Ch-7 - Risk Analysis

EIA STUDY FOR GRASSRROT BG RAILFED POL STORAGE DEPOT AT MOINARBAND,
SILCHAR, CACHAR, ASSAM
RISK ANALYSIS
7.0 RISK ANALYSIS
7.1 PREAMBLE
As the depot will handle various types of petroleum products i.e. MS, SKO, HSD
and ATF having potential of fire/ explosion hazard, it is necessary to evaluate the
risk arising out of storage & handling facilities.
Scope of the study

The risk assessment has been carried out for evaluating potential hazards of the
depot which may lead to loss of property, life and interruption in the normal work.
The scope of work in risk analysis includes the following:
 Identification of potential hazard areas;

 Identification of representative failure cases;
 Identification of possible initiating events;
 Assess the overall damage potential of the identified hazardous events and
the impact zones from the accidental scenarios (Consequence analysis);
 Risk Characterization;
 Suggest suitable measures to reduce accidents;
Hazard Identification
 Identify potentially hazardous materials that can cause loss of human life/
injury, loss of properties and deteriorate the environment due to loss of
containment.
 Identify potential scenarios, which can cause loss of containment and
consequent hazards like fire, explosion and toxicity.
Consequence Analysis
 Evaluate the magnitude of consequences of different potential hazardous
scenarios and their effect zones.
 Consequence analysis is a measure of potential hazards and is important for
taking precautionary measures for risk reduction as well as for preparation of
Disaster Management Plan (DMP).
Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 127 of 200

RISK ANALYSIS
This report has been prepared by applying the standard techniques of Risk
Assessment (RA) and the information provided by IOCL as well as field study.
7.2 GLOSSARY
The common terms used in RA and DMP are elaborated below:
“Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death)

occurring within a specified period or under specified circumstances. This may be
either a frequency or a probability depending on the circumstances.
“Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury,

damage to property or the environment or some combination of these criteria.
“Hazardous Substance” means any substance, which by reason of its chemical

or physico-chemical properties or handling is liable to cause harm to human
beings, other living creatures, plants, micro-organisms, property or the
environment.
“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an

industry, which may cause impairment to the health of the persons engaged or
connected therewith or which may result in pollution of the general environment.
“Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic

disruptions, loss of human life and deterioration of health and health services on
a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected
area or community. Disaster occasioned by man is factory fire, explosions and
release of toxic gases or chemical substances etc.
“Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal

injury or property damage or both.
“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the

resources. This highlights the typical nature of emergency. “It will be after
experience that enough is not enough in emergency situations. Situations of this
nature are avoidable but it is not possible to avoid them always.”

RISK ANALYSIS
“Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall

Management. Preparedness, though largely dependent upon the response
capability of the persons engaged in direct action, will require support from others
in the organization before, during and after an emergency.
7.3 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY

Risk involves the occurrence or potential occurrence of some accident consisting
of an event or sequence of events. The description of the tasks of the various
phases involved in RA is detailed below:
Phase-I: Hazard Identification

Hazard identification is a critical step in risk analysis. Many aids are available
including experience, checklist, detailed process knowledge, equipment failure
experience, hazard index techniques, what-if analysis, hazard and operability
studies, failure mode and effect analysis and preliminary hazard analysis for
hazard identification. Process information study and relevant data would help in
the identification of hazard prone section of the plant. Inventory analysis and Fire
and Explosion and Toxicity Indices helps in hazard identification.
Phase-II: Hazard Assessment and Evaluation

Safety of hazard prone section is studied using Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA).
PHA is a part of the US Military Standard System Safety Program requirements.

The main purpose of this analysis is for an early recognition of hazards, thus
saving time and cost, which could result from major plant redesigns, if hazards
are discovered at a later stage. Many companies use a similar procedure under a
different name. It is generally applied during concept or early development phase
of a process plant and can be very useful in site selection. PHA is a precursor to
further hazard analysis and is intended for use only in the preliminary phase of
plant development for cases where past experience provides little or no insight
into any potential safety problems, e.g. a plant with a new process. The PHA
focuses on the hazardous materials and major plant elements since few details
on the plant design are available and there is likely not to be any information
available on procedures. The PHA is sometimes considered to be a review
RISK ANALYSIS
where energy can be released in an uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of

formulating a list of hazards related to:
● Pipeline / equipments;
● Interface among system components;
● Operative environment;
● Operations (tests, maintenance, etc.);
● Facility; and
● Safety equipment
The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the

subsequent plant design phase. The PHA is followed by evaluation of MCA and
Consequence Analysis.
Phase-III & IV: Disaster Management Plan (DMP) and

Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP)
Safety review of especially vulnerable process units is covered in this phase.
This helps in reducing the risk qualitatively while the outcome of Phase-I and
Phase-II would reduce risk in quantitative terms. EPP based on the earlier
studies is covered in this activity. Customarily, major industries to have their
EPP’s and therefore, there is a need to look into those details and recommend a
realistic EPP based on the above studies.
7.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

7.4.1 Introduction
Identification of hazards in the proposed project is of primary significance in the
analysis, quantification and cost effective control of accidents involving chemicals
and process. A classical definition of hazard states that hazard is in fact the
characteristic of system/plant/process that represents potential for an accident.
Hence, all the components of a system/plant/process need to be thoroughly
examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned
event/ sequence of events, which can be termed as an accident.
Typical schemes of predictive hazard evaluation and quantitative risk analysis

suggest that hazard identification step plays a key role.

