ONGC GCS KG Basin

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ANDHRAPRADESHPOLLUTIONCONTROI~BOARD ."
.~=~ pARYAVARANBHAVAN,A-3,INDUSTRIAL ESTATE, Phon~...~887S00 ..
~~~~ SANATHNAGAR,HYDERABAD-500 018 Webslte.www.appcb.ap.mc.lI1
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REGD.POST WITH ACK.DUE
CONSENT ORDER FOR ESTABLISHMENT ~
Order No. 379/APPCB/CFE/RO-KKD/HO/2015 3.I 'J..~ Dt.13.08.2015
Sub: APPCB -CFE -MIs. Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., i:<asanapalli (V),
Malkipuram (M), East Godavari District -Consent for Establishment (CFE) of the
Board for Laying and Commissioning of the pipeline for marine disposal of treated
effluent from ETP at Kesanapalli GGS, East Godavari District under Sec.25 of Water
(P &Cof P) Act, 1974 and Under Sec.21 of Air (P&C of P4 Act, 1981 -for Marine outfall
-Issued -Reg.
Ref: 1) CFE application received on 20.06;2015 and Addl. Information received on

29.06.2015.
2) R.O's inspection report dt. 07.07.2015.
3) CFE Committee meeting held on 31.07.2015. "
',;-,.;
1, In the reference 1 st cited, an application was submitted to the Board seeking Consent for
Est~blishment (CFE) for laying and commissioning of the pipeline for marine disposal
o~eated effluent from ETP a! Kes~li GGS, East Godavari District to Bay of
Bengal with a capital investment of Rs.26.047 lakhs.
2. As per the application the marine pipeline to the length of approx 8 km. with marine
disposal line (2 km is on land-and 5-6 km in subsea) for discharge of the treated effluent
from ETP at Kesa.napalli(W)-GGS to the landfall point on surface and the subsea line to be
laid till the final discharge point in the. sea for discharging effluent of 1500 cu. m per day.
3. The site proposed for alignment of marine outfall for the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
Ltd., Kesanapalli, ETP was inspected by the Asst. Environmental Engineer-I, Regional "-
Office~ Kakinada, A.P Pollution Control Board on 06.0-1.2015.
4. The Board, after careful scrutiny of the application verification report of Regional Officer and
recommendations of the CFE Committee, hereby issues CONSENT FOR
'II---~ ESTABLISHMENT (NOC) TO YOUR ACTIVITY FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF MARINE
\i,~
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Section 21 of Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the rules made there
under.
.5. This Consent Order now issued is subject to the conditipns mentioned in Schedule 'A' .
,. WET MANAGER .
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6, This ?rder is issued from pollution control point of view only. Zoning and other regulations
are not considered.
Encl: Schedule 'A'
Sd/-
MEMBER SECRETARY
/ To, -
M/s.Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.,
Godavari Bhavan,
ONGC Base Complex, Lala Cheruvu,
Rajahmundry -533106.
East Godavari District.
II T.C.F.B.O.II
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JOINT CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL ENGI~EER (UH-1)
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Page 2 of 3
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';,'" SCHEDULE -A
The proponent shall obtain CRZ Clearance before starting the pipeline project.
I 2. Progress on implementation of the project shall be repor1ed to the concerned Regional ~

Office, A.P. Pollution Control Board once in six months.
3. The proponent shall obtain amendment to Consents for Operation (CFO) from APPCB, as
required Under Sec.25/26 of the Water (P&C of P) Act, 1974 and under sec. 21/22 of the
Air (P&C" of P) Act, 1981, before commencement of the activity.
4. Notwithstanding anything contained in this conditional letter or consent, the Board hereby
reserves its right and power Under Sec.27(2) of Water (Prevention and Control of
Poflution) Act, 1974 and Under Sec.21 (4) of Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,
1981 to review any or all the conditions imposed herein and to make such alternation as
deemed fit and stipulate any additional conditions qy the Board.
5. Compensation is to be paid for any environmental. damage caused by it, as fixed by

the Collector and District Magistrate as civil liability.
6. The effluents shall be treated to the marine discharge standards, as stipulated under
,~i'"",
Schedule VI of E!1vironment (Protection) Rules, 1986, notified by Ministry of Environment
and Forests, Government of India vide G.S.R.422 (E), dt.19.05.1993 and its
amendments thereof.
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7. The proponent shall construct guard pond of 8 days storage capacity of effluent day
generation capacity.
8. The proponent shall regularly monitor the flora and fauna of the marine aquatic life. The
trend analysis of the monitoring repor1s shall be compared with the base line data. If it is
found any negative impacts, itnmediate restorative measures shall be implemented duly
submitting a repor1 to Board.
9. The proponent shall dispose only treated effluents into Bay of Bengal through
marine outfall. !
10. The propol'lent shall provide magnetic flow meter with the digital totalizer with recording
facility for the purpose of quantification of treated effluent discharged through marine '-
outfall.
.
11. Concealing the factual data or submission of false information! fabricated data and failure --
to comply with any of the conditions mentioned in this 9rder may result in withdrawal of
this order and attract action under the provisions of releva!1t pollution control Acts.
12. The Board reserves its right to modify above conditions or stipulate any additional
conditions in the interest of environment protection. .
13. This order is valid for period of 5 years from the date of issue.
Sd/-
MEMBERS~CRETARY
To,
M/s.Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.,
Godavari Bhavan,
ONGC Base Complex, Lala Cheruvu,
Rajahmundry -533106.
East Godavari District.
II T.C.F.B.O.II
~ -<9r- ~ ""-10
.JOINT CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL ENG'lNeER (UH-1)
IJr Page 3 of 3 h
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b:
AMMENDMENTS CARRIED OUT
S. No. Amendment Details Para/Page Name, Designation Date
Reference No. and Signature
1
BASIS AND METHODOLOGY OF DISASTER
MANAGEMENT PLAN
Rajahmundry Asset is a unique E&P Operational Hub located at East Coast. Its operational
activities are spread over through East Godavari, West Godavari & Krishna Districts. The
existing risk studies conducted by various agencies have been considered as vital data for
formulating the DMP. The perceived risk, failure of frequency have been identified and
referred respectively from the available published literature of HSE.
In view of distances from the base Disaster Management Control Room, the emergencies and
on-site plan has been formulated. Based on infrastructure and trained human resource
available the emergency procedures have been postulated. In the event of any emergency at
the drilling rig, the well trained and equipped crisis management team is in place. The DMP
has been formulated based on stipulated guidelines, rules & notifications issued by the
MOEF, MINISTRY OF HOME, CPCB etc.,
Even though the key contact personnel and the role clarity are spelt out, experience has
shown that in a critical situation like a Disaster, there is invariably some sort of panic at the
beginning. At this stage, the confidence of the leader should be of the highest order, as he
has to ensure awareness of the functions, sub - functions and command system, so that
everybody starts playing their roles as per the standing instructions and the whole machinery
starts moving in the desired direction. Each coordinator must have a manual with him to
train the personnel under him. This can be achieved if regular mock drills are undertaken.
Each and everyone will become more conscious of the type of roles they will have to play
successfully to combat the crisis situation. The successful implementation of DMP will
depend upon that how fast the structure of Disaster Management Control Room, Roles and
Responsibilities of individuals and procedures are created and being practiced by the
concerned authorities. The on scene Coordinators, Chief Emergency Coordinators, Chief
Reaction Coordinators, Assembly point is also to be notified for successfully implementation
of the DMP.
2
ACRONYMS
ARMV - ACCIDENT RELIEF MEDICAL VANS
ALR - ADIABATIC LAPSE RATE
BLEVE - BOILING LIQUID EXPANDING VAPOUR EX-PLOSIONS
CBOs - COMMUNITY BASED ORGANISATIONS
CCMNC - CABINET COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL
CALAMITIES
CCS - CABINET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
CER - CHIEF EMERGENCY CO-ORDINATOR
CPQRA - CHEMICAL PROCESS QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
CRC - CHIEF REACTION CO-ORDINATOR
CMT - CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM
DDMA - DISTRICT DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
DM - DISASTER MANAGEMENT
DMCR - DISASTER MANAGEMENT CONTROL ROOM
ERP - EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
IDRN - INDIAN DISASTER RESOURCE NETWORK
MHA - MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
NCMC - NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
NDMA - NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY
NDMRC - NATIONAL DISASTER MITIGATION RESOURCE CENTRES
OSC - ONSCENE CO-ORDINATOR
OSCER - ON SCENE EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM
PRA - PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT
RCMT - REGIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM
3
PURPOSE OF THE PLAN
The purpose of this Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is to set out the appropriate
mechanism and course of action to mitigate the impact of an Emergency event. The plan
provides a procedure allowing all those involved in and outside ONGC to mobilize their
resources in an orderly way and react in time and effectively.
Disaster, in present context means an occurrence resulting in uncontrolled release of Oil &
Gas and other associated developments. Most Disaster have three common characteristic
features i.e., Loss of control, Unwanted release of Energy and Failure to arrest chain of
events. These may result in Loss of Life, Damage to property and Environment and
Ecology imbalance.
The plan therefore, aims at immediate response to an Emergency event to prevent

escalation to a Disaster and also the response in the event of such escalation.
SCOPE OF THE PLAN

The plan has been developed taking into consideration of Emergency anticipated in and
around ONGC operational facilities from onshore area. The plan covers the Emergencies
arising out of acts such as:
 Process Leak
 Fire / Explosion
 Blow Out
 Pipeline Rupture and Leakage
 Oil Spills response in onshore areas.
 In plant Emergency due to Equipment Failure
 Deliberate Acts of man like Sabotage, Riots etc.,
 Handling of Explosives and Radio Active Sources.
 Earthquake and other natural calamities
4
GLOSSARY ON RISK AND DISASTER MANAGEMENT
Hazard warning structure:
It is a modified form of fault tree highlighting event mitigating feature pairs. These are often
pairing of incident precursors and protective devices of event terminating features which are
combined through an AND gate.
Historical incident data:

Data collected and recorded from past incidents.
Human Error:
Any Action by designers, operators, or managers that may result in accident.
Accident Site:
The Location of an unexpected occurrence, failure, or loss either at a facility or along a
transportation route, resulting in a release of hazardous materials on incident site.
Airborne Release:
Release of any chemical into the air.
Aerosol Fraction:
The fraction of liquid phase which, when flashed to the atmosphere, remains suspended as an
aerosol.
Analysis data base:

A data base that contains all input data for a CPQRA including the System Description, as
well as environmental data (eg., land use and topography, population and demography,
meteorological data).
5
Atmospheric Dispersion:
The low momentum mixing of a gas or vapor with air. The mixing is the result of turbulent
energy exchange, which is a function of wind (mechanical eddy formation) and atmospheric
temperature profile (thermal eddy formation).
Atmospheric Stability:
A measure of the degree of atmospheric turbulence commonly defined in terms of the
vertical temperature gradient. In neutral stability the gradient is equivalent to the Adiabatic
Lapse Rate (ALR). Stable atmospheric conditions refer to a gradient less than the ALR
(ultimately to a temperature inversion) and unstable conditions to a gradient greater than the
ALR.
Average Individual Risk:

There are three Average Individual Risks introduced in this book.
A. Average Individual, Risk(exposed population) is the individual risk averaged over
the population which is exposed to risk from the facility.
B. Average Individual Risk (total population) is the individual risk averaged over a
predetermined population, without regard to whether or not all people in that population are
actually exposed to the risk.
C. Average Individual Risk (Exposed hours/worked hours). The individual risks for
an activity may be calculated for the duration of the activity or may be averaged over the
working day.
Average Rate of Death (ROD) :

The average number of facilities that might be expected per unit time from all possible
incidents.
Averaging Time:
The length of time in atmospheric dispersion testing over which concentration data is
averaged to produce the concentration-time series.
6
Basic Event :
A fault tree event that is sufficiently basic that no further development is necessary (eg.,
equipment item failure, human failure, or external event). See also Undeveloped Event.
BLEVE:
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Ex-plosions (BLEVE) are amongst the most feared events
when tanks of hazardous chemical are exposed to fire or physical damage or other events that
cause excessive pressure within the tank. The pressure inside the tank eventually vents itself
through the weakest area of the tank. This sudden venting of pressure and vaporasation of
product involves violent rupture of the container with rocketing fragments.
Chronic Effects:
Of long duration or having frequent recurrence. Chronic health effects are those that become
apparent or continue for some time after exposure to hazardous chemicals.
Contingency Plan:
A document to identify and catalogue the elements required to respond to an emergency, to
define responsibilities and specific tasks, and to serve as a response guide.
Catastrophic Incident:
An incident with an outcome effect zone that extends off site into the surrounding
community.
Cause Consequence Diagrams:

A method for illustrating the possible outcomes arising from the logical combination of
selected input events or states.
Cell (in study cube):

One of the 27 different categories of CPQRA defined by a unique value for each axis of the
study cube.
Common Cause Failure (CCF):

The failure of more than one component, item, or system due to the same cause.
7
Component Technique:
One member of the roster of methods that collectively form the complete CPQRA procedure.
Condensed phase explosion:

An explosion that occurs when the material is present in the form of a liquid or solid.
Conditional probability:
Probability of occurrence given that a precursor event has occurred.
Confidence Interval:
A range of values of a variable with a specific probability that the value of the variable lies
within the range.
Confidence Limits:
The upper and lower endpoints of a confidence interval.
Confined Explosions:
An explosion of a fuel-oxidant mixture inside a closed system (eg., vessel or building).
Consequence analysis:
The analysis of the expected effects of incident outcome cases independent of frequency or
probability.
Consequences:
A measure of the expected effects of an incident outcome case.
Continuous release:
Emissions that are long in duration compared with the travel time (time for cloud to reach
location of interest) or averaging or sampling time.
CPQRA:
The acronym is Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis. It is the process of hazard
identification followed by numerical evaluation of incident consequences and frequencies,
and their combination into an overall measure of risk when applied to the chemical process
8
industry. It is particularly applied to episodic events. It differs from but is related to a
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), a quantitative tool used in the nuclear industry.
Demand:
(1) A signal or action that should change the state of a device, or
(2) An opportunity to act, and thus, to fail.
Demand Rate:
The number of demands divided by the total elapsed operating time during which the
demands occur.
Demand-related failure:
A failure that is primarily related to the number of times that a device or system is challenged
(cycled) rather than the length of time the device or system is in service.
Dense gas:
A gas with density exceeding that of air at ambient temperature.
Dependent failure:
A failure of multiple devices due to some common cause, for example, the failure of all
temperature sensors in a system due to miscalibration during maintenance.
Detonation:
A release of energy caused by the extremely rapid chemical reaction of a substance in which
the reaction front advances into the unreacted substance at greater than sonic velocity.
Dispersion coefficient:
The standard deviation in a specified direction of the Gaussian distribution model used in
atmosphere dispersion. The dispersion coefficient is normally expressed as a function of
distance for a given weather stability.
9
Domino effects:
The triggering of secondary events, such as toxic releases, by a primary event, such as an
explosion, such that the result is an increase in consequences or area of an effect zone.
Generally only considered when a significant escalation of the original incident results.
Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR):

The negative of the temperature gradient established as dry air ascending in the atmosphere.
Fir air with a molecular weight of 29 and a specific heat ratio of 1.41 the DALR = 0.995
C/100m.
Effect models:
Models that predict effects of incident outcomes usually with respect to human injury or
fatality or property damaged.
Effect zone:
For an incident that produces an incident outcomes to toxic release, the area over which the
airborne concentration equals or exceeds some level of concern. For a flammable release the
area over which a particular incident outcome case produces an effect based on a specified
criterion. For a loss of containment incident producing thermal effects, the area over which a
particular incident outcome case produces an effect based on a specified radioactive heat
stress limit.
Emissivity:
The ratio of the radiant energy emitted by a surface to that emitted by a blackbody at the
same temperature.
Entrain:
The suspension of liquid as an aerosol in the atmospheric dispersion of a two-phase release or
the aspiration of air into a jet discharge.
Episodic release:
A release of limited duration usually associated with an accident.
10
Event:
An occurrence involving equipment performance or human action, or an occurrence external
to the system that causes system upset. In this book an event is associated with an incident
either as the cause or a contributing cause of the incident or as a response to the initiating
event.
Event Sequence:
A specific unplanned sequence of events composed of initiating event and intermediate
events that may lead to an incident.
Event Tree (analysis):

A graphical logic model that identifies and quantities possible outcomes followings an
initiating event.
Expansive list (of incidents):

The list of incidents from which the study group is selected. An Expansive List is derived
from the Initial list by
(1) Removing incidents that are too small to be of concern
(2) Combining redundant or very similar incidents and
(3) Grouping similar incidents into a single equivalent incident.
Expected Number of Failures (ENF):

The average number of occurrences of the fault event during a specified time interval.
Explosions:
A release of energy that causes a pressure discontinuity or blast wave.
Exposure Period:
Expressed in terms of a continuous variable, such as the time equipment is operating, or as a
function of a discrete variable, such as the number of demands (also called cycles in some
tests) imposed on a piece of equipment.
External Event:
Event accused by
11
1. A natural hazard – earthquake, flood, tornado, extreme temperature, lightening etc. or
2. Man-induced events – aircraft crash, missile, nearby industrial activity, sabotage etc.
Emergency:
A situation created by an accidental release or spill of hazardous chemicals which poses a
threat to the safety of workers, residents, the environment or property.
Evacuation:
Removal of residents and other persons from an area of danger.
Exercise:
A stimulated accident or release set up to test emergency response methods and for use as a
training tool.
Failure frequency:
The number of failure events that occur divided by the total elapsed calendar time during
which those events occur or by the total number of demands, as applicable.
Failure mode:
It is a symptom, condition, or fashion in which hardware fails. A mode might be identified as
a loss of function; or a simple physical characteristic such as a leak (incipient failure mode)
observed during inspection.
Failure mode and effects analysis:

A hazard identification techniques in which all known failure modes of components or
features of a system are considered in turn and undesired outcomes are noted.
Failure rate:
The number of failure events that occur divided by the total elapsed operating time during
which these events occur or by the total number of demands, as applicable.
Failure severity:
The degree of function degradation of equipment usually noted through deficient
performance; categorized by the terms catastrophic, “degraded” and “incipient”.
12
Fault tree:
A method for representing the logical combinations of various system states which lead to a
particular outcome (top event).
Fault Tree analysis:

Estimation of the hazardous incident (Top Event) frequency from a logical model of the
failure mechanisms of a system.
Fireball:
The atmospheric burning of a fuel air cloud in which the energy is mostly emitted in the form
of radiant heat. The inner core of the fuel release consists of almost pure fuel whereas the
outer layer in which ignition first occurs is a flammable fuel air mixture. As buoyancy forces
of the hot gases begin to dominate the burning cloud rises and becomes more spherical in
shape.
Fault tolerant:
A control system configuration that inherently provides auto selection of alternate or
redundant signal paths to effect uninterrupted operations.
Fault Tolerant:
A control system configurations that inherently provides auto selection alternate or redundant
signal paths to effect uninterrupted operations.
Flash fire:
The combustion of a flammable vapor and air mixture in which flame passes through that
mixture at less than sonic velocity, such that negligible damaging overpressure is generated.
Fractional Dead Time (FDT):

The mean fraction of time in which a component or system is unable to operate on demand.
(Also known as Unavailability).
Frequency:
Number of occurrences of an event per unit of time.
13
Gaussian model:
A dispersion model based on the concept that atmospheric dilution is a random mixing
process driven by turbulence in the atmosphere. The concentration at any point downwind of
a release source is approximated by a Gaussian concentration profile in both the horizontal
and vertical dimensions.
Generic Data:
Data that are built using inputs from all of the plants within a company or from various plants
within the CPI, from literature sources, past CPQRA reports, and commercial data bases.
Hazard rate:
Also known as the Time-related equipment failure rate, is an instantaneous Failure Rate
function of time (see equation (5.5.6).
Hazard:
A chemical or physical condition that has the potential for causing damage to people,
property or the environment.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP):

A technique to identify process hazards and potential operating problems using a series of
guide words to study process deviations.
Human Error probability:

The ratio between the number of human errors and the number of opportunities for human
error.
Human Factors:
A discipline concerned with designing machines, operations, and work environments so that
they match human capacities and limitations.
Human reliability:
The study of human errors.
14
Human reliability analysis (HRA):
A method by which the probability of a person successfully performing a task is estimated.
Hazardous Chemicals:
A chemical which is explosive, flammable, poisonous, corrosive, reactive or radio-active and
requires special care in handling because of the hazards it poses to public health and
environment.
Hazardous Installation:
An industry handling hazardous chemicals.
Hazard Analysis :
Identification of undesired events that lead to the materialization of the hazard. The analysis
of the mechanism by which those undesired events could occur and usually the estimation of
ht extent, magnitude and relative likelihood of any harmful effects.
Hazards Identification:
Provides information on available extremely hazardous substances (EHSs) on site, their
nature, quantities and also on storages and conditions of storage.
Impulse:
There are under the overpressure time curve for explosions. The area can be calculated for
the positive phase or negative phase of the blast.
Incident:
The loss of containment of material or energy.
Incident Enumeration:
The identification and tabulation of incidents without regard to significance or other biases.
Individual Hazard Index (IHI):

The Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) for a particular hazard, with the exposure time defined as the
actual time that a person is exposed to a hazard of concern.
15
Individual risk:
The risk to a person in the vicinity of a hazard. This includes the nature of the injury to the
individual the likelihood of the injury occurring, and the time period over which the injury
might occur.
Instantaneous release:
Emissions that are short in duration compared with the travel time (time for cloud to reach
location of interest) or sampling (or averaging) time.
Intermediate event:
An event that propagates or mitigates the initiating event during an event sequence.
Isopleth:
A plot of specific locations (in the three spatial coordinates : x,y,z) downwind from the
release source that is corresponding to a concentration of interest (e.g. fixed by toxic load or
flammable concentration).
IDLH:
Immediately dangerous to life or health (IDLH) level means the maximum level to which a
healthy worker can be exposed for 30 minutes without suffering irreversible health effects or
escape impairing symptoms.
Jet discharge:
The release of vapor and/or liquid at sufficient pressure such that significant air entertainment
results.
Jet fire:
Fire type resulting from fires from pressurized release of gas and/or liquid.
Kinetic Tree Theory (KTT):

An approximation method that allows the analyst to estimate fault tree Top Event reliability
characteristics through use of minimal cut sets, and failure for the basic events in the fault
tree.
16
Localized incident:
An incident whose effect zone is limited to a plant area (e.g. pump fire, small toxic release),
and does not extend into the off-site surrounding community.
LCLO:
Where acute exposure data are available (30 minutes to 4 hours exposure), the lowest
exposure concentration causing death or irreversible health effects in any species is used as
the IDLH concentration. These data are often reported as lethal concentration low (LCLO).
Lethal:
Causing or capable of causing death.
Level of Concern (LOC):

The concentration of an extremely hazardous substances (EDS) in the air above which there
may be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a
relatively short period of time.
Major incident:
An incident whose effect zone, while significant, is still limited to site boundaries (e.g. major
fire, spill ).
Maximum individual risk. :

The individual risk to the person(s) exposed to the highest risk in an exposed population.
Maximum potential quantity:

The individual risk to the person(s) exposed to the highest risk in an exposed population.
Median lethal concentration/dose:

Concentration or dose levels, respectively, that kills 50% of exposed laboratory animals in
controlled experiments.
17
Minimal cut set approach:
A term used in Fault Tree Analysis to describe the smallest combination of component and
human failures which, if they all occur, will cause the top event to occur. The failures all
correspond to Basic or Undeveloped Events.
Mortality Index:
An index based on the observed average ratio of casualties to the mass of material or every
released, as derived from the historical record.
It is sued to characterize the potential hazard of toxic material storage.
Negatively buoyant gas:

A gas with density greater than that of air at ambient temperature.
Neutral buoyant gas:

A gas with density approximately equal to that of air at ambient temperature.
On-site Emergency:
An accident which takes place in a chemical industry and its effects are confined to the
factory premises involving only the people working in the factory.
Off-site Emergency:
If an accident takes place in a chemical industry and its effects are felt outside the factory
premises, the situation thus generated is called an off-site emergency.
Occupier:
“Occupier” in relation to any factory or premises, means a person who has control over the
affairs of the factory or the premises and includes, in relation to any substance, the person in
possession of the substance.
18
Probability:
A number expressing the likelihood of occurrence of a specific event. Such as the ratio of the
number of outcomes that will produce a given event to the total number of possible outcomes.
Performance shaping factors:

Any factor that influences human behavior performance shaping factors may be external
(heat, stress, etc) or internal to the person (religious beliefs, education, etc.).
Phased models:
Models that provide quantitative information on source rates and extent of damage (thermal
radiation, explosion overpressure, or concentration of dispersing vapor clouds).
Physical explosion:
The catastrophic rupture of a pressurized gas-filled vessel.
Plant-specific data:
Failure rate data generated from collecting information on equipment failure experience at a
specific plant.
Pool fire:
The combustion of material evaporating from a layer of liquid at the base of the fire.
Programmable logic control (PLC):

Intelligent electronic models to perform the tasks of sequential control and process logic
solution.
Positively buoyant gas:

A gas with density less that of air at ambient temperature.
Predicted data:
19
Data generated by using correlation, factored estimation procedures, and analogies to predict
equipment failure rates.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA):

A commonly used term in the nuclear industry to describe the quantitative evaluation of risk
using probability theory.
Probability:
The expression for the likelihood of occurrence of an event or an event sequence during an
interval of time or the likelihood of the success or failure of an event on test or on demand.
By definition, probability must be expressed as a number ranging from 0-1.
Radius of Vulnerable Zone:

The maximum distance from the point of release of a hazardous substance at which the
airborne concentration could reach the level of concern (LOC) or LCLO under specified
weather condition
Raw plant data:

Untreated field equipment – specific failure information often collected as part of plant
operating and maintenance records, required as input for preparing plant-specific failure rate
data.
Reflected pressure:
The pressure on a structure perpendicular to the shock water.
Reliability parameters:
The collection of mathematically defined properties (e.g. Reliability, Availability,
Dependability) used in reliability engineering to describe the behavior of systems and their
elements, such as chemical processes, process systems, equipment and their components.
(See Appendix E).
Response:
20
The efforts to minimize the risks created in an emergency by protecting the people, the
environment or the property and the efforts to return the scene to normal pre-emergency
conditions
Risk:
A measure of economic loss or human injury in terms of both the incident likelihood and the
magnitude of the loss of injury.
Risk analysis:
The development of a quantitative estimate of risk based on engineering evaluation and
mathematical techniques for combining estimates of incident consequences and frequencies.
Risk Assessment:
The process by which the results of a risk analysis (i.e., risk estimates) are used to make
decisions, either through relative ranking of risk reduction strategies or through comparison
with risk targets.
Risk Contour:
Lines that connect points of equal risk around the facility (“iso-risk” lines).
Risk Estimation:
Combining the estimated consequences and likelihood of all incident outcomes from all
selected incidents to provide a measure of risks.
Risk management:
The systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices to the tasks of
analyzing, assessing and controlling risk in order to protect employees, the general public and
the environment as well as company assets while avoiding business interruptions.
Risk measures:
Ways of combining information on likelihood with the magnitude of loss or injury (e.g. risk
indices, individual risk measures, and societal risk measures).
Risk Targets:
Objective based risk criteria established as goals or guidelines for performance.
21
Sampling time:
The length of time in atmospheric dispersion testing over which concentration data are
sampled. Sampling time is normally synonymous with averaging time.
Sensitivity:
The sensitivity of a measure to a parameter is defined as the change in the measure per unit
change in that parameter.
Site/Facility:
Any location where actually toxic chemicals are manufactured, processed, stored. Handled
used or disposed; in short any place where these chemicals may be found.
Societal risk:
A measure of risk to a group of people. It is most often expressed in terms of the frequency
distribution of multiple casualty events.
Storage:
Methods of keeping raw materials, finished goods or products while awaiting use, shipment
or consumption.
Study Cube:
A geometrical representation of the variety of depths of study possible for a
CPQRA using the three major factors that define the scope of a CPQRA ; risk estimation
technique, complexity of analysis and number of incidents selected for study.
Task Analysis:
A human error analysis method that requires breaking down a procedure or overall task into
unit tasks and combining this information in the form of event trees.
Time-related failure:
A failure than is primarily due to the degradation over the time that a device or system is in
service. For example, the failure of a pump after 2000 hours of continuous service due to
wear on the bearings would be considered time-related failure.
22
Time to failure:
The time period measured from the moment when equipment installation is complete to the
release rate varies significantly with time.
Time in service:
Time from that moment when equipment installation is complete, the time period for
equipment commissioning, and the operating time thereafter.
Toxic Dose:
The combination of concentration and time for inhalation of a toxic gas that produces a
specific harmful effect.
Transfer :
Loading and unloading of chemicals between transport vehicles and storage vessels and
sending chemicals via pipes between storage vessels and process reactors.
Transport:
To carry or convey good from one place to another using ships, tanks, trains, pipelines or
airplanes.
Threshold Planning:
A quantity designated for each chemical which requires the Quantity (TPQ) occupier to take
various steps in preparation of emergency planning like preparation of onsite plans,
submission of information for preparation of off-site plan or making a safety report as per
Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989.
Transmissivity:
The fraction of radiant energy that is transmitted from the radiating object through the
atmosphere to a target. The transmissivity is reduced due to the absorption and scattering of
energy by the atmosphere itself.
Unavailability:
The profitability the fault event exists at a specified time.
23
Uncertainty:
A measure, often quantitative, of the degree of doubt or lack of certainty associated with an
estimate of the true value of a parameter.
Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE):

When a flammable vapor is released its mixture with air will form a flammable vapor cloud.
If ignited, the flame speed may accelerate to high velocities and produce significant blast
overpressure.
Undependability:
The probability the fault event exists at a specified time or occurs during a specified time
interval.
Undeveloped event:
A base event that is not developed because of insufficient consequence or because
information is unavailable.
Unreliability:
The probability that the fault event occurs during a specified time interval.
Virtual Source:
The offset in distance to the specified source of a gas or vapor release that results in a
maximum concentration of 100% at the source using a Gaussian dispersion model.
Vulnerable Zone:
It is an estimated geographical area that may be affected by the toxic release at levels that
could cause irreversible acute health effects or death to human.
Worst Credible Incident:

The most severe incidents considering only incident outcomes and their consequences of all
identified incidents and their outcomes, that is considered plausible or reasonably believable.
Worst possible incident:

The most severe incident, considering only incident outcomes and their consequences of all
identified incidents and their outcomes.
24
CHAPTER - 1
INTRODUCTION TO RAJAHMUNDRY ASSET, PROFILE
AND AREAWISE FACILITIES
1.1 LOCATION
Rajahmundry is situated on 170-1’ Northern Latitude, 810-41’ Eastern Longitude. It is
on the left bank of river Godavari just above the Head of Delta. The average rainfall is
about 1057.2 m. Rajahmundry Asset has a large hinterland comprising of delta of
Godavari. This is blessed with vast agricultural land with irrigation potential.
1.2 TOPOGRAPHY
The Rajahmundry Asset-Operational Area is bounded on the north by the Satmala Hills,
the Ajanta Range and the Mahadeo Hills, on the south and east by the Eastern Ghats and
on the west by the Western Ghats. It is roughly triangular in shape and the main river
itself runs practically along the base of the triangle. Except for the hills forming the
watershed around the basin, the entire drainage basin of the river Godavari comprises of
undulating country, a series of ridges and valleys interspersed with low hill ranges. Large
flat areas which are characteristic of the Indo-Gangetic plains are scarce except in the
delta. The Sahyadri ranges of Western Ghats form the western edge of the basin. The
interior of the basin is a plateau divided into a series of valleys sloping generally towards
east. The EasternGhats, which form the eastern boundary, are not so well defined as the
Sahyadri range on the west. The northern boundary of the basin comprises of tablelands
with varying elevation. Large stretches of plains interspersed by hill ranges lie to the
south. Like most of the parts of India, the Rajahmundry Asset receives the major portion
of its rainfall during the south-west monsoon period. The other rainy seasons are not so
well defined and well spread as the south-west monsoon season. They contribute about
16% of the total annual rainfall in the Godavari basin. The Godavari River receives the
drainage from a length of about 129 km of the high rainfall zone in the Western Ghats.
The annual rainfall varies from 3000 mm to 1000 mm in this reach. East of the Western
Ghats, the annual rainfall decreases rapidly to less than 600 mm along a line appearing
approximately from Chitradurga to Sangli and Pune to a point north-east of the line
connecting Kurnool, Raichur, Bijapur and Ahmednagar. East of this line the rainfall
again gradually increases to about 900 mm in and around Guntur.
25
There is a belt, some distance east of the Western Ghats and in width varying from about
80 km in the south to about 97 km in the north, with less than 600 mm, the normal annual
rainfall. This belt, which is about 10360 km2 in area, includes portions of the
Aurangabad and Ahmednagar districts of Maharashtra. January and February are almost
entirely dry in the Godavari basin, the rainfall during these two months being less than 15
mm. During the next three months up to end of May, it varies from 20mm to about 50mm
in most parts of the basin. The Rajahmundry Asset has a tropical climate. The mean
annual surface temperature in the Western Ghats area is about 24o C, and it increases
gradually towards the east and attains a maximum of 29.4 o C on the east coast. During
January, which may be taken as a typical winter month, the mean daily minimum
o
temperature going from west to east, increases from 15 C, on the Western Ghats to
about 18 o C on the east coast; the mean daily maximum temperature generally exceeds
30 o C in the western part of the Rajahmundry Asset and it is only slightly less than 30 o C
in the eastern part. The population of the basin, based on 1991 census was 51.6 million
out of which about 77% live in rural and remaining 23% in urban areas. The density of
population is around 165 persons per km2. Nearly 40% of work force is engaged in
cultivation, 30% as agriculture labour and balance 30% in mining, manufacturing etc.
26
1.3 PROFILE OF RAJAHMUNDRY ASSET – KG BASIN
The Operational Areas in Rajahmundry Asset covering an area of 28000 sq.km on land
and 1,45,000 sq.km in the offshore including deep waters. This is a unique one in the
sense that the hydrocarbons are discovered in the geologically oldest (250 Million years)
to the youngest (5 Million years) sediments and also from both on land and offshore parts
of the basin. As on date we are holding the PEL acreage in 2 onland blocks viz Godavari
AND West Godavari . Two blocks KG-DWN-98/2 and KG-ONN-2003/1) are under
joint venture. Ravva field located off Amalapuram coast, discovered by ONGC is on
joint venture (Production sharing contract). Overcoming the challenges of high pressure,
high temperature, and other drilling problems, to date 590 on land wells and 241 offshore
wells (excluding wells drilled in Ravva field) have been drilled with an overall success
ratio of 1:2.58. These exploratory efforts led to the discovery of 59 small to medium
sized HC fields with 248.53 MMT (O+OEG) of initial In-place reserves as on 1.04.2014
(excluding Ravva field).
Dispersed hydrocarbon habital of the basin resulting in small to medium sized fields also
poses exploitation challenges.
Presently, the Asset is progressing with 8 On land rigs with capability to drill 3000-6000
meters, 02 Workover rig, 18 Installations.
The current production of Oil and Gas is 686 Metric tons /day 16.6 LSCM / day
respectively from various facilities located in East Godavari, West Godavari and Krishna
district.
27
Table 1.1 The Area Wise Details of Facilities
Area I
Oil Prod Gas Distance (In Kms)
(MT) per Prod.(SCM) From Rajahmundry
S. No. Installation day per day
1 Mandapeta GCS 4.8 3,00,000 40
2 Endamuru GCS 3.2 2,20,000 70
3 MDP(W) EPS 0.64 34,000 44
Area II
S. Oil Prod Gas Distance (In Kms)

No. Installation (MT) Prod.(SCM) From Rajahmundry
1 Mori GCS 6.0 6,80,820 100
2 Adavipalem GCS 6.4 92,000 110
3 Ponnamanda GCS 14.698 3,64,258 126
4 Kesanapalli (W) GGS 291 55,119 120
5 Pasarlapudi GCS 4.970 3,28,276 85
6 Tatipaka GCS 13.065 846,073 80
7 Narsapur GCS 0.780 98,914 85
9 Gopavaram GGS 272.70 23,225 90
10 Penumadam EPS 1.889 25,284 120
Area III
Oil Prod Gas Distance (In Kms)
S. No. Installation (MT) Prod.(SCM) From Rajahmundry
1 GGS Lingala 46.261 32,155 160
2 Kaikalur EPS 1.655 9,766 160
3 Nandigama EPS 1.558 30,060 195
4 Suryaraopeta EPS 3.143 0 150
28
1.4 EAST GODAVARI DISTRICT PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS
1.4.1 Introduction of Adavipalem Field
Location : Adavipalem Production Oil Mine is located near Sankarguptam village
(Razole Mandal) in E.G. District in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through state
highway.
Airport: Rajahmundry is about 90 Kms North West of Adavipalem town and
Hyderabad is about 460 Kms. North West
Railway station: Palakollu is the nearest Railway station falling in line Narasapur-
Bhimavaram-Gudivada-Vijayawada sector
Road: Plenty of Buses are flying for Vijayawada from Razole town. Normally it
takes about 4 hours to reach Vijayawada by Bus.
Brief on Adavipalem Field:

The ONGC started exploration activity in Adavipalem area in 1997 and struck Gas in
Adavipalem well number-1. The present GCS is located within the well site of
Adavipalem-1. Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for consumption of gas
from the GCS. M/S GAIL draws gas from the GCS and feeds on to distribution
network system for distribution to consumers.
Brief description of GCS- I

GCS Adavipalem is located at about 0.5 Km from Sankaraguptam Town and approx.,
20 km from Razole town. The fluid from different wells is brought to the GCS
through flow lines to the respective header and then to gas separator whereby the gas
is separated from liquid. The produced water is decanted from liquid and oil is stored
in storage tanks. The oil thus stored is transported through road tankers to the
unloading station at S-Yanam, which collects oil from all production installations of
the Asset for custody transfer.
The effluent is partly injected into the disposal wells and partly transported through
tankers to Kammapalem Injector well. There are two numbers of headers viz, High
pressure Group header, and High –pressure Test header. Presently, 9 wells are
connected and 5 are flowing and producing gas, condensate oil and effluent.
Details of Equipment’s
1) DG Set-62 Kva
2) Effluent Injection pump-30 KW
3) HP Sep-1 No
4) LP Sep-1 No
5) LP Compression Capcity-1 Lakh m3
6) HP Filters-2 Nos
Details of Fire Fighting System:

1) Fire Water Pumps-2 Nos
2) Water Reservoir-815 m3
3) Jockey Pump-1 Nos
4) Portable Extinguishers, Monitors and Hydrants are available as per OISD STd-189
29
1.4.2 Introduction of Endamuru Field
Location:. ENDAMURU Production Oil Mine is located near ENDAMURU Village near
Kakinada Town in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through state highway.
Airport: Rajahmundry is about 80 Kms south west of Endamuru village.

Vijayawada is about 250 Kms North West of ENDAM URU Village.
Railway station: Kakinada is the terminal point for the branch line KAKINADA-
SAMALKOT--Vijayawada.
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying for Rajahmundry from KAKINADA town. Normally it
takes about 2 hours to reach Vijawada by Bus.
Brief on Field: The ONGC started exploration activity in ENDAMURU area in 1992.
The production from the field has started after commissioning to the GCS on 1st JULY-
1992. Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for consumption of gas from the GCS.
M/S GAIL draws gas from the GCS and adds on to distribution network system for
distribution to consumers.
Brief description of GCS-ENDAMURU
ENDAMURU-GCS is located at about 25 Km from KAKINADA Town. KAKINADA Town is
on the state High way. The ENDAMURU GCS is located near ENDAMURU Village of
KARAPA Mandal. The fluid from different wells is brought to the GCS through flow lines to the
header and then to gas separator whereby the gas is separated from liquid. The produced water is
decanted from liquid and oil is stored in storage tanks. The oil thus stored is transported through
road tankers to the unloading station at S/Yanam, which collects oil from all production
installations of the Asset for custody transfer aft.
The effluent is collected in one tank and transported by road tankers to injection wells.
There are two numbers of headers viz, High pressure Group header, and high –pressure
Test header.
Presently, 6 Nos. of wells are connected and 5 No of wells are flowing and producing gas,
condensate oil and effluent
Details of Equipment’s
a) Storage Tank-2 nos each with a capacity of 40 m3
b) Effluent Storage Tank-40 m3 and 70 m3
c) HP filter-2 Nos
d) Seperator-3 Nos(Production./Test/Group)
e) Gas receiver(InsT)
f) LP Sep-6 ATM
g) DG Set-1 no-30kva
h) Gas Gen Set 1: No

1)Fire Water Pumps: 2 Nos
2)Fire Water reservoir – 2 Nos each with 300 m3 capacity
3)Jockey Pump-1 No
4)Portable Extinguishers, Monitors and Hydrants are available as per OISD STd-189
30
1.4.3 Introduction of Gopavaram Field (Amalapuram Area)
Location: Gopavaram Production Oil Mine is located near Gopavaram village,

Uppalaguptam Mandal in Andhra Pradesh and is connected by road
Airport:
Vijayawada is about 175 Kms.
Hyderabad is about 525 Kms
Railway station: Rajahmundry is the nearest Railway station, which is about 95 Kms
from GMAA
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying from Rajahmundry to Amalapuram town (25 km
away from GMAA). Regular Buses are also available from Amalapuram to GMAA.
Brief description of Amalapuram Field

The ONGC started exploration activity in Amalapuram area in 1984 and struck oil in
1989 Pasarlapudi well number-8. At Odalarevu, first well stuck in 1995 (KPA #1 E).
Continuous production started from 1998 with GS-23-AD, GS-23-AE, and KPAA.
GS-15-4, GS-23-1 in the year 2001, KWAM added in the year 2004. In 2005 after
tsunami GS-23-AD & AE wells were abandoned due to the inundation of wells by sea
water. #KPAB & KPAC are effluent disposal wells.
Brief description of Gopavaram GGS: Gopavaram-GGS is located at about 25 Kms

from Amalapuram town. The well fluid from different wells is brought to the EPS
through underground flow lines and is taken to the Inlet Manifold. Provision exists for
recording the Pressure and Temperature of each flow line before it enters the manifold.
