VI.

From these premises, the Court is able to make the following binding conclusions. First, there
is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for
transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which
should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as
appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration
on 17 April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such
mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an
OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to
an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT
claims over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates appearing
on their respective titles.

Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT
No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the
conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind
any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.

With these conclusions, what then is the proper course of action to take with respect to the
pending motions for reconsideration? Considering that CLT and the Dimsons clearly failed to
meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and
recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal of their original
complaints before the trial court. However, such solution may not satisfactorily put to rest the
controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate.

More pertinently, after the instant petitions were filed with this Court, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the OSG, had sought to intervene.  The Republic did not participate as a
1âwphi1

party when these cases were still before the trial courts and the Court of Appeals. While the
Republic had originally prayed for the grant of the petitions filed by all the petitioners in these
consolidated cases, instead it presently seeks of the Court the promulgation of a new ruling
upholding the validity of OCT No. 994 issued73 or registered74 on May 3, 1917. Rather than
suggest whether the petitions be granted or denied, the OSG argues that after a declaration
from this Court that it is the 3 May 1917 mother title that is valid, "a remand of this case to the
Court of Appeals, to settle which among the private parties derived their titles from the existing
OCT 994, is proper"75

Notably, both the Manotoks and Araneta are amenable to the remand of the petition, albeit
under differing qualifications. The Manotoks submit that there should be a remand to the court
of origin, consolidating all the present petitions, and that a full trial be conducted by the trial
court.76 On the other hand, Araneta proposes four (4) options for the Court to consider: (1) the
dismissal of the original complaint filed by Dimson; (2) a ruling granting Araneta’s appeal and
dismissing Dimson’s complaint, but at the same time remanding the case to a new division of
the Court of Appeals for factual determination pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court; (3) the suspension of the resolution of the present motion for reconsideration while the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for factual determination; or (4) the remand of the
proceedings to the Court of Appeals for the reception of further evidence, particularly the
Senate and DOJ Reports, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, and the
consequent resolution by the appellate court of the instant petitions.

The OSG observes that during the oral arguments on the motion for reconsideration, then
Chief Justice Panganiban suggested that a remand may be required to determine the status of
the original title.77 Considering that the genuine OCT No. 994 is that issued on/ registered
on/dated 3 May 1917, a remand would be appropriate to determine which of the parties, if any,
derived valid title from the said genuine OCT No. 994. On the one hand, the appreciation of
facts is beyond the province of this Court, since it is not a trier of fact 78 as well as not
capacitated to appreciate evidence at the first instance. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals has the competence to engage in that undertaking.

Under Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, 79 the Court may,
whenever necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such
issues to any of its members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. 80 The delegate need
not be the body that rendered the assailed decision.

The Court of Appeals generally has the authority to review findings of fact. 81 Its conclusions as
to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully
capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including
documentary evidence.

In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter pending before it to the
Court of Appeals. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,82 this Court commissioned the former
Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals to hear and receive evidence on the controversy,
more particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate
Corporation, and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are ‘open spaces’ and/or
‘areas reserved for certain purposes,’ determining in the process the validity of such postulates
and the respective measurements of the areas referred to." 83 The Court of Appeals therein
received the evidence of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner’s Report" shortly
thereafter.84 Thus, resort to the Court of Appeals is not a deviant procedure.

The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the
Court of Appeals to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the
Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a
question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage
of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. 85 The order of reference can be limited
exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon
the admissibility of evidence.86 The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in
writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. 87 In Republic,
the commissioner’s report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter.
The same result can obtain herein.

VII.

The OSG likewise adverts to the findings reached in the respective investigations and reports
by the Department of Justice and the Philippine Senate, components of the two other co-equal
branches of the government. Both the DOJ Report dated 28 August 1997 and the Senate
Report dated 25 May 1998 conclude that there is only one (1) OCT No. 994 issued or
registered on 3 May 1997. The OSG argues that the contents of both of these reports may be
considered as evidence. It also points out, with basis, that these reports may be taken judicial
notice of by this Court, following Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, it cannot be
disputed that these reports fall within the ambit of "the official acts of the legislative [and]
executive… departments."88

It bears noting that the DOJ and Senate Reports were rendered on 28 August 1997 and 25
May 1998 respectively. They were issued some years after the trial courts had promulgated
their respective decisions in the Manotok and Araneta cases, and even after the Court of
Appeals handed down its decision against the Manotoks which is assailed in its present
petition.89 In Araneta’s case, the Court of Appeals had first ruled against Araneta in its Decision
dated 30 May 1997, or just shortly before the rendition of the DOJ and Senate Reports.

Since this Court is not a trier of fact, we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the
DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such
questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. The
Court, in the 2005 Decision, refused to take into account

the reports on the regrettable premise that they could somehow "override" the judicial
decisions earlier arrived at.90 The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial
decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as
the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the
DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry.
The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and
analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them.

There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out
in the remand to the Court of Appeals. The Manotoks and Araneta advert to certain factual
allegations relating to their titles and backstories to advance their respective positions. Still, if it
indeed emerges from the determination of the Court of Appeals on remand that
notwithstanding the clear flaws of the title of respondents the titles of petitioners are cut from
the same counterfeit cloth, then the Republic of the Philippines, an intervenor in these cases, is
armed anyway with any and all appropriate remedies to safeguard the legitimate owners of the
properties in question.

VIII.

The definitive conclusions reached by the Court thus far in these cases are spelled out in Part
VI of this Resolution. Said conclusions serve to guide the Court of Appeals in hearing these
cases on remand.

The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear these cases on
remand. The Special Division shall be composed of three Associate Justices of the Court of
Appeals, namely; Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga as Chairperson; Justice Lucas Bersamin
as Senior Member; and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as Junior Member.
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and
submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3)
months from finality of this Resolution.

In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is
directed to make the following determinations based on the evidence already on record and
such other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it, to wit:

i. Which of the contending parties are able to trace back their claims of title to OCT No.
994 dated 3 May 1917?

ii. Whether the imputed flaws in the titles of the Manotoks and Araneta, as recounted in
the 2005 Decision, are borne by the evidence? Assuming they are, are such flaws
sufficient to defeat the claims of title of the Manotoks and Araneta?

iii. Whether the factual and legal bases of 1966 Order of Judge Muñoz-Palma and the
1970 Order of Judge Sayo are true and valid. Assuming they are, do these orders
establish a superior right to the subject properties in favor of the Dimsons and CLT as
opposed to the claims of Araneta and the Manotoks?

iv. Whether any of the subject properties had been the subject of expropriation
proceedings at any point since the issuance of OCT No. 994 on 3 May 1917, and if so
what are those proceedings, what are the titles acquired by the Government and
whether any of the parties is able to trace its title to the title acquired by the
Government through expropriation.

v. Such other matters necessary and proper in ascertaining which of the conflicting
claims of title should prevail.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the Special Division of the Court
of Appeals for further proceedings in accordance with Parts VI, VII and VIII of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Sgd.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

No part due to relationship to one of the counsels

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Sgd. (No Part)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 See my Dissenting Opinion (No Part - On Leave)
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Sgd. See concurring and dissenting opinion:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Sgd. Sgd.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO J. AZCUNA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Sgd. I join the dissent of J. A. Gutierrez

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No part. As SolGen appeared in the

I join the dissent of J. A.S. Gutierrez
oral arguments
RUBEN T. REYES
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

Sgd.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION