm
conditions, and mechanical positions of devices. Counter inputs are optional.

Analog inputs

A RTU can monitor analog inputs of different types including 0-1 mA, 4–20 mA current loop, 0–
10 V., ±2.5 V, ±5.0 V etc. Many RTU inputs buffer larger quantities via transducers to convert
and isolate real-world quantities from sensitive RTU input levels. An RTU can also receive
analog data via a communication system from a master or IED (intelligent electronic device)
sending data values to it.

The RTU or host system translates and scales this raw data into the appropriate units such as the
quantity of water left, temperature degrees, or Megawatts, before presenting the data to the user
via the human–machine interface.

Digital (control relay) outputs

RTUs may drive high current capacity relays to a digital output (or "DO") board to switch power
on and off to devices in the field. The DO board switches voltage to the coil in the relay, which
closes the high current contacts, which completes the power circuit to the device.

RTU outputs may also consist of driving a sensitive logic input on an electronic PLC, or other
electronic device using a sensitive 5 V input.

Analog outputs

While not as commonly used, analog outputs may be included to control devices that require
varying quantities, such as graphic recording instruments (strip charts). Summed or processed
data quantities may be generated in a master SCADA system and output for display locally or
remotely, wherever needed.

Software and logic control

Modern RTUs are usually capable of executing simple programs autonomously without
involving the host computers of the DCS or SCADA system to simplify deployment and to
provide redundancy for safety reasons. An RTU in a modern water management system will
typically have code to modify its behavior when physical override switches on the RTU are
toggled during maintenance by maintenance personnel. This is done for safety reasons; a
miscommunication between the system operators and the maintenance personnel could cause
system operators to mistakenly enable power to a water pump when it is being replaced, for
example.

Maintenance personnel should have any equipment they are working on disconnected from
power and locked to prevent damage and/or injury.

Communications

A RTU may be interfaced to multiple master stations and IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Device)
with different communication media (usually serial (RS232, RS485, RS422) or Ethernet). An
RTU may support standard protocols (Modbus, IEC 60870-5-101/103/104, DNP3, IEC 60870-6-
ICCP, IEC 61850 etc.) to interface any third party software.

Data transfer may be initiated from either end using various techniques to insure synchronization
with minimal data traffic. The master may poll its subordinate unit (Master to RTU or the RTU
poll an IED) for changes of data on a periodic basis. Analog value changes will usually only be
reported only on changes outside a set limit from the last transmitted value. Digital (status)
values observe a similar technique and only transmit groups (bytes) when one included point
(bit) changes. Another method used is where a subordinate unit initiates an update of data upon a
predetermined change in analog or digital data. Periodic complete data transmission must be
used periodically, with either method, to insure full synchronization and eliminate stale data.
Most communication protocols support both methods, programmable by the installer.

Multiple RTUs or multiple IEDs may share a communications line, in a multi-drop scheme, as
units are addressed uniquely and only respond to their own polls and commands.

IED communications

IED communications transfer data between the RTU and an IED. This can eliminate the need for
many hardware status inputs, analog inputs, and relay outputs in the RTU. Communications are
accomplished by copper or fibre optics lines. Multiple units may share communication lines.
Master communications

Master communications are usually to a larger control system in a control room or a data
collection system incorporated into a larger system. Data may be moved using a copper, fibre
optic or radio frequency communication system. Multiple units may share communication lines.

SCADA communication channels

In order for SCADA systems to obtain its functionality, it needs a protocol for transmitting data.
Some of the SCADA protocols include Modbus RTU, RP-570, Profibus and Conitel. These
communication protocols are all SCADA-vendor specific but are widely adopted and used.
Standard protocols are IEC 61850 (in which T101 branched out), IEC 60870-5-101 or 104, and
DNP3. These communication protocols are standardized and recognized by all major SCADA
vendors. Many of these protocols is now improved and contain extensions to operate over
TCP/IP. It is good security engineering practice to avoid connecting SCADA systems to the
Internet so the attack surface is reduced. RTUs and other automatic controller devices were being
developed before the advent of industry wide standards for interoperability. The result is that
developers and their management created a multitude of control protocols. Among the larger
vendors, there was also the incentive to create their own protocol to "lock in" their customer
base. This paper discusses and compares T101 and DNP3. These two open communication
protocols that provide for interoperability between systems for telecontrol applications. Both are
now competing within the world market. DNP is widely used in North America, South America,
South Africa, Asia and Australia, while IEC 60870-5-101 or T101 is strongly supported in the
Europe.

IEC 60870-5

IEC 60870-5 is the collection of standards produced by the IEC(International Electrotechnical

Commission). It was created to provide an open standard for the transmission of SCADA
telemetry control and information. It provides a detailed functional description for telecontrol
equipment and systems for controlling geographically widespread processes specifically for
SCADA systems. The standard is intended for application in the electrical industries, and has
data objects that are specifically intended for such applications. It is also applicable to general
SCADA applications in any industry. But IEC 60870-5 protocol is primarily used in the
electrical industries of European countries. When the IEC 60870-5 was initially completed in
1995 with the publication of the IEC 870-5-101 profile, it covered only transmission over
relatively low bandwidth bit-serial communication circuits. With the increasingly widespread use
of network communications technology, IEC 60870-5 now also provides for communications
over networks using the TCP/IP protocol suite. This same sequence of development occurred for
DNP3.

T101

T101 or IEC 60870-5-101 (IEC101) is an international standard prepared by TC57 for power
system monitoring, control & associated communications. This is compatible with IEC 60870-5-
1 to IEC 60870-5-5 standards and uses standard asynchronous serial tele-control channel
interface between DTE and DCE. The standard is suitable for multiple configurations like point-
to-point, star, mutidropped etc.

T101 features 60870-5-101 or T101 have many features such as the following:

• Supports unbalanced (master initiated message) & balanced (master/slave initiated message)
modes of data transfer. Link address and ASDU addresses are provided for classifying the end
station and different sectors under the same. Data is classified into different information objects
and each information object is provided with a specific address. Facility to classify the data into
high priority (class-1) and low priority (class-2) and transfer the same using separate
mechanisms.

• Possibility of classifying the data into different groups (1-16) to get the data according to the
group by issuing specific group interrogation commands from the master & obtaining data under
all the groups by issuing a general interrogation.

• Cyclic & Spontaneous data updating schemes are provided. Facility for time synchronization
Schemes for transfer of files

Remote Terminal Unit

• Single indication without / with 24 / with 56 bit timestamps.

• Double indication without / with 24 / with 56 bit timestamps.

• Step position information without / with 24 / with 56 bit timestamps.

• Measured value – normalized, scaled, short floating point without / with timestamps.

• Bitstring of 32 bit without / with timestamps. • Integrated totals (counters) without / with
timestamps. • Packed events (start & tripping ) of protection equipments

• Single commands

• Double commands

• Regulating step command

• Set point commands of various data formats

• Bitstring commands

• Interrogation commands

• Clock synchronization & delay acquisition commands

• Test & reset commands

DNP3 Protocol

The DNP3 or Distributed Network Protocol is a set of communications protocols used between
components in process automation systems. It is usually used is in utilities such as water and
electric companies. It is also technically possible to use it in other utilities. It was specifically
developed to facilitate communications between various types of data acquisition and control
systems. It plays a crucial role in SCADA systems. It is used by SCADA Master Stations or
Control Centers, Remote Terminal Units, and Intelligent Electronic Devices. It is primarily used
for communications between a master station and IEDs or RTU's. DNP3 supports multiple-slave,
peer-to-peer and multiple-master communications. It supports the operational modes of polled
and quiescent operation. The latter is also referred to as reporting by exception.

Challenges for Implementation of SCADA

SCADA systems are rapidly being adopted for monitoring and industrial automation for outside-
the-fence applications. The adoption has been particularly strong in the areas of water,
wastewater, electric power, and natural gas. Naturally, there have been challenges during this
period. Operators using outside-the-fence monitoring face challenges that inside-the-fence
applications simply do not.

For example, power and communications are both significant limitations when connecting
remote assets to SCADA systems. When implemented in a manufacturing plant, all inputs to a
SCADA system have access to a fixed and reliable power supply. By contrast, a programmable
logic controller (PLC) or remote telemetry unit (RTU) deployed in a remote location cannot
easily be wired to a fixed source of power. Instead, they must usually rely on batteries, which
deplete and require periodic replacement.  Solar panels can offer redundant supply, but they
require maintenance (they become less effective when covered with debris or dust and therefore
need to be cleaned periodically). They are also vulnerable to vandalism and theft, particularly
when they are installed at street level in urban environments.

Certain sensors are more energy-intensive than others, increasing the challenge posed by
obtaining adequate power. More frequent wireless data transmission of larger packet sizes place
significant demands on the battery powering the wireless modem of an RTU or PLC. Addressing
these technological limitations requires higher energy-density or larger batteries, more frequent
battery replacements, or using communication networks with lower energy requirements. All
these approaches entail additional cost to the network operator.
Connectivity is another challenge. Telecommunications operators may have strong coverage in
some areas, but limited signal in others. Obtaining SIM cards and data plans from multiple
carriers to ensure reliable connectivity and verifying which carriers offer reliable network
strength at each remote installation location is a difficult and costly undertaking. In addition,
network strength can vary considerably based on unpredictable conditions such as weather.

Low-power wide area networks (LPWAN), such as those developed by Sigfox and the LoRA
Alliance, show great promise. However, network coverage is still limited, and tight bandwidth
limitations dictate the type, amount, and transmission frequency of data over these networks. 2G,
3G, CDMA, LTE cellular, and satellite networks are currently too power intensive to enable
fully-autonomous operations for longer durations with frequent data transmission. Future cellular
networks (4G and 5G), including NarrowBand IoT (NB-IoT), will offer significantly more
power-efficient communications when rolled out in the coming years, but it remains to be seen
which specific variant will dominate the market.

An inside-the-fence operator has visibility and autonomy when a local area network (LAN) fails.
As the administrator and owner of the network, a plant operator can work swiftly to resolve
network issues to minimize downtime. The same cannot be said for outside-the-fence operators
relying on third-party wireless networks. When connectivity on cellular and satellite networks
fails, a SCADA operator has to rely on the network operator to remedy the situation. Given the
much larger extent of their network under management, the response time is naturally slower
than what could be offered by a proprietary network operator. In addition, when the downtime is
due to defects with the communications infrastructure on the remote assets themselves, they must
be repaired in situ, making rectifying the situation far costlier.

Despite the challenges of integrating SCADA systems with outside-the-fence applications, their
benefits outweigh the challenges. Technologies to resolve the difficulties of integrating remote
assets with SCADA systems exist and are being developed on an ongoing basis.

SCADA systems are invaluable tools for monitoring and automation of assets and processes, but
challenges exist when attempting to integrate with remote equipment. Obtaining reliable power
and communications are two major challenges that must be overcome.
Unit Commitment: 

Introduction

Because human activity follows cycles, most systems supplying services to a large population
will experience cycles. This includes transportation systems, communication systems, as well as
electric power systems. In the case of an electric power system, the total load on the system will
generally be higher during the daytime and early evening when industrial loads are high, lights
are on, and so forth, and lower during the late evening and early morning when most of the
population is asleep. In addition, the use of electric power has a weekly cycle, the load being
lower over weekend days than weekdays. But why is this a problem in the operation of an
electric power system? Why not just simply commit enough units to cover the maximum system
load and leave them running? Note that to “commit” a generating unit is to “turn it on;” that is, to
bring the unit up to speed, synchronize it to the system, and connect it so it can deliver power to
the network. The problem with “commit enough units and leave them on line” is one of
economics. As will be shown in Example 1A, it is quite expensive to run too many generating
units. A great deal of money can be saved by turning units off (decommitting them) when they
are not needed.

EXAMPLE 1.1

Suppose one had the three units given here:

Unit 1: Min = 150 MW

Max = 600 MW

HI = 510.0 + 7.2P1 + 0.00142P: MBtu/h

Unit 2 Min = 100 MW

Max = 400 MW

Unit 3:
H2 = 310.0 + 7.85P2 + 0.00194PI MBtu/h

Min = 50 MW

Max = 200 MW

H, = 78.0 + 7.97P3 + 0.00482P5 MBtu/h

with fuel costs:

Fuelcost, = 1.1 P/MBtu

Fuel cost, = 1.0 P/MBtu

Fuel cost, = 1.2 v/MBtu

If we are to supply a load of 550 MW, what unit or combination of units should be used to
supply this load most economically? To solve this problem, simply try all combinations of the
three units. Some combinations will be infeasible if the sum of all maximum MW for the units
committed is less than the load or if the sum of all minimum MW for the units committed is
greater than the load. The results are presented in Table 1.1. Note that the least expensive way to
supply the generation is not with all three units running, or even any combination involving two
units. Rather, the optimum commitment is to only run unit 1, the most economic unit. By only
running the most economic unit, the load can be supplied by that unit operating closer to its best
efficiency. If another unit is committed, both unit 1 and the other unit will be loaded further from
their best efficiency points such that the net cost is greater than unit 1 alone. Suppose the load
follows a simple “peak-valley’’ pattern as shown in Figure 1.la. If the operation of the system is
to be optimized, units must be shut down as the load goes down and then recommitted as it goes
back up. We would like to know which units to drop and when. As we will show later, this
problem is far from trivial when real generating units are considered. One approach to this
solution is demonstrated in Example 5B, where a simple priority list scheme is developed.

TABLE 1.1 Unit Combinations and Dispatch for 550-MW Load of Example 1.1
FIG. 1.la Simple “peak-valley” load pattern.
 FIG. 1.1b Unit commitment schedule using shut-down rule.

EXAMPLE 1.2

Suppose we wish to know which units to drop as a function of system load. Let the units and fuel
costs be the same as in Example 1.1, with the load varying from a peak of 1200 MW to a valley
of 500 MW. To obtain a “shut-down rule,” simply use a brute-force technique wherein all
combinations of units will be tried (as in Example 1A) for each load value taken in steps of 50
MW from 1200 to 500. The results of applying this brute-force technique are given in

Table 5.2. Our shut-down rule is quite simple. When load is above 1000 MW, run all three units;
between 1000 MW and 600 MW, run units 1 and 2; below 600 MW, run only unit 1.

TABLE 1.2 “Shut-down Rule” Derivation for Example 1.2

Figure 1.lb shows the unit commitment schedule derived from this shut-down rule as applied to
the load curve of Figure 1.la. So far, we have only obeyed one simple constraint: Enough units
will be committed to supply the loud. If this were all that was involved in the unit commitment
problem-that is, just meeting the load-we could stop here and state that the problem was
“solved.” Unfortunately, other constraints and other phenomena must be taken into account in
order to claim an optimum solution. These constraints will be discussed in the next section,
followed by a description of some of the presently used methods of solution.

5.1.1 Constraints in Unit Commitment

Many constraints can be placed on the unit commitment problem. The list presented here is by
no means exhaustive. Each individual power system, power pool, reliability council, and so
forth, may impose different rules on the scheduling of units, depending on the generation
makeup, load-curve characteristics, and such.

5.1.2 5.1.2 Spinning Reserve

Spinning reserve is the term used to describe the total amount of generation available from all
units synchronized (i.e., spinning) on the system, minus the present load and losses being
supplied. Spinning reserve must be carried so that the loss of one or more units does not cause
too far a drop in system frequency (see Chapter 9). Quite simply, if one unit is lost, there must be
ample reserve on the other units to make up for the loss in a specified time period. Spinning
reserve must be allocated to obey certain rules, usually set by regional reliability councils (in the
United States) that specify how the reserve is to be allocated to various units. Typical rules
specify that reserve must be a given percentage of forecasted peak demand, or that reserve must
be capable of making up the loss of the most heavily loaded unit in a given period of time.
Others calculate reserve requirements as a function of the probability of not having sufficient
generation to meet the load. Not only must the reserve be sufficient to make up for a generation-
unit failure, but the reserves must be allocated among fast-responding units and slow-responding
units. This allows the automatic generation control system to restore frequency and interchange
quickly in the event of a generating-unit outage. Beyond spinning reserve, the unit commitment
problem may involve various classes of “scheduled reserves” or “off-line” reserves. These
include quick-start diesel or gas-turbine units as well as most hydro-units and pumped-storage
hydro-units that can be brought on-line, synchronized, and brought up to full capacity quickly.
As such, these units can be “counted” in the overall reserve assessment, as long as their time to
come up to full capacity is taken into account. Reserves, finally, must be spread around the
power system to avoid transmission system limitations (often called “bottling” of reserves) and
to allow various parts of the system to run as “islands,” should they become electrically
disconnected.

EXAMPLE 1C

Suppose a power system consisted of two isolated regions: a western region and an eastern
region. Five units, as shown in Figure 1.2, have been committed to supply 3090 MW. The two
regions are separated by transmission tie lines that can together transfer a maximum of 550 MW
in either direction. This is also shown in Figure 1.2. What can we say about the allocation of
spinning reserve in this system?

The data for the system in Figure 1.2 are given in Table 1.3. With the exception of unit 4, the
loss of any unit on this system can be covered by the spinning reserve on the remaining units.
Unit 4 presents a problem, however. If unit 4 were to be lost and unit 5 were to be run to its
maximum of 600 MW, the eastern region would still need 590 MW to cover the load in that
region. The 590 MW would have to be transmitted over the tie lines from the western region,
which can easily supply 590 MW from its reserves. However, the tie capacity of only 550 MW
limits the transfer. Therefore, the loss of unit 4 cannot be covered even though the entire system
has ample reserves. The only solution to this problem is to commit more units to operate in the
eastern region.

FIG. 1.2 Two-region system.

TABLE 1.3 Data for the System in Figure 1.2

5.1.3 Thermal Unit Constraints

Thermal units usually require a crew to operate them, especially when turned on and turned off.
A thermal unit can undergo only gradual temperature changes, and this translates into a time
period of some hours required to bring the unit on-line. As a result of such restrictions in the
operation of a thermal plant, various constraints arise, such as: 0 Minimum up time: once the unit
is running, it should not be turned off 0 Minimum down time: once the unit is decommitted,
there is a minimum immediately. time before it can be recommitted. 0 Crew constraints: if a
plant consists of two or more units, they cannot both be turned on at the same time since there
are not enough crew members to attend both units while starting up. In addition, because the
temperature and pressure of the thermal unit must be moved slowly, a certain amount of energy
must be expended to bring the unit on-line. This energy does not result in any MW generation
from the unit and is brought into the unit commitment problem as a start-up cost. The start-up
cost can vary from a maximum “cold-start” value to a much smaller value if the unit was only
turned off recently and is still relatively close to operating temperature. There are two
approaches to treating a thermal unit during its down period. The first allows the unit’s boiler to
cool down and then heat back up to operating temperature in time for a scheduled turn on. The
second (called banking) requires that sufficient energy be input to the boiler to just maintain
operating temperature. The costs for the two can be compared so that, if possible, the best
approach (cooling or banking) can be chosen
where
C, = cold-start cost (MBtu)
F = fuel cost
C, = fixed cost (includes crew expense, maintenance expenses) (in p)
SI = thermal time constant for the unit
t = time (h) the unit was cooled