The Inlet Manifold consists of a Production header and a Test header with change over
valves to facilitate diversion of any well to either the Production Separator or the Test
Separator. Two Production Separators and one Test Separator are available where the
Gas is separated from the liquid stream. These separators operate at 3.5-4.0Kg/cm2.
The gas from the Separators, after passing through filters, is routed to the LP
Compressors where the pressure is raised to 50 Kg/cm2 for dispatch to GAIL terminal
through a 4” trunk line. The liquid stream separated from the Separators flows to the
Heater Treater where the temperature of the liquid is raised to 65 deg C for separation
of water from Oil. The separated water is routed to the Effluent storage tank and the
pure oil is routed to any of the available eight Crude Oil storage tanks.
The part of the Oil from the storage tanks is pumped through the 4” GMAA-OUS Oil
trunk line to the Cairn Energy terminal for custody transfer and the remaining Oil is
dispatched through road tankers again to the OUS, S.Yanam. The effluent so generated
is sent through Road Tankers to ODL-GCS for injection to ED wells below 1000
meters depth. PPD and Demulsifier are used for improving the Pour Point and for
breaking the Oil water emulsions during the process. Presently, 14 Oil & Gas Wells
and 3 Disposal wells are connected to GMAA-GGS and produce Gas, Oil & Water
Details of Major Equipment’s
The list of major equipment at GMAA EPS is as under:
1) HP Separator 1 no
2) LP Separator 2 nos
3) Test Separator 1 no
4) HP Gas Filter 1 no
5) Instrumentation Scrubber 1 no
6) Heater Treater 1 no
31
7) Oil Storage Tanks 2 x 45.5 m3
8) Oil Storage Tanks 6 x 40.5 m3
9) Effluent Storage Tanks 1 x 55 m3
10) LP Gas Compressors 2 x 36,000 m3/day (1 running + 1 S/B)
11) Gas Genset 1 x 62.5 KVA
12) DG set 1 x 62.5
13) Oil Despatch Pumps 4 x 25 hp
14) Oil Loading Pumps 2 x 10 hp
15) Oil Loading Pumps 2 x 5 hp

1) Fire water storage tank of capacity – 750 m3
2) 2 Nos of fire pumps with a capacity of 275 Cum/Hr @10 KG
3) Fire water pumps, DCP fire tender (300 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at
adequate locations as per the OISD STd-189requirement.
4) Electric fire alarm and fire bell are installed.
5) Fire Water Monitors and Hydrants in the Fixed Fire water network
32
1.4.4 Introduction of Kesanapalli Field
Location :.. KESANAPALLI Production Oil Mine is located near Thurupalem village (
Malkipuram Mandal ) in E.G. District in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through state
highway
Airport: Rajahmundry is about 100 Kms North West of KESANAPALLI town.
Railway station: Palakollu is the nearest Railway station falling in line Narsapur-
Bhimavaram-Gudivada-Vijayawada sector.
Road: Plenty of Buses are flying for Rajahmundry from Razole town. Normally it takes
about 2 hours to reach Rajahmundry by Bus.
Brief on KESANAPALLI Field: The ONGC started exploration activity in

KESANAPALLI area in 2000 and struck Gas in KESANAPALLI well number-1. The
present GGS is located within the well site of KESANAPALLI-3. The production from
the field has started after commissioning of the GGS on Feb 2000.Gas consumers have
come up in the vicinity for consumption of gas from the GGS. M/S GAIL draws gas from
the GGS and adds on to distribution network system for distribution to consumers. Also
there are three direct consumers for the supply of gas from KESANAPALLI.
Brief description of KSP GGS

GGS KESANAPALLI is located at about 90 Km from Rajahmundry. The fluid from
different wells is brought to the GGS through flow lines to the header Separately HP
wells & LP wells. It goes to the gas separator whereby the gas is separated from liquid.
The liquid is processed in Heater treater where the effluent water and oil are being
separated. The oil is decanted from liquid and produced water is subsequently treated
fluent in Effluent treatment plant. The oil thus stored is transported through road tankers
to the unloading station at S-Yanam and pumped through pipe line to Tatipaka Refinery.
The effluent water after treatment will be disposed in to effluent injection wells. There
are 4 numbers of headers viz, High pressure Group header, and High –pressure Test
header and Low pressure Group header, and Low–pressure Test header. Presently, 27
wells are connected and 21 wells are flowing and producing crude, gas, condensate oil
and effluent . There are 4 nos of effluent disposal wells.
Details of Major Equipments

The Kesanapalli Production Oil Mine has the following facilities:
1) Gas Collection Station (GGS) – KSP : commissioned on Feb 2000
2) Gas Handling Capacity : 10.0 Lakh Scum/day
3) Liquid Handling Capacity : 1500 Cum/Day
4) Effluent Treatment Plant : 750 cum/day
5) Manifold with :20 wells (HP Wells + LP Wells)
6) HP Separator :2 nos
7) LP Separator :1 nos
8) LP Test Separator :1 nos
9) HP Test Separator :1 nos
10) Heater Treater :3 nos
11) Bath Heater :2nos
12) Filters :2 nos
13) Gas compressors - :3 nos (hired basis) – 86000 cum/ day(max)
33
14) Elevated Flare System with a capacity of 3.0 Lakh Scum/day
15) Storage tank of oil : 2 X 1000 cum
16) Storage tank of Effluent : 2 X 200 cum
17) Test tanks : 2 X 90 cum

a) Fire water storage tank of capacity – 2500m3
b) 2 Nos of fire pumps with a capacity of 275 Cum/Hr @10 KG
c) Fire water pumps, DCP fire tender (300 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at
adequate locations as per the OISD STd-189 requirement.
d) Electric fire alarm and fire bell are installed.
34
1.4.5 Introduction of Mandapeta Field
Location: Mandapeta Production Oil Mine is located near KOTTURU Village near
Mandapeta Town in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through state highway.
Airport: Rajahmundry is about 40 Kms North West of Kottur Village
Railway station: RAJAHMUNDRY is the point for the main line From
Visakhapatnam-Vijayawada.
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying for Mandapeta from RAJAHMUNDRY town.
Normally it takes about 1 hour to reach Mandapeta by Bus.
Brief on Field:
The ONGC started exploration activity in MANDAPETA area in 1993 and struck Gas
in MANDAPETA well number-1. The present GCS is located in the campus of the well
site of the well MANDAPETA-1
The production from the field has started after commissioning to the GCS on 29 th
September’1994.Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for consumption of gas
from the GCS. M/S GAIL draws gas from the GCS and feeds on to distribution network
system for distribution to consumers.
Brief description of Installation: GCS- MANDAPETA

GCS - MANDAPETA is located at about 25 Km from KAKINADA Town.
KAKINADA Town is on the state High way. The MANDAPETA GCS is located near
MANDAPETA Village of ALAMURU Mandal.
The fluid from different wells is brought to the GCS through flow lines to the header
and then to gas separator whereby the gas is separated from liquid. The produced water
is decanted from liquid and oil is stored in storage tanks. The oil thus stored is
transported through road tankers to the unloading station at S/Yanam, which collects oil
from all production installations of the Asset for custody transfer. The effluent is
collected in one tank and transported by road tankers to injection wells. There are three
numbers of headers viz. High pressure Group header, low –pressure Group header and
Test header. Presently, 10 Nos. of wells are connected and 8 No of wells are flowing
and producing gas, condensate oil and effluent.
Gas Compression facility is commissioned in the year August 2011 with a minimum
suction pressure requirement of 4.5 to 5 kg/cm2 and after compression the discharge
pressure varies in the range of 45-50 kg/cm2 as per GAIL trunk line pressure.The
Compression capacity of the compressor is 3 Lakh m3/Day. Gas Compressor plant is
having Cooling tower, Cooling Water Circulation pumps and Gas Coolers etc. with
Safety System of HC gas detection system
Details of Equipment’s:
1)HP Compressors-1 No @3 Lac m3/Day
2)HP Filter-1 No
3) Storage Tank-45m3-3Nos
4)HP Header-1 No
5)Test Header-1No
6)Production Header-1 No
35
Introduction to Mandapeta (W)-EPS
Location :The Installation is located near Devarapally Village, Ravulapalem Mandal, EG

District
Airport: Nearest Airport is Rajhamundry and it is about 50 Kms from the installation
Vijayawada Airport is around 200 Kms from the installation
Railway station: Nearest Railway station is Rajahmundry Station and is 40 kms away
Road: The installation is connected to National Highway at a distance 10 Kms
Brief description of Mandapeta(W) EPS

The well fluid is received from 5 wells through flow lines and the gas is separated and
sent to consumers (M/S Steel Exchange and Padma Steel).Condensate is dispatched to
GMAA through tankers.
Details of Equipment’s:
1) Storage Tanks:1 Nos with 40 m3 capacity
2) Separators(HP)-1 No
3) LP separator-1 No
4) 6 ATM Vertical Vessel
5) 16 ATM Vertical Vessel
6) DG SET-1 NO
7) Gas gen Set-1no

1) Trolley Mounted Fire Water Pump- 01 Nos
2) Reservoir capacity-300 m3
3) Fire water pumps, DCP fire tender (300 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at
adequate locations as per the OISD STd-189 requirement.
4) Electric fire alarm and fire bell are installed.
36
1.4.6 Introduction of Mori-Field
Location :MORI Production Oil Mine is located near SRUNGAVARAPPADU village

(Razole Mandal) in E.G. District in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through state
highway
Airport
Rajahmundry is about 90 Kms North West of MORI town.
Bhimavaram-Gudivada-Vijayawada sector
Brief on Mori Field: The ONGC started exploration activity in Mori area in 1990 and
struck Gas in well number Mori -1. The present GCS is located within the well site of
Mori -1. The production from the field has started after commissioning of the GCS on
March1991. M/S GAIL draws gas from the GCS and adds on to distribution network
system for distribution to consumers. Direct marketing to M/S VENKATARAYA
POWER PLANT situated near the site.
is decanted from liquid and effluent water is stored in storage tanks and subsequently
injected into water injection well. The oil thus stored is transported through road tankers
to the unloading station at S-Yanam, which collects oil from all production installations
of the Asset for custody transfer/pumped to Tatipaka Refinery. There are two numbers
of headers viz, High Pressure Group header, and High –Pressure Test header. Presently,
41 Wells are connected and 19 Wells are flowing and producing gas, condensate oil and
effluent.
Brief description of Mori

and then to gas separator whereby the gas is separated from liquid. There are four
numbers of headers viz, High Pressure Group header, and High –Pressure Test header.
And Low pressure production with one low pressure test header. Presently, 40 Nos. of
wells are connected and 22 nos wells are flowing and producing gas, negligible
condensate oil and effluent

1)HP Production Facility
2)LP Production Facility
3)125 KVa Gen Set
4) Compressor Plant
5)Flare System

37
a) Fire water storage tank of capacity – 300m3
b) 2 Nos of fire Pumps with a capacity of 170 Cum/Hr @10 KG
c) Pressurized Fire Water network covering the entire plant with adequate monitors
and hydrant points.
d) Fire water Pumps, DCP fire tender (150 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at
adequate locations as per the requirement.
e) Electric fire alarm and fire bell installed.
38
1.4.7 Introduction of Pasaralapudi Field (Amalapuram Area)
Location :.. PASARALAPUDI Production Oil Mine is located near Amalapuram town
in Andhra Pradesh and is connected by road
Airport: Vijayawada is about 225 Kms.

Hyderabad is about 480 Kms.
Rajahmundry is about 95 Kms
Railway station: Rajahmundry is the nearest Railway station, which is about 95

Kmsfrom PSARALAPUDI
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying from Rajahmundry to Amalapuram town (12 km
away from PSARALAPUDI). Regular Buses are also available from Amalapuram to
PSARALAPUDI
BRIEF ABOUT PASARALAPUDI FIELD:

ONGC started exploration activity in PSARALAPUDI area in mid 1991 and struck Oil
in 1992 in PSARALAPUDI well#8. The present GCS is located around the well site of
the well PSARALAPUDI#8.
As per the initial scale of operations the installation was a Well Head installation and
was subsequently upgraded as EPS and as later as GCS as more wells were added over
a period of time. M/s GAIL draws the gas from the GCS and distributes to various
consumers through their gas trunk line network.
Brief description of GCS

GCS Pasarlapudi is located at about 8 Km. from Amalapuram Town. The nearest
village from Pasarlapudi GCS is Devarlanka of the Allavaram mandal.
The fluid mostly gas from different wells is brought to the GCS through flow lines to
the header and then to HP gas separator whereby the gas is separated and goes to the
consumers through GAIL gas trunk line. The liquid from HP separator goes to the 2nd
stage separator through a Level Control Valve and the small amount of Gas liberated
in this vessels goes to the Flare through the Flare Knock Out Drum. The liquid from
this vessel goes to the condensate knock out drum through another LCV. The liquid
consisting of condensate and water from this vessel is collected in the storage tanks.
The Oil/Condensate thus stored is transported through road tankers to the unloading
station at S-Yanam, which collects oil from all production installations of the Asset for
custody transfer.
The effluent is collected in to tanks and transported to Odalarevu GCS, through
tankers, for Injection into Effluent Disposal Wells at a depth below 1000m. .
There are two numbers of headers viz, High pressure header, and Test header. An
additional two headers are also provided viz. one MP and one LP, for future processing
of Low Pressure Gas as the pressure of the reservoir depletes.
Presently 21 wells are connected and 13 wells are flowing and producing
Gas/Condensate ,2 waters injector and 6 Non flowing
39
a) HPSep-1 Nos
b) LP Test Sep-1 Nos
c) HP Filters-2 Nos
d) ]LP Sep-1Nos
e) LP Header
f) MP Header
g) HP header
h) DG Set-2 Nos-=125 Kva
i) Oil loading pumps

a) Fire Water Pumps: 2Nos @ 275 m3
b) Water Reservoir:420 m3
c) Pressurized Fire Water network covering the entire plant with adequate monitors
and hydrant points.
d) Fire water Pumps, DCP fire tender (150 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at
e) Electric fire alarm and fire bell installed.
40
1.4.8 Introduction of Ponnamonda Field
Location: PONNAMONDA Production Oil Mine is located near Sankarguptam village

(Razole Mandal) in E.G.District in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through state
highway.
Airport:
Rajahmundry is about 90 Kms North West of Ponnamonda town.
Bhimavaram-Gudivada-Vijayawada sector.
BRIEF ABOUT PONNAMONDA FIELD:

The ONGC started exploration activity in Ponnamonda area in 1997 and struck Gas in
Ponnamonda well number-1. The present GCS is located within the well site of
PONNAMONDA-1.. Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for consumption of
gas from the GCS. M/S GAIL draws gas from the GCS and adds on to distribution
network system for distribution to consumers.
Brief description of GCS- PONNAMONDA

GCS Ponnamonda is located at about 0.5 Km from Sankaraguptam Town and approx,
20 km from Razole town. The fluid from different wells is brought to the GCS through
flow lines to the respective header and then to gas separator whereby the gas is
separated from liquid. The produced water is decanted from liquid and oil is stored in
storage tanks.
The oil thus stored is transported through road tankers to the unloading station at S-
Yanam, which collects oil from all production installations of the Asset for custody
transfer.
The effluent is collected in to tanks and transported for further injection to well in PO#7.

1) Seperators-2 Nos(LP)
2) HP filters-2
3) LP filters-2
4) LP Knock out Drum
5) Storage Tank(Oil-45 x 4
6) Effluent Storage Tanks- 3 Nos (75 m3 x1 and 45 m3 X2)
7) Effluent Dispatch Pumps-2 nos
8) Air Compressors for Intrument air
9) Gas gen set-1 No.
10) DG Set-KVA-1 No
11) Gas Scrubber-1 No
41
1) FWP – 2Nos
2) Reservoir-60m3
3) Jockey Pump-1 No
4) Fire water Pumps, DCP fire tender (150 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at
5) Electric fire alarm and fire bell installed.
42
1.4.9 Introduction of Tatipaka Field
Location: Tatipaka Complex is located near Nagaram village in Tatipaka town in East
Godavari district Andhra Pradesh and is connected through road – 65Kms from
Rajahmundry. Tatipaka Complex consists of Tatipaka Mini Refinery, Gas Collection
Station and Effluent Treatment Plant.
Airport: Rajahmundry is about 90 Kms North West of Ponnamonda town.
Railway station: Narasapuram falls on Vijayawada – Bhimavaram - Rajahmundry line

and 22 Kms. East of Narasapuram towns.
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying from Rajahmundry to Tatipaka, Razole and
Sakhinetipalli town. Normally it takes about 2½ hours to reach from Rajahmundry by
Bus.
BRIEF ABOUT TATIPAKA FIELD: The onshore area enclosed between Vasistha
river and Vynateyam-Godavari river and bay of Bengal in the east is termed as Island
area and is highly gas prospective. In this Island area Tatipaka-Pasarlapudi field is
located at about 22kms and 26 Kms north east of Narsapuram town respectively.
Production from Tatipaka field started by connecting Tatipaka#1,&2 to Tatipaka gas
collecting station ( GCS ) in Feb. 1989. With connection of more number of wells
Tatipaka GCS in the present form commissioned on 23.11.93
Brief description of GCS– TATIPAKA:

GCS –II is located in NAGARAM village. GCS-II is connected with total 36 no. of
wells out of which at present 17 are flowing wells, 12 non-flowing wells and 7 are
effluent disposal wells.
The well fluid from different wells flows through flow lines to production header and
goes to Production Separator. Production Separator pressure maintained at 65Kg/cm2
and these separators are 3 phase separators. Gas that is separated in production separator
moves out from top of the production separator and is supplied to various consumers
through GAIL. Water separated at production separator sent to Oily Water Sump
through a network of underground pipelines. Condensate that is separated in production
separator enters into H.P. separator which is maintained at 17.5kg/cm2.In this separator
water present if any gets separated and dissolved gas in the liquid gets separated due to
pressure difference and this gas will be used for internal consumption. Condensate from
H.P. separator enters the L.P. separator whose pressure maintained at 3.5kg/cm2. Again
dissolved Gas from condensate separated and this L.P. gas is used for internal
consumption. The stabilized condensate stored in condensate storage tanks. Water if any
present in condensate gets separated in L.P. separator and this water is sent to ows.

1. HP Gas Header
2. LP Gas Header
3. Media Filters
4. Effluent Storage Tanks
43
5. Wash Tank
6. Receiver Tank
7. Flotation Cells
8. Gas Compressors
9. Heat-Exchangers
10. Desalter
11. Furnace
12. Distillation Column
13. Side Stripper
14. Storage Tanks
15. HP Gas Compressors-3 Nos

1. Fire Water Pumps : 450 m3/Hr pumps 4 Nos
2. Fire Water Pumps : 275 m3/Hr pumps 4 Nos
3. Jockey Pumps-50 m3/Hr-2 Nos
4. Jockey Pumps-10.8 m3/Hr-2 Nos
5. Reservoir Storage: 4800 m3 / 1nos
6. Reservoir Storage: 3400 m3 / 1nos
7. DCP fire extinguishers (300 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at adequate locations
as per the OISD STd-189 requirement
44
1.5 WEST GODAVARI DISTRICT PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS
1.5.1 Introduction of Narasapur Field
Location:.. Narasapur Production Oil Mine is located near Narasapur town in Andhra
Pradesh and is connected through state highway
Airport:
Rajahmundry is about 100 Kms North East of Narasapur Town.
Vijayawada is about 150 Kms North West
Railway station: Narasapur is the terminal point for the branch line Narasapur-
Bhimavaram-Gudivada-Vijayawada.
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying for Rajahmundry and Vijayawada from Narasapur
town. Normally it takes about 3 hours to reach Rajahmundry and 4 hours to reach
Vijayawada by Bus.
BRIEF ABOUT NARASAPUR FIELD:

The ONGC started exploration activity in Narasapur area in 1977 and struck Gas in
Narasapur well number-1. The present GCS is located around 7.0 Km form the well site
of the well Narasapur-1
The production from the field has started after commissioning to the GCS on 25th
Febuary -1988.
Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for consumption of gas from the GCS. M/S
GAIL draws gas from the GCS and adds on to distribution network system for
distribution to consumers.
Brief description of Narsapur GCS

GCS Narasapur is located at about 05 Km from Narasapur Town. Narasapur Town is on
the state High way. The Narasapur GCS is located in Chinamamidipalli Village of
Narasapur Mandal .
is decanted from liquid and oil is stored in storage tanks.
transfer.
The effluent is collected in to tanks and transported to injection wells. An effluent

injection facility for disposal is exist near Narasapur GCS. There are two numbers of
headers viz, High pressure Group header, and High –pressure Test header.
Presently, 10 Nos. of wells are connected and 10 No of wells are flowing and producing
gas, condensate oil and effluent.

1. High pressure Group header
2. High pressure Test header.
45
3. LP Seperators-2 No’s
4. HP Filters-2 No’s
5. Test Seperator-1 No’s
6. Storage tank-225 m3
7. Storage Tank-200 m3
8. DG Set-1 No’s

1. Fire Water pumps-2 Nos
2. Fire Water Reservoir-2 Nos
3. DCP fire extinguishers (300 kg) and fire extinguishers positioned at adequate locations
as per the OISD STd-189 requirement
46
1.6 KRISHNA DISTRICT PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS
1.6.1 Introduction of Lingala Field

Location:. Lingala Production Oil Mine is located near Gudiwada town of Krishna
District in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through national highway NO: 214.
Airport: Vijayawada is about 70 Kms South-west of Gudiwada town.
Hyderabad is about 340 Kms. South West
Railway station: Mudinepalli falls on Vijaywada-Gudiwada-Bhimavaram line and 16
Kms. East of Gudiwada town. Gudiwada falls on a branch line from Vijayawada to
Machilipatnam
Road: A number of Buses are plying for Vijayawada from Gudiwada town. Normally it
takes about 1 ½ hours to reach Vijayawada by Bus.
BRIEF ABOUT LINGALA FIELD:
The ONGC started exploration activity in Lingala area in 1988 and struck oil in 1989 in
well no: Lingala#1. Lingala GGS is located encompassing the well site of this well.
The production from the field has started after commissioning of the GGS on 18-
December-1989. Initially, production facilities were adequate for one Well. Later, the
Installation was upgraded to GGS as more number of wells was added.
Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for consumption of gas from the GGS. M/S
GAIL draws gas from the GGS and distributes to local consumers. There is one direct
gas consumer nearby the GGS, who uses gas for power production.
Brief description of Lingala GGS

GGS Lingala is located at about 16 Km from Mudinepalli Town. Mudinepalli Town is
on the NH-214. The nearest village from Lingala GGS is Chigurukota of the
Muninepalli Mandal.
Well fluid from different oil wells, is brought to the GGS through flow lines and is
routed to gas-liquid separators wherein gas and liquid are separated. Liquid from the
bottom of separators which contains produced water and oil/emulsion is subjected to
heating cum chemical treatment in Heater-Treater. Oil which is free of water, flows to
crude oil storage tanks. Produced water from Heater-Treater, is collected in the settling
tanks and then pumped into the well formation, below 1000meters depth. From the top
of the Separators flows the natural gas which flows to gas consumers, both HP & LP.
The oil from storage tanks is transported through road tankers to the unloading station at
S-Yanam for onward dispatch.
In addition to the above, natural Gas from High pressure gas wells is received
separately, in GGS to High Pressure Gas Lift Header. Gas from this header is routed to
low pressure oil wells via separator, for injecting high-pressure gas to the wells for
lifting of oil.
Overall 20 no’s of wells are connected to the instsallation for production of Oil& Gas
Oil:6
Gas:4
ED Wells:2
47
WI:2
Sick wells:6
a. Separator (600 M3 Liquid,4,00,000 M3 Gas)-3
b. Heater treater (600 M3 Liquid)-1
c. Storage Tanks (500 M3 )-2
d. Test Tanks (45 M3 Each)-2
e. Produced water Tanks (45 M3 Each)-2
f. Produced water injection Tanks (150 M3) connected in series with four chambers.
Details of Fire Fighting System
1) Fire water Diesel engine driven pump (47.5LPS)
2) Portable Fire Extinguishers
3) Sprinklers
4) Monitors
5) Hydrants
48
1.6.2 Introduction of Kaikaluru Field
Location :.. KAIKALURU Production Oil Mine is located near Gudiwada town in
Andhra Pradesh and is connected through national highway - 214
AirPort: Vijayawada is about 70 Kms South-west of Gudiwada town.

Railway station: Mudinepalli falls on Vijaywada-Gudiwada-Bhimavaram line and 16

Kms. East of Gudiwada towns.Gudiwada falls on a branch line from Vijayawada to
Machilipatnam
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying for Vijayawada from Gudiwada town. Normally it
takes about 1½ hours to reach Vijawada by Bus.
BRIEF ABOUT KAIKALURU FIELD:

The ONGC started exploration activity in Kaikaluru area in 1986 and struck oil in 1986
Kaikaluru well number-1. The present EPS is located around the well site of the well
Kaikaluru-1The production from the field has started after commissioning to the EPS on
26th January-1987Initially production facilities are adequate for a Well Head Installation
which has been up graded to EPS.Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for
consumption of gas from the EPS. M/S GAIL draws gas from the EPS and distributes to
consumers
Brief description of EPS

EPS Kaikaluru is located at about 4 Km from Mudinepalli Town. Mudinepalli Town is
on the NH-214. The nearest village from Kaikaluru EPS is Inampudi of the Muninepalli
Mandal.
The fluid from different wells is brought to the EPS through flow lines to the header and
then to gas separator whereby the gas and oil are separated and oil is stored in storage
tanks.
transfer aft.
The effluent is collected in to tanks and transported to injection facility for disposal at
more than 1000 mts in Lingala-GGS
Presently, 07 wells are connected and 3 are flowing and producing Gas, oil/emulsion.
Overall 7 nos of wells are connected to the instsallation for production of Oil& Gas
Oil:1
Gas:2
Sick wells:4
Details of Major Equipment
Separator (100 M3 Liquid,1,00,000 M3

2
Gas)
Storage Tanks (40 M3 ) 1
Produced water Tanks (45 M3 ) 1
Loading Tanks 1
49
Loading Pumps(20M3/Hr) 2
Loading Bay 1
Details of Fire Fighting System
Fire water storage Tank Capacity

Fire water Diesel engine driven pump(26.6LPS)
280 M3
at7 kg/cm2
Hydrants 1
CO2 6.8 kg 2
DCP 10kg 3
Foam 9 litrs 6
50
1.6.3 Introduction of Nandigama Field
Location: Nandigama Production Oil Mine is located near Machlipatnam town in Andhra
Pradesh and is connected through national highway - 214.
Airport:
Vijayawada is about 60 Kms SouthWest of Gudiwada town.
Railway station:
Pedana falls on Vijayawada- gudiwada- Machlipatnam and 10 Kms. North of
Machlipatnam town.Pedana falls on a branch line from Vijayawada to Machilipatnam
Road: Plenty of Buses are plying for Vijayawada from Machlipatnam town. Normally
it takes about 1 ½ hours to reach Vijayawada by Bus.
Brief on Field:
The ONGC started exploration activity in NANDIGAMA area in 1988 and struck oil in
1989 Lingla well number-1. the present EPS is located around the well site of the well
NANDIGAMA-1The production from the field has started after commissioning to the
EPS on 18th December 1999.Initially production facilities ar adequate for a Well Head
Installation which have been up graded to EPS and EPS during the course with more
number of wells getting added. Gas consumers have come up in the vicinity for
consumption of gas from the EPS. M/S GAIL draws gas from the EPS and distributes to
consumers numbering 5 at present. There is one direct consumer who produces power
from feeding the same to State Electricity Board (APTRANSO)
Brief description of EPS
EPS Nandigama is located at about 16 Km from Machlipatnam Town. Pedana Town is
on Gudiwada-Machlipatnam road. The nearest village from Nandigama EPS is Kuduru
of the Pedana Mandal.
The fluid from different wells is brought to the EPS through flow lines to the header and
then to gas separator whereby the gas and oil are separated. and oil is stored in storage
tanks.The oil thus stored is transported through road tankers to the unloading station at
S-Yanam, which collects oil from all production installations of the Asset for custody
transfer aft. The effluent is collected in to tanks and transported to injection wells
presently. An effluent injection facility for disposal is coming up near Lingala-GGS.
Presently, 03 Nos. of wells are connected and flowing and producing gas, oil/emulsion.
Details of Major Equipments
Separator (100 M3 Liquid,3,00,000 M3 Gas) 1
Storage Tanks (40 M3 ) 1
Produced water Tanks ( Concrete 40 M3 ) 1
Loading Pumps(40M3/Hr) 1
Loading Bay 1
51
Fire water storage Tank Capacity 280 M3
Fire water Diesel engine driven pump(26.6LPS) at7 kg/cm2
1
Hydrants 2
3
CO2 6.8 kg
6
DCP 10kg 5
Foam 9 litrs
52
1.6.4 Introduction of Malleshwaram EPS field
Location:. Malleshwaram EPS is located near Chinnapandraka Village near Bantumilli

village and Gudiwada Town in Andhra Pradesh and is connected through state highway.
Airport: Rajahmundry is about 180 Kms

Vijayawada is about 90 Kms from the installation
Railway station: Gudiwada is the railway terminal point from the installation
.
Road:
1. Plenty of Buses are plying for Vijayawada from Bantumilli Village
2. From Bantumilli to Singarayapalem via Bhimavaram to Rajahmundry
3. Normally it takes about 2 hours to reach Vijayawada by Bus and Rajahmundry it takes
4 hours
Brief on Field: The ONGC started exploration activity in Malleshwaram in 2010.
The production from the field has started after commissioning the EPS in 2011.
Presently the field is under development phase.
Brief description of EPS Malleshwaram

The fluid from different wells is brought to the EPS through flow lines to the header and then
to gas separator whereby the Oil and Gas is separated from liquid. The produced water is
decanted from liquid and oil is stored in storage tanks. The oil thus stored is transported
through road tankers to the unloading station at S/Yanam, which collects oil from all
production installations of the Asset for custody transfer aft. Gas produced from
Malleshwaram EPS is supplied to to M/S Centini Ceramics plant located adjacent to
the installation.The net Oil produced from Malleshwaram is @20-25 M3/Day
Presently, 5 Nos. of wells are connected (1 Well is dual completion) 5 No of wells are
flowing and producing gas, condensate oil and effluent
Details of Major Equipment

a) Storage Tank-6 nos each with a capacity of 40 m3
b) Seperator-2 Nos(Production./Test/Group)
c) Gas Scrubber-1 no
d) DG Set-1 no- 30kva
e) Gas Gen Set 1: No
f) Loading Pumps

1)Trolley mounted Fire Water Pumps: 1 Nos
2)Fire Water reservoir – 1 Nos each with 300 m3 capacity
4)Portable Extinguishers, Monitors and Hydrants are available as per OISD STd-189
53
1.7 FOLLOWING DRILLING RIGS ARE OPERATIONAL IN THE
ASSET
On land Area
1. E- 2000-1
2. E- 2000-III
3. E -760-M
4. BI 2000-II
5. E-1400-16
6. F-6100-3
7. E-1400-17
8. EV-2000-I
54
1.8 LIST OF EQUIPMENT AT DRILLING RIGS
Rig E-760-M
MAST
1 Height of Mast 142 feet
2 Height of Substructure 25 feet
3 Type Type – 1
4 Make BHEL
5 Capacity 350 Tons –Hook load
ENGINES
1 MAKE Caterpillar
2 Model CAT3512
3 Quantity Four
5 Rating RPM 933 KW @ 1000
7 Displacement 51.8 Liters
8 No. of cylinders 12
9 Compression Ratio 14:1
10 Crank case capacity 318 Liters
DRAW WORKS
1 Make BHEL
2 Model E 760
3 Rating 1000 HP
4 Casing line diameter 32 mm
5 Rotary speed 3
6 No of hoisting speeds 6
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 350 T
3 No of sheaves 5+1
4 Wire rope 32mm
5 Sheave diameter 50.1 inch
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 350 T
3 Capacity 350 T
4 No of sheaves 5
5 Wire rope dia 32 mm
6 Sheave diameter 42 inch
HOOK
1 Make Joy Hydra
2 Model HYDRA JOY-350T
3 Capacity 350 Tons
SWIVEL
1 Make BHEL
2 Model PC 300
3 Max RPM 400
4 Capacity 300 Tons
5 Oil capacity 59 Liters
ROTARY TABLE
55
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 27 ½”
3 Capacity 500 Tons
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
MUD PUMPS
1 Make BPCL
2 Model A850PT
3 Numbers Two
4 Rating, RPM 850 HP@160
5 Dia x Stroke 7.5” x 9”
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
7 Discharge Pressure 5000 psi
8 Suction Pressure 250 psi
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make Elgi
2 Model ELGI-E55-11.5
3 Number of unit Two
4 Pressure 10.5 kg/cm2
5 Rating 55 KW
Rig E-2000-I
MAST
3 Type Type – 2,BRANHAM
4 Make BHEL
ENGINES
1 MAKE Cummins
2 Model KTA 50 G
3 Quantity Four
5 Rating RPM 1200 HP @ 1500
10 Crank case capacity 318 Litres
DRAW WORKS
1 Make BHEL
2 Model E 2000
3 Rating 2000 HP
5 Rotary speed 2
56
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model SKY TOP 500T
3 No of sheaves 6+1
4 Wire rope 1 ¼”
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model American Block 650 T
3 Capacity 350 T
4 No of sheaves 6
5 Wire rope dia 1 ¼”
HOOK
1 Make Joy Hydra
2 Model Hydra Joy 500 T
3 Spring capacity 8100 lbs
4 Spring Travel 10”
5 Shank diameter 8”
SWIVEL
1 Make BHEL
2 Model PC650
3 Max RPM 400
4 Capacity 650 Ton
ROTARY TABLE
1 Make BHEL
3 Capacity 500 Ton
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
MUDPUMPS
1 Make BPCL
2 Model A1400PT
3 Numbers Two
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make Elgi
2 Model EH04100
5 Rating 100 HP
57
Rig E-2000-III
MAST
4 Make BHEL
ENGINES
1 MAKE Caterpillar
2 Model CAT 3512
3 Quantity Four
DRAW WORKS
1 Make BHEL
2 Model E 2000
3 Rating 2000 HP
5 Rotary speed 2
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 500T
3 No of sheaves 6+1
4 Wire rope 1 ¼”
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 500 T
3 Capacity 500 T
4 No of sheaves 6
HOOK
1 Make Joy Hydra
2 Model Hydra Joy 500 T
5 Shank diameter 8”
SWIVEL
1 Make BHEL
2 Model PC650
3 Max RPM 400
4 Capacity 650 Ton
ROTARY TABLE
58
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL A 27 ½”
3 Capacity 500 Ton
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
MUDPUMPS
1 Make BPCL
2 Model A1400PT
3 Numbers Two
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make ATLAS COPCO
2 Model PNA600215
3 Pressure 13 bar
4 Rating 55 KW
59
Rig E-1400-16
MAST
4 Make BHEL
ENGINES
1 MAKE Cummins
2 Model KTA 50 G
3 Quantity Four
DRAW WORKS
1 Make BHEL
2 Model E 1400
3 Rating 1400 HP
4 Casing line diameter 1 ¼”
5 Rotary speed 2
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model SKY TOP 500T
3 No of sheaves 6+1
4 Wire rope 1 ¼”
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 500 T
3 Capacity 500 T
4 No of sheaves 6
HOOK
1 Make BJ Dynaplex
2 Model BJ 5500
5 Capacity 500 T
SWIVEL
1 Make BHEL
2 Model PC 425
3 Max RPM 400
4 Capacity 500 Ton
ROTARY TABLE
60
1 Make BHEL
3 Capacity 500 Ton
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
5 Oil capacity 32 Litres
MUDPUMPS
1 Make BPCL
2 Model A1100PT
3 Numbers Two
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make Elgi
2 Model ELGI-SR12100LH
4 Rating 100 HP
61
Rig E-1400-17
MAST
4 Make BHEL
ENGINES
1 MAKE Cummins
2 Model KTA 50 G
3 Quantity Four
DRAW WORKS
1 Make BHEL
2 Model E 1400
3 Rating 1400 HP
4 Wireline rope diameter 1 ¼”
5 Rotary speed 2
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 500T
3 No of sheaves 6+1
4 Wire rope 1 ¼”
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL 500 T
3 Capacity 500 T
4 No of sheaves 6
HOOK
1 Make Joy Hydra
2 Model Joy Hydra500
5 Capacity 500 T
SWIVEL
1 Make BHEL
2 Model PC425
3 Max RPM 400
4 Capacity 500 Ton
ROTARY TABLE
62
1 Make BHEL
3 Capacity 500 Ton
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
MUDPUMPS
1 Make BPCL
2 Model A1100PT
3 Numbers Two
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make Elgi
2 Model ELGI-E55-10.5
4 Rating 55 KW
63
Rig F-6100-3
MAST
3 Type Type – 2
4 Make ROMANIAN
ENGINES
1 MAKE Cummins
2 Model KTA 50 G
3 Quantity Four
DRAW WORKS
1 Make GD
2 Model GD 1500 RE
3 Rating 2000 HP
5 Rotary speed 2
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make GD
2 Model GF 600
3 No of sheaves 6+1
4 Wire rope 13/8”
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make GD
2 Model MCM 500
3 Capacity 500 T
4 No of sheaves 6
5 Wire rope dia 1 3/8”
HOOK
1 Make Joy Hydra
2 Model Joy Hydra500
5 Capacity 500 T
SWIVEL
1 Make BHEL
2 Model PC425
3 Max RPM 400
4 Capacity 425 Ton
ROTARY TABLE
64
1 Make GD
2 Model GD 27 ½”
3 Capacity 500 Ton
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
MUDPUMPS
1 Make National
2 Model 12P160
3 Numbers Two
4 Rating, RPM 1100 HP
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make Elgi
2 Model ELGI-SR12100LH
4 Rating 100 HP
65
Rig BI-2000-II
MAST
3 Type Type – 2
4 Make BRANHAM
ENGINES
1 MAKE Caterpillar
2 Model CAT 3512 B
3 Quantity Five
DRAW WORKS
1 Make BHEL
2 Model E 2000
3 Rating 2000 HP
5 Rotary speed 2
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model SKEW
66
3 No of sheaves 6+1
4 Wire rope 1 1/4”
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make GD
2 Model GD 550
3 Capacity 550 T
4 No of sheaves 6
HOOK
1 Make Joy Hydra
2 Model Joy Hydra 500
5 Capacity 500 T
SWIVEL
1 Make GD
2 Model GDS500
3 Max RPM 400
4 Capacity 500 Ton
ROTARY TABLE
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL A 27 ½”
3 Capacity 500 Ton
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
67
MUDPUMPS
1 Make GD
2 Model GD-PZ-11
3 Numbers Two
4 Rating 1600 HP
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make CP
2 Model SEA100
5 Rating 100 HP
68
Rig EV-2000-1
MAST
3 Type Type – 3
4 Make BHEL /NOV
5 Capacity 500Tons –Hook load
ENGINES
1 MAKE Caterpillar
2 Model CAT 3512 B
3 Quantity FOUR
DRAW WORKS
1 Make BHEL/NOV
2 Model ADS10SD
3 Rating 2000 HP
5 Rotary speed 2
6 No of hoisting speeds AUTO
CROWN BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model D2A-8378
3 No of sheaves 6+1
4 Wire rope 1 1/4”
TRAVELLING BLOCK
1 Make BHEL
2 Model TYPE 500
3 Capacity 500 T
4 No of sheaves 6
HOOK
1 Make AMERCIAN BLOCK
2 Model 500-HH-R
3 Spring capacity 500 T
5 Capacity 500 T
SWIVEL
1 Make BHEL
2 Model PC500
3 Max RPM 400
69
4 Capacity 500 Ton
ROTARY TABLE
1 Make BHEL
2 Model BHEL B- 37 1/2
3 Capacity 500 Ton
4 Gear ratio 3.84:1
MUDPUMPS
1 Make BPCL
2 Model A1700-PT
3 Numbers Two
4 Rating 1700 HP
6 Gear Ratio 4.48:1
AIR COMPRESSOR
1 Make CP
2 Model SEA100
5 Rating 100 HP
70
1.8.1 LIST OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT –
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT-RIG E-2000-I
S.no. Equipment name Make Model Sl.No Specifications

1 ALTERNATOR-1 BHEL OA-6301- 4612030 1430 KVA,
AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
5 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903-CX 4593516 1000 HP, 750
A V DC,1050 A,
1050 RPM
6 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903-CX 4593511 1000 HP, 750