RISK ANALYSIS
Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its consequences form the

basis of quantification of risk in terms of damage to property, environment or
personnel. Therefore, the type, quantity, location and conditions of release of a
toxic or flammable substance have to be identified in order to estimate its
damaging effects, the area involved and the possible precautionary measures
required to be taken. Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA) method for
hazard identification has been employed in this study:
7.4.2 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance

Hazardous substances may be classified into three main classes namely
flammable/explosive substances, unstable substances and toxic substances.
Flammable substances require interaction with air for their hazard to be realized.
Under certain circumstances the vapours arising from flammable substances
when mixed with air may be explosive especially in confined spaces. However, if
present in sufficient quantity such clouds may explode in open air also resulting
in the vapour cloud explosion.
7.5 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS (MCAA) APPROACH

7.5.1 Introduction
A Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) can be characterized, as an accident with
a maximum damage potential, which is still believed to be probable.
MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of

an accident. Moreover, since it is not possible to indicate exactly a level of
probability that is still believed to be credible, the selection of MCA is somewhat
arbitrary. In practice, the selection of accident scenarios representative for a
MCA-Analysis is done on the basis of engineering judgement and expertise in
the field of risk analysis studies, especially accident analysis.
Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to

MCA analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the
hazards and calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of
heat radiation, toxic releases, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or
potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage
RISK ANALYSIS
and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their

credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on
the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the
respective damage caused can be assessed.
As an initial step in this study, a selection has been made of the processing and
storage units and activities, which are believed to represent the highest level of
risk for the surroundings in terms of damage distances. For this selection, the
following factors have been taken into account:
 Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic;

 Quantity of material present in a unit or involved in an activity; and
 Process or storage conditions such as temperature, pressure, flow, mixing
and presence of incompatible materials.
In addition to be above factors, the location of a unit or activity with respect to

adjacent activities is taken into consideration to account for the potential
escalation of an accident. This phenomenon is known as the Domino Effect. The
units and activities, which have been selected on the basis of the above factors,
are summarized; accident scenarios are established in hazard identification
studies, while effect and damage calculations are carried out in MCAA Studies.
7.5.2 Methodology
Following steps are employed for visualization of MCA scenarios:
 Chemical inventory analysis;

 Identification of chemical release and accident scenarios;
 Analysis of past accidents of similar nature to establish credibility to identified
scenarios; and
 Short-listing of MCA scenarios.
 Analyse the poor maintenance of equipments.
7.5.3 Common Causes of Accidents

Based on the analysis of past accident information, common causes of accidents
are identified as:

RISK ANALYSIS
 Poor housekeeping
 Poor maintenance
 Improper use of tools, equipment, facilities
 Unsafe or defective equipment facilities
 Lack of proper procedures
 Improvising unsafe procedures
 Failure to follow prescribed procedures
 Jobs not understood
 Lack of awareness of hazards involved
 Lack of proper tools, equipment, facilities
 Lack of guides and safety devices
 Lack of protective equipment and clothing
7.5.4 Failures of Human Systems

An assessment of past accidents reveal human factor to be the cause for over
60% of the accidents while the rest are due to other component failures. This
percentage will increase if major accidents alone are considered for analysis.
Major causes of human failures reported are due to:
 Stress induced by poor equipment design, unfavourable environmental

conditions, fatigue, etc.
 Lack of training in safety and loss prevention
 Indecision in critical situations
 Inexperienced staff being employed in hazardous situations.
 Poor health and increasing age.
Often, human errors are not analyzed while accident reporting and accident
reports only provide information about equipment and/or component failures.
Hence, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds analysis of failure of human
systems and consequent damages.
7.5.5 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA)

Hazardous substances may be released as a result of failures or catastrophes,
causing possible damage to the surrounding area. This section deals with the
question of how the consequences of the release of such substances and the
damage to the surrounding area can be determined by means of models.

RISK ANALYSIS
It is intended to given an insight into how the physical effects resulting from the
release of hazardous substances can be calculated by means of models and
how vulnerability models can be used to translate the physical effects in terms of
injuries and damage to exposed population and environment. A disastrous
situation is generally due to outcome of fire, explosion or toxic hazards in addition
to other natural causes, which eventually lead to loss of life, property and
ecological imbalance.
Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to

MCA analysis. MCA analysis encompasses certain techniques to identify the
hazards and calculate the consequent effects in terms of damage distances of
heat radiation, toxic release, vapour cloud explosion etc. A host of probable or
potential accidents of the major units in the complex arising due to use, storage
and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their
credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on
the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the
respective damage caused can be assessed. The MCA analysis involves
ordering and ranking of various sections in terms of potential vulnerability.
7.6 RISK ANALYSIS

7.6.1 Properties of Materials Handled
Petroleum products like, Motor Spirit (MS), Superior Kerosene Oil (SKO), High
Speed Diesel (HSD) and Aviation Turbine Fuel (ATF) will be handled in the
depot. All these products are a combination of hydrocarbons and are highly
inflammable. MS is a class-A type petroleum liquid (Flash Point <23oC) whereas
SKO, HSD and ATF are of Class-B type (Flash point between 33oC and 55oC)
according to convention. The products, when spilled from the containment will
cause fire, if they get any source of ignition. Incomplete combustion of these
hydrocarbons may generate carbon monoxide, which may cause toxicity as well
as explosion. However, fire is the main hazard in such installation. Lower the
flash point, higher is the possibility of ignition and hazard. The light hydrocarbons
will evaporate from these petroleum oil liquids, which may catch fire, if they get
into contact with an ignition source. Properties of the products handled are given
in Table - 7.1.
RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 7.1
PROPERTIES OF LIQUID HANDLED
Products
Properties
MS SKO HSD ATF
o
1] Boiling point, ( C) (range) 50-215 150-300 260-380 140-240
o
2] Density at 15 C 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.80
o
3] Flash point, ( C) <18 35-43 36-61.6 35-46
o
4] Auto ignition temp. ( C) 280 295 380 210
5] LFL (% V/V) 1.4 0.7 1.8 0.9
6] UFL (% V/V) 7.6 5.0 5.6 5.0
7.6.2 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products

7.6.2.1 The hazard of equipment/pipeline handling petroleum products is the potential
loss of integrity of the containment with subsequent release of liquid causing fire.
The pipelines carry large quantities of petroleum liquid. A rare pipeline fracture
releases large quantities of hydrocarbons. The product gets collected in the
neighbourhood of the pipeline and may lead to a fire hazard if it gets source of
ignition and improper precautions.
Catastrophic failure of the shell of a storage tank is a very rare phenomenon,

which may occur due to earthquake or due to aerial bombardment during war.
However, vapour coming out through the vent line of fixed roof tank or through
vapour seal around the shell in floating roof tanks may be ignited through
lightning. However, such cases are also very rare. In such cases, the whole tank
may be on fire. Corrosion in the tanks may cause small holes resulting in release
of petroleum liquid from the tanks. However, in such cases the oil will be
contained in the dyke. In case of oil spill collected on ground, an oil pool will be
formed. An ignited pool of oil is called Pool Fire. It creates long smoky flames.
The wind may tilt the flame towards ground causing secondary fires and
damages. Radiation from the flame can be very intense near the fire but falls off
rapidly beyond 3-4 pool diameters. Such fires are very destructive within the
plant area and near the source of generation.
In case of formation of small holes on the above ground pipeline, the liquid may
escape in the form of jet and may catch fire if it gets an ignition source. Damage
due to heat radiation from such jets is mostly limited to objects in the path.
However, the ignited jet can impinge on other vessels and the pipelines causing
domino effect.
RISK ANALYSIS
7.6.3 Brief Review of Safety Related Facilities

7.6.3.1 Because of the inherent hazard potential of the petroleum products used in the
installation, due care shall be taken in handling of the same in tanks, pipelines
and other associated facilities e.g.
I. Well planned layout (as per guidelines of OISD 118).