C, = cost (MBtu/h) of maintaining unit at operating temperature Up to a certain number of

hours, the cost of banking will be less than the cost of cooling, as is illustrated in Figure 1.3.
Finally, the capacity limits of thermal units may change frequently, due to maintenance or
unscheduled outages of various equipment in the plant; this must also be taken into account in
unit commitment.

5.1.4 Other Constraints

5.1.4.1 Hydro-Constraints
Unit commitment cannot be completely separated from the scheduling of hydro-units. In this
text, we will assume that the hydrothermal scheduling (or “coordination”) problem can be
separated from the unit commitment problem. We, of course, cannot assert flatly that our
treatment in this fashion will always result in an optimal solution.

FIG. 1.3 Time-dependent start-up costs.

5.1.4.2 Must Run

Some units are given a must-run status during certain times of the year for reason of voltage
support on the transmission network or for such purposes as supply of steam for uses outside the
steam plant itself.

5.1.4.3 Fuel Constraints

A system in which some units have limited fuel, or else have constraints that require them to
burn a specified amount of fuel in a given time, presents a most challenging unit commitment
problem.

5.2 UNIT COMMITMENT SOLUTION METHODS

The commitment problem can be very difficult. As a theoretical exercise, let us postulate the
following situation.

 We must establish a loading pattern for M periods.

 We have N units to commit and dispatch.
 The M load levels and operating limits on the N units are such that any one unit can
supply the individual loads and that any combination of units can also supply the loads.
 Next, assume we are going to establish the commitment by enumeration (brute force).
The total number of combinations we need to try each hour is,

where C(N, j ) is the combination of N items taken j at a time. That is,

 For the total period of M intervals, the maximum number of possible combinations is
(2N - l)M, which can become a horrid number to think about.

For example, take a 24-h period (e.g., 24 one-hour intervals) and consider systems with 5, 10, 20,
and 40 units. The value of (zN - 1)24 becomes the following.
These very large numbers are the upper bounds for the number of enumerations required.
Fortunately, the constraints on the units and the load-capacity relationships of typical utility
systems are such that we do not approach these large numbers. Nevertheless, the real practical
barrier in the optimized unit commitment problem is the high dimensionality of the possible
solution space.

The most talked-about techniques for the solution of the unit commitment problem are:

 Priority-list schemes,
 Dynamic programming (DP),
 Lagrange relation (LR).

5.2.1 Priority-List Methods

The simplest unit commitment solution method consists of creating a priority list of units. As we
saw in Example 5B, a simple shut-down rule or priority-list scheme could be obtained after an
exhaustive enumeration of all unit combinations at each load level. The priority list of Example
1B could be obtained in a much simpler manner by noting the full-load average production cost
of each unit, where the full-load average production cost is simply the net heat rate at full load
multiplied by the fuel cost.

EXAMPLE 1D

Construct a priority list for the units of Example SA. (Use the same fuel costs as in Example 5A.)
First, the full-load average production cost will be calculated:
A strict priority order for these units, based on the average production cost, would order them as
follows:

and the commitment scheme would (ignoring min up/down time, start-up costs, etc.) simply use
only the following combinations.

Note that such a scheme would not completely parallel the shut-down sequence described in
Example 5B, where unit 2 was shut down at 600 MW leaving unit 1. With the priority-list
scheme, both units would be held on until load reached 400 MW, then unit 1 would be dropped.