B V DC,1050 A,
1050 RPM
7 MUD PUMP -1A BHEL 4903 AZ 4593075 700 HP, 630
V,
800A, 1025
RPM
8 MUD PUMP-1B BHEL 4903 AZ 4593263 700 HP, 630
V,
800A, 1025
RPM
9 MUD PUMP-2A BHEL 4903BX 4593032 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
10 MUD PUMP--2B BHEL 4903BX 4593004 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
11 Eddy current brake Baylor 3630 JI10067W -
12 TRANSFORMER- HAMMOND TYPE K- DB04A192 750 KVA
1 POWER CLASS 600/415V
SOLUTION ANN
13 TRANSFORMER- HAMMOND TYPE K- DB04A132 750 KVA
2 POWER CLASS 600/415V
SOLUTION ANN
14 DSA KIRLOSKAR 4AB280-2 9720308- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-1 17 415 V, 278 A.
15 DSA KIRLOSKAR 4AB280- 9920320- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-2 M2 040 415 V, 278 A
16 DSA NEWAGE UC2744H1 04101224 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-3 ELECTRICAL 415 V.
71
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - RIG E-2000-III
S.No Equipment Name Make Model Sl.No Specificat

ions
1 ALTERNATOR-1 BHEL OA7002A 4600807 1430
Z KVA, 600
V, 1376
A,1000
RPM
Z KVA, 600
V, 1376
A,1000
RPM
Z KVA, 600
V, 1376
A,1000
RPM
Z KVA, 600
V, 1376
A,1000
RPM
5 DRAW WORKS- A GE 5CL752R 7540063 900
CA HP,750 V
DC,950
A, 1050
RPM
6 DRAW WORKS- B GE 5CL752R 7541250 900
CB HP,750 V
DC,950
A, 1050
RPM
7 MUD PUMP -1A BHEL 4903CXL 4593482 1000 HP,
H 750 V
DC,1050
A, 1050
RPM
8 MUD PUMP-1B BHEL 4903 CX 4593515 1000 HP,
RH 750 V
DC,1050
A, 1050
RPM
9 MUD PUMP-2A BHEL 4903 CX 4593517 1000 HP,
LH 750 V
DC,1050
A, 1050
RPM
10 MUD PUMP--2B BHEL 4903AZ 4593023 700 HP,
630 V,
72
800A,
1025
RPM
11 Eddy current brake BAYLOR - AT10502 -
W
12 IRD MOTOR BHEL 4903AZ 700 HP,
4593025 630 V,
800A,
1025
RPM
13 TRANSFORMER- 1 HAMMOND -- DB07G68 750 KVA,
600/415
V
14 TRANSFORMER-2 HAMMOND -- DB07G31 750 KVA,
5 600/415
V
15 DSA KEC SOA725, 81302A6- 125 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-1 33 415
V,1500
RPM
16 DSA KIRLOSKAR 4AB280/ X120361- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-2 M2 009 415 V
1500
RPM
17 DSA KERALA TA3160 0603AA2 250 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-3 ELECTRIC & 00129 415V,
ALLIED 348
CO.LTD A,1500
RPM
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - RIG E-760-M
S.N Equipment Name Make Model Sl.No Specifications

o
1 ALTERNATOR-1 BHEL OA7002AZ 4600806 1430 KVA,
600 V, 1376
A,1000 RPM
600 V, 1376
A,1000 RPM
600 V, 1376
A,1000 RPM
( SPARE) 600 V, 1376
A,1000 RPM
5 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903 BX 4593173 900 HP,750 V
A DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
6 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903CX 4593002 1000 HP, 750
73
B V DC,1050 A,
1050 RPM
7 MUD PUMP -1 BHEL 4903CX 4593328 1000 HP, 750
V DC,1050 A,
1050 RPM
8 MUD PUMP-2 BHEL 4903BX NA 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
9 IRD MOTOR BHEL 4903BX 4593485 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
10 Eddy current brake BAYLOR 105652
11 TRANSFORMER BHEL DRY TYPE 2024542 600 KVA,
-1 600KVA/415
V
12 TRANSFORMER BHEL DRY TYPE 2024542
-2
13 DSA RUSTON BRUSHLES 8813AA- 125 KVA, 415
ALTERNATOR-1 KIRLOSKA S 09. V,1500RPM
R
14 DSA KIRLOSKA SLIP RING 83302AG 125 KVA,415
ALTERNATOR-2 R ELECTRIC -17 V ,1500 RPM
15 DSA NA BRUSH NA 125 KVA,415
ALTERNATOR-3 LESS V ,1500 RPM
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - RIG E-1400-16
S.No Equipment Name Make Model Sl.No Specifications

1 ALTERNATOR-1 BHEL OA-6301- 4612017
AY
AY
AY
AY
5 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903CX 4593266 1000 HP, 750
A V DC,1050
A, 1050 RPM
6 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903BX 4593309 900 HP,750
B V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
7 MUD PUMP -1A BHEL 4903BX 4593138 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
8 MUD PUMP-1B BHEL 4903BX 4593244 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
9 MUD PUMP-2A BHEL 4903BX 4593141 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
74
1050 RPM
10 MUD PUMP--2B BHEL 4903BX 4593343 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
11 Eddy current brake BAYLOR 108610044 108610044
12 IRD MOTOR BHEL 4903BX 4593447 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
13 TRANSFORMER-
1
14 TRANSFORMER-
2
15 DSA KIRLOSKAR 8816-PAH- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-1 1 415 V V
1500 RPM
16 DSA KIRLOSKAR 8816-PAH- 200 KVA,
1500 RPM
17 DSA KOEL 4507837 250 KVA,

ALTERNATOR-3 415 V,1500
RPM
18 DSA KIRLOSKAR 8916-PAC- 200 KVA,
1500 RPM
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - RIG F-6100-3

AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
AY 600 V, 1376
A,1500 RPM
5 DRAW WORKS- A BHEL 4903BX 4593319 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
6 DRAW WORKS- B BHEL 4903CX- 4593346 1000 HP, 750
LH V DC,1050
A, 1050 RPM
7 MUD PUMP -1A BHEL 4903CX- 4593318 1000 HP, 750
LH V DC,1050
75
A, 1050 RPM
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
9 MUD PUMP-2A ROMANIAN MCF 95628 800 KW, 750
9XTH 2- V, 1100 A,
FXPIIT3 1100 RPM
10 MUD PUMP--2B ROMANIAN MCF 99494 800 KW, 750
9XTH 2- V, 1100 A,
FXPIIT3 1100 RPM
11 Eddy current brake BAYLOR - 05859968
12 IRD MOTOR BHEL 4903AZ 4593038
13 TRANSFORMER- 1 BHEL DRY 2004753 500 KVA
TYPE 600/415 V
14 TRANSFORMER-2 BHEL DRY 2004752 500 KVA
TYPE 600/415 V
15 DSA KEL - 150004 160KVA, 415
ALTERNATOR-1 V
16 DSA KIRLOSKAR - 9620508- 200 KVA,415
ALTERNATOR-2 13 V
17 DSA NEI - 04110039 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-3 415 V
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - RIG E-1400-17
S.No Equipment Name Make Model Sl.No Specification

s
1 ALTERNATOR-1 KATO A24458 14492 1430 KVA,
600 V, 1375
A,1500 RPM
2 ALTERNATOR-2 KATO A24458 95469-01 1430 KVA,
600 V, 1375
A,1500 RPM
600 V, 1375
A,1500 RPM
600 V, 1375
A,1500 RPM
5 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903 BX 4593498 900 HP,750
A V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
6 DRAW WORKS- BHEL 4903BX 4593187 900 HP,750
B V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
7 MUD PUMP -1A BHEL 4903BX 4593227 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
76
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
9 MUD PUMP-2A BHEL 4903BX 4593216 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
10 MUD PUMP--2B BHEL 4903BX 4593442 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
11 Eddy current brake BAYLOR 6032 NF11743W -
12 IRD MOTOR BHEL 4903 BX 4593494 900 HP,750
V DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
13 TRANSFORMER- BHEL DRY TYPE 2004747 500 KVA,
1 600/440V
14 TRANSFORMER- BHEL DRY TYPE 2004749 500 KVA,
2 600/440 V
15 DSA KIRLOSKA 9820120- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-1 R 009 415 V.
16 DSA KIRLOSKA 81302 AF- 125 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-2 R 21 415 V.
17 DSA KIRLOSKA 8816 PA1- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-3 R 02 415 V
18 DSA KIRLOSKA 8816 PA1- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-4 R 03 415 V
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - RIG BI-2000-II

1 ALTERNATOR-1 BHEL OA 7001AZ 4600128 1215 KVA,
600 V, 1375
A,1500 RPM
2 ALTERNATOR-2 KATO 22232 92142-09 1215
KVA,600
V,1155
A,1000 RPM.
3 ALTERNATOR-3 KATO 22232 9155-1 1215
KVA,600
V,1155
A,1000 RPM.
4 ALTERNATOR-4 KATO 22232 92142-05 1215
KVA,600
V,1155
A,1000 RPM.
5 ALTERNATOR-5 KATO 22232 91360-7 1215
KVA,600
V,1155
A,1000 RPM.
5 DRAW WORKS- GE GE752AR2A 50080176 900 HP,750 V
A DC,950 A,
1000 RPM.
77
6 DRAW WORKS- GE GE752AR2B 43040177 900 HP,750 V
B DC,950 A,
1000 RPM.
7 MUD PUMP -1A GE GE752AR2A 42620102 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1000 RPM.
8 MUD PUMP-1B GE GE752AR2B 43180117 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1000 RPM.
9 MUD PUMP-2A BHEL 4903BX 4593519 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
10 MUD PUMP--2B BHEL 4903BX 4593520 900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
11 Eddy current brake BAYLOR
12 IRD MOTOR BHEL 4903BX 4593283
900 HP,750 V
DC,950 A,
1050 RPM
13 TRANSFORMER- MGM ACN370- 85-2- 500 KVA
1 U0109 23659-A1 600/440V
14 TRANSFORMER- MGM ACN370- 85-2- 500 KVA
2 U0109 23659-A5 600/440V
15 DSA KIRLOSKAR 4AB280-6 903PAA- 200 KVA, 415
ALTERNATOR-1 09 V
16 DSA KIRLOSKAR 4AB280-6 9620508- 200 KVA,
ALTERNATOR-2 13 415V
17 DSA KIRLOSKAR KG250S45M1 4507-855 250 KVA, 415
ALTERNATOR-3 V
78
ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT - RIG EV-2000-1
S.N Equipment Name Make Model Sl.No Specifications
o
1 ALTERNATOR-1 BHEL 4600845 1430 KVA, 600
OA7002A V, 1375 A,1000
Z RPM
2 ALTERNATOR-2 BHEL OA7002A 4600850 1215 KVA,600
Z V,1155 A,1000
RPM.
Z V,1155 A,1000
RPM.
Z V,1155 A,1000
RPM.
5 ALTERNATOR-5 STAMPFOR OA7002A NOV13BO7198 250
D Z 6 KVA,415V,115
5 A,1000 RPM.
5 DRAW WORKS- GE 5GEB22A5 RR12060047H 1150HP,600 V
A 1000 RPM.
6 DRAW WORKS- GE 5GEB22A5 RR12050131H 1150 HP,600 V
B 1000 RPM.
7 MUD PUMP -1A GE 5GEB22A5 RR12040125 1150 HP,600 V
1000 RPM.
8 MUD PUMP-1B GE 5GEB22A5 RR1209008 1150HP,600 V,
1000 RPM.
9 MUD PUMP-2A GE 5GEB22A5 RR12080155 1150 HP,600 V,
1050 RPM
10 MUD PUMP--2B GE 5GEB22A5 RR12090007 1150HP,600 V,
1050 RPM
11 IRD MOTOR GE 5GEB22A5 RR12080063 750 HP,600 V,
800RPM
12 TRANSFORMER MGM ACN370- 85-2-23659-A1 500 KVA
-1 U0109 600/440V
13 TRANSFORMER MGM ACN370- 85-2-23659-A5 500 KVA
-2 U0109 600/440V
14 IRON ROUGH : NOV ST-80C ST80C HF 75-130VHP-
NECK: A03W569 806-AC
15 TOP DRIVE PARKER, TC- : 10664682 GEAR BOX:
2356546- 500 TON;
01;
79
1.8.2 GAS DETECTORS AVAILABLE IN THE DRILLING RIGS OF
RAJAHMUNDRY ASSET
Name Gas Detectors Make Model Type

of the Rig
E-2000-III Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
Detector 1, Groups Sensor
A,B,C,D (LEL)
Online H2S GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (H2S)
Portable LEL Detection GASMAN FL Catalytic Bead
Detector 1 Instruments Sensor
(India) PVT Ltd
Portable LEL Crowcon Tetra Portable Catalytic Bead
Detector 2 Detection Gas Detectors Sensor
Instruments
E-2000-I Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (LEL)
A,B,C,D (H2S)
Instruments
Instruments
E-1400-16 Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (LEL)
A,B,C,D (H2S)
(India) PVT Ltd
Instruments
E-1400-17 Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (LEL)
A,B,C,D (H2S)
80
(India) PVT Ltd
Instruments
F-6100-III Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (LEL)
A,B,C,D (H2S)
(India) PVT Ltd
Instruments
E-760-M Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (LEL)
A,B,C,D (H2S)
Instruments
Instruments
BI-2000-II Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (LEL)
A,B,C,D (H2S)
Instruments
Instruments
EV-2000-I Online LEL GDS Corp GASMAX CL Catalytic Bead
A,B,C,D (LEL)
A,B,C,D (H2S)
Instruments
81
Instruments
82
1.8.3Fire-fighting equipment
DRILLING RIG E – 2000 # I
FIRE TOTAL NO.S OF

SL/NO EXTINGUISHERNAM FIRE MAKE NAME
E EXTINGUISHERS
1 DCP 10 KG 10 DEFLAME (INDIA)
2 CO2 02 KG 2 DEFLAME (INDIA)
3 CO2 6.8 KG 3 DEFLAME (INDIA)
4 M/F 09 LTR 0 NA
5 M/F 50 LTR 1 DEFLAME (INDIA)
6 DCP 50 KG 0 NA
7 FIRE BUCKETS 6 NA
8 BUCKETS STAND 1 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
DRILLING RIG E – 2000 # III
TOTAL NO.S OF
FIRE
SL/NO FIRE MAKE NAME
EXTINGUISHERNAME
EXTINGUISHERS
DEFLAME
1 DCP 10 KG 13
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
2 CO2 02 KG
(INDIA)
3 DEFLAME
3 CO2 6.8 KG
(INDIA)
4 M/F 09 LTR 0 NA
5 M/F 50 LTR 1 DEFLAME
(INDIA)
6 DCP 50 KG 1 DEFLAME
(INDIA)
7 FIRE BUCKETS 7 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
83
DRILLING RIG BI – 2000 # II
FIRE TOTAL NO.S OF FIRE

SL/NO MAKE NAME
EXTINGUISHERNAME EXTINGUISHERS
DEFLAME
1 DCP 10 KG 11
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
2 CO2 02 KG
(INDIA)
1 DEFLAME
3 CO2 6.8 KG
(INDIA)
4 M/F 09 LTR 0 NA
5 M/F 50 LTR 0 NA
(INDIA)
7 FIRE BUCKETS 6 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
DRILLING RIG E – 1400 # 16
TOTAL NO.S OF
FIRE
EXTINGUISHERNAME
EXTINGUISHERS
2 CO2 02 KG 3 DEFLAME (INDIA)
3 CO2 6.8 KG 2 DEFLAME (INDIA)
7 FIRE BUCKETS 10 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
DRILLING RIG E – 1400 # 17
84
TOTAL NO.S OF
FIRE
EXTINGUISHERNAME
EXTINGUISHERS
DEFLAME
1 DCP 10 KG 09
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
2 CO2 02 KG
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
3 CO2 6.8 KG
(INDIA)
4 M/F 09 LTR 0 NA
(INDIA)
(INDIA)
7 FIRE BUCKETS 6 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
DRILLING RIG E – 760 # M
TOTAL NO.S OF
FIRE
EXTINGUISHERNAME
EXTINGUISHERS
DEFLAME
1 DCP 10 KG 08
(INDIA)
1 DEFLAME
2 CO2 02 KG
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
3 CO2 6.8 KG
(INDIA)
(INDIA)
(INDIA)
(INDIA)
7 FIRE BUCKETS 6 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
DRILLING RIG F – 6100 # III
FIRE TOTAL NO.S OF FIRE

SL/NO MAKE NAME
EXTINGUISHERNAME EXTINGUISHERS
85
DEFLAME
1 DCP 10 KG 15
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
2 CO2 02 KG
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
3 CO2 6.8 KG
(INDIA)
4 M/F 09 LTR 0 NA
(INDIA)
(INDIA)
7 FIRE BUCKETS 6 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
DRILLING RIG EV-2000-1
TOTAL NO.S OF
FIRE
EXTINGUISHERNAME
EXTINGUISHERS
DEFLAME
1 DCP 10 KG 10
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
2 CO2 02 KG
(INDIA)
2 DEFLAME
3 CO2 6.8 KG
(INDIA)
4 M/F 09 LTR 0 NA
(INDIA)
(INDIA)
7 FIRE BUCKETS 4 NA
9 FIRE BELL 1 NA
10 FIRE SIREN 1 NA
11 FIRE PUMP 0 NA
86
1.8.4 Blowout prevention equipment
Rig Description Make Model Size Rating
Annular BOP Cameron D 21 1/4" 2M
Annular BOP Hydril GK/SH 7 1/16" 10M
B-I-2000-2 DBL Ram BOP Cameron U 21 1/4" 2M
DBL Ram BOP Cameron U 13 5/8" 10M
SGL Ram BOP Cameron U 13 5/8" 10M
Accum. Unit NOV Sara 200-11-ST PLC 3M
Choke
Manifold Cameron 4 1/16" 10M
Kill Manifold Cameron 2 1/16" 10M
HCR Valve -- -- 4 1/16" 10M
HCR Valve -- -- 2 1/16" 10M
SARA-
Testing Unit
KOOMEY -- 8 1/2" 15M
E-1400-16 Annular BOP Hydril GK/SH 7 1/16" 10M
Accum. Unit Sara 200-11-ST CON 3M
Choke
HCR Valve BHEL -- 4 1/16" 10M
SARA-
Testing Unit
KOOMEY -- 7 3/8" 15M
E-1400-17 SGL Ram BOP Cameron U 13 5/8" 10M
Accum. Unit Sara 200-11-SB CON 3M
Choke
Manifold BHEL 4 1/16" 10M
Kill Manifold BHEL 2 1/16" 10M
BMS-D-65-
Testing Unit 1/180-
RESATO 1/R1/P/I/S 7 3/8" 15M
Annular BOP Hydril MSP/SH 20" 2M
DBL Ram
BOP Cameron U 21 1/4" 2M
DBL Ram
E-2000-1 BOP Cameron U 13 5/8" 10M
DBL Ram
BOP WOM WU 13 5/8" 10M
SGL Ram BOP WOM WU 13 5/8" 10M
87
Accum. Unit Koomey 180-11-SB CON 3M
Choke
HCR Valve Cameron -- 4 1/16" 10M
Testing Unit SARA-
KOOMEY -- 7 3/8" 15M
Annular BOP Hydril MSP/SH 21 1/4" 2M
DBL Ram
SGL Ram BOP Cameron U 11" 15M
E-2000-3 Accum. Unit Koomey 200-11-ST CON 3M
Choke
Kill Manifold WKM 2 1/16" 10M
SELF
Testing Unit SARA- CONTAINED
KOOMEY TANK 7 3/8" 15M
DBL Ram
E-760-M BOP Cameron U 13 5/8" 5M
Accum. Unit Sara 180-11-SB CON 3M
Choke
Manifold BHEL 4 1/16" 10M
Kill Manifold WKM 2 1/16" 10M
HCR Valve -- -- 4 1/16" 10M
BMS-D-65-
Testing Unit 1/180-
RESATO 1/R1/P/I/S 8 1/2" 15M
Annular BOP Hydril MSP/LH 21 1/4" 2M
Annular BOP Hydril GK/SH 13 5/8" 5M
DBL Ram
F-6100-3 BOP Cameron U 21 1/4" 2M
DBL Ram
DBL Ram
BOP WOM WU 13 5/8" 10M
Choke
Manifold SEREG 4 1/16" 10M
Kill Manifold BHEL 2 1/16" 10M
SARA-
Testing Unit
KOOMEY -- 7 3/8" 15M
Annular BOP Hydril MSP/SH 20" 2M
DBL Ram
DBL Ram
EV-2000-1 BOP Cameron U 13 5/8" 10M
DBL Ram WOM WU 13 5/8" 10M
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BOP
Accum. Unit Koomey 180-11-SB CON 3M
Choke
SARA-
Testing Unit
KOOMEY -- 7 3/8" 15M
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1.9 AN UPDATE ON MAJOR ACCIDENTS OCCURRED DURING
PAST 15 YEARS OF RAJAHMUNDRY ASSET
1. Industrial Disasters
a) Narsapur#1 1979 Major Blow Out (Complete Rig was lost)
b) Narsapur#2 1982
c) Komarada 1993
d) PSP#18 Blow Out
e) Mandapeta West 1997 Major Blow Out (Complete Rig was lost)
f) PSP# 39 (PSAR) 2005 Major Blow Out (Complete Rig was lost)
g) Electrical Hazards
h) One Fatal Accident at Rig E-2000-I in April’2014
2. Natural Calamities encountered
a) Tsunami
b) Cyclone
c) Floods
3. Sabotage, thefts, etc from flowing pipelines and flowing wells.
CHAPTER - 2
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INTRODUCTION TO DISASTER AND DISASTER
MANAGEMENT
Disaster means’ a catastrophe, mishap, calamity or grave occurrence from natural or
man-made causes, which is beyond the coping capacity of the affected community. or
Disaster is a sudden occurrence of such magnitude as to affect normal pattern of life in
the vicinity, extensive damage to life and / or property.
Hazard X Vulnerability = A potential for Disaster.
Hazards can be eliminated or diminished. Vulnerabilities can be lessened or mitigated.
The difference between an Emergency and a Disaster is a matter of awareness and
capabilities to address a Risk.
Disaster Management deals with the following aspects:
 Command, Control, and Emergency Communications,
 Safety of people and other livestock,
 Protection of company properties,
 Recovery and Restoration of industrial activity,
 Administration and Logistics supports,
 Dealing with Community concerns.
Other issues are:

 Involving the community,
 Entering into mutual aid agreements,
 Arranging community services,
 Providing public information and,
 Communicating with the media.
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2.1 TYPES OF DISASTERS
 Operational Emergencies
 Natural
 Others
Operational Emergencies
 Man - made (Industrial - Technological Disasters)
 In - plant Emergencies due to deficiencies in
 Operation (Hydrocarbon Leakage with or without fire, Blowout, etc.)
 Maintenance
 Gaseous, Chemical contamination
 Design or Equipment Failure
Natural Disaster
 Cyclone.
 Flood.
 Earth Quake
 Famine, Drought.
Others
 Civil Conflict.
 Environmental Degradation.
 Fires, either open area or urban (also man - made).
 Emergencies in nearby Industries
Man - made Disaster can frequently be prevented and be anticipated.

Natural Disaster cannot generally be prevented, but can be anticipated.
Both can have their worst effects minimized, reduced or mitigated by proper Disaster
Management.
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2.2 CAUSES OF DISASTER
Disasters may happen due to natural as well as man made reasons. The increase in
population and man's desire to increase its requirement has made him to look for soft
options without caring for Ecology balance. The disturbance of Ecology due to cutting of
trees, unscientific plantation of commercial crops, unscientific development of
infrastructure, restricting or changing the flow of rivers, excessive use of ground water,
pollution of air and water may lead to a Disaster. The Disasters like Flooding & Drought
may appear to be Nature created, but surely they are man - made and can be minimized.
The vast expanses of rivers and land have been flogged by steady but unplanned
development of population, industrialization, urbanization resulting into improper use of
land mass during last 40 - 45 years. Reduction in Forest area creates havoc because of
poor river management where ONGC in Rajahmundry Asset is working. All rivers
flowing through East Godawari, West Godawari and Krishna area are meandering
through the State land , have caused formation of COW - Heads and removal of
protective vegetation / plantation from river side . Inland river side agriculture is on rise
leading to embankment erosion etc. All this affects Environment and Ecology of the area.
These need attention of State/District level authorities to prevent and minimize the
Disasters. These problems gets aggravated when small quantity of spillage of Oil within
the work area of ONGC spreads in to nearby area due to flooding. Another area which
needs the attention of the Government for prevention of Disaster beyond the control on
ONGC is the encroachment by the local people on the land very near to the Oil producing
wells and Installations and the people are not knowledgeable about the safety to be
observed .They may create fire like situations which may result into a major disaster.
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2.3 DISASTER MANAGEMENT (DM)
Disaster Management is an Applied Science consisting of continuing process of
systematic observation analysis and dissemination that allows for the conscious
structuring of a series of events of conditions by the timely and informed application of
resources.
The objectives of the On–site Disaster Management Plan are to:
i. Safeguarding lives both at Installations and in the neighborhood.
ii. Containing the incident and bringing it under control.
iii. Minimizing damages to property and the Environment.
iv. Rescuing and treating the causalities.
v. Evacuating people to safe areas.
vi. Identifying persons and to extend necessary welfare assistance to
causalities.
vii. Finally when the situation is controlled, efforts are to be made to bring
back to near normal conditions.
Disaster Management (DM) involves a continuous and integrated process of planning,

organizing, coordinating and implementing measure which is necessary or expedient for:
 Prevention of danger or threat of any disaster.
 Mitigation or reduction of risk of any disaster or its severity or consequences.
 Capacity-building.
 Preparedness to deal with any disaster.
 Prompt response to any threatening disaster situation or disaster.
 Assessing the severity or magnitude of effects of any disaster.
 Evacuation, rescue and relief.
 Rehabilitation and reconstruction.
DM shall be a set of actions to be taken before, during and after a disaster. A typical DM
cycle has six elements to it divided into two groups.
 Pre-disaster elements include structural and non-structural measures to avoid
(prevention) and limit (mitigation and preparedness) the adverse effects of a hazard.
 Post-disaster (response) elements consist of
 Emergency rescue and
 Relief,
 Rehabilitation
 And reconstruction.
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A disaster management plan should address:
 Set out Prevention techniques to minimize risk
 Set out Preparedness procedures for the eventuality of disaster
 Establish an emergency manual for Reaction in the vent of a disaster
 Outline considerations for a Recovery plan following the disaster
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2.4INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
The Yokohama message emanating from the international decade for natural disaster
reduction in May 1994 underlined the need for an emphatic shift in the strategy for
disaster mitigation. It was inter-alia stressed that disaster prevention, mitigation;
preparedness and relief are four elements which contribute to and gain, from the
implementation of the sustainable development policies. These elements along with
environmental protection and sustainable development, are closely inter related.
A Holistic and integrated approach will be evolved toward DM consistent with the UN
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Millennium development goals and the
Hyogo framework. This will additionally lay emphasis on carrying out a meaningful
dialogue with Regional and other Nations for building up strategic partnership in the field
of DM.
The Yokohama Strategy also emphasized that disaster prevention, mitigation and
preparedness are better than disaster response in achieving the goals and objectives of
vulnerability reduction. Disaster response alone is not sufficient as it yields only
temporary results at a very high cost. Prevention and mitigation contribute to lasting
improvement in safety and are essential to integrated disaster management.
2.5 NATIONAL APPROACH

The Government of India has adopted mitigation and prevention as essential components
of their development strategy. The Tenth Five Year Plan document has a detailed chapter
on Disaster Management. The plan emphasizes the fact that development cannot be
sustainable without mitigation being built into developmental process. Each State is
supposed to prepare a plan scheme for disaster mitigation in accordance with the
approach outlined in the plan. In brief, mitigation is being institutionalized into
developmental planning.
The Finance Commission makes recommendations with regard to devolution of funds

between the Central Government and State Governments as also outlays for relief and
rehabilitation. The earlier Finance Commissions were mandated to look at relief and
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rehabilitation. The Terms of Reference of the Twelfth Finance Commission have been
changed and the Finance Commission has been mandated to look at the requirements for
mitigation and prevention apart from its existing mandate of looking at relief and
rehabilitation. A Memorandum has been submitted to the Twelfth Finance Commission
after consultation with States. The Memorandum proposes a Mitigation Fund.
The Government of India has issued guidelines that where there is a shelf of projects,
projects addressing mitigation will be given a priority. It has also been mandated that
each project in a hazard prone area will have disaster prevention/mitigation as a term of
reference and the project document has to reflect as to how the project addresses that
term of reference.
2.6 THE LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN

INDIA ON DISASTER MITIGATION, PREPAREDNESS &
MANAGEMENT
The Indian legislative framework is very stringent and very old on Disaster Mitigation,
Preparedness & Management. These are given below:
1. Factories Act 1948 and subsequent Amendments there off hasclearly spelled out
provisions of disaster control in Section 41 B and other related subjects from Section
10 to 40.
2. Explosives Act 1884. Explosive Rules 1983
3. The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991
4. The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning Preparedness, and
Response)Rules 1996
5. Batteries (Management and Handling) Rules, 2001.
6. Disaster Management Act 2005
7. The Disaster Management (Amendment) Bill, 2006
8. Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989.
9. Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Amendment Rules, 2003
10. Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules,
2000
11. Manufacture, Storage And Import Of Hazardous Chemical Rules, 1989.
The details of relevant portions of these Acts are placed as Annexure II
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2.7 CASE IN POINT - DISASTER MANAGEMENT OF E & P
OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF AN UPSTREAM PETROLEUM
ORGANIZATION
In view of the hazards associated with the Oil Exploration and Production industry, it is
essential that a Disaster Management Plan be evolved to effectively deal with the
situation utilizing the available resources. There are many agencies involved in the
activities associated with a Disaster Management e.g., Government at State, District and
local level, Fire Services, Medical, Police, Army, Scientific and technical organizations,
Voluntary Organizations etc..
Disaster Management can be successful if we abide by the basic elements of Disaster

cycle i.e., Information -- Awareness -- Initiative -- Response -- Application.
The most important aspects of an effective Disaster Management is precisely those

activities that are undertaken, pursued, tested, updated, practiced and kept ready, well
before the striking of Disaster or unforeseen activity. Unfortunately, that is also the time
when it is hardest to engage people or policies to concentrate their attentions and
resources of these important functions.
i. Awareness
ii. Initiative.
iii. Commitment.
iv. Expenditure.
v. Information.
vi. Participation.
vii. Institutionalization.
viii. Operation Structure.
Degree of Hazards and Vulnerability, which are the parameters for the disaster are to be
analyzed by doing; Hazard Analysis, Hazard Screening and Risk Analysis.
The risk calculation and the modalities of the risk assessment are as follows:
Risk Assessment is to be performed on regular basis. The goal of each risk assessment
session is to identify hazards, determine risk ratings and controls, and to revise the
implementation of risk controls from previous risk assessment sessions. The following
workflow diagram illustrates the areas involved in performing a risk assessment session:
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Identifying the Hazards
In the identification of hazards the main objective is to ensure that all possible hazards
are identified. Processes that can be utilised are:
 Previous experience of accidents or occurrences in the mine.
 Work Process evaluation.
 Consultation with experienced employees.
 Experienced offsite specialists (Consultants).
 Fault tree analysis to determine underlying hazards that might not be evident at
first glance.
 Safety Statistics.
 Significant incident, near miss or accident reports.
 Inspections of the mine.
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An alternative method is to consider hazards that could occur from unwanted release of
energy.
 Dividing the workplace e.g.-by activities, equipment, Geographical area, specific
job activity. Processes can be broken up into nodes and then each node can be examined
independently as to what can go wrong.
All hazards are to be identified whether minor/major or likely/less likely and findings to
be recorded.
Assessment of Risk and Ranking
Objective of Risk Ranking:
 Identification of risks which are in most need of attention and the option for
achieving that risk reduction
 Identification of risks, which need careful ongoing management, the nature of

ongoing management and indicators that show that risk is being managed.
 Identification of triggers, which might be used to monitor that hazard and initiate
remedial action if elimination is not feasible.
The process of Risk Ranking is carried out by considering both the Likelihood of the
occurrence of each Hazard and the potential Consequence should the hazard occur.
The risk of any hazard is dependent upon the chance that it will occur (likelihood) and the
impact of an occurrence (consequence):
Risk Score= Likelihood x Consequence
 Consequence is the size of the loss or damage. It is the degree of harm that could
be caused to people exposed to the hazard, the potential severity of injuries or the number
of people who could be potentially affected.
 Likelihood is the chance that hazard might occur
A more detailed analysis can be carried out of the Risk Ranking by taking into the
consideration if the fact that personnel are exposed to hazard for a part of the time.
Risk Score = Probability x Exposure x Consequence
 Exposure is % time personnel is present.
 Probability is the chance that they will be harmed.
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Risk Ranking can be determined by qualitative and quantitative means. The most
important purpose in Hazard identification, Risk Assessment and Ranking is to draw up
and implement plans to control these hazards.
Treatment, Controls and Action Plans
The potential to reduce or eliminate the risk by using the hierarchy of controls should be
considered. The effectiveness of each method is given as a percentage after each of the
control descriptions.
 Elimination: Remove step to eliminate the hazard completely (100 %).
 Substitution; Replace with less hazardous material, substance or process (75 %).
 Separation: Isolate hazard from person by guarding, space or time separation
(50 %)
 Administration: Adjusting the time or conditions of risk exposures (30 %)
 Training: Improving skills making tasks less hazardous to persons involved.
 PPE: Appropriately designed and properly fitted equipments where other controls
are not practicable.
The control measure can reduce either the Likelihood or consequences of the event or
both. An action plan recommending actions, responsibilities and when it should be
completed needs to be developed.
Induction, Training and Continuous Improvement

 Each mine to have training programs for employees, which need to be reviewed
against safety criteria.
 When a new skill has been taught to the individual and he has been assessed to
have achieved that competency then it should be recorded.
 Staff should be prevented from performing tasks until they are correctly trained.
Accident/Incident Reporting & Investigation

This should cover:
 Responsibilities of those on the site.
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 Immediate response and Emergency backup.
 Notifying the key staff of accident
 Securing the site
 Treatment of any injuries
 Investigation and reporting
 Review of any recommendations and determining actions.
Auditing & Review/Revision

 Reviewing the effectiveness of the program within the safety management plan
should be an ongoing process.
 This should show whether policies, regulations and expectations are being met.
 Both internal and external audits should be considered.
Calculation of Risk Score

Risk Score= Likelihood x Consequence
Risk Score = Probability x Exposure x Consequence
Scale for consequence
 Several dead 5
 One dead 1
 Significant chance of fatality 0.3
 One permanent disability or 0.1
 Many lost time injuries 0.01
 One lost time injury 0.001
 Small injury 0.0001
Scale for exposure
 Continuous 10
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 Frequent (daily) 5
 Seldom (weekly) 3
 Unusual (monthly) 2.5
 Occasional (yearly) 2
 Once in 5 years 1.5
Scale for probability
 May well be expected 10
 Quite possible 7
 Unusual but possible 3
 Only remotely possible 2
 Conceivable but unlikely 1
 Practically impossible 0.5
 Virtually impossible 0.1
Conclusion
 The system stands on a premise that all risks need to be eliminated and different
control measures can be adopted for different levels or risks.
 Aim should be for ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) which eventually
depends on cost consideration.
 When mine operators themselves through brainstorming create the system, they
feel ownership of the system and hence chances of successful implementation are more.
2.8 NATURAL PHENOMENON

Probability is also determined by the frequency of failure of equipment or what we call
Mean time between failures. Severity Factor depends upon the availability of accusing
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factors at a time. For example, creation of explosive mixture plus ignition source will
have high severity factor than explosive source without ignition source.
Industrial - Technological Disasters occurs due to in - plant Emergencies because of

deficiencies in Operation, Maintenance, Design or Equipment failure and Disaster due to
Floods are also probable in this Asset. These Disasters are being managed but the impact
of these could be minimized if we are able to keep our Drill sites, Producing Wells and
Production Installations and the nearby areas free of encroachment by peoples.
The continuous increase in population and pressure on maximum utilization of land for
Cash crops, industrialization, roads and other developments in unscientific way and
deforestation has changed the rain pattern and results in to floods and droughts.
Success of Management of any Disaster depends on how simple and effective Disaster
Management plan has been made by an Organization after taking into consideration all
the factors, which may create any Disasters.
These include clear - cut lay out of:
a) Villages - Population.
b) Monuments.
c) Rivers.
d) Fire Hazard Area.
e) Industry.
f) Wind Pattern.
g) Rain Pattern.
h) Crop Pattern etc., within and near the area of operation.
ONGC has made elaborate arrangements to meet the various emergencies arising out of
its normal operations. There is full flagged Asset HSE, Surface and Drilling Safety
Officer and Fire department. In addition there is Specialist group of personnel trained for
crisis situations i.e. Crisis Management Team equipped with all kind of required
equipments.
2.9 TYPES OF EMERGENCIES
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The diverse nature of activities involved in the Oil field operations encounters various
hazards which pose a potential threat and risk of major accidents that are even capable of
turning in to a disaster. The emergency situations that arise as a consequence of the
manifestations of Fire, Explosion or Well Blow out hazards require meticulous handling
for ensuring effective control and minimal after effects.
The various types of Emergency situations that are probable in Oil well drilling, work
over and production operations are discussed in this section of the DMP, which form the
basis for framing up the Emergency Preparedness plans. The sum up of the different
emergency situations and the plans and procedures to combat them, limited to within the
four walls or premises of ONGC’s owned facility of location is compiled as the “ON
SITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN”.This all requires the creation of dedicated
Disaster Management Control Room, Structure of Emergency Response Organization for
On Site and off site Disaster Management, Cadre and lay out of Emergency Procedures
role and responsibilities etc.
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2.10 OBJECTIVES OF THE ON – SITE EMERGENCY PLAN
The objectives of the On – site Disaster Management Plan is to evaluate the various
courses of disasters that can occur at ONGC’s Drilling and Production installations, and
to formulate Emergency Plans and procedures that can be implemented by ONGC in
house.
The objectives of the on – site Emergency Plan is:
a) Safeguarding lives both at Installations and in the neighborhood.
b) Containing the incident and bringing it under control.
c) Minimizing damages to property and the Environment.
d) Rescuing and treating the causalities.
e) Evacuating people to safe areas.
f) Identifying persons and to extend necessary welfare assistance to causalities.
viii. Finally when the situation is controlled, efforts are to be made set to return
to near normal conditions.
2.11 HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

The possible factors which lead to a hazardous situation, resulting in risk / danger to
human life, equipment and properties is operational such as
 Blow out
 Fires during Drilling / Work over operations
 Fire and explosion at installations
 Pipeline rupture and leakage
 Oil spillage due to leaks in pipeline and storage tank
 Release of toxic gases / chemicals.
 Handling of Explosives and Radio active Sources.
Hazardous situation may also occur due to Natural calamities like

 Floods
 Earthquakes
 Lightning
And also due to external factors like
 Civil commotions
 Riots
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 Arson
 Sabotage
 Break down of essential services
 Threat of war and war itself.
 Terrorist activities
2.11.1 At Rigs
In drilling and work over rigs, the major hazards encountered is Blow out. Blow out may
or may not lead to Fire, also it may be accompanied by release of toxic gases such as H 2S
and CO2
Some of the observed indications preceding or warning a Blow out are as follows:
a) While Drilling:
1. Sudden increase in drilling rates.
2. Return Flow rate increases.
3. Mud tank volume increases.
4. Pump pressure decreases.
5. Pump SPM increases.
6. Signs of Self flow.
7. Increase in String weight.
8. Surging and splashing of mud.
b) During Pulling Out:

1. Failure of the well to take mud equal to the metallic volume of pipes removed.
2. Self flow.
c) While Running in:
1. Mud tank level will increase more than the steel volume of the pipes run – in.
2. The hole does not stop and flowing during time gap between running in of one
pipe stand and the other.
2.11.2 At Production Installations:
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Inside the installations, major hazards are Fire, bursting of pressure vessels / lines and
leakage / release of toxic gases. Fire may occur due to
 Exposure of naked flame / sparks near gas vents in tanks and vent line
 Bursting / collapse / failure of oil storage tanks
 Heating up of bearings of pumps
 Pumping of crude oil
 Lighting up of any vegetation due to heat
 Explosion of electrical transformers
 Electrical short circuiting
 Electrostatic charges developed in tanks / tankers due to faulty earthings
 Improper lightening arrestors
 Bursting / rupture / failure of pressure vessels, bath heater, heater treater, headers,
manifolds & flow lines.
It is also seen that hazards in installations are complicated and may be combination of
Fire, bursting of pressure equipments and toxic gas leaks. Invariably one hazard may
triggers off the other.
a) Bursts of pressure vessel / pipelines occur mainly by faulty operations of
instruments or operating personnel. The bursting of pressure vessels / pipelines may also
occur with hazardous release of toxic gases.
b) Well flow lines and oil and gas trunk lines forming a Chapter of installations are
laid as per Mines Rules. Main hazard due to this is again bursting of pipeline, leakage of
pipeline in joints or pin holes and unauthorized tampering of pipeline. In all the above
cases, there is possibility of Fire accompanying.
c) If a non boiling liquid (crude oil or condensate) flows out, a pool forms and if the
liquid is flammable and in presence of ignition source, Pool fire may occur. Even though
there is no direct ignition in the formed pool, its vapor may ignite at some distance from
the pool, and the flame may travel back to ignite liquid in the pool.
This can be caused due to
 Over flowing of storage tanks
 Burning of oil in the tank premises
 Spillage during loading and other repair works.
Following serious hazards may be anticipated in installations in ONGC Oil Mines.

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BLOW OUT:
Blow out (uncontrolled gushing of Oil & Gas) is the worst situation, which may arise at
oil wells during drilling, work over operations, perforation, and reservoir studies at active
wells etc. or due to some unforeseen reasons.
BLOW OUT & FIRE EXPLOSION:

Blow out may also result into fire and explosion, which may cause immense loss of life &
property damage.
BLEVE OF GAS SEPARATOR:

BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) may occur due to:
 Rupturing of separators operating much above the atmospheric pressure.
 Excess Pressure due to malfunctioning of relief valve and high pipeline pressure,
choking partially or fully.
 Weakening of steel of the separator.
 Heating of the internally welded surface of the separators below atmospheric
pressure
 Impact of missile on the separators as a consequence of an adjacent BLEVE or
other explosion.
FIRE IN STORAGE TANK:

Lightning, spark, sudden release of pressure (explosion in the tank due to operational
faults/sabotage or some other unforeseen reasons like human error, attack etc.)
GAS COMPRESSOR STATION:

Heavy sudden gas leakage and blasting /exploding of gas storage/reservoir and gas lines
due to pilferage, corrosion sabotage etc.
BURSTING OF CRUDE OIL LINES OR EFFLUENT LINE:

This may happen due to rupturing of lines because of corrosion of line material, pilferage,
sabotage etc.
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ELECTRICAL SHOCK & HAZARDS DUE TO BURSTING OF TRANSFORMER:
Personal injuries due to electrical shocks from H.T and L.T supply and spread of heated
transformer oil due to bursting of transformer, causing fire & loss of life & property.
2.12 WHILE USING EXPLOSIVES AND RADIO ACTIVE SOURCES

In petroleum industry,
 logging operations, perforations and seismic operations involves use of explosives
 Sub surface structural mapping of Geological formations involves radio active
Neutron and Gamma ray logging.
The emergencies that may arise while using explosives and radio active sources are
mainly sub divided into three main categories namely
 Storage.
 Transportation.
 Handling / Operation.
2.12.1 Measures to Be Taken During Such Emergencies

The measures to be taken during the different types of emergencies vary with respect to
specific situation. There are however, certain broadly classified measures that are
universally applicable while tackling any emergency situation. These are listed below:
a) Passing on information to relevant persons or agencies.
b) Warning and advising people who are likely to be affected.
c) Mobilizing and gearing up necessary on site resources.
d) Calling up assistance from outside agencies.
e) Initiating and organizing evacuation of affected persons.
f) Collecting data on the latest development, other relevant information and the
different requirements.
g) Co-ordinating action taken by various agencies.
