Wordsworth's Panentheism Daniel Dombrowski Creighton University, Omaha, Neb. Most critics seem quite self-assured when they dis- ‘cuss what Wordsworth meant by God, but the conflicts among. scholars on this topic make one wonder if Wordsworth’s concept of God is in a state of confusion Some interpreters see him as a pantheist, such that his closest philosophical model was Spinoza.! Others deny that hhe was a pantheist, even if they donot know what sort of theist he was? Still others see 2 shift in Wordsworth's thought away fom a pantheistic, naturalistic early period to some other form of theism later on. These scholars dis- agree about exactly when and to what extent this shift took place, but they are alike in having a great deal of difficulty Aescribing Wordsworth’s later theism, which never quite fits the traditional Western mold? A resolution of the problems surrounding Worlsworth’s God can be found, 1 think, fone compares Wordsworth with Whitehead, who was neither a pentheist nor & classical thest, bt a ps theist The mistake most interpreters make isto assume that divive immanence and transcendence are mutually exclusive. My purpose in this article is to defend the panen- theistic interpretation of Wordsworth with the aid of the greatest living panentheist, Charles Hartshorne, who is also the greatest living defender of Whitehead, who was a devotee of Wordsworth himself. ARer analyzing Hartshomne’s thought about God, I will use his thought to examine several texts from Wordsworth, Then I will suggest why it i plausible to claim that Wordsworth was 4 pinentheist in spite of himself, m that he never would Ihave used the word “panentheism.® Hartshorne fully accepts the goal of the traditional Chistian philosophers; ie, logical analysis in the service of a higher end. But he holds that the classical conception, of God is internally incoherent. One of the major com- plaints Hartshome has with classical theism (in philosophy and theology, 3s opposed to Biblical theism) is that it either explicitly or implicitly identifies God as active and, not passive. St. Thomés's unmoved mover is the most ob- vious example of this tendency, but in general classical theists see God as a timeless, supernatural being that does not change. The classical theist’s inconsisteney lies in his also claiming that God knows and loves. For example, if God knows God must be a subject on the analogy of hhuman subjects, and if God is a subject who knows God rmust be afected by, be passive with respect to, the object known It will be to our advantage to get as clear as we can ‘on what we mean by the term “Cod.” For Hartshome, the term refers to the supremely excellent, or all-worship- 136 fal being. As is well known, Hartshorne has been the most important defosder of St. Anselm's ontological argument in this century, and bis debt to St. Anselm is evideat in this preliminary definition. It closely resembles St. An- seln’s “that than which no greater can be conceived.” Yet the ontological argument is not what is at stake here. Even if the argument fails, which Hartshorne would doubt, the preliminary definition of God as the supremely excellent being, the all-worshipful being, or the greatest conceivable being seems unobjectionable. To say that God can be de- fined in these ways sill leaves open the possbilty that Gol is even more excellent or worshipful than our ability to conceive, This allows us to avoid objections from mys- tics who fear that by defining God we are limiting God to “merely” human language. All Hartshorne is suggesting is that when we think of God we must be thinking of a being that surpasses al others, oF we are not thinking of God, Even the atheist or agnostic would admit this mach, When the atheist says “There is no Cod," he ie denying that a supremely excellent, all-worshipful, greatest con- ceivable being, exists ‘The contrast “excellent-inferior” isthe truly invidi- ous contrast when applied to God. If to be invidious is to be injurious, then this contrast is the most invidious one of all when applied (both terms) to God because God is only excellent. God is inferior in no way. To suggest that God is in some small way inferior to some other being is to no longer speak about God but about some being that is not supremely excellent, or all-worshipful, or the greatest concetsable, Hartshorne's major criticism of dlass- fal theism is that it hes assumed that all contrasts, or most of them, when applied to God are invidious Let us assume from now on that God exists. What attributes does God possess? Consider the