THIRD DIVISION
Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
[ G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGER P.
TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained
in docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together
with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of
A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel
owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded
with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline,
and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of
P40,426,793,87. was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay
Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain
Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator
Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum
ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older
brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates,
including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were
armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos.
They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel.
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T
Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as
the PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then
painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo,
Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while
sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the
disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and
secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the
Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity
of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await
another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were
thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991,
arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it
remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and
anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's
shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored
beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to
transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-
appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride"
in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with
both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30,1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area
and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas,
but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members
of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning
not to report the incident to government authorities for a period
of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be
killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly
painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus,
Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the
crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch
was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April
10, 1991 and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the
members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members
were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The
incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation
where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that
the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant
Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in
Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by
chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were
pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were
arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or
violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine
Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN,
VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE,
and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of
qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10,
1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch and armed
with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the
Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum
products, together with the complement and crew members,
employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where
the cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the
Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.
 thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid
CONTRARY TO LAW. P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told
that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was
neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.) parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge,

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch
averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He
49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali,
ensued.
adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining
the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola,
as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board
notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to
a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as
where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of
Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of
denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any
trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and
cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their
vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were
conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain Edilberto
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by
Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board,
Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the
approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three
company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime
if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work
Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone
was light and that each worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month
operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period.
They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a
board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore,
for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the
claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival
company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan,
the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent
of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but
failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March
27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma,"
was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off
the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul
Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of
the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars
for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor
William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called
"M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be
making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was
made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine
Services, Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon
submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan,
and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not
pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely
reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T
Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-
side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired.
Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be
Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full
name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the
tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The
surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby"
signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the
payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore
in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity
and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer
of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride."
The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This
time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks,
including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T
Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March
30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that
he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo
operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for
the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines
to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the
details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact
vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at
the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha
Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name
"SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who
later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at
Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong
found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter
arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused- corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly
appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of said and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo
decision reads: in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus
interests until said amount is paid in full. After the accused
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations,
Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported
judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused
to Singapore.
Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio
Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of the
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their
crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of
detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail
Presidential Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong,
of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they
as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law,
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules
the penalty for the principals of said crime is mandatory death.
and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau
However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the
of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, ]r., and Cecilio Changco are hereby
SO ORDERED.
each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the
accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is (pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to
Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of
532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr.
accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:
and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the
Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O.
accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are
Changco
hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation
the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00 Philippine
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco
Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum
assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the
from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the
proceedings taken during the time they were being represented
accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return
by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of
to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao",
their constitutional right to procedural due process.
or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas
entered his appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in
the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial
court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the
Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and
examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio,
Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were
forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to
read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel,
and were not informed of their rights, in violation of their
constitutional rights,
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in
finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege
that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22
and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these
accused-appellants conclude, could have overpowered the
alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in
effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court
erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that
Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T
Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the
subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in
finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting
and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly
committed by him were done or executed outside of Philippine
waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction
to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court
erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record
to prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence
adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as
an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under
said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-
appellants do not prove any participation on his part in the
commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues
that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T
Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and
that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged
under the information with qualified piracy as principal under
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was
convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For
the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been
committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1)
what are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-
lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what
are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel
during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in
finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime
of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the
crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can
accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he
was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed
by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and
territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit
"20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they
were adopting the evidence adduced when they were
represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due
process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance
of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as
represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the
nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and
that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They
also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open
court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). It is true that an accused
person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115,
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact
that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However,
it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right
recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus,
the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the
accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his
rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy , but without
prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice
of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants
were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of
Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that
he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that
there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation
during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly,
and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide
lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has
been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs.
People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during
custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms
of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436
[1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which
is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial
investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may
waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even
adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in
writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-
called confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid.
In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even
shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section
12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree
doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388
[1939]). According to this rule, once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary
or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence
illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints
all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251
SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise
inadmissible in evidence against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject
confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound
deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits see and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact,
"U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the
Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime charged. In operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin
the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas
Court of Appeals - executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and
identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.
...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses,
officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, x x x
who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those
who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, x x x
at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island,
Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its x x x
cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of
Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the
shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense,
San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T
the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact,
Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00
boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2 1991 and
(American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991...
remained on board when the vessel sailed to its, destination,
x x x which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
x x x

x x x We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-

appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard
evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution
Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the
cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than
commission of the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296
one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of
[1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante,
the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did
Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were hired by
three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said
accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the
seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on
board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-
shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as
cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without
even saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing
their destination or the details of their voyage, without the
personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence
is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As
pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon,
Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the
vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely
unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p.
113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the
alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that
on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping,
suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak
defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses
(People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy
to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-
appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at
about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for
him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed
to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place
of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of
a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have
an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor
of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is
telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part
to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when
conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may
appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole
and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the
ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang,
Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch
the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of
Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus,
Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with
money for their fare and food provisions on their way home.
These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an
objective common to all other accused- appellants.
 to offenders who are members of the complement or to
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall
one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement
brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the
Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio coverage of the law.
worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are
approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The
hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in
penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person
Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant
who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being
Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity
a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the
.Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a
whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or
seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel
personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka
Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that
(Underscoring supplied.)
time remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1,
longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and 1994), reads:
penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January
Philippine waters. -The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
"superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No.
complement or passengers.
532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains
that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person"
(Underscoring ours)
mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must
be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person. including a passenger or member of the complement of
said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as
piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished
as hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high
seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a
passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No.
7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other
hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is
no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no
ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage
of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as
well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations.
As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential
Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries."
For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since the
crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state
that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel
was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done
under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure
of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality
in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the
instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy
under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree
No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force
here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761
[1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law
penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the
whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an
accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even
though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under
Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence
showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the
attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he
induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and
its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-
appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided
or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the
disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which provides:
SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting
piracy or highway robbery brigandage. -Any person who
knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway
robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government,
or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands
or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person
who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or
highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in
accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless
the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence
that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the
liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v.
Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation
of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved
in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465
[1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4
of Presidential Decree No 532 which presumes that any person
who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed
them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal
presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the
commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates
and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the
pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally directing its
transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited
therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the
quality and verified the quantity of the petroleum products,
connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the
General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal
transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities,
and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for
their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration
(Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and
utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services
personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by
Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong
not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could
have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and
this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in
Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T
Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court
showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the
disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on
March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the
"Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous
with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of
the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities,
excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for
departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore
(Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the
vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the
evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the
purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the
vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after
the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio Changco
a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the
surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH,
Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was
2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master
of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above
the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then
paid $150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount;
that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the
requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on
March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-
A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi
Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said
voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000
metric tons of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the
same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised
by accused- appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco
supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following
the orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge of the
illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny
knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he himself
received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering
that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any
participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious
circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a
single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any
contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered
to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative
to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain
Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check
the source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66
nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a
marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first
time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum
of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even
aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to
deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was
P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$l,000,000.00
(computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time).
Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value.
Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this
irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away
Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation -only
to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved.
This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that
accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his
firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was
"merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual is
justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by
a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the
means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful
(Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a
patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law.
Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated
vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said
order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration
authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to
consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself,
and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and
articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must
have realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua
Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to follow
orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo
to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must
now suffer the consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants
justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS
the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154130, October 01, 2003 ]
BENITO ASTORGA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,[1] as well as its
Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the
following Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram,
Samar, as well as a number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for
sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with unidentified persons,
who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES,
who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with
deliberate intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo
Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR
Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them
to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby
restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine
(9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group
(RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the island of
Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and
forest protection operations in line with the government's
campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed of
Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest
Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with
Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Section, as team leader. The team was escorted by
SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian.[3]
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at
2:00 p.m., where they saw two yacht-like boats being
constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials,
the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael
Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the time,
the team left Brgy. Bagacay.[4]
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted
two more boats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-
Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them
to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante
disembarked from the DENR's service pump boat and proceeded
to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor
Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to
their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of
Mayor Astorga.[5]
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1
Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the
purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice
on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed, "Puwede ko
kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga
natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay
puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make you swim
back to Tacloban. Don't you know that I can box? I can box. Don't
you know that I can declare this a misencounter?)[6] Mayor
Astorga then ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements," and
forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m.,
a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in
fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles,
and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the
team members.[7] At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the
purpose of his team's mission.[8] He then took out his handheld
ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at the
DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the team's whereabouts.
Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon's radio, saying,
"Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina
kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig." (It's better if
you have no radio so that your office would not know your
whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help).[9] Mayor
Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong
siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo
puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it
to Samar because I will not tolerate it here.)[10] Simon then
asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which
Mayor Astorga retorted that they would not be allowed to go
home and that they would instead be brought to
Daram.[11] Mayor Astorga then addressed the team, saying,
"Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon
madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay
puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you really want to
confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you confiscate
the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender
mine.)[12] Simon then tried to reiterate his request for
permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor
Astorga, who angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko
kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya." (You cannot go
home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many
things to discuss there.)[13]
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they
would be served dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga
and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted between
7:00-8:00 p.m.[14] After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1
Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to
leave the barangay.[15] On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the
rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally
allowed to leave.[16]
 this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002.[24]
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention
against Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole
above-quoted Information. error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000,
of Arbitrary Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124
wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged.[17] At the
of the Revised Penal Code, based on mere speculations, surmises
trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1
and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint
Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses
Affidavit.[18] However, the presentation of Simon's testimony
wherein the latter categorically declared petitioner's innocence
was not completed, and none of his fellow team members came
of the crime charged.[25]
forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the
DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance.[19] Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the
required quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, accused,[26] especially in light of the fact that the private
disposing of the case as follows: complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.[27] Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
the case is there any competent evidence that could sufficiently
finding accused BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary
establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons
Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
of the team members.[28] Furthermore, he claims that the mere
circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
presence of armed men at the scene does not qualify as
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months
competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the
of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8)
minds of the team members, to the extent that they would feel
months of prision correctional as maximum.
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.[29]

SO ORDERED.[20]
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person.[30] The
2001[21] which was denied by the Sandiganabayan in a elements of the crime are:
Resolution dated September 28, 2001.[22] A Second Motion for
That the offender is a public officer or employee.
Reconsideration dated October 24, 2001[23] was also filed, and
That he detains a person.
That the detention is without legal grounds.[31]
That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed
herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence,
the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a
public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of
petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On
the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his
"instinct for self-preservation" and the feeling that he was being
"singled out."[32] The detention was thus without legal grounds,
thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team
was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,[33] which involved the illegal
detention of a child, we found the accused-appellant therein
guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that any
physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However,
because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned
not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had
returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could
not leave because of his fear to violate such instruction.[34]
In the case of People v. Cortez,[35] we held that, in establishing
the intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary
that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict
her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the
offended party in said case was found outside talking to the
owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained
that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the
kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her should she
do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the
kidnappers knew where she resided and they had earlier
announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to
kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to
render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are
equivalent to the use of actual force or violence.[36]
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention
is that the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any
physical restraint upon the victim's person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of
the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the
victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in
accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for
all intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident.
Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were
not allowed by petitioner to go home.[37] This refusal was quickly
followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen
"reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the
complainants and the witnesses.[38] Given such circumstances,
we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian's statement that it was not
"safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga's orders.[39] It was not just the That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity
presence of the armed men, but also the evident effect these and improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and
gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and
was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the project can be effectively implemented through the support of
extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The the local officials for the betterment of the residence living
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and conditions who are facing difficulties and are much dependent on
witnesses against their will is thus clear. government support.[42]
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the
evidence, pointing out that the Sandiganbayan's reliance on the
private complainants, suffice it to say that the principles
testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that
governing the use of such instruments in the adjudication of
SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the
other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it
case.[43] He also makes much of the fact that prosecution
was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional
witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to, and
ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole
knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other
accused and the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from
circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
their alleged `confrontation,' until they left Barangay Lucob-
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given
Lucob in the early morning of 2 September 1997."[44]
by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge. Here,
there are no such circumstances.[40] Indeed, the belated claims
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court's factual findings
made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations
are conclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless some
that the incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that
facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been
the team acceded to Mayor Astorga's orders "out of respect," are
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.[45] Nothing in
belied by petitioner's own admissions to the contrary.[41] The
the case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed,
Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainants is
the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in
complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the
the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of
rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively
the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the case.
supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary
This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which
Detention. Furthermore, Mayor Astorga's claim that SPO1
reads:
Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what transpired between
Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian
testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk
to petitioner.[46] He heard all of Mayor Astorga's threatening
remarks.[47] He was with Simon when they were encircled by the
men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles.[48] In
sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which led
to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor
Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact
prevented from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had
simply decided to "while away the time" and take advantage of
the purported hospitality of the accused.[49] On the contrary,
SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply
"whiling away the time" between their dinner with Mayor
Astorga and their departure early the following
morning.[50] SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that
they did not use the time between their dinner with Mayor
Astorga and their departure early the following morning to "enjoy
the place" and that, given a choice, they would have gone
home.[51]
Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge", because the ponente of the assailed decision
acted both as magistrate and advocate when he propounded
"very extensive clarificatory questions" on the witnesses. Surely,
the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a
trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order
to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be
assailed on the ground that clarificatory questions were asked
during the trial.[52]
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention.
Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that, where the
detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall
be arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum
term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
or arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which has
a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in imposing the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice
Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he
decried the impunity enjoyed by public officials in committing
arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the intensification of
efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention
committed by government officers form part of our statute books
even before the advent of American sovereignty in our country.
Those provisions were already in effect during the Spanish
regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued
in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese
regime they were not repealed. The same provisions continue in
the statute books of the free and sovereign Republic of the
Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often
heard of violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that
prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact
that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same
government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high
time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and
that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold shrugging
of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or
illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124
and 125 of the Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to
its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as
depicted in this case. The responsible officials should be
prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees' right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified
violation of their fundamental rights.[53]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary
Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF
MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio
Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners
with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao,
a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on
April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the
fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition
for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners
were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed against them an information with the proper
courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there
was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in
Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting
in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have
not until now an official information as to the action taken by the
office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao
against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action
taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case
in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for
the information and guidance in the future of the officers
concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in
order to decide whether or not the petitioners are being illegally
restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of
manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions
of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties
provided in the next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the
public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the
proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the
above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution
guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of
Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion
that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean
the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial
power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a
person charged with having committed a public offense, that is,
"the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken
from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force of these
Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial
officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge
of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial
authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no
doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge
of a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper
investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention
of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other
officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article
204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code
provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and
medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1.
Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the
provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to
release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner
formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds
upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old
Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be
construed as having been modified by the mere omission of said
provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons...against
unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of
arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he
may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may
be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after
examination of the complainant and his witness. And the judicial
authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must
be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who
alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or
provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of
the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment,
the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be
illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules
of court, which, referring to the duty of an officer after arrest
without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal
ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to
the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem
proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that
"after the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court,
he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against
him. He shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and
evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to
present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to
do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to
writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and
4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the provision of
said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue
of a judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which
a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be
allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the City
of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant
of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a
person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested
without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off.
Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on
January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the
city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation
proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to
which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court
of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere
investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the
corresponding information against the defendant with the proper
municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result
of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from
the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a
law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary
investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious
prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the
courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper
preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper
preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of both
the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from
the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who
are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the
caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule
108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation
which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the
investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the
commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is
not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of
Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or
conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must
be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or
through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the
purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with
the proper court the necessary information against the accused
if the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from
the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted
bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should, as
abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the
person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to
try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17,
Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if
the court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or
make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace
court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to
the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the
provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with
the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or
person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take
the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the
investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the
corresponding information within the time prescribed by section
125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a
warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of the
accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the
investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them
to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making
the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available,
and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the
person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city
fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having
committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the
information on the strength of the testimony or evidence
presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested
for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code,
without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and
filing afterwards the proper information against him with the
court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of
course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an
officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as
the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the
investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be
taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the
detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period
longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by
a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after
due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information
or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the
latter had been illegally detained for days or weeks without any
process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person
without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any
other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law.
What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a
complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice
of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to
order the arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that
there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the
accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even
though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement
as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the
detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have
acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the
matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of
article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the
office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact
that the petitioners were being actually detained when the said
policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we
hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their
liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now
detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of
justice. So ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 201565, October 13, 2014 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EX-
MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO “REY”
ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO A.K.A. “EDEL ESTONILO,”
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES A.K.A. “NONONG ITCOBANES,”
NONOY ESTONILO-AT LARGE, TITING BOOC-AT LARGE, GALI
ITCOBANES-AT LARGE, ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM A.K.A.
“NEGRO MATERDAM,” AND CALVIN DELA CRUZ A.K.A.
“BULLDOG DELA CRUZ,” ACCUSED,
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO “REY”
ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO A.K.A. “EDEL ESTONILO,”
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES A.K.A. “NONONG ITCOBANES,” AND
CALVIN DELA CRUZ A.K.A. “BULLDOG DELA CRUZ,” ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr.
(Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario Estonilo (Rey), Edelbrando Estonilo
(Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz
(Bulldog) seek liberty from the judgment[1] of conviction
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila,
which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Murder with Direct Assault in Criminal Case No.
05-238607.
The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others,
namely: Nonoy Estonilo (Nonoy),[2] Titing Booc (Titing),[3] and
Gali Itcobanes (Gali),[4] and Orlando Tagalog Materdam
(Negro)[5] were all charged in an Information dated July 30, 2004
that reads:
That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening
thereof, at Celera Elementary School,[6] Brgy. Villa Inocencio,
Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, armed with firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one FLORO
A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being the District
Supervisor of public schools, hitting the latter on the different
parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.[7]
On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended
Information,[8] which provides:
That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy.
Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of
Masbate, the above-named accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS
ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR REINARIO “REY” ESTONILO, conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, with intent
to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce their co-
accused, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO AL[I]AS “EDEL ESTONILO[,]”
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES AL[I]AS “NONONG ITCOBANES[,]”
NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, GALI ITCOBANES, ORLANDO
MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS “NEGRO MATERDAM[,]” [and]
CALVIN DELA CRUZ AL[I]AS “BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,]” who were
all armed with firearms, to attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the
performance of his duty being a District Supervisor of public
schools, by then and there shooting the latter, hitting said FLORO
A. CASAS on the different parts of his body which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.[9]
When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On the same
date, the RTC issued a pre-trial order which stated, among others:
a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the
following:
The identities of the five (5) accused present;
As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from
the Honorable Supreme Court as to the transfer of venue;
The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;
That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a
District Supervisor of the Department of Education.
b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did
not admit that Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. and Mayor
Reinario Estonilo were not at the scene of the incident during
the incident.[10]
The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas
(Elsa), the victim’s wife; Felix Q. Casas (Felix), the victim’s son; Dr.
Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health Officer,
Placer, Masbate; Senior Police Officer 4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.
(SPO4 Lepatan), Placer Police Station; Serapion M. Bedrijo
(Serapion), employee of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela
Pisa; Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a resident of Placer, Masbate;
Diego L. Casas (Diego), cousin of the victim; Rosalinda V. Dahonan
(Rosalinda), a resident of Placer, Masbate; and Servando P.
Rosales (Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr.[11]
The testimonies of the foregoing witnesses consisted of the
following:
Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005, the day before his father,
Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned down, he was with the latter and
some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School, Placer,
Masbate; that they were working on the closing ceremonies to be
held the following day; that one Ranio Morales called on Floro
and told him that Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at his
(Ranio) house; that Floro and Felix went to see Mayor Carlos, Sr.;
that when they saw Mayor Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro and
Felix) a program of a celebration of the Federation of 7th Day
Adventist that contained the names of the governor, the
congressman, and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero
(Cotero), as guests of the said activity; that Felix asked his father
why Cotero’s picture was so big while Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s name
was not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied that he
cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the
answer angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and he scolded Floro; that
Mayor Carlos, Sr. said “you are now for Cotero but you’re only
Estonilo when you ask for my signature to sign the voucher. This
is up to now that you will be the supervisor of Celera”; that Floro
responded “when are you a superintendent when you don’t have
any scholastic standing. Just look if I will still vote for your son”;
that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied “let’s see if you can still vote”; and
that the following day, Floro was shot to death.[12]
But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on
December 10, 2003, upon invitation of Nonoy, he joined the
latter’s group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they
talked about the death of one Titing Villester; that Nonoy told
Felix that “brod, do not be afraid, because others are supposed
to be afraid [of] us because they believe that we were the ones
who killed Titing Villester”; that afterwards Felix and the group
were fetched at the videoke bar by Edel, a messenger of Mayor
Carlos, Sr.; that they were brought to the house of one Bobong
Baldecir (a nephew of Mayor Carlos, Sr.) in Daraga; that upon
arriving thereat, Rey uttered “it’s good that Dodong (Felix’s
nickname) is with you; that Nonoy then said “who would not [be]
otherwise, his father would be the next victim after Titing
Villester”;[13] that Rey then turned to Felix and said, “it’s very
important that your father is with us because a District Supervisor
has a big [role] in the Comelec’s choice for those teachers who
would become members of the Board of Election Inspectors”;
that Felix clarified that Rey was then the 2004 mayoralty
candidate for Placer, Masbate; and that Felix went along with him
since he was in Daraga, the bailiwick of the Estonilos.[14]
On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to
discredit Felix by questioning him on why it took him a long time
to execute an affidavit relative to his father’s killing. Felix
explained that he went to Cebu to stay away from Placer, which
is under the Estonilo’s jurisdiction.[15] The defense confronted
Felix of a criminal case against him for illegal use of prohibited
drugs, for which he was out on bail.[16]
On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr.
Ulysses Francisco y Pedrano and SPO4 Restituto Lepatan, Sr. The
prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation of facts
relative to their testimonies.
[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco’s testimony:]
That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer,
Masbate, is expert in medicine;
That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem
Examination on the dead body of Floro Casas y Baronda on April
6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;
That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post-
Mortem Examination Report, marked as Exhibit “F,” the printed
name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, marked as Exhibit
“F-1”;
That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit
“G” and the Sketch of a Human Body, marked as Exhibit “H”;
The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings
indicated in the Post-Mortem Examination Report; and
In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness
recovered three slugs: the 1st slug was marked as Exhibit “I,” the
fragmented slug as Exhibit “I-1,” and the metallic object
consisting of two pieces of Exhibit “I-2.”
[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.’s
testimony:]
That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of
the Placer, Masbate Police Station relative to the shooting
incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera Elementary
School. Said Police Blotter was requested to be marked by the
prosecution as Exhibit “J”;
That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004
relative to the blotter written on the Blotter Book. Said Police
Report was requested to be marked as Exhibit “J-1” and the
signature of Sr. Police Officer IV Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as Exhibit
“J-1-a”;
The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter
Book page number 325. Said Police Blotter book page 325 was
requested to be marked as Exh. “K” and the bracketed portion
thereof as Exh. “K-1.”[17]
According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds
caused by more than one firearm based on the sizes of the slugs
recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The
counsel for the accused waived his cross examination.[18]
Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing
the name of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa on the
street facing the Celera Elementary School on the night of April 5,
2004, he heard gunshots coming from inside the compound of
the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or less
six persons coming out of the school; that he was able to identify
three of them as present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and
Nonong; that he saw the six men approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s
vehicle, which was parked near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr.
and Rey came out of a house nearby; that upon reaching the
vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. “mission
accomplished, sir”; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his
group to escape, which they did using two motorbikes towards
the direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor Carlos, Sr.
and Rey drove towards the direction of Daraga.[19]
During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit
Serapion by confronting him with the fact that he has a pending
criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on
bail.[20]
Antipolo testified that on April 5, 2004, he was riding his
motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera Elementary
School when he heard gunshots and someone shouted that Floro
was shot; that he stopped, alighted from his motorcycle, went to
the gate, and saw four persons holding short firearms; that he
identified Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at Floro about
seven times; that he identified Edel and Nonong as the two other
gun holders; that at that moment, Gali shouted “sir, that’s
enough, escape!”; that Gali was accompanied by someone
named Ace, Titing and Bulldog; that right after Gali shouted for
them to escape, all of them hurriedly left the school compound;
that he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s pick-up vehicle arrive soon
thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Negro alighted from
the vehicle and watched the proceedings; that he heard Mayor
Carlos, Sr. say “leave it because it’s already dead”; and that
afterwards, the police officers arrived.[21]
In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel
confronted him with a criminal case against him for homicide of
one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that
happened on October 30, 2005.[22]
Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the
killing of Floro, the circumstances surrounding the killing and its
discovery, their family background, her husband’s line of work,
how she felt on their loss, and the expenses relative to his killing.
She testified that she heard there were people who were jealous
of Floro’s position because he could bring voters to his side during
election time; that Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero donated
medals for the 2003-2004 closing ceremony of the entire district
of public schools; that during the closing ceremony, the donor’s
name was announced, which angered then Mayor Carlos,
Sr.;[23] that when Floro was processing a voucher worth
P70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr. refused to sign the same and even
threw the voucher on the floor saying “let this be signed by
Vicente Cotero”; and that Floro’s cousin, Diego Casas, helped
Floro secure the Mayor’s signature by ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr.
that Floro was for him, and only then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree
to sign the voucher.[24]
Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsa’s testimony relative to the fact
that he helped Floro secure Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s signature on the
voucher.[25]
Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor
Carlos, Sr. went to her house and told her that he would kill her
husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus,
she went to the Placer Police Station and reported the incident;
that she went to see her husband, who was then campaigning for
mayoralty candidate Cotero, and informed him of what
happened; and that she went to Elsa’s house and informed the
latter of the threat.[26]
Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he
was in the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr. together with said Mayor,
Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias “S”
[Ace], Rollie, Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he witnessed Mayor
Carlos, Sr. say “ipatumba si Floro Casas”; that Servando later
learned that the mayor’s men were unsuccessful in their goal
because Floro was no longer in Barangay Taberna, where they
intended to execute the mayor’s order; and that Mayor Carlos,
Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary
School on April 4, 2004.[27]
During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with
the latter’s Affidavit of Retraction, which he executed on June 14,
2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his Sinumpaang
Salaysay taken on May 30, 2004 at the Philippine National Police-
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp
Bonny Serrano, Masbate City relative to the criminal complaint
for direct assault with murder filed against Mayor Carlos, Sr. and
his company. He was also asked about two criminal charges filed
against him in Cebu relative to violation of Republic Act No. 9165,
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.[28]
On re-direct examination, Servando narrated that Mayor Carlos,
Sr.’s nephew, Bobong Baldecir, fetched him from his house and
he was brought to the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr. in Daraga; that
from there, he was brought to Atty. Besario in Cebu; that Atty.
Besario informed him about the Affidavit of Retraction that he
was supposed to sign, which he did not understand as it was
written in English; and that he clarified that the contents of the
affidavit was not his but those of Bobong.[29]

The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir,
Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino D. Calipay (Quirino), and the five
accused-appellants.
Jesus denied Servando’s allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to
sign the Affidavit of Retraction. Jesus narrated that Servando
gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that
upon their meeting, Servando told him that he wanted to retract
his sworn statement because Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company
did nothing wrong; that Jesus, Servando and Servando’s wife
went to Cebu to meet Atty. Besario; that while traveling,
Servando told him that was evading the men of Governor Go,
Vicente Cotero and Casas because he feared for his life; that
during the meeting Atty. Besario prepared the affidavit and
translated it to Cebuano dialect; that afterwards, Jesus, Servando
and Servando’s wife went to the Capitol so that Servando could
sign it before the prosecutor; that Jesus, Atty. Besario, Servado
and his wife, and Dante Estonilo (another nephew of Mayor
Carlos) went to Manila to meet with the media; that the media
asked Servando whether he was forced to sign, or was given
money or reward to sign the affidavit of retraction, Servando
replied in the negative; and that the purpose of the press meeting
was to present Servando and show that he was not
kidnapped.[30]
But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his
nickname was Bobong, and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his uncle;
that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the
kidnapping of Servando; and that it was Dante (Dante) Estonilo
who arranged for the meeting with the media, and who served as
Servando’s and his wife’s companion, while he was with Atty.
Besario.[31]
During his turn, accused-appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified that
in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in a house near the
Celera Elementary School attending a birthday party; that while
thereat, he heard successive gunshots and went out to ride his
vehicle so he could check the source of the gunshots; that when
he reached the school gate someone informed him that Floro was
gunned down; that he did not see the victim because according
to the people it was boarded in a jeep and brought to the
hospital; and that he and his son, Rey, confirmed that they were
at the school minutes after the incident.[32]
During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro
were close friends; that he learned that he and his son were
suspects in Floro’s killing five months after the incident; that he
confirmed that Rey and Calvin dela Cruz were with him while
inquiring about the shooting at the school; and that he denied
having met Felix on April 4, 2004, seeing Rosalinda after April 5,
2004, or that Servando was his bodyguard.[33]
Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April
5, 2004 he was in his house and was planning to campaign
at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to
said barangay, he passed by Celera Elementary School and
noticed his father’s vehicle, and that there were several people
thereat; that he stopped and stayed in the school for a few
minutes, and then proceeded to meet his candidates for
counselors at Ranio’s house; and that afterwards, they all went
to Barangay Matagantang.[34]
On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may
be politically motivated because his opponents could not
attribute anything to him since he won as mayor.[35]
Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his
family were having supper at their house located in front of
Celera Elementary School’s guardhouse, when they heard
gunshots; that they immediately laid down, while Quirino ran
across the road and took cover at the school fence; that he
peeped through the fence and saw three persons firing a gun;
that he could not identify them or their victim because it was a
bit dark; that after 10 to 20 seconds, he went back home; that a
certain Joel Alcantara and his companions went to him asking him
to go with them inside the school, once inside the school, they
saw Floro lying face down; that he took the liberty to go to the
police headquarters located five minutes away; and that when he
and the Placer Chief of Police arrived at the school, he noticed
Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing near the gate.[36]
For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the
evening of April 5, 2004 he was engaged in a drinking spree in
Nining Berdida’s house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and that
he stayed in her place until 11:00 p.m.[37]
During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong
acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his uncle and Rey is his
second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s bodyguard, but
admitted that he handled the latter’s fighting cocks; and
admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45 minutes away from the
poblacion of Placer.[38]
Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping
in his house when Rey called him to go to Ranio’s house in Placer,
Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera
Elementary School and saw that there were plenty of people, one
of whom was Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that their group stopped to
inquire about what happened, and learned that Floro was gunned
down; and that he and his group stayed for about five minutes
and left.[39]
Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and
confirmed that he was with Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his wife
attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School;
that they went to the school to check on what happened and
learned that Floro was shot; and that they did not stay long and
went home to Daraga.[40]
During cross examination, he denied that he was the bodyguard
of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he was merely accompanying the
latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to
work.[41]
After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of its March 30,
2009 Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO “REY” to the other accused was already about to end.[42]
ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias “EDEL ESTONILO,”
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES alias “NONONG ITCOBANES,” and
The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and
CALVIN DELA CRUZ alias BULLDOG DELA CRUZ” GUILTY BEYOND
the corroborating testimony of Serapion, who were both present
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder with Direct Assault
at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC
under Article 248 and Article 148 in relation to Article 48 all of the
pronounced that the evidence on record showed unity of purpose
Revised Penal Code and each of said accused are hereby
in the furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20)
killing of Floro. Accused-appellants Nonoy and Negro were the
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.
gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong served as
backup gunmen. Accused-appellant Bulldog, and accused Gali,
As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts.[43]
the aforesaid sentenced the accused are all hereby ordered to
solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the
The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). Likewise, by way
have ordered their co-accused to kill Floro based on the
of moral damages, the said accused are furthermore ordered to
testimony of Servando, who was present when the group
solidarily pay the said family the amount of One Hundred
planned to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant
Rey conspired with his father. In sum, the prosecution was able
The accused are, however, credited in the service of their
to establish conspiracy and evident premeditation among all the
sentence the full time during which they have been denied.
accused-appellants.[44]