2.12.2 General Guidelines to Employees

In any work site, the general reaction to an untoward incident is of Panic. Needless to
say it is very vital that the operating crew maintain their cool. Also, to avoid a situation
110
that may delay the remedial measures, it is very important that the working crew maintain
a certain emergency discipline. Some of these are:
a) Do not be Panic.
b) Do not approach the scene as spectator.
c) Do not engage communication channel / telephone unnecessarily.
d) Do not move around unnecessarily.
e) Keep the visitors / guest if any, out of installation.
f) Be attentive to instructions.
g) Surroundings/habitats should be protected or be asked for safe evacuation
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CHAPTER – 3
An Update on Risk Assessment, Estimation and Mitigation at
Processing Facilities
3.1 RISK ASSESSMENT (THE QRA CONCEPT)
The numerical estimate of the risk is of no inherent use as they neither ensure
acceptability nor improve safety. It is the analysis of those numbers against well-defined,
suitable appropriate risk criteria that allows conclusions to be drawn and
recommendations to be made. Though achieving complete safety is desirably but
practically it is impossible to achieve, as any activity will have its own inherent risk.
Society a whole has to decide whether the benefits etc.) Out weighs the risks involved.
The usual question “Is it safe?” has to be interpreted in the decision making as meaning
“Are the Risks low enough to be tolerated? This is what a risk criteria attempts to
establish.
Decision-makers are not usually familiar with numerical risk estimates; hence it has to be
converted into qualitative terms before they can balance the risks against the other
relevant factors. These qualitative terms are nothing but the value judgments about the
significance of the risks. Risk criteria are, therefore, nothing but the standards, which are
used to translate numerical estimates (e.g. 10-6 per year) into value judgments (e.g.
negligible risk ) and which can be set against other value judgments (e.g. economic
benefits) in a decision-making process.
Although since long risk analysis studies have been used in India but till date Indian
Regulatory Authorities have not specified any formal regulation/guideline regarding risk
criteria to be adopted for the studies. In absence of it, in this study, Individual Risk
Acceptance Criteria (RAC) as suggested by Health & Safety Executive (HSE), of the
Government of United Kingdom, for onshore hazardous industry has been used to assess
the individual risk to public and plant personnel Table 3.1.
Further, society usually judges accidents, which result in multiple fatalities more harshly
than the accidents, which causes fewer fatalities. In view of this fact, the Societal Risk
has also been assessed Table 2. In absence of any Societal Risk criteria specified by
Indian Regulatory Authorities as also being not formally published by HSE U.K in the
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form of F-N curves, Societal / Risk Criteria as suggested Health and Safety Commission,
U.K. has been used.
Health & Safety Executive, U.K. suggested a flexible framework, for risk criteria. This
form of criteria usually specifies a level, often known as the maximum tolerable criterion,
above which the risk is regarded as intolerable whatever the benefit may be, and must be
reduced. Below this level, the risks should also be made as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP). This means that when deciding whether or not to implement risk reduction
measures, their cost may be taken into account, using cost-benefit analysis. In this
region, the higher the risks, the more it is worth spending to reduce them. If the risks are
low enough. It may not be worth spending anything and the risks are then regarded as
negligible.
This approach can be interpreted as dividing risks into three tiers, as it illustrated in the
figures given below.
Figure3.1 ALARP and Risk
 An intolerable region, within which the risk is generally intolerable whatever the
benefit may be. Risk reduction measures or design changes are considered essential.
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 A middle band (or ALARP region) where the risk is considered to be tolerable
only when it has been made ALARP. This requires risk reduction measures to be
implemented if they are reasonably practicable, as evaluated by cost benefit analysis.
 A negligible region, within which the risk is generally tolerable, and no risk
reduction measures are needed.
Table No. –3.1 Individual Risk Criteria
Risk Levels Public (Per Year) Plant Personnel (Per Year)
Maximum Tolerable 1X10-4 1X10-3
Negligible 1X10-6 1X10-6
(Suggested by Health & Safety Executive, U.K)
Table No. –3.2 Societal Risk Criteria

Risk Levels N F
Maximum Tolerable 1 1X10-1
10 1X10-2
100 1X10-3
1000 1X10-4
Negligible 1 1X10-4
10 1X10-5
100 1X10-6
1000 1X10-7
(Suggested by Health & Safety Commission, U.K)
NOTE: 1. N is the Number of Fatalities
2. F is the frequency of N or more fatalities per year.
Further, risks can be categorized as involuntary or voluntary depending on the benefit

gained from the activity by an individual undertaking the risks.
Risk to an individual member of the public may generally be treated as involuntary. For
the sake of comparison, the following involuntary risks undertaken by individuals may be
of interest.
Chances of Death (India)

Road Accidents in India : 5X10-5 per year
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(risk in Urban areas is much more)
Lighting (in India) : 2X10-6 per year
Railway Accidents (in India) : 1.5X10-5 per year
Drowning (India) : 3X10-5 per year
Risks to an individual are usually being treated as voluntary. For the sake of comparison,
the following voluntary risks undertaken by individuals may be of interest.
Chances of Death (UK)

Cigarette Smoking : 5X10-3 per year
(20 cigarettes per day)
Playing Football : 4X10-5 per year
Motor Vehicle Accidents : 1.06X10-4 per year
(Car Racing)
Rock Climbing : 4X10-5 per year
3.1.1 Individual Risk to Plant Personnel& General Public

 Individual Risk to Plant Personnel :
It may be observed from the individual risk contours and the actual presence factor of the
plant personnel (assuming that a plant person is present inside the plant for 45 hours per
week for 48 weeks of the year i.e. working hours is 2160 hours per year) the individual
risk to the plant personnel inside the plant is generally between the contours of 2.5X10-3
per year to 0.25 X10-3 per year which is marginally above the ALARP (As Low As
Reasonably Practicable) risk region, as per the risk criteria framework suggested by
HSE, UK.
Further, the individual risk level at some of the continuously manned locations inside the
plant are given below i.e. Table - 3,
Table- 3.3 Individual Risks in Plant Location
Location Risk Level
Office Building 1.07x10-4
Guard Room 0.54x10-4
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Now, when the above risk levels are compared with the individual Risk Acceptance
Criteria suggested by HSE, U.K. given under Table –3.1 it is found that the risk levels
fall in the ALARP risk region. This means that the risk is tolerable only when efforts
have been made to bring down the risk as low as reasonably practicable.
The risk levels in the ALARP region means that the risk is tolerable only when efforts
have been made to bring down the risk levels as low as reasonably practicable.
 Individual Risk to General Public
From the individual risk contours, it is concluded that the individual risk contours of
1X10-4 per year extend beyond the plant boundary in all direction. In the north direction
it extends upto 140 meters in the east up to 70 meters in the south upto 3 meters and in
the west upto 75 meters. Therefore there should be no inhabitation anywhere in the
vicinity of the boundary wall of the plant.
Societal (Group) Risk

On perusal of the F-N of Curve and the Societal (Group) Risk figures tabulated under
Table - 3.2 the following conclusions may be drawn :
 The Group risk to plant personnel is within the ALARP risk region. This means
that Group risk to plant personnel is acceptable only when efforts have been made to
bring down the risk levels as low as reasonably practicable.
 The societal risk arising from the accidental events scenarios to the general public
surrounding the plant is negligible, as there is no population around the plant.
3.1.2 Risk Assessment Criteria

Hazard analysis involves the identification and quantification of the various hazards
(unsafe conditions) that exist in the proposed plant. On the other hand, risk analysis deals
with the identification and quantification of risks, the plant equipment and personnel are
exposed to, due to accidents resulting from the hazards present in the plant.
Hazard and risk analysis involves very extensive studies and require a very detailed
design and engineering information. The various hazard analysis techniques that may be
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applied are hazard and operability studies, fault-tree analysis, event-tree analysis and
failure and effects mode analysis.
Risk analysis follows an extensive hazard analysis. It involves the identification and
assessment of risks the neighboring population is exposed to as a result of hazards
present. This requires a thorough knowledge of failure probability, credible accident
scenario, vulnerability of population etc. Much of this information is difficult to get or
generate, consequently, the risk analysis is often confined to Maximum Credible
Accident studies.
3.2 RISK ASSESSMENT STUDIES FOR THE OIL & GAS

COLLECTING STATION A TYPICAL CASE IN POINT OF
ODALAREVU GCS
The Study:
The GCS receives the raw natural gas with moisture from the nearby operating wells and
will undergo condensation and stabilization. The risk assessment study covers the
following:
 Identification of potential hazard areas;
 Identification of representative failure cases.
 Visualization of the resulting scenarios in terms of fire (thermal radiation) and
Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE).
 Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and the
impact zones from the accidental scenarios.
 Assess the overall suitability of the site from hazard minimization and disaster
mitigation points of view;
 Furnish specific recommendations on the minimization of the worst accident
possibilities; and
 Preparation of broad Disaster Management Plan (DMP), On-site and Off-site
Emergency Plan, which should includes occupational and Health Safety Plan.
Steps in Risk Studies
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Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting of an
event or sequence of events. The description of the tasks of the various steps involved in
risk analysis is described below;
Step 1: Hazard Identification
The technique employed for the Hazard Identification is MCA analysis. MCA stands for
Maximum Credible Accident or in other words, an accident with maximum damage
distance, which is believed to be probable, MCA analysis, does not include quantification
of the probability of occurrence of an accident. In practice, the selection of accident
scenarios for MCA analysis is carried out on the basis of engineering judgment and
expertise in the field of risk analysis especially in accident analysis. Process information
study and relevant data would help in the identification of hazard prone section of the
plant. Inventory analysis and Fire and Explosion and Toxicity Indices (FETI) and
following Manufacture, Storage and Transport of Hazard Chemicals Rules of MoEF,
Government of India (GOI Rules, 1989) are some of the methods used in hazard
identification.
Release of chemicals in the atmosphere from the storage section is then studied by
building scenarios on the basis of the properties of the chemicals and the consequences
are calculated terms of damage distances. This study helps in plotting the damage
contours on the detailed plot plan of the unit in order to visualize the magnitude of
occurrence of a particular event.
Step -II: Hazard Assessment and Evaluation

Ranking of each unit in hazard prone section is done based on the Fire and Explosion
Index (F&E1), Toxicity Index (TI) and inventory Analysis. Safety of hazard prone
section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis.
A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a part of the U.S. Military Standard System
Safety Program requirements. The main purpose of this analysis is to recognize hazards
early, thus saving time and cost which could result from major plant redesigns, if hazards
are discovered at a later stage. Many companies use a similar procedure under a different
name. It is generally applied during concept or early development phase of a process
plant and can be very useful in site selection. PHA is a precursor to further hazard
analysis and is intended for use only in the preliminary phase of plant development for
cases where past experience provides little or no insight into any potential safety
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problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA focuses on the hazardous materials
and major plant elements since few details on the plant design are available and there is
likely not to be any information available on procedures. The PHA is sometimes
considered to be a review where energy can be released in an uncontrolled manner. The
PHA consists of formulating a list of hazards related to:
 Plant equipment;
 Interface among system components;
 Operative environment;
 Operations (tests, maintenance, etc);
 Facility; and
 Safety equipment
The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the subsequent

plant design phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and Consequence
analysis.
Safety review of especially vulnerable process units is covered in this phase. This helps
in reducing the risk qualitatively while the outcome of step -1 and phase-II would reduce
risk in quantitative terms. Emergency Preparedness Plan based on the earlier studies is
covered in the activity. Customarily, major industries do have their EPP’s and therefore,
there is a need to look into those details and recommend a realistic EPP based on the
above studies.
Risk Assessment: Damage Criteria
Flammable / Toxic substances may be released to the surrounding area as a result of
catastrophic events casing possible damage. This chapter gives the idea of how the
consequences of release of such substances and the damage to the surrounding area can
be calculated. Calculation by means of models, are made to give the picture of physical
effects due to the release of the hazardous substances. These physical effects are
explained in terms of injuries and damages to the exposed population and structures. The
assessment of physical effects due to the release of the hazardous substance involves the
determination of:
 Nature of liquid (gas, liquid or vapor);

 Pathway of release (tank, pipeline etc);
 Flow rate of evaporation from a pool of liquid; and
119
 Dispersion of released gas or vapor into atmosphere
Major hazards on the onshore GCS relate to accidental release of natural gas may
potentially result in injury to people and damage to property as follows:
 Thermal radiation from a spill over of condensate resulting in a pool fire;
 Thermal radiation from a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion(BLEVE)
 Pressure wave (peak over pressure) due to gas/vapor could explosion.
The above damage criteria have been considered for fire and explosion scenarios in the
proposed GCS unit.
Damage due to Pool Fire:

A flammable liquid in a pool will burn with a large turbulent diffusion flame. This
releases heat based on the heat of combustion and the burning rate of the liquid. A part
of the heat is radiated while the rest is convicted away by rising hot air and combustion
products. The radiation can heat the contents of a nearby storage or process unit to above
its ignition temperature and thus result in a spread of fire. The radiation can also cause
severe burns or fatalities of workers or fire fighters located within a certain distance.
Hence, it will be important to know beforehand the damage potential of a flammable
liquid pool likely to be created due to leakage or catastrophic failure of a storage or
process vessel. This will help to decide the location of other storage/process vessels,
decide the type of protective clothing the workers/fire fighter’s need, the duration of time
for which they can be in the zone, the fire extinguishing measures needed and the
protection methods needed for the nearby storage/process vessels. Following Table- 3.4
tabulate the damage effect on equipment and people due to thermal radiation intensity.
Table –3.4 Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensities

S. No. Incident Type of Damage Intensity
Radiation
(kW/m2)
Damage to Equipment Damage to People
1 37.5 Damage to process 100% lethality in 1 min. 1%
equipment lethality in 10 sec.
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2 25.0 Minimum energy required to 50% Lethality in 1 min.
ignite wood at indefinitely significant injury in 10 sec.
long exposure without a
flame.
3 19.0 Maximum thermal radiation -
intensity allowed on
thermally unprotected
adjoining equipment.
4 12.5 Minimum energy to ignite 1% ;lethality in 1 min.
with a flame; melts plastic
tubing
5 4.5 - Causes pain if duration is
longer than 20 sec, however
blistering is un-likely (First
degree burns)
6 1.6 - Causes no discomfort on
long exposures.
Source: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards by World Bank.
The effect of incident radiation intensity and exposure time on lethality is given in Table-
3.5;
Table – 3.5 Radiation Exposures and Lethality

Radiation
(kW/m2)
121
flame.
tubing
degree burns)
long exposures.
Source: Techniques for assessing industrial Hazards by World Bank.

Damage Due to Explosion
Explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy accompanied by the generation of
pressure wave and a loud noise. The rate of energy release is very large and has potential
to cause injury to the people, damage to the plant and nearby property etc. The effect of
over-pressure can directly result in deaths to those working in the direct vicinity of the
explosion. The pressure wave may be caused by a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding
Vapor Cloud) or Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE).
 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion(BLEVE)-Fireball
BLEVE is sometimes referred to as a fireball, a BLEVE is a combination of fire and
explosion with an intense radiant heat emission within a relatively short time interval.
This phenomenon can occur as a result of overheating of a pressurized vessel by a
primary fire. If a pressure vessel fails as a result of a weakening of its structure the
contents are instantaneously released from the vessel as a turbulent mixture of liquid and
gas expanding rapidly and is dispersing in air as a cloud. When this cloud is ignited a
fireball occurs, causing enormous heat radiation intensity within a few seconds. This
heat intensity is sufficient to cause severe skin burns and deaths at several hundred meters
from the vessel, depending on the quantity of gas involved. A BLEVE can therefore be
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caused by a physical impact on a vessel or a tank, which is already overstressed. The
initial failure of the container can come from a variety of causes including.
 Excess pressure due to over filling too small a relief valve and high pipeline
pressure;
 Flame impingement, heating the vapor space of the container by fire or flame on a
specific spot. The weakening of the steel may cause rupture.
 Heating of the internally wetted surface of the container by a fore below it. If the
relief valve is not adequate or not working properly, rupture of the container can occur,
 Impact, where a missile hits the container as a consequence of an adjacent
BLEVE or other explosion.
A BLEVE results in blast waves due to the physical explosion; in flash evaporation of
the liquid fireball and ignition of the escaping gas or liquid and in a series of missiles of
high velocity if the container ruptures.
 Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

Explosion can be confined and unconfined vapor cloud explosion. Confined explosion
are those, which occur within some sort of containment such as a vessel or pipeline.
Explosions in buildings also come under this category. Explosions, which occur in the
open air are referred to as unconfined explosions and produce peak pressures of only a
few kPa. The peak pressures of confined explosions are generally higher and may reach
hundreds of kPa. Table- 3.6 and Table –3.7 and Table – 3.10 tabulates the damage
criteria as a result of peak over pressure of a pressure wave on structures and people.
Table – 3.6 Damage Type – Vapour Cloud Explosion (CASE: HP/FILTER/LP
SEPARATOR)
Radiation
(kW/m2)
123
flame.
tubing
degree burns)
long exposures.
Note: D = Duration in Seconds
Table – 3.7 Damage Due to Peak over Pressure

Human Injury Structural Damage
Peak Over Pressure Type of Damage Peak Over Type of Damage
(bar) Pressure(bar)
5.00-8.00 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)
3.50-5.00 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable(10% damage)
2.00-3.50 Threshold lethality 0.03 Damage of Glass
1.33-2.00 Severe lung damage 0.01 Crack of Windows
1.00-1.33 50% Eardrum rupture - -
Source: Marshall, V.C. (1977) ‘How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes’.
3.3 WORST CASE ACCIDENT SCENARIOS

Results and Discussion: BLEVE-Fireball
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The results of the modeling for BLEVE-Fireball are tabulated indicating the distances for
various damages identified by the damage criteria. Calculations are done for radiation
intensities levels of 37.5, 25, 19, 12.5 and 4.5 kW/m2 which are presented in Table- 3.8,
for different scenarios. The distances computed for various scenarios are given in meters
and are from the center of the fireball. The distances for the HP Separator, filter
Separator and LP separator has been plotted.
Table – 3.8 Occurrences of Various Radiation Intensities – BLEVE (CASE:
HP/FILTER/LP SEPARATOR)
Human Injury Structural Damage
Peak Over Pressure Type of Damage Peak Over Type of Damage
(bar) Pressure(bar)
5.00-8.00 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage)
3.50-5.00 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable(10% damage)
2.00-3.50 Threshold lethality 0.03 Damage of Glass
1.33-2.00 Severe lung damage 0.01 Crack of Windows
1.00-1.33 50% Eardrum rupture - -
Fireball Due to Failure of HP Separator

A perusal of the modeling scenario Table –3.4 clearly indicates that 37.5kW/m3 (100%
lethality) and 25.0kW/m2 (50% lethality) occurs up to the distance of 32.6 and 40.0m in
case of natural gas leakage from HP separator.
The radiation intensity of 12.5kW/m2 (1% lethality) occurs at 56.5 m. similarly, the
threshold limit for first degree burns is 4.5kWm2 , this vulnerable zone occurs at 36.1 m
from the center of the fireball in case of natural gas leakage from filter separator.
Fireball Due to Failure of LP Separator

A perusal of the modeling scenario Table –3.8 clearly indicates that 37.5kW/m2 (100%
lethality) and 25.0kW/m2 (50% lethality) occurs up to the distance of 28.6 and 35.0 m in
case of natural gas leakage from LP separator.
125
The radiation intensity of 12.5kW/m2 (1% lethality) occurs at 49.5 m. Similarly, the
threshold limit for first degree burns is 4.5kW/m2, this vulnerable zone occurs at 82.5 m
from the center of the fireball in case of natural gas leakage from LP separator.
Results and Discussion – Pool Fire

The results of the modeling are tabulated indicating the distances for various damages
identified by the damage criteria, as explained earlier. Calculations are done for radiation
intensities levels of 37.5, 25, 12.5 and 4.5 kW/m2 which are presented in Table-3.9 for
different scenarios. Along with the distances computed for various scenarios are given in
meters and are from the center of the pool fire.
Table-3.9 Occurrence of Various Radiation Intensities – Pool Fire (Case: Storage /
Tanks)
Radiation and Effect Radiation Intensities (kW/m2)/Distance (m)
37.5 25.0 19.0 12.5 4.5
Failure of /Storage
Condensate tanks (four --- 6.6 7.9 13.5 17.6
tanks)
Pool Fire Due to Failure of Storage / Condensate tanks

The maximum quantity of condensate stored in a tank will be 45m3. In the event of a tank
spilling its content through a small leakage or due to rupture of the pipeline connecting
the tank and on ignition fire will ensure. As the tanks are provided with dyke the fire will
be confined within the dyke wall. It should be noted that the occurrence of bund fire is
rather rare but such data/discussions are useful for emergency planning. There will be
adequate time to evoke emergency planning and evacuate people by the time a small fire
in tank area can grow into a full fledged bund fire.
A perusal of the modeling scenario clearly indicates that 37.5kW/m2 (100% lethality)
occurs within the pool and 25.0kW/m2 (50% lethality) occurs at 6.6 m respectively in
case of failure of condensate tank from the center of the pool. These vulnerable zones
will damage all process equipment falling within the pool radius.
 Based on the results it can be inferred that the vulnerable zone of 37.5 kW/m2
intensity is likely to influence only the condensate storage area in the plant.
126
The threshold limit for 1% lethality is 12.5kW/m2. From the results, it can be concluded
that the vulnerable zone in which the thermal fluxes above the threshold limit for
1%lethality if restricted to 13.5 m from the center of tank.
Similarly, the threshold limit for first degree burns is 4.5 kW/m2, this vulnerable zone in
which the thermal fluxes above the threshold limit for first degree is restricted to 17.6 m
in case of failure of condensate tank on pool fire from the center of tank.
Table-3.10 Peak over Pressure-Vapour Cloud Explosion
Radiation and Effect Radiation Intensities (kW/m2)/Distance (m)

37.5 25.0 19.0 12.5 4.5
Failure of /Storage
Condensate tanks (four --- 6.6 7.9 13.5 17.6
tanks)
Effect of Thermal Radiation on Population

A perusal of Table –3.5 clearly indicates that 1.6 kW/m2 represents the safe radiation
intensity for human population even for long exposures. Hence, pool fire and fireball
modeling has been done for all the scenarios and the distance for 1.6kW/m2 has been
computed. The result for pool fire and fireball is presented in Table-3.11.
Table-3.11 Occurrence of Safe Radiation Intensity

S. No. Unit Pool fire BLEVE-Fire Ball
1.6 kW/m2 Radiation Intensity distances (m)
1 HP Separator - 158.0
2 Filter Separator - 60.5
3 LP Separator - 138.3
4 Condensate storage tank 25.3 -
A perusal of the above table reveals that in all the scenarios the distance of occurrence of
1.6kW/m2 is observed to be in the range of 25.3 m to 158.0 m and is not likely to cross
the boundary of the proposed GCS facility. The nearest human settlement is about 1.5
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km from the GCS facility. Any accident scenarios considered above are not likely to
effect the settlement.
Based on the above analysis it can be concluded that the risk in case of any accident
scenarios due to BLEVE and pool fire will be confined to the facility boundary and the
risk would be more of an occupational risk to the personnel operating within the facility.

COLLECTING STATION A TYPICAL CASE IN POINT OF
PASARLAPUDI GCS
Risk Presentation
Once the frequencies and consequences of each modeled accident scenario have been
estimated, they have to be combined to form measures of overall risk. In this study,
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) in-built within SAFETY software has been used to estimate
the risk. Risk is usually presented in the form elaborated below:
Individual Risk
It is the frequency at which an Individual may be expected to sustain a given level of
harm from the realization of specified hazards and is normally taken as the risk of death
(fatality). It is expressed as a risk per year and is not significantly affected by the number
of people present.
Individual risk is usually presented in the form the Individual Risk Contours, which are
also commonly known as ISO-Risk Curves. SAFETI software presents Individual risk in
this form. This is used to indicate the individual risk of fatality at a particular
geographical location and is actually a risk to a hypothetical individual being present at
that location continuously for 24 hours a day and 365 days a year. It is the standard
output from a risk analysis.
Societal (Group) Risk

Some major incidents have the potential to affect many people. Societal risk is a measure
of risk to a group of people.
128
It is the risk experienced in a given time period by the whole group of personnel exposed,
reflecting the severity of the hazard and the number of people in proximity to it. It is
defined as the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering a
given level of harm (normally taken to refer to risk of death) from the realization of the
specified hazards. The terms “Societal risk” is nothing but the group risk of the members
of the general public/nearby community. It is expressed in the form of following Risk
measures:-
 F-N Curve – it is cumulative frequencies versus fatalities curve, showing the

cumulative frequencies (F) of accident scenarios involving N or more fatalities. They are
derived by sorting the frequency-fatality pairs from each accident outcome of each
accident scenario, and adding them to form cumulative frequency-fatality (F-N)
coordinates for the plot. They can be used to identify the accident scenarios with the
potential to cause large number of fatalities at once. SAFETI software presents group
risk in this form as well as ranks the societal risk results in descending order of fatalities
for easy identification of the accident scenarios contributing maximum to the societal (or
group) risk.
 Annual Fatality Rates (AFR) – It is the long-term average number of fatalities

per year due to a particular cause and is calculated by multiplying the frequency of the
accident outcome and the number of fatalities. The fatality rates of all relevant events
may be summed to given the total AFR for the accident type or the installation as a
whole. It is convenient for illustrating the main contributors to the risk. SAFETI
software presents risk in this form also as explained above under F-N curve.
3.5 RISK ESTIMATION

The large quantity of frequency and consequence information generated by the
quantitative risk analysis must be integrated into a presentation that is relatively easy to
understand and use. The form of presentation will vary depending on the goal of the
study and the measure of risk selected. The presentation may be on a relative basis (e.g.,
comparison of risk reduction benefits from various remedial measures) or an absolute
basis (e.g. comparison with a risk target).Risk presentation provides a simple quantitative
risk description useful for decision making. The number of incidents evaluated may be
very large but risk presentation reduces this large volume of information to a manageable
129
from. The physical manifestation of the accident is the accident outcome e.g. BLEVE,
Flash Fire, VCE, Pool Fire, Jet Fire, etc. The quantitative definition of a single result of
an accident outcome, through specification of sufficient parameters to allow distinction of
one case from all others for the same accident scenario is done through Event-Tree
Analysis.
Fatality Risk Results

Individual Risk Estimates (case in point of GCS, Pasarlapudi)
The risk study of GCS, Pasarlapudi and after examination and evaluation of the contours
the individual risk levels at a few potential locations inside the Plant have been estimated
and placed as follows in Table No –3.12
Table No. –3.12 Individual Risk levels

LOCATION LSIR ISIR
(per year) (per year)
Office Building 4.27X10-4 1.07X10-4
(E -W:124m, N-S:81m)
Guard Room 217X10-4 0.54X10-4
(E-W:84m, N-S:100m)
Further, all the potential contributors to individual risk at some of the important locations
such as office building, Guard room (Main Gate), Separator Area Storage Tanks, with
their percentage contribution have been.
Societal (Group) Risk Estimates

After study of the overall Societal (Group) risk F-N curve plotted by “SAFETI” software
for the GCS Pasarlapudi and after examination / evaluation of the F-N curve, the risks to
different group sizes of personnel affected have been estimated and placed as follows
Table No 13
Table No. –3.13 Societal (Group) Risk

Estimated number of fatalities (N) Cumulative frequency (F) of “N” or more
130
fatalities (per year)
N=1 1x10-3
N=3 3x10-5
N=6 3X10-5
On perusal of the Societal Risk Ranking results, it can be summarized that the
following are the five scenarios of GCS Plant, which contribute to approximately 50% to
the total Group risk which is 1.78X10-3 fatalities per year.
1. HP1 Separator (Operating Pressure 55 kg/cm2), medium (Liquid) Leakage

Size:<50mm:10.8%
2. LP1 Separator (Operating Pressure 15 kg/cm2), Medium leakage, (Liquid)

Leakage Size:<50 mm:10.4%
3. HP1 Separator (Operating Pressure 55 kg/cm2), Medium leakage, (Liquid)

Leakage Size:<50mm:10.3%
4. Manifold M2 Catastrophic rupture (Operating Pressure 55 kg/cm2), 8.8%
5. HP2 Separator (Operating Pressure 55 kg/cm2), Medium leakage, (Gs) Leakage

Size :< 50 mm: 8.6%.

COLLECTING STATION - A TYPICAL CASE IN POINT OF
KESANAPALLI(W) GGS
Following have been concluded from the Risk Assessment studies conducted for taking
risk reduction measures at GGS Kesanapalli(W)
Individual Risk Levels to Plant personnel working in the GGS are in the ALARP risk
region. This means that the Individual risk level to plant personnel is tolerable but efforts
should be made to reduce the risk level to as low as reasonably practicable. Also special
emphasis is to be given to continuously manned location to bring down the risk level.
131
The Individual risk levels at some important location inside the GGS taking into
consideration of presence factor are given in Table 3.14.:
Table –3.14 Individual Risk Level

Location Risk Level
Security Booth 7.39X10-4
Office 6.47X10-4
Loading Area 5.85X10-4
The individual risk levels in the Storage Tanks area and Test Separator area falls within
the individual risk contours of 0.25X10-2 per year, which is in the intolerable risk region.
These areas are having lots of leakages sources as well as they are handling huge amount
of inventory, which has resulted in higher risk figures.
The individual risk contours of 1X10-4 per year extend beyond the plant boundary in 90
meters in southwest direction where a power plant is situated. As a Power plant it self is
a hazardous installation, so risk of the order between 1X10 -4 and 1X10-3 can be
acceptable provided power plant employees should have proper safety and fire training in
case a hazardous situation breaks out. Moreover entry of general public should be strictly
restricted in this area.
The Group risk to plant personnel working in the GGS is in the ALARP risk region. This
means that Group Risk to plant personnel is acceptable but efforts should be made to
bring down the risk level to as low as reasonably practicable.
The Societal risk to general public is negligible as there is no significant population

around the plant. This means the societal Risk to general public around the plant is
broadly acceptable.
Risk Reduction Measures:

Based on the conclusions drawn above, remedial measures have been recommended as
brought here ,risk levels to, as low as reasonably practicable as required by ALARP
principle of HSE, U.K.
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The individual risk levels in the plant are high, of the order of 1X10-3 Hence, it is
recommended that operators who are properly trained and well aware of the process
hazards should only visit such areas as per operational requirements.
The Group (Societal) risk pictures to the plant personnel and outside population is in the
ALARP risk region. This means that Group risk to plant personnel and general public is
acceptable, but in order to maintain the risk pictures at present levels, it is advised that
present status of manning level inside the GGS and inhabitation around the GGS should
be strictly maintained in future.
The major risk contributors to the Group risk pictures are associated with pumps, storage
tanks, Gas Compressors and heater Treater. In view of this, it is recommended that
frequent inspection and monitoring of wall thickness of above process vessels, Header,
Compressor, associated piping, valve, and flanges should be carried out. This will help
ascertain the integrity of the vessel and piping and consequently reduce the likely hood of
a leak from the process equipment/piping.
Fixed Fire Fighting System including firewater reservoir should be properly maintained
and tested periodically as OISD Std-117
Mock drill and surprise drill should be carried out periodically to improve Fire Fighting
preparedness.
The Fire fighting training should be made compulsory to all officers, operators, truck
drivers and other employees who are likely to be present in the installation in line with
OISD-Std.117.
Hazardous area should be classified as per OISD-Std-113 and accordingly, electrical

fittings and equipment should be provided/installed.
The fatality risk; is a combination of leakage frequencies and consequences. Therefore,

with regard to reduce the process leak risk, some general suggestions for risk reduction
are given below which may be adopted during day-today operation and maintenance of
the installation.
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 Reduce the likelihood of a leak occurring by improving maintenance.
 Reduce the probability of a leak being ignited.
 Reduce the consequence of an ignited leak by reducing amount of inventory
available for release (i.e. isolation of the equipment/piping)
 Reduce the number of personnel exposed to the hazard.
Maintenance plays a very important role in proper upkeep of the installation and reduces
the chances of leakages and probability of ignition. Consideration should be given to
carry out preventive maintenance of the various static and rotating equipments. Also,
periodic calibration and testing of valves (PSV, LCV) and other instruments (PSH, PSL,
LSH, LSL etc.) should be given due attention.
Emergency Preparedness is crucial in order to safeguard human, environment and

material assets from adverse effects in case of unintended incidents. In view of this, it
is recommended that an effective and adequate Off-site and Onsite emergency plan
should be developed for KESANAPALLI – GGS installation. The Emergency Plan
should be updated at least once in a year.
The processing of well fluid involves handling of large amount of highly flammable gas
and condensate and hence, entry of unauthorized personnel should be strictly restricted to
prevent unwarranted incident.
GGS KESANAPALLI should initiate a system of monitoring and recording of the

number and nature of hydrocarbon leaks/fires experienced at different point of time
which will be very useful for assessing risk in future and also will be of help for risk
analysis of similar types of installations.
The approach roads leading to potential hazardous units like feed pumps. Dispatch
pumps heater treater, Storage Tanks and Compressors Plant should be kept in proper
condition and free from any obstacles so that in case of emergency, movement of fire
tenders are not hindered.
Consideration maybe given for installing separate fire fighting ring around the tanker
loading area.
134
All the follow/dispatch lines should be protected by C.P. system as per OISD Std.141
Consideration may be given for provision of low point drain to all oil/gas (process) pipe
lines to have easy draining at the time of fire hazard.
Consideration maybe given to provide adequate working platform to the vessels as it

would be helpful during isolation and depressurization of the vessels.
The control valve and the instruments fitted over the gas line of GCP should be properly
supported in order to avoid fire hazards.
Consideration may be given for installation of on line gas detection system at Gas
Compressor Plant GCP to avoid any untoward incident in case of any fire hazards.
The OWS pit outside the dyke wall should be cleaned regularly in order to a void any
heavy oil spillage during rainy season. Consideration may be given; to connect OWS pit
to ETP in line with OISD Std-108.
Consideration may be given for providing OWS facility at the Oil loading area.
Consideration may be given for installation of either spectacle blind or regular blind over
the tank drain points in order to avoid miscreant activity / spillage.
Consideration may be given for the provision of High-low level indication alarms in
storage tanks.
Storage tanks should be provided with temperature indicators as per OISD Std-108
Consideration may be given to review the design of existing flare system for stack height
with respect to OISD-Std 106 and API-521, and inter distance with existing
process/utility block with respect to OISD Std-118.
All the relevant drawings e.g. equipment layout drawings, area drawings, plot plan etc.
should be updated and drawn to the scale.
3.7 PERCEIVED RISKS (NUMERICAL VALUES GIVEN BELOW

ARE ILLUSTRATIVE - FAILURE FREQUENCY)
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Operator shall perceive the risk from their operating facilities considering likely sources,
expected quantity and its impact on the environment. A contingency plan shall include
following elements while describing perceived risks:
Riser Failure – Failure frequency
 Above sea portion 20%. (HSE), 19% (DNV)
 Sub sea portion 47%. (HSE), 29% (DNV)
 Splash Zone portion 33%. (HSE), 52%(DNV)
 Riser size 12”<D<16” = 1.47X10-5/year
 Riser size 4”<D<8” = 2.68X10-6/year
 Riser size D>16” = 1.84X10-5/ year
Pipelines, Hoses and Arms Leakage / rupture
 Partial Rupture
 Total Rupture
 Riser flexible 4”<D<8” = 1.25X10-5/Year
 Riser flexible <16” = 3.94X10-5/year
Main Oil Line
 Partial Rupture
 Total Rupture - 18-24” Oil line 1.76X10-5/year,
 10-16” Oil line 2.26X10-5/year
Blow Out
 5X10-5/well year (development and exploratory indicative for onshore and
offshore area)
 1.4 X10-3/ well workover
Leakage from Couplings / Joints / Valves
Spillage due to likely leak from following sources should be considered.
 Hose Joints
Valves/Block valve and Blinds

 3-11” =1.08X10-4/year,
 >3”=6.99X10-5/year,
 <11”= 3.95X10-5/year
Swivel Joints /Flange Joints
136
 3”-11” = 5.56X10-5/year
 > 3” = 3.95X10-5/year
 <11” = 76X10-5/year

Tanker Grounding/Collision/Platform/System Failure

 MSV 3X10-3/year, OSV 1.8X10-4/visit.
 Passing vessel 1.07 X 10-4/year (May be applicable for fishing vessel).
Over Flow from Tanker / Barge

The operator shall consider pumping rate and period of overflow for estimation of spiller.
Others
 Escape of oil from nearby Installations through storm drains.
 Escape of oil along with treated effluent water.
 Seepage from on shore collection/storage facilities.
 Overflow form jetty slop tank-collection trays/on shore tanks.
The quantity of spill from the various sources under different scenarios shall be indicated,
in the plan
The above studies have made sound basis for taking necessary steps for decision making
processes, resource mobilization in the event of any disaster, for mitigation. This all set
the scientific ground for developing and putting a well tested DMP shall be in place.
137
CHAPTER – 4
EMERGENCY ORGANISATION AND CREATION OF
RESPONSE STRUCTURE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The existence of a well-defined emergency organization is easily the most vital part of an
emergency preparedness plan drawn up to combat any emergency situation. The lines of
command need to be clearly identified and ambiguity of any form, whatsoever should be
eliminated. Further, the responsibilities and the authorities need to be clearly listed out.
While the emergency situations are elaborated in detail in CHAPTER - 6, common
emergency organization chart is formulated which will be appropriately activated and
made functional while combating every emergency situation.
4.2EMERGENCY ORGANISATION
Emergency shall be handled in a coordinated way and from locations as appropriate. A
few of such arrangements are:
 Disaster Control Room at Base (DMCR)-Permanent Set up

 On Scene Emergency Control Room ( OSECR ) – need base
The response cadre and appropriate structure needs to be created entrusted with
responsibilities with their corresponding area of specialization for handling emergency
situations. The quickreaction team (QRT) comprises of the following be created:
 Advisory Group Headed by ED, Asset Manager (Assisted by Surface

Manager/Head Drilling Services / Head well Services/Head Logging Services)
 On Scene Co- ordinator ( OSC ) or Incident Controller
 Chief Emergency Co- coordinator(CEC)
 Crisis Management Team ( CMT )
 Regional Crisis Management Team RCMT )
 Support Services
The specified functions and responsibilities of the different members of quick reaction
team (QRT) are elaborated below. These are the emergency functions and therefore
138
functions during the normalcy become defunct. All the QRT members are required to
assume their emergency roles forthwith without any time lag.
4.3 DISASTER MANAGEMENT CONTROL ROOM (DMCR) AT
BASE
A Base Disaster Management Control Room is the place from where the operations to
handle the Emergency are directed and coordinated. The shall be manned by
Surface/Drilling/Well Services Groups, as the case may be, to be decided by respective
Heads and Chief Emergency Coordinator. The DMCR should be equipped with good
communication facilities like Telephone 4 Nos. out of which two shall be with STD/ISD
facility , Radio Equipments, Walkie Talkies, Wall Chart showing Locations of
Installations, various maps, fire station copy of the Disaster Management Plan, List of
key personnel as standing list , their addresses and telephone numbers, resource
agencies phone number, name, addresses and telephone numbers of mutual aid partners,
district authorities, technical manuals, note pads etc .,
As such the following facilities have been suggested by OISD-168 for the Disaster
Management Control Room (DMCR) at Base
a) Communication equipment
b) Copy of DMP / ERPs
c) Maps, blue-prints, boards
d) List of emergency coordinators, their roles and responsibilities, contact details
e) Technical information and data i.e. site details, layouts, process data, storage data,
existing safety gadgets, ignition sources data, pipeline data, meteorological data, nearby
population data
f) Information on resources available e.g. monitors equipments(Gas detectors etc),
antidotes, list of rescue equipments etc.
g) Essential Telephone numbers
h) Back-up power for communication and lighting.
Location of the Disaster Management Control Room at Base:

GODAVARI BHAVAN, RAJAHMUNDRY
139
Duty Officer : Chief Emergency Coordinators will depute Two Officers not below E-5
Level on 12 Hrs. shifts in DMCR. The names of the Duty Officers are to be notified by
CEC.
Head Finance or his nominee will also be deputed in DMCR by concerned Head of
Services / Head of Finance to extend financial concurrence for rescue operations,
procurement of various materials required to handle the Emergency.
Functions:
 Command and Control of entire Operations.
 Information to all Officers as per standing list given in DMCR.
 Round the Clock monitoring and Flow of information to & from the site of
Emergency.
 Maintenance of running record of events and action taken.
 Casualty List & Information to next if Kin.
 Preparation of Management Report on the situation at every 12 Hrs. intervals.
 Co- ordination with the key personnel for guidance and assistance required at site.
 Co- ordination with other Oil companies.
 Co-ordination with Local authorities - Police, Civil Administration, Hospital, Fire
etc.,
 Sanctioning and procurement of the items required during Emergency.
 Arrangement of food , water, shelter , medicine , logistics etc.,
 Information to Public and media (only on the approval from ED - Asset Manager,
Rajahmundry Asset.)
 Co- ordination with Regions / Projects and Head – Quarters
4.4 ADVISORY GROUP HEADED BY ED, ASSET MANAGER

(ASSISTED BY SURFACE MANAGER/HEAD DRILLING
SERVICES / HEAD WEL SERVICES/HEAD LOGGING SERVICES).
140
On receipt of first information report, the Advisory group will immediately meet to
review the situation and declare an emergency, if situation warrants so. The ED-Asset
manager will also be empowered for taking decision to call off the emergency operations.
4.5 ON SCENE EMERGENCY CONTROL ROOM (OSCER)

Location: In case of Emergency at Site, an On Scene Emergency Control Room shall
be set up at a safe distance near the Site by the Mines Manager. Safety Officer of the
particular installation shall be manning the OSECR during any onsite emergency.
However Mines Safety Officer shall assume the charge after his arrival at site.
Duty Officer: In case the emergency continues for more time, a team consisting of two -
four officers not below E-4 to E -5 level be deputed in OSECR on 12 Hrs. shift basis by
the Mines Manager, assisted by equivalent number of E-0 to E-1 level Officers. In case of
Emergency in any installations, the concerned Mines Manager will nominate Duty
Officers at the time of Emergency.
The list of key officials / competent persons for each production/drilling/work over mine
given at Annexure X.
Facilities:
Emergency vehicle, Communication facilities, Mobile Van, Lighting arrangement and
Food shall be provided at the OSECR in the minimum possible time.