Most priority-list schemes are built around a simple shut-down algorithm that might operate as
follows.
  At each hour when load is dropping, determine whether dropping the next unit on the
priority list will leave sufficient generation to supply the load plus spinning-reserve
requirements. If not, continue operating as is; if yes, go on to the next step.
 Determine the number of hours, H, before the unit will be needed again. That is,
assuming that the load is dropping and will then go back up some hours later.
 If H is less than the minimum shut-down time for the unit, keep commitment as is and go
to last step; if not, go to next step.
 Calculate two costs. The first is the sum of the hourly production costs for the next H
hours with the unit up. Then recalculate the same sum for the unit down and add in the
start-up cost for either cooling the unit or banking it, whichever is less expensive. If there
is sufficient savings from shutting down the unit, it should be shut down, otherwise keep
it on.
 Repeat this entire procedure for the next unit on the priority list. If it is also dropped, go
to the next and so forth. Various enhancements to the priority-list scheme can be made by
grouping of units to ensure that various constraints are met. We will note later that
dynamic-programming methods usually create the same type of priority list for use in the
DP search.

5.2.2 Dynamic-Programming Solution

5.2.2.1 Introduction

Dynamic programming has many advantages over the enumeration scheme, the chief advantage
being a reduction in the dimensionality of the problem. Suppose we have found units in a system
and any combination of them could serve the (single) load. There would be a maximum of 24 - 1
= 15 combinations to test. However, if a strict priority order is imposed, there are only four

combinations to try:

Priority 1 unit
Priority 1 unit + Priority 2 unit

Priority 1 unit + Priority 2 unit + Priority 3 unit

Priority 1 unit + Priority 2 unit + Priority 3 unit + Priority 4 unit

1. The imposition of a priority list arranged in order of the full-load average cost

rate would result in a theoretically correct dispatch and commitment

only if:

2. Unit input-output characteristics are linear between zero output and full

load.

3. There are no other restrictions.

4. Start-up costs are a fixed amount.

In the dynamic-programming approach that follows, we assume that:

1. A state consists of an array of units with specified units operating and

2. The start-up cost of a unit is independent of the time it has been off-line

3. There are no costs for shutting down a unit.

4. There is a strict priority order, and in each interval a specified minimum

the rest off-line. (i.e., it is a fixed amount). amount of capacity must be operating. A feasible
state is one in which the committed units can supply the required load and that meets the
minimum amount of capacity each period.

5.2.2.2 Forward DP Approach

One could set up a dynamic-programming algorithm to run backward in time starting from the
final hour to be studied, back to the initial hour. Conversely, one could set up the algorithm to
run forward in time from the initial hour to the final hour. The forward approach has distinct
advantages in solving generator unit commitment. For example, if the start-up cost of a unit is a
function of the time it has been off-line (i.e., its temperature), then a forward dynamic-program
approach is more suitable since the previous history of the unit can be computed at each stage.
There are other practical reasons for going forward. The initial conditions are easily specified
and the computations can go forward in time as long as required. A forward dynamic-
programming algorithm is shown by the flowchart in Figure 1.4. The recursive algorithm to
compute the minimum cost in hour K with combination I is,
 FIG. 1.4 Unit commitment via forward dynamic programming.

State ( K , 1) is the Zth combination in hour K . For the forward dynamic programming

approach, we define a strategy as the transition, or path, from

one state at a given hour to a state at the next hour.

Note that two new variables, X and N, have been introduced in Figure 1.4.

X = number of states to search each period

N = number of strategies, or paths, to save at each step

 Fig.1.5 Restricted search paths in DP algorithm with N = 3 and X = 5.

These variables allow control of the computational effort (see Figure 1.5). For complete
enumeration, the maximum number of the value of X or N is 2” - 1. For example, with a simple
priority-list ordering, the upper bound on X is n, the number of units. Reducing the number N
means that we are discarding the highest cost schedules at each time interval and saving only the
lowest N paths or strategies. There is no assurance that the theoretical optimal schedule will be
found using a reduced number of strategies and search range (the X value); only experimentation
with a particular program will indicate the potential error associated with limiting the values of X
and N below their upper bounds.

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