II. Provision of weather resistant painting for protection of exposed areas of
pipelines, valves and equipment.
III. Provision of dykes and/or fire walls around storage tanks.
IV. Well planned Fire Fighting Facilities.
V. Well trained manpower for operation and maintenance.
7.6.3.2 Fire Fighting Facilities

i] Well planned Fixed Fire Fighting Facilities as per OISD guideline shall be
provided in the installation e.g.
a) Fire Hydrants and Monitors

Fire Hydrants and monitors around the dyke walls of storage tanks.
They shall be considered for Pump Manifold, Pump Bay & Road
Tanker Loading gantry and railway wagons gantry.
Layout of fire hydrants & monitors and isolation valves shall be in

such a way that Fire Tenders can approach to put out fire in any
possible area.
b) Spray Protection System

MS storage tanks shall be provided with water spray protection.
Perforated spray water pipes shall be provided around the shell of the
storage tanks and are located at the top of the shell.
ii] Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus

Fire Extinguishers and other fire fighting apparatus shall be provided in
vulnerable areas of the plant, administrative block; Fire Water Pump House,
PMCC, BT/ TF/TWD Gantry/TF PH/ BT PH etc. as per OISD guidelines.

RISK ANALYSIS
7.6.3.3 Safety Valves

Two numbers of pressure/vacuum valves have considered on the roof of the
storage tanks containing MS to prevent failure of tanks due to over-pressure as
well as vacuum.
7.7 RISK ASSESSMENT

7.7.1 Introduction
The POL Depot at Moinarband of M/s IOCL, which includes the facilities for
receipt, storage and despatch of petroleum products mainly poses fire hazard
due to unwanted and accidental release of hydrocarbons. However, due
safeguard has been taken in design, installation and operation of the system to
prevent any unwanted release of hydrocarbons from their containment. In the
event of release of hydrocarbons from their containment, there is a risk of fire.
The chances of explosion are mainly due to MS. This section deals with various
failure cases leading to various hazard scenarios, analysis of failure modes and
consequence analysis.
Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various

failure scenarios to determine the possible magnitude of damage effects and to
determine the distances up-to which the damage may be affected. The reason
and purpose for consequence analysis are manifolds like:
 Computation of risk
 Aid to better plant layout
 Evaluate damage & protective measures necessary for saving properties &
human lives
 Ascertain damage potential to public and evolve protective measures
 Formulate safe design criteria and protection system
 Formulate effective DMP
The results of consequences analysis are useful for getting information about all
known and unknown effects that are of importance, when failure scenarios occur
and to get information about how to deal with possible catastrophic events. It also
gives the plant authorities, workers, district authorities and the public living in the

RISK ANALYSIS
area, an understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be

taken.
7.7.2 Modes of Failure

There are various potential sources of large/small leakages in any installation.
The leakages may be in the form of gasket failure in a flanged joint, snapping of
small dia pipeline, leakages due to corrosion, weld failure, failure of loading arms,
leakages due to wrong opening of valves & blinds, pipe bursting due to
overpressure, pump mechanical seal failure and any other sources of leakage.
7.7.3 Damage Criteria

The damage effect of all such failures mentioned above are mainly due to
thermal radiation from pool fire or jet fire due to ignition of hydrocarbons released
since the petroleum products are highly inflammable especially MS, whose flash
point is low.
The petroleum products released accidentally due to any reason will normally
spread on the ground as a pool or released in the form of jet in case of release
from a pressurised pipeline through small openings. Light hydrocarbons present
in the petroleum products will evaporate and may get ignited both in case of jet
as well as liquid pool causing jet fire or pool fire. Accidental fire on the storage
tanks due to ignition of vapour from the tanks or due to any other reason may
also be regarded as pool fire.
Thermal radiation due to pool fire or jet flame may cause various degrees of
burns on human bodies. Also its effect on inanimate objects like equipment,
piping, building and other objects need to be evaluated. The damage effects due
to thermal radiation intensity are elaborated in Table - 7.2 & 7.3.

RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 7.2
DAMAGE DUE TO INCIDENT THERMAL RADIATION INTENSITY
Incident Thermal
Radiation Intensity Type of Damage
KW/m2
Can cause heavy damage to process equipment,
37.5
piping, building etc.
32.0 Maximum Flux level for thermally protected tanks.
12.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood.
8.0 Maximum heat flux for un-insulated tanks.
Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to
4.5
reach cover within 20 sec. (First Degree Burn).
1.6 Will cause no discomfort to long exposure.
0.7 Equivalent to solar radiation.
Table - 7.3
PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THRESHOLD THERMAL DOSES
Dose Threshold
Effect
KJ/m2
375 3rd Degree Burn.
250 2nd Degree Burn.
125 1st Degree Burn.
65 Threshold of pain, no reddening or blistering of skin caused
1st Degree Burn  Involve only epidermis, blister may occur; example: sun
burn.
2nd Degree Burn  Involve whole of epidermis over the area of burn plus
some portion of dermis
rd
3 Degree Burn  Involve whole of epidermis and dermis; subcutaneous
tissues may also be damaged.
In case of MS having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a possibility of

vapour cloud explosion. Damage effects due to blast over pressure are given in
Table - 7.4.
Table - 7.4
DAMAGE EFFECTS DUE TO BLAST OVER PRESSURE
Blast Over Pressure
Damage Type
(Bar)
0.30 Major Damage to Structures
0.17 Eardrum Rupture
0.10 Repairable Damage
0.03 Damage of Glass
0.01 Crack of Windows