following two columns of attributes in polar contrast to each other: one mary being becoming. setivity asivity permanence change recessty ‘contingency self-sufficient dependent setual potential absolute relive abstract concrete ‘Clessical theism tends toward oversimplification. It is com- pantively easy to say “Cod is strong rather than weak, s0 in all relations God is active, not passive.” In each ease,the classical theist decides which member of the contrast- ing pair is good (on the left), then attributes it to God, ‘while wholely denying the contrasting term (on the right). Hence, God is one, but not many; permanent but not changing This leads to what Hartshome calls “the monopolir prejudice.” Monopolasty is common to both classical theism and pantheism, with the major difference between the two being the fect that classical theism admits the reality of plurality, potentiality, and becoming as asec- ondary fori of existence “outside” God (on the right); ‘whereas, in pantheism, God includes all reality within it. self, Common to both classical theism and pantheism is the belie that the above categorical contrasts are invidi- ‘ous. The dilemma these two positions face is that ether the deity is only one constituent of the whole (classical theism), or the alleged inferior pole in each contrast (on the right) is illusory (pantheism). 1 will show that ‘Wordsworth avoided both of these positions For Hartshome this dilemma is artificial. It is pro- duced by the assumption that excellence is found by separating and purifying one pole (on the left) and grating the other (on the right). That this is not the case can be seen by anelyzing some of the attributes on the right side. At least since St. Augustine, classical theists Ihave boon convinced that Cod'e eternity meant not that Gol endared through all time, but that God was outside of time altogether and did not. could not, be receptive to temporal change. St. Thomas identified God, following Aristotle, who was the greatest predecessor to classical theism, as unmoved. Yet bath activity and passivity ean be either good or bad. Good passivity is likely to be called sensitivity, responsiveness, adaptability, sympathy, and the like. Insufficiently subtle or defective passivity is called ‘wooden inflexibility, mulish stubborness, inadaptabilty, unresponsiveness, and the like. To deny God passivity al- together is to deny God those aspects of passiaty which are excellences. Or again, to altogether deny God the abil. ity to change avoids fcklencss, but at the expense of the ability to lovingly react to the sufferings of others. For ‘Wordeworth this too great a price to pay, at we shal coo ‘The terms on the left side have both good and bad aspects as well. Oneness can mean wholeness; but also it ‘ean mean monotony or trivalty. Actualty can mean def- initeness; but also it can mean non-relatedness to others. ‘What happens to divine love when God, according to St ‘Thomas, is claimed to be pure actuality? God ends up lov- ing the world, bt is not intrinsically related to it, whatever sort of love that may be. Sel-sufficiency can, at times, be selfishness. ‘The trick when thinking of God, for Hartshorne, is to attribute to God all excellences (left and right sides) and not to attribute to God any inferiortes (right and left sides). Io short, excollont-inferior, knowledge ignorance, or good-evil are invidious contrasts, but cne-many, being 137 becoming, et al., are non-invidious contrasts. Unlike cass- ‘cel theism and panthsism, Hartshorne’s theism is dipolar. Tobe specific, within each pole ofa non-invidious contrast (eg., permanence-change) there are invidious elements {inferior permanence or inferior change), but also nos-in- vidious, good elements (excellent permanence or excellent change). Hartshorne does not believe in two gods, ene uni and the other plural. Rather he believes that what are often thought to be contraries are really mutually interde- pendent correlative: “The good as we know itis unity-in- varity, or variety-in-unity: ifthe variety overbelances, we hhave chaos or discord; if the unity, we have monotony or trivalty” (PSG, 3). Supreme excellence, if it i truly su- preme excellence, must somehow be able to integrate all the complexity there is in the world into itself as one spiritual whole. The word “must” indicates divine neces- sity along with God's essence, which is to necessarily exist. ‘And the word “complexity” indicates the contingency which affects God through creaturely decisions or feelings. But in the classical theistic view, God is