Functions:
 Assessment of situation and requirements , for mobilization of equipment/
resources etc.,
 To pass on the information's regarding latest positions to Base Emergency Control
Room.
 To keep record of all decisions and messages received.
 To keep records of all materials received at site during Emergency.
 To recommend and announce ‘All Clear” at site after receipt of such message
from DMCR.
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4.6 ON SCENE CO-ORDINATOR (OSC) OR INCIDENT
CONTROLLER(IC)
At the initial stage of emergency, some one close enough to the scene of Emergency,
i.e. Installation Manager / DIC / senior most people, as the case may be, will act as On
Scene Co-ordinator or Incident Controller. He will wear an identification badge/ jacket
of ‘Incident Controller’ and take the charge of the situation till the Mines Manager
reaches the site and takes over from him.
In case of unmanned location, any one noticing the hazards will inform the Base Disaster
Management Control room. On receipt of the information, the Base Disaster
Management Control Room will direct at least two persons from the nearest Installation
to visit the site with Walkie -Talkie/Torch.
Responsibilities of OSC:
The responsibilities of the OSC are as follows:
 Initial assessment at the site
 Identification of source of leakage & fire
 Isolation of the leak source
 Taking depressurization action, if required.
 Trying to extinguish the fire with hand held fire extinguishers
 Cutting off nearby source of ignitions like stoppage of cutting / welding jobs,
stopping engines, switching off electricity, etc.
 Starting of fire water pumps and pressurizing Fire header to extinguish fire.
 Informing other GGS/GCS to stop supply of Oil & Gas to the station
 Declaration of onsite emergency through siren following particular sound code as
given under ‘Siren Code”, being described subsequently.
 Informing nearby installation for help.
 Establishing Site Emergency Control Room (OSECR) and suitably manning it.
 Assessment at the spot and need for mobilization of sources.
 Informs Base Emergency Control Room. In case if the communication is lost due
to Disaster, seeks assistance from nearby Rig or Installation for communication.
 In case of Fire, commands the First-aid Fire fighting operations till Fire service
assistance reaches on the scene and takes over.
142
 Arrange initial rescue operation with the help of fire crew and may order Partial
evacuation of staff from the scene of emergency.
4.7 EMERGENCY SIREN (ALARM) CODES

Different Siren (Alarm) Codes have been framed for sounding alarms depending on the
type of emergencies. If automatic devices are not there, the siren can be operated
manually following the time gap, as suggested in the Std. OISD-116:
Major Fire: A wailing siren for two minutes. Siren should be sounded three Times for 30
seconds with an interval of 15 seconds.
Disaster: Same type of siren as in case of Major Fire, but the same will be sounded for 3
times at the interval of 02 minutes.
Gas Leak: A wailing sound for 2 min .5 times for 20 sec at 5 sec. Interval
Blow-out with Fire : Same as ‘Major Fire’ siren
Blow-out without fire : Same as ‘Gas Leak’ siren
All Clear : Straight run siren for 2 minutes
Test Run : Straight run for 2 minutes.
Note: Sound for Gas leak situation and blow-out sirens have been devised internally, as it
is not mentioned in OISD-116.
143
4.8 CHIEF EMERGENCY CO-ORDINATOR (CEC)
The concerned Head viz. Surface Manager / Head Drilling Services / Head Well Services
will be the Chief Emergency Co- ordinator and will exercise control through BECR. He
may visit the location of emergency at his discretion.
Responsibilities of CEC:
 Assessment of the gravity of the situation and report to ED-Asset Manager. To
declare the state of emergency as per Asset Managers directives.
 Executive control of operations.
 Keep record of messages and decisions taken to control the emergency.
 Mobilization of resources.
 Control of rescue operations.
 Supervision of medical attention to injured.
 Oversees all situation reports.
 Organizes all post emergency operations.
 Appraise the Asset Manager from time to time on steps taken to control the
situation and status of Emergency.
4.9CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM (CMT)

There is one Central team at Rajahmundry headed by CMT Operations and Five Regional
Teams (RCMT), one each at Baroda, Mumbai, Rajahmundry, Agartala and Nazira. In
each region there will be additional Reserve team (ACMT).
The Crisis Management Team at Rajahmundry caters to the need of specialized tools as
and when required;
Responsibilities of Head CMT:

 Lead the CMT and Members for Mitigation of Crisis situation on his arrival at
site.
 Ensure that the RCMT maintains equipment and ensure its operational readiness.
 Conduct familiarization and basic training on techniques of Blow out Control and
Fire Fighting to CMT members.
144
 Plan and monitor advance training to Team leader, Deputy Team Leader and
members of RCMT's.
 Ensure periodic checking / maintenance of BOP’s and Accumulators.
 Technology up gradation and standardization of equipment required for
controlling Blow outs.
 Functional control of RCMT’s.
4.9.1 Regional Crisis Management Team (RCMT)

The Regional Crisis Management Team will consist of Officers and Staffs dedicated for
exclusive work on CMT. These Officers will not be associated on day - to - day
operations of Rig and will devote for maintenance of equipment under their control.
Responsibilities of RCMT
 In the event of Crisis to take immediate charge for mitigating the crisis till the
arrival of Head CMT Operations. Thereafter, the RCMT will work on overall command
of Head CMT operations.
 To maintain equipment of CMT and keep in “Ready to Use “status.
 To plan, monitor and ensure availability of spares.
 To organize Mock drills on Blow out / Fires at regular intervals to ensure
preparedness of the members.
 Familiarizing the Rig crew in dealing with Emergencies like Kicks as well as
maintenance of Accumulators.
 Carry out random inspections of installations and testing of BOP equipment under
both Drilling and Well Service Groups
 Representative of RCMT of each work centre shall visit the site on receiving
information of Kick in Well and guide the Rig crew on Kick control, monitor its progress
and shall report to RCMT.
 Servicing of BOP and Accumulators and liaisons with Original Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) and with the Workshop for major repairs.
Note: Setting up of CMT and RCMT has been approved by the competent authority of the
ONGC.These teams are well structured, well equipped and experienced. They take their
own decisions in the event of any disaster, once they are assigned the duties Onscene by
the Asset Manager
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4.10 SUPPORT SERVICES GROUP
The Support Services Group will comprise of coordinators from all essential sections
viz ., Workshop, Electrical, Civil, Logistics, E&T , Health Services , P&A , Info Com,
Geology and Reservoir etc ., and their responsibilities are described below. The Heads of
the respective sections will be the Chief Reaction Coordinator (CRC) and for effective co
ordination during any Emergency, the CRC shall nominate competent persons under
their control to form the Support Services Group and they will actively participate in the
Emergency Control operations. They shall normally be present in the DMCR and will
provide all necessary help required by Base Disaster Management Control Room / Site
Emergency Control Room / RCMT / CEC or be in constant touch with Base Disaster
Management Control Room and may have to stay at the site of Emergency, if required.
Table 4.1 Functions and Responsibilities of Support Services Group:
S. Co - ordinators Functions / Responsibilities

No.
1. Support Manager Relief and welfare operations

(P & A)  To identify location of relief camp at a safe
distance from the affected area and arrangement for
shelter ( tent, cot, chair, blanket etc., )
 To arrange food , drinking water , beverage at
relief camp
 Maintenance of record of Causalities
 Co- ordinate with DC’s office and other local
Authorities.
2. Finance  Arrangement of funds for rescue operations and

emergency purchases of essential supplies such as
food , medicine , clothes etc.,
 Assistance in financial sanctions for procurement
of material , in mobilizing equipments/services and
material from international sources , placement of
commercial orders and obtaining approval of foreign
146
exchange from Government .
 Assistance in documentation and interaction with
external agencies on commercial matters such as
insurance claims etc.,
 Financial assistance in disbursement of
compensation for damage to life and property.
3. Fire Services  Mobilize fire fighting persons and equipment to the

site with fire tenders and other appliances
 Call for help, if needed, to
 District Fire Brigade
 Civil Defense
 Mutual Aid partner- GAIL
(other near by partner need to be arranged)
4. Info - com  Ensure Communication facilities

(E & T)  Set up Emergency communication (Walkie- talkie,
VHF etc.,) at the Site /Base Emergency Control Room.
5. Electrical  Arrangement of Emergency Gen. Set and Flame

proof lighting at the site.
6. Logistics  Arrangement of necessary transport facilities,

cranes, moles etc., for men and material.
7. Central Workshop  Arrangement of fabrication of any device or

gadget on priority as required by Emergency Team.
8. Material Management`  To assist in issuing of material
 Arrangement of equipment, materials, expertise

etc., as per requirement of Base Disaster Management
Control Room / RCMT
 To assist in interaction with external agencies on

commercial matter.
9. Civil  Civil jobs such as construction of temporary road

, control of Oil spread by sand bags or digging of pits,
water pumping and storage arrangement etc .,
147
10. Chemistry  Arrangement of Chemicals and additives for mud
preparation required.
11. Medical (Health Mobilize first - aid team with adequate medical
Services) facility and ambulance at Emergency site.
 Establish a medical centre at Emergency Site.
 Arrange treatment of the injured at ONGC

Hospital / Civil Hospital / Private Hospital.
 To inform authorities of major hospitals for

treatment of serious cases , if any,
 Inform District Health officer for any help.
12. Security  Deployment of Security personnel at vulnerable

locations.
 Cordoning off the affected site with ropes or

identification tape
 Informing to CISF
 Police Help.
13. Sub surface Team  To assist in Geological / Reservoir information

(Geology&Reservoir ) about the well.
14. Helicopter Services  To seek permission of ED Asset Manager, Asset

Logistics and Offshore logistics
15. Corporate  Arrange photography of the incident and the

Communication emergency actions being taken.
( CC)  Press briefing and media releases with the
approval of Asset Manager in consultation with Head
HSE.
 Act to provide information on emergency

handling to OR.net with Asset Manager’s approval
4.11 ASSET MANAGER

Although the Chief Emergency Coordinator(CEC) and Chief Reaction
Coordinator(CRC) are responsiblefor actual emergency management,Asset Manager
148
shall be appraised by CEC/CRC about the situation and the actions being taken
periodically and his guidance and directives shall be sought with the aim to bring the
asset back to normalcy after the emergency ceases to exist.
As such on getting information of the emergency, ED-AM will -

 Appraise himself and review the latest situation at the incident site and the
actions being taken to defuse the situation
 Inform higher authorities of ONGC i.e. C& MD, Director(Onshore), ED-
CHSE and the statutory authorities i.e., MOEF, DDMS, APPCB, Dy. Collector etc.
depending on the situation.(as per the demand of the occasion)
 Keep constant touch with the CEC and advice him accordingly from time to
time.
 Arrange to airlift fire fighting, medical supplies and other aids from other
ONGC work centers or elsewhere, if situation so demands.
 Act as an advisor to the Chief Emergency Coordinator in all matters
concerning the emergency management.
 Direct/arrange press briefings and media releases, whenever needed, through
Corporate Communication.
 Visit the location of emergency at his discretion.
4.12 HEAD, ASSET-HSE

On getting information of an emergency, he will --
 Report to Disaster Management Control Room (DMCR)
 Keeps constant touch with the DMCR on the emergency actions being taken.
 Be an observer to the activities and provide inputs when needed
 Observe any shortcomings and record information for future learning.
 Issue case study and safety alerts for dissemination of information of all
concerned, after the emergency ceases.
 Assist ED _Asset Manager in transmission of information to Statutory
Authorities.
During normalcy, he will coordinate onsite and offsite mock-exercises with the
involvement of Mutual Aid members and the District Administration.
149
During normalcy, he will coordinate onsite and offsite mock-exercises with the
involvement of Mutual Aid members and the District Administration.
150
CHIEF EMERGENCY CO - ORDINATOR APPRAISES
SURFACE MANAGER / HEAD DRILLING / ED - ASSET
WELL SERVICES MANAGER
DISASTER
ON SCENE MANAGEMEN
EMERGENC T CONTROL
Y CONTROL ROOM
ROOM
ROOM
ON SCENE CRISIS
CO - MANAGEMEN
ORDINATOR T TEAM
SUPPORT SERVICES
HR / ER
HEAD, ASSET-HSE
FINANCE
COMMUNICATIONS (INFOCOM)
ELECTRICAL
TRANSPORT (LOGISTICS)
CENTRAL WORKSHOP
MATERIAL MANAGEMENT
CIVIL
CHEMISTRY
MEDICAL
SECURITY
SUB SURFACE
CORPORATE COMMUNICATION
FIRE
Figure 4.1 ON SITE EMERGENCY ORGANOGRAM
CHAPTER-5
151
OFF - SITE DISASTER MANAGEMENT
The objective of Off- site Disaster Management Plan is to safe guard lives and properties
of general public around ONGC ' s Drill site and Production Installations, following an
emergency which might extends outside the installation/drill site premises and also to
minimize Environment Pollution due to Disaster with the help of Local Authorities .
The offsite emergency may occur either due to Exploration &Production (E&P)
Operations or due to natural calamities, sabotage, terrorist acts, etc.
The overall responsibility of commanding any offsite emergency rests with the District
Authorities under the Chemical Accidents (Emergency Preparedness, Planning and
Response) Rules, 1996.Accordingly, Dy Collector / Addl.Dy. Collector will assume
command in case any emergency from within the ONGC installations results into an
offsite emergency situation. Through the Asset Manager’s office, the concerned Chief
Emergency Coordinator (CEC) of ONGC will liaison with the District Collector and
Disaster Management Authorities at District Level which takes over as the Chief Offsite
Emergency Coordinator (COEC).
5.1ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1.1 Functions & Responsibilities of Local / District Authorities
5.1.1.1District Collector
1. Take over all commands for combating the off - site Emergency as Chief Offsite
Emergency Coordinator (COEC).
2. Declare an area of 2 km around the site as Emergency zone.
3. Direct the District Police, Fire services for warning and evacuating the public.
4. Direct the team of Doctors headed by the District Medical Officer to attend the
affected people.
5. Direct the District Revenue Officer to provide safe shelter, food and other life
sustaining requirements for the evacuees.
6. Direct the District Transport Officer to arrange for transportation of victims and
evacuation of the people trapped within the Emergency zone
5.1.1.2 Superintendent of Police

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1. Mobilize force to the site of Emergency on receipt of instruction from DC / Addl. DC
to cordon off the affected site / area and disperse the unwanted crowd for easy fire
fighting operation / rescue operation.
2. Post adequate nos. of Police personnel in the following places:
 In all the evacuated areas to provide security to the properties of the evacuees.
 In the entire Road junction outside the emergency zone to control traffic and to
allow priority movement for fire tenders, ambulances etc.
3. Warning and advising the affected population through unambiguous, reliable and rapid
announcement. The information to be given to the public should be the nature of the
incident, the degree of the incident; the steps taken to control the situation, location of
emergency shelters (if any) and the Emergency counter measures. The announcement
shall be both in Telugu, English and/or Hindi.
4. Liaison with the Medical coordinator for post mortem of the dead bodies , if any
5. Any other action as directed by the District Collector.
5.1.1.3 District Transport Officer

On receipt of the request from Base Disaster Management Control Room , ONGC, and
on instructions from DC’s Office, the Transport Officer shall arrange for the dispatch of
vehicle to reach the Emergency site immediately . The dispatched vehicle shall be at the
disposal of ONGC until the release order is issued. He also takes up the action as directed
by the District Collector/ Addl. District Collector.
5.1.1.4 District Medical & Health Officer

Upon receipt of information from District Collector/ Addl. District Collector about the
Emergency, the District Medical Officer shall extend the facilities available at the
Hospital and make the services of the trained Doctors to provide necessary medical care
for Emergency medical cases.
He will ensure that the Primary Health Centers & Municipal Dispensaries are equipped
with required quantities of drugs & equipment. Head of Medical centre, ONGC will
liaison with him in all matters concerning the medical issues.
5.1.1.5 District Fire Officer
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On information of emergency from ONGC Fire station, he will direct fire tenders with
crew to the site of emergency and assist in Fire Fighting and rescue operations in the
affected area. In charge Fire section, ONGC will liaison with him in all matters relating
to fire fighting and rescue operations.
5.1.1.6 Officer in - charge of Evacuation Shelter / Relief Camp

An Officer in the cadre of Revenue Inspector shall be the incharge of the Evacuation
Shelters/Relief camps. He shall maintain a record of the evacuees under the Head Men,
Women and Children. The department concerned at the Relief Camps shall provide the
following facilities.
Sanitation: This is very important at the Relief Camps. A team of Sanitary Inspector
shall attend the camp round the clock. Latrine facilities shall be provided.
Water: Municipal Board shall arrange storage of Water.
Lights:AP Electricity Board shall arrange Electric Lights at the Camp.
5.1.1.7 District Veterinary & Animal Husbandry Officer

He shall depute as many persons as required (taking in to account the number of Cattle
especially milking animals in the affected areas) to look after the welfare of the cattle and
protect their lives by applying precautionary measures. He shall also be responsible for
arranging food for the Cattle during Emergency
5.1.1.8 District Agriculture Officer

He will prepare an action plan to protect the food grains/standing crops in the Emergency
affected area and will take action accordingly.
5.1.1.9 Station Director (Doordharshan/AIR)

On receipt of the message from the Superintendent of Police, he will immediately telecast
the Emergency message as given by the Police authority, if required.
Similarly, he will also arrange to telecast periodic review message and completion of
Emergency / all clear message.
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5.1.1.10 Civil Defense Authorities
On intimation from ONGC, Fire Station and with instruction from DC’s office, the civil
defense authority will mobilize their team(s) to the location of emergency with all
necessary tools and equipments and ambulance. On arrival at site, they should report to
the ONGC Installation manager (Incident Controller) and start rescue and first-aid actions
immediately. ONGC Fire Head will liaison with them for all matters of disaster handling.
DISTRICT EMERGENCY
ON SITE CHAIRMAN &
DIRECTOR
ASSET MANAGING
DISTRICT COLLECTOR
MANAGER DIRECTOR
PA TO DISTRICT
COLLECTOR
SP OF DISTRICT REGIONAL
TRANSPORT
OFFICER
DIVISIONAL FIRE
OFFICER DISTRICT
HEALTH OFFICER
MEMBER DISTRICT
SECRETARY, REVENUE
APPCB, OFFICER
HYDERABAD
Figure 5.1 ORGANOGRAM FOR OFF-SITE EMERGENCY
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Disaster Management Plan – 2015, Rajahmundry Asset
CHAPTER- 6
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The procedures for combating emergency situations viz., Blow out at rig, Release of toxic gases
in an uncontrolled manner, Fire or Explosion are defined as Emergency procedures. These are
written laid out, action sequences to be followed while fighting an emergency. Also these are
practiced in the form of periodic mock drills during normalcy for better acquaintance.
An On site Emergency can be detected either manually or automatically through specific

detection system when provided in a drilling / work over system and production units. The
indications when monitored triggers off the alarm or alarm systems and sound an alert. The
operating crew can then swings in to an action by response and fight the situation as per the laid
down guidelines.
6.2 RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY

1. Any person noticing , say a fire , an explosion or a leak of hazardous gas must sound for
help and alert the shift in charge / DIC / Installation in charge by shouting “FIRE, AAG, AGNI,
MANTALU, HELP, EMERGENCY” as applicable.
2. Should attempt to control or contain the emergency with the available resource.
3. Simultaneously, the Shift in charge / RIC or DIC / Installation in charge instruct to
operate the emergency siren given in the form of a continuous ringing of alarm such that all crew
are on the alert.
4. The emergency procedures are put into action immediately by the Shift in charge / DIC /
Installation in charge, who then assumes the role of “On Scene Co-ordinator (OSC)”.
5. The “Regional Crisis Management Team” arrives at the scene and joins hands with the
site crew, other supporting team to further combat the crisis in association with the on scene
Coordinator and Chief Emergency Coordinator (CEC).
6. A buddy team which is also created from the available man power and kept as standby to
the main team which gears up to take command as called for.
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6.3 SAFE ASSEMBLING POINT

A safe assembling point or a safe briefing area is pre – identified for every particular installation.
This is normally chosen near or outside the exit preferably in the upwind and cross wind
direction. Normally in Drilling installations there is only one route whereas in major Production
installation, an Emergency gate is provided with inter linked road.
1. Operating personnel not directly involved with emergency management will quickly
assemble at the Main gate or any specified area just outside the installation boundary and wait
for any instructions from the On Scene Coordinator (OSC) or Chief Emergency Coordinator
(CEC).
2. Person directly involved with the emergency management will assemble at the site in
charge’s office for command from OSC or CEC.
6.4 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

6.4.1 For Control of Kick
A Kick during Drilling or Work over operations is an event preceding a Blow out. A Blow out
situation is never sudden and almost always follows after several indicators or pointers.
A Kick can be defined as sudden outflow or upsurge of the Drilling mud or Work over well fluid
due to unexpected encountering of a gas zone or high pressure fluids, which throws out the fluids
upwards out of the well bore. The Kick of the out flowing fluid needs immediate remedial
attention lest it assumes a more dangerous form of a Blow – out. The remedial action by the
crew and the Kick control procedures are elaborated in the succeeding paragraph of this section
6.4.2 Remedial Actions by the Rig Operational Crew

Until the higher ups reach site, all operations will be carried out under the control and guidance
of the shift in charge / DIC/RIC, who till then functions as the on scene coordinator (OSC).
(i)When a Kick is detected, a signal will be given by the shift in charge and all members of the
crew will take up their respective positions. The signals will be in the form of short sirens in a
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continuous manner from the Driller’s console. The respective positions of the rig crew are as
follows:
Shift in Charge
 Stand on brake and control as necessary
 Supervise all activities to control the situation.
 Ensure functioning of BOP and choke manifold lines.
 Ensure help is provided to Chemist in order to maintain mud parameters as directed by
authorities.
 Ensure safe removal of records, men, material to safe and secure place.
Assistant Driller
 Be available at control panel of BOP to operate as per direction of DIC/RIC / shift in
charge and the guide lines issued to close BOP , install Kelly cock etc.,
 Keep watch on pressure in discharge line , stand pipe and annulus pressure and increase
in mud volume in the pit / tanks.
 Help Chemist in preparation of mud and maintaining mud parameters as required.
 Ensure operations of degassing unit, if any. Also keep watch for rise in mud level in the
suction tank.
 Work on choke line / kill line of BOP.
 Keep watch on the float in the mud pit for loss or gain of mud and inform shift in charge
the status and request shift in charge to alert site personnel of impending danger
Topmen - Will work on choke line and valves.
Rigmen -Will help the shift in charge in fitting NRV / Kelly etc., and will be available at
derrick floor.
Jr. Engineer (M) / Assistant Technician (D)

 Will be near the engine waiting for directives from shift in charge
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Fitter
 Should be available near the pump and will give pump connection as and when advised
by shift in charge / chemist.
Electrician
 Should be available near BOP panel board and will attend electrical work if any needed
for charging the accumulator.
Chemist
 Will liaison with shift in charge and calculate kill mud weight as per available data and
take necessary steps to prepare mud as per requirements. It must be ensured however, it should
be checked at the time of kick control and shift in charge should be informed of condition.
Geologist
 Will keep contact with the shift in charge and keep him abreast of possible reservoir
condition.
Security Guard
 Will see that no unauthorized person enter the site.
 Should not allow the villagers to assemble near the gate
 Should ensure that there is no open fire nearby.
Others
 The rest of the member of the crew should assemble near the DIC/RIC bunk house or
store bunk house within full view of shift in charge so that any of them is summoned by shift in
charge at the time of need. They also should ensure that there is no open fire at the site.
 After taking respective positions by the crew members, all lines, valves, closed position
of BOP are to be inspected by shift in charge and certified.
 Information should immediately be sent to higher ups including Safety officer as and
when any kick is detected.
 Same procedures to be followed by every member of the crew during BOP Drill.
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6.4.3 Kick Control Procedure

A:While Drilling (Bit on Bottom)
1. Stop Rotary and lift Kelly joint above rotary table (40 cm approx.) to
enable to engage slip of elevator when required.
2. Lock the brake securely.
3. Open choke flow line and adjustable choke.
4. Stop mud pump and close annular preventer / BOP.
5. Close adjustable choke slowly.
B: While Tripping In
1. Set the string on slips.
2. Fit NRV / Inside BOP.
3. Continue running in till well condition permits.
4. Make up Kelly, lift the string and remove slips.
6. Open choke line valves and adjustable choke.
7. Close BOP.
8. Close adjustable choke.
C: While Tripping Out

1. Set the string on slips.
3. Start running in till well condition permits.
4. Set slip and add Kelly.
5. Lift the string and remove slips.
7. Open choke line and adjustable choke slowly.
D: Drill Collars in Preventors

1. Start running in and position the first drill collar joint above rotary and
set slips.
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4. Add Kelly.
6. Close BOP.
7. Close the adjustable choke.
E: String Out Of Hole

1. Start running in and position the first drill collar joint above rotary and set slips.
4. Add Kelly.
6. Close BOP.
7. Close the adjustable choke.
F: If Well Condition Does Not Permit

2. Close Blind Rams.
3. Close choke or choke line valve at choke.
4. Note casing pressure and if it exceeds the maximum permissible casing pressure (80% of
casing burst pressure) or fracture gradient 80 psi / 100 ft of depth whichever is less, bleed off
the pressure. For surface casing pipes, if pressure exceeds 50% of casing burst pressure or 50 psi
/ 100 ft of depth whichever is less, bleed off the pressure.
G: Assessment
1. After above mentioned steps are completed, all lines, valves, closed position of BOP are
to be inspected by Shift in charge and certified.
2. Information should immediately be sent to higher ups including Safety Officer as and
when any kick is detected.
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6.4.4 In The Event Of Blow Out

A blow out situation is a consequence of uncontrolled flow of oil/ gas and there is every
likelihood of fire being triggered off. To tackle such an emergency situation, the flow of action
can be divided into following two steps
Step: 1 Action on the spot - On site.

Step: 2 Actions of project base office.
The various functions with regard to these steps have been elaborated in the form of action flow
sequences and kick control procedures. With a view to avoid overlapping of functions, the
various actions required to be taken during a blow out have been identified and the personnel
responsible for tackling these actions have been specified.
The position of the blow out well being different in different cases, the exact action plan of work
to control the blow out spill / blow out fire and for capping of well shall be finalized by
competent authorities of the Project / Region / Head Quarters.
6.4.5 Action Sequences

Installation Manager / DIC/RIC as the On Scene Coordinator
Take charge of the situation at rig and follows the standing instruction given below:
He may depute his shift in charge to carry out the following duties under his control.
1. Evacuate all personnel to safe place.
2. Switch off engines and generators.
3. Remove and secure all well records.
4. Avoid and extinguish all naked flames / sparks.
5. Pull out all inflammable material i.e., HSD, Petrol, Gas cylinders, Chemicals etc., from
well premises.
6. Pull out all possible equipments to safe distance.
7. Start spraying water on well mouth to keep it cool.
8. Cordon off the area and do not allow entry of any unauthorized person. Allow only the
persons directly involved in operations to go near blow out well and maintain record of such
persons.
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9. Intimate Base control room immediately for help and immediate requirement of men and
material.
10. Keep in touch with control room for update feed back and instructions from base.
11. Assign responsibilities to the concerned persons to control the situation.
12. Evacuate all equipment and material to safety, if required.
Conveys the following information to Fire and Safety Co-ordinators, Disaster Management
Control Room at base and on scene Control Room and CEC
1. Well condition. Time at which observed.

2. Position of drill string/ tubing in the well.
3. Last tubing and annulus pressure recorded.
4. Number, Name and Designation of persons at site, measures initiated to meet the
situation, details of injury / casualty, if any
5. Any special requirement of back up services. Technical/ Administrative/Medical/other
Logistic support.
6.4.6 Procedures for Pipeline Related Emergencies

The pipe line related emergencies arise due to leakage, rupture or burst in the line. The
emergency procedure has been drawn up for the following emergencies:
1. In the event of the bursting of the pipeline and fire.
2. In the event of leakage from the pipeline or in the event of unauthorized tapping from
the pipeline.
6.4.7 Emergency Procedures :

1. In the event of a burst in the pipeline, the oil dispatching end will immediately know
because of the sudden drop in oil pumping pressure. He immediately stops the pumping and
informs the Shift in charge as well as the Installation in charge. Installation in charge conveys
the information as depicted in the emergency chart to the concerned authorities and also
immediately mobilizes for tackling the situation with the help of the operational crew, safety ,
fire services and C&M personnel The team immediately starts checking the line and takes the
remedial measures to repair the pipeline.
2. In the event of leakage or unauthorized tapping from the pipeline, there will be drop
in the pumping pressure than the normal limit. Again from the dispatching end the operating
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crew alerts the shift in charge. Immediately pipeline inspection team starts checking the pipeline
from the dispatch and receiving end to locate the point of leakage / tapping. Also the Installation
in charge mobilizes the operational crew, safety and fire personnel to repair the leakage.
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6.5 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FOR CONTROL OF FIRE

An action plan for fire control is normally drawn keeping into consideration the intensity of fire.
A minor fire can be effectively controlled with various First aid Fire fighting equipments
available at work points.
In the event of a major fire i.e., Blow out Fire , Fire on Petroleum Storage Tanks, Heater
Treaters, Oil & Gas pipelines etc., which is beyond the control of First Aid Fire fighting
equipments , major fire fighting equipments such as Fire tenders , Fire water pumps etc ., are
required and elaborate arrangements are to be made for provision and mobilization of resources
at site as per detailed plan drawn for fire control
In this Chapter, the details of organizational plan for control of a major fire have given in the
form of an information flow chart. The control procedures and immediate actions in the event of
a minor or a major fire and the personnel responsible for taking these actions have been
specified.
6.5.1 Fire Control Procedures at Rig and Responsibilities
First Person to detect Fire:
 Sound alarm or convey by distress shout “FIRE FIRE, AAG AAG, AGNI – AGNI,
MANTALU - MANTALU”.
 Try (till others come) to extinguish fire and prevent it from spreading with the help of
nearest fire extinguishers / sand buckets and fixed fire fighting system.
Shift in charge
 Stop the work in a safe and controlled manner.
 Rush to the spot along with the shift crew and with all possible fire fighting equipments.
 Take charge of the situation and co ordinate with shift crew to control fire with the help
of suitable fire extinguishing agents.
 Inform DIC / In charge of work point.
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In case if the situation so warrants

 Inform the nearest Fire station.
 Arrange closure of wells / control valves to control and to avoid spreading of fire.
In charge Fire station
 Send immediately first turn out to the spot.
 Inform head of Fire section and nearby fire stations by quickest available communication
means.
 Record occurrence properly
 Keep equipments / appliances ready for additional help
 Proceed to the spot to co ordinate all the fire fighting operations
DIC /RIC/ In charge of work point

 Inform Head of fire section / fire station, if not already done. Inform Base control room
and CEC for all back up needed.
 Rush to the spot and co ordinate with shift staff and fire fighting personnel in the
activities to bring men and material to safety and to control fire.
6.5.2 Fire Control Procedures at Production Units and Other Places

Fires other than the one accompanying or following a Blow out at a Drilling Rig or a Work over
Rig can be categorized broadly into two heads viz .,
1. Minor localized fires inside installations, in Office / control rooms, in Workshops, in
Store yards etc.
2. Bursting / collapse / failure of oil storage tanks resulting in fire.
3. Fire due to explosion of electrical transformers.
4. Fire due to bursting / rupture / failure of pressure vessels, bath heater, heater treater,
headers and flow lines.
The control procedures are elaborated below:
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6.5.3 General Procedures:

1. The first observer will raise an alarm or shout “FIRE FIRE , AAG AAG, AGNI,
MANTALU AGNI, MANTALU , HELP HELP, EMERGENCY EMERGENCY” as applicable
and summon the operating installation crew working in other areas without getting into a panic.
2. Pass information to the Base Disaster Management Control Room and Fire Station about
the occurrence requesting for onward transmission as per the standing order.
3. Immediately utilize the primary fire extinguishing equipment , the portable First aid
extinguishers of the correct type to fight fire with the help of shift crew and fire personnel
available on the spot .
Foam Extg.-- For Oil, petrol, Diesel, Kerosene etc.

DCP -- For Oil & Gas Fire. (Specially for metal fire)
CO2 Extg. -- For Gas, Oil, Electrical equipments
1. Try to locate source and isolate the same in order to arrest spreading of the fire or
compartmentalize the fire. e.g.,
i. By stopping the electrical live wires by snapping wires or making switches off
(whichever is feasible and advisable in the spur of the moment).
ii. Stopping flow of oil / gas to burning zone by closing relevant isolation valves.
2. To form a rescue squad out of the available fire personnel and shift crew to rescue
those already trapped in the fire zone, if any.
3. Keep away unauthorized men and cordon off the area.
4. Intimate nearby work center to provide additional men to fight the situation.
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6.6 SPECIFIC ACTIONS:
6.6.1 Case - I: Fire and Explosion at Installations

Process Leak / Loss of control resulting in Fire and Explosion at GGS , ETP , GCS , EPS
etc.,
Action at Scene
1. Shout "FIRE", " FIRE " ' " FIRE ", "AAG" , "AAG", "AAG","AGNI”, AGNI,
MANTALU MANTALU",…….In case of Fire.
2. Inform Shift incharge / Site incharge at first site of Fire / heavy Gas leakage / Oil spill.
Action: Person who notices the incident first.
3. Inform Field Fire Station, Base Fire Station and Base Control Room .Action: Shift I/ c /
Site I/ c.
4. Identify the Source of leakage , Isolate and attempt to extinguish the Fire with hand held
Fire Extinguisher
Action: Shift I/ c / Site I/ c.
5. Nearby source of Ignition should be cut off immediately (like stoppage of the cutting /
welding jobs, stopping engines, switching off the Electricity etc.,
Action: Shift I/ c, Site I /c, Elect I/c, Mech I/ c.
6. Start Fire water pumps and pressurize Fire Header to extinguish Fire.
Action: Mechanics, Shift Operator.
7. Inform other GGS to stop supply of Oil & Gas to the affected Installation.
8. If needed, Close all wells and Shut down the Installation under Emergency conditions.
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9. Release over pressure wherever required.

10. Inform nearby Installation for Help.

11. If heavy spillage occurs, try to contain in the restricted area.

12. Fire crew incharge after arriving at Site will report to the Shift In - charge / Installation
In - charge and access the situation and position the Fire tender at appropriate place from where
it can be fought effectively.
Action: Fire Crew I / c.
13. The quantum of spillage / Gas leakage shall be briefed by the Installation I / c to Fire In-
charge for Fire fighting.
Action: Installation I/ c.
14. Cooling and quenching of nearby pressure vessel / tanks to be carried out.
Action: Fire crew.
15. All persons present at the site should assist the Fire crew in fire fighting.
Action: All persons present at site.
16. Continuous monitoring of Gas concentration should be done.

Action: Safety Officer / Asst. Shift I/c.
17. Entry at Main Gate should be regulated and Contract personnel should be removed from
the affected site by CISF.
Action: Area Commander CISF.
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18. Pass the information and progress to Base Disaster Management Control Room at regular
intervals.
Action: Installation I/ c, / Field I/ c.
6.6.2 Case - II: Fire and Explosion at Pipe Lines

Any mishap / subversive act / sabotage may lead to Crude spillage/ Gas leakage and
consequently Fire / Explosion in:
i. Flow Lines
ii. Collector Lines
iii. Trunk Lines
Action at Scene
1. Inform Field Fire station about Oil spillage / Gas leakage or Fire
Action: Person who first notices
2. Identify the source of leakage, isolate line to stop leakage / spillage, close oil / gas wells,
isolate field manifold as per requirement.
Action: Shift I/ c / Site I /c.
3. Inform other Installations to stop pumping / stop supply of Gas to the affected lines and close
the isolation. Consumer also to be informed to isolate the line.
Action: Shift I/c / Site I/ c.
4. Area - in charge / Field -in charge will assess the quantum of leak at site and draw the
execution plan to stop the spill / leak and arrange means to lift Oil and clean the area.
5. Contain the spillage in the minimum area so as to reduce the pollution damage.
6. Depressurize the system to reduce the leakage.

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7. Area I / c - (C&M) will assess the quantum of work to be done for pipeline to pump out the
Oil from sites.
Action: Area I / c - (C&M).
8. Temporary method of arresting the leak line clamping to be resorted to reduce the pollution
damage.
Action: Area I/ c / Field I/ c.
9. Arrange the pumping unit / tankers / installation pump / lay pipeline to pump out the oil from
sites.
Action: Area I / c - (C&M)
10. Pass the latest information and progress to the Base Control Room at regular intervals.
Action: Installation I/ c / Field I/ c.
11. Fire Officer will rush to the Site and take action on confirming the Fire by
i. Positioning the tender at appropriate location.
ii. Making necessary connection for Fire fighting.
iii. Searching the source of Water.
iv. Mobilization of fire tender / equipment from other fire station, if required.
v. Fire fighting operation.
Action: Fire Officer.
6.6.3 Case - III: Fire and Explosion at Flowing Wells/Well Head Installations
Loss of control / fire at existing well of production installation / well head installation.
Action at Scene
1. Inform Shift incharge / Site incharge at first site of Fire / heavy Gas leakage / Oil spill.
Action: Person who notices the incident first.
2. Inform Field Fire Station, Base Fire Station and Base Control Room.
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3. Identify the Source of leakage, Isolate and attempt to extinguish the Fire with hand held Fire
Extinguisher.
4. Nearby source of Ignition should be cut off immediately (like stoppage of the cutting /
welding jobs, stopping engines, switching off the Electricity etc.,)
Action: Shift I/ c, Site I /c, Elect I/c, Mech I/ c.
5. If needed, Close all wells and Shut down the Installation under Emergency conditions.
6. Release over pressure wherever required.

7. Inform nearby Installation for Help.

8. If heavy spillage occurs, try to contain in the restricted area.

9. Fire crew incharge after arriving at Site will report to the Shift In - charge / Installation In -
charge and access the situation and position the Fire tender at appropriate place from where it
can be fought effectively.
Action: Fire Crew I / c.
10. The quantum of spillage / Gas leakage shall be briefed by the Installation I / c to Fire In-
charge for Fire fighting.
Action: Installation I/ c.
11. All persons present at the site should assist the Fire crew in fire fighting.
Action: All persons present at site.
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12. Continuous monitoring of Gas concentration should be done.

Action: Safety Officer / Asst. Shift I/c.
13. Entry at Main Gate should be regulated and Contract personnel should be removed from
the affected site by CISF.
Action: Area Commander CISF.
14. Pass the information and progress to Base Disaster Management Control
Room at regular intervals.
Action: Installation I/ c, / Field I/ c.
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6.6.4 CASE - IV: Fires and Explosions at Loading –Unloading Point /Tank Farms
Action at Scene
1. Inform Field Fire station about Oil spillage or Fire.
2. Identify the source of leakage; isolate line to stop leakage / spillage.
3. Inform other Installations to stop pumping oil to the affected CTF. Consumer also to be
informed to isolate the line
4. If Fire is due to spillage in bund area ,
a. Immediately apply Foam to blanket and arrest spread and rise of flame.
b. Cool the nearby tanks with water hydrants / monitors by directing the jet on the tank
shell.
c. Isolate Tank Farm area completely by closing the valves at the valve platform.
5. If the tank roof is blown off and the crude oil in the tank is burning at the liquid surface.
a. Pump out some of the contents in controlled manner to reduce the flame height or to
contain the height of burning surface in order to avoid froth spill over during foam application.
b. Start cooling the tank shell by directing water jet through Hydrant / monitors on the sides
c. Convey foam to the burning surface through foam pourers
d. Cool the nearby tanks by water jet
e. Isolate the entire tank farm area.
6.6.5 Case -V Fixed Roof Tank Fire (Crude)

1. Spill Fires only
 In case of spill fires within the tank dyke, use foam for extinguishing thereby reducing
the heat input to adjacent tank contents.
 Cool the adjacent tanks (contents of which have not ignited but are exposed to radiation
heat) by means of water spray and jet applied to shell to prevent excessive vaporization and to
reduce the danger of fire spreading to other areas.
2. Fire in tank also

 Apply foam inside the tank through the semi fixed foam arrangement
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 Actuate fixed spray system or apply cooling water to other adjoining tanks exposed to
radiation heat from fire.
 Arrange to discard the water from dyke to safe area if loading of tank dyke occurs.
6.6.6 Case-VI Road Tanker Fire

1. Stop all pumping / loading operations
2. Close block valves on pipelines connecting tanker and tank.
3. Isolate the burning tanker from other tank trucks, not yet involved in the fire.
4. Apply cooling water spray from fixed water monitors as well as hose lines to cool the tanks
trucks completely.
5. Protect adjacent tank trucks with cooling water stream.
6. When the fire is contained with the help of water spray streams, apply foam to extinguish
flames.
7. Apply cooling water even after the flame extinguishers until all danger of re-ignition from
hot surfaces has been eliminated.
8. Salvage as much un-burnt oil as possible.
6.6.7 Case-VII Pump Fire
1. Isolate the affected pump out of service.
2. Drain or de-pressurize the equipment and connecting lines if conditions permit.
3. Use DCP fire extinguishers on the fire.
4. If portable extinguisher is inadequate, blanket the fire area with jets of high pressure water
fog in to the source of fuel until the flow of fuel is stopped.
5. Apply foam on the ground / trenches in which burning oil may accumulate covering the
sewer drain to prevent fire entering the sewers.
6. Maintain adequate drainage of fire area.
6.6.8 Case-VIII Trench or Pit Fire

Locate and stop the source of leak in to the trench or pit.
Apply carbon-di-oxide or DCP to the fire area. If this is not successful, apply foam covering the
sewer drain as possible.
Apply high pressure water fog or spray to prevent damage to adjacent equipment.
Avoid overflowing trenches or pits with water since this may cause spread of fire.
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6.6.9 Case-IX Natural Gas Fires:

a. Use proper PPE before attending any gas leakage or fire.
b. Approach the fire or gas leakage from upwind direction.
c. Keep all persons away from vapour cloud area. If necessary, evacuate the area which is
in the path of vapour cloud.
d. Eliminate all sources of ignition from the surrounding area of the leakage and vapour
cloud.
6.6.9.1 Leakage without Fire:

1. Escaping natural gas is not on fire, close required valves that can stop the flow of gas.
2. Water spray is effective for dispersion of natural gas vapours. It should be used in
directing spray stream across the normal vapour path. Ensure stoppage and de-energization of
any electrical appliances in the spray stream.