RISK ANALYSIS
7.7.4 Dispersion and Stability Class

In calculation of effects due to release of hydrocarbons, dispersion of vapour
plays an important role as indicated earlier. The factors which govern dispersion
are mainly Wind Velocity, Stability Class, Temperature as well as surface
roughness. One of the characteristics of atmosphere is stability, which plays an
important role in dispersion of pollutants. Stability is essentially the extent to
which it allows vertical motion by suppressing or assisting turbulence. It is
generally a function of vertical temperature profile of the atmosphere. The
stability factor directly influences the ability of the atmosphere to disperse
pollutants emitted into it from sources in the plant. In most dispersion problems
relevant atmospheric layer is that nearest to the ground. Turbulence induced by
buoyancy forces in the atmosphere is closely related to the vertical temperature
profile.
Temperature of the atmospheric air normally decreases with increase in height.

The rate of decrease of temperature with height is known as the Lapse Rate. It
varies from time to time and place to place. This rate of change of temperature
with height under adiabatic or neutral condition is approximately 10C per 100
metres. The atmosphere is said to be stable, neutral or unstable according to the
lapse rate is less than, equal or greater than dry adiabatic lapse rate i.e. 10C per
100 metres.
Pasquill has defined six stability classes ranging from A to F

A = Extremely unstable
B = Moderately unstable
C = Slightly unstable
D = Neutral
E = Stable
F = Highly stable
7.7.5 Selected Failure Cases

The mode of approach adopted for consequence analysis is first to select the
probable failure scenarios. The failure scenarios selected are given in Table-7.5:

RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 7.5
LIST OF FAILURE CASES
Sl.
Failure Scenarios Likely Consequences
No.
Storage tanks on Fire
i) MS Tank
1] ii) SKO Tank Thermal Radiation
iii) HSD Tank
iv) ATF Tank
Thermal radiation for MS,
Vessel connection failure of inlet / outlet lines for
2] SKO, HSD & ATF and
MS, SKO, HSD and ATF tanks
also VCE for MS.
TLF Pumps discharge lines full bore failure for MS, - do -
3]
SKO, HSD and ATF
TWD Unloading Hose failure for MS, SKO, HSD and
4] - do -
ATF
Gasket failure in TLF pump discharge line MS,
5] - do -
SKO, HSD and ATF (Tank lorry Filling Pump)
Failure of 2.5" dia loading arm for road tanker
6] - do -
loading of (i) MS (ii) SKO (iii) HSD & (iv) ATF
Mechanical seal failure of MS, SKO, HSD and ATF
7] - do -
pumps for Tank Lorry Filling (TLF)
Hole in TLF pump Discharge line of (i) MS (ii) SKO
8] - do -
(iii) HSD & (iv) ATF
It may be seen that most of the probable cases of failures have been considered
for Consequence Analysis.
7.8 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

Consequence Analysis of the selected failure cases have been done with the
help of Phast Risk Micro Software of DNV Technica (Version: 6.70) latest to
evaluate and identify possible consequences as well as to incorporate suitable
measures to prevent and mitigate such events.
7.8.1 Storage Tanks on Fire:

A tank is susceptible to fire hazard, if a static charge or a spark ignites the vapour
being released from the vent or rim seal (in case of FRVT tank) causing fire. If
the fire is not controlled at the initial stage, it can lead to collapse of roof and total
liquid is exposed to fire. The hazard posed by such failure and subsequent fire is
intense thermal radiation. The thermal radiation emanating from such tank fire
can cause damage to nearby tanks and persons' in the vicinity. As per IP Code,
thermally protected facilities and storage tanks can withstand a thermal radiation
of 32 KW/m2 while unprotected tanks and process facilities can withstand only up
RISK ANALYSIS
to 8 KW/m2. Normal persons can withstand an intensity of 1.5 KW/m2 for a long
duration. A radiation intensity of 4.5 KW/m2 can cause 1st degree burn if a man is
exposed for more than 20 seconds.
Hazard distances due to thermal radiation as a result of fires in storage tanks are
shown in Table - 7.6.
Table - 7.6
HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO STORAGE TANKS ON FIRE
Hazard distances (m) to Thermal Radiation
Incident Thermal
2
Radiation KW/m
2F 2B 3D 5D
MS TANK
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 17 17 18 19
8 26 25 28 32
4.5 43 43 47 53
SKO TANK
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 16 16 18 19
8 26 25 28 32
4.5 37 37 40 42
HSD TANK
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 16 16 17 17
8 25 25 28 28
4.5 36 36 38 38
ATF TANK
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 16 16 17 19
8 26 25 28 32
4.5 38 38 41 45
NR = Not Reached
It is evident from the above table that in case of tank on fire for MS, the hazard
distance for thermal radiation level for 8 KW/m2 will extend up to a maximum
distance of 32 m. In case of tank on fire for SKO, HSD and ATF distance for
thermal radiation of 8 KW/m2 extend up to a maximum distance of 32 m, 28 m
and 32 m respectively. Hence, it is important that in case of fire in any storage
tank, cooling of the tank on fire as well as nearby tanks should be started quickly
through cooling water pipes/water jet to avoid failure of nearby tanks.