Let this case be archived as against the accused NONOY

The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial did not
ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and GALI ITCOBANES who have
withstand the positive identification of the prosecution
warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large,
witnesses. The accused-appellants claimed that they were
pending their arrest/s.
somewhere else in Placer, Masbate when the shooting took
place. However, they were not able to establish the physical
As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS
improbability of their being in the crime scene at the time of the
“NEGRO MATERDAM,” separate trial is necessary considering
shooting. The RTC was convinced that the motive for the murder
was due to Floro’s support for mayoral candidate Vicente Cotero.
Since the victim was a district supervisor of public schools, the
RTC convicted the accused-appellants of the complex crime of
murder with direct assault.[45]
All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision
to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC erred in concluding
that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution
evidence and disregarding the salient points of the defense
evidence, and in convicting the accused.[46]
In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the RTC decision.[47] The dispositive part thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is
denied. The Decision dated 30 March 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 45 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification in that the penalty imposed upon accused-
appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua with its accessory
penalties and that the award of civil indemnity is increased to
Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00).[48]
The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the RTC considering that the RTC had
observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior
and deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The Court of
Appeals corrected the penalty imposed, and explained
that reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty which should be
imposed without specifying the duration.
On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for
reconsideration,[49] which the Court of Appeals denied in its
November 8, 2011 Resolution.[50] Unsatisfied, the accused-
appellants appealed their case before this Court.[51]
This Court’s Ruling
The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of
conviction in the criminal case on the following assignment of
errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving
credence and weight to the prosecution evidence, (2) finding that
there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants, and (3)
finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
based on the prosecution evidence.
In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the
Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for murder with direct
assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses constitute circumstantial evidence, and
that the prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the
conviction of the accused-appellants for murder with direct
assault.
The age-old rule is that the task of assigning values to the
testimonies of witnesses on the witness stand and weighing their
credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand
impressions as a witness testifies before it. It is, thus, no surprise
that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses enjoy, as a rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts have
the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they
testify.[52]
This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but
found no indication that the trial and the appellate courts
overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would
change the outcome of this case. The trial court and the
appellate court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of Antipolo who was an
eyewitness to the crime.
Antipolo’s testimony did not suffer from any serious and material
inconsistency that could possibly detract from his credibility. He
identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro as
those who fired at Floro about seven times, while accused-
appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their
firearms. He also witnessed accused Gali shouting to the gunmen
to stop and escape. He narrated that after all the accused left,
Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Materdam arrived aboard the mayor’s
vehicle. He also heard Mayor Carlos said “leave it because it’s
already dead.” From his direct and straightforward testimony,
there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following
elements must be established:[53] (1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is
not parricide or infanticide.[54]
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1)
Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel, Nonong, and
Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses,
Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed;
and (4) the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are
essentially contested by the defense. The Court finds that the
prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of
evidence which when joined together point to the accused-
appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill
Floro. It was Floro’s support for Vicente Cotero, who was Rey’s
opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second,
the prosecution was able to establish that the accused-appellants
planned to kill Floro on two separate occasions. The prosecution
witness, Servando, was present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s house when
they were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr.
say “ipatumba si Floro Casas.” Third, Antipolo was an eyewitness
to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by another
witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the accused-
appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he heard the
gunshots. Serapion also recounted having heard one of them
said “mission accomplished sir,” after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr.
ordered them to leave.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct
evidence and circumstantial evidence. The testimony of the
eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the
crime.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or
series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by
inference.[55] It consists of proof of collateral facts and
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience.[56] Here,
the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of
Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor
Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro. Whether this order was
executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolo’s eyewitness
account as well as Serapion’s testimony.
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution witness, Servando, testified that he was present on
the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning to
kill Floro. His categorical and straightforward narration proves
the existence of evident premeditation.
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be
present, two elements must concur: (1) at the time of the attack,
the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro
successively fired at Floro about seven times – and the victim
sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at
close range giving the latter no chance at all to evade the attack
and defend himself from the unexpected onslaught. Accused-
appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their
firearms to insure the success of their “mission” without risk to
themselves; and three others served as lookouts. Hence, there is
no denying that their collective acts point to a clear case of
treachery.
Defense of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-
appellants must fail in light of the positive identification made by
Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak
defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has
sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused
as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails
over negative testimony.[57] The accused-appellants’ alibis that
they were at different places at the time of the shooting are
negative and self-serving and cannot be given more evidentiary
value vis-à-vis the affirmative testimony of credible
witnesses. The accused-appellants, the victim, and the
prosecution witnesses reside in the same municipality and are,
therefore, familiar with one another. More so, that the two
principal accused in this case are prominent political figures.
Therefore, the prosecution witnesses could not have been
mistaken on the accused-appellants’ identity including those who
remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper,
the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was present at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and
(ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves
the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene
and the location of the accused when the crime was committed;
the accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could
not have been physically present at the crime scene and its
immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.[58] Here, the
accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted
requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused,
except for Nonong, admitted that they were near the school
before the incident and at the school minutes after the killing
took place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude
the presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for
them to slip away from where they were supposed to be,
unnoticed.
Penalties
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC
correctly concluded that they should be held accountable for the
complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two
modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentes under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-
appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements
of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious
intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent;
the assault was made when the said person was performing his
duties or on the occasion of such performance; and the accused
knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is,
that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of
a person in authority.
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of
Public Schools, Placer, Masbate, thus, was a person in
authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there
was direct assault just because Floro was a person in authority,
this Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on
the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was, in reality, made
by reason of the performance of his duty as the District
Supervisor.
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person
in authority for that matter, there arises the complex crime of
direct assault with murder or homicide.
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for
the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for
the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have
been death. Plus the fact that there exists an aggravating
circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper penalty is death. But the imposition of
death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346,
entitled “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines”; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, properly imposed upon accused-appellants the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
The Proper Indemnities
As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime
charged, modifications must be made herein. The award of
P100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper
to conform with current jurisprudence. [59]
Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230[60] of the New
Civil Code. Thus, conformably with the above, the legal heirs of
the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary
damages[61] in the amount of P100,000.00.
Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall
be imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from the date
of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.[62]
At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the
Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison informed this Court of the
death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9,
2013. In view thereof, the case against deceased Ex-Mayor
Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision
dated May 12, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04142, affirming the
Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 05-238607,
finding accused-appellants REINARIO “REY” ESTONILO,
EDELBRANDO “EDEL” ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO “NONONG”
ITCOBANES, and CALVIN “BULLDOG” DELA CRUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder with Direct Assault, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages is increased to P100,000.00 each,
in addition to P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the
imposition of 6% thereon as legal interest upon finality of this
Court’s Decision.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 173150, July 28, 2010 ]
LYDIA C. GELIG, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored
for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as an appeal in CONTRARY TO LAW.
criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being the
duty of the court to correct such error as may be found in the
Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial
judgment appealed from.[1]
ensued.

Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the

Decision[2] promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27488 that vacated and set aside
the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City,
Branch 23, in Criminal Case No. CU-10314. The RTC Decision
convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty
only of the crime of slight physical injuries.
Factual Antecedents
On June 6, 1982, an Information[4] was filed charging Lydia with
Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion committed as follows:
That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, at Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and
seriously intimidate one Gemma B. Micarsos a public classroom
teacher of Nailon Elementary School while in the performance of
official duties and functions as such which acts consequently
caused the unintentional abortion upon the person of the said
Gemma S. Micarsos.
The Prosecution's Version
Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma),
were public school teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in
Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of
Gemma at the time material to this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia
confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma
called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the
cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall
divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a
contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical
certificate[5] issued by a doctor in the Bogo General
Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal
pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On
August 28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands
Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered
incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a medical certificate[6] was
issued.
The Defense's Version
Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to
refrain from calling her son names, so that his classmates will not
follow suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding
her hands and kicking her. She was therefore forced to retaliate
by pushing Gemma against the wall.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision
convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an
Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR
AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION
CORRECCIONAL AS MAXIMUM. She is likewise ordered to pay the
offended party the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos
as actual damages and Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos for
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA vacated the trial court's judgment. It ruled that Lydia
cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended
from being a person in authority to a private individual when,
instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of the matter,
she engaged in a fight with Lydia.[8] Likewise, Lydia's purpose
was not to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the
alleged name-calling of her son.[9]
The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for
unintentional abortion since there was no evidence that she was
aware of Gemma's pregnancy at the time of the
incident.[10] However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty
of slight physical injuries, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court-Branch 23 of Cebu City, dated October 11,
2002 is hereby VACATED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered
CONVICTING the accused-appellant for slight physical injuries
pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum
of ten (10) days.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Issues
Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as
errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article
266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer
the penalty of arresto menor minimum of ten days.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the
information charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional
Abortion.[12]
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction,
he waives his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy
and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are
then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice
dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and
sift through the whole case to correct any error, even if
unassigned.[13]
The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex
crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. Direct assault
is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code. The provision reads as follows:
Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without
a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the
crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on
occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a
weapon or when the offender is a public officer or employee, or
when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none
of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision
correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an
offense against public order that may be committed in two
ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on
occasion of such performance.[14]
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more
common form of assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his
agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties,
or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of
official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
4. That there is no public uprising.[15]
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was
engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is, she was
busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the
needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to
which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she
entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a
"sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma
and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the
victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal's office but
Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and
pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in
Gemma's fall to the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of
persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the
provision reads as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in
Authority - Who shall be deemed as such. -
xxxx
In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code,
teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision
of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall
be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).[16]
Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish
beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of direct
assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in
setting aside the trial court's verdict. It erred in declaring that
Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was
no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because
she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by
fighting with Lydia. The fact remains that at the moment Lydia
initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official
functions as a teacher. She tried to pacify Lydia by offering her a
seat so that they could talk properly,[17] but Lydia refused and
instead unleashed a barrage of verbal invectives. When Lydia
continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated
in kind as would a similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the
situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a
wall divider while she was going to the principal's office. No fault
could therefore be attributed to Gemma.
The prosecution's success in proving that Lydia committed the
crime of direct assault does not necessarily mean that the same
physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime
of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to
prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that
occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the
abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma's attending
physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was presented to the court to
prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the
document to prove that her medical condition was a direct
consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.[18] It was therefore
vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was
competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia's assault and
Gemma's abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to
ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a
hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981, which was
42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is
too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the fetus from the
womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her
bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said incident
were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus,
it is not unlikely that the abortion may have been the result of
other factors.
The Proper Penalty
Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of direct assault, she must suffer the penalty
imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding P1,000.00, when the offender is a public officer or
employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority.[19] Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee since
she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and pushing
Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person in
authority.
The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence
of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.[20] Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,[21] the petitioner should be
sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, and the maximum of which is that properly
imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be
imposed must be within the indeterminate term of four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months
of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum to
three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four
(4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. A fine of not
more than P1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in
accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding
petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault and is ordered to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and one (1)
day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional. She is also ordered to pay a fine of
P1,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013 ]
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is the December 12, 2006 Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with
modification the June 25, 1999 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-
163806-10 finding Carlos L. Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. Likewise questioned is the CA’s
September 6, 2007 Resolution[4] denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration[5] and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration.[6]
Factual Antecedents
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations[7] for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents were filed against
petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of
commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but
differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory
notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz:
That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru
falsification of commercial document, the METROPOLITAN BANK
& TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by its Legal officer,
Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein
accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH
OF METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg.,
Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of his position as such,
prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up
METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and
figures reading “BD#083/97” after the letters reading “PN”, with
figures reading “07.24.97” after the word “DATE”, with the
amount of P16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other
words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to
be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading “ROMEO
TAN”, feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on
top of said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own
signature at the left bottom thereof purportedly to show that he
witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan,
thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be prepared and
filled up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a
commercial document, with date reading “July 24, 1997”, with
the name reading “Romeo Tan” as payee, and with the sum
of P15,362,666.67 in words and in figures, which purports to be
the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his
own signature thereon, and [directing] the unsuspecting bank
cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as authorized
signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to
be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times at the back thereof
the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it
did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the [preparation],
execution and signing of the said Promissory Note and the signing
and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK and
that he obtained a loan of P16,000,000.00 from METROBANK,
when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, such was
not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from
METROBANK, neither did he participate in the preparation,
execution and signing of the said promissory note and signing and
endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK, much less
authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his
signature in the said documents; that once the said documents
were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said
accused released, obtained and received from the METROBANK
the sum of P15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the
proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his possession,
with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and
converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum
of P15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the
petitioner after he refused to enter a plea.[9] The cases were
then consolidated and jointly tried.
The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA
are as follows:
During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the
jurisdiction of the court, and that accused was the branch
manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to
December 1997, no other stipulations were entered
into. Prosecution marked its exhibits “A” to “L” and sub-
markings.
xxxx
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant
caused to be prepared promissory notes and cashier’s checks in
the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has
substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the
purported loans obtained by the latter from the bank. Appellant
approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of
Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or
caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee
of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show
that the latter had indeed endorsed the same for payment. He
handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for
encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified,
appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds
of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his use and
benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal
audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was
held in the Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant
signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit “N”) in the form of
questions and answers.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs [D]epartment
of Metrobank[,] testified that he conducted and interviewed the
appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant
admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations,
specifically forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the
loan were secured or personally received by the appellant
although it should be the client of the bank who should receive
the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were
contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed,
thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit “N”).
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that
the signatures appearing on the promissory notes were not the
signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear
her signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo
Tan is a valued client and her manager accommodated valued
clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon
instruction of appellant; and that after signing the checks,
appellant took the same [which] remained in his custody.
Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting
expert, testified that the signatures appearing on the promissory
notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo
Tan were not written by one and the same person.
Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio
Branch, testified that several cashier’s checks were issued in favor
of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the same;
and that it was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he
is a holder of a Masters degree from the Asian Institute of
Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank
Commercio Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with]
the above-named offense. He was with Metrobank for nine (9)
years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas
Branch, Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day
operations of the [branch], solicited accounts and processed
loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a
client-depositor when he was the branch manager of Metrobank
Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit
line for forty million pesos ([P]40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan
was also allowed to open a fictitious account for his personal use
and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the
bank. In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious
account and used the name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued
clients was allowed by and known to the bank to hide their
finances due to rampant kidnappings or from the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.
According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line
(through promissory notes) for five (5) times on the following
dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos
([P]16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for six million pesos
([P]6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos
([P]3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos
([P]16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two million pesos
([P]2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the loan on 24
July 1997 when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly
gave his instructions regarding the loan through the
telephone. Upon receiving the instructions, appellant would
order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send
the same through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which
was located across the [street]. The latter would then return to
the bank, through his own messenger, the promissory notes
already signed by him. Upon receipt of the promissory note,
appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding
cashier’s check representing the proceeds of the particular loan,
send the same through the bank’s messenger to the office of Tan,
and the latter would return the same through his own messenger
already endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current
Account No. 258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check
dated 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos
([P]16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited for,
allegedly, it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July
1997. Appellant claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing
on the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were the
genuine signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix
them thereon.
In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors
conducted an audit of the Commercio Branch for more than a
week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by
Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to
the Head Office on the following day. When appellant arrived at
the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other
people present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank
lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain
clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the
bank, Valentino Elevado.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit
“N”) in connection with the audit investigation; that he inquired
what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation;
that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police
that he will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he
was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the
purpose of the meeting; [and] that “just to get it over with” he
signed the paper which turned out to be a confession. After the
said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was
unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no
avail.[10]
 per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully paid.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
4. In Criminal Case No. 98-163809[,] to suffer the indeterminate
After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as
Decision[11] dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
crimes charged, the decretal portion of which states: including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
indemnify Metrobank the sum of P2 Million with interest [at] 18%
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee,
per annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully paid.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa thru
falsification of commercial document[s] charged in each of the
5. In Criminal Case No. 98-163810[,] to suffer the indeterminate
five (5) Informations filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as
following penalties:
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806[,] to suffer the indeterminate
indemnify Metrobank the sum of P3 Million with interest [at] 18%
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as
per annum [counted] from 12 November 1997 until fully paid.
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
including the accessory penalties provided by law.
Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.
2. In Criminal Case No. 98-163807[,] to suffer the indeterminate
As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as
maximum duration of the sentence imposed shall not be more
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum
than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most
including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
severe of the penalties imposed upon him and such maximum
indemnify Metrobank the sum of P16 Million with interest [at]
period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.
18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.[12]
3. In Criminal Case No. 98-163808[,] to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum Ruling of the Court of Appeals
including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
indemnify Metrobank the sum of P6 Million with interest [at] 18% Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where
the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23653. On December
12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision[13] affirming with
modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the appeal as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the
Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo
[Tanenggee] on five counts of estafa through falsification of
commercial documents is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No.
98-163806, he is further ordered to indemnify Metrobank the
sum of [P]16 Million with interest [at] 18% per annum counted
from 24 July 1997 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[14]
On December 29, 2006,[15] petitioner moved for
reconsideration, which the CA denied per its September 6, 2007
Resolution.[16]
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court raising the basic issues of: (1) whether
the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the
petitioner’s written statement based on its finding that he was
not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the
same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
established by the prosecution.[17]
The Parties’ Arguments
While he admits signing a written statement,[18] petitioner
refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was
only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He
asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his
rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly
of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be
informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have
been admitted in evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that
petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the
constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply
to inquiries made in the context of private employment but is
applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus
prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.
Our Ruling
We find the Petition wanting in merit.
Petitioner’s written statement is
admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of
admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section
12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
 paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or made in an administrative investigation.[22]
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement
administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection
thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be
course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed
informed of the two other rights above.[19] In the present case,
to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due
while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled
consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no
written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.
he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an
Petitioner’s written statement was given
internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress
said to be under custodial investigation and to have been
and intimidation, an already prepared typewritten
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his
statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his
written statement.
supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the
records that would support his claim of duress and intimidation.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,[20] we
declared that the right to counsel “applies only to admissions
Moreover, “[i]t is settled that a confession [or admission] is
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
administrative investigation.” Amplifying further on the matter,
confessant bears the burden of proving the
the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil
contrary.”[23] Petitioner failed to overcome this
Service Commission:[21]
presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under to have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent
Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and
custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The
details contained therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly
pointed out by the CA:
As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of
appellant is replete with details which could only be supplied by
appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence
which cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has
been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions 14 and 24 were
even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections
made therein. The response to every question was fully
informative, even beyond the required answers, which only
indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints.[24]
In People v. Muit,[25] it was held that “[o]ne of the indicia of
voluntariness in the execution of [petitioner’s] extrajudicial
[statement] is that [it] contains many details and facts which the
investigating officers could not have known and could not have
supplied without the knowledge and information given by [him].”
Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest
and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the
investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly
intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions
of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against his
supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence
was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as
having been voluntarily executed.[26]
Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the
contents of his statement before affixing his signature thereon
“just to get it over with” prop up the instant Petition. To recall,
petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational
institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of
years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend
the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate
that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own
affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.
Forgery duly established.
“Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the
signing of another’s name with intent to defraud.”[27] It can be
established by comparing the alleged false signature with the
authentic or genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend
entirely on the testimonies of government handwriting experts
whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge
is not precluded but is even authorized by law[28] to conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.
In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan
(Tan) appearing in the promissory notes and cashier’s checks was
not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document
Examiner. The trial court also made an independent examination
of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same,
reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in
the promissory notes are different from his genuine signatures
appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen
Signature Cards on file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to
disturb the above findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the
CA. A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a
trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight
and respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the said findings,
as in this case, the same should be deemed conclusive and
binding to this Court.
No suppression of evidence on the
part of the prosecution.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan
in court to shed light on the matter. His non-presentation
created the presumption that his testimony if given would be
adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends
that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.
Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the
prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to
present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its
case.[29] Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence
is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the
disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.[30] In the
present case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal
witness who could exculpate him from liability by establishing
that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents,
the most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his
witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory
process to secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant to
Article III, Section 14(2)[31] of the Constitution. The records
show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view
of these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the
prosecution.
Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.
The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated
allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by the promissory
notes and the cashier’s checks were personally transacted by Tan
against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly
never saw Tan affix his signature thereto. Again, this allegation,
as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established
evidence. “It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving
evidence. [They merit] no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.”[32] The chain of
events in this case, from the preparation of the promissory notes
to the encashment of the cashier’s checks, as narrated by the
prosecution witnesses and based on petitioner’s own admission,
established beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the
unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.
Elements of falsification of commercial
documents established.
Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in
relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to
falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee,
who did not take advantage of his official position, of public,
private or commercial document. The elements of falsification of
documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that
the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee
who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he
committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC;[33] and, (3) that the falsification was committed
in a public, official or commercial document.
All the above-mentioned elements were established in this
case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of
falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or
imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to
appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2)
causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the
falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are,
in general, documents or instruments which are “used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions.”[34] Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions
while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of
money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s
check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the
person whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the
check and withdraw the amount indicated therein.[35]
Falsification as a necessary
means to commit estafa.
When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial
document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa,
theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex
crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a
complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an
offense as a necessary means for committing another.
In Domingo v. People,[36] we held:
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may
be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to
cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification
of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the
crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that
falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud
another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission
of estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the
falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only
a necessary means to commit estafa.
“Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b)
the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation.”[37] “[D]eceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended
to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury.”[38]
The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing
that Tan requested him to process purported loans on the latter’s
behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan
in the cashier’s checks. Through these, petitioner succeeded in
withdrawing money from the bank. Once in possession of the
amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan
Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in
order to take hold of the money, misappropriated and converted
it to his own personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the
damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about P43
million.
Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could
not have withdrawn the money without falsifying the questioned
documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means
to commit estafa, and falsification was already consummated
even before the falsified documents were used to defraud the
bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Document by the lower
courts was thus proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty
The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under
Article 172 of the RPC is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under
paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period[39] if
the amount defrauded is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the
same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year
imprisonment for every P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total
penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.
Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
document. The crime of falsification was established to be a
necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the
Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be that
corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied
in its maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for
the crime of estafa, being the more serious offense than
falsification.
The amounts involved in this case range from P2 million to P16
million. Said amounts being in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty
imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, adding one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional
penalty of one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 would
surely exceed the maximum limitation provided under Article
315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed
the maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.
There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the
trial court as affirmed by the CA in each case respecting the
minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful
range. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term of the penalty should be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty
prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods which has a duration of six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets
the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty at four (4) years
and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner is
therefore sentenced in each case to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated
December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum
term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon the
petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017 ]
EDWINA RIMANDO Y FERNANDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] dated September 6, 2016 and Resolution[2] dated
January 31, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR No. 36422. The CA affirmed the
Decision[3] dated February 6, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 137 of Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 12-1761.
An Information was filed against Romeo Rimando y Cachero and
Edwina Rimando y Fernando charging them with violation of
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:
On the 14th day of September 2012, in the City of Makati, the
Philippines, accused conspiring and confederating together and
both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to use,
have in their possession, custody and control false and
counterfeit 100 pieces U.S. Dollars which are bank notes, knowing
that said notes are all falsified and counterfeit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The Facts
We quote the narration of facts of the CA, as follows:
Prosecution's Evidence:
Alex Muñez, Bank Officer I of the Investigation Division, Task
Department, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Complex, East
Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, testified that:
a) He was tasked to conduct investigations, make arrests and
conduct searches and seizures in all cases adversely affecting
the integrity of currencies pursuant to BSP Circular 599, Series
of 2008. He recognized appellants because the latter were
arrested for violation of Art. 168 of the RPC;
b) Sometime in July 2012, his office received information from
their confidential informant that a certain Pastor Danny and
Datu Romy and their cohorts were involved in the distribution,
manufacture, and printing of counterfeit US dollar notes. They
validated the information by conducting a surveillance on the
suspects, including appellant Romeo Rimando, also known as
Datu Romy;
c) On September 5, 2012, the confidential informant introduced
him to the group of counterfeiters at Farmer's Market,
Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. His team subsequently
conducted a test-buy around 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He
was able to buy 3 pieces of USD100 counterfeit notes for P500
per piece. He knew that the notes were fake because he had
been trained to detect counterfeit currencies;
d) In the morning of September 14, 2012, Romeo Rimando called
him and offered to sell 100 pieces of USD100 counterfeit notes
at P500 per piece. His office formed a team to conduct an
entrapment operation;
e) It was agreed that he and appellants' group would meet at
Savory Restaurant along Makati Avenue. Before proceeding to
the venue, they coordinated with the Tactical Operation
Center of Philippine National Police (PNP). By 2:00 in the
afternoon, they were already at the restaurant. When Romeo
Rimando arrived, he was accompanied by appellant Edwina
Rimando. Members of the entrapment team were
strategically positioned in the area;
f) Romeo Rimando talked to him. He asked Romeo Rimando
about the counterfeit notes. Romeo Rimando handed him the
counterfeit notes while he gave Romeo Rimando the marked
money. After receiving the marked money, Romeo Romando
went over to appellant Edwina Rimando and placed the
 money inside her bag. Appellants started to walk away when
he gave the prearranged signal-placing his eyeglasses on top
of his head. The team then closed in and arrested appellants.
Reynaldo Paday, Senior Currency Specialist, Investigation
Division, Cash Department, BSP, testified that:
1) He was part of the team that conducted the test-buy on
September 5, 2012 at Farmer's Market. He was assigned to
assist poseur buyer Alex Muñez and secure the confidential
informant during the test buy. He was about 150 meters from
Alex Muñez when the test-buy took place;
2) Alex Muñez bought 3 pieces of USD100 counterfeit notes.
Afterwards, the team went back to the office and he made an
initial verification of the 3 notes. He later issued a temporary
certification that said notes were fake;
3) On September 14, 2012 their team conducted an entrapment
operation at Savory Restaurant in Makati Avenue. He was
tasked to secure the perimeter and assist Alex Muñez, who
was waiting for the suspect. He observed that an old man
talked with Alex Muñez. Afterwards, Alex Muñez put his
eyeglasses on top of his head, the prearranged signal;
4) After they had closed in, he grabbed Romeo Rimando and told
the latter he was under arrest. Appellant Edwina Rimando,
who accompanied Romeo Rimando, was also arrested by one
of the agents. They proceeded to the vehicle and conducted
an inventory of the 100 pieces of counterfeit notes and
marked money. He examined and verified the 100 pieces of
notes and concluded that they were counterfeited;
Sylvia Tamayo, Assistant Manager of the Currency Analysis and
Redemption Division, Cash Department of the BSP, confirmed
that she issued a Certification dated September 17, 2012. She
certified that the 100 pieces US dollar bills were counterfeit, viz:
This is to certify that the one hundred (100) pieces 100 US Dollar
notes submitted for verification as to their genuineness by Mr.
Reynaldo L. Paday, Senior Currency Specialist, Investigation
Division, Cash Department per memorandum of even date and
more particularly described as follows:
had been found to be COUNTERFEIT after examination conducted
by the Currency Analysis and Redemption Division, this
Department and are therefore being retained by Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas pursuant to BSP Circular No. 61, Series of 1995. The
abovementioned notes had been stamped "COUNTERFEIT"
(Subject Romeo Rimando y Cachero a.k.a. "Datu Ramie" and
Edwina Rimando y Fernando).
Glenn Peterson, Special Agent of the US Secret Service in Guam
testified: the 100 pieces of US Dollar bills were referred to him for
examination. He examined each note under a magnifying glass.
Unlike genuine US Dollar notes which were printed, using Intaglo
and Typographic Printing Method, the 100 counterfeit bills were
printed with the use of an inkjet printer.
Appellants' Evidence:
Appellant Edwina Rimando, a freelance real estate agent,
testified:
a) At 2:00 in the afternoon of September 14, 2012, she was in
Makati Tower Hotel in Kalayaan Street Makati City. She was
invited there by a certain Pong to meet a certain Emily about
an old coins transaction. Her husband, Romeo Rimando, was
with her. Emily invited them to eat at a Pizza Hut behind the
hoteL Once there, they just sat on the sofa. Emily left them to
smoke and make a call. She followed Emily outside and the
latter told her to look for another restaurant They walked
towards Kalayaan and Burgos. While waiting for the stop light
to change, she and her husband were suddenly apprehended
by the group of Alex Muñez. Pong and Emily suddenly
disappeared. They were forced to ride a silver Toyota Innova;
b) She and her husband were handcuffed. Agent Armida
Superales took her bag and said: "Boss, negative." She also
saw Agent Superales take out from her side something
wrapped in plastic and put it inside the bag. When they
reached the BSP premises in Quezon City, Agent Superales
opened the bag and declared that there were US dollar bills
and a bundle of marked money inside. She and Agent
Superales had an argument;
c) The agents took Romeo Rimando to another room while she
was left at the front desk. Alex Muñez and Reynaldo Paday
interrogated her and she was asked to admit that the
counterfeit notes came from her. She was afraid because they
were threatening her. They told her she could not do anything
because there were no witnesses around. The agents also
informed her that they had a companion who was a shooter.
She just kept silent. She was further told that if she admitted
the crime, she would be made a civilian agent, given cash
rewards, and set free after the inquest;
Appellant Romeo Rimando, a scrap agent, testified:
On September 14, 2012, he and his wife were somewhere along
Makati Avenue. They went there upon invitation by a certain
Pong who wanted to transact with them about old coins. They all
met at Makati Tower Hotel with a certain Emily. According to
Pong, Emily was a trusted buyer of a hotel guest;
They met and talked at the ground floor of the hotel. Afterwards,
Emily invited them to have lunch at a nearby Pizza Hut. There was
no table available at the restaurant so Emily suggested they go to
Andok's on Jupiter Street. On the road, they were arrested by a
group of 10 agents who had 3 vehicles.
He and his wife were handcuffed and forced into a Toyota Innova.
Emily and Pong were walking ahead of them and did not notice
that they were already arrested. When Emily and Pong looked
back, the two did not concern themselves with what transpired.
They were taken to a parking lot near the Makati Tower Hotel.
Inside the Innova, he saw through the back mirror that Pong and and One (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period as
Emily were talking to the operatives; minimum to Ten (10) years Eight (8) months and One (1) day
of prision mayor in its maximum period as maximum; to pay a
On their way to BSP, their cellphones were taken. Agent
fine of P5,000.00 and to pay the cost.
Superales grabbed his wife's shoulder bag. They were told that it
was SOP to confiscate their belongings. He saw Agent Superales
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to burn the one hundred
put into his wife's bag a plastic wrapped bundle of US dollar bills
three (103) pieces of counterfeit US$100 dollar notes subject of
and marked money worth P50,000.00;
the offense.
When they arrived at BSP, Alex Muñez brought him to the
storeroom. Alex Muñez took out his pistol and placed it on top of SO ORDERED.
the table. Alex Muñez also had a plastic bag and said it was going
Before the CA, accused-appellants assigned the following errors,
to be used on him. He was interrogated and told to just admit
to wit:
that the confiscated notes belonged to them;
I.
His wife was interrogated by Reynaldo Paday. Afterwards, he and
his wife got seated at a table with Alex Muñez. Alex Muñez was
writing his initials on the dollar bills. Photographs were taken of The RTC gravely erred in finding that all the elements of the crime
him, his wife, and the alleged confiscated items; charged have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The process ended at 2 o'clock the following day. They were told II.
that they could sleep on the chairs. Later that day, they were
taken for inquest.[5]
The RTC gravely erred in admitting in evidence exhibits "E" to "E-
Accordingly, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision dated 99" (counterfeit US dollar notes) since there were doubts as to
February 6, 2014. The dispositive portion states: whether a valid entrapment operation took place and whether
the counterfeit notes presented in court were the same ones
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court finds and
allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellants.
declares both accused ROMEO RIMANDO y CACHERO and
EDWINA RIMANDO y FERNANDO GUILTY beyond reasonable III.
doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168, and penalized in Art.
166 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; and hereby sentence
The RTC gravely erred in admitting in evidence against accused-
each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years
appellants exhibits "F" to "F-2" (counterfeit US dollar notes) since
there was no proof that they owned or possessed the said
counterfeit notes as the same were recovered from pastor Danny
and not from the accusedappellants.
IV.
The RTC gravely erred in giving full faith and credence to the
testimonies of agents Alex Muñez and Reynaldo Paday despite
their contradictory statements.[6]
The CA, in its Decision dated September 6, 2016, affirmed in
toto the Decision of the RTC, to wit:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
February 6, 2014 is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
Initially, Romeo signified his intention to appeal his case.
However, he decided to withdraw his appeal through a letter
dated March 16, 2017.[7]
On October 7, 2016, Edwina filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of
petitioner Edwina Rimando.
Ruling of this Court
Inarguably, the resolution of the issues raised by petitioner in her
Brief requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence
presented, including the credibility of the witnesses, a course of
action which this Court, as a general rule, will not do, consistent
with our repeated holding that this Court is not a trier of facts.
Well-settled is the rule that only questions of law should be raised
in petitions filed under Rule 45. This Court is not a trier of facts
and will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of
the appellate court, when supported by substantial evidence, are
fmal, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court.[8]
But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound
to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which stands
second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot
be lightly taken away.[9] It is the unique nature of an appeal in a
criminal case that the appeal throws the whole case open for
review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite,
and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned.[10]
After a careful review of the records of the case, we sustain the
ruling of the CA with respect to the validity of the entrapment
operation conducted by the BSP agents and its findings as to the
existence of all the elements of the crime of illegal possession and
use of false treasury bank notes as defined under Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code. The CA did not also commit grave abuse
of discretion in giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and on the basis thereof, convicted
Romeo.
Having charged that petitioner acted in conspiracy with Romeo,
it was, however, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that
both the accused had come to an agreement concerning the
commission of the crime and decided to execute the agreement.
In holding that petitioner conspired with Romeo, the CA quoted
with approval the trial court's observation, to wit:
Notwithstanding that Edwina's part1c1pation on September 14,
2012 seemed merely to accompany her husband Romeo, the
commonality of intent to pass on and sell counterfeit US$ notes
was evident and inferable from the following circumstances: (1)
it was husband Romeo who offered to sell the counterfeit US$
notes to the agent of the BSP; (2) Edwina accompanied her
husband to Makati City coming all the way from their residence
in Quezon City; (3) upon arrival at the designated meeting place,
which was in front of the Original Savory restaurant along Makati
Avenue, she merely distanced herselffrom her husband and
Agent Muñez but did not leave them alone entirely; (4) when her
husband handed over to her the marked money, she willingly
accepted and placed it inside her handbag; (5) upon receipt of the
marked money she and her husband proceeded to leave the
place together.[11]
We do not agree.
It bears stressing that conspiracy requires the same degree of
proof required to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission without proof of cooperation or agreement to
cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy.[12] In this regard, our ruling in Bahilidad v.
People[13] is instructive, thus:
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the
conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission
of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be
strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For
conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious
design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of
intentionality on the part of the cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some
overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of
the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it
may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being
present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere
presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even
approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not
enough for purposes of conviction.
In the instant case, we find petitioner's participation in the crime
not adequately proved with moral certainty. There were no overt
acts attributed to her adequate to hold her equally guilty of the
crime proved.
Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged,
provides:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank
notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of
those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his
possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are:
(1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other
obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument
payable to order or other document of credit not payable to
bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the
offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or
falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to
use any of such forged or falsified instruments.[14]
None of these elements are present in the case of petitioner. The
prosecution was not able to prove that she was even aware of the
counterfeit US$ notes. Moreover, there was no showing that
petitioner had a hand or active participation in the
consummation of the illegal transaction. In fact, petitioner was
not present during the test-buy operation conducted by the team
of Alex Muñez nor was she spotted during the surveillance.
Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish
conspiracy.[15] To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual
cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal
act is required.[16] Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence
or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design
and purpose.[17]
The fact that petitioner accompanied her husband at the
restaurant and allowed her husband to place the money inside
her bag would not be sufficient to justify the conclusion that
conspiracy existed. In order to hold an accused liable as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he or she must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of
conspiracy.[18]
This Court has held that an overt or external act
is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated
by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act
is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared
intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking
before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act
or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed,
and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the
ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct
movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made. The act done need not constitute the last
proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the
words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense.[19]
The record is bereft of any hint that petitioner cooperated in the
commission of the crime under Article 168 of the RPC. Taken
together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test
of moral certainty in order to establish that petitioner conspired
with her husband Romeo to commit the crime. Hence, in the
absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances
are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test
of moral certainty[20] and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.[21] Exoneration must then be granted as a matter of
right.[22] Thus, petitioner's acquittal is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
September 6, 2016 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Edwina Rimando is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 139857, September 15, 2006 ]
LEONILA BATULANON, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification
the April 15, 1993 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625,
3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999
Resolution[3] denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI)
employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up
to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits
from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain
irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered.[4]
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to
herself the same and received the loan of P4,160 and thereafter
misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said
amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.[5]
Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion,