3. If the flow of gas cannot be stopped, ensure vessel under leakage has not sufficient
cooling water to cool the shell of the vessel and exposed piping in the area. This will reduce the
danger of vessel or piping failure in case of fire.
4. Ensure all sources of ignition in the surrounding are positively extinguished.
6.6.9.2 Leakage with Fire:

1. It is important to know when not to put out a fire. If fire is extinguished and gas flow
continues, it will spread over a wide area and re-ignition may result in a catastrophe in way of
much bigger fire or vapour cloud explosion. Don't extinguish unless leakage can be stopped
except under certain conditions.
2. Apply large quantities of water as quickly as possible at all surface exposed to heat.
Concentrate on piping and metal surfaces of vessels.
3. Search for cutting of the fuel to the fire with possible means.
4. If the only valve that can be used to stop the flow of fuel is under the fire, consider the
possibility of effecting shut off protecting fireman with water, fog streams and protective
clothing while they are closing the valve.
5. The controlled burning of escaping natural gas is a commonly accepted fire fighting
practice. Application of sufficient water to cool the exposed surfaces will allow the fire to
consume the product in the tank without the danger of casing failure.
6. Isolate affected vessel & release gas to flare to reduce pressure, as quickly as possible.
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7. Dry chemical extinguishers are effective for extinguishing small fire. Extinguishing
agent should be directed towards the point of vapour discharge. It is to follow by water spray to
prevent re-ignition.
8. Carbon dioxide may also be used.
9. Ensure sufficient water in the firewater pond and make it up from nearby sources for
effective fire fighting.
10. If sufficient water is not available despite of all above means, metal surface in the vapour
sphere of the vessel may become overheated and weakened to the point not to sustain the
pressure of the product. Ensure evacuation of all person to the safe area.
6.6.10 Evacuation
1. Non essential personnel, contract personnel and visitors will be evacuated from the
incident area and also from adjacent areas.
2. The Assistant Emergency Coordinator as deemed fit; will order evacuation of all road
tankers, trucks and other vehicles from inside the plant.
3. Depending upon the gravity of the situation, the Assistant Emergency Coordinator will
order evacuation of areas around the incident site.
4. If the Assistant Emergency Coordinator anticipates a further deterioration of the situation
and expects a serious explosion of fire or BLEVE he will recommend to Onscene Coordinator to
order evacuation of personnel from process area as well as from within the buildings.
5. At the worst possible situation, when the lines of the emergency arrangement crew
themselves are threatened, the Main Controller will order for evacuation of them from the
emergency area at once and continue the emergency management activities remotely if possible
or from a distance.
6. Security will be assisting the evacuation operation as needed by the Assistant Emergency
Coordinator.
During the emergency period, entry at the gates will be restricted to resources arriving from
outside for emergency management only.
6.6.11 General Procedures to be followed in Case of Fire

1. Inform Fire Brigade without delay. This can be done by Fire Alarm, Telephone, and
Messenger or through Police.
2. Give correct address with location and wait for the arrival of Fire Brigade.
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3. Till the arrival of Fire Brigade, try to extinguish the Fire with the help of fire fighting
equipments available nearby.
4. On hearing the Fire Bell, always give right of way to Fire appliances.
5. Do not get panicky or excited, do all you can to check the spread of Fire.
6. Raise Alarm, and then assist the occupants to evacuate safely.
7. Do not interfere with Fire Brigade operations, unless asked to do so.
8. Crowding hampers Fire Brigade work, hence allows the Fire Brigade contingent at the
ground to work without obstructions.
9. Assist only when called for help by the Fire Brigade unit.
6.7 MAJOR INJURY OR HEALTH EFFECTS/ ELECTRICAL SHOCK

6.7.1 Preparation
a. Installation manager will maintain & display a list of first aid trained personnel. At least
two such personnel should normally be available in each shift.
b. At least two first aid kits will be maintained in appropriate locations by Installation
Manager.
c. Installation Manager will maintain details of employees as follows:
i. Name, designation, age, address, emergency contact nos.
ii. Blood group
iii. Known allergies
iv. Special medical considerations (hypertension, diabetes etc.)
d. PME of employees should be carried out as per following schedule:
a) Age less than 45 years - once in 5 years.
b) Age between 46 to 55 years - once in 3 years.
c) Age more than 55 years - once in 2 years.
Record of PME is to be maintained by Installation Manager.
e. First Aid Chart for electrical shock should be displayed at Electrical control room.
f. All electrical equipments, tanks, skids, bunk houses etc. should be properly earthed.
Earth resistance should be regularly measured. Earth pits and circuit breakers should be
maintained.
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6.7.2 Response
a) In case of injury/sudden illness, intimate shift In-charge.
b) Installation Manager / Shift In-charge will intimate concerned Location Manager/Area
Manager with full details.
c) Switch off the supply immediately, in case of electrical shock.
d) Remove the patient from the source of danger.
e) Check the patient's breathing.
f) Restore natural breathing by artificial respiration, if breathing has ceased by trained
persons. Provide other necessary first aid to the victim.
g) Call medical help immediately.
6.7.3 On-Scene
a. First aid trained person will provide necessary first aid.
b. Other crew members will not crowd around injured person.
c. If serious, victim will be shifted in Ambulance/emergency vehicle to nearby hospital with
escort.
d. First aider/ Doctor shall ensure that necessary medical equipment and facility is made
available on the Ambulance/emergency vehicle during transit.
e. Following information should be provided to the hospital like:
i. Details of accident & symptoms exhibited by the sick or injured person.
ii. First aid treatment administered on the site
iii. Patients blood group
iv. Known allergies
v. Special medical considerations (hypertension, diabetes etc...)
f. As per rule 45-A of Mines Rules'1955
(1) Every person receiving an injury in the course of his duty shall, as soon as possible,
report the same to an official. Where the person receiving an injury is not in a position to report
the same to an official, it shall be the duty of the person who first comes to know of it, to report
the same to an official. The official shall make such arrangements for rendering first-aid to the
injured as may be required. If in the opinion of the official, the injury is of such nature as to
require immediate attention by the medical practitioner, he shall arrange for the medical
practitioner to be called.
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(2) If an official who is required to carry a first aid outfit under rule 45 receives information
about injury to a work person, he shall himself attend the injured person.
(3) It shall be the duty of the person-in-charge of the nearest first-aid station to render such
first-aid to the injured person as may be necessary.
6.8 PIPE LINE EMERGENCIES:

6.8.1 Categorization of Emergencies on Any Pipeline:
a. Leak of oil/Gas detected en-route the pipeline.
b. Fire at any leakage Point
c. Explosion occurred due to leak of petroleum
d. Leak/Fire due to Natural disaster.
PREPARATION:
a. All non essential persons must be cleared from the fire / leakage site.
b. Stop all the supplies to the pipeline and close the upstream valve.
c. Let the fire burn, till line is fully depressurized.
d. Take gas readings of the surrounding areas and barricade 20% LEL zone.
EMERGENCY PROCEDURE:
a. Allow the line to cool off.
b. Wait for LEL at the surrounding to reduce below 20%.
c. Keep the fire tender standby.
d. Mobilize men and materials
RESPONSE:
a. Clear the debris
b. Excavate and expose the pipeline. Look for extent of damage.
c. Decide repair method; clamping/ part replacement/replacement of segment.
d. Remove the affected portion by cold cutting after cleaning and isolating the pipeline.
e. Make the line free of hydrocarbon, before taking any hot job.
f. Pipeline or part pipeline is welded into the removed portion.
g. Weld portions are x-rayed for detecting for flaws.
h. Pipeline is coated suitably.
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i. Pipeline buried and site is cleared of all materials.

j. Engineering section clears for hydro testing and starting of pipeline service.
ALL CLEAR:
The Incident Controller will give 'all clear' signal for resuming normal operation.
6.8.2 Emergency Response for External Gas Trunk Pipeline Burst/Leakages

Gas Trunk Pipelines / Transmission pipelines move crude oil, and natural gas to marketing and
distribution terminals typically using larger diameter, high-pressure lines and have the High Risk
potential of Fire in case of Burst/Major leaks. Every incident is different and each will have
special problems and concerns.
In the unlikely event of an incident involving Gas trunk Pipeline Burst/Leakages carefully select
actions to protect people, property and the environment.
The below listed Safety Actions shall be considered for
1. Goal should be to minimise the Level of Risk

2. Defined Command Structure shall be brought in place and all groups shall work
together with the Pipeline Operator for defence and search operations
3. For effective response to Pipeline leakages understand the Hazards and Risks associated
with the incident and Do Not Panic
4. Call nearest installations and Pipeline operator for more information and maintain
continuous contact and monitor the situation until the threat is removed Seek additional
information about Pipeline from the surrounding sources also
5. Responders should focus on protecting the public and isolating or removing ignition
sources.
Note: Normally, do not extinguish a leaking gas fire unless leak can be stopped. Extinguish
surrounding fires, but not gas fed fire.
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Incident Response Checklist
A. Assess the Situation
a) Approach with caution

b) Identify hazards
c) Note conditions of hazard, weather, surrounding community and available resources
d) Secure the scene, denying entry to unauthorized persons
e) Locate nearest pipeline marker sign, Pipeline Operator, 24-hour emergency phone
number
f) Contact pipeline operator to maintain site control and act as Incident Commander
B. Protect People, Property and the Environment
a) Stop the flow of gas and isolate the rupture/leak/burst site by Manual Isolation /Closing
of valves and if possible use Automatic /remote controlled valves to reduce the amount of time
taken to stop the flow of gas
b) Establish isolation zones and set up barricades
c) Rescue and evacuate people
d) Eliminate ignition sources
e) Control fire, vapour and/or leak
f) Let primary fire burn
g) Cool surrounding structures
h) Beware hot spot re-ignition
C. Call for Assistance of Trained Personnel (Fire Fighters, Rescue Teams/CMT and other P/L
Experts etc)
a) Call the Pipeline Operator

b) Contact the concerned organization and Others
c) Obtain State Assistance if required
D. Work Together with the Pipeline Operator
a) Carefully select actions to Protect People, Property and the Environment

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6.9 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE FOR HANDLING OIL SPILL

Various possible scenarios are:
a) Case 1: Spill from main oilStorage Tanks and intermediate storage tanks due to failure of
tanks
b) Case 2: Spill due to leakage from oil transfer lines
Consequences of such spill will depend on the following factors
1. The size and extent of damage of the tank and the dyke wall.
2. The capacity of storm water channel around the dyke wall. The layout of storm water
channel will also determine the movement of oil within the plant boundary.
The extent of spill can be minimized by early identification of spill; stopping pumping in that
line and closing the valves as quickly as possible, if situation demands.
Oil Spill from Pipe Line Leakage
Area Manager/
Installation Manager
SITE
Asset Control
Room
GM-Support HES Asset Manager Co-ordinator

Manager
Civil External Agency I/C Corporate Head HSE

Authority GAIL Dowlewsh Communication
waram
Workshop
183
Fig. 6.1 Step I: Site to Head Engineering Service (HES)
Other HES
Agencies
GAIL
Individual
Concerned with
Field
Asset Authorities
Co-ordinator
LM (W)
Resources
I/C I/C I/C I/C I/C

Technical Logistic Pipe Line Store Security
Cell Maintenance
(C&M)
Fig. 6.2 Step II – Location Manager (Works) to Co-ordinate
184
Individual concerned External Resources

with field & Agencies
Co-ordinator
I/C Search Party Repair Party I/C

Logistic Stores/ SK
Fig.6.3 Step III – Co-ordination at Maintenance Level
185
Area Manager/ I/C Logistic

Installation Co-
ordinator
In-charge
Security
Drawing / Map
Section
Concerned Installation
In-Charge/ Area
Manager
Site
Fig 6.4: Step IV – Search Team
In-charge
Search Party Pipe line Co- I/C Logistic
ordinator
I/C Security
Dowleshwaram
Work Shop if Individual Team
required Staff/ Worker/ Member
Agencies
Site
Fig. 6.5: Step V – Repair Team
186
Search Party
Monitor Control
Room
Repair Party
Monitor
Site Co-
ordinator
I/C Pipe Line

Maintenance
LM (Works)
HES
SM
Asset Manager
Fig 6.6: Step VI –Communication
Co-ordinator
GM (Support Service)
Local Police Security Gram

Authorities Panchayat
Site Medical
Team
Control Room
Fig 6.7: Step VII- Evacuation

Procedure
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6.10 EMERGENCY PERTAINING TO LOGGING OPERATIONS

6.10.1 Blow-Out
Blow out may occur during logging operation especially during production logging
(i)With rig or
(ii) With Logging portable Mast where there is no Rig.
In case a blow out is experienced during Logging operation at a well where there is a Rig.
The In-charge of Rig (DIC) will take command of the situation.
In case a blow out is experienced during Logging operation at a well where there is no Rig.The
In-charge of Logging crew at site will take command of the situation. He will flash the message
to key personnel with the help of I/C of any nearby Installation or Rig or to Base office.
In charge of Drilling / Well services / Work over Rig will report immediately on receipt of
message & assumes charge of blow out at site soon after arrival. All necessary control action to
be taken under this emergency has been mentioned at the chapter of Emergency Procedure for
Drilling and Work over Rigs.
Recommendation: Rigless operation in gas well should be avoided on holidays, unless it is very
critical to be carried out.
6.10.2 Explosives Hazard
6.10.2.1 Storage of Explosives

Explosives, being highly hazards and dangerous materials, are stored in Magazines having valid
license, specifically constructed at a suitable location maintaining all the required safety
distances as per guidelines of explosives Act 1884 and Explosives Rules 1983. Magazines are
guarded 24 hrs for security purpose. Only authorized persons are allowed to enter.
In the unlikely event of an explosion in the storage facility, there is no way to control it except to
wait and watch and warn the surrounding people not to approach the site. Besides the Logging
Base, the Civic authorities and Controller of Explosives are also to be informed, who will do
needful?
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Addresses of persons to be contacted in such cases are given below.

 Head Logging Services
Logging Services, RAJAHMUNDRY
 Jt. Chief Controller of Explosives

Dept. of Explosives,Kendriya Sadan
Sultan Bazar, HYDERABAD-500 095
 DIRECTOR OF MINE SAFETY

Region-1,APHB Complex,Block-2
Gruhakalpa, M J Road, Nampally
HYDERABAD-500 001
 Chief Controller of Explosives

Department of Explosive, “A” Block, 5th Floor, CGO Complex,
Seminary Hills, Nagpur – 440 006
6.10.2.2 Transportation of Explosives

Transportation of explosives is done only in a licensed vehicle / van, properly designed and
approved by competent authority for that purpose with arm guards.
In case the vehicle carrying explosive is involved in accident or fire or any other such
occurrence.
a) If any accident occurs at public place and the vehicle is not on fire.
(i) A caution is to be given to the public not to approach the incident site.
(ii) Warning signs are to be put out where traffic can see them.
(iii) A message is to be immediately sent to the Logging base about the accident and the place
of occurrence. Emergency contact numbers are provided on the explosive van as well as
available with the driver.
(iv) Local police station is to be informed. All requirement of law relating to road accident to
be complied.
(v) Arrangement for safe custody and storage of explosive is to be done.
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(vi) Licensee will inform Chief Controller of Explosive giving full details of explosive carried
and nature accident in case of major accidents where explosives cannot be safely removed to
base.
b) If vehicle is on fire,
(i) The driver will use his judgment as to whether to try to extinguish it or to get a safe
distance away
(ii) It would be usually safe to try to put out engine fire first than cabin fire.
(iii) If driver decides to leave the vehicle he should take the detonator container with him
and keep it in safe place (if possible). Get as far away as possible, but he should do his best to
stop the on coming traffic and get or keep everybody away.
(iv) Message will be immediately sent to the Logging base and other authorities.
In case of theft or explosives falling out of the explosives van during transportation, the details
and quantity of explosives missing is to be ascertained. Head-Logging Services or Logging Base
office is to be informed immediately. The contact numbers are available with the driver of the
van. Head-Logging Services will contract civic authorities and Controller of Explosives.
6.10.2.3 Handling of Explosives
Explosive are to be handled by the trained and competent persons only following strictly
recommended safety procedures to insure safe use of explosives.
During logging job using explosives, following signs in English, Hindi and local language are to
be displayed at appropriate places in the well site area.
Danger Zone, Explosives in Use, Turn Off All Radios /Mobile Phones
Danger Zone, Explosive in Use, Turn Off All Generators
Danger Zone, Explosive in Use, Turn Off All Welding Machines.
Danger Zone, Explosive in Use, No smoking, No fire.
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6.11 RADIATION HAZARDS

6.11.1 Storage of Radioactive Sources
Radioactive sources, when not in use, are stored in suitably constructed storage room,
specifically designed and approved by the competent authority, in Logging base. These sources
are removed from storage room and loaded into shielded containers, provided by OEM, attached
to the Logging Truck just before logging operation and transported to the well site. In case of
rupture, theft or damage of the radioactive sources by extremists, district authorities and BARC
are to be informed.
6.11.2 Handling of Radioactive Sources

Only trained and competent persons are authorized to handle radioactive sources. The sources
are transferred from the containers to the tools by using suitable source roods to maintain the
required safety distances. On-lookers should be kept away during radiation jobs. Persons
handling radio active sources should wear Thermo Luminescent Dosimeter (TLD) badges of
BARC, with proper sl. no. The badges are to be sent periodically for evaluation of the exposed
equivalent dose and proper record to be maintained. If any one has been exposed to the critical
dosage, he should be taken off immediately from the logging operation involving radiation.
6.11.3 Loss of Sources in Well

Logging tool carrying radiation source may get stuck in the well during operation. First all
efforts should be made to safely retrieve the tools along with sources. In the event of failure to
fish out the same from the well, following procedure should be adopted:
i) Close the well.
ii) Inform to the Head, Radiation Protection Services Division, BARC,
Mumbai – 400 085.
iii) Expert guidance from BARC and OISD guidelines will be followed.
iv) A cement plug above the logging tool to be placed as per guidelines of radioactive
abandoning plan
6.11.4 Damage To The Sources During Transportation

The sources are transported in specified containers to the well site.
191
(a) In case of any minor damage to the sources/containers during the transit:
The radiation level should be measured with the help of portable radiation survey meter. If the
radiation level is within admissible range, the source should be brought back to the radiation
source room and its use should be discontinued and BARC should be informed.
(b) If any major damage occurs to the sources/containers during the transit, the following
steps are to be taken.
i) Cordon off the Area.
ii) Demarcate the area of excessive radiation by Radio activity survey.
iii) Note down the names and address of the persons who might have been
exposed to the radiations.
iv) Inform Logging base and the Civic Authorities.
v) Inform BARC.
In case of theft or R.A. sources falling out of the van during transportation, Head-Logging or
Logging Base office is to be informed immediately at the address given below. The contact
addresses are also available with the driver of the van.
Address:
(a) Head Logging Services

Logging Services, RAJAHMUNDRY,
(b) Head Radiological Physics & Advisory Division

CT & CRS Building, Anushakti Nagar, Mumbai – 400 094,
(c) Head Radiation Protection Service Division

BARC, CT & CRS Building, Anushkati Nagar,
Mumbai – 400 094
(d) DAE Emergency Control Room

Telephone: 022 2202 3978, 022 2283 0441, 022 2202 6823 (Extn. 208)
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TABLE 6.1 Information About Civil Facility

Installation Name Logging Base
Installation Section WLS, RJY
1 Location of Installation
Nearest village Kavlagoyya
Nearest gram panchayat Kavlagoyya
2 Nearest Mandal Office
Address Rajahmundry
3 Nearest Fire Station
1. Address Inhouse – Dowleswaram
Phone no. 2417359, Extn.730
2. Address Fire Station – Innespeta
Phone no. 2444101
4 Nearest Police Station
Address III Town Police Station
Phone no. 2471043
5 Nearest Hospitals
1. Address Swatantra Hospitals
Phone no. 2400400 to 2400404
2. Address Krishna Nursing Home
Phone no. 2467935
6 Nearest offices
1. Name Core House
2. Name Reservoir Complex
7 Nearest water source
1. Location Logging Section
Type of source Water Tank
Distance 50 m
2. Location Core House/Reservoir Complex
Type of source Water Tank
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Distance 100 m
8 Telephone / Contact Nos.
Head-Logging Services 0883-2444520 or 0883-2494684 or 9440621139
I/C-Operations,LOGGING 0883-2494139 or 0883-2494684 or 9490168901
I/C-HSE, LOGGING 0883-2494143 or 0883-2468388 or 9490168931
Security Section, ONGC,RJY 0883-2436556
Doctor, ONGC Dispensary,RJY 0883-2469245
ACMO/DCMO 0883-2424669
GM(P&A) 0883-2427347 / 0883-2494030
IC-Security, RJY ASSET 0883-2436556 / 0883-2494067
Head-HSE,RJY ASSET 0883-2432911 / 0883-2494415
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6.12 NATURAL DISASTER

6.12.1 Earthquake Response Plan
6.12.1.1 Introduction
Physically, an earthquake is the result of a sudden movement of two blocks of rock along a break
(fault) deep within the earth's crust. A moderate earthquake may last only a few seconds. A large
earthquake could last several minutes. Aftershocks are smaller earthquakes that happen when the
earth underneath the surface adjusts to a new position. Aftershocks may happen for some time
after the initial earthquake. Over time, they generally grow weaker.
Although ground shaking is the major source of earthquake damage, secondary effects such as
landslides, the liquefaction of saturated sandy soils, flooding of low-lying areas and tsunamis or
tidal waves washing over coastlines can also cause loss of life and massive destruction to
property and the environment. In recent years, large buildings, roadways and other
infrastructures have been built on reclaimed land, steep slopes and unstable soils. Such areas are
at high risk of being damaged by a large earthquake. This also means that, in future, earthquakes
in such built-up areas could affect more people and cause more damage than in the past. For
example, Bhuj earthquake of 26th January 2001 claimed over 20000 lives and caused
injuries to more than 165000. The total estimated loss amounts to approximately Rs.212, 620
million.
Earthquakes cannot be predicted! In an ideal situation, scientists would have been able to
accurately predict earthquakes, but it is not so, scientists cannot determine when an earthquake
might occur so that preparations can be made in an efficient and highly cost effective manner.
However, advance preparation and commitment of resources before an earthquake occurs is the
best way of dealing with the problems associated with earthquake-prone area. Industries should
ensure that they have reasonable time to prepare and implement plans that will allow them to
lose as little time as possible. Also governments should have well defined plan of work to reduce
or eliminate any economic downturn that earthquakes usually cause.
6.12.1.2 Predicting an Earthquake

Scientists have spent much time and effort trying to determine a method for predicting
earthquakes. However, accurate prediction of earthquakes cannot be done anywhere in the
world. The predictions made by scientists almost always have a large amount of uncertainty.
195
Although scientific predictions of earthquakes are uncertain, scientists are able to locate
seismically active areas and provide important information about future likelihood of
earthquakes. This information includes:
 The range of earthquake magnitudes that could possibly occur,

 Recurrence intervals between each earthquake event on any one fault,
 Recurrence intervals between earthquakes for groups of faults in a region,
 Areas most likely to impacted,
 Where earthquake hazards are most likely to cause damage or loss of life.
Earthquake strength is measured as both magnitude and intensity. Magnitude measures the
relative strength of an earthquake and is recorded with the Richter scale. Each earthquake only
has one magnitude. People usually cannot feel earthquakes with magnitudes of 3.0 or less.
Intensity measures the severity of an earthquake in terms of its effect on humans, structures, and
the land surface. On the Richter Scale, magnitude is expressed in whole numbers and decimal
fractions. For example, a magnitude 5.3 might be computed for a moderate earthquake, and a
strong earthquake might be rated as magnitude 6.3.
6.12.1.3 Seismic Zones of India

Bureau of Indian Standards is the official agency for publication of the Seismic maps in India.
BIS came out with a seismic map containing six zones in the year 1962, which was changed to a
seven-zone map in 1966. A five-zone map was developed in the year 1970/84 based on MM
intensities recorded in various Chapters of the country.
Details of the five seismic zones are being given below:

Zone V: Very High Damage Risk Zone - Covers the areas liable to seismic intensity IX and
above on Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale.
Zone IV: High Damage Risk Zone - Gives the area liable to MM VIII.
The map below gives the seismic zones of India including that of Rajahmundry.
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Fig 6.8: Seismic zones of India
Zone III: Moderate Damage Risk Zone - The associated intensity is MM VII.
Zone II: Low Damage Risk Zone - The probable intensity is MM VI. This zone is
Zone I: Very Low Damage Risk Zone - Here the maximum intensity is estimated as
MM V or less.
Majority of ONGC’s production installations have been taken for revamping jobs, where the
installations would be designed to withstand earthquake of 7 and above in Richter Scale (as
confirmed by the Design Engineering Group of ONGC, Mumbai). In the mean time
6.12.1.4 Steps to Prepare For an Earthquake
1. Staff Briefing Staff to be told what they have to do before, during and after an earthquake
2. Emergency Supplies enough emergency food, water, heat, lighting and sanitation
supplies are to be ensured.
3. Assess Building Vulnerability: Installations/ buildings are to be assessed as to how
vulnerable they are to earthquakes.
4. Reduce Hazards: Earthquake hazards within the premises are to be identified and
assessed.
197
5. Dangerous Goods or Hazardous Materials: Procedures for the storage, use, transport and
disposal of hazardous materials need to be reviewed and an inventory of such materials prepared.
6. Assign Tasks to Staff: Staff is to be assigned specific task to do during earthquake to
respond as quickly as possible and to remove any uncertainty. They also are required to be
trained so they know what to expect.
7. Resources: Critical resources are to be determined to continue operation (e.g. supplies,
equipment, and equipment stock). Also alternate supply source of supply of such resources is to
be identified in advance.
8. Transportation: Considerations are to be given as to how the critical resources could be
transported if normal routes are not accessible due to the disaster.
9. Vital Records: Vital records and documents of installation operations (e.g., computer
records) are to be identified and adequate back-up taken.
10. Communications: Telephone systems may be disrupted. Alternate methods of
communication with employees, suppliers and customers are to be established.
11. Review Insurance: Insurance coverage may be required to include earthquake damages
and if required additional coverage can be taken.
12. Coordinate Plans: Emergency plan is to be coordinated with other installations.
13. Community Involvement: Earthquakes affect entire communities, not just the
installations. Local authorities are required to be assisted to help nearby community.
14. Practice: Like any other emergency preparedness, earthquake response and recovery
activities are to be practiced regularly. If required, the plan is to be revised based on the lessons
learned from such exercises.
Now that we understand the requirement of a sound earthquake emergency plan, the
requirements have been dealt here in detail.
(A) PREPAREDNESS OF WORKING STAFF
Basic Responses
Before An Earthquake.
* Each Installation including drilling and work-over rigs will have an Earthquake Operations
Plan (EOP) in place. This includes an evacuation map, an emergency telephone list, and an
Emergency Assembly Point (EAP).
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 Evacuation routes are to be marked and no exits to be blocked.

 Valuable and shock-sensitive materials, such as computer disks and glassware in latched
cabinets or closed shelves to prevent falling.
 Desk or work tables should be kept away from windows if possible.
 Each work area is to be periodically checked to maintain awareness and situations that need
correction to be identified.
 Heavy objects are to be stored on low levels of shelves and cabinets.
 Anchor gas lines suitably, since fire damage can result from broken gas lines.
 Keep Safety torch for any such emergencies
 Know the locations of fire extinguishers and first aid equipment
 Have first-aid kits on hand and sufficient supply of important medicines.
 Periodic earthquake drills to be conducted.
(B) PREPAREDNESS DURING AN EARTHQUAKE (FEW DON’TS)

-Stay calm. Think through the consequences of any action you take. Try to reassure others.
-If indoors, watch for falling plaster, bricks, light fixtures, cabinets, and other objects. Stay away
from windows, mirrors, and chimneys.
- Get under a table, desk, or bed
- Get in a corner away from windows
- Get in a strong doorway--but don't let the door slam on your fingers!
- Do not run outside until the shaking has stopped--debris may be falling from roofs.
- If in a high rise office building, get under a desk. Do not dash for exits, since stairways may
be broken and jammed with people. Do not use elevators.
- If outside, avoid high buildings, walls, power poles, and other objects which could fall. Do
not run through streets. If possible, move to an open area away from all hazards.
- If on the road, pull over and stop until you believe it is safe to continue.
-Turn off electricity, gas, and water main switches and valves.
Safe places:under heavy tables or desks; inside hallways; in corners of rooms or under strong
archways.
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Dangerous places: near windows or mirrors; under any heavy objects that can fall; the
kitchen, where the stove, refrigerator or contents of cupboards may fall on you; doorways,
where the shaking may slam the door on you.
(C) AFTER AN EARTHQUAKE

- Go directly to the Emergency Assembly Point (Near Main Gate), especially if the earthquake
has been severe.
- If the situation is health-threatening, call for medical help.
- If you detect a hazardous gas or chemical, stay away from the material until it can be identified
- If uncertain about any potential hazard in a building or work area, please do not enter that
workspace
- Wear durable shoes in all areas near debris and broken glass.
- Review fire hazards such as leaking gas or utility lines.
- Shut off main gas valve only if a leak is suspected or identified.
- Do not turn on gas again until you are certain it is safe to do so.
- Await further instructions from Installation manager.
- Take pictures of all damage prior to cleaning it up.
- Shut off electrical power at the control box if there is any damage to your home wiring.
- Do not use lighters or electrical equipment until you are certain no gas leaks exists (this
includes candles).
- Do not operate any electrical switches or appliances if there may be a gasleak.(Sparks can
ignite gas from broken lines.)
- Do not use your telephone to report a gas leak since even a small spark could be enough to
cause an explosion.
- Do not search for gas leaks with a match.
- While checking closets and cupboards, open doors with caution since objects may be on the
edge of the shelves.
(D) ELECTRIC AND GAS SAFETY DURING AN EARTHQUAKE
 Know where your electrical circuit box is located and how to shut off circuits.
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 Know where your gas meter is and how to shut off the gas in an emergency. You should
shut off your gas only if you smell gas.
 Store a battery-powered radio, a wind-up or battery-powered clock, a first aid kit, a

supply of water and food and a manual can opener in a place where they can be easily reached.
 Know how to shut off your individual appliances. Place an emergency phone list that
includes the number to report a gas leak or downed or damaged power line, near the phone.
 Earthquakes can cause improperly secured water heaters to move or topple. To prevent
this, check the wall straps on your water heater regularly to ensure a secure fit. If your water
heater isn’t already secured to the wall, strap it firmly to the wall studs in the upper and lower
one-third of the tank with heavy bolts and metal tape. Be sure to place straps at least 4 inches
above the thermostat controls. Materials can be found at your local hardware store.
 Check gas and electric lines and appliances for damage. However, do not use electrical
switches or candles to check for damage.
DON’T
 Panic.
 Light a match, candle or cigarette.
 Turn any electrical appliances or lights on or off.
 Use any phone in your house.
(E) EMERGENCY SUPPLIES AND RESOURCES

Sufficient food materials, water are required to be stored in the installation for emergency use. A
week’s supply could be considered as sufficient. Enough blankets and tarpaulins are required for
making temporary shelters within the installation. Supply of essential medicines is also to be
ensured, in the unlikely case of non-arrival of doctors and medicine supplies to the affected
installation.
Communication equipment are to be enough in quantity and in working order. Requirement of

makeshift toilets may be felt as well. Lighting arrangement is to be pre-planned and provision of
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emergency power is to be ensured. Other requirements for continuity of operations (whether

drilling/work-over or process) have been identified as mentioned in the Disaster Management
Plan (DMP). Further, any specific need may have to be satisfied.
(F) VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

As mentioned earlier, Rajahmundry is in the probable earthquake zone and so as the installations
of ONGC, Rajahmundry Asset. The general Emergency Response Plan (ERP) mentioned in the
DMP would follow in case of earthquake emergency also. The line of action and the emergency
organogram to handle the after effects of earthquake would be the same as in case of a gas
leak/fire, because the likely result of an earthquake is expected to be bending and bursting of oil
& gas lines, toppling of equipments/ tanks etc, causing spillage of oil and leakage of
hydrocarbons with or without association of fire. Detailed Vulnerability Assessment of our
installations from earthquake specifically needs to be studied by an outside expert agency for
which action has already been initiated.
In the meantime, timely action as normally we take in case of a fire/gas leak would reduce the
consequences of this type of disaster.
(G) REDUCE THE HAZARDS

The hazards those are present in the installations which may assist in aggravating the
consequence of an earthquake, needs to be identified and reduced. For example, the stock of
hazardous materials must be kept low in the installations, as far as feasible, or the storage area
having such substances is segregated, so that its effect dos not fall on rest of the installations.
Hence, a hazard identification exercise, as done for making the DMP/ERP, should be carried out.
The extent of the priority hazards may be reduced.
(H) DANGEROUS GOODS AND MATERIALS

A list of such materials is required to be kept in the installation and be reviewed from time to
time. Storage, use and transportation procedures of such goods have already been established.
An inventory analysis is also to be done at regular intervals so as to keep the stock as minimum
as feasible. Hence timely evacuation of the product is essential.
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(I) TRANSPORTATION OF CRITICAL RESOURCES

There is a well managed transport fleet with ONGC, Rajahmundry Asset, having different kinds
of transport vehicles which will be used for transportation of emergency supply and resources
apart from mobilizing stand-by manpower to respond to the emergency. Additional supply of
light and heavy vehicles would be ensured, in case the need arises. Alternate routes to the
affected sites will be prepared for ensuring essential supplies, in case the normal route is
disrupted.
(J) VITAL RECORDS

Important records of installations have been identified and necessary back-up taken. Such
records will include:
a) P&ID
b) Layouts
c) Commissioning details
d) Turn-around records
e) Audit Records
f) Hazardous area Drawings
g) Operating manuals
h) Certificates and test reports,
i) Pipeline network and connected wells etc.
The list is not an exhaustive one.
(K) COMMUNICATION ARRANGEMENTS

Elaborate communication arrangements are available at each installations for effective and
efficient communication in any emergency. The list will include:
a) Internal and external Telephones
b) Internet Facility
c) SAP system
d) Walkie-talkie
e) WLL and GSM mobiles
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f) ICENET facility
g) SCADA system –under implementation
In case of total communication break down in the installations, nearby public telephones outside
the installations can be used for emergency communications.
(L) COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

In case of an earthquake and subsequent destruction in the affected installation, help from local
bodies and mutual aid industries e.g. from OIL and GAIL will be available, apart from those
rendered by the local population mainly for timely rescue and relief operations.
(M) ROLE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATION

The roles and responsibilities of various local/District Authorities have been detailed in Chapter
- 5 of the Disaster Management Plan (DMP). Accordingly functions of Dy. Collector/Addl.
Deputy Collector, Superintendent of Police, District Transport Officer, District Medical and
Health Officer, District Fire Officer, Revenue Inspector etc have been outlined which would be
extended for earthquake preparation also.
(N) PRACTICING THE PLAN

This Earthquake Response Plan is to be exercised periodically as is done during fire or gas
release scenarios. The basic cause to be considered is an earthquake which manifested in the
resultant fire and gas release apart from collapsing structures and buildings. Mutual-aid Partrners
may also be involved in the drills and observers to be posted. Lessons learned from such drills
are to be shared with the installation people, mutual –aid members and if feasible, the nearby
community.
6.12.2 Tsunami Response Plan

6.12.2.1 General Damage Caused By Tsunami On The Indian Coast
 Inundation of near shore areas and loss of life.
 Destruction of coastal structures like harbours, bridges, buildings etc.,
 Erosion of beaches, barrier spits and sandbars
 Destruction of coral reefs, mangroves.
 Widening of river mouths
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 Salt water intrusion into fresh water aquifers
ANDHRA PRADESH
The IRS P6 LISS IV images of 12 January 2004 and 27 December 2004 were compared to locate
the Tsunami affected areas.The image shows the situation in the surroundings of Nagayalanka
and the submerged three sand bars. The total area of the submerged sand bars is about 1.9 ha.
The IRS P6 AWiFS images of 18 December 2004 and 27 December 2004 were compared and
few locations were identified where the affect of Tsunami is seen.
The affected areas near Machilipatnam had an inundation of about 91 ha.
The IRS-1D PAN images of 6 November 2004 and 26 December 2004 were compared to locate
the Tsunami affected areas on the confluence of Vamsadhara river with the sea, which shows the
beach erosion.
THE WAY AHEAD

The Tsunami damage assessment exercise has alerted the Decision Support Centre (DSC) at
NRSA to re-look and review its activities related speed, accuracy, connectivity and planning
with regard to information generation and dissemination.
The DSC will prioritise five important areas in its future activities as follows.
 Generation of databases and information sources that will enable disaster mitigation by
way of making risk analysis and vulnerability zonation.
 Generation of collective wisdom to enable development of very focused remote sensing
capability by way of research, networking and participation in national and international
initiatives.
 Reduction of time involved in the process of generation of vital information through
satellite data acquisition, processing and interpretation.
 Developing effective ways of transferring information to the user community as instantly
as possible and establishing satellite connectivity through secure networks.
 Develop local capacity in user organizations to assimilate and utilize information during
the crisis.
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Tide gauge records are the best and usually the only instrumental data of tsunamis. Tide gauges
provide valuable information on the tsunami arrival times and the changes in sea level due to
tsunamis. The sea-level measurements from the tide gauges can be de-tided (removing of the
tidal effect) to get the changes in water level due to tsunamis alone. The great tsunami of 26
December 2004 was recorded on all the tide gauges located in the Indian Ocean. The National
Institute of Oceanography analysed the data from the tide gauges along the coast of India
(maintained by the Survey of India) and from elsewhere in the Indian Ocean that are located to
the west of the rupture zone. At all these stations, the water level first rose, then fell. Available
data from Indonesia show that the stations to the east of the rupture zone first saw a drop in
water level (Merrifield et al., Geophy. Res. Lett., 32, 2005). The tsunami struck the Indian east
coast around 0330 UTC (0900 IST). The amplitude was 2m above the tide at Chennai, Paradip
and Colombo. The east coast of India (and of Sri Lanka) was hit shortly after high tide; Tuticorin
and Colombo, however, were hit shortly after low tide. The tide gauge at Nagapattinam (the
worst affected place among all the Indian east coast stations) was destroyed by tsunami waves
and hence the data from there are not available. The tsunami wave propagated northward along
the Indian west coast. The prominent periodicities associated with the tsunami waves are
observed to be 35-45 minutes and about 20 minutes. Along the Indian east coast, there is another
prominent peak between 1-2 hours. One possible cause of these high period (hence the low-
frequency) oscillations is coastally trapped edge waves triggered by the reflection of the tsunami
waves. Another possibility for this `anisotropy’ in the spectrum is the lower frequencies
triggered by rupture propagated more to the north-northwest towards the Indian coast. Available
geophysical evidence suggests that such anisotropy existed in the forcing: the rupture
propagation speed and rate of slip were not uniform along the rupture arc (Bilham, Science, 308,
2005). For more details, see: Nagarajan et al., Earth Planets Space, 58, 211
TSUNAMI - Do's and Dont's
What to Do Before and During a Tsunami
The following are guidelines for what you should do if a tsunami is likely in your area:
 Turn on your radio to learn if there is a tsunami warning if an earthquake occurs and you
are in a coastal area.
 Be alert for Early Warnings
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 Learn to understand and notice the sea. If there is noticeable recession in water away
from the shoreline become cautious and move away immediately.
 Move inland to higher ground immediately and stay there.
 Stay away from the beach.
 Never go down to the beach to watch a tsunami come in. If you can see the wave you are
too close to escape it.
What to Do After a Tsunami
The following are guidelines for the period following a tsunami:
 Stay away from flooded and damaged areas until officials say it is safe to return.
 Stay away from debris in the water; it may pose a safety hazard to boats and people.
 Save yourself - not your possessions
6.12.3 Flood
6.12.3.1 In Operational Area
The shift Incharge or Incharge of the affected site should take stock of the situation and avoid
occurrence of major mishap by stopping operations by closing the wells / control valves etc.
depending on the requirements of the situation. He should use judicious judgments while taking
such action in consultation with senior officers available at site.
6.12.3.2 Pre-Monsoon Check List

i. The run off/storm water at various significant points, which lead to ital, stretches of river/
canals should be constantly monitored for its water quality assurance.
ii. Final outlet of industry is also required to be monitored during rainy days to ensure that
there is no irregular discharge.
iii. Your effluent treatment plant units & chemical storage tanks should be monitored to the
effect that there is no overflow/leakage to surrounding environment.
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iv. The solid waste accumulated in solid waste storage site should be provided with a
waterproof cover/roof in order to avoid its mix up with rainwater and so as to prevent the
excess leachate generation.
v. You are also required to implement guidelines for management plan for used/discarded
packaging material as issued by this office.
vi. You are required to monitor & operate air pollution control equipment efficiently in such
a manner that any flue gas/process emission from your plant confirms the APPCB norms.
Further you are required to ensure that accidental leakage, fugitive emissions etc. are
prevented.
vii. You should operate your incinerator regularly and efficiently in such a manner that at any
instance the stock of waste to be incinerated (solid/liquid) should not exceed 10 Mt.
viii. You should transfer your all solid waste from intermediate storage facilities to secured
land fill site prior to monsoon
ix. All necessary precautions for SLF site with respect to monsoon should be taken to avoid
any unusual situation.
x. The units having evaporation pan are required to take all necessary steps to prevent
overflow/run off from the evaporation pan during rainy days.
xi. Good house keeping avoiding mixing of contaminants shall be ensured. Highest flood
line (HFL) during last 25 years shall be marked in your unit. Further it shall be ensured that
the environment management system of the unit is in place and functioning effectively.
xii. The concerned authorities – responsible operator of the, MSW sites, BMW incinerators,
CETP, and individual incinerators are also directed to link with Andhra Pradesh state disaster
management authority / concerned district collector
xiii. Development of green belt not only soothes the eyesight but also helps to protect the
environment. Pre-monsoon is an ideal time for the planning for plantation. It would be pleasure
to see if you include green belt plan along with nos. of plants species and location in compliance
report.
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xiv. At Last but not the least, water harvesting is considered as one of the most important task
not only for recharging water table but for improving ground water quality too. You are
requested to make best possible efforts in this area during monsoon.
