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OPERATIONS MANUAL
Revision: 00 PART B
st
Date: 31 July, 2017 (EMBRAER 145)
ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL Chapter : 0
ORGANISATION APPROVAL
AUTHORITY’S APPROVAL
Signature : Date:
0.1.1 PREAMBLE
This Manual also known as Standard Operating Procedures Manual (SOP) is prepared as a
guide for all Air Peace Crew for safe operation of our Embraer 145 aircraft. Majority of its
content especially those relating to certification limitations are propriety in nature and have
therefore been copied as is from the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). Also, references to
sections in this manual are to the relevant sections of the AFM and should be read as such.
0.1.2 INTRODUCTION
The objective of procedures in this manual is for a smooth, coordinated cockpit management
system, which promotes standardization and enhances safety.
Each crewmember is assigned his specific duties however; organizing these duties with the
other pilots is also needed. SOP is established for this purpose. SOP is not intended to
supply detailed systems or components operating information, but primarily:
SOP is a procedural guide to the proper conduct of a normal flight. Emergency, Abnormal,
and supplemental procedures are not included in SOP. Proper use of SOP requires a
thorough knowledge of the airplane, its systems, and company policies.
Where a detailed explanation of a given step or policy is required, that detail will be found in
other parts of AIRCRAFT OPERATING MANUAL or OPERATIONS MANUAL.
Teamwork is the key concept to an understanding of the SOP. As a pilot you are an integral
part of a coordinated operation. The SOP explains not only your duties but also the duties of
OTHER crewmembers.
Knowing what to expect from the other pilot’s aids in standardization and is an important
factor in cockpit resource management. This knowledge enables the crewmember, to detect
and correct errors or omissions.
0.1.3 ADHERENCE
All pilots are responsible for following the procedures set out in this manual and will be held
accountable for it.
The Captain has the authority to deviate from SOP, but only when unusual circumstances
require him to do so in the interest of safety.
In accordance with the Nig.CARs 9.3.1.4, this manual of Air Peace Limited is in
compliance with the stated Regulations and will be followed by all the company
personnel of Air Peace Limited. This Operations Manual (Part B) will be a guiding
procedure for all Air Peace Limited flight personnel to perform their duties and
procedures required for a safe operation and also their interrelationship to the system
as a whole. The objective of the Operations Manual is to demonstrate compliance
with Nig.CARs. Adherence to these procedures is therefore in support of continued
airworthiness and enhancement of the operation and safety standards of Air Peace
Limited.
Approved by
Date -:
0.5 PAGINATION
The Quality/Safety Manager (QSM) is responsible for authorising the revisions of the
Standard Operations Procedures Manual. When an amendment to this manual becomes
necessary, the request shall be submitted in writing to the Director of Flight Operation giving
a detailed information about the reason for this amendment. If the Director of Flight
Operation is satisfied with the formal request, an amendment will be prepared and sent to the
Quality/Safety Manager to process for approval.
All proposed revisions must be checked by the Quality/Safety Manager and approved by the
Accountable Manager. All revisions must be submitted to and approved by the Regulatory
Authority (NCAA) before coming into force.
The Quality/Safety Manager is responsible for notifying the Regulatory Authority of Proposed
amendments and revisions. He is also responsible for the regulatory administration,
distribution and control of this manual.
All amendments will be in the form of printed, replacement pages. They are accompanied by
filing instructions and an updated List of Effective Pages (LEP).
A normal revision record sheet mentioning the issue date is provided in page 22.
Temporary revisions are amendments to a controlled manual/document that are issued out of
the normal revision cycle. They are distinguished from the rest of the manual content by
yellow shaded headers and footers.
Normal and temporary revisions are transmitted to all manual holders through a transmittal
letter attached to each amendment/revision, outlining the nature of each change. A vertical
bar in front of the line indicates any change in the text.
Upon receipt of any revision, manual holders are responsible for inserting the pages as per
the instructions in the transmittal letter. This responsibility includes registering the insertion of
the Normal and Temporary Revisions.
Where revision instructions require Temporary Revisions to be removed and destroyed, the
manual holders must ensure that the removal details are registered on the record of
temporary revisions sheet. This includes when temporary revisions are removed upon receipt
of a formal revision.
Each holder of this Manual is responsible for the security and safeguarding of this manual, for
insertion of amendments, revisions and for maintaining the manual in a current status.
After each insertion of amendment/revisions, the manual holder must acknowledge receipt
and endorse a copy of the transmittal letter to the effect that the instruction has been carried
out and then return same to the Quality/Safety Manager to file up.
Hand-written amendments and revisions are not permitted except in situations requiring
immediate amendment or revisions in the interest of safety.
When receiving a Temporary Revision, insert the "Issue date", "Date filed" and sign in
the "filed by" box.
When receiving a revision, insert the "Date filed" and sign in the "filed by" box.
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0.11 DEFINITIONS
Aircraft Technical Log: Documentation for an aircraft that includes the maintenance
record for the aircraft and a record for each flight made by the aircraft. The aircraft
technical log is comprised of a journey records section and a maintenance section.
Airworthiness Release: Air Peace aircraft are released for service following
maintenance by a person specifically authorised by Air Peace, rather than by an
individual or maintenance organisation on Air Peace behalf.
The Authority – NCAA: Post holder – a Person acceptable to the authority who is
responsible for a particular part of operations.
Cabin crew member: A crew member who performs, in the interest of safety of
passengers, duties assigned by the operator or the pilot-in-command of the aircraft,
but who shall not act as a flight crew member.
Cargo aircraft: Any aircraft carrying goods or property but not passengers. In this
context the following are not considered to be passengers:
i. A crewmember.
Chief Inspector: The individual responsible for quality control, as opposed to quality
assurance, and is not to be confused with the Quality Assurance and Safety Manager
under the quality system.
Flight crew member: A licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the
operation of an aircraft on the flight deck during a flight duty period.
Handling agent: An agency which performs on behalf of the operator some or all of
the latter's functions including receiving, loading, unloading, transferring or other
processing of passengers or cargo.
Holdover time: The estimated time deicing/anti-icing fluid will prevent the formation
of frost or ice and the accumulation of snow on the protected surfaces of an aircraft.
Holdover time begins when the final application of deicing or anti-icing fluid
commences and expires when the deicing or anti-icing fluid applied to the aircraft
loses its effectiveness.
Operational Flight Plan: The operator's plan for the safe conduct of the flight based
on consideration of aircraft performance, other operating limitations and relevant
expected conditions on the route to be followed and at the aerodromes/heliports
concerned.
Package: The complete product of the packing operation consisting of the packaging
and its contents prepared for transport.
Packaging: Receptacles and any other components or materials necessary for the
receptacle to perform its containment function.
Passenger aircraft: An aircraft that carries any person other than a crew member,
an operator's employee in an official capacity, an authorised representative of an
appropriate national authority or a person accompanying a consignment or other
cargo.
Quality: The totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bears
on itself the ability to satisfy stated or implied needs.
Quality Assurance: The formal and systematic process of auditing and evaluation of
management system and operational functions of an operator to ensure:
Quality Control: The operational techniques and activities that are used to fulfill
requirements for quality.
Quality Manual: The document containing the relevant information pertaining to the
operators Quality System and Quality Assurance Programme.
Quality Management: The management responsible for the overall function and
implementing Quality Policy.
Quality Plan: A document setting out the specific qualify practices, resources and
sequence of activities relevant to a particular product, service, contract or project.
Quality Policy: The overall quality intentions and direction of a company as regards
quality, formally expressed by the Accountable Manager.
Quality System (QS): Set of rules and procedures designed to ensure quality
standards maintenance in every activity related to Flight Operations, Handling and
Airworthiness. Organically it corresponds to Quality Management for which are
allocated human resources and materials in order to implement the Quality System.
State of Origin: The State in which dangerous goods were first loaded on an aircraft.
Technical Instructions: The latest effective edition of the Technical Instructions for
the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc. 9284-AN/905), including the
supplement and any addendum, approved and published by decision of the Council
of the ICAO. The term "Technical Instructions" is used in this Part.
Unit load device: Any type of freight container, aircraft container, aircraft pallet with a
net, or aircraft pallet with a net over an igloo.
AD Airworthiness Directive
CE Chief Engineer
CI Chief Inspector
QM Quality Manual
QA Quality Assurance
QC Quality Control
SB Service Bulletin
SCU Security
STD Standard
UN United Nations
WD Wiring Diagram
CORPORATE COMMITMENT
Date:
CORE VALUES
FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS
o APL will have a formal written safety goal, and MEV will ensure everyone
understands and accepts that goal
o APL will have a communications and motivation system in place to keep our
people focused on the safety goal
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This aircraft must be operated in accordance with the limitations presented in this Section.
These limitations also apply to operations in accordance with an approved Supplement or
Appendix to the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), except as altered by such Supplement or
Appendix.
Figure 1
NOTE: In the event of a landing below –40°C, the aircraft may not take-off
without further maintenance inspection.
Total Air Temperature (TAT) in cruise flight above 25,000 ft is limited to –45°C.
Loading
The aircraft must be loaded in accordance with the information contained in Section 7.
Weight Limits
EMB145 LR
Maximum Weight
Weight Limits
EMB145 MP
Maximum Weight
EMB 145 LR/MP – 50 passenger seats, 2 pilot seats, 2 Cabin Crew seats and
1 cockpit Observer seat.
Note: Cargo and baggage loading up to 990 kg are not required to be tied down. If
the baggage compartment is loaded with more than 990 kg (2182 lb), only the
exceeding load must be tied down with a horizontal net.
To comply with the performance and operating limitations of the regulations, the
maximum allowable take-off and landing operational weight may be equal to, but not
greater than design limits.
The take-off weight (weight at brake release or at start of take-off run) is the lowest
among MTOW and the following weights:
1) Maximum Take-off Weight for altitude and temperature determined from Maximum
Take-off Weight - Climb Limited chart (Chapter 4).
2) Maximum Take-off Weight, as limited by runway length and determined from
Maximum Take-off Weight - Field Length Limited charts (Chapter 4).
3) Maximum Take -off Weight as limited by brake energy and determined from
Maximum Take-off Weight - Brake Energy Limited charts (Chapter 4).
4) Maximum Take-off Weight , as limited by obstacle clearance, en-route, and landing
operating requirements (Chapter 4).
The Landing Weight is the lowest among MLW and the following weights:
1) Maximum approach and landing weight for altitude and temperature determined from
Maximum Landing Weight - Climb Limited charts (Chapter 4).
2) Maximum Landing Weight, as limited by runway length and determined from
Maximum Landing Weight - Field Length Limited charts (Chapter 4).
18.4%
16.2%
1. 2 . 4 Vm o
NOTE: The VMO / MMO may not be deliberately exceeded in any regime of flight.
To avoid nuisance high speed warnings the following limits are to be observed
in the descent: Red line minus 20 kts above FL100 (or 10,000ft) or 240kts
below.
Note:
VLO for retraction is the maximum speed at which the landing gear can be
safely retracted.
VLO for extension is the maximum speed at which the landing gear can
be safely extended.
VLE is the maximum speed at which the aircraft can be safely flown with
the landing gear extended and locked.
VA 200 kts
NOTE: Manoeuvres that involve angle of attack near the stall or full application of
rudder, elevator, and aileron controls should be confined to speeds below VA. In
addition, the manoeuvring flight load factor limits, presented in this Section,
must not be exceeded.
Max Take-off and Landing Crosswind Component (Wet & Dry) is 30 kts.
The wind speed limit for parking with the tail into wind on the EMB 145 is 30 kts.
If wind gusts in excess of this speed have been reported within the last 30 minutes, the
aircraft should be parked nose into wind, regardless of airport stand allocation.
The manoeuvring and operating wind speed for the EMB 145 is 50 kts. Maximum tail wind
for starting the APU is 30 kts or 34 kts depending on APU serial number.
See the table in APU Limitations.
Above 20 kts tailwind there is an increasing risk of a hung start occurring, and dependent
upon local conditions, the aircraft Commander may wish to take this into account when
starting.
With a direct tail-wind component of 30 kts and above, there is a much greater risk of a hung
start, and every endeavour must be made to avoid starting the engines until the tail is turned
out of wind.
The nose wheel & main wheels should all be double chocked if any wind conditions or
forecast conditions above 20kts.
In any wind conditions of 20kts or above, a Maximum towing speed of 3MPH must be
adhered to.
Note – In any conditions forecast to reach 65kts , towing including in winds up to 65kts will
be permitted to facilitate hangerage as a preventative method of accruing aircraft damage
This aircraft may be flown day and night in the following conditions, when the appropriate
equipment and instruments required by airworthiness and operating regulations are
approved, installed and in an operable condition:
1) Visual (VFR),
2) Instrument (IFR),
3) Icing Conditions.
In some circumstances this can be reduced by one Level, subject to prior approval.
Standard operating crew for the EMB145 is 1 Pilot, 1 Co-Pilot and one cabin crew. There is
a second cabin crew seat on the EMB145 when 2 cabin crew are required.
In the event that the Cabin Crew seat is unserviceable, the Crew member is to occupy the
passenger seat closest to the crew station. Refer to the MEL.
1.6 RUNWAY
For operation from snow covered runways, the minimum cleared width for EMB 145
operation is 30 m. Maximum snow bank depth at this width is 40 cm, increasing linearly to
one metre depth at 50 m width.
The EMB 145 shall not be operated over a route which contains a point further from an
adequate aerodrome than the distance flown in 60 minutes at the one engine inoperative
cruise speed (275 kts).
Note: EMB 145 all have post Mod APUs fitted at the publication date of this
document.
2) May be exceeded up to 925°C above 25000 ft during 10 seconds.
To prevent wear and increase service life, only 1 air conditioning pack shall be used on the
ground to provide cabin temperature control.
Use of APU Bleed must be delayed for 3 minutes after APU start
Unless APU is used for air conditioning (both A/C packs ON) during engine
starting, the time interval between engine start, using APU Bleed, must be one
minute or more.
1.9 POWERPLANT
1.9.1 Operational
Limits
Rolls Royce AE3007 A1(EMB 145)
N1 99.9%
N2 102.4% (7)
ITT:
Start 800°C
Take-off Modes 921°C (1)
Max Continuous 868°C
OIL PRESSURE:
Below 88% N2 34 psi 95 psi (2) (5) 110 psi (6)
A Thrust Assurance Check is not required on the EMB 145 (Air Peace Limited subscribes
to the manufacturer’s engine monitoring programme).
Note: AE 3007A /1 Engine will only provide ATTCS with Alternate Take Off selected
selected (ALT T/O), but not Take Off mode mode (T/O).
After start and prior to take-off, the engines must be allowed to run at idle or taxi
thrust to stabilise the engine temperatures before take-off thrust is applied. The
following minimum times will apply:
The engine is considered to be cold if it has been shutdown for more than 90
minutes.
Note: To increase N2 above 83% the engine oil temperature must be 40oC or above.
The engines must be run for at least one minute at idle or taxi thrust before shutdown.
NOTE: Icing conditions may exist whenever the Static Air Temperature
(SAT) on the ground or for take-off, or Total Air Temperature (TAT)
in-flight, is 10°C or below and visible moisture in any form is present
(such as clouds, fog with visibility of one nautical mile [1850 m] or less,
rain, snow, sleet, and ice crystals). Icing conditions may also exist when
the SAT on the ground and for take-off is 10°C or below when operating
on ramps, taxiways, or runways where surface snow, ice, standing
water, or slush may be ingested by the engines, or freeze on engines,
nacelles, or engine sensor probes.
Landing gear extension is prohibited at altitudes higher than 3000 ft above runway elevation
in icing conditions. (ICE CONDITION is displayed on the EICAS).
The APU and the ECS packs must be switched off during ground de-icing to avoid fluid
ingestion. Sufficient time must be allowed for fluid run-off before starting the APU or ECS
packs.
The APU is not to be used to provide air conditioning and pressurisation following a de-icing
operation. Engine air bleeds should be used for the air supply and should T/O-1 thrust
setting be required, the packs will need to be reset after take off.
If the aircraft has been de-iced prior to a take-off the APU is not to be used for
conditioning air after landing whilst passengers are on board.
On any sector where there is no restriction on APU use for conditioning the No 2 pack must
be switched on in advance of boarding. This is so that if any fumes are generated by the
conditioning it will be noticed by the crew before passengers arrive at the aircraft (passenger
boarding should be delayed until any fumes have dispersed).
1.11 FUEL
NOTE: The values below have been determined for an adopted fuel density of
0.811 kg/l.
Maximum usable quantity in each tank (EMB145 MP) 2573 litres (2087 kg)
(EMB145LR) 3198 litres (2594 kg)
NOTE: When the EICAS fuel quantity is zero in level flight, any fuel remaining in
the tanks cannot be used safely in flight. When conducting pressure refuelling
the useable quantity in each tank may be reduced by 30 litres.
All Electric Fuel Pumps Operating 27 litres (22 kg) 22 litres (18kg)
Any Electrc Fuel Pump Up to 149 litres (121 kg) 203 litres (165kg)
Inoperative
Maximum permitted Imbalance 363 kg 363 kg
Between Tanks
Brazilian Specification QAV1 √
If battery voltage is below 24v, report to maintenance or try to recharge the affected
battery using the APU generator for at least 30 minutes.
1.12.2 Pressurisation
1.13.1 Flaps
Every time the gust lock lever is set to the unlocked position, the elevator movement
must be checked. This check must be performed no sooner than 10 seconds after
positioning the gust lock lever to the unlocked position by moving the control column from
the full up stop and to the full down stop and back to the full up stop.
A take-off must not be attempted if any of the brake temperature gauges are in
the amber range.
The maximum water tank content for the toilet hand-wash water is 20 litres.
The maximum pressure should be limited to 25 psi when re-filling this tank.
Max recommended airspeed to remove the Direct Vision Window is 140 kts IAS.
1.17 AUTOPILOT
1.18.1 Radar
Do not operate weather radar during re-fuelling, near fuel spills or people.
1.18.2 AHRS
The aircraft must not be moved until all Attitude and Heading information
presented on PFD is valid. The AHARS alignment time is indicated in the
graph below:
NOTE: Aircraft equipped with EGPWS 202-202 (EMB 145) does not
incorporate additional features such as Peaks Mode, Runway Field
Clearance Floor, Obstacle Alerting and Geometric Altitude.
EMB 145 is the only company aircraft equipped with EGPWS 202-202 which, unlike the
other EMB aircraft, does not incorporate Peaks Mode, Runway Field Clearance Floor,
Obstacle Alerting and Geometric Altitude.
Peaks Mode: The lack of this mode removes the digital elevations of the surrounding
terrain which are present on the other EMB aircraft regardless of the aircraft’s altitude.
Runway Clearance Floor: The lack of this mode removes the additional alerts based on
the aircraft’s GPS position and height above the destination runway using geometric
altitude.
Obstacle Alerting: The EGPWS 202-202 does not have an obstacle database for obstacle
conflict alerting and display.
Geometric Altitude: This mode optimizes EGPWS alerting and display capability using an
algorithm and additional system inputs and allows continuous EGPWS operations in QFE
environments.
The EGPWS 202-202 provides adequate protection provided the correct responses are made
to the Warnings and Cautions as described in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the system is not
intended to substitute for thorough pre-flight planning, situational awareness and adherence
to SOPs.
APL EMB 145 is fitted with an integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS). The ISIS
provides the following parameters:
Attitude (pitch and roll);
Standard or barometric-corrected altitude and associated barometric
pressure;
Indicated airspeed;
Indicated Mach number;
VMO (Maximum Operating Speed);
Skid/Slip information;
Magnetic heading (from AHRS 1).
Note: The ISIS relies on 28 V DC power, provided by the Essential DC Bus 2. In case of
an electrical emergency, it will operate solely on the airplane batteries for
approximately 40 minutes.
NOTE: The airplane must not be moved during the first 90 seconds after power-up
while the ISIS is undergoing alignment. Moving the airplane during this period can
cause in-flight attitude indication errors, that are not noticeable on ground. For further
information see ISIS STUDY GUIDE Chapter 2 of this manual.
The Universal UNS1 Operators Manual or an Operating Manual accepted by the Certifying
Authority, must be immediately available to the flight crew whenever navigation is
predicated on the use of FMS. The software status in the Operators Manual must match that
displayed on the FMS Control display Unit (CDU).
Universal FMS Software version 603.0 (or later approved version) must be installed.
IFR en-route and terminal navigation is prohibited unless the pilot verifies the currency of
the database or verifies each selected waypoint for accuracy by reference to current
approved data.
The pilot must review the complete transition – approach, comparing the waypoints and
altitudes displayed on the FMS with those on the published procedure prior to activation to
ensure that the correct procedure and transition are selected.
VNAV is advisory only, and the aircraft altimeter should be the primary source of altitude
information at all times.
When conducting FMS guided missed approach procedures autopilot coupled operation is
prohibited until the flight crew has established a rate of climb that ensures all altitude
requirements will be met.
IFR en-route and terminal navigation is prohibited unless the pilot verifies the currency of
the database or verifies each selected waypoint for accuracy by reference to current
approved data.
The fuel flow and fuel used presented on the FMS are supplementary information only. The
flight crew must use fuel information primarily from the MFD and EICAS display.
Coupled FMS vertical guidance is not available. During FMS operation with Autopilot
coupled, pilots must use the Flight Guidance Controller for vertical control. Advisory vertical
guidance is available only in descent. GPS stand-alone approaches are prohibited.
Precision instrument approaches using the FMS for guidance are prohibited. Non-precision
instrument approaches using the FMS for guidance are prohibited.
During oceanic, NAT MNPS, en-route and terminal area operation with DR annunciated on
the PFD, the flight crew must verify the FMS position using VOR, DME raw data or other
appropriate means.
The aircraft must have other navigation equipment installed and operating appropriate to
the route of flight.
Operation above 73° north latitude and below 60° south latitude is prohibited due to unreliable
magnetic heading. FMS PVOR outbound function is prohibited.
FMS missed approach using the CDU Mode Select Buttons is prohibited. During terminal
area operation the flight crew must crosscheck the FMS/GPS data against the VOR, DME,
NDB and/or radar fix.
During FMS Fuel Management Initialisation the flight crew must enter manually the fuel on
board data.
During performance initialisation the pilot must not accept the OPTIMUM cruise altitude, but
must instead enter with the desired cruise altitude. FMS approaches are not approved for
Air Peace aircraft.
LEKTRO AP8750B-AL and DOUGLAS TBL-50 tow-bar less tugs are approved
for use on EMB145 aircraft.
The place inside the cabin where structural damage or system damage is
least likely to jeopardise flight safety is the third overhead bin from the front
of the cabin
Air supplied to the aircraft for ground conditioning via the air conditioning ground
connection must be supplied within the following parameters: Max Press - 127mm
H2O: Max Temp - 71 Celsius: Max Flow Rate - 3.6m3/min: Min Rating - 50040
BTU. The main door should be left open when using external conditioning
air to avoid pressurising the aircraft.
Air Peace Limited aircraft equipped with the UNS-1K and Honeywell FMS are
approved for BRNAV operations in accordance with AC 20– 130A, provided the
FMS is receiving navigation information from at least one VOR and one DME
station, or from two DME stations. Refer to OM Part A Chapter 8.3 for B-RNAV /
P-RNAV description.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the operation of the EMB 145 have been
developed from the recommended procedures of the manufacturer and are approved by the
certification authorities.
Prior to a flight the aircraft commander is to decide which crew member will act as pilot “in
charge of the sector”, and which as co-pilot or “assistant” pilot. This is a short-term, flight
specific, assignation. For the purposes of the SOP, the “pilot (in charge)” is abbreviated as
PF (Pilot Flying) and the “co-pilot” as PM (Pilot Monitoring). Once assigned, these
designations will not normally be expected to change before the flight ends. The Captain may
change these roles at any time should the necessity arise, such as in cases of emergencies,
when changes in weather require it, or for particular circumstances such as training. PF and
PM are therefore terms describing an individual’s role, usually for the duration of one specific
flight, and are not determined by the individual’s rank.
Duties, which are allocated to the Aircraft Commander, and may not be assigned to the other
pilot, are designated as "CPT" duties.
2.1.2 Briefing
The Captain should brief his crew prior to boarding the aircraft on any expected problems
during that days flying, i.e. weather related, expected slot delays, special passenger
requirements.
The normal procedures contained in this Section have been developed and recommended
by the manufacturer and approved by the certification authorities for use during the
operation of the EMB-145.
General
The purpose of the expanded checklist is to explain the actions to be taken in connection with
each item of the Normal Operating Checklist. This section combines both the Expanded
Checklist and Normal Operating Procedures from Pre-flight to Post-flight.
The checklist shall be read by the RP whilst on the ground and PM when airborne.
When a specific set of check items is complete, the pilot accomplishing the challenge will call
e.g. “After Take-off checklist complete”.
The Expanded Checklist description will confirm which pilot actions which specific task.
However, a symbol running down the right hand side of the checklist will indicate which pilot
is required to respond to each check.
Checklist Symbols
• First Flight AND Turnaround checks
PF Response from Pilot Flying
PM Response from Pilot not Flying
LP Response from the Left Pilot
RP Response from the Right Pilot
P Response from both pilots. (PF first)
SET/CHKD When both pilots are required to respond, e.g.
SET/CHKD, PF shall respond first (e.g. “SET”) and PM second (e.g.
“CHKD”). The LP will initiate the response on the ground and PF whilst
in-flight.
“..........” Words inside quotation marks should be regarded as a specific spoken
response.
Items without explanation are considered self-explanatory.
The normal checklist is “challenge and response” the accomplishment of checklist items
should precede and not follow the checklist. Both pilots can accomplish their functions in
accordance with the expanded checklist, as circumstances and good judgement dictate. The
checklist then becomes verification that items have not been forgotten.
Normal Checklist
The External Checks are normally completed by the PF while the PM completes the internal
checks.
As the crew approaches the aircraft, the general area should be observed and a note made
of safety-related items and activities that may be affected by the preparation checks. Note in
particular:
Personnel
Wheel chocks
Tow bar installation
Area around the APU
Refuelling
Flight control surfaces clear
Blanks and gear pins
Any obvious fluid leaks or irregularities with the aircraft
Manoeuvring area
Aircraft antenna
The external inspection should cover a complete circuit of the Aircraft to ensure every item is
checked.
Nose
Forward Entry Door CHECK CONDITION
Door Control Panel CLOSED & SECURE
Static Port (No.1 & No.3) NO OBSTRUCTIONS
Left Cockpit Side Window CHECK CONDITION
AOA Sensor CHECK CONDITION
Pitot Tube No.1 NO OBSTRUCTIONS
Left TAT Probe CHECK CONDITION
Ice Detector No.1 CHECK CONDITION
Battery Compartment Access Panel CLOSED & SECURE
Note: Ensure hydraulics systems are not energised whilst personnel are
in the nose-wheel bay.
Tyres should not be worn past the bottom of the tyre grooves. Operation past the grooves
will result in the loss of cut protection and penetration of the first ply will render the tyre
unsatisfactory for retread.
Note: If the uplock hook is in the LOCKED position, fit the locking pins
before cycling the free fall lever to reposition the uplock to the UNLOCKED
position.
Right Wing
Right Fuselage, Windows, Emergency Exits CHECK CONDITION
Refuelling Panel and OverWing Fuel Caps CLOSED & SECURE
Ensure refuelling procedure is complete.
Refuel Procedure:
Ensure the system is energised for pressure refuelling by selecting the power switch to
NORMAL or BATTERY as appropriate. Initiate the self-test by selecting TK SEL/TEST switch
to TEST. All light segments illuminate and a failure code is presented if a failure is detected.
If the test is passed select the desired tank quantity using the INCR/DECR switch. As fuel
pressure is applied on the adapter the two CLOSED lights will illuminate to indicate that the
refuelling shut off valves are closed. Select the refuelling switch to OPEN will open the shut
off valves starting the refuelling operation. The shut off valves will close, stopping the
refuelling operation, when:
1. The fuel level reaches 30 litres below the tank full capacity.
2. The selected fuel quantity on the refuelling panel is achieved.
3. The refuelling switch is commanded to closed.
Tail
Horizontal Stabiliser CHECK CONDITION
Elevators & Trim Tabs CHECK CONDITION
Rudders CHECK CONDITION
Static Wicks (Elevator x 4, Rudder x 2) CHECK
Logo Lights, Navigation Lights, Strobe CHECK CONDITION
Left Wing
Overwing Refuelling Cap CLOSED & SECURE
Hydraulic Service Panel CLOSED & SECURE
NOTE: Dynamic aquaplaning occurs when a tyre is lifted off a runway surface by
water pressure and requires a surface-water depth greater than the tyre-tread depth
and sufficient groundspeed to prevent the water from escaping from the tyre’s
footprint. The Embraer 145 Maintenance Manual does not require a tyre change
until the general depth of tread is 0.8mm. However, the following recommendations
are issued to Engineering as to when the wet runway performance of a tyre would
be seriously impaired.
PASSENGER CABIN
FLIGHT DECK
The ‘First flight Checks’, to include those checks annotated with a black dot,
must be completed:
Normal procedures and QRH drills rely on the correct positioning of all levers and
switches to achieve predictable results. In addition, many systems will not usually need
to be tested or checked on subsequent flights even after handover to another Crew.
Observation of correct EFIS indications during checks will ensure that all sensors are
operative remembering that invalid data is either removed from the display or replaced
by amber dashes. For these reasons the first flight checks must be completed in a
thorough and unhurried manner.
Generally, panel buttons in their ‘normal’ position will be black, the striped bar within the
button being illuminated when selected to their ‘abnormal’ position. Buttons are described
as being ‘pressed’ (flush with the panel), or ‘released’ (protruding from the panel). Knobs are
generally vertical in their ‘normal’ position.
Panel lighting and screen brightness should be set as required during preparation
checks. To prevent oil contamination, glare or damage, care should be taken not to
touch any of the Displays.
Once inside the Aircraft, a Security Search should be completed. If required, this should be
followed by a Safety Inspection to ensure that it is safe to energise the aircraft. This check
should flow down the overhead panel, across the glareshield and down the central
pedestal. The following items in particular should be checked and are in flow order:
MAINTENANCE STATUS………………………………………………….CHECKED
Verify all circuit breakers IN at the overhead panel, behind the LP seat and behind the RP seat
to ensure agreement with maintenance status.
Generators PUSHED IN
GPU PUSHED OUT
APU GEN PUSHED IN
BATT 1 & 2 OFF
Essential Power GUARDED OUT
Bus Ties & Shed Buses AUTO
AC Power (if applicable) PUSHED IN
Back-up PUSHED IN
Avionics Master 1 & 2 PUSHED OUT
EMERGENCY LIGHTS……………………………………………………..…….......OFF
FUEL PANEL……………………………………………………………………...........SET
Fuel Crossfeed OFF
Pump Power 1 & 2 OFF
APU..........................................................................................................................SET
APU Fire Extinguishing .......................................GUARDED OUT
APU Master.........................................................OFF
APU FUEL SHUTOFF ........................................GUARDED OUT
IGNITIONS ...............................................................................................................AUTO
Lights ..................................................................................................................OFF
ELT ......................................................................................................................ARMED
Crew Oxygen........................................................................................................ON
If the airplane is to be pushed back for start and if start is to be performed with the APU, the
crew may leave the parking brake released as long as the chocks are in place.
NOTE: To prevent hydraulic fluid transfer between systems: To apply the parking brake, first
press the brake pedals to full deflection, then pull the emergency/parking brake handle. To
release the parking brake, first press the brake pedals to full deflection then release the
emergency/parking brake handle.
POWER UP
The POWER UP procedures and checklist must be performed every crew’s first flight of the
day on a particular airplane or when a power down was required. If receiving the airplane
already powered up, verify compliance with all items and perform FIRE EXTINGUISHER
Panel Test.
For cold soak operation, refer to AOM section 1-02-79 – “Operation In Icing Conditions”.
Once the batteries are on, the pilot must concentrate on starting up the APU shortly, so as to
save the batteries. Avoid, for example, taking time to adjust the seat or to look at documents.
Plan to do these things after starting the APU and its generator is on.
- Press and hold (for at least 2 seconds) the FIRE DETECTION TEST button and observe the
following EICAS messages, lights and warnings:
- Aural warning.
- Fire handles illuminated.
- BAGG EXTG button illuminated (for airplanes with baggage hold extinguishing only).
- Warning lights flashing.
- “APU FIRE” EICAS message.
- “ENG 1(2) FIRE” EICAS message.
- “BAGG SMOKE” EICAS message (class C compartment only).
- “APU FIREDET FAIL” EICAS message.
- “E1 (2) FIREDET FAIL” EICAS message.
NOTE: - On the ground if the FIRE DETECTION TEST button is held for more than 10
seconds with APU running, it will cause an automatic APU Shutdown.
- If it’s necessary to repeat the test, wait at least 6 seconds to press the TEST button.
- If FIRE DETECTION TEST button is held for less than 2 seconds the BAGG EXTG button
may remain illuminated. If this happen, repeat the test.
Check the ELEC page on the MFD if voltage is within 28.0 V (-2.0 V+1.0 V)
When the GPU button is selected, the "GPU AVAIL" message on it goes off and its white
stripe lights up.
To start the APU, select one of the TANK 2 electric fuel pumps and switch the PUMP PWR
TANK 2 to on. If necessary, the TANK 1 may be used via Fuel XFEED Procedure.
APU Bleed......................................................................................CLOSED…….............RP
APU ...................................................................................................START......................RP
To start the APU, turn the knob to ON, wait 3 seconds and then momentarily to START.
Monitor APU EGT and RPM increasing within limits. The APU generator will come on line after
RPM exceeds 95%.
NOTE: For airplanes equipped with AHRS-900 or IRS, do not star the APU before 30 seconds
after airplane energization to prevent disturbances in the AHRS/IRS initialization.
Amperage may be greater than 400 A (APU GEN OVLD may appear on the EICAS) at first
while the APU recharges the batteries. Do not bring any additional load on line until amperage
is below 400 A. Allow a few seconds for the APU GEN OVLD message to disappear before
switching the avionics master to ON.
APU GENERATOR……………………………………………………………..ON…………..RP
With APU Power, Crew must deselect the GPU (if available) as soon as the APU is running
and stable to prevent the ground crew from disconnecting it while it is still powering the busses,
which causes an unwanted transient.
NOTE: Following every APU start attempt, allow 3 minutes of APU warm-up before adding
pneumatic load. This is particularly important after unsuccessful APU start attempts, so as to
permit that excessive fuel accumulated during the previous start attempts is burned,
preventing fuel odor inside the cabin/cockpit.
SHED BUSES……………………………………………………………OVERIDE………….RP
Shed buses must be set to OVRD to operate the recirculation fans or galley power when APU
generator energizes the electrical system.
During the walkaround, ensure all blanks and pitot covers are removed and stowed.
Ensure Pitot Covers are placed in the stowage opposite to ground lock pins.
Observation of the area around the Aircraft prior to commencing the Pre-flight Checks will
ensure that the safety related items and activities that may be affected by the preparation
checks are noted.
GEAR PINS.........................................................................................................STOWED……… RP
The RP visually checks confirms that the Hydraulic and Landing Gear Pins (4 total) are
stowed on the Flight Deck.
Once inside the Aircraft, a Security Search should be completed. If required, this should be
followed by a Safety Inspection to ensure that it is safe to energise the aircraft. This check
should flow down the overhead panel, across the glareshield and down the central pedestal.
The following items in particular should be checked and are in flow order:
The following items of the Ship’s Library should be checked including revision status where
applicable:
Technical Logbook: Review any ADD entries and labels. Ensure that there are
no open engineering entries and the Aircraft will remain within all expiry dates
and total hours, including Out Of Phase checks and Intermediate Inspections.
Part A
Part B
Part C
MEL/CDL/DDL
FMS Pilots Operating Manual
Cabin Crew Operations Manual
SMS
PARK BRAKE..............................................................................................................ON……….. RP
Confirm the Park Brake selector is ON and the BRAKE ON indicator is illuminated. If not,
select the Hydraulics momentarily to AUTO, set the Parking Brake, and then turn the
Hydraulics OFF again.
o Attendant Call.
o GPU Button.
o APU Fire Extinguisher.
o Engine Takeoff Data Store.
o Pressurisation Dump and Auto/Manual.
o EGPWS terrain system override.
o BAGG EXT button.
o Electromechanical GUST LOCK indication lights.
NAV LIGHTS…………………………………………………………………ON………………….RP
FUEL PANEL...................................................................................SET……….…………… RP
Select the Fuel Page on both MFDs. Check the Fuel Quantity indications and reset both
Fuel Used indications. On the overhead Fuel Panel, note which Fuel Pumps are currently
in use and select the next Pump in sequence (either a, b or c). Ensure Cross feed is
selected OFF.
If the APU is operating, the Fuel System Panel should be set as required, otherwise
ensure both Pumps OFF.
o Select Crossfeed LOW 1: Check Tank 1 Fuel Pump indicates OFF and
Tank 2 Pump remains running. EICAS message FUEL X-FEED OPEN.
o Select Crossfeed LOW 2: Check Tank 2 Fuel Pump indicates OFF and
Tank 1 Pump remains running. EICAS message FUEL X-FEED OPEN.
o Select Crossfeed OFF: Check both Fuel Pumps indicate that they are
running. FUEL X-FEED OPEN EICAS message removed.
CAUTION: If the Batteries are powering the Aircraft on the ground the DC Bus
Bars are powered. Do NOT select the Hydraulic Pumps to AUTO or ON, as the
Batteries will be depleted very quickly. Complete the hydraulic checks only
when APU or GPU are available.
Select the Hydraulics page on the MFD. Note System 1 and 2 quantity, pressure indications
and Pump status. On the overhead Hydraulic Panel, confirm that the Engine Driven Hydraulic
Pump Shut-off Valve button is released (no bar) and guarded. Select System 1 Electric
Hydraulic Pump to AUTO. Note on the MFD the Hydraulic Pump indicates ON and the
pressure rises to approximately 2900 +/- 200 PSI. Confirm removal of AIL SYS 1 INOP and
RUD SYS 1 INOP EICAS messages.
Check the Ailerons and Rudder for full and free movement (only 10º Rudder travel available).
Select System 1 Electric Hydraulic Pump to ON. Confirm the Pump remains ON. Select the
Electric Pump OFF.
Repeat the above sequence of tests with System 2.
Note: System 2 also incorporates the Rudder Stop system. When System 2 is
checked, full 15º Rudder travel should be noted in conjunction with the removal
of the EICAS message RUD STOP DISAG).
Confirm the APU has been running for a minimum of 3 minutes. If air conditioning is
required, open the APU Bleed by pressing the APU bleed button. Confirm the OPEN
inscription is displayed and the bar is illuminated in the button. Select the Cross-Bleed
knob to OPEN noting the EICAS message CROSS BLD OPEN is presented. Select
Pack 2 ON by pressing its button. If additional air-conditioning is required, a ground air
conditioning cart should be sourced instead of using Pack 1 in order to save wear on
the APU. Confirm the Gasper and Re-circulation Fan buttons Pack 1 may also be
selected ON. Confirm the Gasper and Re-circulation Fan buttons are ON (pressed).
Set the Temperature Control knobs to the desired position.
AUTOPILOT/FGC……………………………………………………………….CHECKED……..RP
Confirm that both Flight Directors are ON (green indicator illuminated in the FD button). Test
that the Autopilot disconnects as follows:
Select the FGC Couple button to the No.1 Flight Director and note PFD Couple Arrow.
Release the Gust Lock and place the Control Column in the mid-pitch position.
Engage the Autopilot and Yaw Damper by pressing only the AP button. Confirm AP and YD
indicate engaged on the PFDs. Operate the left Control Column Pitch Trim switch and
confirm the Autopilot disconnects. The Yaw Damper will remain engaged and a continuous
“Autopilot” aural warning will sound. Press the left Quick-Disconnect button and release
following the second aural “Autopilot” announcement.
Re-engage the Autopilot. Press and hold the left Quick-Disconnect button and confirm the
Autopilot and Yaw Damper disconnect immediately. Couple the Autopilot to the No.2 Flight
Director and repeat the above steps. With Capt autopilot disconnect button pressed operate
each of the trim switches in turn and check on the trim position indicator that the trim does not
move. Repeat for First Officers autopilot disconnect button.
Re-engage the Gust Lock and set the Couple button to PFS side. Cycling the Couple button
will cancel any Flight Director modes. Reset the Pitch Trim to 7. Do not operate either 1 part
or both parts of the trim switch for longer than 7 seconds or the switch will become
deactivated.
NOTE: When the wind is strong enough to force the horizontal stabiliser,
an automatic pitch trim may occur if the aircraft is on the ground and the
autopilot is engaged.
NOTE: Ensure the correct date is set as the date feed for the DFDR is taken from
this clock.
Select the FLT number position on the mode selector. Press the ET button to select the
digit to be adjusted. Press the CHR button to adjust the selected digit.
Press the ET button to select the remaining digits and adjust, as above until the required
flight number is set.
If required, Check and adjust the left and right side clocks:
Rotate the mode selector anticlockwise to its stop, press in and continue rotating to the
Clock Set position. The HOUR display will be selected (flashing). Adjust by pressing the
CHR button. Press the ET button to select the MINUTES display and adjust as required by
pressing the CHR button. Return the mode selector to the Zulu time display. Both pilots
should ensure they have the correct time set.
REVERSION PANEL.....................................................................................................CHKD…. P
Check both MFD reversion panels. Ensure the MFD selector knob is selected to MFD and
check the ADC, AHRS and SG buttons are released (white bar is not illuminated).
RMUs/TBCH .....................................................................................SET……….. RP
Select the appropriate COM frequencies. Enter the navigation frequencies for the
expected departure. A Pilot Activated Self-Test (PAST) of the TCAS is only required
during the full Pre-flight Checks.
Select the yellow cursor to either field in the TCAS window. Press and hold the Test
Button until TCAS TEST is annunciated. Observe the following:
o An aural TCAS TEST announcement. Both MFD TCAS windows are presented
TBCH: Verify NORMAL mode is selected and the frequencies displayed match the
frequencies on RMU 2. Clear any power-up error codes by cycling the Frequency Transfer
button.
TR I M PA N E L .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C H E C K E D …… …… . RP
Verify that ROLL, YAW and PITCH (Main and Backup) trims are operating
properly both ways. Verify system’s 3 seconds protection working properly.
Adjust YAW and ROLL trims to the neutral position and PITCH trim to the green
band.
PRESSURISATION PANEL…....................................................SET………..RP
Set the Pressurisation Controller to the landing airfield elevation rounded up to the nearest
100 feet. Confirm the MANUAL/AUTO and DUMP buttons are released, guarded and their
inscriptions are not illuminated. Confirm the Manual Control Knob is set to the full ‘DOWN’
position. Check the pressurisation indications on the EICAS indicate airfield pressure altitude
and zero rate-of-climb and differential.
FMS………………………………………………………………………………..….SET………….P
Check NAVIGATION DATABASE expiry date.
PF sets the route according to the flight plan and both pilots check course, distance, time and
altitude on each waypoint.
LP must complete data entry into the FMS including TOTAL FUEL, CARGO DATA and PAX
NUMBER.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
START/PUSHBACK CLEARANCE…………………………………………RECEIVED LP
RP requests for clearance from ATC prior to start and/or pushback.
RED BEACON…………………………………………………………………..ON LP
LP must ensure the Red Beacon switch on the External Lights Panel is switched to ON prior to
engine start.
FUEL PUMPS/QUANTITY...........................................................................CHKD LP
The RP will state the planned fuel requirement for the flight, as per the Flight Plan and the LP
will confirm that the required fuel is on board and in balance, as displayed on the MFD, and
the Fuel Used indicators have been reset. Also, ensure setting Pump Power for TANK 1 and
2 to ON position.
SPEED BUGS………………………………………………………………………….SET P
Setting Take-off Speeds:
On the MFD, select the MFD menu then SPEEDS. Double-box the V1 speed by pressing the
button below its display. Dial in the required speed using the rotary set knob. Double-box the
VR speed by pressing the key below its display. Set the V rotate speed as above. Note that the
V1 speed remains single boxed indicating that it will be displayed on the IAS Tape. Set the V2
speed as above and VAP to the VFS. Set V2+15 speed (Flap 9) or V2+10 (Flap 18) on the
Target Speed Bug by rotating the IAS/VS set knob on the Flight Guidance Controller.
The RP sets the Elevator (PITCH) Trim based on the Loadsheet MACTOW/trim index and
ensures the Aileron (ROLL) & Rudder (YAW) Trims are neutral (zero). The LP crosschecks
and responds
EMB 145
Pitch Trim 8 7 6 5 4
CG Psn % < 25 30 35 40 43
NOTE 2: The Before Start Checks must be completed prior to any pushback.
EMERGENCY/PARK BRAKE…………………………………………………………ON LP
NOTE 3: Both Pilots must monitor external activities as well as the Engine start.
Verify the Emergency/Park brake is set in accordance with the engine start proceedures.
NOTE 4: Both Pilots must remain clear of the Brakes, Rudder Pedals and Tiller
during Push Back.
NOTE
Do not interrupt an engine start to put the park
brake on. Wait until the engine being started has stabilised and
the start cycle is complete.
Complete the After Start Checklist whilst the
Ground equipment is being removed.
The Captain shall communicate with the Ground crew, and release/apply the
Park Brake on command from the ground crew.
The ITT scale is re-scheduled to indicate the Start Limit ITT. Guard the Start/Stop
Selector for the duration of the start. Both Pilots monitor the Engine parameters on the
EICAS and PF shall announce as follows:
o “Oil Pressure”.
The Starter Control Valve will close as N2 accelerates through 53%. However, Maximum
ITT is reached as the Engine continues to accelerate to idle. This must be monitored.
The PF announces a good start when the ITT has fallen below its peak and the FADEC N1
Target ‘T’ is displayed on the N1 scale (e.g. “stabilised”). The start cycle takes
approximately 60 seconds.
Plan to start the No. 1 Engine on stand using the External Air Starter and perform a
cross-bleed start on the No.2 Engine following completion of the Pushback:
o GPU Power will normally be connected and selected ON.
o Confirm with the ground crew that the Air Starter is delivering air.
o Check that the Cross Bleed is AUTO and the Packs are OFF.
o Start the No.1 Engine as above.
Following completion of the No.1 start, de-select the GPU (Button out, GPU AVAIL inscription
illuminated) and request the disconnection of the GPU and Air Starter.
Open the No.1 Engine Bleed Valve. If required, select Pack 1 Valve open but close it prior to
the N0.2 Engine start (the bleed logic will not close the valve of the operating Engine during a
cross bleed start).
Ensure hydraulic pressure is available for Park Brake (light illuminated). If hydraulic pressure
is not available the No 2 Hydraulic Pump should be selected to Auto.
Commence Pushback.
Once pushback is complete and the Tug disconnected, perform a Cross-Bleed Start on the
No.2 Engine.
Wherever possible the Ground Crew should be on intercom during this procedure, which
should only be deviated from when operationally necessary.
In case an engine fails to rotate or the start is aborted due to an abnormality, do not attempt
further starts but report to the maintenance personnel. However, a hung start or a failure to
light up alone are not considered failures to start and a second start may be attempted. A dry
motoring run must always be completed following a hung start / failure to light up or if the
residual ITT is above 210 C to clear the Engine of unburned fuel. Complete the QRH
Engine Dry Motoring procedure.
In the event of a second attempt to start simply due to failure to light up, then maintenance
personnel must be advised after arrival, an ADD and a Tech Log entry made.
NOTE: For ease of reference, External Air Starting and Cross bleed starting
procedures are provided in the Flight deck Handbook located in the Flight deck’s
Central Pedestal Stowage.
The RP shall confirm that the Gasper and Recirc Fans are selected on (buttons pressed) and
set the Air Conditioning/Pneumatics Panel according to the following conditions:
T/O 1 Anti-Ice OFF (APU air used to power Air Conditioning Packs)
NOTE: Following a normal Engine start using the APU bleed air, no panel
adjustments should be required. Confirm the Engine Bleed Valves are Closed
(Buttons released, bars illuminated). Confirm the APU Bleed is Open (button
pressed, the white bar and OPEN inscription illuminated). Select the Cross-Bleed
Valve to OPEN (the advisory EICAS message CROSS BLD OPEN will be
presented).
Confirm both Pack Buttons are selected Open (Buttons pressed and black).
T/O 1 Anti-Ice ON OR
ALT T/O 1 Anti-Ice ON or OFF
Select both Engine Bleed Valves Open (Buttons pressed) and immediately press the APU
Stop Button (unless APU is required for electrical back-up). Select the APU Bleed button to
Closed (released). Select the Cross Bleed Valve to AUTO. Confirm that both Pack Valves
are Open (buttons pressed).
NOTE: The start should not be aborted if fuel flow drops to zero immediately after light
up. The flight or sequence of flights may continue but maintenance must be notified
for any light up occurring later than 5 seconds after the first fuel flow introduction, or
one producing a visible flash. If the light up occurs between 5 and 10 seconds after the
first fuel flow indication, smoke and a momentary flash of combustion may be
produced.
APU/GPU…………………………………………………OFF…………………………………..LP
If the APU is not required for T/O, it should be shut down by the LP and the APU Master
Knob selected to OFF once the RPM has decreased below 10%. The advisory EICAS
message APU FUEL SOV CLSD will be presented briefly. Selection of the APU switch does
not need to be confirmed whilst the aircraft is on the ground.
The LP confirms that the GPU button is released and the GPU is disconnected.
Disconnect the GPU only after releasing the GPU button.
The FADEC RESET/ALTERNATE switch on the roof panel must be selected to RESET then
ALTERNATE by the LP. Following any FADEC reset procedure, a period of 15 seconds
should be given before that FADEC is “used” or a further reset is attempted, otherwise
FADEC faults may occur.
The FADEC must be seen to have changed, and the target N1 figure must be the same on
both FADECs for the same engine. If there is any difference between these target N1 figures,
the engine take-off data must be re-entered.
The LP confirms that the briefed Thrust Setting (T/O or ALT T/O) is indicated above the N1
gauges.
LP confirms that the Engine T/O DATA entered on the MFD has been accepted by the
FADECs and presented cyan (blue). If the information was not accepted the data will remain
amber. In this case re-enter the T/O data.
SHED BUSES…………………………………………………………..AUTO.................................. LP
If the shed buses are set to Overide, switch them to AUTO.
STEERING……………………………………………………………ON........................................... LP
Engage by pressing STEERING HANDWHEEL and observe STEERING INOP message
disappears on EICAS.
NOTE: Steering handle actuation with nose-wheels beyond their operational limits may
cause damage to the nose-wheel steering system.
RUDDER .......................................................................................CHECK………………. LP
The LP should ensure that the Tiller is released and the steering disengaged by pressing the
Steering Disconnect Switch on the Control Column. The STEERING INOP caution message
will be presented on the EICAS. Check full movement and freedom of the Rudders. For each
direction, check that the EICAS message RUD HDOV PROTFAIL is not presented when
pedal is at full travel. The Steering should then be re-engaged by depressing the Tiller and
confirming that the STEERING INOP EICAS message has cleared.
FL A P S .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° SE T LP
LP calls for required T/O flaps if not already set.
RP selects flap. (normally set at the request of the lp following the after
start checks).
Both pilots confirm required setting indicated on the EICAS display.
2.2.4 Taxiing
Duties:
Prior to taxi, the LP should select the Taxi light ON. When the Aircraft is moving forward, the
LP should check the Main Brakes and Steering are operative. The hydraulics page should be
displayed on the RP MFD during taxi. The TCAS should be displayed on the LPs MFD,
especially when taxiing in Low Visibility or when crossing or entering an active runway. The
RP shall check his brakes on the first crew flight of the day.
Once clear of the ramp area, the initial section of the taxi checks should be accomplished at
an appropriate time.
NOTE: To use the Tiller Steering, the Tiller must be depressed and
remain depressed until the nose wheel is re-centred. Releasing the
tiller off-centre will cause the Nose Wheel to remain off centre and
the steering to disengage. It will return abruptly to neutral and
once the steering is re-engaged. Rudder Fine Steering may be used
for maintaining straight ahead and gentle turns.
Manoeuvring the aeroplane on the ground is, in most respects, similar to manoeuvring other
conventional tricycle gear aeroplanes. Nose wheel steering and engine thrust are used for
directional control. Make all turns at a slow speed. Good taxi technique requires awareness
of the proximity of obstacles, the effects of excessive noise, and the force of the jet exhaust.
Important guidelines when taxiing are the following: -
Make all turns with as large a radius as possible. Minimum radius turns cause heavy side
loads and unnecessary scrubbing of the tyres. Slow the aeroplane as much as possible
before turning. After completing a turn and before stopping, return the nose wheel steering
control to centre, and roll forward to allow the nose and main wheels to align, relieving tyre
twisting stresses.
Braking action is good and positive with a smooth response. It is not desirable to
continuously ride the brakes to prevent acceleration. Very little air-cooling takes place when
the brakes are in continuous contact. Allow the aeroplane to accelerate, and then brake to a
slow taxi speed. Release the brakes and repeat the sequence. Intermittent brake use
provides a cooling period between brake applications.
When an outboard engine is used to assist a turn, use as little thrust as possible, and do not
allow the aeroplane to stop while turning. The engines are effective on minimum radius turns.
Use of the inboard brake in a turn should be kept to a minimum. The Ground Crew should
ensure that the wing tips clear all obstacles on the ramp. While making turns, the swept wing
tip effectively moves outboard.
In order to avoid fluid transfer via the brake shuttle from System 1 to System 2, firstly apply
the normal brake and keep it applied until the park brake is fully applied. The same procedure
must be followed for brake release.
Jet exhaust ingestion may be reduced by adequate spacing and/or angling the aeroplane on
the taxiway.
If delays are encountered in icing conditions, apply the procedures given in the Ice and Rain
Protection section of the “Normal Procedures” chapter in this manual.
To prevent damage to the facilities or ground support equipment due to jet exhaust blast
when taxiing into or out of terminal areas, the thrust levers should be moved slowly forward
after receiving the clear-to-taxi signal. If the aeroplane is heavily loaded, or if soft pavement
or a slight incline exists, it may be necessary for this power application to remain on for a few
seconds for the aeroplane to begin to roll.
If the aeroplane will not move, contact the Ground Crew (via interphone) or determine that
the area behind the aeroplane is clear of personnel and equipment before exceeding normal
maximum taxi N1 values (i.e. gust lock needs to be disengaged).
NOTE: With 2 packs running and the APU generator under load the APU fuel burn is
1.24kg/min). The following procedures will apply:
Crews can use the following procedure when departure delays due to slots are
1 hour or less. The passengers should be boarded and the aircraft pushed
back on time and taxied to a holding area designated by ATC. The aircraft
must have a serviceable APU.
Captains should use their discretion over whether to shut down the main engines having
given due regard to fuel/noise/slot considerations.
TAXY LIGHT…………………………............................................................ON LP
The LP should select the Taxi Light ON, gently test the Main Brakes and check the Rudder
Fine Steering in both directions.
Consider any changes to the briefed departure (include a check of the programmed SID,
ensuring FMS is not in Command Heading Mode) due to weather, runway conditions, air
traffic control requirements, etc. Cross check the heading against the runway QDM and
confirm the initial stop ALT/Level is set.
GUST LOCK………………,…………………………………………………….FREE……...LP
CABIN ............................................................................................SECURED………………P
Once the aircraft is moving forward under it’s own power, the Cabin Crew will call the Flight
deck via the interphone to give a “Cabin Secure” report.
NOTE: Taxiing is to be regarded as a critical phase of flight and crews are to apply
sterile flight-deck procedures. The intercom is not to be used for non-operational
conversation.
STROBES………………………………………………………………..ON…………………….LP
LANDING LIGHTS………………………………………………………ON………………….LP
Both Pilots must confirm that the approach and runway is clear prior to crossing the stop bar.
During Low Visibility Procedures a report should be made to ATC when entering the active
Runway. The LP should select the Strobe light and L/R main landing lights ON, leaving the
centre landing light OFF until take-off clearance is received.
Warning: Pilots should be aware that the TOCWS would produce a “TAKE-OFF OK” with
the flaps set at 22°. Particular care must be taken that the correct flap configuration is
set for take-off.
WEATHER RADAR………………………………………………………………..ON…………..LP
If required, should be displayed on the PF’s MFD. EGPWS Terrain must be displayed on at
least one MFD at all times.
If the use of the weather radar is required on the ground (for T/O) it should be displayed on
PF‘s MFD. The procedure to be used is as follows:
a) Select auto gain
b) Press the stab button 4 times in 3 seconds.
TAKEOFF CLEARANCE……………………………………….RECEIVED................................................ P
Both Pilots must ensure Take off clearance is received from ATC prior to advancing thrust for
Take off.
2.2.6 Take-off
2.2.6.1 Normal Take-off Flap 9o
When the aircraft is cleared to line-up, the LP should select the Strobe light and L/R main
landing lights ON, leaving the centre landing light OFF until take-off clearance is received.
When the aircraft is aligned with the runway, the aircraft heading should be checked. A
positive transfer of controls should take place if the RP is PF (“You have control”, “I have
NOTE: AE 3007A/1 Engines will only provide ATTCS with Alternate Take Off mode
selected (ALT T/O), but not Take Off mode (T/O).
control”).
NOTE: If ALT T/O 1 is used and the thrust levers are advanced beyond the thrust set
position, T/O 1 will automatically be set and ATTCS will not be displayed. The packs
will require a reset above 1700 ft AAL.
NOTE: If the runway used for departure is performance or runway limited and the
actual take off weight is within 500kg of the RTOW the thrust must be set against
the brakes.
Prior to a Runway Limited Take-off, maximum turn inputs are required to align the aircraft to
prevent exceeding the Alignment Allowance.
A stopwatch should be started and then the thrust levers should be smoothly advanced to the
thrust set position (in approx 4 seconds) and a check made of engine performance on the
EICAS. The PM should verify engine acceleration and respond, “ATTICS ARMED” (ALT T/O
1 only) “Thrust set”, as the N1 thrust target is reached.
If a static take-off is performed the brakes should not be released until the engines have
reached the N1 thrust target (all performance take-offs). As the thrust is set the PM should
start a timer to ensure compliance with engine limitations (five minutes).
The PM should monitor engine parameters during the initial take-off roll and call out “80
knots, V1, Rotate”. When Take-off power is confirmed, The LP is to guard the Thrust
Levers in readiness for a rejected takeoff.
Below 80 kts, either pilot may command the stop for any significant failure. This is because
the aircraft has relatively low energy and the risk of a runway excursion is negligible. In this
event, the captain retains the power levers and the steering tiller and brings the aircraft to a
halt, and the right-seat pilot retains the control column.
Above 80 kts, the FO must only command a stop for a potential runway blockage or a control
malfunction. For any other malfunction the FO must announce it to the Captain who will
make the clear decision to stop or to continue the take-off. This is because the aircraft has
high energy, and the risk of Excursion increases as the aircraft approaches V1.
If it is the RP handling the aircraft and the decision to stop occurs above 80kts, the LP will
automatically take control. The take-off should be abandoned.
Upon reaching V1, the Captain will remove his hand from the thrust levers and, at VR, PF will
initiate a smooth rotation to a pitch attitude of 14°. This pitch attitude should be achieved in
approximately four seconds. With a heavy aircraft care must be taken to avoid
over-rotation to a higher pitch attitude, which could result in a tail-strike and,
particularly under hot weather conditions, care should be taken against early rotation.
Appropriate corrections should be applied for any existing crosswind.
With a positive rate of climb indicated, the PM should call “Positive climb”. The PF should
then request the “gear up”. PM should select the gear lever to the UP position call “gear
selected up”, and then “Gear is up” once the gear indicates UP on the EICAS.
NOTE: No more than 15º of bank should be used at speeds below Vfs (1/2 bank mode).
The PF should maintain 14° of pitch and allow the aircraft to accelerate to V2 + 15 kts. The
PM should monitor aircraft performance and upon reaching the acceleration altitude, call,
“Acceleration Altitude, XXX kts” (where XXX is the value of V2+15), upon which the PF calls
“CLIMB SEQUENCE”. PM should verify the speed and select Flaps to 0, press the CLB
thrust button on the Thrust Rating Panel, select Speed Mode and set 210 kts” and confirm,
“Flaps 0, Climb Thrust, Speed 210kts”.
The following Air Peace Limited noise abatement take-off Procedure meets the requirements
for noise abatement and should be used for all take-offs where a generic vertical noise
abatement procedure is promulgated by the airport operator. Where only a noise abatement
routing is promulgated, a noise abatement take-off is not required. If as a result of a noise
abatement routing or procedure, a safety conflict arises, safety must take priority over any
noise abatement requirements.
Flap 18° is only used when performance will not allow the use of Flap 9°. Flap 18°
performance pages must be available for the intended take-off runway. The V1 speed is
obtained from the performance pages and not the data card. There are no handling
characteristics specific to Flap 18 but the following procedure must be used:
NOTE: The aircraft will accelerate quickly through the speed calls above when on two
engines but Flaps must not be selected from Flap 18° to 0° in one go. This is to ensure
commonality with engine out procedures.
Use T/O 1 thrust only
At VR rotate to 13
At AA PM calls Acceleration Altitude, XXXkts (V2+10)
PF calls for Flap 9°
PM calls XXX kts (V2+30)
PF calls for Flap 0°
It may be necessary to reduce the pitch angle to 10 after passing AA when hot and/or high
to accelerate the aircraft.
Rudder steering is highly effective and the use of asymmetric thrust on take-off is not to be
used. Even in limiting crosswinds, tiller steering is not required and should be avoided unless
absolutely necessary. Into-wind aileron must be applied to stop the wing lifting during the
take-off roll.
Into-wind aileron should be applied during every crosswind take-off. Rotation must be
positive, smooth and accurately stopped at 14º to prevent over-rotation.
PF should normally call for the After Take-off checklist once the aircraft is clean
configured and standard (1013mb) has been set.
Th
NOTE: The brakes should not be applied prior to gear retraction. e
Aft
er Take-off Checks must also be completed following a go around.
LA N D I N G GE A R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UP PM
Confirm the Landing Gear Selector is in the UP position and the EICAS shows 3 white
Gear UP indicators. PM may also select the Taxi and Nose gear lights OFF.
Gauges.
Thrust Levers need to be in the Detent before the mode will be accepted.
NOTE: Whilst this check is carried out automatically by the PM, they must advise PF of
their actions. Generally, expect the Cabin Differential to increase to approximately 4
PSI prior to climbing at approximately 400 FPM. Following a take off with the Pack
Valves closed or following a go-around, the Cabin Rate of Climb indicator may initially
show a descent to achieve this schedule
ALTIMETERS ..........................................................................................SET/CHKD P
Altimeter check in accordance with Part A, ‘Altimeter setting and checking procedures’.
Confirm both main Altimeters are set to Standard (1013) mbs. To select 1013mbs press the
STD button on the bottom of the PFD.
EXTERNAL LIGHTS…………..…………………………………………….OFF……………..PM
LP should ensure all landing and taxy light switches are selected to the OFF position when
passing 10,000ft AAL.
The Fasten Belt switch should be set to the OFF position when passing 10,000ft if
conditions permit.
2.2.6.7 Turn
Bank angles, during turns, must be limited to 300 or that demanded by the flight director. Only
in an emergency, or for avoiding action, will this bank angle be exceeded. Pilots should be
particularly alert to the danger of over-banking.
Autoflight
Flight Director (FD) and Autopilot (AP) selections are made through the Flight Guidance
Controller (FGC). During the Turnaround/Turnaround checks, both Flight Directors are
selected ON by pressing the Flight Director Buttons (FD1 and FD2). The Couple Button is
selected to PF’s side, thereby selecting the FGC’s ‘master’ (on-side) ADC, AHRS, SG and
NAV source. This selection is critical when diagnosing malfunctions of the above
equipment as they may be feeding invalid or corrupt data to both Flight Directors that will
be followed by the AP or manual flying PF (see section 3 for procedures).
AP and FD mode ‘requests’ are made by pressing the appropriate Mode Button on the
FGC, confirmation of engagement being made by reference to the mode annunciations
on the FMA at the top of the PFD. Blue bugs are displayed on the Compass, Altitude
tape and either IAS tape or VSI (but not at the same time). Selecting the associated FD
Mode will latch the FD Command Bars to the bug and command attitude changes to
achieve and maintain the selected parameter. When the bugs are not latched to their
Modes, they are used as visual references for monitoring purposes and the relevant
parameters are referred to as ‘targets’. Their adjustment does not alter the FD
commands (e.g. IAS bug adjustment has no effect when in Altitude Hold and is therefore
referred to as the Target Speed Bug. However, selecting Speed Mode will then latch the
FD Pitch Command Bar to the IAS Bug and adjusting the bug will cause pitch command
changes).
Both the LP and RP FD Command Bars present the same information and cannot be
programmed independently.
However, on aircraft equipped with Honeywell FMS, PM’s Command Bars are removed
when LNAV Mode is engaged. Cycling the Couple Button twice will cancel all FD modes,
removing the Command Bars when in manual flight and leaving the FGC coupled to the
PF’s side. If the AP is engaged, the FD bars will remain displayed in Basic Pitch and Roll
Modes. AP/YD disconnection is achieved through the Disconnect Button on the Control
Columns and not the FGC AP/YD buttons. The TCS button temporarily de-clutches the AP
pitch and roll channels and allows the Pilot to manoeuvre the aircraft manually. However,
whilst the TCS button is pressed the Pitch Trim Switch on the control column cannot be used
and it is possible for the airspeed to be changed sufficiently to stall the Horizontal Stabiliser
Actuator when the TCS Button is released. For this reason the use of the TCS button is
prohibited.
PF should announce the engagement of the Autopilot anytime that it is engaged and
subsequently read off the FMA. PF should make all FGC selections when the autopilot is
engaged. However, the selection of HDG Mode on a go around and the setting of the speed
bug to VFS on approach should be actioned by PM to reduce PF workload. Any time an FGC
Mode or target bug is changed, PF must announce the new setting to PM. PM must
ensure that the monitoring of the FGC change takes priority over other
tasks such as checklists or the Airplane.
Manual Flight
When the Autopilot is not engaged, PF should request PM to make all FGC selections. The
FD should be programmed correctly and its commands must be followed unless making a
visual approach when the FD Modes may be cancelled. The Commands are sensitive to
rates of change as well as angles of pitch and roll and must be followed smoothly and
accurately, maintaining the magenta FD Command Bars centred in the yellow box of the
EADI’s aircraft symbol. At no time should the aircraft attitude be deliberately flown away from
the FD commands unless the commands are known or suspected to be incorrect. To ensure
FD faults or program errors are detected early, the aircraft attitude should always be
monitored by ‘looking through’ the Flight Director.
When flying manually the Yaw Damper must not be used during departure or
arrival/approach phases. The Yaw Damper may be used during the cruise if conditions (e.g.
turbulence) are encountered/expected that are likely to cause excessive Dutch Roll.
The following information is for general guidance in use of the Flight Guidance system.
Take-off:
Take-off Submode should be selected by pressing either Thrust Lever Go Around
Button. This will select 14 degrees (flap 9) or 13 degrees (flap 18) on the FD Pitch
Command Bar and Basic Heading Hold Submode (ROL). Heading Mode should then be
selected unless departing on an RNAV SID with conventional navigation backup below
MSA, when NAV (LNAV displayed on the PFD) may be selected. In all cases the
Heading Bug should be selected to the Runway QDM or Performance Turn +/- the wind
correction so that the net take-off flight path (NTOFP) is tracked after the aircraft gets
airborne. Half the crosswind component is a good guide.
Climb:
After flap retraction on take-off, Speed Mode 210 kts should be used until above MSA and
turbulent conditions. 210kts will provide a good climb rate, a 20kt margin above Flap 0
Manoeuvre Speed and is minimum speed in icing conditions. For these reasons, 210 kts
can also be used at other phases of flight when an expedited climb is required. When
above the MSA and turbulence FLC Mode should be selected which will provide a
continues climb and smooth acceleration to 240 KIAS. FLC Mode then follows a
pre-programmed climb SPEED schedule, holding an IAS target speed up to FL175 where it
automatically changes to a Mach hold target of 0.56 up to FL370. In Mach hold the IAS will
decay in the climb into colder air, intermediate level-off the aircraft may be allowed to
accelerate to VMO/MMO –10kts provided consideration is given to the increased fuel burn
above AirPlan. Entry into a subsequent climb should be made by selecting the new
assigned level in the ASEL, then:
If within 10kts of the FLC schedule, select FLC and increase thrust gently to the
Climb Thrust detent. Confirm “FL/xxxx’ set and armed” as soon as the ASEL
automatically arms.
If more than 10 kts above the FLC schedule, select Speed Mode (IAS or Mach hold
as appropriate) and gently set the Thrust Levers to the detent. Confirm “FL/xxxx’ set
and armed” as soon as the ASEL automatically arms. ‘Trickle' the selected speed in
10/M 0.01 maximum increments back to the FLC schedule, then select FLC mode.
If more than 10 kts above the FLC schedule VS mode may be used to initiate the
transition into the climb with the intention of returning to the FLC schedule at which
point FLC mode should be selected. Confirm “FL/xxxx’ set and armed” as soon as the
ASEL automatically arms and select Thrust as required. Be aware that an over speed
condition may be possible with certain combinations of VS and Thrust.
Sensible use of vertical speed mode (V/S) for prolonged periods of climb are permitted
during phases of flight experiencing turbulence, or excessive climb rates that may result in a
high Cabin Differential Pressure. However, the use of V/S is not speed protected and may
result in a stall condition. Therefore, it is imperative that the use of vertical speed mode is
highlighted to the other crew member and distractions are kept to a minimum during its use.
A NOT below speed of 210 kts MUST be observed while climbing in V/S mode. Crew should
consider reverting back to FLC or Speed mode in the event of a malfunction which may
subsequently distract and reduce crew monitoring of IAS while in V/S mode.
NOTE: With a heavy aircraft and in temperatures above ISA, a climb of 500'/min at
210 kts may not be achievable. In this circumstance, a stepped climb may be
required and ATC advised.
CAUTION: Do not use VS mode in the climb below IAS 210 kts / Mach 0.56
(whichever is the lower).
NOTE: A Speed hold mode (FLC, IAS hold or Mach hold) must be engaged during climb
prior to commencing and during any abnormal drills or for any other reason that may
cause distraction from monitoring the aircraft flight path e.g. weather avoidance or
complex navigation changes.
Automatic overspeed and underspeed protection is available when FLCIAS hold, Mach
hold and VS modes are engaged. These protections are NOT available in Pitch
Mode.
Overspeed Protection:
If the 10-second IAS trend vector reaches or exceeds VMO/MMO the Overspeed
Protection will ignore the selected mode and raise the Flight Director Pitch Command Bar
to reduce airspeed and MAX SPD in amber will be presented on the PFD. If the Autopilot is
engaged it will follow the FD Command Bars. In extreme cases this may result in a
climb, with the potential for a Level Bust.
Underspeed Protection:
Should the IAS decay to 1.13 VS (top of the IAS amber band) the Underspeed Protection
will ignore the selected mode and lower the Flight Director Pitch Command Bar to prevent
further IAS decay and MIN SPD in amber will be presented on the PFD. If the Autopilot is
engaged it will follow the Command Bars but will automatically
disengage if the Stick Shaker activates.
Descent:
Entry into a descent should be made by selecting the new assigned level in Altitude
Preselect Mode (ASEL), then:
Above FL120:
Select FLC Mode and gently reduce thrust to approximately 70% N1. Confirm
“FL/xxxx’ set and armed” as soon as the ASEL automatically arms at commencement
of the descent. Modulate the thrust to control the speed to a maximum of VMO/MMO –
20 above FL100. FLC Mode will command a 2000 FPM ROD above FL120.
Should a higher rate of descent be required VS mode may be used to select the
desired rate followed by a reduction of thrust to idle and the Speed Brake opened if
required. A maximum of 3000 FPM can be expected. VS Mode may also be used for a
shallower descent angle.
NOTE: Selecting Speed Mode above FL250 will engage Mach Hold Mode and the IAS
will increase as the aircraft descends into warmer air.
Passing FL120:
Confirm FLC Mode is selected and reduce thrust to idle. FLC Mode will
reduce the target VS from 2000 FPM to 1000 FPM by FL100 and the
IAS will decrease to 240 kts at which point Speed Mode 240 kts should
be selected.
NOTE: For descents from a high-speed cruise at FL100 or FL110 the IAS should be
reduced to 240kts before commencement of the descent.
Below FL 100:
Select Speed Mode (maximum 240kts) and gently reduce thrust to achieve
the desired rate of descent. Confirm “FL/xxxx’ set and armed” as soon as the
ASEL automatically arms at commencement of the descent.
Should a higher rate of descent be required the Thrust Levers may be
reduced to idle and the Speed Brake opened. A maximum of 2000 FPM can
be expected.
Should the IAS need to be reduced whilst descending (e.g. in the approach
area) select FLC Mode (preset 1000 FPM) or VS Mode adjusted to the
required ROD and Thrust Levers and Speed Brake used appropriately.
When the desired speed is reached IAS Mode should be re-engaged. In IAS
Mode the Target Speed may be adjusted at any time in increments of 10kts
or less.
NOTE: For normal descents the Gear must not be selected down when in Speed
Mode as this will generate an excessive descent rate that may reach 6000 FPM.
When icing conditions are encountered the FADEC will schedule an increase in the Idle N1 to
achieve sufficient bleed air pressure for Airframe and Engine Anti-icing. This will reduce the
ROD in IAS Mode or cause an acceleration/lack of deceleration in FLC or VS Modes. Opening
the Speed Brake will usually compensate for this effect but the IAS should be monitored
carefully and the ROD reduced to prevent an overspeed condition if required.
The minimum descent rate expected by ATC is 500 fpm. If at any time the descent rate
becomes less than 500fpm pitch/thrust/speed brake should be adjusted or ATC informed.
Descent rate should be limited to a maximum 1000fpm when within 1000ft of a cleared level.
If in IAS Mode, increase thrust to reduce the ROD. If in VS Mode, adjust to 1000fpm or less
before the ‘Pre-level/Pre-Altitude’ call. The Target Speed should not be re-set to the intended
speed until in ALT HOLD. If the ASEL is inadvertently disarmed close to the Target Altitude or
the ASEL is not captured as expected, pressing ALT HOLD immediately will latch the Flight
Director to the current altitude and command a level-off.
Caution: No changes to the FGC vertical modes or other actions that may
cause distraction from monitoring the level-off are to be made within 1000’of
the selected level. Regular checks of the FMA should be made to ensure
compliance with the cleared Level or Altitude.
NOTE: The FD will not capture a Glideslope before the Localiser has captured. Prior to
capturing a Glideslope from a constant descent a gross error check (height x3 = range
to touchdown) must be made to ensure that a false glide is not captured. In the event
the Glideslope is not captured as intended the Approach Mode must be de-selected to
prevent the FD capturing a false Glideslope as the aircraft flies over the antenna.
Go Around:
Under normal GA conditions, this point occurs at low weight, T/O1 thrust, Flaps 9
with the aircraft speed in excess of 170 kias and therefore, crews are to expect
the commanded speed to be 170 kias with a resultant excessive climb, often
close to ASEL. Therefore, this engagement of Speed Mode must be observed and
announced.
As soon as the Speed Mode Capture is observed the Speed Bug should be increased to
200kts unless a high gradient is required or climb gradient is compromised.
NOTE 1: If the Go-Around Mode is activated after a non-precision approach, then the
IAS Speed Bug will be set to the speed at the time of the initiation of the Go-Around.
NOTE 2: If at any time in the Go Around Mode the IAS decreases to 1.23 Vs (top of the
white LSA band /VREF 45) the Speed Mode will automatically capture 1.23 Vs to prevent
an underspeed.
Heading Mode:
When required, pressing the HDG SYNCH button will align both HDG Bugs to the current
heading and this feature should be used throughout an approach so that the Bug remains
correctly aligned for any subsequent go around. The Heading Bug can be selected more than
180 degrees (i.e. past the tail) and the FD will command a turn in the direction the bug was
moved. This feature may be used to perform an orbit. Selecting Low Bank Mode will display a
15-degree bank arc on the PFD. This feature must not be used in the approach or departure
area where procedures and ATC expect rate 1 turns or minimum 25 degrees bank angle.
Low Bank Mode must be used for all turns below VFS.
NAV Mode:
NAV Mode can be used to capture and track the ‘on-side’ navigation source determined by the
Couple Arrow. This may be the on-side VOR or Localiser (green CDI)(CDI=Course Deviation
Indicator), opposite side VOR or Localiser (yellow CDI selected by pressing the Display
Controller NAV button twice) or FMS (magenta CDI). NAV is presented on the PFD for VOR
and LOC sources, LNAV for FMS. Heading Mode is usually used to position the aircraft within
the capture zone of the selected course at which point the Heading Mode is dropped and the
NAV Mode changes from Armed (white) to Captured (green) and the FD will command a turn
to track the CDI. This NAV Mode capture must be confirmed by PF. The CDI can be
cantered when selected to a VOR by pressing the CDI Synch button allowing the current VOR
radial to be captured immediately.
The DTO feature of the FMS will perform a similar function when FMS is selected
as the navigation source.
Provided the FMS is serviceable and its position information is not degraded, PF is to
select FMS as the Navigation Source to his CDI for departure (magenta display). MFD
ranges should be adjusted so that displacement from the SID track can be easily
recognised (5-10 nm). Should there be no FMS selectable or published SID (SOU, BRS),
PF may depart with basic NAV data displayed (green display).
FMS must be used for navigation above FL 95. On aircraft fitted with dual FMS, FMS may
be displayed on both PFDs as long as both FMS units are identically matched, permitting
PM to monitor PF’s navigation. Radar headings must be selected on the Heading Bug with
HDG MODE engaged and not selected through the FMS. On aircraft fitted with the
Honeywell FMS, abeam waypoints should be entered when given direct routings to enable
timing and fuel checks to be carried out.
PF is responsible for navigation entries and revisions to the FMS. If the revision affects the
active waypoint, the new entry must be confirmed by PM before insertion, as the aircraft
will change course immediately on activation. PF's MFD must be selected to a range that
displays the active waypoint. PM may use all available Navaids (i.e. NAV 1 & 2 and ADFs,
if not being used by PF) to monitor the progress of the flight, keeping PF informed of all
selections. When using Green Screen his Course Bar should be selected to the Navaid
that the aircraft is tracking to/from. When proceeding towards an FMS/RNAV fix the PM’s
CDI is to be selected to the track being flown with appropriate RMI needles selected to
relevant Navaids. NAV is to be selected on at least one MFD sub-menu to display Navaids
on the MFD.
PF should set up the ARRIVAL procedure and descent profile as required, confirming with
PM the settings.
Before activation, both Pilots must confirm all Holding data. On leaving a hold the Exit
feature must be selected.
Each FMS must be programmed independently by the LP and RP, and subsequent
navigational data cross checked.
X-fill may be used provided the X-filled information is checked independently from the pilot
who entered the data.
An Altimeters and Pressurisation check should be made every 10,000 feet climbing and
descending through FL100, 200 and 300. (Part A, ‘Altimeter Setting and Checking’)
Passing FL 100 in the descent, PM calls “Altimeters, Check speed”. Pilot flying must
ensure that speed is below 250kts prior to encountering the Vmo speed tape and
subsequent “High Speed” warning.
FL100, Cabin Alt 400, Cabin Dif 4.4, Rate of Climb 400
FL200, Cabin Alt 2400, Cabin Dif 6.7, Rate of Climb 400
FL300, Cabin Alt 5400, Cabin Dif 7.7, Rate of Climb 400
To prolong its serviceable life, the Windshield heating system should remain OFF
(released, bar illuminated) unless required for de-misting or de-icing.
When above FL100, PM should use the FMS to record the airborne time
onto the AirPlan and complete the paperwork in accordance with OM Part A.
THRUST SETTING……………………………………………CRUISE PM
After level-off at TOC, the thrust levers can remain in THRUST SET detent or reduced to a
lower thrust setting as desired and the IAS target speed set to a maximum of MMO – 0.02
M (if indicated Mach on Target Speed) or VMO – 10kts (if indicated IAS on Speed Tape).
Do not exceed 790ºC ITT. Select Cruise Thrust (CRZ) when above 0.6 Mach.
PM should carry out a Gross Fuel Check at the next convenient waypoint (plus at
hourly intervals thereafter). Make a passenger PA, to include time of arrival,
expected delays and the destination weather.
Contact destination Ops – passing ETA and aircraft serviceability. Note that
any aircraft defects should be passed using the MEL reference codes only.
Obtain appropriate destination and alternate weather. Set arrival Navaids and
crosscheck the FMS arrival.
PF should periodically check the MFD systems pages and EICAS indications.
Brief an approach, set Navaids and the FMS. Crosscheck landing speeds. Cross
check performance and set the landing speeds.
Both pilots should set TCAS to NORMAL/BELOW as required.
Both pilots should select their TCAS to BELOW and PF shall ask for the Descent
Checks.
2.2.7.1.2 DESCENT
APPROACH BRIEFING...................................................COMPLETE PF
Confirm that the approach brief has been completed using the Briefing Aide
Memoire in the following manner:
Type of approach. Runway in use. Approach Plate. Confirm the minima? Safety
Altitude. Terrain. RVA procedures.
Discuss the type and detail of the approach to be flown, including autopilot usage,
mentioning approach check points, altitudes/heights and the speeds and configuration
to be flown.
Discuss MAP/Div or Holding plan (if applicable). Aids to be set. Runway exit/Ground
brief (if required, e.g. Low Visibility). Crew actions in the event of a go around (In the
event of a missed approach I will call “Go-around”. Your response is “Go-around. Flap
9.” I will select Flap 9 and call “Flap 9”. When established in a climb I will call “Positive
climb”. You will call “Gear Up, Heading Mode”. I will raise the gear and select HDG on
the FGC). Any questions?”
1) Check/update the landing weight. Using data from the Speed Booklet
(rounding the landing weight up to the nearest 500 kgs). AA should be
calculated as airfield elevation plus 1000ft and corrected for surface
temperatures below zero.
CAT I
V1 = VFS
VR = VREF for flap 22º or 45º
V2 = V2+15
VAP = VREF + wind correction (min 5kts)
The main AP (IAS) speed bug should be set to the required target speed
during the intermediate approach.
NOTE: In gusty conditions, VAP may be increased by 1/2 the head wind plus the full
gust factor up to a maximum of 10 kts (Vapp bug should be adjusted). VREF must not
be adjusted in gusty conditions.
The V2 speed should remain unboxed. V2+15 will be set in the box above the airspeed
tape on the PFD using the airspeed setting knob on the FGC during the approach.
PRESSURISATION PANEL.............................................................................SET………. PM
Check that the Destination Airfield Elevation (rounded up to the nearest 100’) is
set in the Pressurisation Controller. Monitor the cabin rate of descent.
2.2.7.3 Descending
The descent should be planned using estimated track miles to touchdown, not
DME range.
The standard descent profile equates to a 3° descent slope. To calculate a descent point,
divide the aircraft’s altitude by three, i.e.: FL 330 = 110 nm. To correct for head or tail winds
add or subtract 2.5 nm per 10 kts of If ATC requires an early descent then the profile should
be adjusted as required, bearing in mind the lower fuel burn and better TAS when flying at
high altitude. If a high rate of descent is flown for a prolonged period of time, ensure the
aircraft does not catch up with the cabin altitude.
During descent and approach, a continuous assessment of aircraft altitude and position, in
relation to terrain clearance and track miles to touchdown, must be made with the aim of
achieving a 3 degree descent path. If any crewmember assesses that the aircraft descent
profile is inappropriate, this must be announced and appropriate action taken by PF.
An unnecessarily early descent should be avoided, as it will reduce TAS, increase fuel burn,
increase the likelihood of EGPWS warnings, and possibly lengthen the time spent in
turbulence and icing.
Should ATC issue a clearance such as ‘Descend when ready to FL XXX’, FL XXX should be
set in the ASEL window when the clearance is received. Descent should be commenced as
required to achieve the desired profiles.
The most efficient operation, in terms of fuel usage, is to operate the aircraft clean for as long
as possible. Thus following normal profiles, flap should only be selected to 9 degrees when
the aircraft’s IAS is decreasing through 200kts with the intention of achieving 180kts/flap 9
configuration. If a little more anticipation is allowed for it is possible to select the thrust to
flight idle earlier to give the IAS decrease and thus fuel usage is decreased. The aim should
be to limit the amount of high thrust settings at low altitude.
Flap only needs to be selected to a greater setting than 9 degrees when it is intended to
operate the aircraft below 160kts. Therefore, if the aircraft is level and ATC require 160kts to
be maintained the most efficient configuration to operate the aircraft in (allowing for flap
manoeuvre speeds) is Gear Up, Flap 9. If a speed below 160kts is required then the flap
must be extended further.
On occasions, ATC will require a quick reduction in speed or a higher rate of descent than is
being achieved. In this instance the speedbrake should be used. Only if this does not give the
required ROD or IAS decrease (e.g. in icing) should the flap be deployed outside the above
guidelines.
LANDING LIGHTS…………………………………………………ON PM
When passing FL100 the Landing/Logo lights should be selected ON. In low visibility
conditions the Landing Lights may remain OFF to prevent glare. The Taxi light may remain
OFF until the clearance to land has been
given by ATC.
CABIN CREW……………………………………………………….ADVISED PM
Cabin Crew stating “10 minutes to landing”. Once the cabin is secure, the Cabin Crew will give
the “cabin secure for landing” check via the interphone. The seatbelt sign should be cycled
OFF and ON by the PM, to advise the cabin crew that final approach has commenced”.
When the QNH is set, both pilots must cross check their respective Altimeter and the
Standby Altimeter in accordance with Part A, ‘Altimeter setting Procedures’. The Approach
Checks should be accomplished as soon as convenient, once the aircraft has been cleared
to an altitude and QNH is set.
Confirm that airfield QNH is set on all altimeters and cross checked.
A visual approach should be flown with a standard traffic pattern, or as directed by ATC.
Traffic pattern entry should be made at not less than 1,500 feet AGL at a maximum airspeed
of 200 knots. Once established on downwind, flaps should be selected to 9 and the aircraft
slowed to 180 knots (60% N1).
Thrust off approaches should be avoided when past the outer marker or equivalent position
(where there is no equivalent position 1000ft AAL may be substituted). At no time should the
aircraft be deliberately side-slipped.
Gear and flap 22 must have been selected and indicating by no later than the outer marker or
equivalent position (where there is no equivalent position 1000ft AAL may be substituted).
PM should look to make a “stabilised” call at both the 1000’ and 500’ gates. Any deviation at
1000’ should be highlighted to PF e.g. “1000’ check speed”. A deviation at 500’ radio will
require an immediate go-around.
NOTE: The outer marker criteria may not be appropriate for visual approaches and
on certain circling approaches. Therefore, on visual approaches and circling
approaches the speeds/profiles in this manual are mandatory.
On short final, the aircraft should be approximately in a level pitch attitude. Crossing the
runway threshold at 50 feet AGL and VREF (for a normal approach), the thrust levers should
be smoothly retarded to flight idle in order for the engine thrust to reduce to idle at
touchdown. An increase in pitch of 2 to 30 is required in the flare for landing. If a crosswind
is present, use the crab method for correction on final. As the aircraft is about to touch
down the rudder should be used to point the aircraft down the runway and the aileron used
to keep the wings level.
An approach may not result in a landing in circumstances such as poor approach tracking,
RVR deterioration or under the instruction of ATC which require the approach to be
terminated. This is generally regarded as a typical ‘missed approach’. When the decision is
made to initiate a missed approach, the PM should call “Go-Around”. The PF should
immediately reply “Go Around, Flap 9” and simultaneously press the go-around button. An
autopilot go-around should be the standard procedure.
However, a manually flown go-around shall follow the same calls and clean up technique.
The only difference being, when an auto go-around is flown the aircraft should be seen to be
pitching up before thrust is advanced to the MAX THRUST SET position. If an auto go
around is not flown, the PF should initiate a pitch-up to 100 and the thrust levers should be
advanced to the MAX THRUST SET position.
The PM should select flaps 9 and call, “Flaps 9 selected”. The PM should confirm that
maximum thrust and flaps 9 are indicated on the EICAS and call “Flap 9 set”. As soon as a
positive rate of climb is indicated, the PM should call out, “Positive climb”. The PF should
verify a positive rate of climb on the vertical speed indicator and altimeter tape and call,
“Checked, Gear up, HDG mode”. The PM will select the gear lever to the UP position, call
out “Gear selected up” and select HDG mode on the FGC. When the gear indicates UP on
the EICAS, the PM should call out, “Gear is up”.
Under less common circumstances, it will be necessary for the approach to be terminated
after DA/MDA *. The probability of being unable to complete the landing in this circumstance is
low, once a decision to land has been made. If this decision has to be reversed, the resulting
go-around is in effect a ‘rejected landing’. Pilots should bear in mind that, reverse it, even if
reversal actually becomes advisable. It is therefore harder to initiate a rejected landing than a
missed approach.
In the case of a rejected landing, the effective callout is “Go-Around”, and the actions are as
for a manually flown missed approach.
The Landing Checks should be called for by PF once Landing Flap has been
set and the approach has been stabilised.
2.2.9.4 LANDING
FLAPS……………………………………………………………………___SET................... PF
Confirm the required Landing Flap setting is indicated on the EICAS.
CABIN/CREW..........................................................................................SECURED/ADVISED P
Confirm that the ‘Cabin Secure for Landing’ report has been received.
LANDING CLEARANCE……………………………………………..RECEIVED PM
Deviation calls
Callout By
Callout indicates
“Speed High” PM Actual deviation from desired final approach
and Vref speed when exceeded by 10 kts, or
from other required speed exceeded by 10 kts.
(e.g. ATC restriction).
Approach calls
APPROACH PHASE PF PM
On touchdown, with the thrust levers at idle, the ground spoilers will automatically open and
the nose may drop briskly. This should be cushioned with aft Control Column input. After the
nose wheel has touched down, the Control Column should be gently moved fully forward and
toe brakes smoothly applied to reduce speed for the runway turnoff. The PM should confirm
on the EICAS that the Spoilers have opened and call “spoilers open”. PM shall then call 80kts
and 60kts as the aircraft slows. At 60kts (higher if required), the LP shall assume control
following a right seat landing [“I have control”]. Directional control should be maintained with
Rudder Fine Steering, only transitioning to Tiller steering once below 40kts. The LP should
then call “engage Gust-lock”.
The After Landing Checks should only be actioned when clear of the runway, and at the
request of the LP after consideration of the impacts of any icing conditions on flap retraction,
i.e.'once vacated, Flap zero, arm APU and the after landing checks'.
Reverse Thrust
NOTE: It is Company policy not to use reverse thrust nor reverse idle on the landing
roll, except when operationally necessary, or in an emergency. Some EMB 145 are
not fitted with reverse thrust.
When fitted, use of reverse thrust should be briefed. After landing, with the thrust levers at
idle and the nose wheel touched down, PF shall initially select idle reverse by lifting the
Reverse Lock Levers and moving the Thrust Levers to the Idle Reverse position. Followed
the “Spoilers Open” call, PM shall announce “Reverse two green” when green Reverse
indications are noted on the EICAS display. Reverse Thrust other than idle reverse shall only
be selected once two green reverse indications have been confirmed.
Reversers should be set to idle reverse by 60 kts, and must be closed by 40 kts. During a
RTO the thrust reverser can be used until the aircraft comes to a complete stop.
After Landing:
To start the APU, select the APU Start Master to START for 3 seconds and then select RUN
and monitor the RPM and EGT until the indications are presented green and stable. Guard
the Stop Button and press if abnormal indications are presented. Start a stopwatch once the
indications are stable.
TRIM SETTING..................................................................................................0/0/GREEN RP
Set the Aileron and Rudder Trims to neutral.
Set the Stabiliser Trim to 7. This reference will be visually checked during the
external checks.
TRANSPONDER .................................................................................STANDBY RP
Select the Transponder to ATC ON pressing the line select button adjacent to the
Transponder Mode and rotating the frequency select knob.
FLAPS ............................................................................................... 0 RP
Select and confirm that Flaps indicate 0º on the EICAS (unless flap leading edge icing is
suspected when flaps should be retracted to 22 , prior to inspection on stand).
Single Engine Taxy has numerous benefits, namely fuel saving; less brake wear, and
assisting brake cool down times during turnarounds. The benefits will be particularly
pronounced when operating into large airports with long taxi routings.
The procedure will be used only for taxi to Stand after landing, and NOT before take off.
SET must only be used at the discretion of the operating Captain when he/she is satisfied
that it’s appropriate and conditions permit its use. The procedure itself is fairly simple to
accomplish via the RP completing a ‘read-and-do’ checklist.
SET PROCEDURE:
On vacating the runway, RP checks that right engine is at ground idle and starts his
stopwatch. When RP reports “After Landing Checklist Complete” LP requests the SET
Checklist if required. RP checks that one minute has expired since idle thrust then carries out
the SET Checklist. The following items will be incorporated into the checklist:
AFTER LANDING:
Right engine......................................................................IDLE THRUST FOR 1 MINUTE
Shed bus............................................................................OVRD
Right Hydraulic Pump..................................................... AUTO
Right Pack/bleed...............................................................OFF
Right Engine.................................................................... SHUTDOWN
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
If the operating engine fails during SET, the procedure below shall be
followed:
Park Brake............................................................................ ON
Hydraulic Pumps............................................................. OFF
Electrical Load.....................................................................REDUCE
APU........................................................................................ START
No 2 Engine.......................................................................... START
The APU can be used to start the remaining engine to taxi to stand.
Note: Under certain circumstances, shutting an engine down can produce a spurious
over-current leading to loss of electrical loads. The engine should not be shut down
just before or during a turn as steering may be lost. Engine shut-down and APU start
should not be carried out within one minute of each other.
There is no requirement to have the APU running whilst carrying out SET.
Before subsequent engine starting the normal Turnaround, Below the Line and Before
Start Checklists must be carried out.
Crews should endeavour to use these procedures wherever possible; however, the
overriding theme is that it should be used entirely at the Captain’s discretion.
2.2.11 SHUTDOWN
2.2.11.1 Shutdown Duties
The LP should complete the shutdown checks from memory before completing the Shutdown
Checklist. Headsets must be worn until it has been confirmed that both engines have shut
down. Both pilots should independently calculate the hours flown and no. of landings, as a
means of cross-checking, prior to making an entry in the Tech Log.
Shut Down:
PARK BRAKE......................................................................................................................... ON LP
To engage the Park Brake, apply full Main Brake Pedal travel and then pull the Park Brake
up and rotate to lock in the on position. Confirm the BRAKE ON light is illuminated.
RED BEACON..........................................................................................................OFF LP
Selecting the Beacon OFF indicates that it is safe for the Ground Crew to
approach the Aircraft.
Selecting the Seatbelt Signs OFF signals the Cabin Crew to open the Main
Door.
The Secure Checks must be fully completed by both Pilots as challenge and response
unless the Aircraft is being handed directly over to another Crew or an Engineer.