RISK ANALYSIS
Frequency for tank on fire of floating roof tanks (MS) is 2.4x10-3/tank year and for
cone roof tank the frequency is 3x10-4/tank year. Since, the vapour pressure of
SKO, HSD and ATF being much low at ambient temperature, there will be no
formation of overpressure due to VCE.
7.8.2 Vessel connection failure of inlet / outlet lines for MS, SKO, HSD and ATF
tanks:
All the storage tanks have two lines (one inlet and another outlet) connected at
bottom of the tank. Diameter of inlet/outlet lines from storage vessels varies from
6" to 8”.In such vessel connection failure is very rare i.e. 3.0 x 10-6 per year for 6"
and 2.4 x 10-6 per year for 8" dia. P/L. In case of failure of such nozzles liquid will
spill inside the dyke and will form a pool. The liquid pool may get ignited if an
ignition source is available. Hazard distances for thermal radiation of 37.5
KW/m2, 32 KW/m2, 12.5 KW/m2, 8 KW/m2 and 4.5 KW/m2 are calculated and
presented in Table - 7.7.
Table - 7.7
HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO POOL FIRE
Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) from centre of the pool

2
Radiation KW/m
2F 2B 3D 5D
MS (RR-172.52 Kg/Sec.)
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 25 25 25 26
8 36 35 38 42
4.5 60 60 66 75
SKO (RR-106.07 Kg/Sec.)
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 25 25 25 26
8 36 35 38 42
4.5 58 58 63 70
HSD (RR-348.31 Kg/Sec.)
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 44 44 44 45
8 58 58 62 67
4.5 91 91 98 108
ATF (RR-108.85 Kg/Sec.)
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 25 25 25 26
8 36 35 38 41
4.5 59 58 64 72
NR = Not Reached, RR = Release Rate
RISK ANALYSIS
It is evident from the above table that in case of vessel connection failure of MS,
the hazard distance for thermal radiation level of 8 KW/m2 will extend up to a
maximum distance of 42 m. While in case of vessel connection failure of SKO,
HSD and ATF, damage distances for thermal radiation of 8 KW/m2 are 42 m, 67
m and 41 m respectively.
Ignition of the pool and subsequent pool fire will cause damage to tanks inside
the dyke and nearby equipment/pipeline. As such, action shall be taken
immediately for covering the spilled liquid with foam compound. In case of fire, a
quick action is required to extinguish the fire to prevent damage.
Another possibility is vapour cloud explosion in case of MS tank nozzle failure.

The vapour from the pool may disperse in downwind direction along with the
wind and may come in contact with some ignition source causing vapour cloud
explosion. The hazard distances for Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) under
different wind speed and stability classes for MS is given in Table - 7.8.
Table - 7.8
HAZARD DISTANCES DUE TO VCE (MS)
Wind Speed Max. Distances (m) to overpressure
Sl.
m/sec & 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar
No.
Stability Class
01. 2F 168 216 346
02. 2B 156 192 290
03. 3D 143 176 265
04. 5D 113 137 199
It is evident for above table that in case of VCE, heavy damage may be caused
to nearby equipments and structures. The overpressure distances of 0.3 bar
(heavy damage) for MS extends up to 156 m for day and 168 m for night.
However, since the failure probability is very low, the occurrence is very rare and
may be considered as incredible.
7.8.3 TLF Pumps discharge lines full bore failure for MS, SKO, HSD and ATF.
The TLF pump discharge line sizes are 6" and 10". Full Bore Failure of these
diameter lines is non-credible in nature. Consequence analysis has been
conducted to evaluate the hazard distances and presented in Table No. - 7.9.

RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 7.9
HAZARD DISTANCES TO POOL FIRE
DUE TO TLF PUMP DISCHARGE LINE FULL BORE FAILURE
Incident Thermal Hazard distances (m) to thermal radiation

2
Radiation KW/m
2F 2B 3D 5D
MS (RR- 46.59 Kg/Sec.)
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 34 33 33 34
8 45 44 47 50
4.5 71 69 76 85
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 29 30 30 31
8 40 40 42 46
4.5 62 61 66 73
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 43 44 44 44
8 56 56 59 64
4.5 85 84 91 99
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 30 30 31 32
8 41 40 43 47
4.5 64 63 69 77
As evident from the above table that thermal radiation distances for a thermal
radiation of 4.5 KW/m2 for the failure of MS, SKO, HSD and ATF line are go up to
distance of 85 m, 73 m, 99 m and 77 m respectively for full bore failure.
Another possibility of occurrence is VCE due to MS line failure. The vapour from
the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition source is
available within its flammability limit, it may result in VCE. For MS pump
discharge line rupture, the overpressure distances due to explosion are
calculated & presented in Table - 7.10.

RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 7.10
Sl.
m/sec 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar
No.
& Stability Class
01. 2F 147 185 285
02. 2B 153 186 274
03. 3D 148 176 250
04. 5D 113 136 198
As evident from the above table that for overpressure of 0.3 bar (heavy damage),
hazard distances may go upto a maximum distance of 153 m during day and 147
m during night and may go outside the plant boundary.
7.8.4 TWD Unloading Hose failure for MS, SKO, HSD and ATF
Petroleum products received through rail wagons are unloaded through
unloading hoses. These hoses are connected between rail wagons and TWD
pump suction header. Consequence analysis has been conducted to evaluate
the hazard distances due to rupture of this unloading hose and presented in
Table No. - 7.11.
Table - 7.11
DUE TO TWD UNLOADING HOSE FAILURE

2
Radiation KW/m
2F 2B 3D 5D
MS (RR- 10.61 Kg/Sec.)
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 19 19 20 21
8 29 28 31 34
4.5 46 45 50 55
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 20 20 20 22
8 29 29 31 35
4.5 44 44 48 52
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 20 20 21 22
8 29 29 31 35
4.5 43 43 47 50

RISK ANALYSIS

37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 20 20 20 22
8 29 29 31 35
4.5 45 45 49 54
As evident from the above table that thermal radiation distances of 4.5 KW/m2 for
the failure of MS, SKO, HSD and ATF unloading hose are go up to a distance of
55 m, 52 m, 50 m and 54 m respectively.
Another possibility is VCE for MS hose rupture. The vapour from the pool may
disperse in downwind direction and if any ignition source is found within its
flammability limit, there may be VCE. For MS pump discharge line rupture the
overpressure distances due to explosion are calculated & presented in Table -
7.12.
Table - 7.12
Sl.
m/sec 0.3 bar 0.1 bar 0.03 bar
No.
& Stability Class
01. 2F 61 74 120
02. 2B 65 81 122
03. 3D 65 79 118
04. 5D 50 59 86
As evident from the above table that for 0.3 bar overpressure (heavy damage)
distances may go upto a maximum distance of 65 meters maximum.
7.8.5 Gasket failure in TLF pump discharge line MS, SKO, HSD and ATF (Tank
lorry loading Pump)
TLF pump discharge lines sizes are 6" & 8" (MS, SKO, HSD and ATF). Gasket
failure is one of the credible failure scenarios in a plant. In case of gasket rupture
in pump discharge line 3 minutes release is considered for consequence
estimation as it is assumed that action will be initiated for stopping the pump by
that time. Hazard distances due to thermal radiation of 37.5 KW/m2, 32.0 KW/m2,
12.5 KW/m2, 8.0 KW/m2 and 4.5 KW/m2 are calculated for TLF pump discharge
line gasket failure and presented in Table - 7.13.

RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 7.13

2
Radiation KW/m
2F 2B 3D 5D
37.5 16 16 16 18
32 16 17 17 19
12.5 27 27 29 31
8 33 32 34 34
4.5 40 39 40 39
37.5 15 15 16 16
32 15 15 16 16
12.5 25 25 28 31
8 31 31 33 36
4.5 38 39 40 42
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 19 19 19 20
12.5 26 26 28 30
8 34 34 37 40
4.5 43 44 46 48
37.5 15 15 15 16
32 15 15 16 16
12.5 26 26 28 31
8 32 32 34 36
4.5 39 39 41 42
Table - 7.14
HAZARD DISTANCES TO VCE (MS)
Sl.
No.
Stability Class
01. 2F 75 90 129
02. 2B 82 94 126
03. 3D 71 82 113
04. 5D 60 70 97
It is evident that in case of failure of gaskets in TLF pump discharge lines,

thermal radiation of 8 KW/m2 due to pool fire may go upto a max. distance of 34
m, 36 m , 40 m and 36 m in case of MS, SKO, HSD and ATF respectively and
remain confined within factory premises. In case of VCE for MS pump discharge
lines, the damage distances to overpressure of 0.3 bar/ 0.1 bar/ 0.03 bar may
extend upto 82 m/ 94 m/ 129 m respectively. Hence, immediate action has to be

RISK ANALYSIS
taken to prevent any fire / explosion by covering the spilled liquid in case of any
failure of gasket.
7.8.6 Failure of 2.5" dia. loading arm for road tanker loading of (i) MS (ii) SKO (iii)
HSD & (iv) ATF
Failure probability of 2.5" dia. loading arm is in the order of 1.18x10-4 per year.
Although, the probability is very low the scenario is taken for calculation of
consequences due to failure of this loading arm for different products. The
consequences have been calculated for 3 minute release as it is assumed that
action will be taken by the operators for stopping the pumps and closing the
isolation valves immediately within this period. Hazard distances for fire due to
snapping of loading arm for different products are presented in Table - 7.15.
Table - 7.15

2
Radiation KW/m
2F 2B 3D 5D
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 23 23 25 27
8 33 32 35 39
4.5 48 47 51 56
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 23 23 24 26
8 33 32 35 39
4.5 46 46 49 52
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 24 23 25 26
8 33 33 35 39
4.5 45 45 48 51
37.5 NR NR NR NR
32 NR NR NR NR
12.5 24 23 25 26
8 33 33 35 39
4.5 47 47 51 55
It is evident from the above table that in case of snapping of 2.5" dia. loading
arm, action has to be taken to stop leakage immediately as well as to prevent it
RISK ANALYSIS
from fire. The hazard distances for thermal radiation of 8 KW/m2 due to pool fire
for Loading arm failure may extend upto a maximum distance of 39 m for MS,
SKO, HSD and ATF.
Another possibility is VCE due to MS loading arm failure, if the evaporated
vapour cloud moving in downwind direction, comes in contact with any ignition
source within its flammability limits. For such scenario, the results of
consequence analysis are presented in the following table:
Table - 7.16
Sl.
No.
Stability Class
01. 2F 77 93 138
02. 2B 84 98 136
03. 3D 72 84 115
04. 5D 59 69 94
It is evident from the above table that overpressure distances may go up to 84 m

for heavy damage i.e. 0.3 bar. So, extreme care should be taken to avoid any
such type of spillage & spilled liquid should be covered immediately with foam
compound to avoid any further catastrophe.
7.8.7 Mechanical seal failure of MS, SKO, HSD and ATF pumps for Tank Lorry
Filling (TLF)
The frequency of failure for mechanical seal of centrifugal pumps, specially
handling light hydrocarbons, is quite high and poses risk due to fire and
explosion. Failure of seal releases considerable quantity of hydrocarbons into
atmosphere and creates a hazardous zone. Present thinking is to adopt double
mechanical seal especially for light hydrocarbon services. This helps in reducing
the frequency of hydrocarbon releases to atmosphere but still contribute to a
great extent to the overall risk of the plant. However, the type of seal, single or
double, does not affect their release rate or the hazard distances. Hazard
distances have been calculated for the pump mechanical seal failure. A shaft
diameter of 40 mm and a seal gap of 2 mm have been assumed for release rate
(Kg/sec) calculation. Installation of hydrocarbon detector in pump house will help
to detect leakage through mechanical seal.

RISK ANALYSIS
The hazard distances to pool fire are given in Table - 7.17:
Table - 7.17

2
Radiation KW/m
2F 2B 3D 5D
37.5 14 14 15 16
32 15 15 16 17
12.5 24 23 24 24
8 28 27 28 26
4.5 33 32 32 29
37.5 14 14 15 15
32 14 15 15 16
12.5 25 25 27 30
8 30 30 32 34
4.5 37 37 38 40
37.5 14 15 15 15
32 14 15 15 16
12.5 24 25 27 29
8 30 30 31 33
4.5 36 36 37 39
37.5 14 14 14 15
32 14 15 15 16
12.5 25 25 27 30
8 30 31 32 35
4.5 37 38 39 40
RR = Release Rate
It is evident from the above table that the hazard distance of 1st degree burn i.e.
for thermal radiation level of 4.5 KW/m2 may extend up to a maximum distance of
33 m, 40 m, 39 m and 40 m for MS, SKO, HSD and ATF respectively.
The VCE distances for MS pump mechanical seal failure has been calculated &
presented in the following Table - 7.18.