solely identified wit the stony immobility ofthe absolute, implying nor-re- latedness to the world. For Hartshorae, God in the abstract nature, God's being, may in a way escape from the temporal lux, but a living God is related to the world ‘of becoming, which entails divine becoming as well if the world in some way is internally related to God. The class- ical theis's alternative to this view suggests that all re- lationships to God are extemal to divinity, once again threatening not only God's love, but also Gods nobility. ‘A dog's being behind a particular rock affects the dog in certain ways, thus this relation is an internal relation to the dog, But it does not affect the rock, whose relationship with the dog is extemal to the rock's nature, Does this not show the superiority of canine consciousness, which 4s aware of the rock, o rocklike existence, which Is una- ware of the dog? Is it not therefore peculiar that God has been described solely in rocklike terms: pure actuality, permanence, only having external relations, unmoved, boing not becoming? In short, the divine being becomes. or the divine be- coming is — God's being and becoming form a single re- ality: *.. There is no law of logic agains atributing con- trasting predicates to the same individual, provided they apply to diverse asprcts of this individual... God is neither being as contrasted to becoming nor becoming 8s contrasted to being: but categorically supreme becoming in which there is inferior being” (PSG, 14-15, 24). Thus, Hartshorne's theism can be called panentheism, which lit- erally means “all in God.” God is neither completely re moved from the world, or unmoved by it, asin classical theism, nor completely identified with the world, as in ppantheism. Rather, God is, first, world.inclusive in the sense thet Cod carer forall the world; and all feokngs in the world — especially suffering feelings — are felt byGod; and, secondly, transcendent in the sense that God is greater than any other being, especially because of God's love My thesis i that Wordsworth was neither a panthetst nora classical theist. Throughout his career his works bear the stamp of panentheism. As late as 1835, when many see him having completely abandoned his supposed earlier partheism. he states: “And nature God disdained not.”* ‘Wordsworth’s theism was always a nature-oriented theism of some sort, and at odds with classical theism. Yet at least as early as 1804, when some suggest he did net see God. as transcendent, we can see him talk of God as: the Upholder of the trangul soul, ‘That tolerates the indiguties of Time, And, from the ceatre of tery All haste motions overruling, Ines In glory immutable (relade, M1, 17-191 (1790-1608), A pantheistic Cod does not uphold souls, nor can st be described in such Platonic terms, bat more on Plato later. More fruitful than a genetic approach to Wordsworth’s theism is my hypothesis regarding his lifelong panentkeism, which, when used as a heuristic de- vice, is quite fruitful.” Has justice been done to these fa- ‘mous lines? And I have felt ‘A presence that dsturbs me with the joy ‘OF elevated thoughts; & sense sublime Of something far more deeply iterfused, ‘Whose dwelling is the light of seting suns, And the round ocean and the living ai, ‘And the blae aby, ‘A motion anda spint, that impels AAI thinking things, all objects of ll thought, ‘And rolls through all things. (Tintern Abbey.” I. 98.108 (1708)) in the mind of man: Granted, the presence that disturbs Wordsworth rolls through all things, dwells in setting suns, the oceans, the air, and in the mind of man. But this presence also impels all thiokiug things, implying that this presence has some sort of independent existence on its own. More accurate than the suggestion that God is in all things is the claim that all things are in God, messing that all that happens in the world makes a difference to God. The raind of man becomes: "In beauty exalted, ar it is itself OF quality and fabric more divine.” (Prelude, XIV, 453.54). God cares for us even when the world which is different from God's being if not God's becoming, does not. Wordsworth speaks 138 In gratitude to God, Who feeds oor hearts For His avn service; knoweth, loveth us, When we we unegarded by the worl (@relede, XM 276-78), If these lines are inconsistent with pantheism, those in the remarkable selection below are equally inconsistent with classical theism. Do they indicate that Wordsworth’s theism was a panentheism, which, again, means “all in Goa"? *.. all beings live with god, themselves/ Are