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court
said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the
Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the
affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections
aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and
of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking advantage
collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking
of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely:
Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by
Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda
then and there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda
Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the said
Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the
Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine
appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that
signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that she received the loan,
the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan, received the loan
thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted
of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never
a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in
granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the
fact the said person was never granted a loan, never received the
Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her
same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent
accused did then and there release to herself the same and
received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate
and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same,
to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned
amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok
Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to,
and collection of the same and paying out loans to members,
taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the
PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of
P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a
fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan
by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made
such a deposit and was never granted loan and after the
document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused
did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the
PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the signature
of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn
Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in
truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and
in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to
defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself
the same, and received the amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit
the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses
to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in
the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion,
Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court,
the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok
Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to,
and collection of, the same and paying out loans to members,
taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an
Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon
with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate
column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon
had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a
loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the
said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and
was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis
Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never granted loan
and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth,
said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check
Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by
signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it
appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never
received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same and receive the loan of P5,000,
and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use
and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and
still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of
the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453,
3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint
trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto
Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in
the preparation of cash vouchers[9] testified that on certain
dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers
representing varying amounts to four different individuals as
follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A[10] for P4,160.00
was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash
Voucher No. 237A[11] for P4,000.00 was released to
Gonafreda[12] Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No.
276A[13] was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and
on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis
Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.[14]
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon
were not eligible to apply for loan because they were not bona
fide members of the cooperative.[15] Ferlyn Arroyo on the other
hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof
that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently
withdrew her membership in 1983.[16] Medallo stated that
pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members
who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.[17]
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the
names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers
and made it appear in the records that they were payees and
recipients of the amount stated therein.[18] As to the signature
of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same
was actually the handwriting of appellant.[19]