6.12.3.3 In Case Of Residential Colonies / Offices

Senior most person / ward/sector Incharge available at the place is to take control of the situation
and guide, staff/residents to move to safer places. As per the requirement and gravity of the
situation, a control room is to be established and steps mentioned in the control plan should be
followed. In addition to what has been envisaged in the contingency plan following action
should also be taken.
• Listen to radio/TV for the latest weather bulletins and flood warnings. Pass on the information
to others.
• Make a family emergency kit which should include; a portable radio/transistor, torch, spare
batteries, a first aid box along with essential medicines, ORS, dry food items, drinking water,
matchboxes, candles and other essential items.
• Keep hurricane lamp, ropes, rubber tubes, umbrella and bamboo stick in your house. These
could be useful.
• Keep your cash, jewellery, valuables, important documents etc. in safe place.
• If there is a flood, move along with your family members and cattle to safe areas like relief
camps, evacuation centers, elevated grounds where you can take shelter.
• Turn-off power and gas connections before leaving your house.
6.12.3.4 During Floods

• Don’t enter into floodwaters; it could be dangerous.
• Don’t allow children to play in or near floodwaters.
• Stay away from sewerage line, gutters, drains, culverts etc.
• Be careful of snakes. Snakebites are common during floods.
• Stay away from electric poles and fallen power-lines to avoid electrocution.
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• Don’t use wet electrical appliances. Get them checked before use.
• Eat freshly cooked and dry food. Always keep your food covered.
• Use boiled and filtered drinking water.
• Keep all drains, gutters near your house clean.
• Stagnation of water can breed vector/water-borne diseases. In case of sickness, seek medical
assistance.
• Use bleaching powder and lime to disinfect the surrounding.
6.12.4 Emergency Preparedness for Cyclone

6.12.4.1 Basic Safety Precautions to Be Taken
• Listen to radio/TV for the latest weather warnings and advice. Pass on the information to
others.
• Pay attention to community warning systems.
• Do not listen or spread rumours- follow information from the official sources.
• Don’t venture out near streams or rivers. These could be dangerous.
• Prepare an Emergency Kit containing a portable transistor/ radio set, battery torch, extra
batteries, hurricane lamp, first aid box, dry food, drinking water and other minimum essential
items.
• Keep plastic sheets, plastic rope, rubber tubes, waterproof bags etc. handy in your house. These
could be useful.
• Store your food grains/agricultural products in plastic bags safely.
• Check your house; repair doors and windows wherever necessary.
• Bolt glass windows and put shutters in place.
• Locate cyclone shelters and safe houses for taking shelter.
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6.12.4.2 Incase Of a Warning of a Cyclone of Severe Intensity
• Don’t stay in your house if it is located in a low -lying area.
• Move to a cyclone shelter along with your family when advised by the authorities; Carry your
cash, valuables, documents and the emergency kit with you.
• Stay in the cyclone shelter as long as you are informed to do so.
6.12.4.3 During And After The Cyclone
• Check the gas leak; do not use electric appliances; if wet.
• Beware of fallen power-lines, loose wires hanging from poles to avoid electrocution, damaged
bridges, buildings and trees.
• It is not safe to enter the floodwaters.
6.12.4.4 Automobiles
• When a cyclone watch is issued, fill vehicles' fuel tanks.
• If driving, stop and park vehicles under solid shelter (hand brake on and in gear) - but well
away from trees, power lines and streams.
• Stay in the vehicle.
6.12.5 Lightening
6.12.5.1 Emergency Preparedness for Lightning
Lightning is a big charge of electricity that can reach from clouds to the ground or to other
clouds. It can start fires and it is strong enough to hurt or kill people. Lightning also helps nature
by putting nitrogen in the ground for plants to use.
6.12.5.2 Personal Lightning Safety Tips
PLAN in advance your evacuation and safety measures. When you first see lightning or hear
thunder, activate your emergency plan. Now is the time to go to a building or a vehicle.
Lightning often precedes rain; so don't wait for the rain to begin before suspending activities.
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6.12.5.3 If Indoors
Avoid water. Stay away from doors and windows. Do not use the telephone. Take off headsets.
Turn off, unplug, and stay away from appliances, computers, power tools, & TV sets. Lightning
may strike exterior electric and phone lines, inducing shocks to inside equipment.
• Injured person does not carry an electrical charge and can be handled safely. Apply First Aid
procedures to a lightning victim if you are qualified to do so.
6.12.5.4 If Outdoor
Lightning has visited most all-outdoor work environments. Lightning safety awareness is a
priority at every outdoor facility and operation.
• Monitor weather conditions in the early morning hours. SAFE evacuation sites include:
• Fully enclosed metal vehicles with windows up. • Substantial buildings. ,• Low ground -- seek
cover in clumps of bushes.
• Trees of uniform height, such as in a forest.
UNSAFE SHELTER AREAS include all outdoor metal objects, like power poles, fences and
gates, high mast light poles, metal bleachers, electrical equipment, mowing and road machinery.
AVOID solitary trees. AVOID water. AVOID open fields. AVOID high ground and caves.
• If caught outside during close-in lightning, immediately remove metal objects (including
baseball cap), place your feet together, duck your head, and crouch down low in baseball
catcher's stance with hands on knees. • Wait a minimum of 30 minutes from the last observed
lightning or thunder before resuming activities. Be extra cautious during this phase, as the storm
may not be over. People who have been struck by lightning do not carry an electrical charge and
are safe to handle. Apply first aid immediately if you are qualified to do so. Get emergency help
promptly.
6.12.6 Extreme Heat Preparedness (Heat Wave)

6.12.6.1 What Is Extreme Heat
Temperature over 10 degrees or more above the average high temperature for the region and last
for several weeks is defined as extreme heat. Excessively dry and hot conditions can provoke
dust storms and low visibility. Droughts occur when a long period passes without substantial
rainfall. A heat wave combined with a drought is a very dangerous situation.
6.12.6.2 During Hot Weather
• Drink Plenty of Fluids.
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• Don't drink liquids that contain alcohol, or large amounts of sugar—these actually cause you to
lose more body fluid. Also avoid very cold drinks, because they can cause stomach cramps.
• Replace Salt and Minerals you lose in sweat by beverage.
• Wear Appropriate Clothing and Sunscreen to protect yourself from sun.
• Schedule Outdoor Activities carefully, if you are not accustomed to working or exercising in a
hot environment, start slowly and pick up the pace gradually.
• Stay Cool Indoors, if at all possible.
• Monitor the condition of your co-workers and have someone do the same foryou. Heat-induced
illness can cause a person to become confused or lose consciousness.
• Try to adjust to the Environment.
• Avoid hot foods and heavy meals—they add heat to your body.
• Limit sun exposure during mid-day hours and in places of potential severe exposure such as
beaches.
• Do not leave infants, children in a parked car.
6.13 MAN MADE DISASTER

The information received from collector office control room/ DSP control room & ONGC
installations will be communicated to ED-AM office, I/C Security, group Heads & Head HSE.
ED-AM on taking the stock of the situation may seek the help from Andhra Pradesh State
Disaster Management Authority (APSDMA) / district magistrate/ DSP for the search, rescue,
security & mitigation on contingencies arising out of terrorist activities.
6.13.1 Explosive Threat
6.13.1.1 If There Is an Explosion
• Take shelter against your desk or a sturdy table.
• Exit the building as soon as possible (ASAP).
• Do not use elevators.
• Check for fire and other hazards.
• Take your emergency supply kit if time allows.
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6.13.1.2 If There Is a Fire
• Exit the building ASAP.
• Crawl low if there is smoke
• Use a wet cloth, if possible, to cover your nose and mouth.
• Use the back of your hand to feel the upper, lower, and middle parts of closed doors.
• If the door is not hot, brace yourself against it and open slowly.
• If the door is hot, do not open it. Look for another way out.
• Do not use elevators
• If you catch fire, do not run. Stop-drop-and-roll to put out the fire.
• If you are at home, go to a previously designated meeting place.
• Account for your family members and carefully supervise small children.
• Never go back into a burning building.
6.13.1.3 If You Are Trapped In Debris
• If possible, use a flashlight to signal your location to rescuers.
• Avoid unnecessary movement so that you don't kick up dust.
• Cover your nose and mouth with anything you have on hand. (Dense weave cotton material can
act as a good filter. Try to breathe through the material.).
• Tap on a pipe or wall so that rescuers can hear where you are.
• If possible, use a whistle to signal rescuers.
• Shout only as a last resort. Shouting can cause a person to inhale dangerous amounts of dust.
6.13.2 Nuclear Blast

A nuclear blast is an explosion with intense light and heat, a damaging pressure wave and
widespread radioactive material that can contaminate the air, water and ground surfaces for
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miles around. While experts may predict at this time that a nuclear attack is less likely than other
types, terrorism by its nature is unpredictable.
6.13.2.1 If There Is a Nuclear Blast
• Take cover immediately, below ground if possible, though any shield or shelter will help
protect you from the immediate effects of the blast and the pressure wave.
• Quickly assess the situation.
• Consider if you can get out of the area or if it would be better to go inside a building and follow
your plan to "shelter-in-place."
• In order to limit the amount of radiation you are exposed to, think about shielding, distance
and time.
• Shielding: If you have a thick shield between yourself and the radioactive materials more of the
radiation will be absorbed, and you will be exposed to less.
• Distance: The farther away you are from the blast and the fallout the lower your exposure.
• Time: Minimizing time spent exposed will also reduce your risk.
Use available information to assess the situation. If there is a significant radiation threat, health
care authorities may or may not advise you to take potassium iodide.
Potassium iodide is the same stuff added to your table salt to make it iodized. It may or may not
protect your thyroid gland, which is particularly vulnerable, from radioactive iodine exposure.
Consider keeping Potassium iodide in your emergency kit; learn what the appropriate doses are
for each of your family members. Plan to speak with your health care provider in advance about
what makes sense for your family.
6.13.3 Chemical Threat

A chemical attack is the deliberate release of a toxic gas, liquid or solid that can poison people
and the environment.
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6.13.3.1 Possible Signs of Chemical Threat
• Many people suffering from watery eyes, twitching, choking, having trouble breathing or
losing coordination.
• Many sick or dead birds, fish or small animals are also cause for suspicion.
6.13.3.2 If You See Signs of Chemical Attack
• Quickly try to define the impacted area or where the chemical is coming from, if possible.
• Take immediate action to get away.
• If the chemical is inside a building where you are, get out of the building without passing
through the contaminated area, if possible.
• Otherwise, it may be better to move as far away from where you suspect the chemical release is
and "shelter-in-place."
• If you are outside, quickly decide what is the fastest escape from the chemical threat.
• Consider if you can get out of the area, or if you should follow plans to "shelter-in-place.
6.13.3.3 If You Think You Have Been Exposed To a Chemical
• If you think you may have been exposed to a chemical, strip immediately and wash.
• If your eyes are watering, your skin is stinging, and you are having trouble breathing, you may
have been exposed to a chemical.
• Look for a hose, fountain, or any source of water, and wash with soap if possible, being sure
not to scrub the chemical into your skin.
• Seek emergency medical attention.
6.13.4 Biological Threat

A biological attack is the deliberate release of germs or other biological substances that can
make you sick. Many agents must be inhaled, enter through a cut in the skin or be eaten to make
you sick. Some biological agents, such as anthrax, do not cause contagious diseases. Others, like
the smallpox virus, can result in diseases you can catch from other people.
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6.13.4.1 Symptoms
• A temperature of more than 100 degrees F
• Nausea and vomiting
• Stomach-ache
• Diarrhea
• Pale or flushed face
• Headache
• Cough
• Ear-ache
• Thick discharge from nose
• Sore throat
• Rash or infection of the skin
• Red or pink eyes
• Loss of appetite
• Loss of energy or decreases in activity
6.13.4.2 Protect Yourself
• Cover your mouth and nose with layers of fabric that can filter the air but still allow breathing.
For example, two to three layers of cotton such as a t-shirt, handkerchief or towel. Otherwise,
several layers of tissue or paper towels may help.
• Contact authorities.
• Antibiotics are often an appropriate treatment for the diseases associated with biological
weapons, the specific drug must match the illness to be effective
• Stay healthy. Eat well. Get plenty of rest.
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• Wash your hands with soap and water frequently.
• In a declared biological emergency or developing epidemic, there may be reason to stay away
from crowds where others may be infected.
• There may be times when you would want to consider wearing a face mask to reduce spreading
germs if you yourself are sick, or to avoid coming in contact with contagious germs if others
around you are sick.
• Do not share food or utensils.
• Cover your mouth and nose when coughing or sneezing.
• Consider having the sick person wear a facemask to avoid spreading germs.
• Plan to share health-related information with others, especially those who may need help,
understanding the situation and what specific actions to take.
6.13.5 Riot
A public disturbance involving an act or acts of violence by one or more persons part of an
assemblage of three or more persons, which act or acts shall constitute a clear and present danger
of, or shall result in, damage or injury to the property of any other person or to the person or any
other individual.
6.13.5.1 Causes of Riots
i) Poor working or living conditions.
ii) Government oppression, efforts at taxation or conscription.
iii) Conflicts between races or religions.
iv) The outcome of a sporting event.
v) Lack of economic opportunity.
6.13.5.2 Stopping a Riot Depends On
i) How police officers may behave toward those whom they try to control.
ii) The size of the crowd relative to the police force available to control it.
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iii) Role of entrepreneur/ Government.
iv) Steps taken by political party, voluntary organization, NGO etc.
6.13.5.3 If You Are Trapped In Riot Control Agent Such As Irritants, Tear Gas Etc.
The main effects of riot control agents are pain, burning, and irritation of exposed mucous
membranes and skin.
Eye: Contact with agent produces a sensation of conjunctival and corneal burning and leads to
tearing, blepharospasm, and conjunctival injection. The severe blepharospasm causes the lids to
close tightly and produces transient "blindness," an effect that could inhibit the recipient's ability
to fight or resist. Because these compounds are solids it is possible for a particle or clump to
become embedded in the cornea or conjunctiva to cause tissue damage.
Nose and mouth: Contact with the delicate mucous membranes of the nose produces a burning
sensation, rhinorrhea, and sneezing; a similar burning sensation accompanied by increased
salivation occurs after contact with the mouth.
Airtract: Inhalation causes burning and irritation of the airways with bronchorrhea, coughing,
and a perception of a "tight chest" or an inability to breathe. An inhaled irritating compound
might be expected to exacerbate a chronic pulmonary disease such as asthma, emphysema, or
bronchitis.
Skin: Contact with skin causes a tingling or burning sensation and may cause erythema,
particularly if the skin is raw or freshly abraded (e.g., shortly after shaving). Under conditions of
high temperature, high humidity, and high concentration of agent there may be more severe
dermatitis starting with erythema hours after exposure and followed by vesication.
Gastrointestinal tract: Gastrointestinal effects usually do not occur with most riot control
agents, although there may be retching or vomiting if the agent concentration is high, if the
exposure is prolonged, or if the individual is sensitive.
Cardiovascular: A transient increase in heart rate and blood pressure has occurred in people
immediately prior to an exposure to a riot control agent or immediately after onset of exposure.
The heart rate and blood pressure returned essentially to pre-test ranges while exposure
continued and may have been caused by the anxiety or the initial pain rather than to a
pharmacological effect of these agents.
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Oral ingestion: Children if eat riot control agent may cause diarrhea and abdominal cramps
(antacids used as therapy).
Lethality: The agent used in excess, may cause deaths in people who refuse to exit a confined
space.
6.13.5.4 Medical Treatment

The effects of exposure to these agents under the usual field conditions usually are self-limiting
and require no specific therapy. Most will disappear in 15-30 minutes, although erythema may
persist for an hour or longer.
Eye: The eye should be carefully flushed with water or saline and impacted particles should be
sought. General care consists of a topical solution (many are available) to relieve the irritation
and topical antibiotics. An ophthalmologist should be consulted for further evaluation and care.
Pulmonary: These agents may exacerbate chronic disease or unmask latent disease.
Bronchospasm with wheezing and mild distress hours continuing after exposure may occur in a
latent asthmatic and more severe effects and respiratory distress may occur in one with chronic
bronchitis or emphysema. Treatment includes oxygen administration (with assisted ventilation, if
necessary), bronchodilators if
bronchospasm is present, and specific antibiotics dictated by the results of sputum studies. A
specialist skilled in the treatment of inhalational injury should be consulted early.
Skin: The early erythema requires reassurance, but no specific therapy unless severe and
prolonged more than an hour or two. The later-onset erythema, precipitated by a larger exposure
in a hot and humid atmosphere, is usually more severe and less likely to resolve quickly; it may
require the use of soothing compounds such as calamine, camphor, and mentholated creams.
6.13.5.5 General Precaution

i) Listen to radio/TV bulletin or keep contact with control room.
ii) Stay inside house/ boundary of operational area.
iii) Avoid assemblage.
iv) Do not allow entering unknown person to restricted area.
v) Keep important telephone numbers, such as police, fire, paramedics, and medical centers.
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vi) Store plenty of water and food.
vii) Do not listen to rumours.
6.14 CONTROL OF OPERATION
6.14.1 Planning Medium Term Operation

At Base Disaster Management Control Room (DMCR), actions to be taken in the next 24, 48
and 72 hours will be prepared on the basis of situation reports received from On Scene
Emergency Control Room (OSECR) for mobilization of additional resources and man power to
deal with the emergency.
6.14.2 Daily Incident Log and Management Reports

At DMCR, a Daily Incident Log will be maintained and management reports will be prepared
for the situation at every 12 hours interval.
6.14.3 Press Briefing

The press and the media will be regularly briefed on the current situation of the Disaster and the
ongoing action plan. The briefs will be prepared on the basis of the Management Reports
mentioned above and will be released to the press by the Public Relation Coordinator( Corporate
Communication)after it is approved by the Asset Manager.
6.14.4 Action to Be Taken During Normalcy
1. Mobile Workshop
A mobile Workshop is to be made on old chassis with the equipment for fabrication jobs such as
Lathe machine, Drilling machine , Vice grinder , D.C. Welding machine , Generator , Exhaust
fan etc ., so that small welding , cutting and fabrication jobs can be done at the site during
Emergency .
2. Mobile Office cum Accommodation Facility at Site

A mobile Site office van with mobile phones, two beds, small kitchen with gas facilities, toilet
etc., is to be kept ready. Old chassis should be used for this purpose.
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3. Items for Shelter

Items for Shelter such as tents , folding cots , folding chairs , folding tables , blankets , drinking
water containers etc ., are to be kept readily available for Emergency by P & A Department .
4. Mud Conditioning Plant

This facility is to be created by Drilling Services to avoid delay in catering Mud at site during
Emergency.
6.15 TERMINATION OF OPERATION (‘ALL CLEAR’ PROCEDURE)
DECLARATION BY CEC
After the emergency has been brought under control and eventually ceases, the installation
manager (OSC) or Incident Controller will ask the installation safety officer to carry out gas
check to ascertain the presence of any residual hazards at the location. After he has satisfied
himself that no residual hazard exists, he will then inform the same to the CEC at Base
Emergency Control Room (DMCR) and recommend for ‘All Clear”.
Thereafter, CEC will review the situation based on the feedbacks from other emergency
coordinators e.g. medical on the condition of injured and evacuees etc. and will declare ‘All
Clear’ through radio communication.
On hearing the announcement, the Installation Manager i.e. OSC or Incident Controller will
declare “ALL Clear” at the emergency site and the “ALL Clear” siren will be sounded.
6.16 REPORT ON MANAGEMENT OF DISASTER

The Emergency Response Monitoring Team mobilized at DMCR will prepare a detailed report
on the Management of the Disaster and submit the same to the CEC. A copy of the report should
be maintained at the Asset- HSE.
6.17 REHABILITATION AND RECOMMISSIONING

After the emergency is controlled, the rehabilitation of damaged facilities and affected persons
will have to be carried out. This will include identification of damages for rebuilding; time
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bound rebuilding providing necessary medical facilities to affected individuals and checking all
infrastructural facilities for quick normalization.
When the rebuilding of damaged equipments and facilities required is complete,

decommissioning the system will be taken up. All the necessary pre start up and the detailed start
up procedure of the unit concerned shall be followed.
6.18 STRATEGY FOR MOCK EXERCISES

Mock exercises will be planned in advance at different installations/rig sites with various
emergency scenarios as identified in the DMP shall be conducted. Exercises on the Onsite
Emergency scenarios will be done once in a year involving mutual aid partners, whereas Offsite
scenarios will be tested/exercised once in two years depending on jurisdiction of the District
Collector and the other District Authorities.
The main focus of the various exercises will be
 To observe the readiness of the fire crew.
 To observe the responses of various emergency coordinators including that of mutual aid
members
 To identify any shortcomings on technical and communication front.
Emergency Response Plan (ERP) Drill is being conducted at different installations every 15
days. Head, Asset HSE will coordinate the Onsite and Offsite Mock-exercises with involvement
of Mutual-Aid members and District Authorities.
6.19 REVIEW OF DMP

In the light of the lessons learnt from the Management of the Disaster , the Asset HSE will
undertake a review of this DMP in consultation with the Surface Group , Drilling and Well
services Safety Officers and the RCMT team members and ensure that the necessary changes are
made .
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INFORMATION FLOW CHART
SHIFT IN CHARGE
(Takes charge of the situation.
Follows standing instructions)
BASE
EMERGENCYCON
TROL ROOM
DRILLING INCHARGE/ ONGC

INSTALLATION FIRE STATION
MANAGER (Nearest)
INCHARGE
MINES MANAGER / FIRE
LOCATION MANAGER SECTION
H- DRILLING SERVICES DISTRICT

H-WELL SERVICES FIRE
SURFACE MANAGER STATION
Fig.6.9 Step –1: Drilling Site / Work over Site / Production Installations
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Receives information from Sites
Head Drilling Services Location Manager

/ Well Sevices, /
Surface Manager. Mines Manager
CMT, IDT,
CHIEF –HSE,
DIRECTORS Move to site to act
as OSC
Executive Director
Asset Manager C & MD
DDMS, DGMS DY SUPTDT OF

OISD, PCBA COLLECTOR POLICE
Set up Base Mobilize Incharge Head Engg. Services

Emergency ACMT RCMT Support Manager.
Control Room Head Finance.
Head Logistics
Head Info - com.
In charge Civil.
Head Asset-HSE.
Head Medical Services
Head Workshop.
In charge Chemistry
In charge Security.
In charge Fire.
In charge Store.
Local Fire Brigade.
Fig 6.10 Step - 2: ASSET LEVEL
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SHIFT IN CHARGE
WORKSHOP
FIRE STATION, INSTALLATION MANAGER/ MINES

NARSAPUR SAFETY OFFICER MANAGER
HEAD ENGG. SERVICES

INCHARGE
FIRE SERVICE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
ASSET MANAGER
DDMS, DGMS SUPTDT OF POLICE,

OISD, PCBA DY COLLECTOR
STATE FIRE
CHIEF HSE,
DEPARTMENT
DIRECTORS
C & MD
Set up Base
Emergency Support Manager
Control Room Head Finance
Head Logistics
Head Info - com
Head Asset- HSE
Head Medical Services
In charge Civil
In charge Security
In charge Fire
Local Fire Brigade
Fig 6.11 Contingency Plan for Dowleshwaram Workshop, Rajahmundry
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6.20.1 SOS Sheet

DRILLING / WORK OVER RIG
(TO BE FILLED ON OCCURANCE OF CONTINGENCY)
DATE: TIME:
RIG No: WELL No: FIELD:
(TICK WHATEVER IS APPLICABLE)
1. FIRE : YES / NO
2. FLOW: GAS ------ OIL ------ OIL AND GAS ------ MUD ---
3. WELL DEPTH: ------------- HOLE SIZE : -------------
4. ACTIVITY: TRIPPING / DRILLING / LOGGING
5. STRING LENGTH IN THE WELL: --------------------------
6. B. O. P CLOSED: YES / NO (RAM TYPE / ANNULAR)
7. STRING FITTED INSIDE: BOP / NRV / KELLY COCK
8. NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED :
9. TYPE OF INJURY: MINOR / SERIOUS / FATAL
SIGNATURE
__________________________________________________________
EMERGENCY VEHICLE ROUTE (Follow the official routing)
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6.20.2 SOS Sheet

PRODUCTION INSTALLATION
(TO BE FILLED ON OCCURANCE OF EMERGENCY)
1. NAME OF THE INSTALLATION :
2. TIME :
3. DATE :
4. NATURE OF HAZARD :
5. DISCHARGE / EMMISSION :
6. INPLANT LOCATION :
7. No. OF PERSONS INJURED :
8. NATURE OF INJURY : -----------------------------------------

i. Minor : -------------------------------------------
ii. Serious : -------------------------------------------
iii. Fatal : -------------------------------------------
9. SUPPORT REQUIRED FROM BASE: Technical/ Medical / Administrative
: -------------------------------------------------
: -------------------------------------------------
: -------------------------------------------------
10. REMARKS : -------------------------------------------------

:-------------------------------------------------
SIGNATURE OF THE SHIFT IN CHARGE NAME:
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CHAPTER 7
MEDICAL EMERGENCIES
ONGC Management is committed to provide best available medical treatment in case of any
medical emergency for this purpose following roles and responsibility are being assigned
A medical Evacuation may involve transport by land, air and sea or a combination of these.
Associated facilities to transport injured person e.g. burn victims, severe back injury cases,
rescue of injury cases from inaccessible areas/ heights/ confined places is to be ascertained prior
to undertaking work and catered to for each installation.
During shifting of patient in transit, the Field First Aider/Doctor/attendant should be present to
ensure safe shifting which does not further deteriorate the patient’s condition.
7.1 ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES

For smooth completion of the evacuation process, the responsibilities are to be divided into the
following key personnel.
7.1.1 Installation Manager
i. Will determine in consultation with the first-aider/ Doctor that the situation is serious
enough to warrant a Medical Evacuation especially during night hours.
ii. Will ensure that adequate first aid is provided to the patient and will designate
responsibilities to key persons as per the site flowchart.
iii. Will communicate with the Base Manager and the air/land ambulance incharge to
identify self, patient, location of incident, nature of illness/ injury to ensure preparedness for
initiating evacuation.
iv. Shall assist the ambulance (air/sea/land) crew and doctor as required once the ambulance
arrives to evacuate the patient.
7.1.2 First Aider / Doctor

Will provide the information concerning the condition of the patient and the nature of the
injuries to the ambulance attendant and to the approved medical centre. First aid trained
personnel must be deployed at all work centres /installations and in each shift. After first-aid the
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victim must be taken to the nearest hospital / Doctor along with the relevant information about
the accident/ illness of the victim.
The information should include, but not limited to :

1. Full Name, designation, age, address of the patient(s) and family contact details.
2. Details of the accident or symptoms exhibited by the sick or injured person.
3. First aid/ treatment administered on the installation.
4. Patients blood group.
5. Known allergies (asthma, medications etc.)
6. Special Medical Considerations (hypertension, diabetes etc.)
The above information can be noted on a recommended format attached in Annexure-C.

a) Based on the nature of the injury/illness, the first-aider/Doctor shall ensure that necessary
medical equipment and facility is made available on the ambulance during transit from the
Installation to the Approved Medical Centre. He should also ensure that the patient is safely
transferred and secured in the ambulance.
b) Based on the condition of the patient and strength of the ambulance crew, the First
Aider/Doctor will recommend to the Installation Manager whether a first aid qualified attendant
to travel with the patient.
7.1.3 Base Manager / Surface Manager / HDS/ HWS

a) Will receive information from the Installation Manager and will notify the Ambulance
Incharge, Approved Medical Centre, family of the patient and his superiors.
b) Will authorise the Ambulance Incharge to dispatch an ambulance to the installation in

question and will inform the Installation Manager about the ETA of the ambulance at the
Installation. In the event that two or more modes of transport (air/sea/land) are required to
transport the patient to the Approved Medical Centre, the Base Manager should inform each
concerned ambulance In charge.
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c) He shall co ordinate with all concerned parties to ensure that the patient is transported to
the AMC with minimum delay.
d) Will Laise with the nearby Police Station to notify them of the accident as per local law.
e) Will liaise with the Base Doctor/ First Aider to ensure that the Approved Medical Centre
(AMC) is prepared to receive and treat the patient.
f) Will designate the Base Doctor to be present at the AMC to ensure that the patient’s
treatment is expedited and will inform the Installation Manager as and when the patient has been
admitted/treated at the AMC.
7.1.4 Shift Incharge / Radio operator

a) Will be available on radio till the patient reaches the AMC and will be responsible for
relaying information between various agencies as per the site flowchart.
b) Will keep Installation Incharge and Base Manager informed about arrival and departure
times of the ambulance.
c) Will Liase with the nearby installation to arrange for alternative transport to ensure
speedier evacuation of the patient.
7.1.5 ONGC Dispensary Doctor (Rajahmundry)

a) Liase with the AMC to ensure preparedness to receive and treat the patient.
b) Accompany patient to the AMC and administer treatment, if necessary, during transit.
c) Will inform Base Manager and Installation manager as and when the patient has been
admitted/treated at the AMC.
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7.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE
Ailment or
Injury
Inspection by
Field Medic or
Doctor
Installation In charge
Inform Radio/ Communication Coordinate shifting

Incharge of patient to Base/helibase
Provide attendant
Inform Employee's Base Inform Air logistics Helibase

Manager of Emergency
(offshore only)
Inform Base Doctor Arrange Air/sea/Land

Ambulance
Accompany Patient to Inform Approved Administer medical

Approved Medical Medical Centre care during
Centre Of Emergency transit
Admit Patient
and review case
Fig 7.1 Evacuation transport, equipment and transit process
A suitable means of communication (such as radio or Mobile phone) with sufficient range to
contact Installation as well as Base should be available inside the evacuation transport facility.
Such equipment should be convenient to use, without requirement of any specialised training.
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7.3 FIRST – AID

(Issued by Industrial Medicine Division, Central Labour Institute, Mumbai)
First-aid is the immediate care given to the victim of an accident or sudden illness before the
arrival of a qualified expert. The purpose of First-aid is to preserve life, assist recovery, prevent
aggravation and minimize complications at a later date with the help of such material as may be
available.
7.3.1 Artificial Respiration

 Mouth to Mouth: This is appropriate and effective technique for emergency artificial
respiration.
 Keep the head slightly backward and open the jaw.
 Seal the casualty’s nose to prevent escape of air by pinching with thumb and index
finger.
 Take a deep breath, open your mouth widely, place it over the victim’s mouth and make
a tight seal.
 Quickly blow the full breath into the mouth of victim.
 Remove your mouth from the victim and allow him to exhale passively.
 Repeat the procedure 12 to 15 times per minute, till medical aid is arranged.
 Arrange immediate medical aid.
7.3.2 Cautionary Note

 Do not give mouth to mouth resuscitation during CPR in the presence of toxins such as
cyanide, hydrogen sulphide, corrosives and organo-phosphates. Ventilate the casualty by using a
face mask or bag/valve/mask assembly.
 Avoid mouth to mouth resuscitation if there is possibility of transmission of infection
between the victim and the rescuer, such as HIV, Hepatitis-B, Tuberculosis, Shigellosis,
Meningococcal meningitis, Herpes simplex virus and Salmonella. Use an interpositional airway
device which must function effectively in both its resuscitation and protective roles, and be
immediately available at all times.
7.3.3 Control of Bleeding

 Apply direct pressure by thumb or finger.
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 Apply dressing – gauze pad and bandage.

 Apply indirect pressure on pressure points.
 Apply tourniquet.
 Remove the injured to the hospital.
7.3.4 Fractures
Signs of Fracture: Pain, Tenderness, Swelling, Loss of Power, Deformity
 Do not move the injured unless the life is endangered from other causes.
 Deal with the haemorrhage and breathing difficulties. Immobilise the fracture by using
suitable splints.
 Immobilisation should include one joint above and one joint below the fracture.
 Remove the injured to the hospital.
7.3.5 Burns
 Pour running cold water on the affected part.
 Do not apply ointments or oils or any other substance.
 Cover the wound with sterilized cloth.
 Give artificial respiration, if needed.
 Prevent shock.
7.3.6 Shock
 Lay the patient on his back.
 Stop bleeding, if any.
 Relieve pain by supporting the injured part.
 Keep the patient comfortable.
 Do not cause sweating.
 Fluids may be given by mouth in small amounts, if the patient is conscious.
 Reassure the patient.
7.3.7 Wounds
 Stop the bleeding, if any.
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 Avoid touching the wounds.

 Cover the wound with sterilized cloth.
7.3.8 Eye Injuries

 Removal of foreign body should not be attempted.
 Do not apply oil or ointment.
 Apply sterile pad and loose bandage.
 Send the patient to the hospital.
7.3.9 Abdominal Wounds

 No time should be lost in sending the patient to the hospital.
 Keep the patient flat on his back.
 Give nothing by mouth.
 Maintain warmth.
 If intestines protrude from the wound, do not attempt to touch or replace them.
 Apply sterile dressing and binder on the wound.
 Provide immediate transportation to the hospital.
7.3.10 Backbone Fracture

 Fracture of backbone may lead to paralysis of limbs. Hence, victim should be handled
with great care.
 Transport on a rigid frame, which may be improvised by using available board.
 The rigid frame is to be placed on a stretcher for transportation.
 Immediate hospitalization is needed.
7.3.11 Heat Stroke

 Make the patient lie down.
 Remove all clothings except the underwear.
 Keep the patient under the fan.
 Pour cold water on the body repeatedly.
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 Wash the head thoroughly with cold water and dry it with towel.
 Record body temperature falls up to 38ºC stop pouring water.
 Give plenty of cold water with a pinch of common salt in each glass of water to drink.
7.3.12 Bleeding Nose

 Make the patient sit on a Chair with head downward.
 Pinch the nose with fingers and thumb.
 Apply ice or cold compression.
 Do not plug the nostrils.
 Do not put water or any medicine through the nostrils.
 Send for medical aid immediately.
7.3.13 Foreign Body In The Nose

 Do not try to remove the solid object.
 Ask the patient to breathe through mouth.
7.3.14 Bleeding Ear

 Lay the patient with the head slightly raised.
 Incline the head to the affected side and apply a dry dressing over the ear with loose
bandage.
 Do not plug the ear.
 Apply pressure in front of the ear.
 Send for medical aid immediately.
7.3.15 Foreign Body In The Ear

 Solid – Do not try to remove, scratch or probe it.
 Insects – Put a few drops of water in the ear and turn the head so that affected ear points
upwards.
 Keep the head in that position for 5 minutes, then turn the head downwards so that the
water flows out.
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7.3.16 Snake Bite

 Reassure the patient
 Do not allow the person to run or walk
 Apply a ligature above the wound (in between the heart and the wound) if the bite is in
the leg or hand.
 Wash the wound with potassium permanganate solution or with soap and water.
 Allow free bleeding.
 Never suck the blood from the wound.
 Treat for shock.
 Arrange immediate hospitalization, by transporting the patient in a lying down position.
7.3.17 Dog Bite

 Clean the wound immediately with water.
 Then wash with antiseptic soap and water.
 Do not try to stop bleeding.
 Do not cover the wound.
 Send the patient to hospital for treatment.
7.3.18 Insect Bite

 The sting bite should be pulled out.
 Apply cold compression.
 Apply vinegar diluted with water.
 Soda-bicarbonate paste should be applied at the site.
 Prevent shock.
 Send for medial aid immediately.
7.3.19 Chemical Burns Of The Eyes

 Immediate washing of the eye with clean water at least for fifteen minute or longer.
 Apply sterile dressing over the eye.
 Neutralising agents or ointments should not be used.
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7.3.20 Suffocation
 Remove the patient from the source
 Clean the airways.
 Restore breathing by artificial respiration.
7.3.21 Electric Shock / Injuries
 Do not touch the casualty while he is still in contact with electricity.
 Switch off the current at once.
 Do not attempt first aid until the contact has been broken.
 Make the air passage clear and clean.
 Restore breathing Artificial respiration and external cardiac massage, if needed.
 Call for immediate medical aid.
7.3.22 Unconsciousness
 Make the patient lie down on his belly with head turned to one side.
 Check breathing and pulse.
 Loosen tight clothings.
 Clean the air-way.
 Give artificial respiration and external Cardiac Massage, if needed.
 Transport the patient to the hospital.
7.3.23 Poisoning
 Find the nature of the poison
 Give universal antidote mixture as given below to drink:
Charcoal powder - 2 table spoons
Coffee powder - 2 table spoons
Chalk powder - 1 table spoon
Add it to a glass of warm water and mix well.

 Send the patient immediately to the hospital.
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7.4 FIRST AID KIT

Drugs/Medications
• Hydrogen peroxide to wash and disinfect wounds.
• Antibiotic ointment.
• Aspirin and non-aspirin tablets.
• Prescriptions and any long-term medications (keep these current).
• Diarrhea medicine.
• Eye drops.
Dressings
• Bandage strips.
• Ace bandages.
• Rolled gauze.
• Cotton-tipped swabs.
• Adhesive tape roll.
• Safety pins.
• Needle and thread.
7.4.1 Survival Kit for Your Home
Tools and supplies
• Axe, shovel, broom.
• Screwdriver, pliers, hammer, adjustable wrench.
• Rope for towing or rescue.
• Plastic sheeting and tape.
Items for safety and comfort
• Sturdy shoes that can provide protection from broken glass, nails, and other debris.
• Gloves (heavy and durable for cleaning up debris) .
• Candles.
• Waterproof matches.
• Change of clothing.
• Knife.
• Tent.
• Blankets or sleeping bags.
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• Portable radio, flashlight, and extra batteries.

• Fire extinguisher -- multipurpose, dry chemical type.
• Cash.
7.4.2 Survival Kit for Transit
• Blankets.
• Bottled water.
• Change of clothes.
• Coins for telephone calls.
• Fire extinguisher -- multipurpose, dry chemical type.
• Emergency signal device (light sticks, battery-type flasher, reflector, etc.).
• Local map and compass.
• Rope for towing, rescue, etc.
• Paper and pencils.
• Prescription medicines.
• Battery-operated radio with fresh batteries.
• Small mirror for signalling.
• Whistle for signalling.
7.4.3 Survival Kit for Workplace
Assemble a survival kit for the workplace with the following supplies:
• Food & Bottled water.
• Jacket or sweatshirt.
• Pair of sturdy shoes.
• Flashlight with fresh batteries.
• Battery-operated radio with fresh batteries.
• Essential medications.
• Blanket.
• Small first aid kit.
• Whistle or other signaling device.
• Windows and other glass that might shatter.
• Unanchored bookcases, cabinets, refrigerators, water heaters, and other furniture that might
topple.
• Heating units, fireplaces, chimneys, and stoves that could move or fall.
• Areas that could be blocked by falling debris.
240
Table 7.1 ONGC Rajahmundry Medical Services

Dr Palani Swamy 0883- 2424669(O), 9490168398(M)
Sr No Dispensary Tel No
1 Rajendra Nagar Dispensary 2424669
2 Base Complex OHC 2494699
3. Dowleshwaram Dispensary 2417341
TABLE 7.2 Telephones Numbers Of Hospitals
S.NO. HOSPITAL TEL. NO.
Hospital in Rajahmundry (STD Code 0883)
1. Abhya Emergency Hospital 2423208
2. Akira Eye Hospital 2471147
3. Alert Emergency Hospital 2443144
4. Bharadwaja Nuring Home 246210
5. Chang Dental Clinic 2465154
6. Dr. Aravindam Orthopaedic Hospital 2425646
7. Dr. Bhaskara Raju, Children Specialist 2469460
8. Dr. KVS Subba Rao, Orthopaedic 2468110
9. Gayatri Homeo Nuring Home 2467503
10. Govt. Hospital Supdt. 2442555
11. Harsha Hospitals 2469403
12. Karsha Hospitals 2469403
13. Krihna Nuring Homw 2467935
14. Lakshmi Ganapati Medicals 2430555
15. Manasa Psychaitric Hospital 2469366
16 Raju Neuro Super Speciality 2461310
17 Rama Children’s Hospital 2462889
241
18 Ratna Bala Medicals 2488408
19 Santaram Hospital(DELS) 2417020
20 Soujanya Uroiogical Hospital 2467090
21 Sravanthi Hospital(ENT) 2461209
22 Sree Nursing Home 2461640
23 Srikanth Nursing Home 2467037
24 Suhasa Dental Multi Specialities 2466078
25 Suraksha Emergency Hospital 2445505
26 Surya Homeo Hospital 2442323
27 Surya Kiran Hospital(Paediatric) 2476556
28 SV Heart Care Centre 2468350
29 Swatantra Hospitals 2400404
30 Viswanatha Nursing Home(Eye) 2426164
Hospital in Vishakhapatnam(STD Code 0891)
1 Apolo Hospital 2727272
2 Seven Hills Hospital 2708090
Hospital in Vijayawada (STD Code 0866)
1 City Cardiac Hospital 2470283
2 Nagarjuna Hospital 2554701
3 Pinnamaneni Care Hospital 5566666
4 SVR Neuro Hospital 2494930
5 Help Hospital 6615553
Hospital in Hyderabad (STD Code 040)
1 Care Hospital 24732684
2 Mythri Multi Speciality Hospital 55633929
3 Yashoda Hospitals, Somajiguda 23319999
242
4 Nizam’s Institute of Med. Science 23320332
5 Apollo Hospitals 23607777
6 AP Super Speciality Dental Hospital 23547570
7 Global Inst. Of Gastro& Laser Surgery 23306187
8 Durga Deshmukh Hos. & R. Centre 27617801
9 Kamineni Hospitals 2402271
10 KIMS Hospital 27725000
11 Shavan’s Sharada Devi Hospital 27113980
12 Yasoda Hospital, SP Road 24022222
13 Mediciti Hospitals 2237644
14 Indo American Hospital(Cancer) 23542120
15 Rainbow Children’s Hospital 23319061
16 Sai Krishna Super Sp. Hospital(N) 27551412
17 Image Hospital 23750000
FIRE
FIRE CLASSIFICATION:
Fire is classified in four following categories
1. Class-A: Fire involving ordinary combustible material e.g. wood, paper, cloth.
2. Class-B: Fire in flammable liquids.
3. Class-C: Fire in flammable gases.
4. Class-D: Fire in metals.
Portable fire extinguishers are the first line of defence available at any location to extinguish fire.