god, Existing ia the mighty whole” It is premature to hold that “If any language is pantheistic, this surly is," as Rader claims." Ifthe above lines mean that the whole is greater than the sum ofthe parts, which is a tenable interpretation supported by many cther texts, then Wordsworth’s lan- guage here is not pantheiste. ‘Trying to have one’s cake ancl eat it too is impossible; crying like Plato's child for both being and becoming (Sophist, 40D), for divine transcendence and immanence, is not impossible at al Listen! The mighty Being is awake, ‘And doth with his eternal motion make ‘A scund lite thurder — everlastingly. (lt is a beauteous evening,” Il. 6-8) God is net only “mighty Being” but also “eternsl motion.” In fact, itis largely God's eternal motion, unlike our tem porary or intermittent motion, which makes God such a mighty Being. Regarding the sounds of « mountain echo Wordsworth tells us to: “Listen, ponder, hold them dear: 4 For of God — of God they are” CYes, itis @ mountain Echo,” Il 19-20). But conceming a seashell he says, at the same period in his career, that ven such a shell the wnlverse ell 1s to the ear of Faith; and there are times 1 doubt not. when to you it doth impart Authentic tidings of snotible things. (Excursion, IV, 141-144) Divine perfection lies, he implies, in dipolaity. After view- ing Leonardo's “Last Supper’ Wordsworth notices: “The love deep-seated in the Savior's face" ("The Last Supper,” 1. 9). Yet Wordsworth also believes that the superiority of the Christian God to pagan deities (nature deities! lies ln God's impenctrabily (Saggested on a Sabbath mora- ing” I. 54). Wordsworth avoids the conflict found in class- ical theism when it cltims thet God is both an unmoved mover and a God of love. That is, for Wordsworth, God ie impenetrable because Cou's love is 40 deep-seated. What have previous interpreters of Wordeworth's ‘concept of God done with the following lines, written about rocks and clouds? TheyWere all lke workings of one mind, the features (Ff the same face, blossoms upon one tee: Characters of the great Apocalypse, ‘The types and symbols of Eternty. Of fst, and lst, and midst, and without end (Prelude, VI, 635-640) God is not only one, which even a pantheist could admit, but one mind. Its not only the defects in pantheism that Wordsworth corrects, but also these, perhaps primarily those, of classical theism: “The immortal Mind craves ob- jeots that endure” (“Those words were uttered,” 1.12). It is true that Wordsworth calls God “Etermal Lori!” in the 1897 sonnet by the same name, and holds that, “The wise man, I aflirm, can find no rest / In that which perishes” (CNo mortal abject,” I. 9-10, {published, 1807). But he also believes, and not inconsistently, that God breathes ("The prayers I make,” I. 8), and has a love whick remains unquenched (Excursion, LV, 50-51). Al can agree with Wordsworth that the term God refers to “Supremacy” ("Not utterly Unworthy,”L 1). But what does it mean to be supreme? To exist necessarily and to be steadfast, yes; but also to be merciful (Outstretching flaneword,” 1.2), or beter, to be a fountain of grace ("By chain yet stronger.” I. 8). a God of peace ("Scattering like birds,” 114), Supremacy consists in a harmonious balance of flexibility and duty, which is the “stern daughter” of God's voice (“Ode to Duty,” Il. 1-2). Notice below, on the ‘one hand, the words “sorrow” and “friend,” and on the other, “never” ‘Ohl There is never sorrow of heart ‘That shall ack a timely end, I but to Gad we turn, and ask Of Him to be our fend! (The Force of Prayer” H. 65-68) ‘Wordsworth’s panentheism is evident not only in the poems cited above, which were written in the wide period between 1798 and 1837, but also in “Ode: Intimations of Immortality.” Wordsworth wishes his days to be bound with “natural piety.” and the youth is “Nature's priest.” But is this theism, which has come to terms with nature, and has linked nature with God, a pantheism? What is lit- tle noticed is that the blessed events in nature which par- ticipate in the divine life ere “Creatures,” with whom heaven laughs. The term “Creature” makes no sense with- out a Creator. Nor is it often emphasized, although i is, mentioned, that Wordsworth’s theism is an affair of the rind as well as of the heart: his “head hath its coronal.” We are in the life of Cod in that Cod knows us, feels us, loves us. But Wordsworth believes in a God “who is cour home,” and we are not fully at home in this world ‘The childs the one who is a “Mighty prophet, seer blest,” with *heaven-bor freedom.” We