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its
board of directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallo's
testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon
are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's
sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3
years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative
is not open to minors.[20]
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in
1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He
testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and
Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit
Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes.
He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is
Batulanon's handwriting.[21] Jayoma also testified that among
the four loans taken, only that in Arroyo's name was settled.[22]
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa
Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the
defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal
for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document
reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative for that
year, she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal with
respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify
only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion.
She failed to identify the other vouchers because the Journal had
missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the
entries. [23]
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that
she did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion
and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in
her presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the
money to them; [24] that the three were members of the
cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger;
that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982
authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries in the
vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the
cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the
approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;[25] that she signed
the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon
because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio,
Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of
irregularity;[26] that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr.,
minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided
they are children of regular members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name
because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has
to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her
son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments
after the cases were filed in court.[27] She also declared that one
automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with
the cooperative.[28] When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI
from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-laws yet.[29]
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-
1982, because the cooperative had been registered since
1967.[30]
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting
Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila
Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-
entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4
months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION
CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of
P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the
complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[31]
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant
LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor maximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a
fine of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the
Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand
one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing
of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is
the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the
prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda
Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of
an unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo.[33] She avers
that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an
element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not
been prejudiced by these loan transactions because these loans
are accounts receivable by the cooperative. [34]
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through
falsification of commercial document, appellant could be
convicted of falsification of private document under the well-
settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name
given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v.
People,[35] we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no
concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime
of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on
the merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed,
and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested,
are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the
to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and
alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?" If he Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not
performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo,
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did
therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the not apply for a loan with the cooperative.
manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished
adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which those Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the
acts constitute. signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it
appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by
The elements of falsification of private document under Article
these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible
172, paragraph 2[36] of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the
testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those
proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of
in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was
Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is
committed in any private document; and (3) that the
not duty-bound to present the persons whose signatures were
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was
falsification was committed with intent to cause such
sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of
damage.[37]
Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness
who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
act[38] of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e.,
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is
because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis.
Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee
There is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any
of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers,
ill motive.
Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan and received
its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a
compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section
27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases,
except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or
those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise
by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been
prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its
books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI
only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting
loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and
neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that
in Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda,
agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the
understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the
money is collected from Batulanon.[39]
The Court of Appeals[40] correctly ruled that the subject
vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents
because they are not documents used by merchants or
businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions[41] nor are they defined and regulated by the Code
of Commerce or other commercial law.[42] Rather, they are
private documents, which have been defined as deeds or
instruments executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally
authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved,
evidenced or set forth. [43]
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.[44] The prosecution in this case was
able to discharge its burden completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of
private document,[45] it is important to ascertain whether the
offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document
or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is
committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be
charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without
the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be
charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,[46] the accused made
it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a
laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July,
1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then
charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages
of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the
wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was
convicted of falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,[47] the accused changed the description of the
pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear
that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter
pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount
largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was
found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan
Tiao,[48] the accused presented a document of guaranty
purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of
P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said
falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar,
was held guilty of falsification of a private document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals
correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625,
3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private
Document with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the
range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.[49] Thus, in Criminal
Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly
imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, which is within the range of the
allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of
private documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties
for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to
indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the
aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount
of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was
settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the
former once the money is recovered. The amount shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the
complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this
judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and
executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its
satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by
Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are
the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act
or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be
a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original; or;
falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case
No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis.[50]
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation
under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by
the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of,
or to return, the same;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner
Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the cash (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the
voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the prejudice of another;
name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal
that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by: offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is
lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)[51]
in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,[52] the Court convicted the
of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing
appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of
untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and
the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of
that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the
the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He
loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making
replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount
untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case.
drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to
As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused
his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the
damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable
Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the month. When an
for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the
audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to
courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of
have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An
inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping
account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions
in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In that the checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain
handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that: period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for
that period. The checks did not constitute cash and as long as they
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is
were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal
very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here
control they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well
discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or
have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate
diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and
with instructions to retain them.
is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the
offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds
xxxx
with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the
offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention
defalcation is discovered. x x x
of the accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to
himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case,
cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary
we find all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the
element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who,
money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was
at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds
received by him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can
for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not
hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the
disposed to extend this interpretation of the law to cases where
corporation and as such had immediate control of the current
officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use,
funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the
especially where, as in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-
custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such control and
public character. The statute is clear and makes no distinction
custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can
between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We
the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded
can see no reason in the present case why it should not be applied
employee who, if he had acted on his own responsibility, might
in its literal sense.
also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become
guilty of estafa.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is
charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his
the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the
Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3)
the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight
of this court that the disturbance in property rights caused by the (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)[53] following MODIFICATIONS:
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager,
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon
Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for
is found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private
PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she
documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two
to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount
(2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count,
she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even
and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative
admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the
Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate
amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part
of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this
of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter
judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed
because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned
from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and
by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive
undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY
caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to
of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3)
constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was
ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative
P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315
Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6%
of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto
per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed
minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00
from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.
but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying
circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
SO ORDERED.
period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 186329, August 02, 2017 ]
DR. FRISCO M. MALABANAN, PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. Nos. 186584-86, August 2, 2017]
ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, PETITIONER, V. THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN - 1st DIVISION, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 198598, August 2, 2017]
ABUSAMA M. ALID, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
These three consolidated petitions stern from a common set of
facts. Abusama M. Alid (Alid) was the Assistant Regional Director
of the Department of Agriculture (DA), Regional Field Office No.
XII, Cotabato City.[1] Frisco M. Malabanan (Malabanan), on the
other hand, was the Program Director of the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani Rice Program (GMA Rice Program) of the DA,
Field Operations Office, Diliman, Quezon City.[2]
On 27 July 2004, Alid obtained a cash advance of P10,496 to
defray his expenses for official travel. He was supposed to attend
the turnover ceremony of the outgoing and the incoming
Secretaries of the DA and to follow up, on 28 to 31 July 2004,
funds intended for the GMA Rice Program. The turnover
ceremony did not push through, however, and Alid's trip was
deferred.[3]
On 22 August 2004, Alid took Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight PR
188 from Cotabato City to Manila under PAL Ticket No.
07905019614316 (PAL Ticket).[4] He attended the turnover
ceremony at the DA Central Office in Quezon City on 23 August
2004.[5] The following day, or on 24 August 2004, he took a flight
from Manila to Cotabato City per another ticket issued in
exchange for the PAL Ticket.[6]
On 1 September 2004, Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the
necessary papers to liquidate the cash advance.
In his Post Travel Report, he declared that his official travel
transpired on 28 to 31 July 2004.[7]
He likewise attached an altered PAL Ticket in support of his Post
Travel Report. The date "22 AUG 2004" was changed to read "28
JULY 2004", and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato"
appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-
Cotabato."[8]
He further attached an undated Certificate of Appearance signed
by Malabanan as Director of the GMA Rice Program.[9] The
document stated that Alid had appeared at the DA Central Office
in Quezon City from 28 to 31 July 2004 for the turnover ceremony
and to follow up the status of the funds intended for the GMA
Rice Program.[10]
During post-audit, discrepancies in the supporting documents
were found and investigated. Thereafter, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor charged Alid and Malabanan before the
Sandiganbayan with falsification of public documents.[11]
In SB-07-CRM-0072, Alid was indicted for falsifying his Post Travel
Report, as follows:
That [on] or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ABUSAMA
MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer holding the
position of Assistant Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the
Department of Agriculture, Regional Field Office No. XII, Cotabato
City, taking advantage of his official position, with abuse of
confidence, and committing the offense in relation to his office,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or
cause to be falsified his Post Travel Report prepared on
September 1, 2004, which is an official document, by making it
appear therein that on July 28, 2004, he proceeded to Davao to
take a flight bound for Manila and that he was in Manila up to July
30, 2004 to attend to the turn-over ceremony of incoming and
outgoing DA Secretaries and to follow up the funds intended for
the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) Rice Program projects
and that on July 31, 2004, he took a taxi from his hotel to the
airport and boarded a flight back to Cotabato City, which
document he submitted to support his Liquidation Voucher for
Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos (P10,496.00) which
he cash advanced [sic] for traveling expenses to Manila for the
period July 28-31, 2004, when in truth and in fact, as the accused
well knew, he did not take the aforesaid official trip to Manila for
the said period of July 28 to 30, 2004 and that the turn-over
ceremony between the incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries
was postponed and moved to August 2004, nor did the accused
follow up the funds for GMA projects in the said month, thus
accused made [an] untruthful statement in a narration of facts,
the truth of which he was legally bound to disclose.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
In SB-07-CRM-0073, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor
charged Alid with falsifying the PAL Ticket. The Information
stated:
That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ABUSAMA
MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer holding the
position of Assistant Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the
Department of Agriculture, Regional Field Office No. XII, Cotabato
City, taking advantage of his official position and committing the
offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the
Philippine Airline (PAL) plane ticket No. 07905019614316[,] a
genuine document which he attached and submitted as
supporting document to his liquidation voucher for the purpose
of liquidating his cash advance of Ten Thousand Four Hundred
Ninety Six (P10,496.00) Pesos as traveling expenses for the period
July 28-31, 2004 thereby rendering the said plane ticket a
public/official document, which falsification was committed in
the following manner to wit: that in the upper right corner of the
said plane ticket indicating the date and place of issue, accused
inserted the figure/number 8 after the figure/number 2 and
erased the original word Aug (August) and superimposed the
[word] July to make it appear that the plane ticket was
purchased/issued on July 28, 2004, when the original date of
purchase/issue was August 2, 2004; that in the portion of the
ticket indicating the flight route, accused also erased the original
word "Cotabato" and superimposed therein the word "Davao"
and under the column "Date" of flight, accused erased the
original figure 22 and superimposed the figure "28" and also
erased the word "Aug." and superimposed the word "Jul" to make
it appear that the flight took place on July 28 originating from
Davao, thus accused made alterations and intercalations in a
genuine document which changed its original meaning and
perverting the truth to make it appear that he made an official
trip to Manila, originating from Davao on July 28, 2004 using a
plane ticket issued/purchased on July 28, 2004 to conform with
the entries in his liquidation voucher when accused knew [full]
well that he did not make such official trip on said date and route
as indicated in the aforesaid falsified PAL plane ticket.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[13]
In SB-07-CRM-0074, Alid and Malabanan were charged with
falsifying the Certificate of Appearance that the former attached
as a supporting document for the Post Travel Report. The
Information reads:
That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID,
a high ranking public officer holding the position of Assistant
Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the Department of
Agriculture (DA), Regional Field Office No. XII, Cotabato City,
conspiring and conniving with accused FRISCO MERCADO
[MALABANAN], Chief Science Research Specialist of the
Philippine Rice Research Institute (Philrice) and Program Director
of the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) [Rice] Program of the
Department of Agriculture, Field Operations Service, Diliman,
Quezon City, holding a salary grade of 26, taking advantage of
their official positions, with abuse of confidence and committing
the offense in relation to their respective offices, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be
falsified an undated Certificate of Appearance issued in the name
of ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID noted by accused FRISCO M.
MALABANAN which is an official/public document and which the
former submitted as one of the supporting document[s] to his
liquidation voucher of his cash advance of Ten Thousand Four
Hundred Ninety Six (P10,496.00) Pesos as traveling expenses for
the period of July 28-31, 2004 by making it appear in the said
Certificate of Appearance that accused Abusama Mangudadatu
Alid appeared in the Office of the DA Central Office, Diliman,
Quezon City for the period of July 28-31, 2004 to attend to the
turn-over ceremony of incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries and
to follow-up the funds intended for the GMA Projects
Implementation; when in truth and in fact, as both accused well
knew, accused Abusama Mangudadatu Alid did not travel to
Manila on said date as the turn-over ceremony of the incoming
and outgoing DA Secretaries was postponed and moved to
August 2004 nor did accused Alid follow up with accused
Malabanan on the said period the funds intended for the GMA
projects, thus accused made an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts, the truth of which they are legally bound to
disclose.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[14]
Upon arraignment, both Alid and Malabanan entered pleas of
"not guilty."[15]
While the cases were pending before the Sandiganbayan, the
prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite,
praying for their preventive suspension pending trial.[16]
In a Minute Resolution dated 29 October 2008, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the
suspension pendente lite of Alid and Malabanan for 90 days.[17]
Both of the accused sought reconsideration, but the
Sandiganbayan denied their motions in a Minute Resolution
dated 30 January 2009.[18]
Malabanan then filed before this Court a Rule 65 Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition[19] praying that the order of
preventive suspension be set aside, and that a writ of prohibition
be issued against the Sandiganbayan to forestall the threatened
implementation of the Minute Resolutions.[20] This petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 186329.
Alid filed a separate Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition[21] before us, likewise praying that the order of
preventive suspension be set aside, and that a writ of prohibition
be issued against the Sandiganbayan's implementation of the
Minute Resolution dated 29 October 2008.[22] He further prayed
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pending the
resolution of the principal case.[23] This petition was docketed
as G.R. Nos. 186584-86.
In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with the criminal
cases and eventually rendered a Decision convicting Alid of
falsification of a private document for altering the PAL
Ticket.[24] The Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted both of the
accused of the other charges. The dispositive portion of its ruling
reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows
In SB-07-CRM-0072 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID
for insufficiency of evidence, with costs de oficio;
In SB-07-CRM-0073 - finding accused ABUSAMA M.
ALID GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code and, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) DAY to THREE
(3) YEARS, SIX MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision
correccional, as minimum and maximum, respectively, and to pay
a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) with costs against the
accused; and
In SB-07-CRM-0074 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID
and FRISCO M. MALABANAN for insufficiency of evidence, with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Alid moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's
decision convicting him of the crime of falsification of a private
document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.[26] The prosecution likewise moved for a partial
reconsideration insofar as the acquittals were
concerned.[27] However, the Sandiganbayan denied both
motions.[28]
Alid thereafter filed the present Rule 45 Petition for
Review[29] before this Court, praying for the reversal of the
Decision and the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan insofar as SB-
07-CRM-0073 is concerned. This petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 198598.
THE COURT'S RULING
We dismiss the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 for
being moot and academic. However, we grant the petition in GR.
No. 198598 and rule that the Sandiganbayan committed a
reversible error in convicting Alid of the crime of falsification of a
private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.
I First, a conviction for falsification of a private document under
The petitions questioning the order of preventive suspension
are moot and academic.
A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of
supervening events, it ceases to present a justiciable controversy,
such that a declaration thereon would no longer be of practical
value.[30] As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case or
dismiss it on the ground of mootness.[31]
In G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86, Alid and Malabanan pray that
the Sandiganbayan's order imposing preventive suspension be
set aside and its implementation restrained. It appears from the
records, however, that the order of preventive suspension had
already been implemented by the DA on 17 March 2009,[32] and
that Alid had already retired from government service on 30 June
2009.[33] Clearly, therefore, by virtue of supervening events,
there is no longer any justiciable controversy with regard to this
matter, and any pronouncement that we may make upon it will
no longer be of practical value. Thus, we rule that the Rule 45
petitions in GR. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 should be dismissed
for mootness.
II
The Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Alid of the crime of
falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.
In G.R. No. 198598, the Sandiganbayan convicted Alid of
falsification of a private document for altering the PAL Ticket. We
disagree with that conviction for two reasons.
paragraph 2 of Article 172 violates the right of Alid to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him given that
his Information charged him only with falsification of documents
committed by a public officer under Article 171. Second, for
falsifying a commercial document, the penal provision allegedly
violated by Alid was paragraph 1, and not paragraph 2, of Article
1 72.
Right to Be Informed of the Nature
and the Cause of Accusation
At the outset, we note that the appeal of Alid is grounded on two
points: (1) that he was not the one who altered the plane ticket;
and (2) that he had no intent to cause damage. He has not raised
the defense that his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him has been violated. However, an
appeal in a criminal case opens the whole matter for the review
of any question, including those questions not raised by the
parties.[34] In this case, a review is necessary because the
conviction was made in violation of the accused's constitutional
rights.
One of the fundamental rights of an accused person is the right
to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him."[35] This means that the accused may not be convicted of
an offense unless it is clearly charged in the Information.[36] Even
if the prosecution successfully proves the elements of a crime,
the accused may not be convicted thereof, unless that crime is
alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed against the
latter.[37]
Pursuant to this constitutional right, Section 4, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, commands:
Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and
proof. — When there is variance between the offense charged in
the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which
is included in the offense proved.
Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when
it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged, although
proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the accused
cannot be convicted thereof.[38] In other words, variance
between the allegation contained in the Information and the
conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction for
either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is
included in the other.
As to when an offense includes or is included in another, Section
5 of Rule 120 provides:
Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. —
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And
an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a
part of those constituting the latter.
Here, it cannot be overlooked that there is a variance between
the felony as charged in the Information and as found in the
judgment of conviction. Applying the rules, the conviction of Alid
for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2, Article
172 is valid only if the elements of that felony constituted the
elements of his indictment for falsification by a public officer
under Article 171.
Article 171 - the basis of the indictment of Alid - punishes public
officers for falsifying a document by making any alteration or
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
The elements of falsification under this provision are as
follows:[39]
The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.
The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.
The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts
of falsification under Article 171.[40]
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code contains three punishable
acts. It reads:
Art. 172. Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified
Documents. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos
shall be imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications
enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the
intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document
commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next
preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any
judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the
intent to cause such dan1age, shall use any of the false
documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of
the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the
penalty next lower in degree.
Paragraph 2 of Article 172 was the basis of Alid's conviction. Its
elements are as follows:
The offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except
those in Article 171(7).
The falsification was committed on a private document.
The falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to
cause damage to a third party.[41]
Comparing the two provisions and the elements of falsification
respectively enumerated therein, it is readily apparent that the
two felonies are different. Falsification under paragraph 2 of
Article 172 goes beyond the elements of falsification enumerated
under Article 171. The former requires additional independent
evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third
person.[42] Simply put, in Article 171, damage is not an element
of the crime; but in paragraph 2 of Article 172, or falsification of
a private document, damage is an element necessary for
conviction.
Therefore, not all the elements of the crime punished by
paragraph 2, Article 172 are included under Article 171.
Specifically, the former offense requires the element of damage,
which is not a requisite in the latter. Indeed, the Information
charging Alid of a felony did not inform him that his alleged
falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to
cause damage to a third party.
Since Alid was not specifically informed of the complete nature
and cause of the accusation against him, he cannot be convicted
of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article
1 72. To convict him therefor, as the Sandiganbayan did, violates
the very proscription found in the Constitution and our Rules of
Criminal Procedure. On this ground alone, we find that the
court a quo erred in its decision.
Falsification under Articles 171 and
172 of the Revised Penal Code
Notwithstanding the erroneous conviction meted out by the
Sandiganbayan, this Court proceeds to peruse the nature of the
crime established in the records of this case. In People v.
Castillo,[43] we emphasized a basic rule in criminal
jurisprudence: that the defendant in a criminal case may be found
guilty of any offense necessarily included in the allegation stated
in the information and fully established by the evidence.
Guillergan v. People[44] declares that the falsification of
documents committed by public officers who take advantage of
their official position under Article 171 necessarily includes the
falsification of commercial documents by private persons
punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172. To reiterate, the
elements of Article 171 are as follows:
The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.
The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.
The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts
of falsification under Article 171.
In turn, paragraph 1 of Article 172 contains these requisites:
That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or
employee who did not take advantage of his or her official
position.
The falsification was committed in a public or official or
commercial document.
The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts
of falsification under Article 171.
Analyzing these felonies, we find that neither of them include
damage or intent to cause damage as an element of the crime;
and that Article 171 encompasses all the elements required in a
conviction for falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172. Thus,
in Daan v. Sandiganbayan,[45] we allowed the accused facing
Informations for falsification of public documents under Article
171 to plead guilty to falsification under Article 172. We
specifically stated that "in the charge for Falsification of Public
Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of
Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear
that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly
falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of Bato,
Leyte.”[46]
Here, if the records show sufficient allegations that would convict
Alid of paragraph 1 of Article 172, the Sandiganbayan is bound to
sentence him to that lesser offense. But, as mentioned, it
overlooked this provision and jumped to convicting him of
falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172. As discussed, the
latter felony is not covered by his indictment under Article 171.
This Court finds that the prosecution has sufficiently alleged all
the elements of paragraph 1 of Article 172. As regards the first
element, Alid was a public officer who did not take advantage of
his official position.
Offenders are considered to have taken advantage of their official
position in falsifying a document if (1) they had the duty to make
or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the
document; or (2) they had official custody of the falsified
document.[47] Here, the accused definitely did not have the duty
to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of the PAL
Ticket. Neither was it in his official custody. Therefore, when he
falsified the PAL Ticket, he did not take advantage of his official
position as Assistant Regional Director of the DA.
Anent the second element, the Sandiganbayan concluded that
because the PAL Ticket was a private document, Alid should not
have been charged with falsifying a public document. However,
the PAL Ticket fell under the category of commercial documents,
which paragraph 1 of Article 172 protects from falsification.
Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants
or business persons to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions. Examples include receipts, order slips, and
invoices.[48] In Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp
Group,[49] we considered a sales invoice a commercial document
and explained:
The Vehicle Sales Invoice [Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex
200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera]
is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a
commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are
those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate
trade or credit transactions. Business forms, e.g., order slip,
delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly recognized in
ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties
and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a
business transaction has in fact transpired.
In this case, since the PAL Ticket functioned as a sales invoice that
memorialized the consummation of the commercial transaction
between the air carrier and the passenger, the Sandiganbayan
should have considered the fact that Alid had altered a
commercial document.
Finally, the accused did not dispute that he had altered a genuine
document. The date "22 AUG 2004" was changed to read "28
JULY 2004"; and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato"
appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-
Cotabato."[50] Hence, the third element of the felony punished
by paragraph 1 of Article 172 is apparent in this case.
Criminal Liability of the Accused
Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed
by means of dolo, such as falsification.[51] Such intent is a mental
state, the 2 existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a
person.[52] Thus, the acts of Alid must have displayed, with moral
certainty, his intention to pervert the truth before we adjudge
him criminally liable. In cases of falsification, we have interpreted
that the criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases
showing that (1) the accused did not benefit from the
falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to the
government or to a third person.
In Amora, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[53] the accused construction
contractor was absolved even if he had admittedly falsified time
books and payrolls. The Court appreciated the fact that he did not
benefit from the transaction and was merely forced to adjust the
supporting papers in order to collect the piece of work he had
actually constructed. On that occasion, we explained at length
the nuanced appreciation of criminal intent in falsification of
documents, viz.:
Although the project was truly a contract for a piece of work,
nevertheless he used the daily wage method and not the contract
vouchers. This was not his idea but by the municipal mayor and
treasurer to prepare a payroll and list of laborers and their period
of work and to pay them the minimum wage so that the total
payment would equal the total contract price. This is the so-called
bayanihan system practiced by former Mayor Bertumen and
Engineer Bertumen of the 2nd engineering district. In the payrolls
only some 20 names of the 200 laborers were listed as not all of
them could be accommodated. Those not listed received their
wages from those listed. As all of the utilized laborers were duly
paid, not one complained. Neither did the municipality complain.
x x x.
xxxx.
From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of
Guindulman suffered no damage and even gained on the project
(the cost of the boulders actually delivered was P18,285.00 but
Murillo was paid only P13,455.00) plus the additional fact that the
alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations
suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact awarded no
indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the
petitioners were done in good faith; there was no criminal intent.
x x x. In other words, although the accused altered a public
document or made a misstatement or erroneous assertion
therein, he would not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted
in good faith and no one was prejudiced by the alteration or error.
(Emphasis supplied)[54]
In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of
Appeals,[55] the heirs of the deceased falsified the signature of
the latter in a Notice of Appeal. The Court rejected the imputation
of falsification because the forgery produced no effect:
In the instant case, given the heirs' admissions contained in
several pleadings that Avelino and Pedro are already deceased
and their submission to the jurisdiction of the Regional
Adjudicator as the successors-in-interest of the decedents, the
effect would be the same if the heirs did not sign the decedents'
names but their own names on the appeal.[56]
This Court is well aware that falsification of documents under
paragraph 1 of Article 172, like Article 171, does not require the
idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person as an element
of conviction. But, as early as People v. Pacana,[57] we have said:
Considering that even though in the falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in
contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing
punished is the violation of the solemnly proclaimed, it must,
nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public
document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or
to change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for
unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element
of the intention to commit the crime which is required by article
1 [now Article 3] of the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)[58]
Here we find that, similar to Amora, Jr. and Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, there is no moral certainty that Alid
benefitted from the transaction, with the government or any
third person sustaining damage from his alteration of the
document.
The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the
PAL Ticket just to be consistent with the deferred date of the
turnover ceremony for the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries
of the DA Central Office in Quezon City. Notably, he had no
control as to the rescheduling of the event he had to attend.
Neither did the prosecution show that he had incurred any
additional benefit when he altered the document. Moreover,
after he submitted the PAL Ticket that he had used to support his
liquidation for a cash advance of P10,496, the public funds kept
by the DA remained intact: no apparent illegal disbursement was
made; or any additional expense incurred.
Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the
PAL Ticket - to remedy his liquidation of cash advance with the
correct date of his rescheduled travel - we find no malice on his
part when he falsified the document. For this reason, and seeing
the overall circumstances in the case at bar, we cannot justly
convict Alid of falsification of a commercial document under
paragraph 1 of Article I 72.
WHEREFORE, the Rule 65 petitions in GR. Nos. 186329 and
186584-86 are hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
The Rule 45 Petition for Review in G.R. No. 198598 is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is hereby
rendered ACQUITTING petitioner Abusama M. Alid in SB-07-
CRM-0073.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 234156, January 07, 2019 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
EMMANUEL OLIVA Y JORJIL, BERNARDO BARANGOT Y PILAIS
AND MARK ANGELO MANALASTAS Y GAPASIN, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated
May 31, 2017 dismissing Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, Bernardo
Barangot y Pilais and Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin's appeal,
and affirming the Decision[2] dated October 28, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Makati City, convicting
appellants of Violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165.
The facts follow.
The Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task
Group (SAID-SOTG), on January 23, 2015, received a report
regarding the sale of dangerous drugs by a certain "Manu"
in Barangay Cembo, Makati City and its nearby areas. As such, a
buy-bust operation was planned and after coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), a buybust team was
formed wherein Police Officer 3 (PO3) Luisito Marcelo was
designated as the poseur-buyer and given a P500.00 bill as
marked money, and PO1 Darwin Catabay as back-up. Thereafter,
the buy-bust team proceeded to the exact location of "Manu"
after it was confirmed by the confidential informant.
When they arrived at the target area, the confidential informant
pointed to appellant Oliva as "Manu," the seller of dangerous
drugs; thus, PO3 Marcelo and the confidential informant
approached the said appellant. PO3 Marcelo was introduced by
the confidential informant to appellant Oliva as a buyer who
wanted to buy P500.00 worth of shabu. PO3 Marcelo handed
appellant Oliva the marked money after the latter demanded
payment. Appellant Oliva then showed PO3 Marcelo four (4)
transparent plastic sachets with white crystalline substance and
asked the latter to choose one. Meanwhile, two (2) other
persons, appellants Barangot and Manalastas were also at the
target area to buy shabu. Appellants Barangot and Manalastas,
and PO3 Marcelo each took one sachet from the four sachets that
appellant Oliva showed.
Upon receiving the dangerous drug, PO3 Marcelo immediately
scratched his chin, which is the pre-arranged signal to his back-up
that the transaction has been completed. Subsequently, PO3
Marcelo grabbed appellants Oliva and Barangot and, thereafter,
PO1 Catabay appeared and arrested appellant Manalastas.
The police officers conducted a body search on appellant Oliva
and it yielded another sachet containing white crystalline
substance, the marked money and two (2) more pieces of
P500.00 bills. Eventually, appellants Oliva, Barangot and
Manalastas were arrested and brought to the barangay hall
where an inventory was conducted and on the basis thereof, an
inventory report was prepared. The confiscated items were then
marked and photographed, and a request for laboratory
examination was accomplished and the seized items were
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The substance found
inside the sachets were all tested positive for the. presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Thus, an Information for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 was filed against appellant Oliva, that reads as follows:
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law and without the
corresponding license and prescription, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and distribute
zero point six (0.06) gram of white crystalline substance
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, contained in one (1) small transparent plastic
sachet, in consideration of Php500.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Also, in three informations, appellants Oliva, Barangot and
Manalastas were separately charged with violation of Section 11
of the said law, thus:
Crim. Case No. 15-196
(against appellant Oliva)
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the
Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law to possess or
otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the
corresponding prescription, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point ten
(0.10) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Crim. Case No. 15-197
(against appellant Barangot)
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the
Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law to possess or
otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the
corresponding prescription, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point five
(0.05) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Crim. Case No. 15-198
(against appellant Manalastas)
On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the
Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law to possess or
otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the
corresponding prescription, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession zero point three
(0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Upon arraignment, appellants, with the assistance of counsel,
entered pleas of "not guilty" on all charges.
All appellants used denial as a defense.
According to appellant Oliva, on January 21, 2015, around 10:30
in the evening, he was in front of a neighbor's house when several
armed men, riding in motorcycles, stopped by and invited him to
go with them. When he refused to go, one of the armed men
pointed a gun at him, handcuffed him, and forcibly took him to
the SAID-SOTG office where he was detained.
On the other hand, appellant Barangot maintained that on
January 22, 2015, around 2:30 in the morning, he was having a
drinking spree with one Mel and Nonoy when several men barged
inside the house and arrested them. They were then brought to
the SAID-SOTG office where they were detained, and
subsequently, freed after Mel and Noy paid the police officers for
their release.
Appellant Manalastas also denied committing the offense
charged against him and claimed that on the same date, he was
inside his room sleeping, when he was suddenly roused by loud
noises causing him to go outside and check the commotion. He
saw armed men inside his house and, thereafter, the latter took
him, his mother, a certain Bong, Ronald, Abby and two (2)
boarders to the SAID-SOTG office where they were all detained.
The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged against them and were sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15-195, the court finds the accused,
Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and
sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case Nos. 15-196 to 15-198, the court finds the
accused, Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y Pilais and
Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II, RA. No.
9165 and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The period of detention of the accused should be given full credit.
Let the dangerous drugs subject matter of these cases be
disposed of in the manner provided by law.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the plastic
sachets containing shabu subject matter of these cases to the
PDEA for said agency's appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellants.
The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[8]
The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the key
elements for illegal possession and sale of dangerous drugs, and
that the bare denials of the appellants cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of the police officers. It also held that the
failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers
conducted the required physical inventory and take the
photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render
inadmissible in evidence the items seized.
Hence, the present appeal.
Appellants assigned the following errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES' INCREDULOUS TESTIMONIES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE THE
POLICE OFFICERS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED DRUGS DESPITE THE POLICE OFFICERS'
FLAWED MANNER IN THE CONDUCT OF INVENTORY AND
MARKING THE SAME.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH EVERY LINK IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED ITEMS.[9]
Appellants argue that it is difficult to believe the testimonies of
the police officers because it is impossible for appellants to
engage in drug transactions in the middle of the street, under
broad daylight, and in the presence of strangers. They also claim
that the arresting officers failed to immediately conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused, their representative or counsel, a
representative of the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who are required to sign the copies
of the inventory. Thus, according to appellants, the prosecution
failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of the seized
items.
The appeal is meritorious.
Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No, 9165 or illegal sale of
prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted of the said violation,
the following must concur:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale
and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor.[10]
In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale
transaction actually happened and that "the [procured] object is
properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the
same drugs seized from the accused."[11]
Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal
possession of dangerous drugs the following must be proven
before an accused can be convicted:
[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such
possession was not authorized by law; and [3] the accused was
freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous
drugs.[12]
In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit
drugs confiscated from the accused comprise the corpus delicti of
the charges.[13] In People v. Gatlabayan,[14] the Court held that
it is of paramount importance that the identity of the dangerous
drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must
be proven with certitude that the substance bought during the
buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in
evidence before the court. In fine, the illegal drug must be
produced before the court as exhibit and that which was
exhibited must be the very same substance recovered from the
suspect.[15] Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose
"as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed."[16]
To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21(1) of R.A. No.
9165 specifies:
(1) The apprehending team having in trial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165
provides:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items[.]
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640[17] was approved to amend R.A.
No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially incorporated
the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally That
noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which
eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator Grace Poe admitted
that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of the evidence
acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said
Section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's
campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and also, in the
conflicting decisions of the courts."[18] Specifically, she cited that
"compliance with the rule on witnesses during the physical
inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not
always available in all corners of the Philippines, especially in
more remote areas. For another, there were instances where
elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the
punishable acts apprehended."[19] In addition, "[t]he
requirement that inventory is required to be done in police
station is also very limiting. Most police stations appeared to be
far from locations where accused persons were
apprehended."[20]
Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of
the substantial number of acquittals in drug-related cases due to
the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain
adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing
law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation."[21] In his Co-
Sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations
of highly organized and powerful local and international
syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the
resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to
apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section
21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the
place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory and
photograph of seized illegal drugs.
xxxx
Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the
foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002 where the
safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be
present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs
and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs
itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug
syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where the seized
drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a
location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are
required to be present during the inventory and photograph are
safe and secure from extreme danger.
It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of
photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be conducted
either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will
provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal
drugs since a safe location makes it more probable for an
inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly
conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug
cases due to technicalities.
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not
automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or
illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the
same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the
inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable
grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people
or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of
these witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug
operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected
official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected
official is afraid or scared.[22]
The foregoing legislative intent has been taken cognizance of in a
number of cases. Just recently, This Court opined in People v.
Miranda:[23]
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions,
strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into
statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest
police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of
warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds
- will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the
seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer
or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to
strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA
9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the
prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. In People v.
Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De
Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist.[24]
Under the original provision of Section 21, after seizure and
confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was required
to immediately conduct a physically inventory and photograph of
the same in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the
media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof. It is assumed that the presence of these three
persons will guarantee "against planting of evidence and frame
up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and
incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or
irregularity."[25] Now, the amendatory law mandates that the
conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items
must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official, and
(3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.
In this case, the absence of a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media during the inventory of the
seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A
review of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes does not yield any
testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there
was no representative from the DOJ or the media. The only one
present to witness the inventory and the marking was an elected
official, Barangay Captain Evelyn Villamor. Neither was there any
testimony to show that any attempt was made to secure the
presence of the required witness.
In People v. Angelita Reyes, et al.,[26] this Court enumerated
certain instances where the absence of the required witnesses
may be justified, thus:
x x x It must be emphasized that the prosecution must able to
prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain requirements
provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: 1)
media representatives are not available at that time or that the
police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the
immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake,
especially if it is done in more remote areas; 2) the police
operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available
representative of the National Prosecution Service; 3) the police
officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of
the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the
provisions of Article 125[27] of the Revised Penal Code in the
timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the
requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
The above-ruling was further reiterated by this Court in People v.
Vicente Sipin y De Castro,[28] thus:
The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of
the required witnesses was not obtained for any of the following
reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the
place of arrest was a remote area;·(2) their safety during the alteration.[32]
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by
an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s Thus, this Court finds it appropriate to acquit the appellants in
acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves this case as their guilt has not been established beyond
were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; reasonable doubt. The resolution of the other issues raised by
(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media appellants is no longer necessary.
representative and elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Could prove futile WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 31,
through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08121
being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints dismissing appellants' appeai and affirming the Decision dated
and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips October 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Makati
of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from City is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellants Emmanuel Oliva y
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y Pilais, Mark Angelo Manalastas y
offenders could escape. Gapasin are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ORDERED
Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless they are
valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in
confined for any other lawful cause. Let entry of final judgment
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.[29] It has the positive
be issued immediately.
duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that,
during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the
acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the
Bureau of Corrections and the Superintendent of the New Bilibid
requirements of the law.[30] Its failure to follow the mandated
Prisons, for immediate implementation. Said Director and
procedure must be adequately explained and must be proven as
Superintendent are ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five
a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. The rules require
(5) working days from receipt of this Decision the action he/she
that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable
has taken.
ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit,
coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the
SO ORDERED.
integrity of the seized item.[31] A stricter adherence to Section
21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is
miniscule since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or
FIRST DIVISION The Information in Criminal Case No. 2078 contained the
following accusatory allegations against appellant:
[ G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017 ]
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:30
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. MYRNA
o’clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian, Eastern
GAYOSO Y ARGUELLES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovementioned accused who acted without the
DECISION
necessary permit from proper authorities whatsoever, did then
DEL CASTILLO, J.: and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her
possession, control and custody eleven (11) x x x sachets
In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession
[containing] Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known
of shabu, primordial importance must be given to "the
as "shabu" weighing 0.53 [gram], a dangerous drug.
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or Contrary to law.[4]
innocence of the accused."[1]
The Information in Criminal Case No. 2079 charged appellant in
This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision[2] of the Court the following manner:
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 that affirmed in
That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:00
toto the April 12, 2007 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court
o’clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian, Eastern
(RTC) of Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch 3, in Criminal Case Nos.
Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
2079 and 2078, finding Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles (appellant)
Court, the abovementioned accused who acted without the
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 (illegal sale
necessary permit or authority whatsoever, did then and there
of a dangerous drug) and 11 (illegal possession of a dangerous
willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver and dispense one
drug), Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, respectively, and
(1) pc. small heat sealed sachet of Methamphetamine
imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" weighing 0.06
P500,000.00 for selling shabu, and the indeterminate prison term
[gram], a dangerous drug.
of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum, for Contrary to law.[5]
possessing 0.53 gram of shabu.
During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of ''not guilty" in
Factual Antecedents both cases. Joint trial then ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
Based on the testimonies of SPO3 Victorino de Dios (SPO3 De
Dios), SPO3 Rolando G. Salamida (SPO3 Salamida), PO2 Rex Isip
(PO2 Isip), SPO4 Josefina Bandoy (SPO4 Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar
Barber, Jr. (PI Barber), PS/Insp. Benjamin Cruto (PSI Cruto), and
the documentary exhibits, the following facts emerged:
PI Barber of the PNP[6] Guiuan Police Station directed SPO3 De
Dios to conduct a surveillance on appellant after receiving several
reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks
later, SPO3 De Dios confirmed that appellant was indeed engaged
in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed for and was issued a search
warrant. However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI
Barber decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating
SPO3 De Dios as poseur-buyer and giving him P200.00 marked
money for the operation.
On March 24, 2004, SPO3 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded
to the house of appellant and asked her if they could buy shabu.
The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked
money from SPO3 De Dios after giving him a sachet of shabu.
SPO3 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message
about the successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his
team of police officers who were positioned 100 meters away
rushed towards the house of appellant. He also instructed SPO3
De Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman
to witness the search of the house. When he arrived together
with a kagawad and a media representative, SPO3 Salamida read
the search warrant to appellant.
During the search of the house, SPO4 Bandoy found a tin foil
under the mattress. SPO3 De Dios took it from SPO4 Bandoy and
gave it to SPO3 Salamida who found seven sachets
of shabu inside, in addition to the four sachets of shabu found
inside the right pocket of the short pants of appellant. The search
of the house also revealed several drug paraphernalia. An
inventory of seized items was prepared and the same was signed
by the Barangay Chairman, PO2 Isip, SPO4 Bandoy, and
appellant. The sachets of shabu were brought to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the
examination verified that the seized sachets contained shabu.
Version of Appellant
Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on
March 24, 2004, somebody forcibly kicked the front door of her
house and tried to break it open. When she opened the door, PI
Barber pushed her aside and told his companions to move
quickly. They went directly to her room; when PO2 Isip emerged
therefrom seconds later, he was holding a substance that looked
like tawas. SPO3 De Dios and SPO3 Salamida went in and out of
her house. She maintained that the search warrant was shown to
her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were
planted. She argued that the police officers fabricated the
charges against her since her family had a quarrel with a police
officer named Rizalina Cuantero regarding the fence separating
their houses.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
sale and illegal possession of shabu. It declared that the
prosecution ably established the elements of illegal sale and
possession of shabu through the testimonies of its witnesses who
arrested appellant after selling a sachet of the illegal drug in a
"test-buy operation" and for possessing 11 sachets of the same
drug in her house after enforcing a search warrant immediately
thereafter. Appellant had no evidence that she had license or
authority to possess the shabu.
The RTC ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain
of custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they were
bought from appellant and/or seized from her house, to its
turnover to the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. The RTC rejected appellant's defense
of denial and frame-up in view of her positive identification by
eyewitnesses as the criminal offender.
The RTC therefore sentenced appellant to life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for the illegal sale of shabu. It also
sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate prison term of
eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum and a fine
of P300,000 for illegal possession of shabu.
From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. In her
Brief,[7] she assailed the validity of the search warrant claiming
that it was not issued by the RTC upon determination of probable
cause. She argued that the "confirmatory test-buy" conducted by
the poseur buyer and the confidential asset was not valid since
they forced her to engage in a drug sale. She maintained that
the shabu presented during trial was inadmissible in evidence
due to several gaps in its chain of custody.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the
Appellee[8] praying for the affirmance of the appealed Decision.
It argued that the evidence on which the RTC based its
determination of probable cause was sufficient for the issuance
of the search warrant. It asserted that the "'test buy operation"
was an entrapment and not an inducement. The OSG maintained
that the shabu confiscated from appellant was admissible in
evidence since the prosecution established the proper chain of
custody.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of
unauthorized sale and possession of shabu. The CA ruled that all
the elements for the sale of shabu were established during the
"test-buy operation". It held that the illegal sale of shabu was
proven by SPO3 De Dios who participated in said operation as the
designated poseur buyer. His offer to buy shabu with marked
money and appellant's acceptance by delivering the illegal drug
consummated the offense. The CA likewise declared that the
elements for possession of shabu were present in the case
against appellant. After appellant's arrest for illegal sale of shabu,
a valid search resulted in the discovery of 11 sachets
of shabu inside her house, which were under her possession and
control. She did not have legal authority to possess the same and
failed to overcome the presumption that she consciously knew
she was in possession of the illegal drug discovered in her home.
The CA noted that the examination by the trial judge established
probable cause in issuing the search warrant. The deposition of
PO3 Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge of
appellant's drug activities, and the same served as basis for the Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts
finding of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a search and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
warrant. prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the "test-
place sought to be searched."[13] The probable cause must be
buy operation" amounted to instigation since it is settled
"determined personally by the judge, after examination under
jurisprudence that a ''decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
inducement or instigation. The CA was also unconvinced by
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
appellant's claim that the proof against her was inadmissible
the persons or things to be seized."[14] Probable cause does not
since the prosecution failed to show strict compliance with
mean actual and positive cause, nor does it import absolute
Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules on the custody
certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause
and disposition of the evidence.
is concerned only with the question of whether the affiant has
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] On July 15, 2013,[10] the reasonable grounds to believe that the accused committed or is
Court notified the parties to file their supplemental briefs. committing the crime charged.[15]
However, appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since
Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search
she had extensively argued her cause in her appellants'
warrant after deposing two witnesses, namely PI Barber and
brief.[11] For its part, the OSG manifested that it would not file a
SPO3 Salamida. In particular, the deposition of SPO3 Salamida
supplemental brief since its appellee's brief filed in the CA had
shows that he had personal knowledge of appellant's drug
already discussed and refuted the arguments raised by
pushing activities which served as basis for the finding of
appellant.[12]
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. Thus,
Our Ruling whether or not PI Barber had personal knowledge of the illegal
drug activities committed by appellant will not adversely affect
The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After
the findings of probable cause for the purpose of issuance of
Finding Probable Cause
search warrant.
Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the
Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does
issuance of the search warrant. She claims that PI Barber had no
not constitute instigation.
personal knowledge of her alleged drug dealings.
Appellant argues that the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police
There is no merit in this contention.
officers was not valid since she was induced by the designated
poseur buyer, SPO3 De Dios, and the confidential informant to
sell the seized shabu.
There is no merit in this argument.
In inducement or instigation —
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the
accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the
would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself
becomes a co-principal. [This is distinguished from entrapment
wherein] ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto.[16]
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not
prohibited by law. It does not amount to instigation. As in this
case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.[17] The police
received an intelligence report that appellant habitually deals
with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report
by engaging in a drug transaction with appellant. There was no
proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal drugs
to him.
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still
deserves an acquittal as will be discussed below.
The chain of custody of evidence was not
established
Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to establish the
charges of illegal sale and possession of shabu against her due to
the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable integrity of the
evidence in view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of
RA 9165.
There is merit in this protestation.
The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements:
"(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and
consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor."[18] On the other hand, the offense
of illegal possession of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the
accused is in possession of an item or an object which is identified
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said
drug."[19] In the prosecution for illegal sale and possession
of shabu, there must be proof that these offenses were actually
committed, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of corpus delicti.[20]
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of [shabu,] conviction
cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity
of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be established with
moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the [shabu] illegally
possessed and sold x x x is the same [shabu] offered in court as
exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of
certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.[21]
"'The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that
it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed."[22]
Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for
destruction."[23] In People v. Havana,[24] the Court expounded
on the custodial chain procedure in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential
when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily
identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is
critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.
The same standard obtains in case the evidence is susceptible of
alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering -without regard to whether
the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the
confiscated item must be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second,
the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission
of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the
court.[25]
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer
of his/her initials and signature on the items after they have been
seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that
the seized items be marked immediately since the succeeding
handlers thereof will use the markings as reference.[26] The
chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized
contraband be done "(1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation."[27]
In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers
marked the seized items with their initials in the presence of
appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While PO2 Isip
testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the
police station,[28] no evidence was presented to show that the
marking was accomplished in the presence of appellant.
Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never
identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the
markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence
to prove authorship of the markings.
While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police
station, this contemplates a case of warrantless searches and
seizures.[29] Here, the police officers secured a search warrant
prior to their operation. They therefore had sufficient time and
opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However, the
police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets
of shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an Inventory
of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said
house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes
the first gap in the chain of custody.
The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to
the investigating officer in the police station constitutes the
second link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court takes
note that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to
identify the person to whom the seized items were turned over
at the police station. While SPO3 Salamida was identified as the
property custodian of the police station, this does not necessarily
mean that he is also the investigating officer. There is nothing in
the records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of
evidence gains importance considering that none of the arresting
officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented
during trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the
second link in the chain of custody is missing.
The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to
the forensic chemist in the crime laboratory is the third link in the
chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned over by PI
Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of
the manner it was handled therein. He also did not identify the
police officer in whose custody the seized sachets of shabu were
placed at the PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to
forward the seized shabu to the crime laboratory. The request for
laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police officer
who delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO1 Asis, but he was
not presented to testify that the shabu delivered to the crime
laboratory was the same shabu confiscated from appellant.
There is a third break in the chain of custody.
Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic
chemist PSI Cruto. His testimony is not clear and positive since he
failed to assert that the alleged packs of chemical substance
presented for laboratory examination and tested positive
for shabu were the very same substance allegedly recovered
from appellant. His testimony was limited to the result of the
examination he conducted and not on the source of the
substance.
From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was
established at all. What we have here are individual links with
breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied
together. The so-called links in the chain of custody show that the
seized shabu was not handled properly starting from the actual
seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as well
as its transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court
therefore cannot conclude with moral certainty that
the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that
presented tor laboratory examination and then presented in
court.
It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect
and unbroken. In reality however, this rarely occurs. The legal
standard that must therefore be observed "is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they
will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused."[30] Here, the Court finds that the apprehending
officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the confiscated shabu. There are just too many breaks
and gaps to the effect that a chain of custody could not be
established at all. Failure of the prosecution to offer testimony to
establish a substantially complete chain of custody of
the shabu and the inappropriate manner of handling the
evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes the government's
chance of successfully prosecuting a drug case.[31]
Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an
unbroken chain of custody, another procedural lapse casts
further uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the
subject shabu. This refers to the non-compliance by the arresting
officers with the most basic procedural safeguards relative to the
custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1),
Article II of RA 9165, which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,
for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of
the drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Corollarily, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations provides as follows:
Section 21(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and a public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided,
that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable,
in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said
items.
In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical
inventory of the seized items at the place where the search
warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the
Department of Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the
presence of appellant after their initial custody and control of said
drug, and after immediately seizing and confiscating the same.
Neither was an explanation offered for such failure. While this
directive of rigid compliance has been tempered in certain cases,
"such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and
Regulations can be applied only when the evidentiary value and
integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved."[32] Such an
exception does not obtain in this case. "Serious uncertainty is
generated on the identity of the [shabu] in view of the broken
linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to the
[apprehending officers] by the courts below cannot arise."[33]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 dated June 23, 2011
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles
is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, her guilt not having been
established beyond reasonable doubt.
The Superintendent for the Correctional Institute for Women is
hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE the appellant from
custody, unless she is held for another lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GLORIA
NANGCAS ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
For review is the Decision[1] dated 6 March 2015, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 01092-MIN, which affirmed in
toto the Decision,[2] dated 8 October 2012, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, 10th Judicial Region, Branch
19, in Criminal Case No. FC-2009-643, finding herein accused-
appellant Gloria Nangcas (Nangcas) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under
Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of Republic Act No.
9208,[3] committed against AAA,[4] BBB,[5] CCC,[6] and Judith
Singane (Judith), and imposing upon her the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000.000.00).
THE FACTS
Accused-appellant was charged for Violation of Republic Act No.
9208 or the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" per the
Information, dated 24 September 2009, which reads:[7]
"That on 22 March 2009 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon
and thereafter, commencing in Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully and unlawfully
recruit, transport, transfer, harbor and provide four (4) women,
namely, fourteen (14) year-old [AAA], thirteen (13) year-old
[BBB], seventeen (17) year-old [CCC] and nineteen (19) year-old
Judith Singane, by means of fraud, deception, or taking advantage
of the vulnerability of said victims for the purpose of offering and
selling said victims for forced labor, slavery or involuntary
servitude, that is, by promising them local employment (as
househelpers in Camella Homes, Upper Carmen, Cagayan de Oro
City) with a monthly salary of PhP1,500.00 each and that they
could go home every Sunday, but instead, said accused brought
them to Marawi City and sold them for PhP1,600.00 each to their
great damage and prejudice.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 4, in relation to Section 6, of
Republic Act No. 9208.
By virtue of the Warrant dated 18 December 2009,[8] Nangcas
was arrested and committed to the jurisdiction of the court a
quo on 13 January 2010.[9] With the assistance of her counsel,
Nangcas pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged.[10]
The Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented Judith, AAA, BBB, P/Insp. Exodio Vidal,
and Enerio Singane (Enerio) as witnesses. Their testimonies,
taken together, tended to establish the following:
On 22 March 2009, at around three o'clock in the afternoon,
Judith was with AAA at xxx when they saw her uncle Junjun
Singane and aunt Marites Simene with Nangcas. The latter
approached them and asked if they wanted to work.[11] Judith,
being interested, brought Nangcas to her house to ask permission
from her parents. Nangcas informed Judith's parents that the
latter would be working as a house helper at Camella Homes in
Cagayan de Oro City, with a salary of P1,500.00 per month and
with a rest day every Sunday. Judith's father, Enerio, was
adamant at first, but Judith insisted because of the salary Nangcas
offered and the location of the employer was nearby at Camella
Homes; hence, Enerio gave his consent.[12] Thereafter, Judith
had her things all ready and went with Nangcas. Nangcas, on the
other hand, left her cellphone number with Enerio.[13]
Since AAA, who was only fourteen (14) years old
then,[14] showed interest in Nangcas' proposition, the latter
then proceeded to AAA's residence to meet her parents. There,
Nangcas also met CCC, AAA's sister, who was only seventeen
years old at that time. CCC also expressed her interest to work as
a house helper. Nangcas explained to AAA and CCC's parents that
both would be working as house helpers at Camella Homes in
Cagayan de Oro, with a salary of P1,500.00 each. The father of the
two girls rejected the idea since he could still manage to support
them. Their mother was also apprehensive that her daughters
might be brought to Marawi. However, since AAA and CCC were
very much interested and Nangcas assured their parents that
they would only work at Camella Homes, the parents eventually
agreed, thinking that both their daughters would be within each
other's reach as they would both be working at Camella
Homes.[15] Thereafter, Judith, AAA, CCC, and Nangcas
proceeded to the house of BBB, a cousin of AAA and CCC, to
inform her of the job offer.[16]
BBB was home attending to her younger sibling when Judith,
AAA, CCC, and Nangcas arrived. After Nangcas told her of work
available at Camella Homes, BBB agreed thinking that her mother
could just visit her there.[17]
All the recruits resided at xxx, Cagayan de Oro City.
After the girls had packed their things, Nangcas brought them to
Camella Homes. The alleged employer was not there, so Nangcas
informed them that they had to go to Cogon. When they were
already in Cogon, Nangcas instructed them to board a van as they
would proceed to Iligan City where the employer was. Though
hesitant and doubtful, the girls followed Nangcas' instructions.
Judith, however, noticed that they were already travelling far and
tried to talk to Nangcas but to naught, as the latter slept during
the trip.[18] Upon reaching their destination, it was only then
that Nangcas told them that they would be working as house
helpers in Marawi. The girls complained that their agreement was
only to work at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro. But Nangcas
informed them that their alleged employer in Iligan was no longer
looking for helpers; and that it was in Marawi where they were
needed. The girls wanted to go home but they didn't have any
money for their fare going back to Cagayan de Oro.[19] They had
no other choice but to stay in Marawi. They were then brought to
the house of one Baby Abas (Baby) where they slept for the night.
The following day, Nangcas brought Judith and BBB to the house
of Baby's sister, Cairon Abantas (Cairon), while AAA and CCC
remained to work for Baby. Nangcas went back to Cagayan de
Oro.
The recruits worked in Marawi for more than a month. They were
not paid their salaries as, according to their employers, Nangcas
had already collected P1,600.00 for each of them. They were also
made to eat leftover rice with only "pulaka" (mixed ginger, chili
and onion) as their viand.[20] Furthermore, they were
threatened not to go out or attempt to escape or else, the
soldiers would kill them since they were Christians.
Since Judith failed to go home on her scheduled day-off on
Sunday, Enerio called up Nangcas to ask about his daughter. The
latter told him that Judith was with her just the other day and that
she could go home only after two (2) months.
On 14 April 2009, Judith asked permission to go home since it was
her birthday, but she was denied Subsequently, with the help of
the "kasambahay" of the neighboring house who lent them her
cellphone, Judith was able to call her father informing him of her
whereabouts.[21] Alarmed by the news from his daughter, Enerio
went to the Lumbia Police Station to report the incident and seek
assistance to rescue her daughter and three (3) other minors.
P/Insp. Exodio Vidal then assisted Enerio in looking for Nangcas.
They went to Nangcas' house but only her children were there.
They left a message inviting Nangcas to their station but she did
not respond.[22] On 5 May 2009, P/Insp. Vidal received orders to
proceed to Marawi City to retrieve the girls. The girls' parents and
a couple of Muslims accompanied the police officers. Enerio
Singane called the cellphone number used by Judith to contact
him and he was able to talk to the cellphone's owner. The latter
gave him the directions to the house of Judith's
employer.[23] The police officers successfully rescued the four
(4) girls. The parents of the recruited girls filed the instant action
against Nangcas.
The Version of the Defense
Nangcas and Cairon testified for the defense.
Nangcas denied the accusation against her. She claimed that her
friend Joni Mohamad (Joni) was looking for two (2) house helpers
to work for him at Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, and two (2)
others for his mother who lived in Iligan City.[24] She went to xxx
to look for interested applicants and there met a couple who told
her that their neighbor was interested. The couple took her to
Judith who expressed interest so she decided to meet her parents
to ask for their permission. She informed the parents that Judith
would be working at Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, with a
salary of P1,500.00.[25] She then went to the parents of AAA and
CCC and made the same offer. The girls' parents gave their
consent provided that the siblings would work in the same
house.[26] After the girls had packed their things, she brought
them to Camella Homes.
Nangcas alleged that while they were at the terminal, she
chanced upon BBB, a cousin of AAA and CCC. The former
requested to accompany them to Camella Homes so that she
would know where to visit her cousins on her day-off.[27] She
agreed; hence, BBB went with them to Camella Homes. When
they arrived at Camella Homes, she introduced the girls to Joni.
However, Joni only needed two (2) helpers and chose Judith and
CCC to work for him but the latter refused because she wanted
to work as a house helper with her sister AAA. Joni then called his
mother to inform her about the house helpers. The latter
instructed him to send them to Iligan and that she would pay for
their fare.[28] Nangcas took the four (4) girls with her to Cogon
and boarded a van going to Iligan. However, before they could
reach Iligan, Joni's mother called her and informed her that she
was no longer hiring the helpers as her current helper decided
not to go home anymore.[29] She asked the driver if he could
take them back to Cagayan de Oro but the latter asked for an
additional charge. When she replied that she had no money left,
Judith immediately suggested that they proceed to Marawi
where she has an uncle. However, Judith could not contact her
uncle, hence she asked the girls if it was okay for them to go to
Marawi and they all agreed. She then contacted her friend Baby
Abas (Baby) in Marawi and the latter lent her money to pay the
van driver.[30] They stayed in Baby's house for the night. When
Baby asked the girls if they were willing to work as house helpers,
they said yes.
Nangcas furthermore alleged that on the following day, AAA and
CCC remained with Baby while she brought Judith and BBB to the
house of Baby's sister, Cairon, to work as house helpers with
P1,500.00 salary each. Before she left for Cagayan de Oro, Baby
gave her P500.00 while Cairon gave her P1,600.00 for providing
them the helpers;[31] Nangcas added that Judith specifically
asked her not to tell their parents about their whereabouts as
they would call to inform them themselves.[32]
Nangcas finally alleged that by the end of March 2009, she went
back to Marawi to follow up on the girls and there learned that
Judith failed to inform their parents of their whereabouts.
Nevertheless, all the girls assured her that they were fine. On 5
May 2009, she was supposed to fetch Judith, who was scheduled
to go home for her birthday but she failed to do so because she
had to attend to her husband who was hospitalized for
pneumonia. On 7 May 2009, Judith's father called and informed
her that he had already fetched his daughter and the other girls.
Cairon also h stified and professed that she came to know
Nangcas only when she brought the girls to work for her. She
recalled offering to pay the girls a salary of P1,500.00 to which
the girls agreed. She claimed that she even asked for Enerio's
number to inform him that his daughter was in good
hands.[33] She further claimed that Nangcas did not ask for
money but she volunteered to reimburse Nangcas' expenses
incurred in bringing the girls. Finally, Cairon alleged that she paid
the girls their salaries and she was surprised when their parents
came to her house to get them.[34]
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its decision,[35] the RTC[36] found Nangcas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
The RTC ratiocinated that Nangcas' deception was apparent in
the manner with which she dealt with Enerio, Judith, and three
other private complainants: that they were made to believe that
the victims would be working as house helpers at Camella Homes
in Cagayan de Oro City; and that Nangcas never bothered to call
the girls' parents to inform them of their children's whereabouts.
The RTC also reasoned that Nangcas further deceived Enerio
when she told him during the last week of March that Judith and
the other girls were at Camella Homes when she fully knew that
they were in Marawi; that she employed the same deception
when she brought the girls from one place to another until they
reached Marawi; that the girls were left penniless and thus had
no fare to go back home, thus, leaving no choice but to work
against their will. Finally, The RTC declared that if there was truth
to the claim of Nangcas, she should have presented Joni
Mohamad and his mother; that Nangcas had also admitted
previously providing helpers to others, and that the incident on
22 March 2009 was not the only occasion he did so.
The fallo reads:
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Gloria
Nangcas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Trafficking in Persons and for which the Court hereby imposes
upon GLORIA NANGCAS the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
IT IS SO ORDERED.[37]
Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, Nangcas appealed
to the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City.[38]
The Assailed CA Decision