If used during incipient stage on fire, it will extinguish it completely. They are suitable to control
small fire. Extinguishers mainly used are:
1. Water Type A
2. Foam Type B
3. Dry Chemical Powder Type A, B, C
4. Carbon Dioxide A, B, C
243
FIRE TYPE
Minor fire: Fire where there is no system interference/ shut down and duration to extinguish
such fires is less than 15 min.
Medium fire: Fires with measurable / considerable loss of property and where the time taken to
extinguish the fire is from 15 minutes to 2 hour.
Major fire: Fires where there is considerable loss of property (50 lacs and above) or human
being or blow-out fires.
METHOD OF OPERATION OF PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHER:
i) DCP 75 KG / 50 KG/ 22 KG
a) Push the extinguisher up to 7-8 ft distances from fire.
b) Uncoil the discharge hose.
c) Remove the safety pin & open the valve of DCP cylinder fully.
d) Press the squeeze grip or open the discharge valve and apply the powder in sweeping action at
the base of fire.
e) The powder shall be applied in downward direction.
ii) DCP FIRE EXTINGUISHER 10 KG/ 5 KG

a) Carry the Extinguisher near the fire.
b) Remove the safety clip & hit the plunger with hard object.
c) Direct the discharge tube toward the base of fire and apply it in sweeping action by pressing
the squeeze grip handle.
iii) CO2 FIRE EXTINGUISHER:

a) Carry the extinguisher near to the fire.
b) Hold the discharge horn from it handle.
c) Remove the safety pin and open the discharge valve fully.
d) Apply the CO2 by moving horn in sweeping action towards the base of fire
Note: Do not be afraid of whizzing sound.
244
iv) CHEMICAL FOAM EXTINGUISHER:

a) Carry the extinguisher near the fire.
b) Lift the ‘T’ shape handle and put it in the groove in locking position.
c) Lift the extinguisher and rotate it up & down to facilitate the mixing of chemicals.
d) Hold the extinguisher in inverted position (Cap facing the bottom)
e) Direct the nozzle toward the vertical support near the fire.
f) Hitting the foam jet toward vertical surface will facilitate the spread of foam layer over
burning liquid.
CLASSIFICATION OF ATMOSPHERIC STABILITY
Atmospheric stability is a very important factor predicting the dispersion characteristics of gases
/ vapours in atmosphere.
The stability classification is given below:
Stability Class Atmospheric Condition
A Very unstable
B Unstable
C Slightly unstable
D Neutral
E Stable
F Very stable
The seasonal variations of atmospheric stability and wind direction at the plant site are as
follows:
SEASON CLASS WIND DIRECTION
Nov-Feb Neutral NE-SW
Mar-Oct Stable to very stable NE
245
Annexure-I Fire Fighting Facilities

STATUS OF FIRE – FIGHTING SYSTEMS OF PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS AND RIGS OF RAJAHMUNDRY ASSET
Production Installations
First aid fire Extinguishers Details of Fixed firefighting system

DCP Fire Pump
Water
S. Name of the DCP UNIT CO2 Mech
Foam Tank Electric Diesel
No. Installation 10 50/ 4.5/ 6.8 Foam
50 lts
Hydrants
Driven Driven
Monitors
Kg 150/ Kg 9 Lts
(m3) (m3/hr) (m3/hr)
300 Kg
--
1 Kesanapalli GGS 7 150Kg 6 13 -- 5 3 2500 275 x 2
2 Lingala GGS 6 -- 6 6 -- 7 9 580 -- 171

3 Advaipalem GCS 8 150Kg 5 4 -- 0 6 300 -- 171
4 Endamuru GCS 6 50Kg 4 7 -- 2 4 200 -- 171
5 Mandapeta GCS 6 50Kg 5 6 -- 3 6 450 -- 171
6 Mori GCS 6 50Kg 4 7 -- 4 1 480 -- 171
7 NSP GCS 6 -- -- 5 -- 5 5 360 -- 70
275 x 2
8 Tatipaka Complex 42 300Kg 14 10 -- 34 16 7900 275 x 2
450 x 4
9 Odelarevu GCS 23 150Kg 4 17 -- 12 8 880 -- 171 x 2
10 Pasarlapudi GCS 5 300Kg 5 6 -- 1 5 400 -- 171
246
First aid fire Extinguishers Details of Fixed firefighting system

DCP Fire Pump
Water
S. Name of the DCP UNIT CO2 Mech
Foam Tank Electric Diesel
No. Installation 10 50/ 4.5/ 6.8 Foam
50 lts
Hydrants
Driven Driven
Monitors
Kg 150/ Kg 9 Lts
(m3) (m3/hr) (m3/hr)
300 Kg
11 Nandigama EPS 5 150Kg 6 6 -- 0 1 150 -- PFP 96
12 Ponnamanda GCS 6 150Kg 3 6 -- 2 4 300 -- 171
13 SUAA EPS 4 -- -- 6 -- -- -- -- -- --
14 Penumadam EPS 6 -- -- 6 -- -- -- 80 -- TFP 108
15 Kaikalur EPS 6 300 Kg 3 5 -- 1 2 280 -- PFP 96
Mandapeta (W)
16 7 -- 2 2 -- 2 1 280 -- TFP 108
EPS
17 GMAA EPS 4 -- 2 8 -- 3 5 320 -- TFP 108
18 GMAB EPS 6 -- 2 6 -- 2 3 300 -- TFP 108
19 S.Yanam OUS 2 150Kg 2 8 -- 3 5 360 -- PFP 96
247
Rigs:
Sr. Name of Rig DCP 10 kg Mech. Foam 09 Co2 4.5/6.8 kgs DCP 50 kg Mech. Foam 50
No. lts lts
1. E-1400-16 11 07 03 01 --
2. E-1400-17 12 07 04 01 01
3. E-2000-I 12 07 04 01 01
4. E-2000-III 10 06 05 01 01
5. E-760-M 12 06 05 01 01
6. F-6100-III 15 06 04 01 01
7. BI-2000-II 13 08 03 01 01
248
ANNEXURE 2 DATA BANK

IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF ONGC OFFICERS AT
RAJAHMUNDRY ASSET
RJY STD CODE : 0883

RJY OFFICE : 2431570-71-72-74-75-76-77-78
NARASAPUR STD CODE : 08814
NARASSAPUR OFFICE : 274380/273370/273352
S. No. NAME & DESIGNATION OFFICE RESIDENCE Fax MOBILE

DIRECT EPBX EXTN DIRECT EPBX NO.
EXTN.
S/SHRI 2424348 4000 2431955 4600 2434386 9490168000
D.G. Sanyal
01.
GGM-Asset Manager/ Mines
Agent
02. Satish Babu, DGM(P) 4004 9490168628
EA to Asset Manager
03. M.R. Sethi SE (D), 2432783 4005 - - 9490168337
EA to Asset Manager
04. TS Rao, GM (M) 2428207 4492 2426440 - 2432785 9490168435
Head Engineering Services
Mines Manager (Tech)
05. P.V. Satish Kumar, GM (P) 2438632 4200 - - 2446240 9490168887
Surface Manager
Mines Manager (Production)
06. R.V. Rao 2444520 4130 2471011 2444520 9490168945
GM (Wells)
Head Logging Services,
Mines manager logging services
07. A.K. Lal GM(D) 2421551 4300 2447154 - 2438630 9490168620
Head Drilling Services/
Mines Manager (D)
08. M.K. Rana DGM (Civil) 2421017 4420 2470474 4611 - 9490168824
LM (Works)
09. M. Ramakrishna DGM-F&A 2440659 4010 2440614 - 2440659 9490168486
Head Finance
10. Dr. M.Rama Krishna DGM, 2427387 4110 2474346 - - 9490168339
(Geo)- SSM
11. A. Satyanarayana, GM(P) 2441039 4220 2470721 - 2441039 9490168304
Head Well Services
12. Sudheer Inapanuri, DLA 2430194 4033 2467305 - 9490168883
249
14. Y.V.S.K. Seshasayi DGM- 2494151 4151 2466620 - 2441038 9490168916

(Chem) Head Regional Labs
15. VRKS Sarma, DGM (Chem) 2439549 4419 2468327 - 9490168902
Head Asset HSE
16. Shashi Kant 2448850 4460 2428641 - - 9490168967
DGM (Logistics)/Head of
Logistics
17. A. Apparao, DGM(Chem)/ 2432909 4340 2476711 4603 - 9490168084
Location Manager (Mud
Services)
19. J. Suresh Kumar, DGM (D) 2440645 4350 2468890 - - 9490168921
Location Manager (Cmtg)
20. H.L. Patel, GM (D) Location 2436518 4320 2442056 - 2436518 9490168532
Manager(DS)
21. N.V.S. Murthy DGM(M) 2430319 4477 2000032 - - 9490168925
OIC, Dowlaiswaram
22. V. Bhaskar Rao GM(P) 2494228 4228 2433486 - - 9490168872
23. M.V.G.K. Murthy, DGM (P),
AM-I
24. B.K.V.R.L Rao, DGM(P) 2440615 4227/13 2462403 - - 9490168587
AM-II
25. R.S.V.R.Murthy DGM(P) AM- 2494262 4262 - 9490168535
III
26. Vikrath DGM(P) 2494252 4252 2423444 - - 9490168780
I/C Tatipaka Complex
27. T.V. Ramana GM(M) 2438086 4330 2420681 - - 9490168915
I/C, Mech-DS
28. S. Chowdhury DGM(E) 2494406 4406 2472590 - - 9490168920
I/C, Electrical – DS
29. A. Balaji, DGM (E&T) 2449393 4440 2465025 4606 - 9490168555
I/C Info.com
30. G. Srihari, DGM (P) - 4326 2466114 - - 9490168665
I/C, RCMT
31. Dr. Handique ACMO 2469245 - - - 2469245 9490168882
32. Munin Gogoi, I/c Security 2436556 4067 - - - 9490168934
34. Dheerendra Kumar, Chief Mgr (08814) 274422 2200 0883- - (08814) 9490168794
(FS) OIC, Narasapur (NSP) 2433937 274422
I/C Fire, Narasapur 4555
(RJY)
36. Fire Control room, Narasapur - 275010/ 274121 - - -
37 Asset Mgr 2474100 - 2461400 - -
Office of AM,
250
EOA, Kakinada
38 Base Radio Room, RJY 2439703 4451/4452 - - -
IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF K.G. BASIN
S.No. NAME & DESIGNATION OFFICE RESIDENCE Fax MOBILE NO.

DIRECT EPBX DIRECT EPBX
EXTN EXT
N.
01. G. Karuppu Swamy GGM 2436170 4100 26543016 - 2440670 09445005919
Basin Manager KG-PG
Chennai
02. PR Bhavana, GM(Geol.) 2440676 4112 2467229 - 94901-68898
Head Forward Base
03. Y.V.S.K. Seshasayi DGM-(Chem) 2461080 - 2435032 4609 9490168916
Head Reg. Labs
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF HSE OFFICERS – RAJAHMUNDRY ASSET
S.No Name Designation Contact no.
1 V.R.K.S. Sarma DGM (Chem) 9490168902
2 P.T.Rao CE (D) 9490168656
3 V.K.Sharma AEE (Env.) 9490168294
251
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF CCMT

S.No. NAME & DESIGNATION OFFICE RESIDENCE MOBILE NO.
EXTN EXTN.
01. Sri., D. Pramanik, 079-23298271 079-23299141 - 09969222371
GM(Drilling), Head CMT,
Mumbai
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF RCMT
S. NAME & OFFICE RESIDENCE MOBILE NO.

No. DESIGNATION DIRECT EPBX DIRECT EPBX
EXTN EXTN.
01. G. Srihari, DGM (P) 2430319 4326 2469076 - 9490168665
I/C, RCMT
02. V.V.Shyam Sundar SE -do- 4325 2469942 - 9490168315
(D)
03. C.N. Rao, CE (P) -do- -do- - - 9490168247
TELEPHONE NUMBER-CORPORATE SECURITY CONTROL ROOM

S.No. NAME OFFICE RESIDENCE MOBILE NO.
EXTN EXTN.
01. Corporate Security Control 011-23301400 - 09968282222
Room, 8th Floor, Jeevan
Bharti Tower, New Delhi
252
PRODUCTION INSTALLATIONS
S. NAME OF THE ADDRESS OF THE INSTALLATION INSTALLATION MANAGER
NO. INSTALLATION
01. TATIPAKA-GCS Tatipaka GCS, ONGC Ltd. Sri.B.Vikranth DGM (P)
Nagaram Village, Off:08862-2427404,407
Mamidikuduru Mandal, E.G.Dist. Ph:9490168780
Ph: 247407. (STD Code:08862)
02. MANDAPETA-GCS Mandapeta GCS, ONGC Ltd., Sri B.Prasada rao, CE (P)
Kotturu Village, Alamuru Mandal, Off:08855-278507
E.G.Dist, Ph: 278507. Ph:9490168778
(STD CODE-08855)
03. NARSAPUR-GCS Narsapur GCS, ONGC Ltd., Sri VVN Jayaram, CE (P)
Narsapur Town, W.G.Dist. Off:08814-273602
Ph:273602 (STD CODE:08814) Ph:9490168660
04. MORI – EPS Mori EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri S. K. Biswal CE(P)
Kesavadaspalem, Off: 09962-200645
Malkipuram Mandal, E.G.Dist. Ph:9490168667
Ph: 200645 (STD Code:08862)
05. LINGALA-EPS Lingala EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri K. Hussain Saheb, DGM(P),
Mandavalli Mandal, Off: 08677-280257
Krishna District. Ph: Ph:9490168659
280257 (STD Code:08677)
06. KAIKALUR-EPS Kaikalur EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri K. Hussain Saheb, DGM((P),
(Sri Haripuram), Mudinepalli Mandal, Off: 08674-233328 & 234242
Krishna Diustrict. Ph:9490168659
Ph:233328.( STD CODE:08674)
07. PASARLAPUDI EPS Pasarlapudi, EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri, B.Vinod Babu
Bodasakurru, Allavaram Mandal, CE(P)
E.G.District. Off: 08856-245148
Ph: 245148 (STD Code:08856) 9490168850
08. PONNAMANDA EPS Ponnamanda EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri, D.Ravindra Babu CE(P)
Malkipalli Village, Razole, Mandal, Off:08862-231332
E.G.District. Ph.:9440168445
Ph:231332 (STD Code:08862)
09. ENDAMURU-EPS Endamuru EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri B.Prasada Rao CE(P)
Endamuru Village, Off: 0884-2004051
Karapa Mandal, Ph. 9440168778
E.G.District.
Ph: 235201. STD Code: 0884.
10. ADAVIPALEM EPS Adavipalem EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri S. K. Biswal CE(P)
Sankaraguptam Village, Off: 08862-253334
Malikipuram Mandal, Ph: 9490168667
253
E.G.Dist.
Ph: 253334. STD Code: 08862.
11. NANDIGAMA EPS Nandigama EPS, ONGC Ltd., Sri K. Hussain Saheb, DGM (P),
Nandigama Village, Near Pedana, Off: 08672-248806
Krishna Dist. Ph:9490168659
Ph.No.08672 - 248806.
12. KESANAPALLI Kesanapalli(W)GGS, ONGC Ltd, Sri, D.Ravinda Babu, CE(P)

(W) GGS Turupupalem Village, Off:08862-251600 & 200646
Mallkipuram Mandal, Ph.:9490168445
E.G.Dist.
Ph.No.08862-251600
13. TATIPAKA MINI Tatipaka Mini Refinery, ONGC Ltd., Sri.K.G. Rao, DGM (P)
REFINERY Nagaram Village, Off: 08862-247404 & 407
Mamidikuduru Mandal, Ph.:9490168658
E.G.Dist.
Ph.No.08862 -248723.
14. GOPAVARAM GGS Gopavaram GGS, ONGC Ltd., Sri V.N.V. Prasad, CE(P)
Uppalaguptam Village, Off: 08856-256810
Uppalaguptam Mandal, Ph.:9490168065
E.G. District. A.P.
Ph.No.08856 -256810
DRILLING RIGS
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS/
S. No. RIG INSTALLATION MANAGER MOBILE No. OF INSTALLATION
MANAGER
01. E-2000-I Sri A.K. Biswas, CE (D) 9490168606
02. E-2000-III Sri Koka Raj Kumar CE(D) 9490168641
03. E-1400-16 Sri H.R. Varma CE(D) 9490168253
04. E-1400-17 Sri S.K. Sinha CE(D) 9490168561
05. E-760-M Sri R.K. Thareja CE(D) 9490168501
06. F-6100-III Sri Atul Kumar CE(D) 9490168651
07. BI-2000-II Sri Hira Lal CE(D) 9490168527
08 VFD Sri M.S.B.A. Khan CE(D) 9490168909
254
DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF MINES SAFETY

II. DGMS OFFICE ADDRESS, DHANBAD (JHARKHAND)
II. The Director General of Mines Safety Fax – 0326 - 2221027
Directorate General of Mines Safety Off – 0326 – 2221005~09
DHANBAD (JHARKHAND) – 826001 Res – 0326 – 2221141~42
CENTRAL DGMS OFFICE – DHANBAD – OFFICER TELEPHONE

NUMBERS
Name Designation Office Residence
Rahul Guha Director General 2221000 2221141-42
Sr. Private Secretary EPB-318 2206765
G.N. Vankatesh Dy. Director General (Mech) 2221039 2221166
B.K. Lama Dy. Director General (Elect.) 2221038 2206763
B.P. Singh Director of Mines Safety (CMC) 2221014 2221199
D.K. Mallick Director of Mines Safety (SOMA) 2221015 2221168
R. Subramanian Director of Mines Safety (S&T 2221037 2221165
C.B. Prasad Director of Mines Safety (MSE) 2221013 2221176
B. Paparao Director of Mines Safety(SD) 2221007 2221177
T.K. Mandal Director of Mines Safety (Exam.) 2221009 2221178
K.S. Yadav Director of Mines Safety (Elect..) 2226051 2221163
Subhashis Roy Dy. Director of Mines Safety (Survey) 2221008 2221180
T.R. Kannan Dy. Director (B&A) 2221016 2221172
Murlidhar Bidari Dy. Director (Exam) 2221182 2206749
V. Kalundia Dy. Director (S&T) 2221198 2221175
Aftab Ahmed Dy. Director (SD) 2221007
S.S. Soni Dy. Director (HQ)
M. Sagesh Kumar Dy. Director (Exam) 2226019
A.K. Mishra Dy. Director (SOMA) 2226124
N. Deori Dy. Director (MSE)
Umesh M. Swarkar Dy. Director (S&T)
Vinod Rajak Dy. Director(SD) 2221008
Yohan Yejerla Dy. Director (Exam)
M.K. Gupta Dy. Director (HQ) 2221019
Rajesh Kumar Singh Dy. Director (SD) 2206768
T. Srinivas Dy. Director (Elect) 2226040 2221171
K. Vijay Kumar Dy. Director (Mech)
Dr. George John Asst. Director (OH) 2226040
Monica Tudu Asst. Director (OL) 2221004 2226123
T.K. Burman Sr. Law Officer 2221024 2206763
J. P. Jha Law Officer 2226121
255
Ritu Srivastava Law Officer 2226111 2206768

A. Tripathy Director of Mines Safety (Stat) 2221003 2206759
N. Tudu Director of Mines Safety (Stat) 2221023 2940570
B.K. Srivastava Asst. Director (Stat) 2226118
Sipra Chattoraj DDO 2226087
P.K Sinha Jr. Scientificl Officer (S &T) 2226042
Rajesh Verma Pay and Accounts Officer 2221017
PARTICULARS OF OFFICERS AT DY. DGMS OFFICE, HYDERABAD
Name Designation Office Residence

S.I. Hussain Dy. Director General 24602505 23002714
G Vijay Kumar Director of Mines Safety 24602506
Anand Agarwal Dy. Director of Mines Safety (Elect) 24602511
Mukesh Kumar Dy. Director of Mines Safety
Sinha
Surjit Ketwa Dy. Director of Mines Safety ad (OH) 24602511 23524825
Director of mines safety (SOMA)
REGION -I, HYDERABAD ( IInd FLOOR)
S. Gangopadhaya Director of Mines Safety 24602507
M.C. Jaiswal Dy. Director of Mines Safety 24602510
Sandeep Dy. Director of Mines Safety (Mech) 24602510 27176305
Shrivastava
REGION-II, HYDERABAD (IInd FLOOR)
S. Krishnamurthy Director of Mines Safety 24602508 23532944
Neeraj Kumar Dy. Director of Mines Safety 24602510 27732321
Kamlesh Sharma Dy. Director of Mines Safety 24602510
GOA REGION OFFICE – 483601
Fatima Building, 2nd Floor Bernardo Costa Road Margao ( Fax No- 0832-2702335)
Munna Tandi Director of Mines Safety 2730985
Dy. Director of Mines Safety 2714010
NELLORE SUB-REGION
OPP- SP BUNGLOW, PODALKUR ROAD, P.O. DARGAMITTA - NELLORE-524001 (STD CODE-0861)
Dy. Director of Mines Safety 2327363 2322472
256
OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE

Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas,
8th Floor, OIDB Bhawan, Plot No 2,
Sector-73, Noida, Uttar Pradesh-201301
(STD Code : 0120, Fax No. 2593802 & 2593858, Web site www.oisd.gov.in)
NAME TELEPHONE NO FAX NO
Shri Hirak Dutta 0120- 2593800, 2593833 0120 – 2593802/2593858

( ED, OISD, Member
Secretary, Safety
Council, New Delhi)
Andhra Pradesh Public Control Board (APPCB)

1. Mr. Sanjay Kumar, IAS Member secretary, Office : 040-23815630
Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board, Fax : 040-23815631
Payavaran Bhawan,A- III,Industrial Estate,Sanath Nagar,HYDERABAD – 500018
2.Joint Chief Environment Engineer,Office: 0891-2719481

A.P. Pollution Control Board,Zonal Office,Fax : 0891-2719480
BESIDES RTA OFFICE,
MADHAVADHARA VUDA LAYOUT,
VISAKHAPATNAM - 530 018.
3.The Environmental Engineer, Office: 0866-2546217

APPCB, Regional Office, Plot No.41, Fax: 0866-2546224
Sri Kanakadurga Officers Colony,
Gurunanak Road,
VIJAYAWADA 8
4. A. P. Pollution Control Board.

Regional Office,
D.No.20532,
ShanthiNagar,Ramanayyapet,
KAKINADA- 533003
5. The Environmental Engineer,

A.P.Pollution Control Board,
Regional Office, 11-19,
KSR Thota,Sanivarapupet,
ELURU-534 003.
Office: 08812-249668
6. Prl. Chief Conservator of Forests,

Aranya Bhavan,A.p.forest Department,
Opp Ag Office, Saifabad,
Saifabad-Khairatabad,
HYDERABAD – 500004
Office : 040-23231772
257
IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF DISTRICT AUTHORITIES
S.NO. DESIGNATION OFFICE RESIDENCE

EAST GODAVARI
1 DISTRICT COLLECTOR, KAKINADA 0884-2361200 2361300
2 JOINT COLLECTOR 0884-2361700 2361500
3 SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE 0884-2362000 2363000
4 D.I.G./I.G./Additional D.G. of Police 0884-222890 231300
5 POLICE STATION, NAGARAM 0884-239463 -
6 M.R.O., MANDAPETA - -
7 MANDAPETA POLICE STATION 08853-230435 -
8 D.S.P. AMALAPURAM 08856-233104 -
9 C.I. OF POLICE, AMALAPURAM 08856-231033 -
10 R.D.O., AMALAPURAM 08856-233100 -
11 M.R.O., AMALAPURAM 08856-233102 -
12 FIRE STATION, AMALAPURAM 08856-231101 -
13 UNITED NURSING HOME, COLLEGE ROAD, 08856-231346 -

AMALAPURAM
14 MANDAL OFFICE, RAZOLE 08862-222027 -
15 FIRE STATION, RAZOLE 08862-221101 -
16 FIRE STATION, RAJAHMUNDRY 0883-2445101 -
WEST GODAVARI
17 DISTRICT COLLECTOR, ELURU 08812-230051 08812-

2310844
18 JOINT COLLECTOR 08812-230471 08812-230373
19 SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, ELURU 08812-230503 08812-230503
20 D.I.G./I.G./Additional D.G. of Police 08812-222890 08812-231300
21 D. S. P., NARASAPUR - -
22 INSPECTOR OF POLICE, NARASAPUR 08458-286333 -
23 M. R. O., NARASAPUR 08814-275048 -
24 MISSION HOSPITAL, NARASAPUR 08814-220960 -
25 INSPECTOR OF POLICE, PALAKOL 0814 - 222333 -
26 FIRE STATION, PALAKOL 08814-222219 -
258
27 M. R. O., MOGALUTURU 08814-247440 -
28 M. R. O., ELAMANCHILI 08814-250129 -

KRISHNA DISTRICT
29 DISTRICT COLLECTOR, MACHILIPATNAM 08672-252882 08672-252000
08672-252668 08672-252222
30 JOINT COLLECTOR 08672-252601 08672-223081
31 SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE 08672-223666 08672-252800
32 D.I.G./I.G./Additional D.G. of Police 08812-231300 08812-231300
08812-231350
33 R.D.O. BANDAR 08672-252486 08672-223374
34 D.S.P. BANDAR - 9440796404
35 R.D.O., GUDIVADA 08674-243697 08674-243654
36 D.S.P., GUDAVADA 08674-243300 9440796407
List of Contact Number of Revenue Officials of East Godavari District

Sl
Designation STD Code Phone Number Mobile Number
No
1 Collector 0884 2361200 9849903879
2 Joint Collector 0884 2361700 9849903889
3 DRO 0884 2361800 9849903862
4 RDO Amalapuram 08852 233100 9849903866
5 RDO Kakinada 0884 2638100 9849903864
6 RDO Peddapuram 08852 241254 9849903865
7 RDO Rajahmundry 0883 2442344 9849903918
8 RDO 08864 243561 9440801442

Rampachodavaram
9 Tahsildar 08865 272421 9493931796
Addateegala
10 Tahsildar 08864 244634 9493931763
Devipatnam
11 Tahsildar 08865 273247 9493931781
Gangavaram
12 Tahsildar 08864 244728 9493931800
Maredumilli
13 Tahsildar 08865 275540 9493931889
Rajavommangi
14 Tahsildar 08864 243321 9493931758
Rampachodavaram
259
15 Tahsildar 08863 224027 9493931761

Y.Ramavaram
16 Tahsildar Gollaprolu 08869 231218 9849903880
17 Tahsildar Kajuluru 0884 2330458 9849903877
18 Tahsildar Kakinada 0884 2376300 9849903875

Rural
19 Tahsildar Kakinada 0884 2375987 9849903874
Urban
20 Tahsildar Karapa 0884 2394854 9849903908
21 Tahsildar Pedapudi 0884 2312030 9440846126
22 Tahsildar 08869 251208 9849903918

Pithapuram
23 Tahsildar Samalkota 0884 2312030 9849903876
24 Tahsildar Tallarevu 0884 2303565 9849903878
25 Tahsildar 08869 245143 9908460099

U.Kothapalli
26 Tahsildar Gandepalli 08852 237755 9849903884
27 Tahsildar 08852 233070 9849903883

Jaggampeta
28 Tahsildar 08868 226774 9849903886
Kirlampudi
29 Tahsildar 08854 278338 9701001669
Kotananduru
30 Tahsildar 08852 241276 9849903881
Peddapuram
31 Tahsildar 08868 246066 9849903885
Prathipadu
32 Tahsildar 08852 246242 9849903882
Rangampeta
33 Tahsildar 08868 235793 9949921783
Rowthulapudi
34 Tahsildar 08868 236623 9849903906
Shankhavaram
35 Tahsildar Thondangi 08854 248825 9849903907
36 Tahsildar Tuni 08854 254088 9849903887
37 Tahsildar 08868 224065 9849903921

Yeleswaram
38 Tahsildar Alamuru 08855 278423 9849903902
39 Tahsildar Anaparthi 08857 227240 9849903910
40 Tahsildar Biccavolu 08857 236440 9849903913
260
41 Tahsildar 0883 2455565 9666088049

Gokavaram
42 Tahsildar K. 08857 255452 9866834799
Gangavaram
43 Tahsildar Kadiam 0883 2453369 9849903901
44 Tahsildar 08855 225457 9866454528

Kapileswarapuram
45 Tahsildar 0883 2496552 9704459963
Korukonda
46 Tahsildar 08855 232393 9849903903
Mandapeta
47 Tahsildar 0883 2421547 9849903860
Rajahmundry Rural
48 Tahsildar 0883 2417274 9849903898
Rajahmundry Urban
49 Tahsildar 0883 2484326 9849903900
Rajanagaram
50 Tahsildar 08864 243321 9849903904
Ramachandrapuram
51 Tahsildar 08857 235215 9849903905
Rayavaram
52 Tahsildar 0883 2498862 9949848346
Seethanagaram
53 Tahsildar Ainavilli 08856 225416 9849903105
54 Tahsildar Allavaram 08856 229456 9849903861
55 Tahsildar 08856 2333102 9849903888

Amalapuram
56 Tahsildar 08856 243356 9849903890
Ambajipeta
57 Tahsildar 08855 271453 9177745186
Atreyapuram
58 Tahsildar 08856 279133 9502806116
I.Polavaram
59 Tahsildar 08856 285254 9948443492
Katrenikona
60 Tahsildar Kothapeta 08855 243228 9849903894
61 Tahsildar 08862 226223 9849903892

Malkipuram
62 Tahsildar 08862 238446 9866784808
Mamidikuduru
63 Tahsildar 08856 271039 9849903897
Mummidivaram
261
64 Tahsildar 08855 289474 9849903896

P.Gannavaram
65 Tahsildar 08855 255281 9849903895
Ravulapalem
66 Tahsildar Razole 08862 221027 9849903891
67 Tahsildar 08862 244316 9849903893

Sakhinetipalli
68 Tahsildar 08856 278435 9849129868
Uppalaguptam
TELEPHONE NUMBERS OF REVENUE OFFICIALS OF WESTGODAVARI DISTRICT

PLACE OFFICE NO. RESIDENCE NO.
POLAVARAM 08811-251235 08811-251637
ACHANTA 08814-236294 -
AKIVEEDU 08816-252060 94403-29260
ATTILI 08819-255010 29 -
BHEEMAVARAM 08816-231106 -
BHIMADOLE 08829-222298 -
BUTTAYAGUDEM 08821-272235 08821-272920
CHAGALLU 08813-271466 -
CHINTALAPUDI, 08823-222228 -
DENDULURU 08829-255352 -
DEVARAPALLE 08813-273750 -
DWARAKA TIRUMALA 08829-271440 -
ELURU 08812-230179 -
GANAPAVARAM 08818-256217 -
GOPALAPURAM 08813-257451 -
IRAGAVARAM 08819-289240 -
JANGAREDDIGUDEM 08821-225412 -
JEELUGUMILLI 08821-283326 -
KALLA 08816-258231 -
KAMAVARAPUKOTA 08823-256256 08812-256620
KOVVUR 08813-231515 08813-232228
KOYYALAGUDEM 08821-236287 08821 236779
LINGAPALEM 08823-246246 -
MOGALTHUR 08814-247440 -
NALLAJERLA 08818-277226 -
NARASAPURAM 08814-275048 -
NIDADAVOLE 08813-224278 -
NIDAMARRU 08818-245876 -
PALACOLE 08818-245876 -
PALAKODERU 08816-248348 -
262
PEDAPADU 08812-247573 -
PEDAVEGI 08812-259422 -
PENTAPADU 08818-223152 -
PENUGONDA 08819-246280 -
PENUMANTRA 08819-277204 -
PERAVALI 08819-232179 -
PODURU 08814-257162 -
T NARASAPURAM 08823-277235 -
TADEPALLIGUDEM 08818-221320 -
TANUKU 08819-222017 -
THALLAPUDI 08813-282241 -
UNDI 08816-276371 -
UNDRAJAVARAM 08819-234416 -
VEERAVASARAM 08816-285376 -
IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS – POLICE DEPT.

Designation Area Code Office Telephone Mobile No.
Hyderabad commisioner 040 27852432 -
DG Fire Services 040 23442955 -
SP OFFICE KAKINADA 0884 2362000 94407 96500
SP (OFF) FAX KAKINADA 0884 2361644 -
ADDL. SP(A) KAKINADA 0884 2361060 94407 96501
ADDL. SP(O) KAKINADA 0884 2367762 -
DIST.CONTROL KAKINADA 0884 2371744 94407 96519
SB INSPECTOR KAKINADA 0884 2361996 94407 96513
SB INSPECTOR 0883 - 94407 96515
RAJAHMUNRY
SDPO KAKINADA 0884 2362711 94407 96505
CI TOWN KAKINADA 0884 2375541 94407 96520
PS I TOWN KAKINADA 0884 2379033 94407 96539
PS II TOWN KAKINADA 0884 2379312 94407 96541
PS III TOWN KAKINADA 0884 2379052 94407 96542
PS PORT KAKINADA 0884 2378711 94407 96543
PCR KAKINADA 0884 2365500 94407 96546
CI CCS KAKINADA 0884 - 94407 96522
263
LIST OF THE POLICE STATION OF EAST GODAVARI

Police Station Phone No.
ADDATEEGALA Police Station 08865 - 272433 , 94409 00769
ALAMURU Police Station 08855 - 278433 , 94409 04849
ALLAVARAM Police Station 08856 - 259433
AMALAPURAM TN Police Station 08856 - 231033 , 94407 96561
AMALAPURAM TQ Police Station 08856 - 231066 , 94407 96562
AMBAJIPETA Police Station 08856 - 243233 , 94407 96563
ANGARA Police Station 08855 - 225433 , 94409 00770
ANNAVARAM Police Station 08868 - 238133 , 94407 96571
ATREYAPURAM Police Station 08855 - 271433 , 94409 04839
BICCAVOLE Police Station 08857 - 236433 , 94409 04851
BOMMURU Police Station 0883 - 2434173 , 94407 96588
CCS RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 0883 - 2468050 , 94407 96534
CORANGI Police Station 0884 - 2303533 , 94407 96558
DEVIPATNAM Police Station 08864 - 244633 , 94409 00763
DONKARAI Police Station 08863 - 222433
DOWLESWARAM Police Station 0883 - 2417433 , 94407 96586
DRAKSHARAMA Police Station 08857 - 252433 , 94409 04850
ELESWARAM Police Station 08868 - 224033 , 94409 04835
GANDEPALLI Police Station 08852 - 237733 , 94409 04841
GANGAVARAM Police Station 08865 - 273233 , 94409 00767
GOKAVARAM Police Station 0883 - 2455533 , 94409 04830
GOLLAPALEM Police Station 0884 - 2335233 , 94407 96559
GOLLAPROLE Police Station 08869 - 231333 , 94409 00758
I POLAVARAM Police Station 08856 - 278388 , 94407 96540
I Town CCS KAKINADA Police Station 94407 96549
I Town CCS RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 94407 96578
I TOWN RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 0883 - 2471033 , 94407 96574
II Town CCS KAKINADA Police Station 94407 96550
II Town CCS RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 94407 96579
II TOWN RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 0883 - 2421133 , 94407 96576
III Town CCS KAKINADA Police Station 94407 96551
III Town CCS RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 94407 96580
III TOWN RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 0883 - 2471043 , 94407 96577
INAVILLI Police Station 08856 - 225533 , 94409 04856
INDRAPALEM Police Station 0884 - 2363037 , 94407 96555
264
JADDANGI Police Station 08865 - 278233 , 94409 00766

KADIAM Police Station 0883 - 2453333 , 94407 96587
KARAPA Police Station 0884 - 2394833 , 94407 96557
KATRENIKONA Police Station 08856 - 285133 , 94409 00774
KIRLAMPUDI Police Station 08868 - 226633 , 94409 04834
KOTANANDURU Police Station 08854 - 278333 , 94409 00773
KOTHAPETA Police Station 08855 - 243333 , 94409 04842
MALKIPURAM Police Station 08856 - 226333 , 94409 04837
MANDAPETA RURAL Police Station 08855 - 230435 , 94407 96592
MAREDUMILLI Police Station 08864 - 244733
MUMMIDIVARAM Police Station 08856 - 271033 , 94407 96564
NAGARAM Police Station 08856 - 238033 , 94409 04853
P GANNAVARAM Police Station 08856 - 289433 , 94409 04838
PAMARRU Police Station 08857 - 255033 , 94409 04848
PEDAPUDI Police Station 0883 - 2312033 , 94409 04840
PEDDAPURAM Police Station 08852 - 241333 , 94409 04846
PITHAPURAM Police Station 08869 - 251333 , 94407 96560
PRATHIPADU Police Station 08868 - 246733 , 94407 96570
R CHODAVARAM Police Station 08864 - 243533 , 94409 00762
R Traffic RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 94407 96585
RAJANAGARAM Police Station 0883 - 2484333 , 94409 04836
RAJAVOMMANGI Police Station 08865 - 275533 , 94409 00765
RANGAMPETA Police Station 08852 - 246233 , 94409 04854
RAYAVARAM Police Station 08857 - 235333 , 94409 04843
SAKHINETIPALLI Police Station 08856 - 244333 , 94407 96566
SAMALKOT Police Station 0884 - 2327333 , 94407 96568
SARPAVARAM Police Station 0884 - 2379287 , 94407 96554
SEETHANAGARAM Police Station 0883 - 2458833 , 94409 04832
THIMMAPURAM Police Station 0884 - 2306332 , 94407 96556
THONDANGI Police Station 08854 - 248833 , 94409 04847
TRAFFIC KAKINADA Police Station 0884 - 2371273 , 94407 96524
TRAFFIC KAKINADA Police Station 94407 96552
TRAFFIC RAJAHMUNDRY Police Station 0883 - 2442953 , 94407 96535
TUNI RURAL Police Station 08854 - 253777 , 94407 96573
TUNI TOWN Police Station 08854 - 253333 , 94407 96572
U KOTHAPALLI Police Station 08869 - 245333 , 94409 00752
UPPLAGUPTAM Police Station 08856 - 283433 , 94409 04852
Y RAMAVARAM Police Station 08865 - 224033
265
CHIEF INSPECTORS OF FACTORIES – ANDHRA PRADESH

NAME DESIGNATION OFFICE NO. RES. NO. FAX
Sri K. Mohan Director of factories
040-23261305 040-27630667 040-27632467
rao
Sri G.Bala Joint Chief Inspector of
040-23261306 040-27674688 040-27632467
Kishore Factories -I
Sri D. Chandra Jt.Chief Inspector of
040-23261307 - 040-27632467
sekhar varma Factories
Jt.Chief Inspector of
040-23261308 - 040-27632467
Factories
EAST GODAVARI
Sri K.Parameswara Rao Deputy Chief Inspector 0884-2376211 - -
of Factories- KKD
Sri S.Radhakrishna Murthy Assistant Inspector of 0884-2376211 - -
Factories – KKD-I
Sri J.Ramagopalam Assistant Inspector of
Factories 0883-2475735 - -
WEST GODAVARI
Sri G.Appa Rao Senior Assistant
O/o the Deputy Chief 08812-231190 - -
Inspector of Factories -
ELURU
Sri Y.Laxmana Rao Assistant Inspector of 08812-231190 - -
Factories - ELURU
Sri D.Ramchander Assistant Inspector of
Factories - 08816-235460 - -
BHIMAVARAM
KRISHNA DISTRICT
Smt. I.Anasuya Junior Assistant
O/o the Deputy Chief 0866-2484002 - -
Inspector of Factories -
VIJAYAWADA
Smt. M.Raja Rajeswari Senior Assistant
O/o Inspector of 0866-2484002 - -
Factories -
VIJAYAWADA
Sri A.V.V.Satyanarayana Senior Assistant, O/o
Inspector of Factories - 08672-222348 - -
MACHILIPATNAM
266

ONGC GCS KG Basin

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---~~~,-~- !

REGD.POST WITH ACK.DUE

CONSENT ORDER FOR ESTABLISHMENT ~

Order No. 379/APPCB/CFE/RO-KKD/HO/2015 3.I 'J..~ Dt.13.08.2015

Ref: 1) CFE application received on 20.06;2015 and Addl. Information received on

Bengal with a capital investment of Rs.26.047 lakhs.

Office~ Kakinada, A.P Pollution Control Board on 06.0-1.2015.

are not considered.

Encl: Schedule 'A'

f-Z. c:a-,fr~ ""

I 2. Progress on implementation of the project shall be repor1ed to the concerned Regional ~

5. Compensation is to be paid for any environmental. damage caused by it, as fixed by

The plan therefore, aims at immediate response to an Emergency event to prevent

SCOPE OF THE PLAN

Historical incident data:

Analysis data base:

Average Individual Risk:

Average Rate of Death (ROD) :

Cause Consequence Diagrams:

Cell (in study cube):

Common Cause Failure (CCF):

Condensed phase explosion:

Dry Adiabatic Lapse Rate (DALR):

Event Tree (analysis):

Expansive list (of incidents):

Expected Number of Failures (ENF):

Failure mode and effects analysis:

Fault Tree analysis:

Fractional Dead Time (FDT):

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP):

Human Error probability:

Individual Hazard Index (IHI):

Kinetic Tree Theory (KTT):

Level of Concern (LOC):

Maximum individual risk. :

Maximum potential quantity:

Median lethal concentration/dose:

It is sued to characterize the potential hazard of toxic material storage.

Negatively buoyant gas:

Neutral buoyant gas:

Performance shaping factors:

Programmable logic control (PLC):

Positively buoyant gas:

Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA):

Radius of Vulnerable Zone:

Raw plant data:

Unconfined Vapor Cloud Explosion (UVCE):

Worst Credible Incident:

Worst possible incident:

S. Oil Prod Gas Distance (In Kms)

Brief on Adavipalem Field:

Brief description of GCS- I

Details of Fire Fighting System:

Airport: Rajahmundry is about 80 Kms south west of Endamuru village.

Details of Fire Fighting System:

Location: Gopavaram Production Oil Mine is located near Gopavaram village,

Brief description of Amalapuram Field

Brief description of Gopavaram GGS: Gopavaram-GGS is located at about 25 Kms

Details of Fire Fighting System:

Brief on KESANAPALLI Field: The ONGC started exploration activity in

Brief description of KSP GGS

Details of Major Equipments

Details of Fire Fighting System:

Brief description of Installation: GCS- MANDAPETA