adults notice that the vi- 19 slonary gleam, the glory and the dream, of our home has faded. However, "We will grieve not, rather find/ Strength. in what remains behind My claim is that panentheism is oe of the things that remains behind, for us perhaps an acquisition of the “years that bring the philosophic mind.” We human being: are dipoles, but not supremely so; we become, and yet have an identity through time. God's supreme becoming, speaks to us through the rainbow that comes and goes: the birds, as Hartshome, who is also an expert on bird song, more than anyone knows; and through timely utier- ances. Concomitantly: “Our noisy years seem moments in the being / Of the eternal silence.” It might be objected that my panentheistic interpre- tation of Wordsworth is highly unlikely because he never real Harshome, nor did he ever consider Whitehead's distinction between God as primordial and Ged as eon- sequent. This charge may be bit to hasty, however. Al- ‘though the word was not used in antiquity, panentheism, cor at Toast dipolar theism, is as old as Pato, Just as one ‘ean be a Platorist without knowing it, so one can be a parenthest. At with regard to Platonism, ‘Wordsworth was a self:conscious participant. He said to Emerson in 1848 that if the Republic were published as a new book it would have few readers, yet “we have em- bodied i al."* We" refers a! least to Wordsworth himself and Coleridge, but perhaps also to the Cambridge Platonists, Thomas Taylor (with his researches and trans- lations), and Scleiermacher (especially his Introduction to the Dialogues of Hato), all of which were well rep- resented in Wordsworth’s library at Rydal Mount. The ce erences to Plato in the Concordance to Wordsworh’s poetry are perhaps greater in number than those to a other thirker. Wordsworth refers to “Plato's genius,” his “re sub id the “everlasting praie” dvc to him. His truth is that “half of truth” most neglected in Eng- sland.” ‘the other half, widely accepted, was the Aristote- lian tradition of empiricism. One scholar goes so far as to claim that the revival of interest in Plato may be the ‘most important single facet of the Romantic movement.” In short, if Plato were a panenthest, it would not be an exctic guess to suspect that it was through him that Wordsworth got his panentheism. lest Certain Platonic texts are obvious sources. In the Sophist (246-249) the Eleatic Straager develops the ma- ture Platonie metaphysics, which is opposed by both the “giants,” who are the materilists (or, we might say, the pantheists) who drag everything down from the heaven to faith; and the “gods.” (or, we might say, the classical theists) who defend their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen Reality is dyadic for Plato, and is corstituted by anything (being or becoming) which has dyramis, the power to affect or be affected by somethinglse* Eyen in the Republic, Plato avoids what many Plaionists have assumed to be the Platonic postion: un- bridled worship of being. The tak of the philosopher (GOIB) fs to glance frequently in two directions: fist, at the Form of Justin, Beauty, and the like as they are in the nature of things, but also at this caveike world, where fone must try to reproduce the Forms to the extent that ‘one can, or atleast recognize the extent to which material justice or beauty participate in formal reality As has often been noticed, but seldom understood fully, Wordsworth had a yearning for the One underlying the Many," but also an appreciation of the extent to which each of the many was itself possessive of a certain degree of unity, or ese each of these would nct be a tree, this cloud, et al Perhaps the most coavincing studies of Plato's them, and the dyadie charscter of being in Plato, have been done by Leonard Eslick, who relies on Hartshome, whom Eslick cites as the first to recognize Plato as a di poler theist There are two significant ways in which Plato talks about God (theos). First he inherited from Par- renides the notion that being is eternal, immutable, and selfsame. It is this notion which was the starting point for the tradition of classical, monopolar theism, “The ex- tent to which Plato is committed to such an absolute schism between being and becoming ...would seem to dictate for him a similar exclusion from divinity of all shadow of change.” This tendency is evidenced in Book Two of the Republic, the Phaedo |78-80), and the Sym- posium (202-203). However, as Eslick and others hold, there is no textual foundation for the popular identification (of Plato's God