The CA, through its Twenty-Second Division, accorded respect to
the findings of fact of the trial court in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that the latter ignored facts and
circumstances which, if considered on appeal, would have
reversed or modified the outcome of the case. The CA found no
merit in the arguments raised by Nangcas, to wit:
First, there is no doubt that the accused-appellant recruited and
transported the private complainants to their supposed employer
in Marawi. These are well within the acts that may constitute
trafficking, to wit: recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring. This meets the first elements of the offense. Second,
we are convinced that the accused-appellant employed fraud and
deceit and took advantage of the victims' vulnerability to
successfully recruit them. These means satisfy the second
element. Lastly, the foregoing acts and means resulted in the
victims' forced labor and slavery.[39]
The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed. The October 8, 2012
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro
City in Criminal Case No. 2009-643 for qualified trafficking in
persons is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[40]
Hence, this appeal.
The Present Appeal
On 19 August 2015, the Court issued a Resolution notifying the
parties that they could file their respective supplemental
briefs.[41] However, both Nangcas and the Office of the Solicitor
General, as counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, manifested that they would no longer file
supplemental briefs, as their respective briefs filed with the CA
sufficiently addressed their particular arguments.[42]
Based on the arguments raised in Nangcas' brief before the CA,
the Court is called upon to resolve the following assignment of
errors:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[43]
THERE WAS NO FRAUD, DECEPTION OR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF
THE VULNERABILITY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIMS.[44]
THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WERE NOT OFFERED OR SOLD FOR
FORCED LABOR, SLAVERY OR INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.[45]
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANTS.[46]
The Arguments of the Accused
Nangcas argues that there was no deception in this case. She
maintained that she did not deceive any of the private
complainants nor their parents when their daughters were hired
as house helpers. She also maintained that in bringing the alleged
victims to Iligan City, she had no idea that the mother of Joni
would no longer be needing house helpers; hence, with no money Section 3(a), (b), and (d) of R.A. No. 9208, which read:
to pay for the fare, she had no other choice but to stay with Baby
Abas in Marawi City. Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for
any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the following
Nangcas further argues that contrary to the findings of the court, acts:
she did not recruit the victims under the pretext of domestic
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a
employment for the purpose of forced labor, slavery or
person by any means, including those done under the pretext of
involuntary servitude. She averred that the alleged victims
domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship,
worked as house helpers as previously agreed upon, that they
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
were not forced to work contrary to their agreement. She also
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
averred that the alleged victims were not enticed to work with a
high salary and the amount offered was not that big to entice Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are
anyone to leave one's home and work for someone else. considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
Nangcas finally argues that there were inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the private complainants in the following manner:
xxxx
that Judith testified that she and BBB were brought to the house
of Cairon Abantas, the sister of Baby; while AAA testified that it
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
was she and BBB who stayed with Baby while Judith and CCC were
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by
brought to Cairon.
a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating
THE COURT'S RULING with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group;
We affirm accused-appellant Nangcas' conviction
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
Accused-appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment,
doubt.
transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
Nangcas was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other
persons under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c), and
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person,
or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person for the
purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of
a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as
"trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the
means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or
one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of
or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
xxxx
(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of work or
services from any person by means of enticement, violence,
intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including
deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy,
debt-bondage or deception.
Under Republic Act No. 10364,[47] the elements of trafficking m
persons have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person."
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale
of organs." (emphasis supplied)
The information filed against Nangcas sufficiently alleged the
recruitment and transportation of Judith and three (3) other
minor victims for forced labor or services, with Nangcas taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through her
assurance and promises of good salary, accessibility of place of
work to their respective residences, and weekly dayoff. Pursuant
to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Nangcas
was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale and
three (3) of her victims were under 18 years of age.
The presence of the crime's elements was established by the
prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial. The
testimonies of Judith and three (3) other minor victims
established that Nangcas employed deception and fraud in
gaining both the victims and their parents' trust and confidence.
In the instant case, we concur with the trial court's decision, to
wit:
"Deception was apparent in the manner with which accused dealt
with Enerio, Judith and the three other private complainants.
Enerio was made to believe that Judith and company will be
working as house helpers at Camella Homes in Cagayan De Oro
City. Through the haze with which the private complainants were
transported from Cagayan de Oro City to Marawi City, what is
clear is that Nangcas has Enerio's number but she never called
him to inform him they were proceeding to Marawi City. Much
worse, she deceived Enerio anew when she told him sometime in
the last week of March 2009 that Judith and her friends were in
Camella when she fully knew they were made to work in Marawi
City."[48]
The testimonies of the victims and Enerio gave a clear picture as
to how the victims were deceived by Nangcas into going with her,
and how she orchestrated the entire trip pretending to take them
first to Cagayan De Oro City, then to Iligan, and finally to Marawi
City, so as to be sure that the victims have no other choice but to
go to Marawi City and serve as house helpers. The prosecution
has aptly shown that the victims would not have agreed or would
not have been allowed by their parents if Nangcas would directly
offer them work at Marawi City; that she deliberately fabricated
a story to delude her victims and their parents.
All told, the prosecution has adequately proved Nangcas' guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in Section 4
of R.A No. 9208.
Nangkas employed fraud and deception in order to bring the
victims to Marawi City.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which
deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act
upon it to his legal injury;[49] while fraud is every kind of
deception whether in the form of insidious machinations,
manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the
purpose of leading another party into error and thus execute a
particular act.[50]
From the factual milieu, it is clear that actual fraud and deception
are present in this case, such as when Nangcas induced and
coaxed the victims to go with her. She promised the victims and
their parents that their daughters would be working within
Cagayan De Oro City, with an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per
month.
At the outset, the intent of Nangcas was obvious. She specifically
employed several deceptive tactics to lure the victims and their
parents into agreeing to take the victims, who were mostly
minors, and bring them allegedly to Camella Homes in Cagayan
De Oro City, to serve as house helpers. Nangcas represented to
Judith and her parents that Judith would be employed as a house
helper, would be allowed to go home once a week, and would be
paid P1,500.00 monthly. After having convinced Judith and her
parents, Nangcas used Judith to entice some more of her friends
to go with her as house helpers in Cagayan De Oro City. After
recruiting Judith and the three other minor victims, Nangcas
immediately boarded them in a jeepney to Cagayan De Oro City
supposedly to bring Judith and her friends to their employer at
Camella Homes.
The record shows that Nangcas' decision to bring the victims to
Marawi City was planned, contrary to her defense that she only
took them there after the supposed employer in Iligan changed
her mind to accept them as her house helpers. It was sufficiently
established that in Marawi City, Nangcas already had Baby and
Cairon ready and waiting for her to bring the recruits to them and
collect her fees. Nangcas' failure to notify the victims' parents of
their whereabouts bolsters the allegation that it was really her
intention to conceal the fact that the work was actually in Marawi
City and not in Cagayan de Oro; her acts thus constitute deceit
and fraud as defined by law.
The victims were sold for forced labor, slavery or involuntary
servitude.
Nangcas alleges that the victims were not sold to slavery as they
knew that they would be working as house helpers; as such, there
was no slavery or involuntary servitude. Her argument is
completely unfounded.
Slavery is defined as the extraction of work or services from any
person by enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of
force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of
authority or moral ascendancy, debt bondage or
deception.[51] In this case, Judith and the three (3) other minor
victims were enticed to work as house helpers after Nangcas had
told them of their supposed salary and where they would be
working; only to discover that they were brought to another place
without their consent. In Marawi, the victims were constrained
to work with the intention to save money for their fare going back
home; however, when they asked for their salary they were told
that it had already been given to Nangcas.
Alleged inconsistencies are minor and do not affect the credibility
of the witnesses.
Nangcas still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such
alleged inconsistencies pertained to the testimonies of Judith and
the other minor victims as to who was employed by whom. These
inconsistencies, however, are of no consequence to the fact that
Judith and the three minor victims were taken by appellant to
Marawi City against their will and were made to work as house
helpers without pay. It is evident that the supposed
inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies pertained to minor
details that, in any case, could not negate Nangcas' unlawful
activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court has
ruled time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative
weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on these
factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the
Court will not weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by
the trial court and affirmed by the CA.[52]
Given the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse
Nangcas' conviction for qualified trafficking under R.A. No. 9208.
The RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P2,000,000.00, applying Section 10(c)
of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and
sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in
this Act:
xxxx
(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section
6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than
Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 6
March 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01092
for Qualified Trafficking in Persons is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,[2] otherwise known as
the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.”[3]
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic
Act No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The
information against accused, dated May 5, 2008, states:
That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock
A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent,
with intent to gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a
minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and
sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different
customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in
Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A.
9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are
as follows:
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),[5] a non-
governmental organization, coordinated with the police in order
to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City.[6]
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe
Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed
the team of police operatives.[7] PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso
were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking
for girls to entertain their guests.[8] IJM provided them with
marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter.[9]
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and
25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was
designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of
the police team.[10]
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district. Accused
noticed them and called their attention by saying “Chicks mo
dong?” (Do you like girls, guys?).[11]
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their
conversation with accused went as follows:
Accused:Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests
Luardo: naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must be young
because we have guests waiting at the motel.)
Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get
Accused:
them.)[12]
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that
they found a prospective subject.[13]
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private
complainants in this case.[14]
Accused:Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with
these two?)
PO1 Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are
Veloso: they good in sex?)[15]
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1
Luardo inquired how much their services would cost. Accused
replied, “Tag kinientos” (P500.00).[16]
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with
them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24, PO1
Veloso handed the marked money to accused.[17]
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a
missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of the
team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed her
of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated the marked
money from accused.[18] Meanwhile, AAA and BBB “were
brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the
representatives from the IJM and the DSWD.”[19]
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991.
This statement was supported by a copy of her certificate of live
birth.[20]
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in
Mandaue City. In March 2008 she stopped working as a house
helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her cousin,
but she subsequently moved to a boarding house. It was there
where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann
worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was
no longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she
needed the money in order to help her father. AAA recalled that
she had sex with her first customer. She was paid P200.00 and
given an additional P500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee
Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought
her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more
customers in that area.[21]
AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA
would usually see her pimping girls to customers in Barangay
Kamagayan.[22] AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008,
accused solicited her services for a customer. That was the first
time that she was pimped by accused.[23] Accused brought her,
BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.[24]
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she and BBB
went to Room 24. It was in Room 24 where the customer paid
Shirley. The police rushed in and told AAA and BBB to go to the
other room. AAA was then met by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she
was rescued and not arrested.[25]
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display
herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m. She
received P400.00 for every customer who selected her.[26]
The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial.
PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified that after
PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they “rushed
to Room 24 and arrested the accused.”[27] SPO1 Altubar
retrieved the marked money worth P1,000.00 from accused’s
right hand “and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan recorded
the same at the ‘police blotter prior operation’. . . .”[28]
The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM
“in conducting the operation against the accused.”[29]
Version of the accused
In defense, accused testified that she worked as a laundrywoman.
On the evening of May 2, 2008, she went out to buy supper. While
walking, she was stopped by two men on board a blue car. The
two men asked her if she knew someone named Bingbing. She
replied that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men
informed her that they were actually looking for Gingging, gave
her a piece of paper with a number written on it, and told her to
tell Gingging to bring companions. When accused arrived home,
she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because
allegedly, she would be given money by the two males.[30]
Ruling of the trial court
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and held[31] that:
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . .
as defined under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the
purpose of letting her engage in prostitution as defined under
paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of “sexual intercourse”
need not have been consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e.
the ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust money”
of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.
....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons under
paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section
6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TWENTY
(20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
SO ORDERED[.][32]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but
modified the fine and awarded moral damages. The dispositive
portion of the decision[33] reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant
appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10 August
2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu
City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly sentenced
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private
complainants Php150,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[34]
Accused filed a notice of appeal[35] on August 28, 2013, which
the Court of Appeals noted and gave due course in its
resolution[36] dated January 6, 2014.
The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by
this court on March 17, 2014.[37]
In the resolution[38] dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to
notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental
briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to
confirm the confinement of accused.[39]
Counsel for accused[40] and the Office of the Solicitor
General[41] filed their respective manifestations, stating that
they would no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all
issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and appellee’s
brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter[42] dated
June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed
accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women
since October 27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused is whether the prosecution was
able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the
sole issue may be dissected into the following:
(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police
was valid, considering that there was no prior surveillance and
the police did not know the subject of the operation;[43]
(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt even though there was no evidence
presented to show that accused has a history of engaging in
human trafficking;[44] and
(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in
persons, considering that AAA admitted that she works as a
prostitute.[45]
Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she
was instigated into committing the crime.[46] The police did not
conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their
subject was.[47] Neither did the police know the identities of the
alleged victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should
be acquitted because the prosecution did not present evidence
that would prove she had a history of engaging in human
trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a pimp and
asserted that she was a laundrywoman.[48] In addition, AAA
admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her
decision to display herself to solicit customers.[49]
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee
The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee
People of the Philippines, argued that the trial court did not err in
convicting accused because witnesses positively identified her as
the person who solicited customers and received money for AAA
and BBB.[50] Entrapment operations are valid and have been
recognized by courts.[51] Likewise, her arrest in flagrante delicto
is valid.[52] Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that
accused had “fully consummated the act of trafficking of persons.
. .”[53]
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime (UN CTOC) was “adopted and opened for signature,
ratification and accession”[54] on November 15, 2000. The UN
CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and
Components and Ammunition.[55]
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations
“Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children” (Trafficking Protocol).[56] This
was ratified by the Philippine Senate on September 30,
2001.[57] The Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force was on
December 25, 2003.[58]
In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:
Article 3
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a
position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the
removal of organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the
intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in
subparagraph (a) have been used;
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or
receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be
considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does not involve
any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.
Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the
“Anti-Trafficking Act will serve as the enabling law of the
country’s commitment to [the] protocol.”[59]
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship
speech and described trafficking in persons as follows:
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its
hideousness, is tantamount to modern-day slavery at work. It is a
manifestation of one of the most flagrant forms of violence
against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt of this insidious
form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception,
abduction, rape, physical, mental and other forms of abuse,
prostitution, forced labor, and indentured servitude.
....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women;
the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United
Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and
their Families; and the United Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking
in Women and Girls, among others.
Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United
Nations’ Convention Against Organized Crime, including the
Trafficking Protocol in October last year.
At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the
problem. So it seems.
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up
with a law that shall squarely address human trafficking.[60]
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then
numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta
asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when
other laws exist that cover trafficking.[61]
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking
issue are the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No.
6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or
the Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues such as
illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification of public documents
and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not respond to
the issue of recruiting, harboring or transporting persons
resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like
practices. They only address to one or some elements of
trafficking independent of their results or
consequence.[62] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address
the issue of human trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208 was passed
on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26, 2003.
II.
Elements of trafficking in persons
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its
definition under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders.”
(2) The means used which include “threat or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
 power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale
to achieve the consent of a person having control over of organs.
another; and
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when the
“exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude
purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even
or the removal or sale of organs.”[63]
if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 10364[64] was approved, paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
otherwise known as the “Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in
Act of 2012.” Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was amended
persons have been expanded to include the following acts:
by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:

(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,

SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of
read as follows:
persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge,
within or across national borders;”
“SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force,
“(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, over another person”
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
person having control over another person for the purpose of
sale of organs” (Emphasis supplied)
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by
accused when their services were peddled to the police who
acted as decoys.[65] AAA was a child at the time that accused
peddled her services.[66] AAA also stated that she agreed to work
as a prostitute because she needed money.[67] Accused took
advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need
money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.[68]
III.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under
Republic Act No. 9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even
before May 2, 2008. She concludes that AAA was predisposed to
having sex with “customers” for money.[69] For liability under
our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a)
of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be
committed even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders
by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale
of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of
a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as
“trafficking in persons” even if it does not involve any of the
means set forth in the preceding paragraph.[70] (Emphasis
supplied)
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human
trafficking.[71] Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her
own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts
of trafficking in persons. Accused was charged under Section 4(a),
which states:
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be unlawful for
any person, natural or judicial, to commit any of the following
acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a
person by any means, including those done under the pretext of
domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship,
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;[72]
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when
the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following are
considered as qualified trafficking:
When the trafficked person is a child;
When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043,
otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”
and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale.
Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by
a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating
with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a
group;
When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a
person who exercise authority over the trafficked person or when
the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution
with any member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
When the offender is a member of the military or law
enforcement agencies; and
When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons,
the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is
afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis
supplied)[73]
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines “child” as:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
....
b. Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or
one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care
of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.[74]
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the
enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, accused performed
all the elements in the commission of the offense when she
peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was
also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for
the customers waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also testified
that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled her. Her
certificate of live birth was presented as evidence to show that
she was born on January 27, 1991.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons, qualified
by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held by the trial
court:
[T]he act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been
consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e. that ‘solicitation’
for sex and the handing over of the “bust money” of Php.1,000.00
already consummated the said act.[75]
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,[76] this court discussed the objective test and
the subjective test to determine whether there was a valid
entrapment operation:
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the
“subjective” or “origin of intent” test laid down in Sorrells v.
United States to determine whether entrapment actually
occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind
and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents.
All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character
traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing
the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state
of mind before the crime. The predisposition test emphasizes the
accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the
officer's misconduct and reflects an attempt to draw a line
between a “trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the
unwary criminal.” If the accused was found to have been ready
and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity,
the entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used an
unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the “objective” test. . . .
Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is
focused on the inducements used by government agents, on
police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to
commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful
police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of
the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-
abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to
commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it is presumed that
a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to
commit a crime that is presented by the simple opportunity to act
unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)[77]
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply
the objective test in determining the whether there was an
entrapment operation or an instigation.[78] However, the use of
the objective test should not preclude courts from also applying
the subjective test. She pointed out that:
Applying the “subjective” test it is worth invoking that accused-
appellant procures income from being a laundry woman. The
prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accused-
appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any
offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic]
been apprehending human traffickers for quite some
time.[79] (Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a
prior surveillance before the entrapment operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between
entrapment and instigation. In Chang v. People,[80] this court
explained that:
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and
schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the
accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the
nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In
entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes
from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission
of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and
carries it into execution.[81]
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly
instigated by the police to commit the offense. She denied being
a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a
laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of
the Court of Appeals:
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction
with PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling their attention on
whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the officers
responded, it was the accused-appellant who told them to wait
while she would fetch the girls for their perusal.[82]
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense
because she initiated the transaction. As testified by PO1 Veloso
and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by saying
“Chicks mo dong?” If accused had no predisposition to commit
the offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they wanted girls.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The
police merely proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay
Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they
wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the part of the
police for the accused to commit the crime.
When accused was arrested, she was informed of her
constitutional rights.[83] The marked money retrieved from her
was recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment
operation and was presented in court as evidence.[84]
On accused’s alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper that
night, the Court of Appeals noted that accused never presented
Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated and cannot
be given credence.[85]
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is
not a condition for an entrapment operation’s
validity.[86] In People v. Padua[87] this court underscored the
value of flexibility in police operations:
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no
rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work.
However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as
long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the
process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The
police officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance.[88] (Citations
omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving
trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may at
times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the
law enforcers.
V.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of
P2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 provides
that:
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following penalties and
sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in
this Act:
....
c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section
6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than
Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from
P150,000.00[89] to P500,000.00. We also award exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000.00. These amounts are in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Lalli[90] where this court
held that:
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as
exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a
Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which
states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
 Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of
(4) Adultery or concubinage; poverty and its accompanying desperation that compels our
women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in such
hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our
(6) Illegal search; world, where our choices of human intimacies are real choices,
and not the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation; enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as a
foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys and
(8) Malicious prosecution; challenges while continually growing together with many shared
experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines the
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; world that we create also for others.

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be
32, 34, and 35. trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should
spend their adolescence moulding their character in
.... environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other
human beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an
conviction of accused in this case.
analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or
other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a
But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we
prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually violated four
also express the hope that our people and our government unite
to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and
against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to
atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical
finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
There are more AAA’s and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to
humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia.
be rescued. They, too, need to be shown that in spite of what
Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being
their lives have been, there is still much good in our world.
committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is
likewise justified.[91]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding accused Shirley
A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a),
qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
P2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate
Sentence Law) in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No.
9346.[92]
The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:
Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:
(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008 ]
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, G.R. No. 162059 Petitioner, VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran iskolar ng
bayan a** accused, along with her brother, of swindling
government fundsccused of being the swindler ng bayan?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan,
at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng
pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction certiorari assailing
the Resolutions[1] of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying
petitioner’s motion to quash the information and herdenying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu (UP). A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed
by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January
1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President
Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.[2] On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the
Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).[3]
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall Annex.[4] President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for
the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to
the information, wais disputed the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.[5] The
succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.[6]
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian
D. Serana forof estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of
the Sandiganbayan.[7] The Information against her reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and
penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being
then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and
taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring
with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the
Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated
and renamed as “President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall,”
and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA
requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the
President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana
on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal use
and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the
accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said accused
failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended
by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.[8] It has no jurisdiction over
the crime of estafa.[9] It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered
by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public
Officers), Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against
Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction.
ShePetitioner also arguedreasoned that it was President Estrada,
and not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that
she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, and not from the coffers of the government.[10]
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. AShe claimed that as a student
regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented
her peers, in contrast to the other regents whothat held their
positions in an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
Petitioner She further contended also claimed that she had no
power or authority to receive monies or funds. She claimed such
power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a
whole. Hence, Since it was not alleged in the information that it
was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the
crime was committed in connection with her official functions,
the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing
the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.[11]
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.[12] It disputed
petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase “in
relation to office,” thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the
prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter
of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown
trial.[13]
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she
hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the
corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a
public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated,
hence, thus not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is
not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By
this definition, petitioner was compensated.[14]
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.[15] It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses
covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249
provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation
to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that
this Court has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed
by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in
representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall
under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express
provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade “27”
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the
Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective
of their salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the
inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities
and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of
law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of
the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general
powers of administration and corporate powers in the university,
such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by
law such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the
university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to
enact for the government of the university such general
ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent
with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to
fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties
and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its
discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an
investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can
act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees in the
case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or
trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the
University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to
those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This
draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such board,
accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public
officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive
jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a
position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that
the same of P15 Million was received from former President
Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter
a defense that should be properly ventilated during the trial on
the merits of this case.[16]
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.[17] The motion was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2004.[18]
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that “THE
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT
QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE CASE
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.”[19]
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below,
namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid
her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came
from President Estrada, not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright
on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a
petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash.[20] Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned
upon and often dismissed.[21] The evident reason for this rule is
to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.[22]
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[23] the
Court clearly illustrated explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely
interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment
or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure
to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if
the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a
motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is
entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in
denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be
unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or
if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made
with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few
examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion
to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent
court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion
to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court
granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court granted
the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge
from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion
to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a
motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended
complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy
was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from
further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion
to quash based on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the
criminal case was dismissed by this Court.[24]
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave
abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note
that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash
before the Sandiganbayan.[25] She repeats the reference in the
instant petition for certiorari[26] and in her memorandum of
authorities.[27]
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or
typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated
this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.[28]
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No.1606, as amended,
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of
the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct
required of public officers and employees, based on the concept
that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall
remain at all times accountable to the people.[29]
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[30]
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23,
1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on
February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249
further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now
stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade “27”
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"_____ (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"_____(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"_____(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
" _____(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
"_____(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintended or higher;
" _____(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
" _____(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations.
" _____(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
as Grade “Grade '27'” and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
" _____(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
" _____(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
" _____(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade
“Grade '27'” and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" _____In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade “Grade '27'” or higher,
as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court,
as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" _____The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" _____The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions,
and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be
filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall
not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" _____The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply
to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and
from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" _____In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers
and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
" _____Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right
to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the criminal
action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the
civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court,
said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint
determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate
civil action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved
on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.[31] Pursuant to
Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the
said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.[32]
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over
which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be
unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation
with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage
of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the
government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family
relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or
affinity in the third civil degree. The word “close personal
relation” shall include close personal friendship, social and
fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving
rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or
cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in
Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while
R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices
and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends
that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable byover which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. We note that in hoisting this
argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of
the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or
an absurd conclusion.[33] Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and
absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.[34] The intention of the
legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and
every part of the act is to be taken into view.[35] In other words,
petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that
a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that
the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.[36] Optima
statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay
marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng
prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang
mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see
no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the
offenses included in Section 4(bB) of
P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The
jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,[37] the Court had occasion to explain
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development
Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created
originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the
development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national
parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as the
National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7,
1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to
transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of
Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated
November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of
the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed
NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of the
President and allotments for its maintenance and operating
expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item
Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with
greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.[38] Pertinent
parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases
to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter
would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial
of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the
nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken
cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even
if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would
nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does
not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be
called upon toare required to define a public officer. In Khan,
Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin
down the definition of a public officer.[39] The 1987 Constitution
does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied
definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence. determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court held that: enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,[43] We
held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls
government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold
by express provision of law.[44]
a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural
right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
(Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
foundations. We find no reason to disturb the findings of the
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have
Sandiganbayan that Petitioner falls under this category. As the
any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
In Laurel v. Desierto,[41] the Court adopted the definition of to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.[45] By
Mechem of a public office: express mandate of law, We find that petitioner is, indeed, a
public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute
“A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an
is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
essential element of public office.[46] At most, it is merely
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
incidental to the public office.[47]
public. The individual so invested is a public officer.”[42]
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade We uphold that the conclusions of the Sandiganbayan that
27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.[48]
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with
Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.[49] Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and
is not a corporation created for profit.[50] Petitioner is therefore
a public officer by express mandate of P.D. No. 1606 and
jurisprudence.
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public
officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over
the offense because it was not committed in relation to her
office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act
without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was
done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in
the information.[51] More than that, jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in
an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.[52] Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent
almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.[53]
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., “while
in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x.”
(Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on
this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President
Estrada’s private funds and not from the government
coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came
from the Office of the President and not its then occupant,
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is
averred that “petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of
the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said
accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00).”
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the
source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.[54]
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,
misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s
counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that “a
lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent.”
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan
v. Ramos,[55] where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name
Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court
ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
different from that with which he was authorized. We severely
reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may
warrant suspension or disbarment.[56]
We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and
accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court
should be characterized by candor and fairness.[57] The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not
act with complete candor and honesty before the courts.[58]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 148862, August 11, 2005 ]
RUBIN TAD-Y Y BABOR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24162 affirming, on appeal, the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 49, in People v. Rubin Tad-y, et al., Criminal Case No. 98-
19401. The RTC ruling had affirmed the decision of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Criminal Case No. 57216 finding the
petitioner guilty of direct bribery.
The Antecedents
 Velez and Tad-y were also charged with violation of Section 3(c)
Engineer Rubin Tad-y, Structural Analyst and Engineer Nestor of Republic Act No. 3019[4] in an Information filed with the RTC,
Velez, Building Inspector, both of the Office of the City Engineer docketed as Criminal Case No. 17186. This case was raffled to
(OCE), Bacolod City, were charged with direct bribery under Branch 44 of the RTC of Bacolod City.
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information filed on
July 26, 1995 with the MTCC of Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal
The Case for the People[5]
Case No. 57216. The accusatory portion of the Information for
direct bribery reads:
The prosecution presented Julio Encabo, a licensed master
That on or about the 24th day of July 1995, in the City of Bacolod,
electrician and electrical contractor, who testified that Mildred
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
Wong contracted his services for the construction of her 6-storey
the herein accused, public officers, being then engineers at the
Atrium building along Gonzaga Street, in front of the Central
City Engineer's Office, Bacolod City, with corrupt intent and
Market in Bacolod City.[6] On February 16, 1994, the Office of the
motivated with pecuniary interest for themselves, did, then and
City Engineer/Building Official issued Building Permit No.
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept
0694509798[7] for the construction of the building. The
marked money in the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00)
construction of the building was finished by April 25, 1995.[8]
Pesos from Julio Encabo, electrical contractor and duly-
authorized representative of Mildred Wong, offended party and
Between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. of even date, Encabo arrived at the
owner of Atrium Building located at Gonzaga Street, Bacolod City,
OCE to arrange the conduct of final building inspections, and,
in an entrapment operation conducted by the PNP Criminal
thereafter, the signing of the corresponding certificates. Rene
Investigation Service Command at Andre's Bakeshop, Bacolod
Cornel, Jose Sotecinal, Ephraim Hechanova, Jose Mari Sales,
City, which amount was earlier solicited by said accused from the
Mateo Tuvida and Rubin Tad-y, were the OCE officers-in-charge
offended party in exchange for the signing/approval of permit for
of the various aspects[9] of the building construction. If all went
building occupancy of the building owned by the offended party,
well, the Building Official would then sign the certificate of
the signing/approval of said building permit is in connection with
occupancy, conformably with the provisions of the National
the performance of the official duties of said accused as
Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096).
engineers in the Office of the City Engineer, Bacolod City, in
violation of the aforementioned law.
Encabo had the certificates of final inspection and occupancy
form typed by an OCE secretary. However, Tad-y,
Acts contrary to law.[3]
Encabo's compadre, approached the latter and dissuaded him
from processing the certificates of final inspection and occupancy
on the building since he (Tad-y) was the one responsible for it;
also, Mildred Wong still had an unpaid balance of P4,000.00 for
his services. When Encabo told Tad-y that collecting the amount
from Wong would be problematic, Tad-y replied, "[It's] up [to]
you."
Shortly thereafter, some of the officers at the OCE, including Tad-
y and Tuvida, conducted their final inspection of the building.
During the first week of May 1995, Encabo and Tad-y had an
altercation and in his anger, Tad-y squeezed Encabo's neck in the
presence of the latter's wife.[10] Thus, the relations between
Tad-y and Encabo became strained.
In the meantime, other officers of the OCE made their respective
final inspections during the months of May to June 1995, and
signed the respective certificates of final inspection for the
building. Tad-y did not make his final inspection, and refused to
do so unless the money he had demanded was given to
him.[11] Encabo even sought the aid of the City Mayor but did
not tell the latter that Tad-y was demanding money because he
did not want to place the latter in a bad light.
Nonetheless, on July 6, 1995, Encabo reported the matter to the
Criminal Investigation Section (CIS) of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) in Bacolod City, and signed a complaint
sheet[12] against Tad-y for extortion. Police officer Alexander
Muñoz was then ordered to conduct an investigation on the
complaint.
Muñoz decided to conduct entrapment operations against Tad-y.
He asked Encabo to procure P4,000.00, consisting of forty (40)
pieces of P100.00 bills for the purpose.[13] Encabo complied.
Muñoz listed the serial numbers of the bills and placed his initials
"AM" on the right lower corner of each bill.[14] The PNP Crime
Laboratory in Bacolod City applied ultraviolet powder on the
bills.[15] The money was placed in a white envelope,[16] and the
envelope was turned over to Encabo for the entrapment.[17] The
police officers and Encabo had agreed that the police officers
would position themselves within the vicinity of the Andre's
Bakeshop, and after giving the envelope to Tad-y, Encabo would
place his eyeglasses in front of his shirt collar to indicate that Tad-
y had already received the money.[18]
After two aborted attempts,[19] Encabo informed Muñoz by
telephone that he and Tad-y would inspect the building at about
3:00 p.m. on July 24, 1995, and that Tad-y would sign the
certificate of final inspection afterwards.[20] Police officers
Eriberto Castañeda and Muñoz, along with civilian agents,
proceeded to Gonzaga Street and positioned themselves as
planned.[21]
Encabo and Tad-y, accompanied by OCE building inspector Engr.
Nestor Velez, arrived at the building at about 5:00 p.m. on July
24, 1995. Encabo brought with him the envelope[22] containing
the forty P100.00 bills and the certificate of final inspection
bearing the signatures of all the other OCE officers concerned,
which Tad-y was to sign after the inspection of the building. Tad-
y was then wearing his orange OCE bowling team t-shirt. Encabo
and Tad-y inspected the building together for about ten to twenty
minutes. Velez, on his own, made a separate inspection of the
building. After the inspection, Encabo, Tad-y and Velez agreed to
have a snack and proceeded to the Andre's Bakeshop at the
ground floor of the Atrium Building along Gonzaga
Street.[23] Velez and Tad-y walked side by side while Encabo
followed.[24] By then, Muñoz, Castañeda and the other police
officers were already in the vicinity to await Encabo's signal.
Inside the bakeshop, Encabo brought out the certificate of final
inspection, which Tad-y forthwith signed.[25] Encabo then gave
the envelope containing the forty P100.00 bills to Tad-y. The
latter asked Encabo, "What is it for?" Encabo replied that it was
the money Tad-y had been waiting for.[26] Tad-y opened the
envelope and saw its contents.[27] He asked Encabo if it was
dangerous for him to receive the envelope, and the latter
answered that it was not.[28] Instead of putting the envelope in
his pocket, Tad-y handed the same to Velez under the table. Velez
asked Tad-y what it was, and Tad-y told Velez to just keep
it.[29] Thereafter, Tad-y and Velez, followed by Encabo, exited
from the bakeshop. Encabo then removed his eyeglasses and
placed it on his shirt collar, the signal that Tad-y had received the
money.[30] The police officers then accosted Velez and Tad-y,
and asked the latter where the white envelope was. Tad-y denied
that he received the envelope. Encabo told the police officers that
Velez had the envelope.[31] When asked where the envelope
was, Velez brought it out from the right pocket of his
pants.[32] Muñoz told Velez to open the envelope and inspected
its contents. Velez did as he was told, and saw that the envelope
contained P100.00 bills.[33] Tad-y and Velez were arrested and
brought to the CIS Headquarters, PNP Crime Laboratory.[34] Tad-
y's shirt was turned over by the accosting officers. Castañeda also
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory the white envelope and
its contents, with a request[35] for the PNP Crime Laboratory to
test Velez and Tad-y for ultraviolet powder and the latter's shirt
to be tested.[36]
Forensic Chemist Rea Villavicencio conducted the examination
and prepared an Initial Laboratory Report,[37] stating that Rubin
B. Tad-y was positive for the presence of yellow ultraviolet
powder on his right arm. Villavicencio, likewise, prepared a
sketch[38] depicting the body of Tad-y, and showing that his right
forearm was positive for ultraviolet powder.
On cross-examination, Encabo admitted that Velez was not aware
of everything.[39]
Edgar Occeña, the Chief of the Inspection Division, later affixed
his signature on the certificate of final inspection bearing Tad-y's
signature.[40] The City Building Official approved and issued the
certificate of occupancy on July 27, 1995.[41]
The Case for the Accused Tad-y
Accused Tad-y denied demanding and receiving P4,000.00 from
Encabo in consideration for the conduct of the building
inspection, and his signature on the certificate of inspection and
the certificate of occupancy. He insists that under P.D. No. 1096,
he is not authorized to sign and issue a certificate of occupancy.
He testified that in the afternoon of April 25, 1995, Encabo
arrived at the OCE requesting that the appropriate officials
inspect the 6-storey Atrium building preparatory to the issuance
of a certificate of final inspection.[42] The next day, he, Tuvida,
Tordesillas, Baja and Danoy conducted the building
inspection.[43] They discovered that only four floors were
completed.[44] Encabo agreed to inspect the building at 3:00
p.m. of July 24, 1995, which, at Encabo's request, was reset to
4:30 p.m.[45] He and Engr. Velez conducted the inspection of the
building on that day and found some defects in the construction
of the building.
After the inspection, Tad-y left Velez and Encabo behind as he
was going to a bowling tournament, but, as he was crossing
Gonzaga Street, Velez and Encabo called him and invited him to
join them for a snack at Andre's Bakeshop.[46] He agreed
because he was hungry. He and Encabo were seated beside each
other at the table in the bakeshop, while Velez was seated at the
opposite side.[47] While taking their snacks, Encabo brought out
the certificate of final inspection bearing the signatures of the
other officers of the OCE who had inspected the building. Tad-y
affixed his signature above his typewritten name with the
notation "see back page for structural requisites" at the dorsal
portion of the document. Appearing at the dorsal portion of the
certificate is Tad-y's handwritten notation: "Please Post the
Allowable Load on [conspicuous] places especially [in the] area to
be used as storage."[48] Before then, he inquired from Encabo
where the other requisite certificates of final inspection,
plumbing, Fire Safety Inspection and logbook were, and Encabo
replied that he brought the requisite certificates with him
gesturing to his portfolio. Encabo assured him that all the
requirements were in his portfolio.[49] With Encabo's assurance,
he then affixed his signature in the certificate of final
inspection.[50]
Momentarily, Encabo told him that he had another document,
and forthwith handed a white envelope to him. Believing that the
envelope contained the requisite certificate of final inspection
signed by the other officers in the OCE, he received the envelope
and, without opening it, immediately handed it over to Velez who
would examine its contents. He then left the bakeshop with Velez
ahead of him, followed by Encabo. He was crossing Gonzaga
Street on his way to the bowling tournament when he was
arrested by policemen, who asked him where the white envelope
he had earlier received from Encabo was. He told them that the
envelope was with Velez.[51]
Tad-y then saw Velez being held by a policeman, and that the
envelope was already opened. A policeman forced Velez to go
near him. Another policeman forced him (Tad-y) to touch the
envelope, but he parried the arm of the policeman with his right
forearm and refused to touch it.[52] They were then brought to
the PNP headquarters where they were tested for ultraviolet
powder.
Encabo filed a complaint against him because on four (4) prior
occasions, he refused to sign the certificate of final inspection of
a house owned by a certain Nelson Señores, as well as the
application for a building permit of Joey Yao, unless the latter paid
a 100% surcharge for deficiencies.[53] Señores and Yao were the
principals of Encabo. In the evening of April 25, 1995, after he,
Tuvida, Baja and Tordesillas had their initial inspections of the
building, they had dinner at the Tasty Treat. When he was about
to pay the bill for their food and drinks, Encabo insisted that he
would pay the said bill. This infuriated him, and he squeezed
Encabo's chin with his hand.[54]
Jimmy Gonzales, a newspaper vendor, corroborated the
testimony of the accused that someone forced Velez to hand over
the opened envelope to Tad-y,[55] but that Tad-y parried the
attempt and refused to receive the envelope.[56]
Tad-y marked and offered in evidence the transcript of
stenographic notes[57] taken during the trial of September 25,
1995 in Criminal Case No. 17186.
The Case For the Accused Nestor Velez
Nestor Velez denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony
of Tad-y and declared that he was appointed as building inspector
of the OCE only on March 16, 1995.[58] When he and Tad-y
inspected the building in the afternoon of July 24, 1995, they did
so separately. After the inspection, Tad-y told him and Encabo
that he was going ahead because he was going to play
bowling.[59] When Encabo invited him and Tad-y for a snack,
Tad-y reluctantly agreed.[60]
Momentarily, Encabo brought out the certificate of final
inspection and handed it to Tad-y for the latter's signature.
However, Tad-y told Encabo that he would note the deficiencies
of the building. Tad-y then signed the certificate after being
assured by Encabo that he had all the other certificates. Tad-y
gave Velez the envelope and told him to keep it because he was
going to a bowling game.[61] Velez received the envelope and
put it inside the right pocket of his pants, thinking that it
contained the requisite final safety inspection certificate and
other certificates.[62]
On his way from the bakeshop, he and Tad-y were arrested by
policemen. He opened the white envelope as the policemen
ordered, and saw money inside. He was forced to approach Tad-
y, and another policeman forced the latter to touch the money
contained in the envelope. Tad-y resisted.
Edgar Occeña testified that he signed the original and duplicate
copies of the certificate of final inspection with the requisite
certificates of the other officers appended thereto. The City
Engineer/City Building Official signed the Certificate of
Occupancy on July 27, 1995. The original copy of the certificate of
final inspection and occupancy was then released to Wong, while
the duplicate was retained by the OCE.[63]
Mateo Tuvida testified that he was the engineer in charge of the
Mechanical Section of the OCE of Bacolod City since February
1975.[64] On April 25, 1995, he, Baja, Tad-y, Cornel and Yolando
Ilog inspected the building at the Gonzaga side of the street and
found that it was already complete but that the structure along
Cuadra Street was still incomplete. He found the mechanical
aspect of the building completed when he inspected it in the first
week of June 1995.[65] He then affixed his signature on the
certificate of final inspection.[66]
Venancio Baja testified that he had been in charge of the
Electrical Division of the OCE since 1990. He was the assistant of
Jose Sotecinal, the Chief Electrical Engineer. He inspected the
Atrium building on April 25, 1995 and found it incomplete. He
again inspected the building and found it in accord with the plans.
He then signed the certificate of final inspection only in the first
week of June 1995.[67]
On September 28, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment convicting
Tad-y of direct bribery defined and penalized under Article 210 of
the Revised Penal Code. Velez was acquitted of the charges.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
Accused Engineer Nestor Velez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime
of violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code on the
ground that it is the finding of this Court that he was innocent of
the crime charged;
Accused Engineer Ruben Tad-y is hereby pronounced GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to
suffer imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months, as minimum, to 3
years, as maximum, in the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, in accordance with the mandatory
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and, to pay the
fine in the amount of P8,000.00 pesos.
Accused Ruben Tad-y, in case of his insolvency to pay the fine,
shall suffer a subsidiary penalty of imprisonment at the rate of
one day for each 8 pesos and shall remain in confinement until
his fine is satisfied. However, his subsidiary imprisonment shall
not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case
shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part
of day shall be counted against the prisoner, in accordance with
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code; and
Accused Ruben Tad-y is also hereby ordered to suffer the penalty
of special temporary disqualification and is hereby ordered to be
deprived of his right to hold office and employment in the City
Engineer's Office, as well as for holding similar offices or
employments either perpetually or during the term of his
sentence in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 210, in
relation to Article 31, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.[68]
The MTC gave full credence and probative weight to Encabo's
testimony, ruling that Tad-y demanded and received P4,000.00
from Encabo on July 24, 1995 in consideration for his signing a
certificate of occupancy. It further ruled that the accused signed
the said certificate on the said date.
Tad-y appealed the decision to the RTC, which rendered
judgment on September 13, 1999, affirming the decision of the
MTC with modification as to the penalty imposed. The fallo of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed
except for the modifications that the accused Ruben Tad-y y
Babor's sentence should consist of an indeterminate penalty of
four (4) months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year,
eight (8) months and twenty- one (21) days of Prision
Correccional, as maximum, and for him to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.[69]
The RTC denied Tad-y's motion for reconsideration. However, the
RTC agreed with Tad-y's contention that what the latter signed
was a certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of
occupancy.
In a parallel development, the RTC rendered judgment on May
18, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 17186, acquitting Tad-y and Velez
of the charge.[70]
The accused, now the petitioner, filed a petition for review of the
decision of the RTC. The CA rendered judgment on February 2,
2001 affirming the RTC decision in toto.[71] Upon the denial of
the motion for reconsideration of the said decision, the petitioner
filed his petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
The threshold issue raised by the petitioner is factual - whether
the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of his
guilt for direct bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner avers that under the Information, and as held by
the courts a quo, he was charged with direct bribery under the
second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, for
soliciting and receiving P4,000.00 on July 24, 1995 from Mildred
Wong, through Encabo, in consideration for his signing/approval
of the certificate of occupancy of the Atrium Building, and that he
signed said certificate on said date.
The petitioner maintains that he did not sign a certificate of
occupancy. He posits that a certificate of occupancy is signed by
the city building official, and that he has nothing to do with the
execution of such certificate. Hence, he is not criminally liable for
direct bribery, one of the essential elements for the crime being
that the act which he agreed to do or execute is connected to the
performance of his official duties.
The petitioner assails the credibility and probative weight of
Encabo's testimony. He avers that Encabo had an axe to grind
against him because, on prior occasions, he had denied the
applications for building permit filed by his principals due to
structural deficiencies in the buildings.
The petitioner further insists that he did not demand, nor could
have demanded the amount of P4,000.00 on April 25, 1995, or
thereafter, because as of the said date, the Atrium building had
not yet been completed. The petitioner avers that Encabo's claim
that he demanded P4,000.00 for the signing the certificate of final
inspection is belied by the fact that he indicated the deficiencies
of the building at the dorsal portion of the certificate. It was only
in the first week of June 1995 that Baja and Tuvida made their
final inspection and signed the certificate of final
inspection.[72] Even Encabo admitted that the petitioner refused
to sign the said certificate because as of July 24, 1995, there had
been no final inspection of the building, and not because he was
demanding P4,000.00 from Encabo.
The petitioner posits that the case for the prosecution was
enfeebled by its failure to adduce in evidence the certificate of
final inspection he signed on July 24, 1995. It adduced in evidence
only the certificate of final inspection bearing all the signatures of
the officers in the OCE, except his.[73] He claims that the
respondent failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he
knew of the contents of the white envelope. He, in fact, believed
that the envelope contained the requisite certificates of
inspection. Moreover, he did not open the envelope and instead
passed it over to Velez for verification, as he was on his way to a
bowling game.
The petitioner further contends that the respondent even failed
to adduce in evidence the white envelope he received from
Encabo, or prove that the said white envelope was what he
actually received from Encabo. He posits that there is no probable
cause for his and Velez's warrantless arrest; hence, any evidence
confiscated by the policemen from them is inadmissible in
evidence.
The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), avers that it adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the petitioner's guilt for direct bribery. It insists that the
petitioner failed to prove that Encabo had any ulterior motive to
falsely charge and testify against him. The OSG points that the
testimony of Encabo is honest and straightforward; hence,
entitled to full probative weight. It is hard to believe, the OSG
avers, that the petitioner would accept the envelope without
knowing its contents. The petitioner demanded and received
from Encabo the P4,000.00 contained in a white envelope in
consideration of his signing the certificate of occupancy.
The OSG avers that the petitioner's signing of the certificate of
occupancy was his duty as the engineer in charge of the structural
design in the City Engineer's Office of Bacolod City. The OSG notes
that the petitioner was found positive for ultraviolet powder.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact
may be raised in this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the
rule is subject to several exceptions. The Court may delve into and
resolve factual issues in those cases where the findings of the trial
court and the CA are absurd, contrary to the evidence on record,
impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a misappreciation
of facts.[74]
In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the MTC,
the RTC and the CA, on the substantial matters at hand, are
absurd and arbitrary, and contrary to the evidence on record.

Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 210. Direct Bribery. - Any public officer who shall agree to
perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally or
through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty
of prison mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine of
not less than three times the value of the gift, in addition to the
penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall
have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the
officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty
provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have
been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties
of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not less
than twice the value of such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to
make the public officer refrain from doing something which it was
his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period and a fine not less than three times the value of
the gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs,
the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be
made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim
commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public
duties.
Direct bribery has the following essential elements:
the offender is a public officer;
the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or
present by himself or through another;
such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received
by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.[75]
The prosecution is mandated to prove, beyond reasonable doubt,
the essential elements of the felony and that the petitioner is the
perpetrator thereof.[76]
Official duties include any action authorized. It is sufficient if the
officer has the official power, ability or apparent ability to bring
about or contribute to the desired end. The acts referred to in the
law, which the offender agrees to perform or execute, must be
ultimately related to or linked with the performance of his official
duties. It is sufficient if his actions, affected by the payment of the
bribe, are parts of any established procedure consistent with the
authority of the government agency.[77] However, where the act
is entirely outside of the official functions of the officer to whom
the money is offered, the offense is not bribery.[78]
The agreement between the public officer and the bribe-giver
may be express or implied. Such agreement may be proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence. Proof of such an agreement
may rest upon relevant and competent circumstantial evidence.
To hold, otherwise, would allow the culprit to escape liability with
winks and nods even when the evidence as a whole proves that
there has been a meeting of the minds to exchange official duties
for money.[79]
It is not necessary that the money is received by the offender
before or at the time he agreed to perform or execute an act. It
is sufficient if he received the money afterwards in pursuance of
a prior arrangement or agreement.[80]
Indisputably, the petitioner is a public officer under Article 203 of
the Revised Penal Code.[81] There is no allegation in the
Information that the issuance of the certificate of occupancy is a
crime or is unjust.
The Court agrees with the petitioner's contention that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
The MTC convicted the petitioner of direct bribery on its finding
that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Wong, through
Encabo, in consideration of signing a certificate of occupancy, and
that on July 24, 1995, the petitioner received the said amount
from Encabo and signed the said certificate for the Atrium
building. The CA affirmed the said findings of the MTC in its
decision, thus:
All the elements above are present in the case at bench.
Petitioner Ruben Tad-y was an employee at the City Engineer's
Office of Bacolod City. That petitioner-accused accepted the
amount of P4,000.00 which he demanded from Julio Encabo, a
representative of Mildred Wong who will secure a certificate of
occupancy for the building of the latter and handed it over to his
subordinate Nestor Velez, petitioner's co-accused, on April 24,
1995 at Andre Bakeshop. And in consideration of the amount
thus given, petitioner would sign the certificate of occupancy,
which is his duty as engineer in charge of structural designs at the
City Engineer's Office of Bacolod City. It must be added that
petitioner signed the certificate of occupancy, the original of
which was kept at the records section of the City Engineer's
Office, after receiving the envelope containing P4,000.00. ...[82]
However, there is no iota of competent and credible evidence to
support these findings. There is no evidence on record that the
petitioner and Encabo met on April 24, 1995. In fact, it was only
on April 25, 1995 that Encabo arrived at the OCE to make
arrangements for the final inspection of the building by the
officers concerned, the signing of the certificate of inspection by
said officers, and the signing of the certificate of occupancy by
the building official.
There is also no dispute that what was signed by the petitioner,
on July 24, 1995, following his final inspection of the building, was
the certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of
occupancy of the building. Thus, Encabo testified:
Q- But in (sic) July 24, 1995 when you mentioned that they
inspected again the building?
A- Yes, Sir.
Q- And after inspection you went down to Andre Bakeshop
which is the ground floor of the Atrium Building. What
happened there at Andre Bakeshop?
A- I gave him the papers and let him sign the necessary papers.
Q- What necessary papers are you referring to?
A- This certificate of Final Inspection where he is the one who
never affixed his signature.
Q- When you gave the Certificate of Final Inspection, he signed
it?
A- Yes, Sir.[83]
It was only on July 27, 1995, after the petitioner had signed the
certificate of final inspection on July 24, 1995, that the city
building official approved and issued the certificate of occupancy
for the building.[84]
There is also no credible evidence on record that the petitioner
demanded P4,000.00 from Wong, through Encabo, in exchange
for the signing of the certificate of occupancy. Indeed, it is
incredible that the petitioner would demand the said amount as
a precondition to his signing a certificate, considering that, under
Section 309 of P.D. No. 1096,[85] the authority to sign said
certificate is vested specifically on the building official, and not on
the petitioner:
Section 309. Certificate of Occupancy
No building or structure shall be used or occupied and no change
in the existing use or occupancy classification of a building or
structure or portion thereof shall be made until the Building
Official has issued a Certificate of Occupancy therefor as provided
in this Code.
A Certificate of Occupancy shall be issued by the Building
Official within thirty (30) days if after final inspection and
submittal of a Certificate of Completion referred to in the
preceding section, it is found that the building or structure
complies with the provisions of this Code.
The Certificate of Occupancy shall be posted or displayed in a
conspicuous place on the premises and shall not be removed
except upon order of the Building Official.
The non-issuance, suspension and revocation of Certificates of
Occupancy and the procedure for appeal therefrom shall be When he testified in Criminal Case No. 17186, Encabo admitted
governed in so far as applicable, by the provisions of Section 306 that the petitioner did not demand P4,000.00 as a precondition
and 307 of this Code.[86] to his final inspection of the building and his signing of the
certificate of final inspection. The petitioner refused to sign a
Calibrating the testimony of Encabo, the prosecution sought to
certificate of final inspection for the sole reason that he had not
prove that the petitioner agreed to conduct a final inspection of
yet conducted the required final inspection.
the building and sign a certificate of final inspection upon the
receipt of P4,000.00. Atty. Sorbito:
On April 25, 1995, when you went there accused Ruben
However, the testimony of Encabo is not entitled to full probative
Tad-y refused to sign?
weight since it is evasive and chameleonic, enfeebled by frontal
inconsistencies on substantial matters which the trial court and
the CA ignored.
WITNESS:

In the court a quo, Encabo testified, on direct examination, that Yes, Sir.
on April 25, 1995, the petitioner dissuaded him from following up
and seeing the approval for the certificate of occupancy because
Wong failed to pay the P4,000.00, the balance due for the ATTY. SORBITO:
petitioner's services in securing the building permit. However, You mean to say Mr. Encabo that even without final
Encabo also claimed that the petitioner agreed to conduct a final inspection any of the signatories to the occupancy permit
inspection of the building and sign a certificate of final inspection can affixed (sic) their signatures without inspection?
if the money was given to the latter. When he testified in Criminal
Case No. 17186, Encabo declared that the petitioner refused to
sign a certificate of inspection on April 25, 1995 unless the WITNESS:
P4,000.00 he demanded was paid.[87] However, Encabo gave a
completely different story to the CIS when he gave his sworn They have to inspect.
statement; he claimed that, on April 25, 1995, the petitioner
demanded P4,000.00 in consideration for his signature on the
ATTY. SORBITO:
certificate of occupancy.[88]
 So when Ruben Tad-y refused to sign the permit on April because only the building official has the authority to sign the
25, 1995, its because there was no final inspection made same. Moreover, the city building official could not have signed
yet? the certificate because no final inspection of the building had
been conducted, and no certificate of final inspection had been
signed by the OCE officers.
WITNESS:
Encabo's claim that the petitioner agreed to make a final
Yes, Sir.
inspection of the building if he was paid P4,000.00 is belied by his
testimony in the court a quo, that, during the second week of
ATTY. SORBITO: May 1995, the petitioner and the other officers of the OCE
conducted an inspection of the building.[90] Encabo did not give
It is not because there was no money or P4,000.00? any centavo to the petitioner on that occasion. However, the
petitioner and Encabo had a quarrel in the course of which the
petitioner tried, in anger, to squeeze Encabo's neck.[91] As
WITNESS: testified to by the petitioner, Encabo insisted on paying for the
No, Sir. food and drinks consumed by him and the other OCE officers after
their inspection of the building, despite the petitioner's insistence
that he should pay for the bill:
ATTY. SORBITO: Q You have also mentioned about that incident whether you
In short, Ruben Tad-y did not ask for anything because only were antagonized by Mr. Encabo which you said you have
there in (sic) no inspection was (sic) made? squeezed his chain (sic) with your hands, where was that
establishment?
A At the second floor of Tasty Treat at Araneta Street,
WITNESS:
Bacolod City.
Yes, Sir.[89]

Q And you were drinking beer with Mr. Encabo during that
Encabo could not have asked the petitioner or any of the officers
time?
in the OCE for that matter to sign the certificate of occupancy
A When I arrived they were already drinking.
Q And you also started to drink beer?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And how many bottles have you consumed, if you can still
recall?
A Two bottles.
Q And it was even Mr. Encabo who paid the bill for the
drinking spree?
ATTY. SORBITO:
Misleading, your Honor.
COURT:
Who pay (sic) for the bills?
A That is (sic) where the trouble began because after I have
consumed two (2) bottles of beer, he asked the bills with
the intention of paying it because there is among the group
are (sic) my relatives and it was my purpose to pay.[92]
Encabo testified that he sought the help of the City Mayor for the
petitioner to conduct the final inspection of the building, but did
not inform the Mayor that the petitioner had demanded
P4,000.00 in consideration for his inspection of the building. He
claimed that the petitioner was his compadre and he did not want
to put him in a bad light:
ATTY. SERFINO:
Q- When you went to the City Mayor, you are yet thinking that
you will go to the CIS?
A- I have already reported that.
Q- What is your reason of not telling the mayor that Ruben
Tad-y demanded money?
A- Being the government employee and he is my kumpare, I
do not want to cause very bad occasion.[93]
Encabo projected himself as solicitous and protective of the
petitioner's well-being and the maintenance of the community's
regard to his compadre, the petitioner. However, when asked
why he had to complain to the CIS and thus placed the petitioner
in jeopardy for prosecution of an offense, Encabo replied that he
did so because the petitioner had mauled him:
Q Now, you have already gone to the CIS, as you said, is it
not?
 A Yes, Sir.
Q And, you have already reported to the CIS that supposed
demand from you?
A Well, he is (sic) trying to maul me.[94]
What is so disconcerting is that Encabo claimed that even months
after the city building official had already issued the certificate of
occupancy to Wong on July 27, 1995, the petitioner still
conducted inspections of the building, along with the other
officers, in September and October 1995:
Q So, you are now certain you have not inspected the
building and several other officials of the City Engineer's
Office in the afternoon of April 25, 1995, when you went
to the office?
A We do the inspection together with the accused and others
during and after April 25 and October 1995.
Q Please answer me, you are definitely sure that it was on
April 25, 1995?
A Yes, the inspection.
Q When you said yes, it was not on that date?
A The date is (sic) April 25, 1995 is not exactly the date of
inspection.
Q In what month after April 25, 1995 when you inspected the
building but prior to October 25, 1995?
A It was October or September, somewhat like that. That
September or October I cannot pinpoint the exact date
because I don't have the record of that.[95]
It is incredible that the petitioner and the other officers would
continue with their inspections of the building even months after
the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, and when the
petitioner had already been charged with direct bribery in the
MTC. Indeed, on September 21, 1995, Encabo was already
testifying in Criminal Case No. 17186 for the prosecution against
the petitioner.
The prosecution cannot find solace in the entrapment operations
conducted by the CIS and the aftermath thereof.
First. The petitioner brought along Engineer Nestor Velez, a
building inspector in the OCE, on his final inspection of the
building after which they had a snack with Encabo. If, as claimed
by Encabo, the petitioner expected to receive P4,000.00 from
him, as bribe, it would be contrary to human experience to bring
another person along (in this case, Velez) to witness the receipt
of the envelope containing the money. Moreover, the Andre
Bakeshop is a public place where people enter to make
purchases. Indeed, this Court in Formilleza v.
Sandiganbayan,[96] declared -
However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano
were present around the table in the canteen with the petitioner
and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to
the petitioner. There were other persons in the premises like the
PC agents whose identities petitioner possibly did not know.
Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not
probable that petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe
money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. If the petitioner
knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at
the canteen, the petitioner would not have invited her officemate
Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not see the
alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money
as it was passed on under the table or when, as petitioner said, it
was quickly placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs.
Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the
canteen, two (2) men approached petitioner, one of whom took
pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What are you
trying to do to me?" The reaction of petitioner is far from one
with a guilty conscience.
Second. The petitioner walked ahead of Velez and Encabo out of
the Atrium building after the final inspection, and was on his way
to the bowling tournament. However, he joined Encabo and Velez
for a snack only because Encabo had invited him. Such behavior
on the part of the petitioner is inconsistent with one who
expected to receive P4,000.00 from Encabo after his final
inspection of the building.
Third. When Encabo handed the envelope to the petitioner, the
latter inquired what the envelope was for. The petitioner opened
the envelope in full view of Velez and saw its contents. He handed
the envelope to Velez instead of putting it into his pocket, even
after Encabo had assured the petitioner that it was not dangerous
for the latter to receive it. It is incredible that, as claimed by
Encabo, the petitioner handed over the envelope to Velez under
the table.
Such facts and circumstances show that the petitioner had no
intention to accept the money and consider it his own; they
negate the prosecution's contention that the petitioner
demanded and expected to receive P4,000.00 as bribe money.
Indeed, this Court ruled in Formilleza -
The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article
211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer concerned
must have accepted the gift material consideration. There must
be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the
gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from
then on, such as putting away the gift for safekeeping or
pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by
any other sign, circumstance or act to show such acceptance is
not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of
indirect bribery has been committed. To hold otherwise will
encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by
simply putting within their physical custody some gift, money or
other property.[97]
The foregoing ruling of this Court applies not only to charges of
indirect bribery but also to direct bribery. The respondent's
contention that the petitioner handed the envelope to Velez Q Did he say anything?
under the table is belied by the testimonies of the petitioner and
A When I turned my head, he told me that I am (sic) under
Velez.
arrest.

Fourth. The police officers even forced the petitioner to

incriminate himself by forcing him to touch the contents of the
Q What else?
envelope, but the petitioner managed to parry the attempt with
his right arm. Thus, Velez testified: A After hearing that, I asked him what sins (sic) have we
committed?
Q What happened outside the bakeshop?
A When we went out of the Atrium building, because we plan
to left (sic) the place separately or to part ways. Q What did he say?
A He was trying to search on my trousers.

Q You mean to say that Engr. Tad-y was going to his own
direction and you to another direction and Mr. Encabo to Q Did he show any warrant or authority for him to do that?
a different direction?
A Never.
A Yes.

Q No warrant of arrest or search warrant?

Q Were you able to do that?
A No.
A When I was already at the middle of Gonzaga Street,
somebody took hold of my arm, almost my shoulder.
Q So, what did he find in your trousers?

Q Then what happened? A While he was searching me, I was asking him, what money
and he asked me, "where is that envelope you received",
A I was shocked or surprised, somebody took hold of my arm. while he was holding me, it's in your pocket, get it. So, I get
 (sic) it because he was holding me in my hand and at the
same time squeezing it.
Q What arm?
A At first, it was my left hand that he was searching, he was
able to took (sic) hold of my right arm as it is used to be the
one to pick the particular envelope.
Q And after you have (sic) involuntarily taken that envelope
from your pocket, what did they do?
A When he was squeezing my hand, I was able to get the
money and they brought me to Engr. Tad-y.
Q How far was Engr. Tad-y when they brought you there?
A Maybe ten to fifteen meters.

Q So, how actually sure were you, when you get (sic) the
Q And when you were already near Engr. Tad-y, did you
envelope from your pocket?
notice what was happening to Engr. Tad-y?
A It appears that myself because he was doing it by
A When I was there going toward Engr. Tad-y, I saw one
squeezing my hand.
person holding his hands.

COURT:
Q When you were near him, what happened next?
Q About what part of your pocket?
A When I was near Engr. Tad-y, they let me open that
particular envelope.
COURT INTERPRETER:
At this juncture, the witness is pointing at the right side of Q Who was handling that particular envelope towards Engr.
his pocket. Tad-y?
A It's myself holding it while he was holding me towards
Engr. Tad-y.
ATTY. SERFINO:
Q You mean the very hand he was holding, squeezing, it's Q What did he do?
also the hand holding the envelope?
A He tried not to receive it but he was forced by one arresting
A Yes. officer.

Q Was it [the] left or right hand? Q What else took place at that stage on that day?
A At first left, when he pulled me it was already his right A When they were not able to force Engr. Tad-y to take hold
hand. of the money, they tried to stop a taxi.[98]

The testimony of the petitioner on this matter reads:

Q What happened when you were near Engr. Tad-y?
Q Now, what happened after you saw that there was another
A When I have already opened the envelope and when they
person holding your co-accused?
saw the content of that envelope, the money, they try (sic)
to pull that so that Engr. Tad-y will receive the money from A They were searching him in order to have the white
me. envelope out.