Secure:
Select the GPU to OFF by releasing the GPU button. The Ground Services Bus will remain
energised if the GPU AVAIL light is still illuminated in the button thereby retaining cabin
lighting.
The Post Flight Inspection is primarily a visual inspection to ensure that the overall condition
of the aircraft is acceptable for the following flight. Particular attention should be given to fluid
leaks, tyre condition and servicing panels. If anything is untoward, the Captain should inform
LMC immediately and consider recording any findings in the Technical Log.
A few minutes to complete a Post Flight Inspection will help to highlight any external defects,
allowing more time for rectification and reduce the risk of significant delays to our colleagues
and passengers.
Following the last flight of the day (when away from a base with Engineering cover)
ensure pitot heads are cool and then fit the 3 pitot covers.
1. Prior to a Performance Take-off, (T/O weight is within 500kgs of RTOW) maximum turn inputs are required to align the aircraft to prevent exceeding
the Alignment Allowance (Could be as low as 17 metres). Do not roll forward to a displaced landing threshold. Take-off thrust must be set prior to
brake release.
2. To ensure the runway centreline is tracked after T/0, the Heading Bug should be set into-wind (approx 1/2 x-wind component, max 10°).
3. To prevent Low N1 indications, the Thrust Levers should be smoothly and continuously advanced to the Detent in 3-4 seconds.
4. Into-wind aileron should be applied during crosswind take-offs and maintained during rotation.
5. PNF must monitor the EICAS and IAS throughout the takeoff.
6. Rotation should be smooth and accurate using visual and instrument references, achieving 14° in 4 seconds to prevent over-rotation.
At AA (AFE * 1000’):
PM *Acceleration XXXkts
PF CALLS for “CLIMB SEQUENCE”
PM Selects flap to 0
Selects climb “CLB”from the thrust rating panel
Selects speed “SPD”on the F9C and sets 210kts
When the actual take-off weight exceeds the flap 9° RTOW but not the Flap 18° RTOW
Roth Pilots have checked the Vi from the RTOW table
When T/O 1 thrust mode is used
Notes:
1. Unstick forces are greater. Once rotation commenced, pitch loads are lighter and care is required to
prevent over-rotation.
2. Flap 18° is not authorised for any flight phase other than take-off. Caution will prevent the inadvertent
selection of Flap 18° in the approach area.
3. V R and V2 take-off speeds are extracted from the yellow Flap 18° column on the TIC 1 side of the
glareshield data card.
Above V2 + 30 kts:
At AA: PNF Calls "XXXkts"
PNF calls "Acceleration, XXXkts PF Calls "Flaps 0°"
Climb Thrust
Speed Mode, 200 kts
Above V2 + 10 kts:
PF calls "Flaps 9°"
1 3°
The Autopilot (AP) can be used to a Minimum Use Height (MUH) of 160 ft AGL. HDG and VS
mode coupled to the AP during a GCA e.g. Precision Approach Radar (PAR) can also be
used down to the MUH. If visibility is restrictive (less than 1500m) during approach,
maintained use of the AP down to the MUH will allow the PF time to gain all visible clues for a
safe landing, and restrict any tendency to go high when the AP is disconnected.
The following procedure is based on the use of the Auto Flight Control System (AFCS) during
an ILS approach:
Both pilots should have the appropriate localiser frequency active on RMU NAV 1 & 2, and
the inbound radial displayed on the PFD. The AFCS NAV and/or HDG mode should be
selected to establish on the LOC. When cleared to descend with the glide path (GP), APPR
may be selected. Intercept the LOC before intercepting the GP. The AFCS should not
capture the G/S before the LOC is capture.
The aircraft configuration and speeds for a precision approach using the ILS is applicable for
CAT I approaches. It is recommended to use the FD and AP.
When starting the inbound turn on a full procedural approach or when on an intercept
heading during a vectored approach, slow to 200 kts.
“Localiser Capture”
“Checked”
“Speed checked, gear
DOWN” “Speed checked, gear selected
down”
“Gear is down”
After GS capture PM sets go-around altitude
on the altitude pre-selector.
“Speed checked, flap 22, (landing
checks” if conducting a flap 22 landing) “Speed checked, flap 22 selected, Flap 22
set” Complete checklist if applicable
“Glideslope Capture”
“Checked”
“Speed checked, flap 45, landing checks”
“Speed checked, flap 45 selected, Flap 45
set” Complete checklist
e.g. “4 DME check”
e.g. “1300 feet” Actual passing altitude.
“checked” Refer to approach chart,
discrepancy greater than 50’ must be
highlighted.
“Checked” “1000 feet stabilised”(RadAlt.)
“landing” “decide”
Note: During manual flight, PM should call “localiser active”, “Glideslope active” as
soon as the LOC and G/S begin to move
Energy Management
Plan ahead
Check profile regularly
Reduce speed/increase descent rate using Thrust, Speed Brake, Flap 9, in that order.
Maximum achievable normal descent rate above 10,000’= 3000 fpm (no ice condition, Speed
Brake open).
A non-precision approach can be accomplished with lateral guidance from a LLZ, VOR, NDB
or an SRA controller, and shall be performed as a CDFA (Continuous Descent Final
Approach). ‘Dive and Drive’ techniques are not to be used.
The landing checks should be completed once the final flap has been selected. After passing
the FAF, PM sets the go-around altitude on the Altitude Preselector. Use VS mode for
descent.
CAUTION: ‘ALT HOLD’ will not allow the aircraft to descend in any mode during an
autopilot flown approach, therefore, once level in ALT HOLD, increase the Pre-set
Altitude using the Altitude Pre-selector. This will allow descent in V/S mode.
When leaving the final descent point in the landing configuration, PM must call
the next advisory or mandatory altitude and the next DME fix/time check as
applicable.
When passing “FS” inbound PM Calls “Descent point next, 20 seconds 2190”
The required lateral and vertical profile must be followed by the PM, carefully monitoring
and announcing the prescribed check altitudes against DME distances as required. The
lateral profile must be accurately flown within 5° of the prescribed track to maintain the
required ‘safety lane’ margin. All ‘not below’ altitudes stated on the approach chart MUST
be observed.
If at MDA, the required visual references has not been achieved a go-around must be
initiated.
Note: To establish an MDA, 30 feet must be added to the published figure, to avoid
compromising the required terrain clearance as the aircraft sinks during the Go
Around. This is catered for on a precision approach, and therefore the 30 feet
correction must not be applied.
3 NM to FAF
“Speed checked, flap 22, (landing
checks” if conducting a flap 22 landing) “Speed checked, flap 22 selected,
Flap 22 set” Complete checklist if
applicable
2 NM to FAF
“Speed checked, flap 45, landing
“Speed checked, flap 45 selected,
checks”
Flap 45 set” Complete checklist
0.5 NM prior to FAF commence descent
“Descent point. Next, 4 miles,
1300 feet”
“4 DME check”
“On profile. Next, 3 miles, 1000 feet”
Refer to approach chart, discrepancy
greater then 50’ must be highlighted.
“1000 feet stabilised” (RadAlt)
“3 miles, on profile”
“500 feet stabilised” (Rad Alt)
“100 above” 100 ft above MDA+30
“decide”
“Checked”
e.g. “1300 feet” Actual passing altitude.
“Checked”
“Checked”
“Checked”
“Checked”
“Checked” (Look up)
“landing” (minimum 160 ft agl, disconnect
the autopilot.)
When performing the approach briefing, initially review the visual part of the circling
procedure, the missed approach procedure and the use of navigation aids that can support
the procedure. Circling shall be performed at the highest possible altitude free from clouds
up to 1500 ft AGL. Use maximum 140-160 KIAS during the visual manoeuvre.
The approach to circling altitude follows the same procedures/callouts and use of the AFCS
as for a normal precision/non-precision approach, except that only flaps 22 is used until base
leg. Use ALT mode to level off at circling altitude. When you have visual contact, use HDG
mode to fly a low circuit 45o offset for 45 seconds.
Fly min 140 kts in the circling pattern. When passing abeam the landing threshold start
timing. When 20 seconds has elapsed, commence the base turn. Once on base leg, select
landing flap and complete the Landing Checks.
If visual reference is lost and/or a missed approach is required at any point during the circling
manoeuvre, crew shall turn in the safest direction onto the Missed Approach track prescribed
for the initial instrument approach flown (NOTE: This may require an initial procedure
turn). If below circling minima or MSA crews must establish best rate of climb to the final stop
altitude prescribed in the missed approach procedure and advise ATC of their intentions as
soon as possible.
Circling approaches are high workload, in which PF must control the aircraft flight path whilst
maintaining visual references. PM is to carefully monitor the flight path, and critical settings,
selections and indications such as power, speed and angle of bank.
The DME ARC procedure is an effective way of establishing an aircraft onto the final
approach track without the necessity of tracking to and from the beacon. This procedure can
be used for a non-precision approach or used to position the aircraft for a precision approach.
The procedure is nevertheless a procedural approach. As with all approaches and especially
in the vicinity of terrain, EGPWS should be displayed.
Whilst this procedure is termed a DME ARC procedure both the RMI and the DME are used
to maintain the required track. The required tolerance is a maximum deviation in distance of
+ 1NM of the ARC. Careful crew coordination must be maintained throughout this procedure
to ensure the correct tracking and vertical profile is flown. Once the initial turn has been made
just before the required DME ARC range a combination of small heading changes of
approximately 10 are then made to maintain the required DME distance. Correct speed
control is vital. These procedures must not be rushed.
As soon as the lead radial has been passed the aircraft should be turned onto an intercept
heading and the appropriate FD approach mode armed to capture the required final course.
The intercept heading should be 30- 45 from the required final course. Once established on an
intercept heading, the aircraft should be configured as appropriate for the type of approach
being flown. The criteria for a stabilised approach must be applied.
As a result of flight tests in icing conditions, the aircraft has demonstrated good response and
requires no special procedures. Flights in all conditions required by the certification
authorities were assessed and ice accretion did not present a noticeable change in the
controllability of the aircraft.
Icing conditions may exist whenever the Static Air Temperature (SAT) on the ground, or Total
Air Temperature (TAT) in flight, is 10°C or below and visible moisture in any form is present
(such as clouds, fog with visibility of 1850m or less, rain, snow, sleet and ice crystals). Icing
conditions may also exist when the OAT on the ground and for take-off is 10°C or below and
operating on ramps, taxiways, or runways where surface snow, ice, standing water, or slush
may be ingested by the engine, or freeze on the engines, nacelles, or engine sensor probes.
An icing on RTOW must be calculated and used if icing conditions are anticipated
from take off to 1500 ft AAL (for temperatures between +5 and +10 C only Engine
Ant-Icing ON needs to be considered for CARD calculations). In this circumstance the
REF ANT ICE should be set to ON and the Engine Anti Ice selected On after engine
start.
The airframe ice detection system assists the flight crew with identification of ice
accumulation and automatic operation of the aircraft thermal anti-icing system.
The ice detector requires airflow across the probe to provide a reliable signal, therefore, it is
operative on the ground at speeds above 25 kts. Engine anti-icing may be required below 25
kts. Consequently, the ice detection override should be selected to ENG during all ground
operations when icing conditions exist or are anticipated.
If either or both detectors fail after dispatch, the crew must refer to the QRH procedures to
monitor icing conditions and manually activate the ice protection system whenever
necessary.
When the ICE CONDITION advisory message appears on EICAS as a consequence of the
signal from an ice detector, stall speeds (stick pusher speeds) are slightly increased.
Please note that following an icing encounter, the advisory message ICE/SPS ADVANCED is
presented on the EICAS. This will extinguish only on the ground by pressing the SPS Test
Button, which means that the increase in the stall speeds will prevail for the remainder of the
flight, whether in icing condition or not.
The ice protection panel in its normal configuration during an icing encounter is shown below:
Fig. 11
The ENG position of the Ice Detection Override Knob turns on the engine anti-icing
system either on ground or in flight. Once airborne (or above 25 kts on the ground), if
ice condition is detected, the wing and horizontal stabiliser anti-icing systems will be
turned on automatically. The AUTO position of the Ice Detection Override Knob turns
on the wing, horizontal stabiliser and engine anti-icing systems provided that the
aircraft is airborne (or above 25 kts on the ground) and ice condition is detected.
The ALL position of the Ice Detection Override Knob turns on the wing, horizontal stabiliser
and engine anti-icing systems provided the aircraft is airborne (or above 25 kts on the
ground) either in icing condition or not.
The ALL position must not be used on ground, except during test.
The ENG position must not be used in flight after it has been selected to AUTO in the after
take-off checks. The ALL position must not be used in temperatures below -40 C SAT.
2.4.3 Performance
The EMB145 is NOT cleared for operations from contaminated runways without the
specific approval of the Chief Pilot or his deputy. However in Wintry conditions the
following apply:
Observe fuel and oil limitations before APU starting.Minimum fuel temperature is –40°C.
Minimum oil temperature is –40°C. Minimum number 2 battery temperature to start the APU
is –20°C. Minimum temperature to start APU using external electrical power is –54°C. If
APU cannot be started, apply heat from a ground cart directly into the APU compartment.
Do not allow the hot air from the ground-heating cart to exceed 100°C as it may damage the
components inside the compartment.
Do not start the engine until it has been checked that all ice deposits have been removed
from the air inlet. Embraer recommend that if the OAT is below 5°C, for the first start of the
day both ignition systems should be used by rotating the ignition switch to ON. The ignition
switch must be rotated back to AUTO after start.
Fuel and oil temperature limits are the same as those prescribed for APU start. Monitor oil
pressure and temperature, the maximum oil pressure limit (110-psi) may be exceeded during
starts if oil temperature is below 21°C. In this case, maintain the engine at IDLE until oil
pressure reduces to within the normal range. If the oil pressure does not rise to at least 34 psi
after the engine reaches stabilised idle or engine instruments indicate abnormal conditions,
shutdown the engine immediately.
If the engine does not start, ground heating may be necessary to warm the nacelle, Air
Turbine Starter (ATS) and Starting Control Valve (SCV). Do not allow the hot air from the
ground-heating cart to exceed 100°C, as it may damage the components inside the nacelle.
The Ice Detection Override Knob must be at ENG during all ground operations in icing
conditions except during ice protection system test. Wing and stabiliser anti-icing must be
kept off.
When Ice Detector Override Knob is at ENG on the ground, TAT heating is on.
2.4.7 Taxi
Use minimum thrust so as to avoid blowing snow or slush on personnel or aircraft nearby.
During taxi, 'cold set' (the condition where the tyre retains the flat shape it had whilst
parked) may induce vibration in the aircraft. Vibration should disappear as the tyres recover
their elasticity during taxi. Do not initiate your take-off run before the cold set disappears.
Fan Blade icing during taxi can be identified by the aircraft vibrating at low frequency (Note:
Engine vibration indicators may not register this vibration as they detect high frequency
vibration). If Fan Blade icing is encountered during taxi the affected engine should be run at
60% N1 for 5 seconds. This procedure will shed any accumulated Fan Blade ice.
Maintain a greater than normal distance behind other aircraft while taxiing in snow-covered
runways, to avoid contamination of snow blown by jet blasts.
Perform the test of the ice protection system. If during test other system related messages
appear, in addition to those which normally appear, it is a failure indication. In the same
way, if any of the messages expected to occur do not appear, it is again a failure indication.
After test is finished, set the Ice Detection Override Knob to ENG. Check that engine REF
A/ICE on MFD takeoff page is set to 'ON'. Do not apply static take-off technique on a
runway with reduced braking action, as the aircraft may begin to
slide when thrust lever is advanced with brakes applied. An engine war up period must be
complied with. N2 should not exceed 83% until the oil temperature has reached 40°C.
After take-off the ice detection override knob should be reset to AUTO and ignition set as
required. Once the ice detect override knob is selected to AUTO in the after take-off checks,
it should not then be set to ENG in the air. Below -40°C SAT the override knob must remain
in AUTO.
If climbing in icing conditions, the minimum IAS for a clean configuration is 200-kts. If a
slower speed is required (e.g. SID procedures) flap retraction should be delayed.
During Cruise, observe minimum fuel temperature (-40°C). If fuel temperature is reaching the
limit apply the FUEL LOW TEMPERATURE procedure in the QRH.
If ice accretion is observed on the airframe (windscreen/wipers) do not rely on the automatic
ice protection system. If the system has not operated, force the override knob to ALL.
If engine vibration increases, advance thrust levers one at a time, to obtain 60% N1
minimum for 5 seconds and then return to the former setting.
If ITT increases beyond limits, reduce Thrust Levers as required to maintain ITT within limits.
When flying in icing conditions or after flying in icing conditions, ice accretion on unprotected
areas may cause vibration at high speeds. This phenomenon, due to ice accretion, does not
occur below 230 KIAS.
A greater rate of descent may be needed due to the increased idle N1 when anti-ice
system is on. Anticipation of icing conditions when planning the descent may be required.
The minimum IAS for holding in icing conditions is 200 kts. The configuration for holding
must be gear up and flaps zero.
When landing gear is down, the increased N1 logic for the anti-icing system is inhibited. If
in icing conditions, the landing gear should not be selected down above 3000-ft aal so as to
maintain the ice protection. Following a gear down selection, the associated low pressure
may cause anti-icing system messages to appear on the EICAS. To avoid those messages
from appearing, it is recommended to maintain a minimum of 55% N1 when landing gear is
down, reducing only when needed for landing.
The possible messages are WG 1(2) A/ICE FAIL, WG A/ICE ASYMMETRY and/or STAB
A/ICE FAIL. If these are displayed for more than 20 seconds whilst in icing conditions, the
ICE COND-A/I INOP message will appear.
Monitor anti-ice systems proper operation. Apply the associated QRH abnormal procedure in
case of system failure. Remember to apply the correct factor to Landing Distance Required –
even if you have left icing conditions. In this case the EICAS messages may disappear
without the fault being cleared. If the failure persists, exit and avoid icing conditions. Make the
air traffic controller know you are requesting a change due to icing conditions and keep him
informed about it.
Strictly follow Part B Operation in Icing Condition normal procedures. Do not reduce airspeed
below 200 KIAS unless committed to land.
Avoid landing in an airport where ice conditions exist or are anticipated if anti-ice system,
brakes, ground spoilers, nose wheel steering or flight controls have failed.
Do not hesitate to leave ice conditions when icing cannot be prevented and/or removed, even
with anti-ice systems operating normally
De/Anti-Icing Procedures
Prior to starting the de/anti-icing procedure, configure as follows:
Warning: APU operation should not be used during the aircraft de-icing
/anti-icing procedure, as damage may occur to the APU. If APU operation is
absolutely necessary, make sure that the APU bleed Air valve is closed, packs are
set to off, and the deicing/ anti-icing fluid is not applied directly to, or near the
APU air inlet. Ground crew must be briefed.
Caution: Due to the position of the APU air intake, de-icing fluid can enter the
APU intake during horizontal stabiliser de-icing. APU bleed must not be used for
air conditioning during the subsequent take-off following de/anti-icing.
Note: Consider de-icing with the aircraft powered down or a GPU connected. Avoid
de-icing with the APU running. The APU may be used to warm the cabin prior to
de-icing.
After De-Icing
After De-Icing
Pitch Trim ....................................................................................................................SET
Engine Bleeds (1 minute after De-icing) .......................................................... OPEN
Air Conditioning (3 minutes after De-icing) ............................................................. ON
APU ..........................................................................................................AS REQUIRED
APU Bleed ........................................................................................................ CLOSED
Before Takeoff Checklist.......................................................................... COMPLETE
The aircraft must be clear of all forms of frost, ice, slush and snow before take-off. A thin layer
of frost is permitted on the fuselage or on the underside of the wing provided the layer is thin
enough to distinguish surface features underneath, such as painting and markings. However,
all vents, probes and ports must be free of frost. Frost is not permitted on the lower surface of
the horizontal stabiliser or the upper surface of the wing. The EMB 145 is particularly
susceptible to under wing icing. The aircraft can become cold-soaked during flight, so that
fuel can be at a subfreezing temperature at the next destination. It can cause ice accretion on
the underside of the wing if the aircraft is subjected to high humidity, fog, drizzle or rain. An
even frost area under the wing of 3 mm can be accepted. Anything more, particularly ice
ridges, must be cleared.
Deposits of snow should be mechanically removed (use of the hand, broom, or mop head)
from engine intakes prior to departure. Any frozen deposits that may have bonded to either
the lower surface of the intake or the fan blades must be removed by the application of hot
air from a source such as a cabin heater before engine start.
Icing of the flap leading edge can occur when the aircraft has landed in conditions of low
visibility and low temperatures (SAT 0 to -10°C with a dew point within 5°C). If this occurs the
flaps will be partially retracted to 22° and must be inspected for leading edge ice before full
retraction. If ice is apparent it may be removed by mechanical means or by gentle application
of de-icing fluid from a hand held device such as a hose from a ground de-icing vehicle or a
portable de-icing sprayer. Minimal fluid should be used and care must be taken not to spray
flight control and flap activation mechanisms.
Do not apply fluids directly into the pitot / static port / ice detector, engine and/or APU air
inlets. The fluid should be applied above the probes and allowed to run down.
Sufficient time must be allowed for fluid run-off before starting the APU or Air Conditioning.
The APU is not to be used to supply Air Conditioning air after De-/Anti-Icing
procedures and the APU Bleed Valve is to remain closed. Engine air bleeds should
be used for the air supply and should T/O-1 thrust be required, the packs will need to
be reset after take-off. In addition the APU is not to be used to supply Air
Conditioning air after landing whilst passengers are on board. (Restrictions on the
use of APU does not apply if only under wing de-icing has been carried out.)
On any sector where there is no restriction on APU use for conditioning, the No 2 pack must
be switched on in advance of boarding. This is so that if any fumes are generated by the air
conditioning it will be noticed by the crew before passengers arrive at the aircraft (passenger
boarding should be delayed until any fumes have dispersed).
Following reports of poor weather radar performance Embraer have conducted a study of
how operators’ crews use the weather radar. They found that in many cases improved use
of the Tilt control would have improved the radar's performance.
When the Tilt control knob is pulled out, the system engages the Altitude Compensation
Tilt (ACT). In ACT the antenna tilt is automatically adjusted with regard to the selected
range and barometric altitude. The antenna tilt automatically readjusts with changes in
altitude and/or selected range. In ACT the tilt control can fine tune the tilt setting by +/- 2
degrees. ACT is best suited for high altitude operation while in the weather surveillance
mode. However since ACT uses ADC barometric altitude to adjust the tilt, operating near
high altitude airports or even high terrain can result in a lower than desired tilt angle. In
such cases the use of manual tilt is recommended (ACT assumes a ground level of
2000ft). However, as soon as weather is detected and at lower altitudes, manual tilt
should be used to frequently sweep above and below the flight level to avoid flying
under or over storms.
Fig. 12
The upper levels of convective storms are the most dangerous because of the probability
of violent wind shear and large hail. But hail and winds shear are not very reflective
because they lack reflective liquid water. Convective thunderstorms therefore become
much less reflective above the freezing level. As an aircraft, at a given level and tilt setting,
approaches a thunderstorm the radar will paint progressively higher levels within the storm
(i.e. levels above the freezing level). Thus if the tilt is not adjusted the radar will show the
thunderstorm weakening in intensity as the aircraft approaches the storm cell. Proper tilt
management demands that tilt be changed continually when approaching hazardous
weather.
With the tilt control knob in the manual position, the tilt should be adjusted as follows: Tilt
the antenna downward in 1 degree increments until ground targets begin to appear at the
display periphery. Ground returns can be distinguished from strong storm cells by
watching for closer ground targets with each small downward increment of tilt. When
ground targets are displayed, move the tilt angle upward in 1 degree increments until the
ground targets begin to disappear. Proper tilt adjustment is a pilot judgement but typically
the best tilt angle lies where ground targets are barely visible or just off the radar image.
The table below shows the approximate tilt settings required for different altitudes and
ranges.
All Weather Operations concerns aircraft operations in low visibility conditions. The
term AWOPS includes Low Visibility Take-Off (LVTO), Landing Category II (Cat II),
Landing Category III (Cat III), and Low Visibility Taxi (LV Taxi). The Embraer 145 is
not approved for Landing Cat III operations.
When NCAA approval is obtained for Category II Operations for the Air Peace
Embraer aircraft, the approved aircraft will be listed here.
1.18 Autopilot
Minimum Use Height Cat II: 80 ft
CAT I approach
A CAT I approach is a precision approach and landing with a decision height not lower
than 200ft (60m) and an RVR not less than 550m.
CAT II approach
A CAT II approach is a precision approach and landing with a decision height lower
than 200ft (60m) but not lower than 100ft (30m), and an RVR not less than 300m.
2.5.2 Abbreviations
AP………………………………………………………………………………….………. Autopilot
APP PLT………………………………………………………………………...Approach Pilot
AWOPS………………………………..…………………….….. All Weather Operations
CM1….…………………………………………………………………….…..Crew Member 1
CM2……………………………………………………………………….….. Crew member 2
FD………………………………………………………………….…………….. Flight Director
FGC…………………………………………………………... Flight Guidance Computer
GA…………………………………………………………………….……………….. Go Around
HI…………………………………………………………….…………………… High Intensity
ILS………………………………………………….…….. Instrument Landing System
IRVR………………………………………..….. Instrument Runway Visual Range
A pilot may not continue the approach below DH unless a visual reference containing
not less than a 3 light segments of one of the following is obtained:
The visual reference must include at least one lateral element of the ground
pattern as follows:
In limiting conditions the required visual references will only be seen through the lower part
of the windscreen. To assist orientation while approaching DH, Cat II (and Cat III) approach
lighting systems have red barrettes on either side of the centreline. In addition and to
provide some ‘texture’ for touchdown Cat II (and Cat III) runway lighting systems have white
touchdown ‘carpets’ in the touchdown zone. These consist of white barrettes on either side
of the centreline with the same spacing along the runway as the red barrettes on the app
roach.
Take-off alternate
When planning a LVTO, crews must consider a suitable airport as a take-off alternate.
The airport selected must satisfy the following conditions:
Met reports and/or forecasts must indicate that the weather at the alternate
airport will be at or above the applicable landing minima for +/-1 hour of the
aircraft’s expected time of arrival.
This must be within 1 hour‘s flying time at single engine TAS (275nm), and if
only non-precision and/or circling approaches are available cloud ceiling must
be taken into account.
Any one engine inoperative limitations e.g. Loss of Cat II capability must be
taken into account.
Destination airport
The airport selected as a destination airport must satisfy the following conditions:
Met reports and/or forecasts must indicate that the weather at the airport will be at
or above the applicable planning minima for +/- 1hr of the aircraft’s ETA as
specified in below:
RVR/Visibility complies with the published operating minima.
For a non-precision or circling approach the cloud ceiling must be above DA.
Notwithstanding the above, an aircraft may depart for a destination airport if the weather is
below or forecast +/- 1hr of the ETA to be at or below the minima required providing 2
suitable destination alternates have been selected.
Met reports and/or forecasts must indicate that the weather at the airport
will be at or above the applicable planning minima for +/- 1hr of the
aircraft’s ETA as specified in Fig 2 below:
Airport NOTAMS must be checked for any changes that may affect Low
Visibility Procedures, for example unserviceable lighting.
Circling Circling
Note i. RVR
Note ii. The ceiling must be at or above the DA.
Departures
LVPs at airports are likely to result in delayed start, slow taxiing and extended holding for
departure. Crews must carefully consider the need to uplift extra fuel to cover these
contingencies. Any changes made to the minimum fuel figure must be annotated on the
Airplane.
Arrivals
In addition, potential CAT II approach and landings may be lost if an early diversion is
required owing to insufficient holding fuel. ATC delays may continue after CAT II traffic flow
restrictions have been removed. A sensible amount of Extra Fuel should be carried due to
expected delays prior to commencing an approach.
Note: Crew must consider any takeoff and landing performance restrictions due to
Extra fuel. If the carriage of extra fuel jeopardises payload, operations must be
informed.
Prior to start-up, crew should read and brief the airport low visibility procedure found in
each applicable Aerad booklet. Should any malfunction occur whilst on stand or taxiing,
immediately advise ATC giving the aircraft location. Poor visibility will restrict the view of
ATC and Fire services.
Prior to taxiing, the crew should review the taxi clearance and brief the taxi routeing. In low
visibility, typically 125m, bright lights may be seen at 200m but unlit or poorly lit obstacles
such as aircraft tail and wing tips may not be seen. Taxiway centreline lights are generally
30m apart, reducing to 15m or 7.5m apart on bends.
Aircraft movement rates will be low in LVPs but taxi slowly. Great care is required to
identify and comply with taxiway routings, and also to ensure that the correct Cat II/III
holding points are used when approaching the runway for departure. In order to prevent the
use of incorrect taxiways, infringing ILS sensitive areas, or inadvertently entering or
crossing an active runway, aircraft heading should be frequently checked against expected
taxiway orientation. If in doubt, stop and request the assistance of a “follow me” vehicle.
Crew should consider delaying non-essential taxi checks until arriving at the runway
holding point. Brake checks and taxi lights, for example, are obviously essential.
Taxiway centreline lights may be illuminated beyond the holding point if it does not coincide
with a stop bar, or if another aircraft is just lining up. Prior to entering the runway consider
the runway state and braking action. Taxi lights must be used even by day, improving
conspicuity to other aircraft and vehicles.
Both pilots must use the eye level indicator to ensure they have their seats positioned
correctly.
The FO must provide the greatest possible support to the Captain in both lookout and
correct navigation of the airport taxiways
The completion of checklists must take second place to maintaining a good lookout and
correct taxi routeing. If there is any conflict between these requirements, checklists must
only be carried out when the aircraft is stationary.
Taxi slowly, and maintain awareness of the position of other aircraft by careful monitoring
of ATC transmissions.
Be especially watchful of aircraft like Boeings that have their rear white navigation lights on
the wingtips and no light on the tail of the aircraft.
If the crew become uncertain of their position at any time, or realise that
they have taken an in correct routeing, they must advise ATC immediately.
If at any time additional guidance is required, stop and request help from
ATC.
Make use of the PFD or MFD heading to assist in confirming the orientation
of taxiways.
Ensure the correct runway QFU is set in HDG before being cleared to line
up and then check the QFU with the runway alignment once lined up.
For a LVO take-off the following conditions must apply: The Captain must be PF.
Make use of the TDZ lights as they are always spaced at 30 metre intervals. Do not
Rejected LVTO
When rejecting an LVTO, the FO should call “900m” when the runway centreline lights
change from all white to alternating red and White, and “300m” when the centreline lights
become Red only.
Training must include ensuring that the turn off from the live runway in the wake of a
rejected LVTO is included in the brief.
As soon as reasonably practicable, ATC should be informed ‘Call sign xxx stopping’.
The approach is flown by the F/O (APP PLT) until DH when a manual landing is completed
by the Captain (LDG PLT).
The Captain remains responsible for briefing all aspects of the Cat II
approach. The brief must be completed prior to descent and specifically
include correct thrust lever handling in the event of a single engine
go-around.
To obtain the optimum view over the nose of the aircraft while maintaining an unrestricted
view of the instruments, pilots must use the eye position indicator to achieve their seating
position.
In limiting conditions the required visual references will only be seen through the lower part
of the windscreen.
To assist orientation while approaching DH, Cat II approach lighting systems have red
barrettes on either side of the centreline.
To assist orientation and provide some runway ‘texture’ for touchdown, Cat II runway
lighting systems have white touchdown ‘carpets’ in the touchdown zone. These consist of
white barrettes on either side of the centreline, at the same spacing along the runway as
the red barrettes on the approach.
At night in poor visibility, light from landing lights and strobe/conspicuity lights reflected
back from water or ice particles or snowflakes can adversely affect visual reference. Pilots
should therefore consider switching off these lights in these conditions, or possibly using
taxi lights instead of landing lights.
DH MINIMUM RVR
100ft-120ft 300m at Touch-down 125m at Mid- Point 75m at Stop End
Performance data specific to a Cat II landing and missed approach must be used. This
data can be found with the normal landing data located in the Route Performance Manual
(RPM).