RISK ANALYSIS
Table - 7.18
Sl.
m/sec & 0.3 bar 0.1bar 0.03 bar
No.
Stability Class
01. 2F 13 17 26
02. 2B 13 17 26
03. 3D 13 17 26
04. 5D 14 18 28
The hazard distances for heavy damage i.e. 0.3 bar overpressure may extend up
to 14 m, so the spilled liquid should be covered with foam to avoid further
catastrophe.
7.8.8 Hole in TLF pump Discharge line of (i) MS (ii) SKO (iii) HSD & (iv) ATF
The TLF pump discharge line sizes are varying from 6" to 8". Formation of hole in
these lines is credible in nature so a hole size of 15mm has been considered.
Consequence analysis has been conducted to evaluate the hazard distances and
presented in Table - 7.19.
Table - 7.19
2
Radiation KW/m
2B 3D 5D 2F
37.5 15 15 16 17
32 16 16 17 18
12.5 25 25 27 28
8 31 30 31 30
4.5 37 36 36 35
37.5 16 16 16 17
32 16 16 16 17
12.5 26 26 28 31
8 32 32 34 37
4.5 39 40 41 43
37.5 16 16 16 17
32 16 16 16 17
12.5 25 26 28 31
8 31 32 34 36
4.5 39 39 40 42
37.5 16 16 16 16
32 16 16 16 16
12.5 26 26 28 31
8 32 33 35 37
4.5 40 40 42 44
RR = Release Rate
RISK ANALYSIS
As evident from the above table that the hazard distance for thermal radiation of
4.5 KW/m2 for hole formation in ATF line is maximum and goes up to 44 m.
Another possibility is VCE for 15 mm dia. hole in MS pump discharge line. The
vapour from the pool may disperse in down wind direction and if any ignition
source is found within its flammability limit, there may be VCE. However, for hole
in MS pump discharge line, the overpressure distances due to explosion (VCE)
are calculated & presented in Table - 7.20.
Table - 7.20
Sl.
m/sec & 0.3 bar 0.1bar 0.03 bar
No.
Stability Class
01. 2F 73 87 123
02. 2B 70 80 106
03. 3D 60 69 96
04. 5D 49 58 81
As evident from the above table that for overpressure of 0.3 bar (heavy damage),
hazard distances may travel upto 73 m during night. Hence, it is suggested that
the MS pump discharge line should be checked by NDT (Non Destructive
Testing) periodically to assess the health of the pipeline.
7.9 RISKS AND FAILURE PROBABILITY

The term Risk involves the quantitative evaluation of likelihood of any
undesirable event as well as likelihood of harm or damage being caused to life,
property and environment. This harm or damage may only occur due to sudden/
accidental release of any hazardous material from the containment due to failure
of component systems. It is difficult to ascertain the failure probability of any
system because it will depend on the components of the system. Even if failure
occurs, the probability of fire/ explosion and the extent of damage will depend on
many factors like:
(a) Quantity and physical properties of material released

(b) Source of ignition
(c) Wind velocity and direction
(d) Presence of population, properties etc. nearby

RISK ANALYSIS
7.10 RISK ASSESSMENT

For the assessment of 'Individual Risk' due to POL Depot at Moinarband
(Silchar), following has been taken into consideration:
a) The individual risk has been calculated as cumulative effect of all the
scenarios mentioned for selected failure case as listed in Table - 3.5 for 2B,
3D, 5D during day and 2F during night where 2F, 2B, 3D & 5D are wind
speed of 2 m/sec & stable stability class, wind speed of 2 m/sec & unstable
stability class & wind speed of 3 and 5 m/sec & neutral stability class
atmospheric conditions respectively.
b) Probability of wind directions has been taken from IMD table
c) No mitigation factors such as shelters, escape etc. are considered which
will result in conservative risk estimation.
d) During risk assessment population data and source of ignition has been
considered.
7.11 Conclusions & Recommendations
Conclusion
a) It is observed from the Iso-Risk Contour (Drg. No. 2) that the acceptable
limit of individual risk of 1.0x10-6 per year remains confined within the
premises of POL depot.
b) The Hazard distances arrived from the consequence analysis reveals that
in most of the cases hazard is confined within the premises of POL depot.
c) It is also observed from FN curve (Drg. No. - 3) that Societal Risk is in an
acceptable range .
Recommendations
The recommendations as revealed from RA Study are as follows:
 The first body valve on the tank nozzle inside the dyke should be Remote
Operated Shut-Off Valve (ROSOV) with remote operation only from outside
the dyke as well as from control room. ROSOV should be fail safe and fire
safe. It should have only ‘close’ feature and not ‘open’ and ‘stop’ from control
room. However, it should have ‘close’, ‘open’ & ‘stop’ operation from the

RISK ANALYSIS
panel located outside the dyke. The second and third valve should be Plug
valve / Ball valve and hand operated Gate valve respectively.
 Push buttons for ROSOV should be placed just outside the dyke.
 Proper approach should be provided for operation of body gate valve.
 All the dykes should be made leak proof.
 Design, inspection and repair of as per latest API codes.
 Level indicator with high level alarm should be provided.
 Piping design inside tank dyke area should ensure easy accessibility for any
operation inside dyke in the tank farm.
 Proper lighting arrangement at night should be made so that there is no
difficulty in operation during night, if required or disaster during evening/ night
time.
 Tank Dyke Valves should be provided with position indicator (open/ close) in
control room and necessary hardware and instrumentation should be
provided for this.
 CCTV should be installed covering tank farm areas and other critical areas.
The CCTV can now-a-days provided with an alarm to give warning in case of
deviation from any normal situation. The CCTV monitoring station should be
provided both in the control room as well as in the security cabin/ office.
 Main emergency shutdown switch located in control room should also
activate ROSOV to close.
● Surrounding population should be made aware of the safety precautions to
be taken in the event of any mishap. This should be done effectively by
developing an advisory programme.
 VHF handsets to be provided to each operating staff
 The existing practice of Mock Drill is to be continued with full activation of
shut-down system.
 The critical operating steps should be displayed on the board near the
location wherever applicable.
 All PPEs as well as safety equipments required during emergency, such as
breathing apparatus, fire suit, fire extinguishers, monitors and sprinklers
should be regularly tested in presence of safety officers and records to be
maintained.
RISK ANALYSIS
 All PPEs required during emergency should be located in designated safe

areas.
 Hydro-Carbon (HC) detectors should be installed near all potential leak
sources of class ‘A’ and class ‘B’ petroleum products e.g. tank dykes, tank
manifolds, pump house manifolds, etc. Further, HC detectors of proper type
should be selected and should be proof tested and maintained in good
condition.
 Medium expansion foam generators may be provided in addition to the
existing foam generator in the terminal to arrest vapour cloud formation from
spilled volatile hydrocarbons.
 All terminal operating personnel including regular contractors and security
personnel should be given safety and fire fighting training with the help of
reputed training institutes.
 The security staff should be trained as first responders for fire fighting and
rescue operations along with plant operating personnel.
 Vehicles with spark ignition engine should not be allowed inside the Depot.
 As per OISD-GDN-145, Safety Audit should be done in all the facilities of a
Depot minimum once in every year.
 The fire fighting system for storage tanks shall be conforming to OISD-STD-
117 norms.
 Health check-up and maintenance of the equipments and pipelines should be
done at regular intervals as per OISD-RP-124, OISD-STD-125, OISD-STD-
126, OISD-STD-129, OISD-STD-130 etc to avoid any major failure.
 Instruments and trip interlocks should be checked and calibrated at regular
intervals to prevent any wrong signalling and consequent failures.
 Fire fighting system as well as portable fire-fighting appliances should always
be kept in good working condition. Safety appliances should also be checked
regularly and kept in good working condition.
 To reduce the failure frequency, due care should be taken in design/
construction/ inspection/ operation. Well-established codes of practices of
OISD should to be followed for inspection and operation of the facility.
 The Depot should be operated by experienced personnel trained for
operation of such facility and fire fighting.
RISK ANALYSIS
 Smoking should be strictly prohibited inside the Depot.

 Non-sparking tools should be used for maintenance to avoid any ignition
source.
 The storage tanks, pipelines and facilities in TLF Shed should be properly
earthed to avoid accumulation of static electricity.
 Entry of unauthorised personnel should be restricted inside the licensed area.
 Good liaison should be maintained with outside organisations and District
Administration, hospitals and nursing homes.
 Area inside the dyke should be well concreted and free from dry grass/ trees
to avoid any fire.
 Different product pipelines should be given different color to avoid confusion
of operation and maintenance personnel.
 As per OISD RP 149, following LUX levels in various sections of the Depot
are required.
Area Lux defined

Main roads (along process units, workshops) 7-10
Secondary roads (along storage tanks etc.) 3-5
Tank farm 10
Pump houses, Sheds 100
Main operation platforms & access stairs 60
Ordinary platforms 20
Process areas 60
Switchgear building 150-200
Transformer bay 100
Battery room 150
Control room building/ laboratory 400
Charger/ UPS rooms 150-200
Switchyard
i) Operating area 100
ii) Other areas 50
Warehouse 100
Office 300
Compressor area 200
Watch room 100
Stairs 50
Corridors/ lifts 70
Watchman booth 100
Fire house, Garage 100-150
 All Water Monitors to be converted to Aqua Foam Monitors

 Foam Barrels should be stored under shed.
RISK ANALYSIS
 DCP Fire Extinguishers to be kept above ground level, under proper shed.
 Fire Walls are not provided/ not effective. Proper Fire Break Walls to be
provided.
 Tank Farm Pump House manifold should be protected with fixed fire fighting
system.
 Painting of Tanks & Pipe Lines to be done as per IP/ IS Codes.
 Truck loading/ unloading facilities should be located close to product
movement gate and should be oriented to provide one-way traffic pattern for
entrance and exit.

Ch-7 - Risk Analysis

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Ch-7 - Risk Analysis

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EIA STUDY FOR GRASSRROT BG RAILFED POL STORAGE DEPOT AT MOINARBAND,

SILCHAR, CACHAR, ASSAM

7.0 RISK ANALYSIS

Scope of the study

 Identification of potential hazard areas;

Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 127 of 200

“Risk” is defined as a likelihood of an undesired event (accident, injury or death)

“Hazard” is defined as a physical situation, which may cause human injury,

“Hazardous Substance” means any substance, which by reason of its chemical

“Hazardous Process” is defined as any process or activity in relation to an

“Disaster” is defined as a catastrophic situation that causes damage, economic

“Accident” is an unplanned event, which has a probability of causing personal

“Emergency” is defined as a situation where the demand exceeds the

Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 128 of 200

“Emergency Preparedness” is one of the key activities in the overall

7.3 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY

Phase-I: Hazard Identification

Phase-II: Hazard Assessment and Evaluation

PHA is a part of the US Military Standard System Safety Program requirements.

where energy can be released in an uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of

The results include recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the

Phase-III & IV: Disaster Management Plan (DMP) and

7.4 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Typical schemes of predictive hazard evaluation and quantitative risk analysis

Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 130 of 200

Estimation of probability of an unexpected event and its consequences form the

7.4.2 Classification of Major Hazardous Substance

7.5 MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS (MCAA) APPROACH

MCA analysis does not include quantification of the probability of occurrence of

Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to

and handling of the hazardous materials are examined to establish their

 Type of compound viz. flammable or toxic;

In addition to be above factors, the location of a unit or activity with respect to

 Chemical inventory analysis;

7.5.3 Common Causes of Accidents

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7.5.4 Failures of Human Systems

 Stress induced by poor equipment design, unfavourable environmental

7.5.5 Maximum Credible Accident Analysis (MCAA)

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Major hazards posed by flammable storage can be identified taking recourse to

7.6 RISK ANALYSIS

7.6.2 Hazards of Equipment/Pipeline Handling Petroleum Products

Catastrophic failure of the shell of a storage tank is a very rare phenomenon,

7.6.3 Brief Review of Safety Related Facilities

I. Well planned layout (as per guidelines of OISD 118).

7.6.3.2 Fire Fighting Facilities

a) Fire Hydrants and Monitors

Layout of fire hydrants & monitors and isolation valves shall be in

b) Spray Protection System

ii] Portable Fire Fighting Apparatus

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7.6.3.3 Safety Valves

7.7 RISK ASSESSMENT

Consequence analysis is basically a quantitative study of hazard due to various

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area, an understanding of the hazard potential and remedial measures to be

7.7.2 Modes of Failure

7.7.3 Damage Criteria

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In case of MS having relatively higher vapour pressure, there is a possibility of

Projects & Development India Limited, Sindri 139 of 200

7.7.4 Dispersion and Stability Class