Q How did you open that envelope in that stage, was it Q So, did you see any envelope after that?
already opened or did you have to exert some efforts to
A Yes, Sir.
open?
A I opened it because it was closed.
Q How did you see it or how did you happen to see it?
A Because he let Mr. Velez open his pocket and have it left
Q Did Engr. Tad-y received (sic), take hold of that money?
opened.
A When he found out that the content is money, he did not
hold it.
Q And then what happened?
A When the said envelope was already opened he hold (sic)
Mr. Velez and pulled Mr. Velez towards me.
Q Were they able to come near you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, while your co-accused was already near you, what
transpired among you?
A A person of small size holding the hands of Mr. Velez
holding the white envelope because he wants that I will
hold the white envelope.
Q Go ahead.
A It was already opened and he wanted me to hold the white
envelope.
Q When you were still inside the bakeshop, will you please
inform the Hon. Court if the envelope was already opened
or not?
A Not yet.
Q The prosecution witness, Julio Encabo here testified that
inside the bakeshop, after he handed to you the envelope,
you opened it and peeped inside the envelope, is this true?
A It is a big lie.
Q Why do you say that it is a big lie?
A It will be subject of the evidence in the Police Laboratory.
It was only shown that there was fluorescent powder.
(Witness, at this juncture is pointing to his right arm.)
Q You are referring to Exhibit "4-A"?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. SERFINO:
I would like to manifest, your Honor that on Exhibit "4",
there is nothing there that indicates that there was any
powder marks in the hands of this accused.
Q Now, what else happened when your co-accused was
already near you?
A They tried to let the hands of Nestor come towards me but
I was trying to move away.
Q On the basis of what you saw, if you know what was the
reason that (sic) they were trying to let you hold the
envelope?
ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR CENTENO:
Asking for a conclusion, your Honor.
COURT:
Sustained.
COURT:
Reform.
ATTY. SERFINO:
Q From that stage, what else happened?
A Since they cannot do the thing of letting the hands of
Nestor Velez go near me, it was the person who picked the
white envelope and tried to give it to me, but I was trying
to parry it. (Witness is pointing to his right forearm.)
Q Thereafter, what happened?
A (Witness, at this juncture is trying to hold the left hand at
his waist.) I do not know whether it was a camera or a gun.
Q What else happened?
He said to me, "relax ka lang, you might be fell (sic) down."
Q Was he a Tagalog?
A I do not know but he speak (sic) in Tagalog.
Q How did that incident in front of that street came to close?
A I stayed calm but I was afraid of them.
Q After you relaxed because of your fear, is there anything
else that took place?
A They stopped a taxi and then pulled me to ride in the taxi
together with the co-accused, Nestor Velez.[99]
The testimonies of Velez and the petitioner were corroborated by
the Initial Laboratory Report of Forensic Chemist Rea
Villavicencio that the petitioner's right arm tested positive for
ultraviolet powder. The Report and Sketch drawn by Villavicencio
did not show that any of the fingers of the petitioner were
positive for ultraviolet powder.
In sum then, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to prove
the guilt of petitioner Rubin Tad-y of the crime charged.
Consequently, the Petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the Information.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. NOS. 160929-31, August 16, 2005 ]
RENE P. PONDEVIDA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On April 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment in
Criminal Cases Nos. 24375 to 24377 convicting petitioner Rene
Pondevida, the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, of three
counts of the complex crime of malversation of public funds
through falsification of commercial documents, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and perpetual
special disqualification for each count. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 24375, the Court hereby finds
the accused RENE P. PONDEVIDA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex offense of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of commercial document defined and penalized
under Arts. 48, 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and PERPETUAL SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION in
accordance with Art. 31 of the Revised Penal Code and to pay a
fine of P213,700.00 and indemnify the Municipal government of
Badiangan the sum of P213,700.00, with costs.
For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused DONATO M.
AMIGABLE and VICTOR N. GRANDE are hereby ACQUITTED of the
offense charged in this case, and their bail bonds posted for their
provisional liberty are hereby ordered cancelled.
In Criminal Case No. 24375, the Court hereby finds the accused
RENE P. PONDEVIDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex offense of Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of commercial document defined and penalized
under Arts. 48, 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUAL and PERPETUAL SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION in
accordance with Art. 31 of the Revised Penal Code and to pay a
fine of P503,287.89 and indemnify the Municipal government of
Badiangan the sum of P503,287.89, with costs.
For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused DONATO M.
AMIGABLE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged in this
case, and the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby
ordered cancelled. October 3, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied due course to the
petition for having been filed out of time, thus:
In Criminal Case No. 24377, the Court hereby finds the accused
FROM THE FOREGOING, the Notice of Appeal shall no longer
RENE P. PONDEVIDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
prosper considering that it was filed out of time and considering
complex offense of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification
further that the Decision rendered in these cases, promulgated
of commercial document defined and penalized under Arts. 48,
on April 11, 2003, in so far as Rene P. Pondevida is concerned, has
171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the
already become final and executory on September 18, 2003.
said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and
PERPETUAL SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION in accordance with Art.
Atty. Lily V. Biton, the Division Clerk of Court, is ordered to furnish
31 of the Revised Penal Code and to pay a fine of P115,153.55
the Director of Prison, National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, a
and indemnify the Municipal government of Badiangan the sum
copy of this Resolution for his perusal, and to issue the
of P115,153.55, with costs.
corresponding Commitment Order for Rene P. Pondevida's
service of sentence.
For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused DONATO M. The Sandiganbayan ruled that under Section 6, Rule 122 of the
AMIGABLE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged in this Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pondevida had only until
case, and the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty is hereby September 17, 2003 within which to file his notice of appeal, but
ordered cancelled. did so only on September 23, 2003; by then, its decision had
become final and executory.
Considering that accused NORMA B. TIU is still-at-large, let
Criminal Case No. 24376 be ARCHIVED until her arrest.[1] The petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on October
14, 2003. On December 15, 2003, he filed his petition
The anti-graft court granted the petitioner an extension of time
for certiorari before this Court, alleging that -
within which to file a motion for reconsideration of its decision,
until May 10, 2003. The said motion was filed on May 9, 2003 I
which the said court resolved to deny on September 5, 2003. The
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on September
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
16, 2003, and filed his Notice of Appeal[2] on September 23, 2003
DENIED THE PETITIONER'S NOTICE OF APPEAL BECAUSE THE
"pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1 of Rule X of the Revised
NOTICE OF APPEAL HAS BEEN FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan." In a Resolution[3] dated
PERIOD.

II
PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
III
THE APPEAL IS SUPPORTED BY MERITORIOUS GROUNDS AND THE
CASE IS ENTITLED TO BE REVIEWED BY THE APPELLATE COURT.[4]
On January 10, 2005, this Court resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the Sandiganbayan to elevate the records
of the cases.[5] The Sandiganbayan complied and forthwith
elevated the records to this Court.
The petitioner maintains that his notice of appeal was filed on
time. He posits that the Sandiganbayan should have applied
Section 1(b), Rule X of its Revised Internal Rules, instead of
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The petitioner argues that since Section 1(b), Rule X of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan does not provide a
period within which to appeal a decision or final order rendered
by it, the applicable rule is that provided in Section 1(a) of the said
Internal Rules, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petitioner avers that under the latter rule, he had
fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the September 5, 2003
Sandiganbayan Resolution (on September 16, 2003), or until
October 1, 2003, within which to file his notice of appeal. Hence,
his notice of appeal filed on September 23, 2003 was timely filed.
For its part, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) avers that
under Section 1, Rule X of the Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an
appeal from a Sandiganbayan judgment where the accused is
sentenced reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is via petition
for review on certiorari; the period for appeal is that provided for
in Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
thus:
1.c. As aptly stated by petitioner, the method of appeal in this
case is by petition for review on certiorari. This, indeed, is
confirmed by Section 1, Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, i.e., "A party may appeal from a judgment or final
order of the Sandiganbayan imposing or affirming a penalty less
than death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua in criminal
cases, and in civil cases, by filing with the Supreme Court a
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."[6]
The OSP cited the ruling of this Court in Formilleza v.
Sandiganbayan[7] to support its position.
The petitioner's contention, that the remedy from the
Sandiganbayan decision which sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua is via notice of appeal under Section 1(b), Rule X of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, is correct. The rule
reads:
(b) Exception. - Where the judgment or final order of the
Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
imposes the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua or where a lesser penalty is imposed involving
 offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose
out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the appeal shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
Sandiganbayan and serving a copy thereof to the adverse
party.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review
on certiorari to this Court (from a Sandiganbayan decision) is
proper only where, as provided for in Section 1(a), Rule X of the
Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the penalty
imposed is less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua:
(a) In General. - A party may appeal from a judgment or final
order of the Sandiganbayan imposing or affirming a
penalty less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua in criminal cases, and in civil cases, by filing with
the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Since Section 1(b), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan does not provide for a period to appeal, Section
6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply:
Sec. 6. Rule 122. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be
taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment
or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion
for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order
overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his
counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.
This is so because under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the Rules of Court applicable to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) shall,
likewise, govern all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan insofar as
applicable:
SEC. 2. Coverage. - These Rules shall apply to the internal
operations of the Sandiganbayan.
The Rules of Court, resolutions, circulars, and other issuances
promulgated by the Supreme Court relating to or affecting the
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, insofar as
applicable, shall govern all actions and proceedings filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the petitioner had only until September 17, 2003
within which to file his notice of appeal, considering that he
received the September 5, 2003 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
on September 16, 2003. However, he filed his notice of appeal
only on September 23, 2003, long after the reglementary period.
Hence, the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with its Revised
Internal Rules and the Rules of Criminal Procedure in denying the
petitioner's appeal.
The ruling of this Court in Formilleza is not applicable in the case
at bar. What was involved in that case was Presidential Decree
No. 1606, under which the decisions of the Sandiganbayan may
be reviewed on petition for certiorari by this Court:
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the
procedure through which cases originating from the
Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court. Under Section 7
thereof, the decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan are
subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court has
ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45, subject to certain rare exceptions.
Simply stated, one way through which a decision or final order of
the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme Court is a
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only
questions of law may be raised therein. The Solicitor General cites
the case of Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan in support of this
view.[8]
The petitioner, however, pleads that even if he filed his notice of
appeal beyond the period therefor, the Sandiganbayan should
have subordinated the rigid application of procedural rules to the
attainment of substantial justice; hence, his appeal should have
been given due course. After all, he submits, the Court has
allowed appeals even if there were delays of four, six and even
seven days.[9] The appeal should not be dismissed simply
because he followed, in good faith, Section 1(b), Rule X of the
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, in relation to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The petitioner argues that he was sentenced to suffer three
counts of reclusion perpetua; it would be the apex of injustice if
he would be deprived of his right to appeal and suffer the penalty,
considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He pleads for the Court to determine whether
his appeal has prima facie merit, so as to avoid a travesty of
justice.
The petitioner avers that in the face of the records, he is not
criminally liable for malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code because (a) the prosecution failed to prove that,
before he was charged with malversation complexed with
falsification of commercial documents in the Office of the
Ombudsman, the Office of the Provincial Auditor had demanded
the refund of the amounts of the three checks; and (b) the
Sandiganbayan ignored the cash deposit slips issued by the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP)[10] showing that he deposited
P1,533,050.26 on June 15, 1995 which increased to
P2,286,550.26 when he made an additional deposit on June 21,
1995, as stated in his letter to the Provincial Auditor, dated June
21, 1995, which included the total amount of the three
checks.[11]
The petitioner further avers that the charges against him were
barred by the decision[12] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 48093 promulgated on April 5,
2002, convicting him of malversation of P1,176,580.59; the
P893,890.87, which is the total amount of the three checks
subject of the cases before the Sandiganbayan, is included in the
P1,176,580.59 he had deposited with the LBP. The petitioner
appended to his petition a copy of the decision of the RTC.

Elaborating further, the petitioner avers that it was incumbent on
the prosecution to prove that he misappropriated, took away or
embezzled the P893,890.87 of the municipality for his own
personal use and benefit. He asserts that the prosecution failed
to prove that he used the said amount for his personal benefit.
The petitioner posits that had the prosecution proved that he
received a demand to account for or refund the said amounts, the
burden could have shifted on him to prove that he did not
misappropriate or take away the said amounts for his personal
use or benefit. Indeed, the petitioner notes, Ely Navarro, the
leader of the audit team who investigated the matter of the three
checks, admitted that the Office of the Provincial Auditor made
no such demand. He avers that Navarro even admitted that it was
only in the Office of the Ombudsman that such demand was
made on him by the team of auditors.
The OSP, on the other hand, avers that the perfection of the
appeal in the manner and within the period provided by law is
not only mandatory, but is also jurisdictional; since the petitioner
failed to appeal within the reglementary period, the decision had
become final and executory and can no longer be nullified or
reversed. On the substantive issues, the OSP avers that demand
is not an essential element of malversation. Moreover, the
prosecution adduced evidence that the petitioner consented to
the taking of municipal funds. The OSP maintains that the
petitioner committed the felony of malversation upon the
delivery of the checks to the three payees and their encashment
of the said checks, and that the refund of the amounts of the
checks is not a ground for his acquittal of the crimes charged.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the total
amount of the three checks was part of the P1,108,741.00 he
deposited with the LBP on June 15, 1995. The OSP concludes that
the decision of the Sandiganbayan is in accord with the evidence
and the law.
On the timeliness of the petitioner's appeal, the Court agrees
with the public respondent's contention that, as a rule, the
aggrieved party must perfect his appeal within the period as
provided for by law. The rule is mandatory in character. A party's
failure to comply with the law will result in the decision becoming
final and executory, and, as such, can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, the rule admits of exceptions, thus:
In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most
mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed. In
other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would
result in absurdity and manifest injustice or where the merit of a
party's cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-
compliance with certain formal requirements, procedural rules
should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be
given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty,
honor or property on mere technicalities. We, therefore,
withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its
palpable failure to comply with the constitutional and legal
mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court. We also
remind all magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article
VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to
uphold the Constitution and the principles enshrined therein, lest the shortage. In response to the letter, the petitioner wrote the
they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.[13] Provincial Auditor of Iloilo on June 21, 1995, as follows:
Considering that the petitioner was sentenced to suffer three June 21, 1995
counts of reclusion perpetua, the Court ordered the
Sandiganbayan to elevate the records of the cases for the Court
The Provincial Auditor
to ascertain, based on the records, whether the appeal of the
Province of Iloilo
petitioner has prima facie merit, or is only an exercise in futility.
Iloilo City
After all, the petitioner enumerated in his petition the grounds
for his appeal from the decision of the Sandiganbayan, and
S i r:
elaborated his arguments in support thereof; the OSP, likewise,
submitted its refutation of the petitioner's submissions.
In compliance with the Memorandum dated June 19, 1995 of the
audit team headed by Mrs. Helen Gamboa, State Auditor II of the
The Court has meticulously reviewed the records and finds that
Provincial Auditor's Office in Badiangan, Iloilo hereunder are my
the petitioner failed to show that his appeal from the decision of
justifications/explanation:
the Sandiganbayan is prima facie meritorious.
That the amount of P722,809.26 was outright deposited with the
There is no dispute that State Auditors Helen G. Gamboa and Land Bank of the Philippines, Iloilo Branch, on June 5, 1995;
Orlino A. Llauderes conducted an audit of the petitioner's cash
That there was also a deposit made on June 15, 1995 amounting
and accounts for the period ending June 1, 1995. In the course of
to P1,108,741.00;
the said examination, the petitioner submitted the Cash
Production Notice and Cash Account Sheet covering the General That another deposit was done on June 21, 1995 amounting to
and Special Education Trust Funds up to the said date. Based on P455,000.00.
the submitted cashbook, the auditors discovered that the
In view of the foregoing circumstances, the delay of my deposit
petitioner had a shortage of P2,264,820.92. The petitioner was
was caused to the late posting of all transaction in the cash book.
notified of the said findings on June 1, 1995.
Another factor is that I was not able to reconcile my bank
statement against general ledger accounts.
On June 19, 1995, the auditors wrote the petitioner, demanding
that the latter refund the amount of P2,264,820.92 within 72 Very truly yours,
hours from notice, and submit an explanation why he incurred (Sgd.)
 RENE PONDEVIDA P2,264,820.92 as reported by Mrs. Helen Gamboa and Mr. Orlino
A. Llauderes in their report dated June 1, 1995.[15]
Municipal Treasurer[14]
The auditors were also directed to examine the petitioner's check
On the same day, the State Auditors submitted their report to the
issuances from June 2, 1995 to June 23, 1995, and to determine
Provincial Auditor on their examination of the petitioner's cash
whether the said payments were covered by legitimate
and accounts. Acting on the said report, Ely Navarro, then Officer-
transactions and supported by proper documentation.
in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Auditor, wrote the
Regional Director of the Department of Finance on June 22, 1995,
In the meantime, Gamboa and Llauderes submitted their report
recommending the petitioner's relief, and the designation of the
on their audit examination of the petitioner's cash and accounts,
Assistant Municipal Treasurer as his temporary replacement. The
appending thereto the deposit slips referred to in the petitioner's
Regional Director approved the recommendation and relieved
June 21, 1995 letter to the Provincial Auditor.
the petitioner of his duties as Municipal Treasurer.

In compliance with the Memorandum of the Provincial Auditor,

On July 18, 1995, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor,
Navarro and Llauderes conducted an examination and
stating that he had already deposited the amount of
verification of the petitioner's claim that he had already refunded
P2,264,820.92 with the LBP, appending thereto the deposit slips
the amount of P2,264,820.92. They concluded that the shortage
for the said amount.
in the petitioner's cash and accounts was only P1,176,580.59.
They also examined the check disbursements, and discovered
On August 9, 1995, Provincial Auditor Dominador Tersol issued a
that the petitioner had issued against the municipal funds three
Memorandum to Auditors Navarro and Llauderes to verify
checks countersigned by Municipal Mayor Donato Amigable, with
whether the P2,264,820.92 had, indeed, been refunded to the
the following particulars:
municipality as the petitioner claimed in his Letter of June 21,
1995. They were, likewise, directed - Check Date Payee Amount
No.
... to conduct an examination on the cash and accounts of
accused Pondevida ... to establish his accountability from 2 June
1995 to 23 June 1995, as a result of his relief as Municipal
051750 6/14/95 Roben Mill &
Treasurer of the said Municipality on June 23, 1995 brought P213,700.00
Mining
about by his incurrence of a shortage, amounting to
 Supply, Iloilo
City
051751 6/14/95 Glenn Celis
Construction,
Iloilo City 503,287.89
051752 6/14/95 V.N. Grace
Enterprises,
Iloilo City 176,902.78
Total P893,890.67[16]
==========
The auditors also noted that the checks were indorsed and
encashed with the LBP, Iloilo City Branch Office, under Current
Account No. 0032-1094-20 of the Municipality of Badiangan,
Iloilo, and that Check Nos. 051751 and 051752 were encashed on
June 14, 1995, while Check No. 051750 was encashed on June 15,
1995.[17]
On August 23, 1995, Navarro and Llauderes sent a
Memorandum[18] to Mayor Amigable, informing him that such
checks were issued without the corresponding disbursement
vouchers and supporting documents; and that Glenn Celis, the
proprietor of Glenn Celis Construction, executed an affidavit,
stating that he has no transaction with the Municipality of
Badiangan, Iloilo, corresponding to the amount of P503,287.89.
The mayor was also furnished copies of the three checks. The
auditors requested the mayor and the petitioner to comment
thereon within five days from notice thereof. However, the
auditors did not receive any response from the two.
In a Memorandum[19] to the Provincial Auditor dated November
14, 1995, Navarro and Llauderes made the following
recommendations on the petitioner's check disbursements:
For defrauding the government, Rene P. Pondevida, Donato M.
Amigable and Olivia K. Grande, shall be jointly and severally held
liable for malversation of public funds pursuant to Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. For having erred
through omission which caused them injury to the government,
Norma B. Tiu and Glenn Celis may be held liable for the same
offense.
The annexes hereto attached shall be considered to form part of
this report.[20]
The reports of the auditors were filed with the Ombudsman. After
the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information was filed
against the petitioner in the RTC of Iloilo City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 48093, for malversation of public funds on the
P1,176,580.59 shortage. The inculpatory portion of the
Information reads:
That in or about the month of June 1995, and for sometime prior
thereto, at the Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, and, as such, was in
possession and custody of public funds in the amount of
P9,962,401.68, Philippine currency, for which he is accountable
by reason of the duties of his office, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate
intent, with intent to defraud and of gain, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take,
misappropriate, embezzle and convert to his own personal use
and benefit from the said public funds the amount of One Million
One Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Five Hundred Eighty Pesos
and Fifty-Nine Centavos (P1,176,580.59) and despite notice and
demands made upon him to account for said public funds, he has
failed and up to the present time still fails to do so, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated.[21]
On November 24, 1997, three Informations for malversation of
public funds through falsification of commercial documents
relating to the checks disbursements were filed in the
Sandiganbayan against Mayor Amigable, the petitioner, and
three private individuals, namely, Victor Grande, Norma Tiu and
Glenn Celis. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24375
to 24377. The inculpatory averments of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 24375 read:
That on or about the 14th day of June 1995, or for sometime
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Badiangan, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused DONATO AMIGABLE and RENE
PONDEVIDA, public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and
Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of the municipality of
Badiangan, Iloilo, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to office, taking advantage of their official positions,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other
and with one VICTOR GRANDE, a private individual and proprietor
of V.N. Grande Enterprises, Iloilo City, with deliberate intent, with
intent to defraud and to falsify, did then and there, falsify a
commercial document consisting of a check of LAND BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Iloilo City Branch, bearing Serial No. 051752
dated June 14, 1995, in the amount of P176,902.78, Philippine
Currency, with V.N. Grande Enterprises as the payee, by making
it appear therein that the municipality of Badiangan has some
accounts payable to V.N. Grande Enterprises for some purchases
made in the total amount of P176,902.78, Philippine Currency,
thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,
when, in truth and in fact, as accused very well knew that while
there were purchases made at V.N. Grande Enterprises; hence,
the municipality of Badiangan has some monetary obligation to
said establishment, the same amounted only to P63,659.00 and
not P176,902.78, and that such scheme was resorted to by herein
accused to be able to obtain the amount of P113,243.78, the
difference thereof, once the said documents was falsified, said
accused encashed the said LBP check, and with deliberate intent,
with intent of gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously appropriate, misappropriate, take away, embezzle
and convert to their own personal use and benefit the amount of
P113,243.78, Philippine Currency, and despite notice and
demands made upon said accused to account for said public
funds, they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.[22]
The material averments of the two other Informations are
similarly worded, except for the particulars of the checks and the
dates of the alleged commission of the crimes.
On April 5, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in Criminal Case No.
48093 finding the petitioner guilty of malversation. The
dispositive part of the judgment reads:
Based on the foregoing, We hereby decree that the Prosecution
established the guilt of the accused Rene P. Pondevida beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.
We hereby order that accused Rene P. Pondevida suffers the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from 16 years, 5 months and 11
days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days of Reclusion
Temporal pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to paragraph 1, Article 64, RPC, and in further relation to
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4225).
Accused Rene P. Pondevida is ordered to be perpetually
disqualified to be employed in the government of the Republic of
the Philippines or any of its agencies or instrumentalities for a
position that requires handling and/or disposition of public funds
pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
Likewise, pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law a fine equivalent to
one-half of the amount he malversed or P588,190.295 is ordered
imposed upon the accused Rene P. Pondevida without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.[23]
As gleaned from the evidence of the prosecution before the
Sandiganbayan, Norma Tiu encashed LBP Check No. 051750 on
June 15, 1995, but when she realized that she had no legitimate
transaction with the municipality, she turned over P213,700.00
to the petitioner on the said date. Glenn Celis encashed LBP
Check No. 051751 on June 14, 1995 but gave the P503,287.89 to
the petitioner when the latter demanded that the amount be
turned over to him, on his claim that there was "an erroneous
application for payment."[24] Victor Grande endorsed LBP Check
No. 051752 but his godson, Engr. Jesus Violeta, Jr., returned
P115,153.55 to the petitioner on June 14, 1995 and applied the
difference of P61,745.78 to the payment of materials supplied to
the municipality.[25]
It also appears, based on the evidence of Mayor Amigable, that
the petitioner inveigled him into signing the three checks. This
can also be gleaned from the petitioner's affidavit:
That I further attest that then Mayor DONATO AMIGABLE is
completely innocent of the charges against him considering that
the three (3) checks which I asked Ex-Mayor Amigable to sign
were intended to pay for the salaries and wages of the employees
of the Municipality of Badiangan for the period until June 30,
1995 at which time Ex-Mayor Amigable will step down from
office;
As Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable was then winding up his term of
office after having served as Mayor for 13½ years, I requested him
to sign the three (3) checks now subject matter of this case with
my guarantee that the three (3) checks will be used for the
salaries and wages of Municipal employees;
That Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable had nothing to do with the
transactions I made with the three (3) suppliers and I hereby
confirm that Ex-Mayor Amigable has not profited a single centavo
from the said three (3) checks or the transactions which arose out
of the said checks.
That I hereby further confirm the innocence of Ex-Mayor Donato
Amigable to the charges which were filed against him.[26]
Malversation is defined and penalized in Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property - Presumption
of malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties
of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall, otherwise, be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation does not exceed 200 pesos.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount involved is more than 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos.
The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more
than 6,000 pesos but is less than 12,000 pesos.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000 pesos but is
less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.
Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or
property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by consenting,
or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other
person to take such public funds or property; or by being
otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property.
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are the following:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
 (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property
by reason of the duties of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable.
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented
or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.
Demand to produce public funds under a public officer's custody
is not an essential element of the felony. The law creates a prima
facie presumption of connivance if the public officer fails to
produce public funds under his custody upon demand
therefor.[30]
However, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the
public officer had fully accounted for the alleged cash shortage.

In the present case, the petitioner does not dispute the fact that,
A public officer may be liable for malversation even if he does not
by his overt acts of drawing and issuing the checks to the order of
use public property or funds under his custody for his personal
Victor Grande, Glenn Celis and Norma Tiu, they were able to
benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or,
encash the checks. Even if the petitioner received P893,860.67
through abandonment or negligence, permitted such taking.
from them on June 15, 1997, a day after the checks were
encashed, by then, the felonies of malversation had already been
The prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt,
consummated. Case law has it that the individuals' taking of funds
either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the public officer
is completed and is consummated even if the severance of the
appropriated, misappropriated or consented or through
funds from the possession was only for an instant.[31] Restitution
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
of the said amount after the consummation of the crimes is not a
public property or public funds under his custody. Absent such
ground for acquittal of the said crimes.
evidence, the public officer cannot be held criminally liable for
malversation.[27] Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of
On the petitioner's claim that he deposited the amount of
conversion; neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn
P893,890.67 with the LBP on June 15, 1995 as evidenced by the
over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even
deposit slips,[32] the Sandiganbayan declared:
the prima facie case. In fine, conversion must be
proved.[28] However, an accountable officer may be convicted of Accused Pondevida asserted that he had deposited these
malversation even in the absence of direct proof of amounts in the account of the Municipality of Badiangan with the
misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his bank. But this assertion of the accused is without evidentiary
account which he is unable to explain.[29] support of any kind. No document or paper such as deposit slip
or certificate of deposit from the bank has been presented by the General
6/5/95 R0032-1094-20 P722,809.26
accused.[33] Fund
The Sandiganbayan is correct. The petitioner was burdened to General
6/15/95 0032-1094-20 192,800.00
prove that the said amount was part of the deposit he made with Fund
the LBP on June 15, 1997, but he failed to do so. Indeed, instead
6/15/95 SEF 0032-1251-74 176,902.78
of buttressing his petition, the decision of the RTC in Criminal
Case No. 48093 militates against his case. It appears that on June 6/21/95 SEF 0032-1251-74 455,000.00
15, 1995, the petitioner deposited P1,108,741.00 in
6/15/95 Trust Fund 0032-1251-74 685,141.00
cash.[34] However, there is no indication whatsoever in the
deposit slips that the P893,890.67 refunded by Grande, Celis and Total Deposits P2,286,550.26[35]
Tiu on the same day was part of the P1,108,741.00. Moreover, ===========
the three checks issued by the petitioner were drawn against
Account No. 0032-1094-20, that of the municipality and relating In fine, it was the petitioner's position in Criminal Case No. 48093
to its general fund. However, of the P1,108,741.00 the petitioner that the total deposit of P2,286,550.26 on June 5, 15 and 21, 1995
deposited on June 15, 1995, P192,000.00 was deposited in the with the LBP was to be credited to him, that is, against the
municipality's general fund, and the rest in the special education P2,264,820.92 shortage on his cash and account. This is also
fund. This is gleaned from the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case gleaned from the petitioner's letter to the Provincial Auditor
No. 48093, which was, in turn, based on the petitioner's dated June 21, 1995, in reply to Gamboa's and Llauderes's
explanation to the finding of Gamboa and Llauderes that the Memorandum of June 14, 1995, requiring him to explain the
petitioner had a P2,264,820.92 shortage: P2,264,820.92 shortage. The petitioner did not claim in the said
letter that the said deposit should be credited to his check
Mr. Pondevida submitted an explanation of his shortage together disbursements of P893,890.67.
with the deposit slips on the deposit he made with the Land Bank
of the Philippines, Iloilo City, totalling P2,288,550.26 itemized as Indeed, as of June 15, 1995, the petitioner was not yet subject to
follows: audit examination for his check disbursements. It was only on
Date Fund LBP Account No. Amount August 23, 1995 that the Provincial Auditor ordered Navarro and
Deposited Llauderes to conduct an examination of the said check
disbursements.