The Landing Mass – Field Length Limit Table on the first RPM page presents the maximum
landing weight for the calculated runway. The table shows both weights for Dry runway
condition NO ICE/AFTER ICE ENCOUNTER. On the reverse side information is given for
Wet runway conditions
Enter the table from the left (Ldg Flap 22 - Cat II) and read off the weight from the
appropriate wind column. The left bold value is for NO ICE runway condition and the right
value is for AFTER ICE ENCOUNTER. A nuance of the certification process means that for
CAT II these two values are always identical.
Enter the table from the left (Ldg Flap 22 - Cat II) and read off the weight from
At least 60 metre edge lighting and at least 30 metre centreline lighting is required for
cat 11 approaches.
Headwind: 23 kts.
Crosswind: 25 kts.
Tailwind: 10 kts.
NOTE: Cat II operation shall be performed by the RHS pilot who has the
Flight Director coupled to the Autopilot.
At Glideslope capture, GS (green) and ‘CAT 2’ (green) must be displayed on
both PFDs. ‘CAT 2’ (green) and the Radio Altitude (RA) must continuously
display throughout the approach on both EADI’s.
If all conditions are met, a green CAT 2 annunciation is displayed on the PFDs. If any of the
required conditions for establishing CAT 2 goes invalid, the green CAT 2 will be replaced by
flashing amber CAT 2 annunciation. It will flash for ten seconds and then go steady.
Note: During LVP Operations ATC will provide full protection to ensure
the integrity of the ILS system is maintained.
A Cat II approach shall be flown at the flap 22, Ice condition landing reference speed
throughout the approach (Blue Bug). Therefore, the green approach bug (AP) is not
required and shall remain unboxed.
Note: Pilots must be aware that the Landing Reference Speed for a Cat II approach
(VREF 22) must be corrected to reflect icing speeds, even if the aircraft has not
encountered icing conditions during flight.
In addition to the normal briefing the Captain should review the equipment requirements
listed above and include the following aspects in the briefing:
The following table outlines the standard calls and actions for a Cat 2 approach:
Note: Flap 22 selection is normally the last condition fulfilled for Cat 2 (green)
illumination on the FMA. Flap 22 is also a prompt for the crew to initiate the landing
checklist.
In order to minimise the possibility of multi tasking during a critical phase of the approach, it is
recommended that Flap 22 is selected, and landing checks requested, when the aircraft is
one dot below the glideslope. This should, in most cases, allow for timely completion of the
checklist before Cat 2 (green) is illuminated on the FMA.
If ‘Cat 2’ illuminates on the FMA during landing checklist completion, or during R/T
exchanges with Air traffic Control, the confirmation of the annunciation must be completed as
soon as practically possible. This may involve interruption of the landing checklist. The
landing checklist must be resumed immediately after the confirmatory calls. In the case of
radio transmissions, Cat 2 (green) should be confirmed as soon as the radio call has been
completed.
A comparison between the Localizer, Glide Slope and Radio Altitude deviation
indications are performed when the following conditions are met:
NOTE: - For aircraft equipped with single Radio Altimeter the Radio Altitude
comparison is made between both displayed RA values. If the Radio Altimeter is off
scale, its value is set to maximum for comparison purposes.
The on-side Localizer and Glide Slope excessive deviations are compared to the Cat II
limits and displayed when the following conditions are met:
APR mode selected on both Flight Guidance Controller.
AUTOPILOT engaged.
Flaps 22°.
CAT II Decision Height setting on Display Control Panels.
VOR/LOC is the active course from the on-side RMU.
On-side Radio Altitude between 500 and 80 ft.
On-side Localizer tuned and valid.
On-side Glide Slope valid.
No back course selected.
Go-around not selected on either side.
If a Localizer deviation greater than approximately 1/3 dot is detected, the EHSI lateral
deviation bar on the PFD’s EHSI will change from green to amber, the lateral deviation
scale will change from white to amber, and flash.
NOTE: The on-side excessive deviation warning is also displayed when the
cross-side system has detected an excessive deviation.
Glide Slope excessive deviation:
If a Glide Slope deviation greater than approximately one dot is detected, the GS pointer on
the PFD’s EADI will change from green to amber, the GS scale will change from white to
amber, and flash.
NOTE: The on-side excessive deviation warning is also displayed when the
cross-side system has detected an excessive deviation.
2.5.8.10.3 Hardover
If any unusual acceleration or motion is noticed on the aircraft flight path the
approach must be discontinued, and:
Perform a normal MISSED APPROACH Procedure, unless the approach is continued under
visual conditions and the aircraft position and attitude assure a safe landing.
Perform a normal MISSED APPROACH Procedure, unless the approach is continued under
visual conditions and the aircraft position and attitude assure a safe landing.
1/ Before 4 miles/OM
If the autopilot disengages or has to be disengaged before 4nm/OM, a Cat 2
2/ Within 4nm/OM
If the autopilot disengages or has to be disengaged, do not attempt to re-engage the
autopilot. Carry out the missed approach procedure.
Monitor the ILS deviation to ensure that the aircraft returns to the
centre beam.
On both cases, perform a normal MISSED APPROACH Procedure, unless the approach is
continued under visual conditions and the aircraft position and attitude assure a safe
landing.
Regulations dictate that each pilot must complete at least three Cat II approach every 6
months. (This can be undertaken in actual CAT II conditions or conditions better than CAT II).
Therefore, recency requirements can be fulfilled during revalidation training at the OPC.
However, it will be company policy to strongly recommend that crews perform a practice Cat
II approach (or an actual) once every 28 days. Licence inserts will be supplied upon
successful completion of initial training in order that a record of Cat II approaches performed
(actual or practice) can be maintained.
NOTE: It has been determined that Aberdeen Airport calibrates its ILS to Cat 3
tolerances, and its alarm thresholds for reductions in performance are set
accordingly. It is, therefore, permissible to operate practice Cat 2 approaches
to both runways at Aberdeen, despite them not operating to Cat 2 parameters.
Prior to commencing a Cat II approach, crew must consult the laminated Cat II briefing
cards. On one side can be found the points to brief over and above the ‘normal’ approach
briefing. On the reverse side, there is a minimum equipment required aide memoire. The
third page contains the approach SOP calls.
To perform the Radio Altimeter test the DH must be set to 200 ft and the button must be
kept pressed. The following indications are presented on the PFD:
‘LAND’ call by The ‘LAND’ call also means the Monitors instruments throughout
Captain Captain is taking full control of the touchdown and landing roll. When
aircraft. In the event of a baulked indicated calls ‘SPOILERS
landing the Captain flies the go- OPEN’. As aircraft slows calls
around. ’80kts’ and ‘60kts’. At ‘60kts FO
takes control column and at 40kts
Gust-Lock can be engaged.
REGRADING FORM
LICENSE INSERT
*Delete as appropriate
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (1000 feet) apply in designated Nigerian airspace
between FL290 and FL410. The separation between levels is 1000 feet for approved aircraft
operators. For details of the lateral extend of NAMA’s airspace, consult the Nigeria AIP and
appropriate charts. Air Peace has RVSM approval for the EMB 145.
Operators intending to conduct flights within the notified RVSM Airspace require an RVSM
Approval from the appropriate authority of the State in which the Operator is based. Air
Peace RVSM approval encompasses several aspects of the operation, which are set out
below.
During flight planning the flight crew are to pay particular attention to conditions that may
affect operation in RVSM airspace.
These include:
a) Verifying that the airframe is approved for RVSM operations.
b) Reported and forecast weather on the route of flight.
c) Minimum equipment requirements pertaining to height keeping and
alerting systems, and
d) Any airframe or operating restriction related to RVSM approval.
NOTE: Flights shall be operated in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules when
operated within, or above, RVSM airspace.
NOTE: The maximum value for these checks for the primary altimeters on the
EMB 145 is 50ft.
The following equipment should be operating normally at entry into RVSM airspace:
Operating Transponder. An operating transponder may not be required for entry into
all designated RVSM airspace. However there is a requirement for an operational
transponder in each RVSM area where Air Peace Limited operations occur.
NOTE: Should any of the required equipment fail prior to the aircraft entering
RVSM airspace, the pilot should request a new clearance to avoid entering this
airspace.
The Pilot should notify ATC as soon as possible of any circumstances (equipment failures,
weather) where the vertical navigation performance requirements for the RVSM airspace
cannot be maintained. In such cases the pilot shall obtain a revised air traffic control
clearance prior to initiating any deviation from the cleared route and/or flight level whenever
possible. Where a revised clearance could not be obtained prior to such a deviation the Pilot
shall follow any established contingency procedures and obtain a revised clearance as soon
as possible thereafter.
The pilot should notify ATC when encountering greater than moderate turbulence. If an
aircraft encounters severe turbulence due to weather or wake vortex that the pilot believes
will impact the aircraft’s capability to maintain its cleared level the pilot shall inform ATC. ATC
shall establish either an appropriate horizontal separation or an increased vertical separation.
ATC shall solicit reports from other aircraft to determine whether RVSM should be
suspended entirely or within a specific flight level band or area.
Where a meteorological forecast is predicting severe turbulence within the RVSM Airspace
ATC shall determine whether RVSM should be suspended and if so the period of time and
specific flight level(s) and/or area.
Pilots shall inform ATC as soon as practicable of any restoration of the proper
functioning of equipment required to meet RVSM Minimum Aircraft System
Performance Specifications (MASPS).
In making technical log entries against malfunctions in height keeping systems, the pilot
should provide sufficient details to enable maintenance to effectively troubleshoot and repair
the system. The pilot should detail the actual defect and the crew action taken to try to
isolate and rectify the fault.
PURPOSE PHRASE
For controller to ascertain RVSM approval status of CONFIRM RVSM
an aircraft. APPROVED
For pilot to report non-RVSM approval status: # on the NEGATIVE RVSM
initial call on any frequency within the RVSM Airspace
(controller shall provide a read back with this same
phrase) and
# in all requests for flight level changes pertaining to
flight levels within the RVSM Airspace and
# In all read backs to flight level clearances
pertaining to flight levels within the RVSM Airspace.
Additionally, except for State aircraft, pilots shall include
this RTF phrase to read back flight level clearances
involving the vertical transit through FL290 or FL410.
For pilot of a non-RVSM approved State aircraft to report NEGATIVE RVSM STATE
non-RVSM approval status in response to the RTF AIRCRAFT
phrase; CONFIRM RVSM APPROVED.
For pilot to report that the aircraft’s equipment has UNABLE RVSM DUE
degraded below the MASPS required for flight EQUIPMENT
within the RVSM Airspace.
This phrase is to be used to convey both the initial
indication of the non-MASPS compliance and
henceforth on initial contact on all frequencies within
the lateral limits of the RVSM Airspace until such time
as the problem ceases to exist or the aircraft has exited
RVSM Airspace.
For pilot to report the ability to resume operation READY TO RESUME RVSM
within the RVSM Airspace after an equipment or
weather related contingency.
For controller to confirm that an aircraft has regained its REPORT ABLE TO
RVSM approval status or to confirm that the pilot is RESUME RVSM
ready to resume RVSM operations.
This section is included to show the aircraft differences within the pool of aircraft
in Air Peace Limited EMB145 fleet.
Engines AE3007AIP
Electro-Mech. Gust
Thrust Reversers
Engines AE3007
T-62T-C40C14
Cat II Equipped
T-62T-40C11
AIRCRAFT
Approved
RVSM
A1
APU
APU
EMB 145 LR x √ √ x √ √ √ x
(MSN 145144)
EMB 145 LR x √ √ x √ √ √ x
(MSN 145168)
EMB 145 LR x √ √ x √ √ √ x
(MSN 145199)
EMB 145 MP x √ √ x √ √ √ x
(MSN 145322)
EMB 145 MP x √ √ x √ √ √ x
(MSN 145337)
EMB 145 MP x √ √ x √ √ √ x
(MSN 145203)
Integrated STBY
Ver. 202-202
Ver. 216-216
Instruments
Instruments
AIRCRAFT
AHRS 900
Standby
EGPWS
EGPWS
(ISIS)
fitted
EMB 145 LR √ x x x √ √
(MSN 145144)
EMB 145 LR √ x x x √ √
(MSN 145168)
EMB 145 LR √ x x x √ √
(MSN 145199)
EMB 145 MP √ x x x √ √
(MSN 145322)
EMB 145 MP √ x x x √ √
(MSN 145337)
EMB 145 MP √ x x x √ √
(MSN 145203)
Some aircrafts are fitted with an integrated Standby Instrument System (ISIS).
The ISIS provides the following parameters:
Attitude (pitch and roll);
Standard or barometric-corrected altitude and associated barometric pressure;
Indicated airspeed;
Indicated Mach number;
VMO (Maximum Operating Speed);
Skid/Slip information;
Magnetic heading (from AHRS 1).
Note: The ISIS relies on 28 V DC power, provided by the Essential DC Bus 2. In case
of an electrical emergency, it will operate solely on the aircraft batteries for
approximately 40 minutes.
Note: The aircraft must not be moved during the first 90 seconds after power-up
while the ISIS is undergoing alignment. Moving the aircraft during this period can
cause in-flight attitude indication errors, that are not noticeable on ground.
The system is powered as soon as the aircraft batteries are switched to AUTO.
The ISIS will then commence its automatic alignment phase which takes
about 90 seconds to complete and can be identified on the screen by the
“INIT 90 s” flag. Use the Baro Rotary Knob to set the aerodrome QNH.
Note: Should it be required, selecting the CAGE button resets the attitude
indication
to provide a fast erect function.
Note: The CAGE function is not operational during the initialization mode and must
only be used in stabilized flight conditions. When pressed for more than
This primary risk was addressed by the cabin crewmember occupying the jump seat during
pilot comfort-breaks, so he / she could open the door should a solitary pilot suffer an
incapacitation.
The secondary risk was that with single cabin crew occasionally having to sit on the jump
seat, the cabin could be left unsupervised more often than normal, which would have raised
security issues, particularly on the longer flights. The requirement for dual cabin crew
A new risk assessment has been conducted to consider the risk from leaving the cabin
unattended. Whilst we recognize that the risk is greater on this aircraft because of the pilot
incapacitation scenario above, there are no incidents or events recorded in Air Peace Limited
of a comfort break exacerbating or causing an incident or emergency.
Moreover, if an additional pilot, engineer or cabin attendant is occupying the jump seat (as is
often the case on some charters) the operating cabin attendant will not be required to do so,
further reducing the risk. In this situation, the jump seat occupant must be briefed by the
Captain (in addition to the normal jump-seat safety brief) on the actions required in the event
of single pilot incapacitation. The action required of the jump seat occupant is to contact
the cabin by intercom and open the flight-deck door using the slide lock, having
identified the crew member by use of The ‘peep-hole’.
Crews are to be aware that comfort breaks are more likely on those flights of greater than two
hours and are to plan accordingly. In addition, coordination is required between the Captain
and cabin attendant to ensure that, except ‘in extremis’, comfort breaks are not taken:
Note that in terms of disruptive passengers, some groups may be considered as higher than
normal risk: football supporters, or Deportees, for example. It is impractical to consider every
possible situation so crews are to exercise airmanship and basic principles in establishing
when comfort breaks are inappropriate.
If a cabin attendant leaves the cabin between engine start and engine
shut-down, for whatever reason, the captain is to be consulted beforehand.
Comfort breaks are always to be kept to the minimal time necessary and
minimal frequency by sensible crew planning beforehand.
The conclusion reached through the Risk Assessment process is that is that
the aircraft may now operate with single cabin crew.
2.7.5 AH – 900
Each AHRU uses two 28 VDC power inputs. The AHRU 1 primary power source is the
Essential DC Bus 1 and its backup power source is the Backup Essential Bus. The
AHRU 2 primary power source is the DC Bus 2 and its backup power source is the
Backup Bus 2. If the AHRU loses primary power, it automatically transfers to backup
power. When the AHRU operates solely on backup power, it will operate for 40
minutes and the AHRS 1 (2) ON BATT advisory message will be presented on the
EICAS.
Ordinarily the above procedures are readily accommodated within the normal first
flight checks. If the EICAS caution AHRS 1(2) FAIL occurs then the equipment may
need to be reset.
Reset procedure
Back up Battery button – PUSH OUT
AHRS CBs pull and reset
ALIGNMENT MODE
The alignment mode initiates when the aircraft is energized. The latitude at which the AHRU
is aligned affects the alignment time. It is normally approximately 8 minutes with increasing
alignment times at high latitude.
The aircraft must remain stationary during alignment (AHRS 1 (2) ALN advisory message
presented on the EICAS). If the AHRU detects excessive aircraft motion (AHRS 1 (2) EXC
MOTION advisory message is presented on the EICAS), it starts an automatic full
realignment 30±1 seconds after the motion stops. Normal passenger loading or
cargo-loading activities should not cause excessive aircraft motion.
If the present position is not entered during the normal alignment time, the AHRS 1 (2) NO
PPOS or ARHS 1-2 NO PPOS advisory messages will be displayed on the EICAS. The
AHRU will not enter the NAV mode until it receives a valid position input. Ordinarily check
and accept the stored position or input the position as coordinates via the FMS.
The AHRU conducts a position-compare test on latitude and longitude immediately after
each data has been entered. To pass the test, the entered data must compare within 1
degree of the stored latitude/longitude from the last power down from the NAV mode. If the
test fails, the AHRS 1 (2) ALN FAULT caution message is presented on the EICAS.
NOTE: More than one position entry may be necessary to confirm, update or correct a
position. Check and re-enter the position on the FMS using co-ordinate format. If
alignment problems persist then enter the position using the MFD1 procedure below.
Whenever the aircraft is on the ground and the AH-900 is in align mode, the MAP/PLAN
label on MFD 1 main menu changes to PPOS INIT. By selecting PPOS INIT, the operator
will access the Present Position Initialization menu, and will be able to set the present-
position coordinates with the data set knob or confirm the stored one. The coordinates are
sent to the AH-900 computer when the ENT bezel button is pressed. No attitude and
heading data is displayed during align mode.
NAVIGATION MODE
The AHRU enters the NAV mode from the align mode. In the NAV mode, the AHRU
uses the last valid position data entered during the align mode as its initial present
position, and updates the present position based only on inertial data while it remains
in the NAV mode.
ATTITUDE MODE
The attitude mode is the AHRU’s reversionary mode. It is automatically entered by
the AHRU if power is lost in flight, and it provides a quick attitude restart: during the
first 20 seconds in the attitude transitional mode, the AHRU enters the erect attitude
transitional mode. In this transitional mode the AHRS 1 (2) ALN advisory message is
displayed on the EICAS and the AHRU computes a new level axis set. The aircraft
must be held steady, straight and level until the AHRS 1 (2) ALN message
extinguishes. When operating in the attitude mode the AHRS 1 (2) ATT MODE
advisory message is presented on the EICAS. In this mode, attitude outputs
are not as accurate as when operating in the NAV mode, and magnetic
heading is not available. The AH-900 must be initialized with magnetic
heading. In this case the operator needs to know the aircraft’s magnetic
heading. Whenever the aircraft is in the air and the AH-900 is in attitude mode,
a menu bezel button annunciates MHDG INIT on the pilot’s MFD. The AHRS 1
(2) NO MAG HDG or AHRS 1-2 NO MAG HDG advisory messages will be
displayed on the EICAS. By selecting MHDG INIT, the operator will access the
Magnetic Heading Initialization menu, and will be able to set the magnetic
heading with the data set knob. The magnetic heading data is sent to the
AH-900 computer when the ENT bezel button is pressed. The associated
EICAS messages are cleared.
POWER-DOWN MODE
The AHRU enters the power-down mode automatically when the system
detects an “end-of-flight” event. In this mode, the AHRU will transfer the last
calculated position and other AHRS parameters to its non-volatile memory.
The following is the required flight test schedule. Engineering will provide the
applicable paperwork.
Normal Descent
check reception of all radio aids (if possible)
Check Speed Brake Operation
Auto Coupled ILS (if possible)
Flap 45° Landing & Engine Shutdown
With this in mind, taking off with the Engine Bleeds closed will also help reduce engine
temperature and subsequently extend engine life. Crews are therefore encouraged to
consider a ‘Summer Take-off’, anytime that Icing Equipment is not required soon after
take-off.
A ‘Summer Take-off’ must be briefed, and the following air-conditioning and APU setup shall
be confirmed as follows:
The LP shall ensure that the APU remains running after engine start.
After Take-off:
After take-off but not before the aircraft is ‘clean’ configured, Pilot not Flying (PM) shall Open
the engine bleed valves individually (button pressed and black), deselect the APU bleed
(button released and black), rotate the cross bleed valve to the AUTO position (12 o’clock)
and ensure the CROSS BLD OPEN message disappears from the EICAS display. If not
required for operational purposes, the APU should then be shutdown. Once below 10%
RPM, the APU Master knob should be selected OFF.
The ISIS system relies on 28 V DC power, provided by the Essential DC Bus 2. In case of
an electrical emergency, it will operate solely on the airplane batteries for approximately 40
minutes.
The system is powered as soon as the airplane batteries are switched to AUTO. Then, the
ISIS starts its alignment phase, which takes about 90 seconds to be completed and can be
identified on the screen by the “INIT 90 s” flag.
Note: The airplane must not be moved during the first 90 seconds after power-up,
while the ISIS is undergoing alignment. Moving the airplane during this period can
cause in-flight attitude indication errors which are not noticeable on ground.
ATTITUDE
Using the data from the respective sensors after its conversion to digital format, the system
computes and displays attitude. The CAGE button resets the attitude to provide a fast erect
function. The CAGE function is not operational during the initialization mode and must
only be used in stabilized flight conditions. If a failure of the attitude function is detected
by internal monitoring, attitude display information, e.g. brown and blue background, pitch
scale, roll scale and roll pointer is removed and replaced by a black background, and an
ATT flag is displayed.
ALTITUDE
Altitude data is provided by processing static pressure sensed by Pitot/Static tube 3. Altitude
is displayed in tape format. Pushing the STD button sets the ISIS reference barometric
pressure to standard (QNE). The barometric pressure can be adjusted, starting from the
standard value by using the rotary BARO knob. In case a failure of the altitude function is
detected by the internal monitoring system, the altitude tape is removed and an ALT flag is
displayed.
INDICATED AIRSPEED
Airspeed data is provided by processing dynamic pressure sensed by Pitot/Static tube 3.
Airspeed is presented in tape format. In case a failure is detected by the internal monitoring
system, the airspeed tape and pointer are removed and a SPD flag is displayed.
SECONDARY PARAMETERS
In addition to primary parameters, the system computes and displays the following secondary
parameters:
Magnetic heading.
Mach number.
VMO.
Lateral acceleration/Slip indication.
1 - BRIGHTNESS ADJUSTMENT
Push buttons labelled + and - adjust brightness.
2 - AIRSPEED INDICATION
Airspeed tape positioned vertically on the upper left segment of the
display.
Ranges from 40 to 520 kts and the scale is graduated every 5 kts
between 40 and 250 kts. From 250 to 520 kts the scale is
graduated every 20 kts with digital indications every 20 kts. The
indications and graduations are displayed in white.
3 - VMO/MMO
VMO is indicated by a red tape associated to the airspeed tape.
Digits of the airspeed tape and Mach number display are green when the
airspeed and Mach number are lower than VMO/MMO and red when the
airspeed and Mach number are equal to or greater than VMO/MMO.
4 - ROLL INDICATION
Roll scale graduated at 0°, 10°, 20°, 30°, 45° and 60°,
to provide bank angle measurement, indicated by the roll pointer.
5 - STD BUTTON
Pushing the button sets the barometric setting to Standard
Atmospheric Pressure.
7 - LATERAL ACCELERATION
The range is ± 0.2 g. Symbol displayed in black surrounded in white, just
below the roll reference triangle.
8 - ALTITUDE INDICATION
Altitude tape positioned vertically on the upper right segment of the
display.
Ranges from -2000 to 50000 ft with 5 digits green display readout in a
yellow frame. A NEG indication is displayed vertically in white in case of
negative altitude.
9 - PITCH INDICATION
Note: The CAGE function is not operational during the initialization mode
and must only be used in stabilized flight conditions. When pressed for
more than two seconds it will reset the horizon function to zero and a
“ATT 10s” warning flag is displayed.
The pitch scale comprises white reference lines every 2.5° between - 30°
and +30°, and the associated pitch angle values, in white, every 10°
between -50° and +50° and at ±80°. The sector above the horizon line of
the screen is blue and the sector below is brown.
Beyond ±30°, red chevrons are displayed to indicate excessive pitch angle
and the direction to follow in order to reduce it.
11 - MAGNETIC HEADING
Given by the horizontal displacement of the heading scale.
Indication symbol yellow and heading scale graduated by white dots every
5°, with a white two-digit indication every 20°. The last digit (0) is not shown
(e.g., 320° is thus presented as 32). The visible range is 50°.
12 - CAGE BUTTON
Resets attitude to provide a fast erection function.
When it is maintained pressed for more than two seconds, resets the
horizon function to zero and warning a “ATT 10s” flag is displayed.
Note: The CAGE function is not operational during the initialization mode and must
only be used in stabilized flight conditions. When pressed for more than two seconds
it will reset the horizon function to zero and a “ATT 10s” warning flag is displayed.
14 - AIRCRAFT SYMBOL
Displayed on the centre of the horizon area.
Black symbol surrounded by a yellow area.
The system is powered as soon as the airplane batteries are switched to AUTO. The ISIS will
then commence its automatic alignment phase which takes about 90 seconds to complete
and can be identified on the screen by the “INIT 90 s” flag. During the ‘Standby Horizon’
check (First Flight/Turnaround checks), ensure no flags are present and use the Baro Rotary
Knob to set the aerodrome QNH.
In response to the ‘Flight & Standby Instruments’ Check during the ‘After Start’ Checks, the
LP will ensure that the aerodrome QNH is set and ensure no flags or warnings are present.
Note: Should it be required, selecting the CAGE button resets the attitude indication
to provide a fast erect function.
Note: The CAGE function is not operational during the initialization mode and must
only be used in stabilized flight conditions. When pressed for more than two seconds
it will reset the horizon function to zero and a “ATT 10s” warning flag is displayed.
In case of abnormal operation or failure detection in one or several ISIS functions, the
following flags are displayed:
Continued
1) Where does the ISIS Magnetic heading obtain its input from?
2) In case of an electrical emergency, the ISIS system will
operate solely on airplane batteries. Approximately how
long will it last?
3) The airplane must not be moved during the first 90
seconds following initial power-up during ISIS alignment.
Why is this?
4) The ISIS system will commence its 90 second alignment
once powered up. How is ISIS selected ON?
5) How is the required Pressure Setting set on the ISIS display?
6) What will selecting the STD button located at
the top of the ISIS instrument achieve?
7) A quick press of less than 2 seconds will reset the
attitude by providing a fast erect function. In only what
flight conditions must this function be used?
8) When is the CAGE function not operational?
General
Abnormal procedures are the actions required to ensure adequate safety, and to enable
further safe conduct of flight following any failure. Abnormal procedures are to be initiated on
command of the Captain and the following assignment of tasks is recommended:
Pilot flying (PF) remains in control of aircraft handling and flight navigation and assumes
ATC radio communications.
Pilot not flying (PM) is responsible for reading the QRH checklist and executing required
actions.
PF shall monitor any action taken by PM during the accomplishment of each memory item or
QRH procedure, and cross confirmation between PF and PM is essential. Abnormal
procedures are applied following the read-and-do-principle and the procedures are
presented in the form of a checklist.
If the abnormal situation is positively corrected before completion of the procedure, the
Captain should evaluate the situation before proceeding with the next step. When the
relevant checklist is completed the PM should announce e.g. “QRH checklist complete”.
Except for aural/visual alert cancellation, checklists should be actioned only after the aircraft
is established on the correct flight path and is under control.
Unless specifically stated otherwise, all procedures only apply when the aircraft is airborne.
For dispatch with certain systems inoperative, reference should be made to the EMB 145
MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST (MEL).
Introduction
The procedures contained within this section include only those procedures where an action
or sequence of actions, or prohibitions of correct action(s), which if not observed could
significantly affect the airworthiness of the aircraft or the safety of passengers and crew.
And any other items of airmanship the crew may consider appropriate.
An abnormal procedure describes actions which are necessary to protect the aircraft
and its occupants from impending serious or critical harm, respectively to cope with
an impending or affective failure of any aircraft system or component.
When applying QRH procedures, alternative crew task allocation may be more
appropriate. It is therefore essential that the Captain assesses the situation and
clearly determines the task distribution for the various phases of flight.
Abnormal operation is non-routine, therefore all abnormal procedures and actions shall
be announced.
As a general rule PM will first announce any Warning or Caution message, only
cancelling the associated aural alert following verification from PF.
NOTE: Cancelling the aural alerts and caution/warning light is considered normal crew
action and is not specified in each procedure.
Both crew members analyse the problem, flying task permitting, during the following course
of action:
If applicable:
Other actions are performed following the “read-and-do” concept. Once both pilots
have identified the applicable procedure and this has been confirmed by the
Captain, PF will continue to monitor and adjust the aircraft’s Navigation and Flight
profile, shall assume radio control and initiate the required procedure by
announcing e.g. “My radios, left engine failure QRH checklist”. PM shall confirm
and respond e.g. “Your radios, left engine failure checklist”.
(e) Reading
Abnormal procedures are read by PM starting with the procedure title.
All applicable text shall be read loudly, including memory items already
performed, and only when PF is attentive. Understanding should be confirmed
by the PF before continuing. Required action shall be read.
An abnormal procedure must be continued to its definite end (“i.e. end of
procedure”), unless otherwise instructed by the captain.
NOTE: Under special circumstances, when loud reading conflicts with other
flight deck duties, the Captain may decide that the text is read silently. In such
case PM shall however, inform the PF of essential steps and progress of the
procedure.
Explanation of Handling
(a) Notification
Notification is the first announcement of any malfunction or existing
abnormal condition (e.g. ‘Engine fire’).
(b) Verification
Verification is the analysis and confirmation of the malfunction by both
crew members and must be completed before definite identification is
made by the Captain.
(c) Identification
Identification of an applicable abnormal procedure by the Captain shall
include the location of the affected system (e.g. ‘Left engine fire’).
(d) Monitored actions
Monitored actions contained in the Abnormal List are movement of:
Thrust lever
Fire handles
Guarded switches
Generator switches
Control disconnect
The Emergency Procedures contained in this manual have been developed by the aircraft
manufacturer and approved by the certification authority. Further information may be found
in the AFM / AOM.
Some procedures require a landing at the nearest suitable airport. Such information is
provided with the intent of establishing that the flight should be terminated at the Captain’s
discretion. It is the captain’s responsibility to make a good judgment concerning the time the
aircraft may safely operate in a certain configuration to determine when to land, as well as to
evaluate factors such as airplane condition, weather, landing field, etc., to determine
where to land.
However, it is emphasized that for fire or smoke that cannot be positively located and
extinguished, an immediate descent, landing, and passenger evacuation should be
performed.
This section is in large print to enable ease of reading whilst wearing smoke goggles and in
poor visibility. This section includes action for all annunciated and non annunciated
procedures. The pages are numbered with the prefix’s.
It is arranged in alphabetical order with emergency procedures first and then followed by
abnormal procedures. The pages are numbered with the prefix ‘NAP’.
These relate to specific EICAS messages. The message index is arranged alphabetically
with Warnings first followed by Cautions. The message in the index is exactly the same as
the EICAS message presented on the screen.
The annunciated procedures are grouped by aircraft system in alphabetical order. The
pages are numbered with the prefix ‘EAP’.
These do not have a QRH procedure and are identified in the QRH index as ‘Crew
Awareness’. If a crew awareness message is displayed on the EICAS take-off is prohibited
unless:
The message is the expected result of an intentional Operation.