with the transcendent Form of the Good, nor even with the world of Forms, either as a whole or in part Even when talking about divine eternity and im- ‘mutability, the Platonic locus for divinity is pyche oF neus. It comes as a shock to some readers of Plato, who have only read the Republic, Phacdo, and Symposium, that in the Phaedrus (245, etc.) Erosis claimed tobe divine. Here Plato discovers, according to Eslick, a new. dynamic mean- ing for perfection, similar to the one described abave, and exemplified in the selections I have chosen from Wordsworth.” The perfection which is dynamic isthe per- fection of life itself, trated not only in the Phardrus but in Book ‘Ten of the Lewy as well In the Timeus and the Sophist both poles in Plato's theism are brought together: the perfection of divine im- mutability and the perfection of divine life, The former is identified im the Timtus with the Demiurge, who eter- nally and without change contemplates the ‘srchetypal models, the etemal Forms. The latter is identified with the World Soul — which is close to Word:worth’s!® panpsychism — whose essence is self-motion, and is de- picted as posterior to the Demiurge ! The motions of psy- chic life include both actions and passions. In fat, in the Sophist, as has been noted above, reality is identified with dynamis o- power; specifically, the power to aflect or be i) alfected by others. Even Arstotle attests to the fact shat realy, for Plato, isthe joint prodoet of the One and the Tiwlefinite Dyad (tetuphyst, A). Unfortunatly, Aris- totl’s ov notion of God loses the Platonic character of divine immanence, of God as the Wordsworthian soul of the world. Even more unfortunate isthe fact that Plotinus, and others who became identified as followers of Phito, ‘were with respest to their descriptions of God really Aris- totelans. Ik is not unreasonable to speculate that Wordsworth saw the inadequacies of latter day Flatomists. We have seen that he claimed about Platonism that “we have embodied it al.” In the following poem Wordsworth indicates that truths about God can be searched for in terms of a Platonic piety. God is the immortal one, henee solitary; but also 2 builder, although Wordsworth was abvays scep- tical about talk of Gad as a creator, even if be engaged in such talk himself at times® God is above the starry sphere, hence dark; yet not alone, ia that God whispers to.as and allows us to see God. Yet Truth i keenly sought for, and the wind Charged wih rich words poured out in hought’ defense: ‘Whether the Church inspite thit eloquence, Or & Platonie pity confired ‘To the sole temple of the inward minis ‘And One there is who builds immortal lays, ‘Though doomed to tread in soltary ways, Dariness before and danger's voice behind Yet not alone, nor helpless to repel Sad thoughts; for from above the stany sphere Cone secrets, whispered nightly to his ear ‘And the pore spit of celestial light Shines through his soul — ‘that he my sce and tel ‘Of things invisible to mortal sight.” (CResesiatcal Sonnets, “Latleudinaranlm,” 1821) Cation must be displayed when putting Wordsworth into a cetegory, or when alfixing a label to him?" But even those Wordsworth interpreters who make this point themselves categorize Wordsworth and affix labels to him, at least if they are interpreters. The trick 4s to avoid egregious errors in categorization, and to affix labels without dogmatism so that the texts themselves can breathe, To call Wordsworth a pantheist or a classical theist (or an orthodox believer) isto leave something sig- nificant in Wordsworth's thought unexplained. To eal him a panentheist sto get alittle closer, I think, to his thought on God. Yet when dealing with thoughts as rich as those of Wordsworth, too deep for tears, getting a little closer may be going a long way. NOTES 'Sce Helen Darbihire, “Wordsworth’s Prelude,” in W.]Haney and Richard Gravil, eds,, Wordsworth: The Prelude (0072), p. 05; Herbert Read, Wordseurth (1850), pp. 47, 104; Johs Jones, The Egotistial Sublime (1854), pp. 36, 4, 74; and Jonsthan Wordsworth, The Music of Humanty (1960), p. 213, Who notices that Wordsworth never repudiated his belief in One Life, and if 1 anderstand Jonathan Wordbworth correctly, ‘Wordsworth never completely abandoned his pantheism, Two ‘other scholars imply, but they aze not explicit, that Wordsworth was a panthoist. Stephen Pricket, Coleridge and Wordsworth (097), pp. 80, 96, 105, 194; and Kenneth Johnston, Wordsworth and “The Recluse” (1988), pp. 15, 9. 2Wilard Spery, “Wordsworths Religion.” in Giert Dunkin, ed, Wordsworth (1851), p. 185; Pal Sheats, The Mal {ng of Wordswortlis Poetry, 1786-1795 (1978), pp, 21-213, where the author ightly holds that Wordsworth's Godis both immanent and ranscendent, but he doesnot explain indepth how tis could ‘be and Richard Brantley, Wordsword's “Naural Methodem (0975) pp. 164-165, who alo is correct in dstieguising between nature a8 the work of God and God ivelf bt he, ke Sheats, does not stow how Wordsworth theism was “aot finaly hod.” if orthodoxy const in something, ike what I vail cll clasca theism This view & at leat as old as Stopford Brooke's lectures ‘1872. On Brooks's attempt to weal the supposed ambigutior of Wordsworth’s religious experience into a theologically sound continuuto, even if Wordkworth somtimes veered toward pan= theism, see Harvey and Grav op. cit. pp. 2021. Als see HW. Garned, Wordsworth: Lectures and Essays (1938), ith Batho, The Later Wordscorth (1933); James Logan, Wordsworthion Criticism 961), p. 112; and John Hodgson, Wordsworth’s Philesophical Poctry, 1797-1814 (980), p. 89. Two other scholars deserve notice: Alin Greb, The Philosyphic Mind: A Study of Wordsworti’s Poetry and Thought, 1797-1805 (973), pp. 24,93, 238, who sees a shit in Wordsworth from panthelsm to transoen dental Cistianty; ard Jonathan Wordsworth, William Wordsworth: The Borders of Vison (1982), pp. 23, 24,26, 180, 320, etal, who modifies the postion of his earlier book in that he believes William Wordsworth somewhat replaces his parth: ‘slom with human imegination, which takes on Godlike powers ‘Molin Rader comes close to such & resolstion, See Wordsworth: A Philosophical Approsch (1987), pp. 59, 200; also see “Whitehead” in the Index. Against the pantheistic interpre- tation, Rader eltes Wordsworth’s 4 denial of the charge that hhe was a pantheist, p. 198. Raderis by no means consisent, how ever, in his treatment of Wordsworth’s panentheism. See pp. 78, 162, 200. Alo ste Alexander Cappon's two studies: About Wordsworth ond Whitehead (1982), p. 62; and Aspects of Wordsworth and Whitehead (1983), pp. 122133. 51 wil concentrate on three of Hartshome’s many works Philosophers Speak of Cod (1959, hereafer: FSG; tights and Ovenights of Grat Thinkers (1883), and “In Defense of Wordswors View of Malate.” Phbophy ond Llerature 4 (0980, 0.8, 1 “Eedesiostical Sonnets, “Deplorable his Tot” LL. all Wordsworth quotations are, unless otherwise noted, from Themae Hutchinson and Emest DeSelinzout,eds., Werdsworth: Foeical Works (1974). all words emphasized in Wordsvorth's poems are my doing. 74 should make st clear that 1 am dealing specticlly with ‘Wordsworth’ consept of God in this artile, not with his attitud» toward organized religions, popular pretensions to piety, or the ike Regarding these latter isues Wordswerth's thought did change, asi evidenced in hi poem “Decay of Piety” (published 1827). However, { am willing to admit a change of emphasis within Wordsworth’s pasentheism as he got elder. Rader quotes these lines from Prelude often (pp. 36,198, te); see Emest DeSelincourt, ed, The Prelude (1926), p. 512 Also see Prelude, VILL 85, where Wordsworth refers tothe soul, which “pasting through all Nature rest with God.” Quote fom page 198, David Newsome, Teo Clases of Men: Patontm end Eng- sh Romertic That 974, p. 9 "sce Rader, pp. 12°73; Newsome, pp. 26-27 1G.M. Harper, The Neoplatonim of Willam Blake (1961), p. 964 See my Plto’s Philosophy of History (1981) onthe Seph- See Newsome, p. 16 Leonard sick, “Plato as Dipolar Theist” Process Studies, 12 (1982), 243.251. Also see his “The Dyadic Character of Being,” Modern Schoalman, 21 (1958-1954), 1-18. Back, “Phto as Dipolar Theis,” p. 244, "Ip addition to Eslick, see the study of PE, Moore, The Religion of Plato 0021). sick, “Phto as Dipolar Theis.” p. 245, Sec my forthcoming book Not Even ¢ Sparrow Fill: Harihome, God, and Animalt, especially the chapter on Wordsworth and my various treatments of parpsychiem or psy- chicalism, On the relationship between Plato's World Soul and Wordsworl’s “Ove Life” see Jonathan Wordsworth, Willam Wordsworth: The Border: of Viton, pp. 39, 14, 419 note 36 nader, p. 5, ressts the contention that Plato's Word Soul is to be idensified with deity. See Timaus (348) where it {5 quite clear thatthe Worhd-Soul is a Messed God, and (90-31) where the World-Soul is described as perfect io the Phiebur (20) the World-Seul i fairest and most precious; abo ace the Laws (896-599)Qu creation ex nfo see Hartshorne's Onmipatence and Other Theclogical Mistates (198) See a good treatment of Wordsworth’s notion of God In John