Flight Crew action is taken to clear the message.
Maintenance action is taken to clear the message.
The aircraft is dispatched in accordance with the company MEL
Flight through severe turbulence must be avoided, if possible. If not possible, reduce altitude
to increase buffet margin.
3.1.1 Airspeed
At or below 10,000 ft. 200 KIAS
Above 10,000 ft 250 KIAS/0.63 M
WHICHEVER IS
LOWER
3.1.2 Attitude
Maintain wings level and proper pitch attitude. Use attitude indicator as the primary
instrument. In extreme drafts, large attitude changes may occur. Do not use sudden large
control inputs.
Maintain control of the aeroplane with the elevators. After establishing the
trim setting for penetration speed, do not change pitch trim.
3.1.4 Altitude
Make an initial thrust setting for the target airspeed. Change thrust setting only in case of
extreme airspeed variation.
3.2 DEFUELLING
Defueling by suction reduces fuel pressure in the APU supply line and may cause the APU
to surge or flameout. Therefore the APU must be shut-down before defueling. The Cross-
feed Valve will need to be opened to allow fuel to be pumped or sucked from the left tank
but the familiar x-feed logic will not select the ‘low tank’ fuel pump OFF during defueling.
Therefore the fuel pumps will need to be manually selected on/off as required to control the
fuel balance. Taking the fuel level below that required by a small amount then performing
an auto refuel up to the required quantity is acceptable procedure if approved by the Fuel
Supplier.
Following defueling operations if the defuel valve sticks in the open position and the refuel
panel is closed, when a No 2 fuel pump starts to operate the LH fuel tank will receive part of
the fuel being pumped to the No 2 Engine. This will be evident by the LH fuel quantity
increasing. When the pilot carries out the normal fuel imbalance drill the No.2 fuel pumps will
be switched off. This will then stop the fuel transfer.
If the LH fuel tank becomes over full the system is designed to vent fuel in order to avoid
damage to the fuel tank. Crews should therefore not only be aware of any fuel imbalance and
take corrective action early, but should also note the fuel quantity in the tank to ensure that it
does not increase.
If a flight has to be made using manual pressurisation, to avoid large pressure pulses in the
aircraft the following procedures should be adopted:
a) On the ground before closing the aircraft doors the pressurisation manual
controller should be set to the fully up position (only one pack, usually Pack
2, should be used prior to engine start to reduce cabin airflow and
uncomfortable pressure changes).
b) Just prior to take off set the pressurisation manual controller to the 11
o’clock position. After take-off, set the Cabin Rate of climb to Zero and
compare the indicated Cabin Altitude to the Pressurisation Table in the
QRH. At the appropriate Aircraft Altitude start the Cabin climbing at 500
FPM and recheck the EICAS pressurisation parameters every 5000’.
When the Aircraft is levelled the Cabin Rate of Climb should be levelled
as well and monitored. Usually the controller will be positioned between
the 11 and 12 o’clock positions. At TOD the Cabin Rate of Descent should
be set at 500 FPM and levelled each time the Aircraft is levelled for a
significant period. The QRH Aircraft/cabin Altitude conversion table (NAP
26) can be used to maintain cabin altitude consistent with aircraft altitude.
c) The aircraft should be fully depressurised (diff pressure = zero) a the manual
controller set to fully up by 1000 agl on approach.
It should also be noted that whilst in manual control the pressurisation dump
button will not be operative. To depressurise the aircraft select UP on the
manual controller.
If a fault occurs in a Brake Control Unit it may cause uncommented braking equivalent to
50% pedal displacement to either inboard or outboard wheels. If this occurs, commanding
the pedals to more than 50% of pedal displacement may not increase braking.
EICAS messages may not be displayed when this fault occurs. If an uncommented brake
application occurs the procedure to adopt is as follows :
(To identify which pair of wheel brakes has been affected by the BCU fault, pull either the
outboard wheel brakes circuit breaker, or the inboard wheel brake circuit breaker, and check
that the uncommented brake actuation has ceased. If the actuation has not ceased, reset the
pulled circuit breaker and pull the other.)
Flight tests and simulations have shown that with a failure during take-off or landing all
distances remained within allowed limits.
The EICAS advisory message RADALT FAIL indicates the failure of RadAlt 1 in the case of a
single installation, or radalts 1 and 2 in the case of a dual installation. The message RADALT
1(2) FAIL indicates which RadAlt has failed in the case of dual installation. The EGPWS
interfaces only with RadAlt 1, and therefore also fails if RadAlt 1 fails. In this case EICAS will
display GPWS and TER INOP cautions. If a Radio Altimeter fails it is acceptable to trip the
associated Radio Altimeter Circuit Breaker to avoid spurious GPWS warnings.
If a CB trips (due to a fault), it should not be reset by the Flight Crew, either during ground
operations or in flight. Tripped CBs must be reported to maintenance personnel (this does
not apply to the Nose Wheel Steering CB). Resetting a tripped CB may cause the CB to
trip again and may cause the entire Busbar associated with this CB to be de-energised.
If, in the Captain’s judgement, the equipment associated with a tripped CB is essential to the
safety of the flight, the following must be considered prior to a CB reset.
If the CB trips a second time the corresponding equipment must be considered inoperative
and the CB must not be reset again.
Resetting the fuel pump circuits, or the fuel quantity indicating system CBs is
prohibited.
Vibration can occur at any airspeed or phase of flight and is felt through the control column
and/or throughout the cabin. It has been determined that the vibration is produced by the
elevator surfaces. The vibration is an undesirable characteristic, but it produces no effect on
the flying qualities, controllability or structural integrity of the aircraft.
The aeroplane may be operated normally, provided that the following aircraft
behaviour is confirmed:
In order to verify that the vibration is eliminated or reduced by using the stabiliser
anti-icing system, proceed:
The EICAS message NO ICE – A/ICE ON may be displayed during the test.
Once the phenomenon has been clearly identified there is no need to repeat the
procedure above if the vibration appears again during the flight.
When the QRH calls for an increase in airspeed for landing, the speed bugs
must be set as follows:
Vapp now becomes the target speed to achieve above the runway threshold
except for an abnormal flap landing where Vapp should be maintained until
touchdown.
In any situation where both engines are not operating, or a system or part of a system is not
functioning normally, consideration should be given as to the advisability of taxiing the
aircraft.
When in doubt, the aircraft should be stopped as soon as possible without causing
congestion, if necessary using the emergency brake, and the aircraft towed to its parking
position. In such circumstances, contact the handling Agent and adopt the Company SOP
for passenger handling, if appropriate.
In the event of a galley emergency (e.g. fire) the shed bus must be switched OFF. This will
isolate all electrical power to the galley. The Cabin Crew should be informed of this
selection, as it will disable some of the cabin lighting systems and the pre-programmed
briefing system.
Below 80 kts, either pilot may command the stop for any significant failure. This is because
the aircraft has relatively low energy and the risk of a runway excursion is negligible. In this
event, the captain retains the thrust levers and applies the brakes to bring the aircraft to a
halt, and the right-seat pilot retains the control column.
Above 80 kts, the FO must only command a stop for a potential runway blockage or a
control malfunction. For any other malfunction the FO must announce it to the Captain who
will make the clear decision to stop or to continue the take-off. This is because the aircraft
has high energy, and the risk of Excursion increases as the aircraft approaches V1.
If it is the RHS Pilot handling the aircraft and the decision to stop occurs above 80kts, the
LHS Pilot will automatically take control. The take-off should be abandoned by retarding the
Thrust Levers.
For any other indication, the Captain may call "Stop, Stop" if he considers the safety of the
aircraft is in doubt. If he considers it safer to continue he must call "GO". The acceleration
rate of the aircraft (3 – 5 kts per sec) means that the decision to stop must be taken, and
action to stop the aircraft must be initiated, by V1, otherwise stopping the aircraft within
the runway is not guaranteed.
Following an engine failure below V1 the take off MUST be rejected because the aircraft
may not be capable of achieving flight before the end of the runway. Pilots must be vigilant
on every take-off and alert for the unexpected.
Pilots are advised that a burst tyre on take off will significantly increase the distance in which
the aircraft can be stopped. Therefore it is recommended that in this situation the take off is
continued if it occurs above 80 kts.
Caution: With a shredded tyre, retracting the gear after take off could be unwise subject to
climb out performance considerations.
Following a RTO a further take-off may be made without inspection of the brakes and
wheels provided:
If these conditions are not met the aircraft must be returned to stand for maintenance
inspection.
For all Take-offs, the LP will guard the Thrust levers. Following a call of "Stop, Stop [I have
control]" the LP should pull both Thrust Levers to idle whilst simultaneously applying
maximum appropriate anti-skid braking.
The RP Calls:
a. "Spoilers OPEN"
b. Speed Calls every 10 kts decreasing
c. “900 m” - alternating red and white centreline lights
d. “300 m” - all red centreline lights
The RP should then advise ATC that the aircraft is rejecting and if appropriate that a fire
warning is indicated. ATC should be asked if they can see any evidence of fire from the
tower. In the event of a fire or situation that may deteriorate (brake fire, fluid leakage),
the aircraft should be stopped on the Runway and parked in an appropriate direction to
position the fire downwind, followed by a review of the failure and appropriate actions.
The Cabin Crew should be contacted by use of the Cabin Emergency Button at an
appropriate time within 15 seconds of coming to rest. Crews should be alert to the
potential for Brake Overheat conditions that may lead to fire and therefore should
monitor the Hydraulics page.
In the event of an engine fire indication on start the Captain is to glean as much
information as possible from the ground crew via intercom and if the warning is considered
not to be spurious, carry out the Vital Actions for the Engine Fire. The Captain is then to
take control and direct the actions to be taken.
LP:
Stop the aircraft on the runway and park appropriately for the wind.
RP:
Completes the Fire Drill immediate actions
LP:
Monitors the drill then liaises with ATC and the CC
RP:
Completes the Fire Drill items from the QRH
NOTE: If the fire message remains illuminated after both fire
extinguishers have been discharged the aircraft must be evacuated.
Captain:
Informs the CC that evacuation is required on his PA command
Informs ATC
First Officer:
Completes his memory items of the evacuation drill
NOTE: If the Captain considers that a Fire Warning was a spurious warning and it has
been confirmed by Fire Crews that there are no signs of fire and the fire warning has
cancelled, the aircraft may be taxied clear of the runway once the Fire Drill has been
completed.
If an engine failure occurs at altitude and an immediate descent is not required (i.e. terrain
clearance) continuous thrust must be selected (thrust lever in the detent). The aircraft IAS
should be allowed to decrease in level flight to Vfs (clean). The drift down is then flown in
"speed mode". Gross driftdown altitudes are available from chapter 5 of this manual.
If a single engine cruise is required to divert, then the IAS for aircraft weight, altitude and
SAT should be obtained from section 5 of this manual.
NOTE: The aircraft must always be operated within one hour’s flight time
from a suitable alternate on one engine (275 kts).
When in receipt of a red wind shear warning the following actions must be carried out from
memory:
Thrust Levers...................................................................................................MAX
Autopilot.............................................................................................. DISENGAGE
Go Around Button....................................................................................... PRESS
An Amber caution is advisory. It is therefore not usually mandatory to carry out the escape
manoeuvre in the event of an amber caution. However, should the guidance be engaged
by pressing of a Go-Around button capture or automatically it is to be followed.
Rotate the aircraft smoothly to minimise speed loss. Flight guidance on EADI must be
followed.
Maintain aircraft configuration. Do not change gear and flap position until terrain clearance is
assured (It is possible that Flap limiting speeds will be exceeded). PM should call out the RA
heights and climbing/descending. Once the aural warning has cancelled, aircraft is climbing
and ground contact is no longer an immediate concern the G/A button should be pressed to
re-program the FD. If the FD wind shear Recovery Mode cancels the standard go around
actions should be carried out to ensure the correct configuration and FGC Modes are made.
If the wind shear Recovery Mode does not cancel the wind shear Recovery actions must be
continued. During the clean-up note limiting speeds such as Gear retraction and Flap 45
and record any exceedances in the Tech Log after landing.
3.16 LIGHTNING
Take the precautions under ‘Turbulence’. Also make full use of weather radar advising ATC
of all course changes. Turn all cockpit lights fully up. In the event of a lightning strike, review
integrity of compasses, radios and electrical systems. Be aware of the possibility of
structural damage and make a PA to the passengers.
After a lightning strike a Tech Log entry must be made and the aircraft inspected by an
engineer before the next flight.
There is a potential hazard of a lightning strike affecting both intake airflows on narrow
bodied aircraft with FADEC controlled, fuselage mounted engines, with the associated
potential for a double engine flame out. When approaching an area where the potential for
lightning strikes exist, when the APU is available, it is to be started.
If an engine auto shuts down following a lightning strike, dependant on the phase of flight
and that there are no other abnormal engine indications an airstart should be attempted.
Certain QRH drills call for use of the flap manoeuvring speed. In this context the
speeds are as follows:
When multiple malfunctions exist, each of which has a unfactored Landing Distance factor
in the QRH, the factors should be dealt with in the following manner:
Where the factors are cumulative e.g. Brakes Degraded and Reduced Flap Landing, the
factors should be multiplied.
Where the factors are not cumulative e.g. Reduced Flap Landing and Jammed Rudder,
the higher factor should be used along with the associated IAS.
Following a Flight Instrument failure or failure of an aid in use on the PF’s instrumentation
only e.g. ASI, Altimeter, Localiser, Glideslope. The following actions should be carried out
promptly:
Failure of the No 1 Integrated Computer (IC-600 1) is indicated by the display of a red “X”
on PFD 1, MFD 1 and the EICAS.
NOTE: The emergency and abnormal procedures are the same on each aircraft with the
exception of those fitted with ISIS as described in Section 2.7.3
Airborne
If the COMM that is connected to the Back Up Tuning Head becomes dashed on the RMU
the COMM may be tuned with this tuning head but only when it is in Emergency Mode.
If the transponder mode or code is dashed on the RMU the other transponder may be
selected by placing the tuning cursor on the transponder mode/code and pressing the 1/2
button. This may be done on either RMU.
Ground
Cycling the Avionics Masters Switches will remove the dashed indications.
If uncommented aircraft swerving occurs on landing the following actions should be taken:
The use of maximum differential brakes and maximum rudder pedal input may
be needed and should be used until the aircraft has come to a standstill.
The key factor for a successful landing is a stabilised approach and proper thrust/flare
coordination.
Do not extend the flare at idle thrust as it will significantly increase landing distance.
Reducing to idle before the flare will also require an increase in pitch. Flaring high and
quickly reducing thrust to idle can cause the aircraft to settle abruptly.
Do not apply stabiliser trim during the flare.
When a light bounce occurs, maintain or re-establish a normal landing attitude. Increasing
pitch can lead to a tail strike. Beware of the increased landing distance and use thrust as
required to soften the second touchdown. When a more severe high, hard bounce occurs,
initiate a go-around – do not attempt to land. Press the go-around button and
advance thrust levers to MAX. Hold the flare attitude until the engines spool up and reset
stabiliser trim, then follow normal go-around procedures.
Note that a second touchdown may occur during such a low level procedure. Therefore,
the landing gear must NOT be retracted until a positive rate of climb is achieved.
All hard landings must be reported to LMC after landing and before the aircraft operates
any further flights.
3.23.1 General
1) The EGPWS may provide little, if any, warning for flight towards
steep terrain.
2) The EGPWS will provide little, if any, warning for a normal stabilised
descent in landing configuration into level terrain, where there is no
operating glide-slope or where the “Minimums” alert feature has not been
utilised.
3) All modes are inactive below 30 feet AGL in order to avoid nuisance
warnings caused by ground-effect-induced static pressure fluctuations.
4) All modes are inactive above 2450 feet AGL, which represents the
altitude cut off limit to eliminate nuisance warnings at en-route altitudes.
When an EGPWS / GPWS CAUTION occurs, adjust the aeroplane flight path until the
CAUTION alert ceases
3.23.5 EGPWS
The operation of the EGPWS will occur on the aircraft power-up, through the 115 V AC Bus
During this phase, the pilot can insert the airport ID (identification) through the CDU, or if
necessary he can just press the accept button on the CDU to accept the current position
stored in the FMC's memory. At the power-up of the equipment, if there is a failure
with the system, the EICAS can display a warning message, or even during its test
procedure, the computer can show a failure message. Prior to T/O the EGPWS is to be
displayed on the P2 MFD. In the event of an engine failure followed by an emergency turn
procedure the EGPWS may activate but must be ignored. this occurs because the limits
defined in the terrain function of the EGPWS are greater than those specified for an
emergency turn procedure.
The switch is installed on the main panel and is used during approach mode in airports not
covered by EGPWS database. It assures protection against unwanted terrain alerts. It
inhibits the terrain mode operation, and, if actuated, the caution message "TERRAIN INOP"
is displayed on the EICAS display.
a. The accuracy of the aeroplane position data from the FMS becomes
inadequate for navigation (DR mode). This will not affect the basic
GPWS functions. If the FMS is restored after a period of inadequacy,
the terrain awareness may be enabled by pressing the Terrain
Override button a second time.
b. Within 15 nm of T/O, approach or landing at an airport where any of
the following conditions apply :
1. The airport has no approved instrument approach procedure.
2. The longest runway is less than 1070 m in length.
3. The airport is not included in the Allied Signal database.
INDICATION LOGIC
GPWS (WARNING) WARNING condition
GPWS INOP (CAUTION) GPWS function inoperative
TERR INOP TERRAIN function inoperative
3.24 T R A F F I C A N D C O L L I S I O N A V O I D A N C E S Y S T E M
3.24.1 Testing
TCAS will continuously test and monitor itself, but a pilot initiated TCAS test during flight
deck preparation is recommended by the manufacturer. This check will be performed as part
of the first flight of the day checks under the item headed RMU.
To initiate the Pilot Activated Self-Test, (PAST), locate the yellow cursor box over any item
of the TCAS section of the RMU radio page and press the TST button. An aural message
‘TCAS TEST’ is generated along with the same message being displayed on the RMU.
Release the test button after the TCAS TEST message to prevent red lines on VSI staying
in place at end of test. In the event of a successful test, the aural message ‘TCAS TEST
PASS’ is generated after a few seconds. Pilots should confirm the appearance of the
TCAS test screen on the MFD, which shows an example of each type of traffic and also
the appearance of red and green arcs on the VSI.
The TCAS test display on the MFD should be cleared by momentarily selecting the
transponder to TA/RA before reverting to STANDBY.
Before start, check that both displays are selected to AUTO by reference to the TCAS page
on the RMU.
Taxiing in LVPs or crossing runways the TCAS should be selected to TA/RA and
displayed on at least one of the MFD. At all other times ATC Mode A only should be
selected in accordance with the normal checklist. Just prior to take-off, TA/RA mode
should be selected on the transponder control on the RMU and the TCAS display should
be activated on at least one MFD.
During climb, the ABOVE display should be selected on the RMU, along with a suitable
range, 12 or 20 nm initially, then 20 or 40 nm once at higher levels.
Once in the cruise, the NORMAL display can be selected on the TCAS control, until BELOW
is selected at the top of descent. As the aircraft descends into the lower levels, the selected
range should be reduced in order to avoid a cluttered and possibly confusing display.
CAUTION: Only intruder aircraft equipped with an operating transponder can generate
advisories on the TCAS display.
Follow all RAs, even if this takes the aircraft above the maximum certified flight level of
FL370.
Respond to the RA within 5 seconds (2.5 seconds for a reversal RA) to achieve the desired
rate within 5 seconds.
If stick shake or initial buffet occurs during the manoeuvre, immediately accomplish stall
recovery or if high-speed buffet occurs, relax stick force as necessary but continue with
manoeuvre.
If and when TCAS is unable to track the bearing of an intruder, the traffic advisory appears
in the top right of the TCAS display in amber e.g. TA 2.0 + 00. This shows traffic 2nm away
at a similar altitude. In the event of an RA, the display would show e.g. RA 3.0 + 02. A
vertical arrow pointing either up or down, indicating rates of climb / descent in excess of
500 feet per minute will display to the right of the altitude figure. TCAS’s ability to compute
a traffic or resolution advisory is not degraded by lack of bearing information.
NOTE: For any Resolution Advisory event, of for any visually acquired TA where
avoidance action was considered necessary, an Air Safety Report must subsequently
be filed.
3.24.4 General
Although RA instructions are in the vertical plane, if one is received whilst in a turn, that
turn may be continued but be aware that TCAS assumes that bank angle will be less than
15 degrees for climb performance purposes.
Note that at higher speeds, TCAS can generate a RA at considerable horizontal miss
distances. Additionally, TCAS has no knowledge of intent; it will issue a RA on the basis of
current vertical speed, unaware of any intention to level off before the encounter occurs.
When high vertical rates are involved, TCAS can issue a RA while one or both aircraft are
still well short of their cleared levels. A RA need not imply a loss of standard ATC
separation, nor does it necessarily imply an ATC error.
PM should still alert PF to the first appearance of proximate traffic. However, the PM
workload is effectively reduced by removing the need to constantly update the position of
multiple proximities.
The equipment will continuously test and monitor itself. If an in-flight failure of the TCAS
occurs, TCAS FAIL is enunciated at the top/right of the traffic display. In this case, select the
Transponder mode to ATC+ALT, replacing TA/RA, on the RMU, and de-select the TCAS
display on the MFD.
In the event of Transponder failure, the alternate unit should be selected and it should be
verified that the XPDR FAIL message extinguishes and that the TCAS display remains
active.
The following procedures are to be used if a pilot suffers any medical symptoms in flight
which might impair his ability to handle the aeroplane such that, if he were in a two pilot
crew, he would hand over control. These symptoms include severe pain (especially sudden
headache or chest pain), dizziness, blurring or partial loss of vision, disorientation, vomiting
or diarrhoea. The procedures must be followed even if the pilot has apparently recovered,
as temporary symptoms are often a warning of more severe illness to follow, and self
diagnosis is notoriously unreliable.
If the affected pilot is handling the aeroplane, he is immediately to inform the other pilot and
hand over control to him. The destination, base or appropriate agency, is to be informed of
the problem and a diversion made to the nearest suitable landing aerodrome, bearing in
mind the nature and severity of the symptoms and the availability of medical facilities.
The affected pilot is not to take control again for the remainder of the flight and is to lock his
shoulder harness to prevent him falling on to the controls if the illness becomes more
severe. The affected pilot is not to fly again as a crew member until he has been medically
examined or, in the case of diarrhoea or vomiting, has had no symptoms for 24 hours. Refer
to Operations Manual Part A.
Complete incapacitation may be subtle or overt, and may not be preceded by any warning.
Whilst incapacitation may occur at any stage of flight, fatal collapse among flight crew has
most commonly occurred in the critical stages of approach and landing when ground
proximity presents a direct hazard. Where the pilot handling the aeroplane is incapacitated,
an accident is inevitable, unless the other pilot detects the collapse and is able to assume
control in sufficient time.
Detection of the incapacitation in the subtle case may be indirect, i.e. only as a result of
the pilot not taking some expected action. If for example, the pilot conducting the approach
to land collapses without any overt sign and the body position is maintained, the other pilot
will not be aware of his colleague's collapse until the expected order of events becomes
interrupted.
In the context of pilot incapacitation, it is essential that crew members closely monitor the
aeroplane's flight path in the critical stages of take-off, initial climb, final approach and
landing, and immediately question any deviation from the norm.
Normal crew duties require that during all stages of the flight, pilots and other crew members
call the handling pilot's attention to any deviation from the normal flight path or ATC
clearance. Adherence to this procedure should assist early detection of the incapacitation of
the handling pilot.
Where the pilot handling the aeroplane has collapsed, the other pilot will assume control.
Once incapacitation has been detected, the first requirement is to ensure that the affected
pilot does not interfere with any control, and to control the aircraft’s flight path. It is
therefore essential that his harness should be locked and, if possible, the seat slid back.
Consideration should be given, if practical, to the briefing and use of cabin crew or
passengers for this task, but caution must be observed due to the risk of the seat moving
forward when it becomes unlocked. The next priority is to re-plan the flight, including
consideration of diverting to the nearest suitable destination.
Medical advice indicates that immediate first aid is not essential or necessary in cases of
sudden incapacitation. Therefore, any attempts at first aid should be delayed until the
immediate operational problems have been dealt with.
Summary
In a two pilot operation, the recovery from a detected incapacitation of the handling pilot
shall follow the sequence below:
a) the fit pilot must assume control and return the aeroplane to safe
flight path;
b) the fit pilot must take whatever steps are possible to ensure that the
incapacitated pilot cannot interfere with the handling of the aeroplane. These steps
may include involving cabin crew and passengers to restrain the incapacitated pilot.
c) the fit pilot must land the aeroplane as soon as practicable to ensure
the safety of the occupants.
In the event of incapacitation on the flight deck, the Cabin Attendant is to be called on the
intercom by the fit pilot and informed. The fit pilot must remain at the controls.
The Cabin Attendant is to gain entry to the flight deck by use of the flight deck door key,
located with the forward oxygen manual release tool on both the EMB 145.
“Please return to your seats and ensure that your seatback and table are in the
upright position and the armrests down. All hand luggage must be stowed under
the seat in front of you or in an overhead locker. Do not use mobile telephones or
other electronic equipment. Your seatbelt must be securely fastened in preparation
for landing. After landing please remain seated with your seatbelt fastened until the
seatbelt sign is switched off.”
6. After shutdown leave the seatbelt sign ON until the First Officer has entered the cabin
to open the main door and supervise the disembarkation of the incapacitated
crewmember.
4)
5 )
6)
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8)
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24)
TAKEOFF – FLAPS,
TAKEOFF – TRIM,
TAKEOFF – SPOILERS
Performance data is specific to the EMB 145 MP (engines AE3007A1P) The aircraft specific
Gross Mass Chart performance manuals are identical in layout and calculated by crew in the
same way. Applicable engine and aircraft specific performance tables are provides on each
aircraft flight deck for destination and alternates. The use of EMB 135 Performance on a
EMB 145 aircraft (or vice versa) could be catastrophic and therefore crews must ensure they
are using the correct data as identified on each page. The Performance Folder will also be
clearly marked with the relevant aircraft variant.
For the purpose of complying with Nig.CAR’s, the EMB 145 aircraft is classified in
Performance Group A. The performance information in this section is in compliance with the
Transport Category (passenger) of Nig.CAR’s 8.9 commercial air transport (Passenger).
25. This volume contains the performance data required to despatch the aircraft taking in
account certified performance standards and operating rules. Reference is made also to the
EMB 145 Aeroplane Flight Manual (AFM), Technical Data. Aerodrome Performance pages
(Gross Mass Charts – GMC) are produced by Navtech Performance Program using the
Embraer Performance modules and based on field length and obstacle data.
Airfields, runways or intersections take-offs not covered by GMCs shall not be used.
Pilots are not permitted to use the AFM directly to calculate take-off or landing data.
The performance information given for the EMB 145 is applicable to the engine AE
3007A1P.
All performance data in this section are based on the following conditions:
An Icing ON RTOW must be calculated and used if icing conditions are anticipated from
take off to 1500 ft AAL.
4.1.4 Definitions
Indicated Airspeed - KIAS. It is the reading on the airspeed indicator (knots), as installed
in the aeroplane, uncorrected for static source position error. Zero instrument error is
assumed.
Calibrated Airspeed - KCAS. It is the indicated airspeed (knots), corrected for static
source position error.
Critical Engine Failure Speed - VEF. It is the speed at which, if one engine fails, the failure
is recognised at V1.
1G Stall Speed - VS1G. Is the minimum speed at which the lift provided by the aeroplane is
capable of supporting its weight.
Take off Decision Speed - V1. The maximum speed in the take-off at which the pilot must
take the first action (e.g. apply brakes, reduce power, deploy speed brakes) to stop the
aeroplane within the accelerate-stop distance. V1 also means the minimum speeds in the
take-off, following a failure of the critical engine at VEF at which the pilot can continue the
take-off and achieve the required height above the take-off surface within the take-off
distance.
Rotation Speed - VR. It is the speed at which rotation is initiated during the take off, to
attain the take off safety speed at or before a height of 35 ft above runway surface.
Take off Safety Speed - V2. The target speed to be attained at a screen height, during a
take off with an engine failure.
Air Minimum Control Speed - VMCA. The minimum flight speed at which the aeroplane is
controllable with a maximum 5° bank, when one engine suddenly becomes inoperative
with the remaining engine operating at takeoff power. The value presented represents the
most critical combination of power, weight, and centre of gravity.
Ground Minimum Control Speed - VMCG. The minimum speed on the ground at which
the take off can be continued, utilising aerodynamic controls alone, when one engine
suddenly becomes inoperative and the remaining engine is operating at take off power.
The value presented represents the most critical combination of power, weight, and
centre of gravity.
Landing Reference Speed. VREF xx. The speed at a 50 ft height in a normal landing. This
speed is presented in the Landing Reference Speed Charts according to landing
configuration (gear down or specific landing flaps 22º or 45º).
Manoeuvring Speed. VA. The maximum speed at which application of full available aileron
rudder will not overstress the aeroplane. Manoeuvre involving pitching control must not
exceed the limit load factor defined in AFM Chapter 2 - Limitations.
Minimum Control Speeds During Landing And Approach. VMCL. It is the minimum
control speed in the landing configuration.
Final Take off Segment Speed VFS. It is the speed to be achieved during final take off
segment, with landing gear up and flaps retracted.
4.1.4.2 Performance
Gross Performance. This represents the average performance which a fleet of aeroplanes
can be expected to achieve if satisfactorily maintained and when flown in accordance with
the required techniques.
Net Performance. The majority of the data scheduled is net performance which is the gross
performance diminished by the amount considered necessary to allow for various
contingencies which cannot be directly accounted for operationally, such as the need to
manoeuvre, unavoidable variations in piloting technique, temporarily below average
performance etc. It is extremely improbable that the net performance will not be achieved in
operation provided that the correct maintenance procedures are adopted and that the
aeroplane is flown in accordance with the required techniques.
Wet Runway. A runway is considered wet when the runway surface is covered with water,
or equivalent. less than 3 mm or when there is sufficient moisture on the runway surface to
cause it to appear reflective, but without significant areas of standing water.
Damp Runway. A runway is considered damp when the surface is not dry, but when the
moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance. Dry runway performance is to be used.
Dry Runway. A dry runway is one which is neither wet nor contaminated and includes those
paved runways which have been specially prepared with grooves or porous pavement and
maintained to retain 'effectively dry' braking action even when moisture is present.
4.1.4.3 Meteorological
Static Air Temperature - SAT. Outside air temperature as indicated on the MFD.
True Outside Air Temperature. The free air static (ambient) temperature.
Wind Velocity. The actual wind velocity at a 10 m (32.8 ft) height, reported from the tower
and corrected by the wind component chart to a headwind or tailwind component parallel to
the flight path.
Some of the terms used in the take off path are defined below.
Screen Height. The altitude to be attained above the take off surface at the end of take off
distance (35 ft for dry runways and 15 ft for wet runways).
Take off Distance. The greater of the distance from the start of the take off to the point at
which the aeroplane is at the screen height, with a failure of one engine at VEF; or 115 per
cent of the distance with all engines operating, from the start of the take off to the screen
height.
Take off Run.
When a clearway exists: the greater of the distance from the start of the take off to a point
equidistant between lift-off and the point at which the aeroplane is at screen height, with a
failure of one engine at VEF; or 115 per cent of the distance from the start of the take off to a
point equidistant between lift-off and the point at which the aeroplane is at screen height,
with all engines operating.
When a clearway does not exist: the greater of the distance from the start of the take off to
the point at which the aeroplane is at screen height, with a failure of one engine at VEF; or
115 percent of the distance from the start of the take off to the point at which the aeroplane
is at screen height, with all engines operating.
Accelerate-Stop Distance. The horizontal distance traversed from brake release to the
point at which the aeroplane comes to a complete stop on a take off during which the pilot
elects to stop at V1. The accelerate-stop distance must not exceed the length of the runway
plus the length of the stop way.
Clearway. A clearway is an area beyond the runway, not less than 500 feet wide, centrally
located about the extended centre line of the runway, and under the control of the airport
authorities. The clearway is expressed in terms of a clearway plane, extending from the end
of the runway with an upward slope not exceeding 1.25%, above which no object nor any
portion of the terrain protrudes, except that threshold lights may protrude above the plane if
their height above the end of the runway is not greater than 36 inches and if they are located
to each side of the runway.
Stopway. A stop way is an area beyond the runway, not less in width than the width of the
runway, centrally located about the extended centre line of the runway, and designated by
the airport authorities for use in decelerating the aeroplane during a rejected take-off. To be
considered as such, a stop way must be capable of supporting the aeroplane during a
rejected takeoff without inducing structural damage to the aeroplane.
The net flight path is the gross (actual) path diminished by the gradient required by
regulation.
Take-off Flight Path. The take-off flight path begins 35 ft above the take-off surface at the
end of the take-off distance required and extends to a point at which the aeroplane is at
least 1500 ft above the take-off surface or has achieved the en route configuration and final
segment speed, whichever occurs last.
Reference Zero. This is the reference to which the co-ordinates of the various points in the
take-off are referred to. It is defined as the end of the take-off distance required and 35 ft
below the flight path at this point.
Acceleration Altitude. The barometric altitude used to initiate the retraction of flaps for an
all-engines operating go-around, or to commence level-off and acceleration to Vfs for a one-
engine inoperative go-around. Normally go–around Acceleration Altitude should be a
barometric altitude 1000’ (one thousand) above the airfield elevation rounded up to the next
hundred feet, unless specified otherwise by the Gross Mass Chart (GMC).
First Segment. Extends from the 35 ft above reference zero to the point at which the
landing gear is fully retracted, using take-off power and take-off flaps, at a speed not less
than V2.
Second Segment. Extends from the point at which gear is fully retracted to the level off
height (400 ft minimum), using take-off power and take-off flaps at a constant V2.
Third Segment. The horizontal distance required to accelerate, at constant altitude, using
take-off power to the final segment speed while retracting flaps.
Final Segment. Extends from the end of the third segment to a gross height of at least
1500 ft, with flaps up, take-off power during five minutes and maximum continuous power
after that, and at final segment speed.
Gross Climb Gradient. The ratio, expressed as a percentage of the change in geometric
height divided by the horizontal distance (both in the same unit) travelled in a given time.
The gradients shown on the charts are true gradients, i.e., they are derived from geometric
(not pressure) rates of climb.
Net Climb Gradient. The demonstrated gross gradient reduced by 0.8% during take-off
phase and 1.1% en-route.
Gross Height. The geometric height attained using gross climb gradient in a given time.
Net Height. The geometric height attained using net climb gradient in a given time. Net
height is used to determine a net flight path which will clear any obstacle by at least 35 ft to
comply with the regulations.
The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for takeoff and landing is 30 kts
measured at tower height of 10 m (32.8 ft). The demonstration was made with both engines
operating on a dry runway and using VREF plus half the maximum gust intensity.
The following maximum crosswind limits are recommended by the manufacturer (these are
not AFM limitations):
Take-off performance is provided for max Take-off thrust (T/O-1), and reduced, or Alternate
(ALT T/O-1), take-off thrust modes. Whenever possible, ALT T/O-1 thrust must be used as it
significantly increases engine life. For A1/3 engines, T/O mode is the maximum permissible
thrust at take-off for the existing conditions and pressure altitude. This rating is limited to 5
minutes.
In the case of engine failure the remaining FADEC will command the operating engine to
T/O RSV mode.
Also for A1/3 engines, ALT T/O-1 is an engine rating lower than the take-off thrust, intended
for engine life extension. It is also time-limited to 5 minutes. In the case of engine failure the
remaining FADEC will command the operating engine to T/O RSV mode.
T/O-1 is the maximum permitted thrust for go-around. While the thrust is the same as for the
take-off with engine failure case, the N1 scheduled will be different because the effect of the
aircraft speed during go-around is considered. Go-around thrust is also limited to 5 minutes.
Maximum continuous thrust (CON) is the maximum thrust for continuous use. CON thrust
should be used whenever the Captain considers it necessary for safety reasons. It should
not be used as a regular climb mode as it significantly increases engine wear.
There are no particular handling issues with the use of Flap 18° for take-off. Pitch changes
are minimal and the unstick force required is only slightly greater than that required for a flap
9º departure.
The retraction schedule when using Flap 18 requires two stages. Once airspeed is above V2
+ 10, retraction to Flap 9° takes place and when the IAS is V2 + 30, flaps can be further
retracted to zero.
VR, V2, flap retract speeds and VFS are all weight/altitude/temperature related.
The V1 must be obtained by reference to the relevant runway performance pages in OM B4,
where V1 figures are presented after the RTOW. Both pilots must, before every departure,
independently verify the V1 speed to be used.
The C of G envelope and the trim settings for Flap 18° are identical to those for Flap 9°.
In still air or better, below 6,000 ft altitude, there is no Brake Energy limitation below a weight
of 19,990 kgs. Effectively, this limit may be ignored.
When brake temperature indications are working normally a take-off must not be
commenced whilst the brake temperatures are in the amber range.
When brake temperature indications are not working normally a take-off must not be
commenced for 33 minutes from completion of the previous landing, after which time a
check of the thermal wheel plugs must be conducted.
Flap Manoeuvring Speeds allow for an inadvertent 15 degree overshoot beyond the normal
30 degrees of bank over stick actuation.
45 DN 140
The Aircraft Flight Manual has a complete set of charts for determination of the
limiting take-off weights, but pilots are not to operate from airfields, runways or
intersections for which GMC data is not provided.
The GMCs are produced for Air Peace Limited by Navtech. An example chart is shown at
Appendix as part of the EAG preamble.
All performance calculations are made to comply with Nig.CAR’s.
The following procedure will be followed for obtaining the necessary performance data from
the available information on board the aircraft:
From the GMC obtain a Regulated Take Off Weight (RTOW) for the runway to be used,
taking into account the conditions on the day (Temperature, wind component etc). Adjust
this figure for QNH and if taking off in icing conditions. The V1 is then obtained for this
adjusted RTOW.
Landing Climb. Climb from an aborted landing with landing configuration and
speed.
4.2 LANDING
For the final approach wing flaps should be in the landing position and the speed set for that
flap configuration. At 50 ft and at VREF speed, the thrust levers are reduced smoothly. When
the aeroplane is firmly on the ground with the nosewheel in contact the brakes are applied.
Un-factored landing distance is the actual distance to land the airplane from a point 50 ft
above runway threshold at Vref, using only the brakes and spoilers as deceleration
devices (i.e. no engine reverse thrust is used). Unfactored Landing Distance tables are
provided in the QRH.
The Performance data section of the QRH includes Unfactored Landing Distance tables
for Non-Ice and After Ice Encounter speeds. These distances can be corrected for
temperature, slope and runway state to calculate the Landing Distance Required for
abnormal landings.
The required landing distance for dispatch is the unfactored landing distance increased by
1.67 for dry runways or 1.92 for wet runways.
For obtaining the DRY runway factored distance, multiply the unfactored landing distance
by 1.67.
For obtaining the WET runway factored distance, multiply the unfactored landing distance
by 1.92.
a) Temperature:
Flap 22: Add 4.5 m per each °C above ISA.
Decrease 2.5 m per each oC below ISA.
b) Slope:
Flap 22: Add 80 m per each 1 % slope down.
For abnormalities that affect the LDR, the Emergency and Abnormal procedures in the QRH
require the unfactored landing distance to be increased by a specific factor. For most
abnormalities the factor to be applied is less than the normal landing distance required
factors of 1.67 for a dry runway and 1.92 for a wet runway. For many abnormalities it is
therefore acceptable to use the maximum landing weight obtained from the GMC.
4.2.5 Speeds
Landing speeds are provided in the Landing reference Speed tables in the AFM. These
speeds are reproduced in the performance section of the QRH.
The Performance data section of the QRH also includes Unfactored Landing
Distance tables for non-ice and After Ice Encounter speeds.
Wind Correction = 1/2 mean headwind component + full gust increment above
steady wind.
For flap 45 the minimum wind correction is 5 KIAS and the
maximum is 15 KIAS. Vapp = flap 45 should not be greater
than 140 kts.
For flap 22 approaches the minimum wind correction is 5
kts and the maximum is 20 kts.
For emergency and abnormal procedures using flap 0, 9,
or 18, the minimum wind correction is 0 kts and the
maximum is 20 kts.
When there is a wind and an abnormal increment, use the
sum of both increments.
When there are multiple abnormal increments, use the
highest Vref obtained to calculate Vapp.
Landing Climb. Climb from an aborted landing with landing configuration and speed.
The GMCs are produced for Air Peace Limited by Navtech and contained in the Route
Performance Manual (RPM). GMCs contain information regarding takeoff and landing
performance limitations for the EMB 145, AE3007A1P engines operated by Air Peace
Limited. They cover Dry, Wet, Contaminated and Slippery runway performance.
If taking off or landing at airports for which the appropriate GMC is not available, the takeoff
and landing mass should be determined as follows:
1. For Take off data, request the GMC from the Operations Department who will fax it
to the handling agent (make sure that the data is up-to-date).
2. For landing data, use the Scheduled Landing Distance Chart provided in the QRH.
3. Pilots are not permitted to use the AFM directly to calculate take-off or landing data
except where indicated in the Operations Manual B (for instance, gear down ferry).
Instructions for the use of the GMCs is contained in the following
document issued by Navtech and consisting of pages 1-23.
Damp A RWY is considered damp when the surface is not dry, but when the
RWY moisture on it does not give it a shiny appearance. For performance
purposes, a damp runway may be considered to be dry.
V1 The maximum speed in the take-off at which the pilot must take the first
action (e.g. apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy spoilers) to stop the
airplane within the accelerate-stop distance (V1max) . V1 also means the
minimum speed in the take-off, following a failure of the critical engine at
VEF, at which the pilot can continue the take-off and achieve the required
height above the take-off surface within the take-off distance (V1 min).
Vso Stall Speed. The minimum speed at which the lift provided
by the airplane is capable of supporting its weight.
WED Water Equivalent Depth.
Wet Ice - A RWY is considered as Wet Ice or Slippery when the braking action is
Slippery poor, that is with a friction coefficient of 0.16.
Wet RWY A RWY is considered wet when the RWY surface is covered with water,
or equivalent, less than 3mm WED or when there is sufficient moisture on
the RWY surface to cause it to appear reflective, but without significant
areas of standing water.
Dry runway
A dry runway is one that is neither wet nor contaminated.
Damp runway
The runway surface has changed colour due to moisture, but the
runway surface does not appear reflective.
Wet runway
A runway is considered wet when the runway surface is covered with water
which is equivalent or less than 3mm or when there is sufficient moisture on
the runway surface to cause it to appear reflective.
Contaminated runway
A runway is considered to be contaminated when more than 25% of the
runway surface area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the required
length and width being used is covered by the following:
a) Surface water more than 3 mm deep, or by slush, or loose snow, equivalent to more
than 3 mm of water.
b) Snow that has been compressed into a solid mass that resists further compression and
will hold together or break into lumps if picked up (compacted snow).
c) Ice, including wet ice.
4.3.5 Windrose
All airport data used in the calculation is presented on the RPM. The official distances are
presented as TORA, ASDA, TODA and LDA.
The slope is the difference in elevation between the line-up position and the runway end
divided by the distance. This is a mean slope used for calculations.
Aerodrome elevation is the elevation of the Airport Reference Point. This is used for
deciding the general pressure altitude, and is not used for obstacle calculations.
Obstacle data is given as distance from and height above the end of the runway, i.e. the
end of TORA. When calculating obstacle clearance the effect of the slope when the TOD
is shorter than the TODA is considered, i.e. the lift off point will have a different height than
the runway end.
Runway alignment penalties are included. There are three different line up methods
considered.
Line-up with 90 degree entry. (TORA/TODA – 20.0 m; ASDA – 20.0 m) This assumes
that the aircraft comes from a taxiway perpendicular to the runway and makes a 90
degree turn onto the runway. Note that the taxi runway markings will take the aircraft too
far into the runway.
Runways marked NIGHT assumed that taxi lights are followed when
making the alignment.
The engine failure procedure is published in the note in the upper part of the
RPM. Acceleration Height/Altitude.
The RPM is based on a standard Engine Failure Flaps Retraction height of 1000ft
AAL in case of an engine failure. If there are special considerations in conflict with
the standard acceleration height, a non-standard acceleration altitude will be
printed in the note on the RPM.
Example: NON-STD. At D4 XXX turn right and intercept R360 XXX. At 2000 turn right to
XXX HP.
For both the “STD” and “NON-STD” procedures the initial climb will be the
runway QFU unless otherwise specified.
Reason for the use of “STD” and “NON-STD” is that it will make it possible for the pilot to
differentiate between the procedures where an early turn needs to be performed and the
ones where a straight climb and acceleration shall be performed before initiating the turn.
Furthermore it will no longer be required to issue new procedure updates each time the
runway QFU is updated, thus reducing the number of updates.
Note: The use of the term “STD” in the procedure only identifies that it conform with the
design standard where a straight climb to obtain 1500ft above runway end threshold can
be performed before turning to the engine failure procedure holding pattern. It shall in no
way be interpreted as less significant than the “NON-STD” procedures. All published
procedure must always be followed as described in order to obtain and secure required
obstacle clearance and include acceleration phases and temporary obstacle data surveys.
HP’s based on NAVAID fix (VOR/DME) are used for all runways where the climb will take
place over sea. The possible loss in navigational accuracy is compensated by the fact that
the holding pattern track will be located over water where no significant obstacles exist and
where slight drift off doesn’t involve a problem.
This standard applies for all runways where the initial engine failure procedure turn is below
1500ft (i.e. “NON-STD” procedures). Please note that exceptions can be required for certain
runways due to operational criteria etc.
Altitudes will continue to be used for runways were no DME guidance is available or when
the DME is unreliable. The same NAVAID used for the holding pattern will preferentially
be used also for the initial turn.
Note that altitudes will still be used as turn indicator for the “STD” procedures.
Example: NON-STD. At D4.5 XXX turn right to 090°. At 2000 turn right to XXX HP.
Criteria
Terrain clearance provided for failure at V1 and any point after V1. If engine fails
after turn point or turn altitude for the SID/CLP: necessary obstacle clearance is
provided. Turn as stated in ENG FAIL Proc. or shortest way to HP.
Clean up: at normal acceleration altitude or as stated in ENG FAIL
procedure.
Continue to climb at VFS, to obtain one engine out safety altitude, then proceed for
approach to the departure airport, or climb in the engine failure pattern/HP to
MOCA/MORA and proceed to the alternate TKOF airport for landing.
Whenever possible, the ENG FAIL HP will be the same as the published HP. If no
HP is published, or due to obstacle clearance, a special ENG FAIL HP will be
described.
Note: MNM altitude for holding patterns used in ENG FAIL procedures may be lower than
depicted in Route Manual as different design criteria are used, therefore no altitude will be
given in ENG FAIL HP’s.
WARNING: In case of an engine failure during take-off, deviation from the published
ENG FAIL procedure may compromise obstacle clearance. Cessation of the
procedure is permitted when the PIC can be assured of obstacle clearance under the
current flight conditions.
EXPLANATION OF TERMS
COT (Climb On Track) No restriction apply in any direction.
Restrictions. States restrictions such as crosswind limits as well as alternate
procedures to be used in case of unserviceable nav aids etc. Flap settings stated
in ENG FAIL procedure must be used.
Note 2: The altitude reached when entering the holding pattern used in the ENG FAIL
procedure may be lower than depicted in Route Manual as different design criteria are
used, therefore no altitude will be depicted in ENG FAIL HP’s.
The RPM is based on a standard Engine Failure Flaps Retraction Altitude (EFFRA) of
1000ft in case of engine failure. If there are special considerations in conflict with the
standard acceleration altitude, a non-standard acceleration altitude will be printed in
the note on the RPM.
This acceleration altitude is the minimum acceleration altitude for both all engine and
engine failure take-off.
The aircraft configuration and RWY is shown in the header of the RPM.
Item Options
T/O Flaps Optimum, 9, 18
A/I OFF, Eng A/I (5-10°C), ON or Eng A/I valve stuck open
Air-condition ECS Auto
TKOF Thrust T/O or ALT T/O-1
Rudder Deflection 10 or 15
Reference to EMB 145 Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) & EMB145 Quick Response Handling
manual (QRH)
Reference to EMB 145 Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) & EMB145 Quick Response Handling
manual (QRH).
V1, VR and V2 are presented for each take-off mass, all speeds KIAS.
The take-off masses in the RPM are only valid for the indicated flaps setting. It is allowed to
interpolate in the wind/depth and the temperature as long as all data is for the same flaps
setting. If the OAT is not found in the RPM use the closest worse condition. Extrapolation
outside the range of the RPM is NOT ALLOWED.
Procedure
a. Enter the RPM at the ambient wind/depth and OAT. Obtain the performance
limited mass and the QNH correction.
b. Subtract the negative QNH correction per hPA to the limited performance mass if
QNH is below 1013.
If available, add the Wind correction per knot to the performance mass if Wind > 0.
Subtract the Wind correction per knot from the performance mass if Wind < 0.
c. Add or subtract any additional corrections, e.g. Anti-Ice etc, to establish the
corrected Performance Limited Mass.
d. Select speeds using the methods described in Speed selection, chapter 2.11.
e. Note the Maximum V1, VR and V2.
BIRK 01 (see chart above), DRY runway, Flaps 9, OAT 0°C, TW 5, QNH
= 998 hPa (1013-980=33 hPa), ECS Auto and Anti Ice Off.
a. Ambient TW5 and OAT 0°C. Performance Limited Mass = 17605kg and QNH
correction is -330kg (33hPa x -11kg).
b. Subtract QNH correction (17605–330) = 17275kg.
c. No additional correction needed. Corrected Performance Limited Mass = 17275kg.
d. Re-enter the RPM at the ambient wind and locate the nearest value to the Corrected
Performance Limited Mass, rounded up. In this case the closest mass is 17409kg, which
corresponds to OAT 5 °C. Use speeds for OAT 5°C (108-117-121).
e. V1 108, VR 117, V2 121.
a. Depth 6 mm, OAT 0°C. Performance Limited Mass = 17562 kg and QNH
correction is -143kg (13hPa x -11kg).
b. Subtract QNH correction (17562-143) = 17419 kg.
c. Subtract wind correction for TW 5, -2745 kg (5 kts x -549 kg). 17419 – 2745 =
14674 kg. Corrected Performance Limited Mass = 14674 kg.
d. Extrapolation is not allowed, use speeds for OAT 0°C (104-119-123).
e. V1 104, VR 119, V2 123.
Reduced take-off power may be used when the Actual Take-off Mass is lower than the
Maximum Permissible Take-off Mass. Maximum power reduction is limited to 25% of the
rated take-off power for the actual ambient temperature.
Note: Reduced Power Take-off must not be used with the Anti-skid system inoperative
or on a contaminated or slippery runways or following de/anti- icing.
Procedure
a. Enter the RPM chart at the ambient wind and OAT. Obtain the
performance limited mass and the QNH correction.
b. Add (not subtract) any negative corrections, e.g. QNH (if actual QNH is below
1013 add the correction per hPa), Anti-Ice etc, to establish a Corrected Actual
Take-off mass.
c. Re-enter the RPM at the ambient wind and locate the nearest value to
the Corrected Actual Take-off Mass, rounded up. Note the Assumed OAT and
lowest available Reduced Take-off Power.
d. Select take off speeds for the Assumed OAT. Note the Maximum V1, VR
and V2.
Power Example
BIRK 01 (see chart above), DRY runway, Flaps 9, OAT 0°C, TW 5, QNH = 1003
hPa (1013-1003=10 hPa), ECS Off and Anti Ice Off. Actual
Take-off Mass is 15500kg.
The take-off speeds shall be selected for the actual take-off mass. This can be
achieved in three different ways:
The performance limited mass is very close to the actual take-off mass. In this case the
proper speeds can be taken from the RPM chart directly.
The actual take-off mass is lower than the performance limited weight. Two
different methods can be used:
a. Find the assumed temperature in the RPM chart. Select speeds for the
corrected actual take-off mass at the assumed temperature. In order to
select take off speeds using an Assumed temperature, enter the RPM
chart at the ambient wind and find the highest Assumed temperature
where the value is greater than the corrected Actual take-off mass. This is
the standard method when using reduced take-off thrust and will also work
at normal take-off thrust. This method is valid for all RPM charts.
b. Select speeds from speed booklet.
c. V1 must not be lower than VMCG for the actual OAT. If V1 is less than
VMCG, find the appropriate take-off speeds by selecting a higher Take-off
Mass for the ambient wind that does not exceed the calculated Performance
Limited Take-off Mass.
Note: When using reduced take-off power, select speeds for the
Assumed OAT and Corrected actual Take-off Mass.
The corrections are calculated for each runway. Anti-Ice corrections are based on OAT of
less than 10°C.
At the bottom of the RPM there is a footer that contains audit information regarding
the versions of the ToDc or LDc software, SCAP, dataset, and obstacle data used
for the calculation.
e.g. ©Navtech – Air Peace Limited CM TKOF Ver 1.0.2 | SCAP Version:
15/JAN/2007 | Dataset:
EMB145/AE3007A1P/TAKEOFF/JAA/ATOSEP2003/001.30/REV | ObstData:
040513_110000 | Air Peace Limited CM LDG Ver 1.0.1 | SCAP Version LDG :
2.5 |Dataset LDG: 01OCT2007 Elja13_1.dat
The Landing Mass – Field Length Limit Table on the first GWC page presents the
maximum landing weight for the calculated runway. The table shows both weights for
Dry and Wet runway condition.
Enter the table from the left with the desired Flaps configuration and read the weight value in
the appropriate wind column. The left bold value is for Dry runway condition and the right
value is for Wet.
The Landing Mass – Climb Limit Table on the second GWC page presents the maximum
landing weight for a missed approach climb with gradient 2.5% and landing climb gradient
3.2%.
Enter the table from the left with the desired Flaps configuration and read the weight value in
the appropriate temperature column.
Wet Runway
A runway is considered wet when the runway surface is covered with water or Water
Equivalent Depth (WED) of less than 3mm, or when there is sufficient moisture on the
runway surface to cause it to appear reflective, but without significant areas of standing
water.
Contaminated Runway
A runway is considered to be contaminated when more than 25% of the runway surface
area (whether in isolated areas or not) within the required length and width being used is
covered by the following:
Surface water more than 3mm deep, or by slush, or loose snow equivalent to more than
3mm of water (WED). Snow which has been compressed into a solid mass which resists
further compression and will hold together or break into lumps if picked up is known as
compacted snow.
The maximum wind speeds for aircraft towing, pivoting, turning and taxiing are:
Every effort should be made to ensure that the runway surface is cleared of any significant
depth of contaminant before take-off or landing. The performance calculation carried out at
the flight planning stage may no longer be appropriate at the time of take-off. Therefore,
further calculations based on the prevailing conditions may be necessary. Gross Mass
Chart (GMC) take-off performance data is provided for take-off from wet runways and also
from contaminated and slippery runways. The following points apply:
T/O1 thrust and Flaps 9° should be used for take-off from a contaminated
runway.
Use a static take-off if runway friction permits, but do not attempt to hold the
aircraft on the brakes before take-off from a slippery surface.
The ignition system must be switched ON when standing water, ice or snow is
present on the runway.
Apply light forward pressure on the control column to increase nose wheel
steering effectiveness.
During a rejected take-off, apply brakes with moderate to firm pressure, smoothly
and symmetrically. Do not release the brakes and allow the anti-skid system to
operate.
Take-off on a contaminated runway with a tailwind is not permitted.
Braking Technique
The following techniques should be used:
Once the nose wheel is on the runway, apply brakes with
moderate to firm pressure, smoothly and symmetrically. Do not
release the brakes; allow the anti-skid system to operate. This
also applies to a rejected take-off.
If the aircraft is hydroplaning do not apply the emergency
brake, as this will remove anti-skid protection and may cause
the spoilers to close.
Maintain centreline and keep brakes applied until the aircraft
is slowed to a safe speed.
Aquaplaning
Aquaplaning may commence on the Embraer 145 at any speed above 108 kts (9 x √ main
tyre pressure of 145 psi). Once started, aquaplaning may continue to speeds well below 108
kts.
The anti-skid and locked wheel protection system senses differential wheel speeds and
releases pressure to the affected wheel or wheels. Correct operation of the anti-skid
system will be felt as a juddering as pressure is reduced to the affected wheel or wheels.
The anti-skid and locked wheel protection becomes available 3 seconds after touchdown or
when the main wheels have spun up to 50 kts.
Application of brakes before anti-skid is available may cause aquaplaning. If all four main
wheels are locked up, the anti-skid protection system will not detect any difference in wheel
speeds and will not function. If no juddering or braking action is felt, the main wheels may be
locked up and aquaplaning. In this case, brake pedal inputs must be released to allow wheel
speed recovery and then the brakes should be reapplied. The emergency brake must not be
used in this case, as anti-skid protection will be lost, ground spoilers will close and
directional control will be reduced.
The RPM Landing Mass is only valid for the indicated flap setting stated on each chart.
Interpolation using both wind and temperature is permitted, providing all data used is for the
same landing flap setting.
The landing masses in the RPM are only valid for the indicated flaps setting. It is allowed to
interpolate in the wind and the temperature as long as all data is for the same flaps setting.
If the OAT is not found in the RPM use the closest worse condition. Extrapolation outside
the range of the RPM is NOT ALLOWED.
PROCEDURE
a. Enter the RPM at the ambient wind/depth and OAT. Obtain the
performance limited mass and the QNH correction.
b. Subtract the negative QNH correction per hPA to the
limited performance mass if QNH is below 1013.
c. Add the Wind correction per knot to the performance mass if Wind > 0.
Subtract the Wind correction per knot from the performance mass if
Wind < 0.
BIRK 01 (see chart above), CONT runway, Flaps OPT, Depth 3mm, OAT
25°C, TW 5, QNH = 1003 hPa (1013-1003=10 hPa), ECS Auto and Anti Ice
Off.
a. Ambient depth 3mm and OAT 25°C. Performance Limited Mass =
18500kg and QNH correction is 0kg (0hPa x 10kg).
b. Subtract QNH correction (18500–0) = 18500kg.
c. Wind correction is 780kg (5kt x 156kg). Substract Wind correction
(18500-780) = 17720kg. Corrected performance limited mass is
17720kg.
7. 0 LO A D I N G
7. 1 LO A D I N G GE N E R A L
The procedures described below are for the guidance and instruction of personnel
engaged in EMB 145 aircraft dispatch. This section contains aircraft dimensions, interior
arrangement data for loading purposes and loading capacity information for the
passenger cabin and baggage compartment.
The aircraft commander is responsible for the correct and safe loading of the aircraft. He
remains ultimately responsible even when he delegates supervision of loading to a
Handling Agent. Under no circumstances must the aircraft be dispatched if, or there is
any doubt that, the load is different from that on the load sheet as an out of trim
condition may result which could have serious FS implications.
7.1.2 Dimensions
Air Peace Limited offers differing fare structures; however, the seating configuration of the
aircraft is the same for all fare classes.
The passenger cabin has a 0.43m (17in) wide aisle, with a recessed floor leaving a 1.82m
(6ft) height, allows for stand-up walking and the use of standard size catering trolleys. The
cabin is 2.10m (6ft 11in) wide and the configuration operated accommodates:
EMB 145 LR/MP– 50 passenger seats, 16 double seats on the right side (fwd facing) and
18 single seats on the left side.
EMB 145
NOTE: The EMB 145 LR/MP has 18 rows of seats as above. However Air Peace Limited
do not designate a Row 13 hence Cabin compartment C rows are designated 14-19 on
the aircraft.
General
Seat Pitch standard: 79cm (31 inches) Seat
Pitch at Emergency Exits: 97cm (39 inches)
Cabin Configuration: 2 seats / aisle / 1 seat
Flight Deck: 2 +1 observer, if required Wardrobe
capacity/weight: 0.93 m3 (32.9 ft3) = 70kg (154lb)
Overhead bin capacity (total): 10.8 m3 (380.7 ft3) = 224kg (494lb)
Overhead bin capacity (each): 1.20 m3 (42.3 ft3) = 24.8kg (54.8lb)
EMB 145 aircraft must operate with a minimum of single cabin crew, and a maximum of two.
Two jump seats are available.
With a normal Cabin Crew complement, the carriage of unaccompanied minors should be
restricted to two. However, this number may be exceeded where no clear safety issues
arise.
Unaccompanied Minors should be seated in rows 2 and / or 3, seat A.
7.2.2 Infants
Five Infant Seat Belts are carried as standard equipment. More may be requested through
Operations, giving as much notice as possible.
Passengers of reduced mobility, including those who may require lift-on/off assistance should,
whenever possible, be seated in rows 3, 4, 12, 14, seats A or F.
Passenger hand baggage is, whenever possible, to be stowed in the overhead bins. The
aircraft has 7 standard overhead bin assemblies, one short and one very short overhead bin
assembly. The Maximum Mass carried in the overhead bins is 27, 20 and 14 Kgs
respectively. A maximum of 10kg of passenger hand baggage (2 pieces) may be carried in
the cabin. Personal items may be placed in the under-seat stowage provided they are
restrained to prevent sliding. Other items of hand-baggage must be tagged, stowed in the
Hold, and returned to the passenger after disembarkation.
Note: Cargo and baggage loading up to 990 kg are not required to be tied down. If the
baggage compartment is loaded with more than 990 kg (2182 lb), only the exceeding load
must be tied down with a horizontal net.
A baggage restraint is installed to prevent loose baggage shifting in flight and blocking the
inward and upward opening motion of the baggage door.
7.2.8 Lighting
Hold lighting is provided by roof dome lights, automatically controlled by the opening of the
baggage bay door.
Air Peace Limited does not permit carriage of any items considered as Dangerous Goods
(see IATA Dangerous Goods Regulations manual or refer to the Air Peace Dangerous
Goods Manual).
Baggage loading up to 990 kg does not need to be restrained. Loads exceeding this value
up to the Compartment limit must be placed under the cargo restraint net.
Baggage should be evenly distributed across the Hold Compartment and the safety net
secured before closing the door. Baggage may be placed on top of or around secured
cargo, but care must be taken to avoid exceeding the maximum permissible floor loading of
1200kgs and a maximum intensity of floor loading of (390 kg/sqm).
During loading and unloading, the aircraft may adopt a tail-down attitude if the rear fuselage
is too heavily loaded. Whenever heavy loads are carried in the cargo area, care is to be
taken with the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, and loading and unloading
of baggage, to minimise this effect. In such cases passengers should be embarked or
disembarked to ensure even distribution throughout the cabin.
To load the baggage compartment above 800 kg the following conditions should be
observed:
A minimum of 907 kg of fuel shall be on the aircraft AND
No more than one person should be in the cone section
inside the baggage compartment or the rear electronic
compartment.
A Load and Trim Sheet is to be completed for all flight to ensure the Centre of Gravity is
within the prescribed envelope.
With a full cabin, the EMB aircraft may have a forward C of G depending upon the
specification ( e.g. the absence of thrust reversers) and therefore ballast may be required.
7.2.12 Ballast
With all cabin seats occupied, there are occasions when the payload in the Hold is
insufficient to satisfy C of G limits, and it will be necessary to add ballast. Ballast should
be loaded at the front of the baggage compartment, end-on to the forward bulkhead.
Aircraft ballast is normally loaded / unloaded by Ground Handling Staff. To avoid any
confusion (and a possible out-of-trim condition), when ballast is carried it is to be recorded in
the Ballast Sheet in the Tech Log, and a ‘ballast tag’ (see figure below) displayed in the
flight-deck (using the document retaining clip on the Left Pilot’s horizontal side console) until
the Hold ballast is removed and the ballast tag returned to the Tech Log. It is the
commander’s responsibility to ensure that the load sheet correctly reflects the amount of
ballast (or lack of) carried on each flight.
Engineering will ensure there is supply of Ballast Control Sheets in the Tech Log.
The passenger access door is located on the left side of the aircraft at the forward end
of the main fuselage.
A hinged door is located on the rear left side of the fuselage. The door can only be
operated from outside the aircraft. There is no access from the cabin to the
baggage bay area.
The EMB 145 is fitted with a reinforced cockpit door. Crew are not to operate the
EMB 145 until they have conducted cockpit door familiarisation on the aircraft.
Description
The reinforced cockpit door is a bullet-proof door and ensures that the flight and landing
will not be disrupted by intrusion or discharges of a firearm.
o PEEPHOLE
o STRAP HANDLES
o DECOMPRESSION PANEL
o SLIDE BOLT
o LOCKING MECHANICAL DEADBOLT
o VENT PANELS
o PRESSURE SENSITIVE LATCH
The cockpit door is located between the passenger cabin and the cockpit. The reinforced
door is ballistic and intrusion resistant. The reinforced cockpit door has a ballistic-resistant
peephole, a mechanical deadbolt, slide bolt and a pressure sensitive latch.
If the flight crew members need to evacuate from the cockpit in an emergency situation,
there is a pressure sensitive latch that is set manually to release the decompression panel.
Also, there are two strap handles installed at the cockpit side that help remove the
decompression panel. The reinforced door has a vent panel in the upper portion of the door
to assure ventilation. For pressure equalization in the event of a sudden decompression a
pressure sensitive latch is installed to allow the pressure equalization. The pressure-
sensitive latch is set to release when an increase of pressure of 0.88 psi (6.6067 kPa) in 4
ms is detected. This will cause the unit to open. In an emergency situation, the
pressure-sensitive latch can be set manually.
REF DESCRIPTION
1 Vent Panel
2 Locking Deadbolt Assembly
3 Slide Bolt
4 Strap Handle
5 Strap Handle
6 Pressure Sensitive Latch Cover
7 Pressure Sensitive Latch
8 Decompression Panel (Blow-out Panel)
9 Peephole
Deadbolt Operation
Some Embraer 145 have a spring loaded turn handle with a locking latch mechanism
on the flight-deck side which is the normal method of locking the door to prevent
unauthorized access.
Other types EMB 145 have reinforced steel door. It has a slide bolt and a deadbolt
mechanism (see diagram) on the flight- deck side. The normal means of locking the
door to prevent intrusion is by using the side bolt. However, because of the
structure of the reinforced steel door, there is no alternative means of access to the
flight-deck if the slide bolt cannot be unlocked from inside. This situation is only
likely to occur if one pilot leaves the flight-deck for a ‘comfort break’, for example,
and the remaining pilot is incapacitated whilst the door is locked on the inside.
Clearly this could be catastrophic.
To avoid this situation, if either pilot has to leave the flight-deck for any reason, the
cabin crew member must occupy the jumpseat until that pilot returns.
The door also has a mechanical latch (deadbolt) that is manually operated. It has three
positions, but both ‘locked’ positions allow the door to be unlocked from the cabin using a
‘Yale type’ key, two of which are stowed in the cabin: one in the forward safety equipment
stowage next to the oxygen door opening tool, and the second at the rear of the audio
player stowage in the galley. The first key is clearly marked with a tag and is the primary
key. The presence and functionality of these keys must be checked by the Cabin Crew as
part of their pre-flight checks. Loss of the primary key must be reported to the Captain and
Engineers, but the flight may continue providing the secondary key is functional.
In the event of a failure of the slide bolt, the MEL permits dispatch if there is an
alternative means of locking the flight-deck door. The alternative means is to use the
deadbolt lock. In these circumstances at least one of the keys is to be available to
unlock the flight-deck door from the cabin side. The MEL refers.
On aircrafts with reinforced steel door, the door is to be locked using the slide bolt before
engine start. Except for emergency / abnormal use it is to remain locked until the cruise
phase of flight. It is to be locked for the descent and until engine shutdown on Stand.
In the cruise, the door may be opened for comfort breaks / refreshment. To provide
refreshments, the Cabin Crew member must call the Flight Crew using the forward
interphone and request that they unlock the door to allow the Cabin Crew member access.
One of the flight crew will unlock the door having checked it is safe to do so using the ’peep
hole’.
If a member of Flight Crew is to leave the flight deck for a comfort break, they will contact
the Cabin Crew member via the interphone. At this time, the Cabin Crew member will
proceed to the flight deck. The Flight Crew member requiring the comfort break will check
through the peep hole that it is safe to open the door. During the comfort break, the Cabin
Crew member will occupy the flight deck until the Flight Crew member returns.
The flight deck door must remain locked at this time. When the Flight Crew member is ready
to re-enter the flight deck, he must contact the flying Pilot via the forward interphone. At this
time, the Cabin Crew member occupying the flight deck will check through the peep hole
that it is safe to open the door. If so, the Cabin Crew member will unlock the door and leave
the flight deck to enable the Pilot to return to his seat.
NOTE: if an additional pilot, engineer or cabin attendant is occupying the jump seat (as is
often the case on some charters) the operating cabin crew member will not be required to
occupy the flight deck. In this situation, the jump seat occupant must be briefed by the
Captain (in addition to the normal jump-seat safety brief) on the actions required in the event
of single pilot incapacitation. The action required of the jump seat occupant is to contact the
cabin by intercom and open the flight-deck door using the slide lock, having identified the
cabin crew member by use of the ‘peep-hole’.
Crews are to be aware that comfort breaks are more likely on those flights of greater
than two hours and are to plan accordingly. In addition, coordination is required between
the Captain and cabin attendant to ensure that, except ‘in extremis’, comfort breaks are
not taken:
Note: that in terms of disruptive passengers, some groups may be considered as higher
than normal risk: football supporters, or Deportees, for example. It is impractical to consider
every possible situation so crews are to exercise airmanship and basic principles in
establishing when comfort breaks are inappropriate.
If a cabin attendant leaves the cabin between engine start and engine shut-down, for
whatever reason, the captain is to be consulted beforehand.
Comfort breaks are always to be kept to the minimal time necessary and minimal
frequency by sensible crew planning beforehand.
The Mass and Balance Manual provides instructions referring to the weighing and loading of
the EMB 145.
The instructions and Data herein presented are approved by the Airworthiness Authority to
comply with the applicable regulations.
Based on the contained information, the operator can determine the aircraft mass and CG at
any time of flight.
This is the mass of structure, power plant, instruments, interior furnishings, systems,
optional, portable and emergency equipment and other items of equipment that are an
integral part of the aircraft configuration. I t is essentially a dry mass, including only those
fluids contained in closed systems such as oxygen, fire extinguisher agent, landing gear
shock absorber fluid, etc.
Operational items are those necessary for aircraft operation and not included in the
BEM.
When performing an approved loading schedule, ensure that the aircraft mass and centre of
gravity remains within the weight x CG envelope by accounting for aircraft mass and
balance with all load conditions.
CG Constraints
When performing the aircraft weighing and balancing, appropriate constraints must be
established and applied in order to assure that the centre of gravity limits are not exceeded
in any aircraft operating conditions, due to:
When used correctly, the load sheet systems issued by Air Peace Limited covers for all of
the above.
FUEL QUANTITIES
EMB145
NOTE: Fuel density may range from 0.785 to 0.811 kg/l. The values above have been
determined for an adopted fuel density of 0.0811kg/l
NOTE: When EICAS fuel quantity is Zero in level flight, any fuel remaining in the tanks
cannot be used safely in flight
NOTE: When performing pressure refuelling the usable fuel quantity may be reduced by
30 litres.
EMB145
NOTE: Adopted engine oil density (ref. MIL-L-7808) 0.98 kg/l. Adopted hydraulic fluid
density (ref. SAE AS 1241 A TYPE IV) 0.99 kg/l.
Pilot 85
Co-pilot 85
Observer 85
Attendant 75
Navigation Kit 10
NOTE: The adopted flight crew items are in accordance with the approved average
mass including the respective carry-on baggage.
6.8 PASSENGERS
Passenger Location
Cabin Sections, seat rows and the maximum number of passengers seated in each
section is given below.
Passenger Mass
NOTE: The EMB 145 LR/MP has 18 rows of seats as above. However, Air Peace
Limited do not designate a Row 13 hence Cabin compartment C rows are designated
14-19 on the aircraft.
IX = M* (STA-15.5) / 200 + 60
The Dry Operating Weight and Dry Operating Index for each aircraft are
issued to each pilot through FCIs. Below is an example.
X_XXXX
Number of Crew in Cockpit/Cabin
2/0 2/1 2/2 3/0 3/1
Catering 3/2
X X X X X X
Int 215 Kg X x x x x x
X X X X X X
Dom 60 Kg X x x x x x
X X X X X X
Nil 0 Kg X x x x x x
Crew Masses
Cockpit crew........................... 85.0 kg
Cabin crew............................. 75.0 kg
The following is an example of an EDP (Electronic Data Processed) Load sheet, with
detailed explanation of printed lines :-
1. Checked (Load Controller’s signature), Approved (Captain’s
signature), Ed. No. (Edition Number).
2. Routing / Flight Number and Date / Aircraft Registration /
Version / Crew / Date and time of load sheet print.
3. Dead Load (Baggage / Cargo / Mail) Hold distribution.
4. Passenger breakdown TTL = Total heads on board.
5. Pax = total passengers in seats (not including infants).
6. BLKD = seats blocked.
7. The letter ‘L’ indicates the limiting factor for allowable traffic
load. In this case Landing Mass.
8a Confirmation of Dry Operating Index (DOI), Loading Index,
Zero Fuel Mass, Max for Zero Fuel and Take-off Mass.
(MAXZFW / MACTOW) The Elevator Trim Setting for take-
off, distribution of Passengers by Compartment (A, B and C.)
and the Underload before LMC are all correct.
8b Last Minute Changes as detailed, usually hand-written by load controller.
9. Load message as sent with departure signal.
EMB 145
There are three sections in the EMB 145 cabin: A, B & C, and one cargo compartment C1.
Section A is rows 1 to 6, and has 14 passenger seats, the mid-section B is from row 7 to
row 12 has 18 passenger seats and the aft section C is from row 14 to row 19 has 18
passenger seats (row 13 does not exist).
Note: Except for clear colour coded identification of the Variant in the top left corner
and the shape of the C of G envelope, the EMB 135 and EMB 145 load sheets look
similar. Use of the incorrect load sheet could be catastrophic, so the block shading is
BLUE for the EMB 145 MP and red for the EMB135. Crews must be meticulous in
checking the correct load sheet is being used.
The captain must ensure the ACTUAL passenger seating positions on the Plan are
reflected on the load sheet.
Cabin crew will be responsible for keeping and replenishing a sufficient number of blank
Passenger Seating Plans and must issue one to dispatchers unfamiliar with this
procedure; these will generally be charter or ad-hoc flights. Cabin crew will ensure the
dispatcher then completes the hold distribution section, initials and returns the plan for
their completion.
Completed Seating Plans shall be kept with the Ship’s Papers for auditing purposes.
The captain should, if possible, inform the cabin crew of any special passenger
distribution requirements, for trim purposes, as soon as possible.
Cabin baggage stowed under the seat and in the overhead bin are included in
passenger weights. Large or heavy cabin baggage can be stowed in the forward RH
Wardrobe and LH stowage, index corrections shall be made on the load sheet for
this baggage.
1 2 3
4 5 6 7
10
11
13
12
14
17
16
18
19
20
21
22
15. Maximum mass for: Enter Max Zero fuel and Landing mass.
16. Trip Fuel
17. Take-off fuel
18. Lowest TOM: Find the most restricting TOM. Column 1: Enter the
total sum of the zero fuel and take-off fuel figures. Column 2:
Enter
the max allowed Take-off Mass, this maybe the aircraft structural limit or
performance restricted limit. Column 3: Enter the total sum of the maximum landing
mass and trip fuel.
19. DOM+T/O Fuel: Using the column with the lowest calculated TOM, enter the
sum of the DOM+T/O fuel.
20. Allowed traffic: Lowest TOM less the DOM+T/O fuel calculation from above (19).
21. Total Traffic: Enter the actual traffic load.
22. Underload: Subtract Total Traffic from the Allowed Traffic.
23
24
25
26
27
28
32 29
30
31
Once the passengers are onboard the Cabin will complete and pass
on the Seating Report).
23. Passengers: Calculate the total passenger load using the
appropriate Mass from the DOM/DOI statement sheet, or the
Part A. Enter the total passenger figures in kilos.
24. Total traffic: Total baggage mass + total passenger mass.
25. Dry Operating Mass: Extracted from the DOM and DOI
statement sheet.
26. Extra crew: Enter 85 kilos for the additional flight deck
observer if not already included in the Dry Operating Mass.
27. Zero fuel mass: Total traffic + DOM + Extra crew.
28. Takeoff fuel: Fuel required less the taxi fuel.
29. Take-off mass: Zero fuel mass + Take-off fuel
30. Trip fuel: Figure obtained from the AirPlan.
31. Landing mass: Take-off mass – Trip fuel.
32. Enter the Max Allowed Takeoff and Landing Mass
Once the cabin crew have completed the seating report, trim calculation can
be completed. For this Example:
For clarity, circle each corresponding Cabin, Cargo, Fuel and Wardrobe
index on the loadsheet (Infants should not be included) and enter each
index into the appropriate columns/rows.
33
34
35 36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
33. Dry Operating index: from the DOM and DOI statement sheet.
34. Jump seat: Enter -5 if the flight deck observer seat is
occupied at the last minute, LMC the additional weight.
Note: Only use if not included in the original Dry Operating Index and Dry Operating
Mass.
Trim
45. Enter the top index line with the Take-off Mass, Landing Mass, Zero
Fuel Mass index and draw a cross where each line intersects the
Actual Take-off, Landing and Zero Fuel Mass entered from the left
hand side of the graph.
Note: All Takeoff, Landing and Zero Fuel intersections must fall within the solid lines of
the envelope when carrying more than 33 passengers. When carrying 33 passengers or
less, the envelope marked by a dotted line must be used.
1 2 3 4 5
7
1. Enter the destination of the LMC.
2. Enter the designator code for the LMC. For example M for male, F for female,
C for Cargo.
3. State the compartment. A, B, C, C1.
However, Air Peace Limited uses PPS Computer Generated Flight Plans for all EMB 145
operations, including non-revenue.
Air Peace Limited utilises PPS Computer Flight Plans. PPS provide computed route plans
taking into account the latest winds and temperatures. The flight times and fuel burns are
based upon manufacturer’s data, modified slightly to reflect fleet mean fuel performance. The
route plans are delivered to handling agents via SITA, 45 minutes before blocks and
usually include both outbound and inbound plans.
The Configuration Deviation List (CDL) is published in a separate folder and it is available in
hard copy on all EMB145 Company aircraft.
10.1 INTRODUCTION
This section deals with the survival and emergency equipment carried aboard the aircraft.
The location of the equipment is described, and any crew checks that are required of the
equipment.
The jacket is made of a rubberised nylon material and has only one inflation chamber.
It is equipped with :-
1. A CO2 inflation cylinder. Attached to the CO2 cylinder is a lanyard and a red
toggle, this cylinder provides the primary means of inflation.
2. An inflation / deflation tube with deflation key attached for use in the event
of a CO2 cylinder failing to inflate the jacket, or the jacket being over
inflated. This is referred to as the secondary means of inflation.
3. A light for easy identification at night, which is operated by a water
activated battery (24 hours duration).
4. Whistle - for attracting attention.
5. Tapes for attaching the jacket firmly to the wearer.
Remove the jacket from its valise and place the jacket over the head, jacket facing the front.
Take the tapes around to the back of the body, bring the tapes to the front, taking the right
hand tape beneath the jacket and tie both tapes in a secure double knot on the left hand
side of the body. This then leaves one long end, to enable the person wearing the jacket to
tie his or herself to another person’s jacket, to enable a close circle to be formed in the
water.
If the life jacket is too tight around the neck, a small amount of air can be released by using
the deflation key - insert the deflation key into the opening on the rubber mouth piece and
press key down as far as possible, this will then open the by-bass in the valve.
It is important that the correct way of entry into water is observed by all passengers and
Crew. Grasp the forward lower neck of the life jacket with both hands and pull hard down,
giving full support to the back of the neck, keep elbows tightly tucked in over the top of the
jacket, thus forming a ‘V’ shape which will act as a water break. If this position is not taken,
severe injuries to the neck can result. Enter the water feet first, knees and ankles tightly
together. Avoid snagging the life jacket on jagged metal, etc.
Warnings
1. Never inflate the jacket inside the aircraft, unless for a very small child.
2. Inform the passengers of the danger of touching the CO2 cylinder (dry ice)
resulting in skin burns and skin removal.
Large Child
Whenever insufficient tape is available to tie the tapes at the back (due to the size of the
child) tapes may be tied at the front of the jacket, as the following diagram shows.
Checks:
Amount - Correct number on board for all passengers and Crew.
Stowed - In a plastic valise and in date.
1 2 3 4 5
1. After removing Life Jacket from its valise, place over
head (Jacket facing the front).
2. Take the tapes around the back of the body.
3. & 4. Bring the tapes to the front, taking the right hand
tape beneath the jacket and tie both tapes in a secure
double knot on the left hand side of the body.
5. When outside the aircraft, pull sharply down on the red toggle to
inflate. If CO2 fails to inflate, use the rubber oral inflation tube.
These life jackets are carried for infants too large for baby cots and too small to be fitted with
an adult life jacket. They are recommended for children between the ages of two and five
years.
Method of Operation
1. Place life jacket over the head, take the tapes to the back, cross, bring
to the front and tie in a knot at the side of the body.
2. Inflate by pulling the red toggle downwards. The oral inflation valve
can be used for further inflation or deflation.
3. A lifting becket is attached by Velcro to the mouth inflation tube. After
ditching, the Velcro is removed and the lifting becket used to lower the
infant into the water. The lifting becket is positioned on the life jacket to
correspond to the centre of gravity of the infant, to give comfort and
ease of lifting and lowering.
Each cot is similar to a carry cot, but in the form of a small rubber dingy with a hood to
provide protection from the elements. The cot is inflated with a CO2 cylinder by operation of
a red toggle at the lower end: a mouth inflation tube is also provided. Suspension straps
attached to the cot allow it to be carried easily. In a pouch on one of the straps is a twenty
foot lifeline with a toggle by which the cot may be attached to the parent’s life jacket. A
lamp attached to the top of the hood is illuminated by a water activity battery. Two tapes
are provided inside the cot, so that the child may be secured when the cot is in use.
Inflation and securing procedures should be carried out after impact. The procedures are
listed below:-
a) Open out the cot and inflate by pulling the red toggle. If the cot fails to
inflate, use the mouth inflation tube.
b) Wrap the child in a blanket or other warm soft material with their arms
enclosed.
c) Pull back the apron from the inflated hood arch and place the child
in the cot, feet first, with the child’s head under the canopy.
d) Place the child in a lying position on its side, as far towards the closed
end of the hood as possible. Position folded blankets alongside the
baby to keep it on its side. Tie the securing tapes diagonally across the
child. Avoid over-tightening, especially around the chest.
e) Pull the apron up over the arch tube, ensuring that the corners fit
neatly and pass the lamp housing through the hole in the centre of the
apron top. Fit the metal suspender hooks at the corners of the apron
to the rubber buttons at the side of the cot.
f) Engage the press stud where the suspension straps cross.
After ditching, the cot may be lowered from an emergency exit window by means of the
suspension straps or lifeline, depending on the circumstances.
This operation should be carried out by a member of the Cabin Crew, after the parents or
able bodied passengers are already in the water with life jackets inflated, ready to receive the
cot. The lifeline may be secured to the parent’s life jacket. The Cabin Crew member should
not jump into the water clutching the cot.
Checks:
Stowed.
Dated.
Wirelocked.
The oxygen system is divided into two different systems: a gaseous-type for cockpit
crewmembers (pilot, copilot and observer) and a chemical generated-type for passengers
and flight attendants.
Minimum pressure for dispatch is 1100 psi (2 pilots) at 15°C, 1500 psi with an observer
occupying the jump seat. Pressure may be checked either at Oxygen Service Panel or MFD
submenu ECS.
The smoke protection equipment consists of two pairs of smoke goggles to be used with
oxygen masks by the pilot and copilot, and one Protective Breathing Equipment (PBE) unit
for fire fighting outside cockpit.
The mask is provided with an automatic oxygen dilution system which provides pure
oxygen when the cabin altitude is over 33000 feet. It can also be manually selected to
the 100% or EMERGENCY position to maintain positive pressure in the venting orifice.
3. Flow Indicator (Pilot’s and Co-pilot’s Boxes Only) A yellow star appears
when oxygen is flowing.
4. Venting Valve Control (Pilot’s and Co-pilot’s Masks Only) Actuating the control
forward opens the venting valve. A red band is visible to indicate that the control is actuated.
5. Harness Inflation Control Valve (Red Ear) Pressing the control inflates the harness
and allows donning the mask.
6. Flow Indicator (Observer’s Mask Only)
The black shutter disappears when pressure is applied to the mask.
The passenger oxygen system consists of chemical oxygen generators and continuous-flow
masks installed in cabin dispensing units.
Dispensing units are located above the cabin crew seat, in the galley and in the toilet. All of
these contain 2 masks. There are also dispensing units above the passenger seats as
follows:
EMB 145: one mask on the left hand side (rows 1A-19A) and 3 masks on the right hand side
(rows 3DF-19DF except row 12 which is the overwing exit row). The Passenger Oxygen
Control Panel is located in the flight-deck, on the right lateral console, above the copilot
mask stowage box.
The system is automatically activated, provided the Passenger Oxygen Selector Knob on
the Flight Deck is set to AUTO position and the cabin pressure altitude is above 14,000 ft.
The system may be manually activated, at any altitude, by setting the Passenger Oxygen
Selector Knob to MANUAL position.
A timer circuit is provided to keep the electric latches energized for 6 seconds after altimetric
switch actuation (in automatic mode), or operation in manual mode.
When the system is activated, the oxygen ON indicator light on the Passenger Oxygen
Control Panel illuminates to indicate that the electric latches are energized. In this case, the
NO SMOKING and FASTEN SEAT BELTS signs in the passenger cabin are automatically
illuminated. These indicator and passenger advisory lights remain illuminated until the
oxygen system is reset.
Activating the system causes the masks to drop from the dispensing units. Each oxygen
generator is activated when any mask in the associated dispensing unit is pulled down.
Pulling one mask down causes all masks in that unit to come down and 100 per cent oxygen
flows to all masks. The oxygen flows for approximately 12 minutes and cannot be shut off.
Note: When the oxygen masks drop from the PSU they are held in a Mask Retaining Clip
(see diagram). In the pre-flight safety demonstration the passengers will be instructed to pull
the mask away from the Retaining Clip.
CAUTION :
ONCE ACTUATED, EACH CHEMICAL GENERATOR SUPPLIES OXYGEN
CONTINUOUSLY, WHETHER THE MASKS CONNECTED TO IT ARE BEING USED OR
NOT.
10.4.3.1 CONTROL
NOTE: When oxygen is supplied, high temperature is produced in the oxygen
chemical generator.
1 Oxygen ON Indicator Light (White) This light indicates that the electric are
energized.
WARNING
A RAPID DECOMPRESSION AT 37,000 FT WILL RESULT IN
LOSS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN 10 TO 30 SECONDS!
The smoke hood is stowed in a vacuum sealed aluminised bag. It is self contained and
attached to the bottom side of a rigid flat orange box. The box is provided with a green ‘good
condition’ indicator. If the indicator becomes red, the smoke hood must be replaced.
Checks:
Correct quantity onboard
Indicator showing green
Spring Lock not tampered with
In date
Operation
The operation automatically starts when the hood is donned. The user can hear the
oxygen flow release inside the hood.
The pre-flight check on the Drager Oxycrew Smoke Hood is defined by the manufacturer
and confirms that the unit is in working order prior to flight.
The Drager Oxycrew is a portable, self-contained oxygen breathing apparatus. The unit
generates chemically produced oxygen. It is used for fighting fire in a smoke filled
environment. The hood also protects the user from falling burning materials as it is made
from a flame resistant material. The hood is fitted with an ori-nasal to fit over the nose and
mouth with a speech diaphragm enabling the wearer to communicate. The unit is also fitted
with an anti-suffocation valve.
PRE-FLIGHT CHECKS
Quantity on board.
Secure in stowage.
In date.
Yellow serviceability indicator should be partially intact.
Yellow
serviceabilit
y indicator
should be
partially
intact
NOTE: The smoke hood is packed in a vacuum-sealed bag, and the serviceability of the
bag is ascertained from the partially intact yellow serviceability indicator fitted around the
bag. This should be visible through the viewing window on the smoke hood box. Should
humidity from the atmosphere enter the vacuum-sealed bag, the chemical generator
would be activated and the yellow indicator would not be visible. In this situation the
smoke hood is no longer serviceable.
Cabin Crew must continue to report any pre-flight equipment defect directly to the Captain,
who will then communicate immediately with LMC to resolve.
Smoke goggles are carried in the flight deck for use by the operating crew, which, when
used in conjunction with the oxygen mask system will give complete protection for the eyes,
mouth and nose during a fire or smoke emergency.
The goggles can also be used for eye protection in case of flight deck windscreen failure.
Check:
Correctly stowed Condition
In the cabin there are two portable oxygen cylinders for first aid therapeutic purposes only.
Each has two continuous-flow masks supplying oxygen at a rate of 4 litres per minute.
Each cylinder has 312 litres (11 cu.ft) holding 280 useable litres, and is provided with an
ON/OFF regulator installed on the cylinder neck, which regulates the outlet pressure from 60
to 90 psi.
The cylinders are positioned near the Cabin Crew stations, to be used for first-aid
therapeutic purposes only.
10.8 TORCHES
Breakaway battery operated torches are provided for emergency use. They are located as
indicated on the Emergency Equipment Location Diagrams. The torch is automatically
activated when removed from its stowage bracket, and turned off automatically when
properly returned to its stowage bracket. When correctly stowed, the torches are
automatically charged from the aircraft electrical system.
The torches have a red ON light which can only be checked when the aircraft power is on.
The red light indicates the torch is recharging. When in use the torch will last up to
approximately 4 hours.
Checks: Correctly
stowed. Red light on
Quantity.
A crash axe is mounted behind the First Officer’s seat. The crash axe is shaped basically
as a normal axe, with the exception of a hook. It is made of steel and has a rubber sleeve
fitted over the handle. This is to prevent the user from receiving an electrical shock if the
axe is used for cutting through live electric cabling. The axe is particularly useful for
levering-off panels, behind which an electrical fire may have started, thus enabling access
to the cabling, for BCF extinguishant. Please note that cabling runs throughout an aircraft
cabin, behind bulkheads, lockers, panelling in toilets, etc. The axe may also be used for
levering open any exit which may be partially jammed open.
The crash axe cannot be used for opening any type of exit which is inoperable, due to the
strength of the aircraft structure, nor can it be used for breaking through the aircraft’s hull or
windows.
Checks: Stowed.
A pair of protective fire gloves is located in a pouch on the bulkhead behind the
Captain’s seat.
Checks: Stowed
There is a fire retardant bag onboard. Gash bags must be placed in the fire retardant bag
and placed in the toilet before landing.
Checks: 1 onboard.
One Mandatory First Aid Kit is stowed in the First Locker, and is wire locked or
sealed, to be used in an emergency only, with the Captain’s permission. Contents
are listed.
The emergency lighting consists of internal and external lights which provide proper
illumination for emergency cabin evacuation.
These lights are powered by four dedicated batteries, located along the fuselage. Fully
charged batteries are sufficient to supply all emergency lights for approximately 15
minutes.
Two external emergency lights are installed on each side of the wing-to-fuselage area in
order to illuminate the wing escape route and the ground area. In addition, emergency lights
are installed on the main door and galley service door in order to illuminate the ground area
around these doors in case of an emergency evacuation.
Internal emergency lights comprises the flight deck light, aisle lights, main door lights, galley
service door lights, over wing emergency exit lights, floor proximity lights and EXIT signs.
A flight-deck light is located on the flight-deck ceiling and provides general emergency
illumination of the flight deck area.
Aisle lights comprise four dome lights located along the aisle and provide general
emergency cabin illumination.
Lights are located over the main door, galley service door and over wing emergency exits to
provide general illumination of these areas.
Exit signs are installed near each door and emergency exits.
Floor proximity emergency lights provide emergency escape path marking for visual
guidance during cabin evacuation. It consists of red and white lights spaced along the left
side of the aisle. The route from the rear of the aircraft to the over wing exits is identified by
red arrows pointing forwards. Red lights and an exit identifier are located near each door
and emergency exit.
Emergency lighting is controlled through the Emergency Lighting Switch, located on the
overhead panel in flight deck on/off/arm selection, and through the Cabin Crew Emergency
Lighting Button.
Overhead Panel
1 - EMERGENCY LIGHTING SWITCH
ON Emergency lights illuminate with power supplied by the dedicated
batteries.
ARM Emergency lights are in standby mode (lights turned off and the
batteries being charged) and illuminate automatically in case of an electrical
emergency, with power supplied by the dedicated batteries.
NOTE: The emergency lights are controlled by the Emergency Lighting Switch when
the Attendant Emergency Lighting Button, on the Attendant’s Panel, is in the NORM
mode.
PILOT (Green) – Illuminates continuously when the call is from the Flight Crew (a discrete
bell tone is heard)
Emergency (Red) – Illuminates blinking when an emergency call to the Cabin Crew is
made from the Flight Crew (a discrete bell tone is heard)
The loud hailer (megaphone) is stowed in the Entrance Locker. It is powered by 8 penlight
batteries and used during and post evacuation for crowd control, or during complete
electrical failure. It may also be used if the P.A. system fails.
To operate, hold the loud hailer with one hand, press the trigger switch and speak into the
mouthpiece. The volume control is pre-set to high and can only be adjusted by a qualified
engineer.
Checks: Stowed.
Operational.
The lavatory smoke detection system consists of a smoke sensor installed in the lavatory
ceiling and the Smoke Detector Panel located near the forward galley.
Upon detection of smoke inside the lavatory, the smoke detector signals the panel to
activate a red alarm light and a horn. In addition, a warning message is presented in the
flight deck. The smoke sensor is less sensitive to smoke from cigarettes.
The sensor must not be blocked by any objects like tissue or paper, etc.
A single fire extinguishing bottle is installed for fire protection of the lavatory waste
container. The bottle discharging tube outlets are fitted in the waste container and
are provided with temperature sensitive heads.
When the temperature inside the container reaches 77o C, the heads will melt and
open outlet passage, causing automatic discharge of the extinguishing agent
(approximately duration of discharge is ten (10) seconds).
The Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT), when activated, transmits a radio signal at
frequencies of 121.5,243.0 and 406.0 MHz to facilitate aircraft location during search and
rescue operations.
The system comprises a transmitter, antenna, switch, and impact switch installed in the
lavatory ceiling and a control panel located in the cockpit.
A red light on the cockpit control panel flashes to indicate ELT activation.
Manual activation is achieved by setting the control switch to the MAN position. Automatic
activation occurs when the transmitter switch is set to AUTO, and the aircraft suffers a
deceleration greater than 5 g’s.
Whether the ELT has been activated manually or automatically, the pilot may
deactivate it by performing the reset procedure with the ELT control switch.
Note: the ELT is hard-wired to the aircraft systems. It is not accessible to crew and
is not a carry-off item.
The Minimum Equipment List (MEL) is published in a separate folder and it is available in
hard copy on all EMB145 Company aircraft.