Paski, Preface to Wordsworth (1982), pp. 79-05, This a thor does not Mle Wordsworth being called pastheist, but stretches his cate a bitin favor of Wordsworth’s orthodoxy with respect to God. Again, 10 become more orthodox with respect te raligious cult isnot necessarily to hold the orthodox predicates applied to God Presence, Absence, and the Difference: Wordsworth’s Autobiographical Construction of the Romantic Ego Eugene L, Stelzig SUNY College at Genesco After listening to Wordsworth’s recitation of the 1805 Prelude, Coleridge identified its true subject as “the foundation and the building wp / Of a Human Spirit” (To Wiliam Wordsworth,” 5-6). The spirit building or shrine of The Prelude is an omcular project fairy consistently in- formed by a heightened Romantic poetics of “presence.” Right at the start The Prelude strikes a bold note of spiritual renovation, “prophesy,” and “holy services,” as the poet finds his voice fully present to himself ("my own voice cheared me”) (I, 60-64), Yet as students ofthe poem know too well, this is only half the story for the poet's supreme assurance of his fitness for his appointed task has a dark double or shadow which manifests itself, almost im- mediately, as a halting counter-thetorie of the failure or encumbrance of the poet's will, voice, end power. This anxious counter current at once calls into question and de- fines Wordswort’s autobiography, for his exemplary and selfassured buthling up of the poet's “spit” ts frustrated almost at every turn by a sease of “absence,” snd some- times by a traumatic recognition af the “difference” — to uote one of the “Lucy” poems — between presence and absence, 25 well as between present, past, and future In other words, Wordsworth’ autobiographical con- struction of the self involves the assertion of a poeties of presence called into question by an equally powerful pres- sure of absence, by the nighimare of a faltering self bur- dened by the loss ofits voice and a coherent sense of its proper identity. This isa “blank desertion” (1, 422) which Wordsworth can suffer, paradoxically, even in his supreme moments of selfconsciousness, the “spots of time,” which are frequently ambivalent moments of troubled selfex- perience. Moreover, if Wordworth’s fashioning of the Romantic ego is threstened by self-doubt, the language ‘of absence which signs this fact sometimes reaches out to its opposite in a confessional movement of sef-(relas- surance, a strviag for a recovered, strong ego that is lo cated somewhere in the past and that the autobiographer a hopes can be tansferted to the present and the future So at the end of the opening bock of the 1805 Prelude, Wordsworth acknowledges his need to “fix the wavering balance of (his) mind” as the "hope" to “fetch / Invigorat- ing thoughts from former years” (648.649). As he charac. terzes this compensatory plot of converting absence into presence in that poigrant confessional moment of Prelude XI, he “would enshrine the spirit of the past / For future restoration” (341-342). Such an identificble pattern of a ‘weik and anxious self recoiling to past moments of strength and “the hiding places of (its) power’ (995) is ‘Wordsworth’s distinctive contribution to Romantic suto- biography: ‘The gap or “difference” between “presence” and ‘absence” might be called the particular location of Wordswoith’s best confessional poetry. In the symbolic “Lacy” Iyses, for through the speaker's elegioc lament at Lucy's untimely demise: “But she is in her grave, and, oh. / The difference to me!” (‘She Dwelt Among the Untrodden Ways"). The threat of absence and loss haunting Wordsworth, his human fears” CA Slumber Did My Spirt Seal") of mor- tality — “the memory of whet has been, /And never more will be” ("Three Years She Grew") —is focussed in the stark Lucy seript as the graphic reducticn of the human to the gravitational motion of mere matter ("Rolled round in earth's diurnal course, / With rocks, and stones, and trees") ("A Slumber Did My Spint Seal”). The elegiac dialectic of present absence and absent presence at work im the “Loey” poems isalso enacted at length in such major naratives of naked human suffering as Michael and The Ruined Cottage, where Wordsworth’ anxicties find objec~ tive correlatives through such starkly symbolic signfiers 4s Michael’ unfinished sheepfold and Margarets ruined ‘cottage. This graphic architecture of absence again equates death with the terminally insensate and material even ax it movingly commemorates the dear presence of those de- ance, this “difference” is dramatized