On the petitioner's claim that the charges against him in the

court a quo were barred by the RTC decision in Criminal Case No.
48093, the same is belied by no less than the said ruling. The trial
court declared that the P1,176,580.59 shortage subject matter of
the said case was different from the petitioner's check
disbursements subject matter of the cases in the Sandiganbayan:
The evidence further showed that the three Land Bank checks
issued by the accused Pondevida to V.N. Grande Enterprises,
Iloilo City, Check No. 051752 dated 14 June 1995 P176,902.98,
Exhibit "X"; Glen Celis Construction, Iloilo City, Check No. 051751
dated 14 June 1995 P503,287.89, Exhibit "X-1"; Roben Mill and
Mining Supply, Check No. 05[1]750 14 June 1995 P213,700.00,
were all issued without the prescribed supporting documents.
These aforesaid exhibits are now the subject of a criminal case
before the Sandiganbayan - Criminal Case No. 243-75-76-77 for
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents captioned People of the Philippines versus Rene P.
Pondevida and Donato Amigable pending at the Third Division,
Sandiganbayan.[36]
Hence, the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 48093 is not
a bar to the petitioner's prosecution and conviction in the
Sandiganbayan.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolution dated October 3, 2003 and
Decision dated April 11, 2003 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 184908, July 03, 2013 ]
MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Major Joel G. Cantos appeals the Decision[1] of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-07-A/R-0008, which
affirmed with modification the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, convicting him of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
In an Information[3] dated February 19, 2003, Major Cantos was
charged as follows:
That on or about December 21, 2002 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Commanding Officer of
the 22nd Finance Service Center, based in the Presidential
Security Group, Malacañang Park, Manila and as such is
accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to him by
reason of his office, acting in relation to his office and taking
advantage of the same, did then and there, wi[l]lfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, misappropriate and convert to his personal
use and benefit the amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED then inquired why Major Cantos did not use the safety vault, but
SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P3,270,000.00), Philippine Major Cantos did not reply.[7]
Currency, from such public funds received by him by reason of his
Office to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the Major Balao further testified that Major Cantos asked him to get
aforestated amount. a screwdriver so he went out of the office and got one from his
vehicle. He gave the screwdriver to Major Cantos, who used it to
CONTRARY TO LAW. unscrew the safety vault. Then, he left the office and handed the
screwdriver to Sgt. Tumabcao. After a few minutes, Major Cantos
instructed him to go to the house of Major Conrado Mendoza in
Upon motion by the prosecution, the trial court issued an
Taguig to get the safety vault’s combination number. However,
Order[4] granting the amendment of the date of the commission
Major Mendoza was not around. When he returned to the office
of the offense from December 21, 2002 to December 21, 2000,
at around 4:00 p.m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
the error being merely clerical. When arraigned, Major Cantos
personnel took his fingerprints. He learned that all the personnel
entered a plea of not guilty.[5]
of the 22nd FSU were subjected to fingerprinting. Thereafter, Col.
Espinelli tried to force him to admit that he took the money, but
At the trial, the prosecution presented as witness Major Eligio T.
he maintained that he was not the one who took it.[8]
Balao, Jr.[6] He testified that on December 21, 2000, he reported
for duty as Disbursing Officer at the 22nd Finance Service Unit
In his defense, Major Cantos testified that on July 2000, he was
(FSU), Presidential Security Group (PSG), Malacañang Park,
assigned as the Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the PSG,
Manila. At that time, he did not notice any unusual incident in the
Malacañang Park, Manila. His duty was to supervise the
office. He picked up some Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) forms
disbursement of funds for the PSG personnel and to perform
which he filed with the BIR Office at the Port Area, Manila. He
other finance duties as requested by the PSG Commander, Gen.
returned to the office at around 10:00 a.m. At around 12:00 noon,
Rodolfo Diaz. On December 19, 2000, he received a check from
his commanding officer, Major Cantos, called him to his office and
Director Aguas in the amount of P1,975,000 representing the
informed him that the money he (Major Cantos) was handling,
Special Allowance of PSG personnel. Accompanied by two
the Special Duty Allowance for the month of December, and
personnel, he went to the Land Bank branch just across Pasig
other Maintenance Operating Expenses in the amount of more or
River and encashed the check. He placed the money in a duffel
less P3 Million was missing from his custody. Shocked, he asked
bag and kept it inside the steel cabinet in his office together with
Major Cantos where he kept the money, to which the latter
the P1,295,000 that was earlier also entrusted to him by Gen.
replied that he placed it in the steel cabinet inside his room. He
Diaz. Major Cantos added that as far as he knows, he is the only
one with the keys to his office. Although there was a safety vault
in his office, he opted to place the money inside the steel cabinet
because he was allegedly previously informed by his predecessor,
Major Conrado Mendoza, that the safety vault was defective. He
was also aware that all personnel of the 22nd FSU had
unrestricted access to his office during office hours.[9]
Major Cantos also narrated that on December 20, 2000, he
arrived at the office at around 9:00 a.m. and checked the steel
filing cabinet. He saw that the money was still there. He left the
office at around 4:00 p.m. to celebrate with his wife because it
was their wedding anniversary. On the following day, December
21, 2000, he reported for work around 8:30 a.m. and proceeded
with his task of signing vouchers and documents. Between 9:00
a.m. to 10:00 a.m., he inspected the steel cabinet and discovered
that the duffel bag which contained the money was missing. He
immediately called then Capt. Balao to his office and asked if the
latter saw someone enter the room. Capt. Balao replied that he
noticed a person going inside the room, but advised him not to
worry because he is bonded as Disbursing Officer.[10]
In a state of panic, Major Cantos asked for Capt. Balao’s help in
finding the money. Capt. Balao asked him how the money was
lost and why was it not in the vault, to which he replied that he
could not put it there because the vault was defective. Capt.
Balao then suggested that they should make it appear that the
money was lost in the safety vault. In pursuit of this plan, Capt.
Balao went out of the office and returned with a pair of pliers and
a screwdriver. Upon his return, Capt. Balao went directly to the
vault to unscrew it. At this point, Major Cantos told him not to
continue anymore as he will just inform Gen. Diaz about the
missing funds. Major Cantos was able to contact Gen. Diaz
through his mobile phone and was advised to just wait for Col.
Espinelli. When Col. Espinelli arrived at the office, Col. Espinelli
conducted an investigation of the incident.[11]
Lt. Col. Al I. Perreras, Executive Officer of the Judge Advocate
General Office (JAGO), likewise conducted an investigation of the
incident. His testimony was however dispensed with as the
counsels stipulated that he prepared the Investigation Report,
and that if presented, the same would be admitted by defense
counsel.[12] It likewise appears from the evidence that Police
Inspector Jesus S. Bacani of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
administered a polygraph examination on Major Cantos and the
result showed that he was telling the truth.[13]
On April 27, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Major
Cantos of the crime charged, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court finds
the accused Major Joel G. Cantos GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, under
paragraph 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present, hereby
sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
a period of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as
minimum, to Eighteen (18) Years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum; to reimburse the AFP
Finance Service Center, Presidential Security Group, Armed
Forces of the Philippines the amount of Three Million Two
Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P3,270,000.00); to pay a fine
of Three Million Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos
(P3,270,000.00); to suffer perpetual special disqualification from
holding any public office; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the RTC explained that
although there was no direct proof that Major Cantos
appropriated the money for his own benefit, Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that the failure of
a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal uses. The RTC
concluded that Major Cantos failed to rebut this presumption.
Aggrieved, Major Cantos appealed to the Sandiganbayan
questioning his conviction by the trial court.
On July 31, 2008, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision promulgated on May
3, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 03-212248 of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila finding
the accused-appellant Major Joel G. Cantos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modification that instead of being convicted of
malversation through negligence, the Court hereby convicts the
accused of malversation through misappropriation. The penalty
imposed by the lower court is also likewise AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The Sandiganbayan sustained the ruling of the RTC. It held that in
the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is
proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and
that he did not have them in his possession when demand
therefor was made. There is even no need of direct evidence of
personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his
account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same. In
this case, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner liable for
malversation through misappropriation because he failed to
dispute the presumption against him. The Sandiganbayan noted
that petitioner’s claim that the money was taken by robbery or
theft has not been supported by sufficient evidence, and is at
most, self-serving.
Contending that the Sandiganbayan Decision erred in affirming
his convicting, Major Cantos filed a motion for reconsideration. In
its Resolution[16] dated October 6, 2008, however, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner
assails the Decision of the Sandiganbayan based on the following
grounds:
I.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AFFIRMING
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR MALVERSATION DESPITE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE FUNDS WERE
CONVERTED TO THE PERSONAL USE OF PETITIONER.
II.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AFFIRMING
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF THE MERE
PRESUMPTION CREATED BY ARTICLE 217, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN VIEW OF THE ATTENDANT
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PRESENT CASE.[17]
Essentially, the basic issue for our resolution is: Did the
Sandiganbayan err in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds?
Petitioner argues that mere absence of funds is not sufficient
proof of misappropriation which would warrant his conviction.
He stresses that the prosecution has the burden of establishing
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, petitioner
contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he
appropriated, took, or misappropriated, or that he consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take the public funds.
On the other hand, the People, represented by the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), argues that petitioner, as an
accountable officer, may be convicted of malversation of public
funds even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation. The
OSP asserts that the only evidence required is that there is a
shortage in the officer’s account which he has not been able to
explain satisfactorily.
The petition must fail.
The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in its
decision convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds,
which is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, as follows:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption
of malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the duties
of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property shall suffer:
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand
pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to
the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the elements of malversation of public funds under Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. that the offender is a public officer;
2. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office;
3. that those funds or property were public funds or property for
which he was accountable; and
4. that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take them.[18]
We note that all the above-mentioned elements are here
present. Petitioner was a public officer occupying the position of
Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the AFP Finance Center,
PSG. By reason of his position, he was tasked to supervise the
disbursement of the Special Duty Allowances and other
Maintenance Operating Funds of the PSG personnel, which are
indubitably public funds for which he was accountable. Petitioner
in fact admitted in his testimony that he had complete control
and custody of these funds. As to the element of
misappropriation, indeed petitioner failed to rebut the legal
presumption that he had misappropriated the fees to his
personal use.
In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the
presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which states that the failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima
facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or property to
personal uses. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable.
Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present adequate evidence
that can nullify any likelihood that he put the funds or property
to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and
the prima facie case is effectively negated.
In this case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima
facie evidence of guilt. He failed to explain the missing funds in
his account and to restitute the amount upon demand. His claim
that the money was taken by robbery or theft is self-serving and
has not been supported by evidence. In fact, petitioner even tried
to unscrew the safety vault to make it appear that the money was
forcibly taken. Moreover, petitioner’s explanation that there is a
possibility that the money was taken by another is belied by the
fact that there was no sign that the steel cabinet was forcibly
opened. We also take note of the fact that it was only petitioner
who had the keys to the steel cabinet.[19] Thus, the explanation
set forth by petitioner is unsatisfactory and does not overcome
the presumption that he has put the missing funds to personal
use.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in
the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is
involved and conviction thereof is proper.[20] All that is
necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable
officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could
not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of
personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as
long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in
his accounts.[21] To our mind, the evidence in this case is
thoroughly inconsistent with petitioner’s claim of innocence.
Thus, we sustain the Sandiganbayan’s finding that petitioner’s
guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31,
2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-07-A/R-0008
convicting Major Joel G. Cantos of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. NO. 165711, June 30, 2006 ]
HERMOSO ARRIOLA AND MELCHOR RADAN, PETITIONERS, VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For allegedly having lost the confiscated lumber entrusted to
their custody, petitioners Barangay Captain Hermoso Arriola and
Barangay Chief Tanod Melchor Radan of Dulangan, Magdiwang,
Romblon were convicted as principal and accessory respectively
by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 of
the crime of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or
Abandonment defined and penalized under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, in an Information[1] docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2064, which alleges –
That on, about and during the first week of May, 1996, in
barangay Dulangan, municipality of Magdiwang, province of
Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a duly
appointed/elected Barangay Captain and Chief Tanod of
Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon and as such, they have under
their custody and control approximately forty four (44) pieces of
illegally sawn lumbers of assorted sizes and species, with an
estimated value of P17,611.20, Philippine currency, which were
confiscated or recovered by the elements of the Philippine
National Police and DENR personnel and thereafter turned over
the same to accused Brgy. Capt. Hermoso Arriola which he
acknowledged to have received the same and stockpiled at the
backyard of accused Chief Tanod Melchor Radan's house, and
through abandonment or negligence, they permitted any other
person to take the public property wholly or partially, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the sum of
P17,611.20.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter. On May 3, 1998, the trial court rendered its
Decision,[2] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds co-accused barangay captain
HERMOSO ARRIOLA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru
Negligence or Abandonment and he is hereby sentenced to not
less than 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2
months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories of the
law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and of a fine of P17,611.20, Philippine Currency,
and to pay the sum of P13,209.20 as indemnification of
consequential damages to the government.
Likewise, co-accused barangay chief tanod MELCHOR RADAN is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory of the crime
of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or
Abandonment and he is sentenced to not less than 6 years, as
minimum, to 8 years and 8 months, as maximum, with the
accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and of a fine of P4,402.80, Philippine
Currency, and to pay the sum of P4,402.80 as indemnification of
consequential damages to the government.
No subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine is
imposed to both accused under Article 39, paragraph 3, RPC but
either accused is subsidiarily liable for the quota of either in the
indemnity for consequential damages to the government (Art.
110, RPC). Both accused shall pay the costs equally.
The accused are entitled to credit for preventive imprisonment
under Article 29, RPC.
The accused are allowed to continue on provisional liberty under
the same bail bonds during the period to appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsmen (Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure as amended.)
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which
referred the same to the public respondent Sandiganbayan on a
finding that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.[4] On June
29, 2004, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan resolved[5] thus
–
Notwithstanding the referral of this case to this Court by the
Court of Appeals, it appearing that no correction was made of the
correct appellate court by the appellant, this Court is constrained
to DISMISS the instant case pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, stating insofar as
pertinent, that "(a)n appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall
be dismissed outright," and the ruling in the case of Moll vs.
Buban, et al., G.R. No. 136974 promulgated on August 27, 2002,
that the designation of the correct appellate court should be
made within the 15-day period to appeal.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied[6] by the
Sandiganbayan; hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan in dismissing their
appeal. They maintain that the trial court committed the
following errors:
IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA IS AN
ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC OFFICER WITH RESPECT TO CONFISCATED
ILLEGALLY LOGGED LUMBER, BY REASON OF THE DUTIES OF HIS
OFFICE.
IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA
MISAPPROPRIATED OR CONSENTED OR, THROUGH NEGLIGENCE
OR ABANDONMENT, PERMITTED ANOTHER PERSON TO TAKE THE
CONFISCATED LUMBER.
IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA
MALICIOUSLY OR FRAUDULENTLY ATTEMPTED TO MAKE IT
APPEAR THAT THE MISSING LUMBER WERE FOUND AND
RECOVED (sic).
IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MELCHOR RADAN IS AN
ACCESSORY AFTER THE CRIME WHO SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE,
TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-PETITIONER.
IN RULING THAT THE GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WERE ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE OF GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[7]
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
At noon on April 22, 1996 Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) Forest Rangers Efren Mandia (Mandia)
and Joepre Ferriol, Senior Inspector Noel Alonzo, the team leader
of Task Force Kalikasan together with the Chief of Police of
Magdiwang, Romblon SPO3 Agustin Ramal and some other police
officers, confiscated 44 pieces of illegally sawn lumber totaling
1,174 board feet with an estimated value of P17,611.20.[8]
Mandia scaled the lumber and made notches on most of the
pieces before issuing the seizure receipt[9] and turning over its
custody to petitioner Arriola in the presence of petitioner
Radan. Arriola acknowledged receipt thereof and
signed[10] accordingly. Mandia subsequently discovered the
lumber missing on May 5, 1996.[11]
He went back to Barangay Dulangan on May 14, 1996
accompanied by several police officers and Foresters Gerardo
Sabigan and Glenn Tansiongco. They requested petitioners to
turn over custody of the confiscated lumber but the latter
claimed that the same were taken away without their
knowledge. Subsequently, petitioners produced lumber and
claimed that these were the ones they recovered. Upon closer
inspection however, Mandia noted that the lumber produced by
petitioners were different from those previously confiscated.
The subsequent investigation conducted by Mandia together
with Forester and Officer-in-Charge Gerardo Sabigan, SPO1 Jose
Fabrique, Jr., and some members of the Multi-Sectoral Forest
Protection Committee showed that the missing lumber was
actually hauled to and used in the Magdiwang Cockpit where
petitioner Arriola is a stockholder.[12]
On June 10, 1996, a complaint was filed against petitioners before
the Romblon Provincial Prosecution Office.
In his defense, Arriola asserts that contrary to the finding of the
trial court, he is not an accountable officer insofar as the
confiscated lumber is concerned. He maintains that none of the
powers, duties and functions of a Barangay Captain as
enumerated in the Local Government Code[13] (R.A. 7160)
directly or by inference suggests that as such Barangay Captain,
he is an accountable officer with respect to the custody of illegally
sawn lumber confiscated within his territorial jurisdiction.
He insists that the confiscated lumber was placed in his custody
"not by reason of the duties of his office" as Barangay Captain,
thus he is not legally accountable to answer for its loss so as to
make him liable for Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioners claim that they did not misappropriate,
abandon or neglect the confiscated lumber and insist that the
same were stolen. Arriola claims he visited the stockpiled lumber
regularly so the theft probably occurred at night.
With respect to the replacement lumber they subsequently
produced, petitioners believed in good faith that the various
lumber found scattered in a nearby creek were the missing
confiscated lumber left by the thieves who failed to transport
them across.
Before going into the merits of the case, we must first resolve the
procedural issue of whether the Sandiganbayan correctly
dismissed the appeal. The Sandiganbayan anchored its dismissal
on this Court's pronouncement in Moll v. Buban[14] that the
designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the
validity of the notice of appeal. However, the designation of the
proper court should be made within the 15-day period to
appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the
correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the
case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section
2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply, the relevant portion
of which states:
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. –
xxxx
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.
In this case, the records had been forwarded to the Court of
Appeals which endorsed petitioners' appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. However, petitioners failed to designate the a.] The offender is a public officer;
proper appellate court within the allowable time.
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason
We cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for dismissing the appeal of the duties of his office;
outright for it was merely applying the law and existing
jurisprudence on the matter. Appeal is not a vested right but a c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for
mere statutory privilege; thus, appeal must be made strictly in which he is accountable; and
accordance with provisions set by law.[15] Section 2, Rule 50
clearly requires that the correction in designating the proper d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has
appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted
appeal. the taking by another person of, such funds or property.
An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who,
However, the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very
by reason of his office is accountable for public funds or
rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure
property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the
– not override – substantial justice.[16] This Court has repeatedly
Philippines (PD No. 1455) defines accountable officer to be every
stressed that the ends of justice would be served better when
officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require
cases are determined, not on mere technicality or some
the possession or custody of government funds or property and
procedural nicety, but on the merits – after all the parties are
who shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping
given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses. Lest
thereof in conformity with law.[18]
it be forgotten, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds
is frowned upon.[17]
In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the
nature of the duties which he performs – and not the
Having resolved the procedural issue, we shall now proceed to
nomenclature or the relative importance the position held –
the merits of the case. The issue boils down to whether or not
which is the controlling factor.[19]
petitioners Arriola and Radan are accountable officers within the
purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the
Is petitioner Arriola, who signed as custodian in the seizure
confiscated items.
receipt for the confiscated lumber an accountable officer with
respect to its loss?
To find an accused guilty of malversation, the prosecution must
prove the following essential elements:
Chapter IV, I-E, (4) of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging states
that:
In cases where the apprehension is made by the field DENR
officer, the forest products and the conveyance used shall be
deposited to the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED office, as the case
may be, for safekeeping, wherever it is most convenient. If the
transfer of the seized forest products to the above places is not
immediately feasible, the same shall be placed under the custody
of any licensed sawmill operator or the nearest local public
official such as the Barangay Captain, Municipal/City Mayor,
Provincial Governor or the PC/INP; at the discretion of the
confiscating officer taking into account the safety of the
confiscated forest products x x x. In any case, the custody of the
forest products shall be duly acknowledged and receipted by the
official taking custody thereof.
In the case of United States v. Lafuente,[20] the accused was a
Municipal Secretary and a member of the auction committee. A
public auction for the sale of fishery privileges was held pursuant
to the provisions of the Municipal Law and a municipal
ordinance. When the auction was concluded, the bidders
deposited the amount of their respective bids with the
accused. The latter embezzled the money for his personal use. It
was held that the accused is guilty of misappropriation of public
funds. Although a Municipal Secretary's duties do not normally
include the receipt of public funds, the accused in this case was
nonetheless held accountable for the same because the money
was deposited with him under authority of law. The obligation of
the secretary was to safeguard the money for the
Government.[21]
In the instant case, Arriola knowingly and willingly signed the
seizure receipt for the confiscated articles. By affixing his
signature in said document, he undertook to safeguard the
lumber on behalf of the Government. The receipt contains a
provision which states that as custodian, Arriola "obliges himself
to faithfully keep and protect to the best of his ability the said
seized articles from defacement in any manner, destruction or
loss and that he will never alter or remove said seized articles
until ordered by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources or his duly authorized representative or any court of
Justice in the Philippines."
Although his usual duties as Barangay Captain do not ordinarily
include the receipt of confiscated articles on behalf of the
Government, by virtue of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging,
which had for its basis Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705,[22] he may be called on to take custody thereof as the need
arises. Furthermore, by affixing his signature in the seizure
receipt which clearly enumerates his obligations as a custodian
therein, he effectively becomes an accountable officer therefor.
The records show that prior to its confiscation by the DENR
officers on April 22, 1996, the lumber was previously
apprehended by Arriola on April 19, 1996.[23] Thus, even
without the seizure receipt where he signed as custodian for the
said lumber, Arriola was accountable therefor because he was
the one who originally took possession of it on behalf of the
government.
His claim that the trial court erred in holding him liable for
malversation through negligence or abandonment lacks
merit. The lumber curiously turned up at the Magdiwang cockpit
structure where he happens to be a stockholder. Also, Arriola
admitted that he already knew about the missing lumber long
before the DENR officers came back to get it but he did not inform
them about its loss because "somebody advised me not to report
because the one who got the lumber might panic and tuluyan na
ang lumber."[24]
He even produced 44 pieces of lumber and passed it off as those
missing. The evidence showed however that the species was of
a cheaper quality and did not bear the markings made by the
apprehending officers of the DENR. All told, his alibi and denials
cannot prevail over the credible testimonies of government
witnesses which corroborated each other. His defenses did not
withstand the onslaught of clear and obvious physical,
documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the
prosecution.
With respect to petitioner Radan, the trial court erred in judging
him liable as an accessory.
Article 19, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code defines accessories as
those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by
concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the prosecution to
prove Radan's liability as an accessory were neither clear nor
convincing. His presence during the time when the DENR officers
turned over the custody of the seized items to Arriola is not
enough proof of complicity, nor the fact that the confiscated
lumber was placed behind his father's house. The assertion that
he was responsible for the alleged transport of the confiscated
articles to the cockpit in Dulangan was a mere conjecture.
In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for
proof in establishing the guilt of the accused.[25] When guilt is
not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long
standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and
exoneration granted as a matter of right.[26]
We now come to the penalty which should be imposed on
petitioner Arriola. According to Article 217, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for malversation is reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than P12,000 but less than P22,000. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, the maximum imposable penalty
shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18
years, 5 months and 20 days, while the minimum shall be within
the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. The
trial court therefore properly imposed the penalty of
imprisonment to petitioner Arriola ranging from 14 years and 8
months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as
maximum.
Under the second paragraph of Art. 217, persons guilty of
malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled,
which in this case is P17,611.20. There will be no subsidiary
imprisonment because the principal penalty imposed is higher
than prision correccional.[27]
WHEREFORE, the May 3, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 in Criminal Case No. 2064
finding petitioner Hermoso Arriola guilty of Malversation of
Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment to not less than 14
years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20
days, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the
additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
of P17,611.20 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the
imposition of consequential damages on petitioner Hermoso
Arriola is ordered DELETED for lack of legal basis. Petitioner
Melchor Radan is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 136266, August 13, 2001 ]
EUTIQUIO A. PELIGRINO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To convict the accused in a prosecution for the violation of
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, mere receipt of a gift or any
other benefit is enough, even without any express demand for
it. The duration of the possession is not controlling. Important
are the appellant’s words, action and reactions showing
acceptance thereof. These are factual in nature and, absent any
arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, or palpable error, the trial
court’s assessment of their presence or absence is generally
binding on appellate review.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the August 24, 1998 Decision[1] and
the November 16, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan, First
Division, in Criminal Case No. 17086. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby
rendered, finding accused EUTIQUIO A. PELIGRINO, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of having violated Sec.
3(b) of R.A. 3019 as charged, and hereby imposes upon him in the
absence of any modifying circumstances affecting criminal
liability, an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) MONTH as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS as maximum, with all
the accessories of the law, to suffer perpetual disqualification
from office, and to pay the cost.

“There is no pronouncement as to civil liability it being apparently
clear that the amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) used in the
entrapment has been returned to the offended party.
“Accused ATTY. BUENAVENTURA V. BUENAFE, on the other
hand[,] is ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt, with cost
de oficio.
“His bond is ordered cancelled and any Hold[-] Departure Order
issued in this case is set aside and ordered lifted as to him.”[3]
The assailed Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration as
follows:
“There being no adequate cause to set aside the decision herein,
more particularly since the points raised by the accused in his
motion for reconsideration dated September 2, 1998 have been
adequately taken up in the decision, the said motion for
reconsideration is denied.”[4]
This case originated from the Information filed on October 17,
1991 by Special Prosecution Officers Carlos D. Montemayor and
Edna Herrera-Batacan. The accusatory portion reads thus:
“That on or about October 15, 1991, in Makati, Metro Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EUTIQUIO
PELIGRINO y ALAAN, a public officer being then an Examiner II of
Region IV-A of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and as such [was]
tasked among others, to examine or investigate Books of
Accounts for Income and Business [t]ax [r]eturns earned by
professionals (medical practitioners) in order to determine their
compliance and/or tax deficiencies and to collect payments
thereof, while in the performance of his official duties as such
public officer, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally demand the amount of P200,000.00 from Dr. Antonio
N. Feliciano, a practicing [g]enetology [d]octor holding office at
Pasong Tamo, Makati, Metro Manila, found by the accused to
have incurred an allege[d] deficiency income tax assessment of
P500,000.00 for the calendar years 1988-1989, received
P200,000.00, P51,858.57 was in the form of Prudential Bank
Check No. 914077 dated October 15, 1991 payable to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue as full payment of Dr. Feliciano’s tax liabilities
and the remaining balance to be appropriated to himself, to the
damage and prejudice of Dr. Antonio Feliciano in the amount of
P148,141.43 and the government in the amount equal to the
deficiency income tax due it.”[5]
On February 25, 1992, the Information was amended to include
Buenaventura V. Buenafe as co-accused. It is reproduced below:
“That on or about October 15, 1991 and/or for sometime prior
thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EUTIQUIO
PELIGRINO y ALAAN and BUENAVENTURA V. BUENAFE,
both public officers, being then Examiner II and
Supervisor, respectively, both of Region IV-A of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Makati, Metro Manila, and as such are tasked,
among others, to examine or investigate the Books of Accounts
for Income and Business Tax and other accounting records of
professionals (medical practitioners) and to determine their lawyers,[7] were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty.[8] On April
compliance and/or tax deficiencies after assessment, and to 24, 1998, after full trial, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner
collect payments thereof, taking advantage of their public of the offense charged, but acquitted his co-accused.
positions, while in the performance of said official duties as such
The Facts
public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
Version of the Prosecution
each other, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
criminally demand directly from taxpayer Antonio N. Feliciano, a
practicing [g]enetology [d]octor holding office at Pasong Tamo, The Sandiganbayan narrated the evidence of the prosecution in
Makati, Metro Manila, found by both accused to have incurred this wise:
an alleged deficiency income tax assessment of P500,000.00 for
“Stripped of the non-essentials, the prosecution’s evidence
the calendar years 1988 and 1989, the amount of
shows that about the last week of July or early August of 1991,
P200,000.00 Philippine currency, for the purpose of applying a
accused Atty. Buenafe delivered a letter of authority dated July 4,
portion thereof in the amount of P51,858.57 as full payment for
1991 (Exhibit K) to complainant Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano in the
deficiency income tax due from said taxpayer for fiscal years 1988
latter’s office at Valgozon Bldg., Pasong Tamo, Makati. Said
& 1989 and the balance of P148,141.43 to be appropriated by
Exhibit K is addressed to Dr. Antonio [N.] Feliciano signed by one
both accused for themselves as gift or consideration for their
Eufracio D. Santos a [d]eputy [c]ommissioner of the BIR stating
promise to make as they did lower assessment for said fiscal years
inter alia that ‘x x x the bearer(s) hereof Revenue Officer Eutiquio
1988 & 1989 in the amount of P51,858.57, which request or
Peligrino to be supervised by Buenaventura Buenafe is/are
demand for money was in connection with a transaction between
authorized to examine your books of accounts and other
the government and Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano wherein both
accounting records for income and business for the
accused in their official capacities had to intervene under the law,
calendar/fiscal year(s) ending 1988 & 1989 x x x.’ Atty. Buenafe
and thereafter, accused Eutiquio A. Peligrino wil[l]fully,
was referred to the accountant of the complaining witness.
unlawfully and criminally received the amount of P200,000.00 in
behalf of both accused, to the damage and prejudice of Dr.
“About two weeks later, the complainant received a telephone
Antonio Feliciano in the amount of P148,141.43 and the
call from accused Atty. Buenafe asking him if his accountant had
government in the amount equal to the deficiency income tax
not told him anything, and when he (complainant) inquired from
due it.”[6] (Underscoring in the original.)
his accountant Ellen Quijano about the matter, he was informed
that the accused were demanding half a million pesos. Surprised
On August 28, 1992, the two accused, assisted by their respective about the demand, since the books were not even examined, he
instructed Ellen Quijano to further clarify the matter. Thereafter A We set it for the next day and I told the NBI people that I
about Sept. 1991, Atty. Buenafe called him up requesting for a ha[d] a feeling that they [would] show up the next day and
meeting in his (complainant’s) office. so early on the next morning the NBI came to my office.

“On October 10, 1991 accused Eutiquio Peligrino and Atty.

Buenaventura Buenafe appeared in the complainant’s office and PJ GARCHITORENA
told the latter that his tax deficiencies would amount to [f]ive
[h]undred [t]housand [p]esos (P500,000.00)[.]
Q On Monday, how many NBI agents came to your office?
“Flabbergasted, because his books were not even examined, A About two or three, Your Honor.
complainant entertained the idea that it was the beginning of an
extortion, and he tried to negotiate for a smaller amount, and
finally the two (2) accused agreed to the amount of [t]wo PROS. CAOILI
[h]undred [t]housand, of which [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos would
be paid to the BIR, and the rest to them. The pay-off would take
place on that coming Monday. He immediately wrote a letter to Q Now, at about what time did the NBI c[o]me to your office?
the NBI (Exhibit A) requesting for assistance, and an NBI Agent
Atty. Rafael Ragos, went to his office where they talked and A They came before noon, sir.
arranged for an entrapment which was set on October 14. At
around noon-time of the said date, he provided the NBI with the
Q And did the accused Atty. Buenafe and Mr. Peligrino
pay-off money consisting of [t]hree [t]housand (P3,000.00) pesos
appear on that date, October 15, 1991?
as the entrapment was scheduled at 4:00 p.m. Prior to this, he
had executed an affidavit (Exhibit C). On the said entrapment A Atty. Buenafe did not appear but Mr. Peligrino appeared at
date, October 14, 1991 neither accused appeared. The 4:00 p.m. in my office.
complainant further testified:
[‘]Q What happened next after October 14[?]
Q When Mr. Peligrino appeared in your office at 4:00 p.m., of
October 15, 1991, what transpired?
A By this time I was already ready with the planted money in PJ GARCHITORENA
an envelope, brown Manila envelope and the NBI agents
were already positioned and we ha[d] a pre-arranged
signal that if I buzz[ed] or made a buzzer in the intercom Mr. Caoili.
that mean[t] that the money was accepted and they
[would] come out and arrest Mr. Peligrino.
PROS. CAOILI

Q Now, were you able to hand the money to Mr. Peligrino?

Q When the NBI agents came to your room after pressing the
A Yes, sir.
button, what happened next?
A There was a commotion, sir, and it happened so fast that I
Q What did he do when he took hold of the money? don’t remember anymore but they brought him out of my
office with an instruction for me to follow.
A He accepted the envelope and opened it and look inside
and saw the money then close[d] it again and place[d] it in
front of him.
Q Did you understand where to follow[?]
A Yes, sir, in the NBI office at Taft Avenue.
Q What happened next?

Q And did you do that Mr. Witness?

PJ GARCITORENA
A Yes, sir.

Q And after you turned over the envelope to him, you still
Q Then what happened at the NBI office?
ha[d] a conversation with him?
A I was asked to make an affidavit of what happened which I
A No, your Honor, I immediately [pressed] the buzzer and
[did] and I signed it.
then the NBI immediately c[a]me out.
 (TSN August 12, 1993 pp. 19-21)[’]
“Corroborating the declaration of the complaining witness,
witness Rafael Z. Ragos an NBI Agent testified that on October 11,
1991 he was handed a letter ([E]xhibit A) by NBI Deputy Director
Antonio Aragon with instruction to handle the complaint of the
author – Dr. Antonio Feliciano. He then contacted the physician –
complainant and requested him to execute an affidavit (Exhibit
C). After studying the affidavit, he decided together with other
NBI agents to conduct an entrapment operation. Thus, 30 pieces
of one-hundred peso bills were secured and submitted to the
Forensic Chemist Section for marking. He made arrangement
with Dr. Feliciano that on October 14, 1991, he, with the
members of his team would standby at the office of the said
doctor to conduct the entrapment. Nothing came out of their
plan as the two (2) accused did not appear. The following day, he
with 8 or 10 NBI agents returned to the office before lunch time
and waited for the two (2) suspects. The arrangement was that,
the NBI agents would stay in one of the rooms of the clinic, would
wait for the signal of the Doctor which [was] the sound of the
buzzer, and when the buzzer [was] heard they would proceed to
arrest the subject of the operation.
“At around 4:30 p.m., accused Peligrino arrived, and so upon
hearing the sound of the buzzer, he [Ragos], together with his co-
NBI agents immediately proceeded to the room of Dr. Feliciano,
and on seeing the accused in possession of the brown envelope
which contained the marked money, arrested him, and made a
body search on him. An inventory of the things found in the
possession of the accused was made (Exhibit T). The following
were seized from accused Peligrino:
Prudential Check No. 914077;
BIR Authority to Issue Payment Order dated 28 August 1991 with
stated amount of P14,092.92;
BIR Authority to Issue Payment Order dated 28 August 1991 with
stated amount of P23,760.35;
BIR Authority to Issue Payment Order dated 28 August 1991 with
stated amount of P14,005.30;
Worksheet labeled ‘COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROJECTS’ with
[L]ist of Taxpayers [who were] Doctors;
1988 and 1989 [P]rovisional Computation (DR. FELICIANO) Tax
Assessment;
List of Dr. A. FELICIANO’s withheld taxes for 1989;
Computation of Dr. FELICIANO[‘s] 1989 Sales of Clinic Supplies
and Number of Patients;
Computation of Dr. Feliciano’s Number of Patients;
BIR Letter of Authority No. 0456962 addressed to Dr. ANTONIO
N. FELICIANO;
Photocopy of Dr. FELICIANO’s 1989 Income Tax Return and its
attached Auditor’s Report, Balance Sheet, Profit and Loss
Statement and Schedule of Salaries and Wages;
DR. FELICIANO’s 1989 Confirmation Receipts;
Photocopy of Dr. FELICIANO’s 1988 Income Tax Return and its
attachments;
DR. FELICIANO’s Worksheet for 1989 transactions;
DR. FELICIANO’s Worksheet for 1988 transactions;
Big-brown envelope containing the Bogus Money with (30) pcs.
of marked One Hundred [Peso b]ills.
“The accused was then brought to the NBI Office in Manila where
he was examined for the detection of the fluorescent powder
[o]n his hands and body. He then prepared his report (Exhibit Q)
after the complainant executed a written statement.
“NBI agent Raul A. Ancheta also took the witness stand and
declared that on October 14, 1991 Agent Ragos assigned him to
get the statement of Dr. Feliciano, after which he was instructed
to prepare ‘boodle’ money to be submitted to the Forensic
Chemist Division of the NBI in preparation for the entrapment.
Accordingly, with thirty (30) pieces of genuine money, he
submitted the same to the Forensic Chemist for dustings and
proper markings. He was present in the initial process of dusting
the articles with fluorescent powder but did not witness the
entire proceedings. He thereafter retrieved the money from the
Forensic Chemist, placed it in an envelope, and delivered the
same to Agent Ragos.
“[O]n the morning of October 14, Agent Ragos called all the
members of the entrapment team and made the necessary
briefings. They, thereafter proceeded to the office of Dr.
Feliciano, and waited for the accused but nobody appeared, and
Agent Ragos instructed the members of the team to be on the
stand by status the following day.
“The next day, October 15, the NBI agents posted themselves at
the different parts of the clinic and waited for the BIR examiners.
His [Agent Rago’s] assignment was [at] the main door of the clinic
to secure the team members from outside forces. By 4:00 p.m.,
only accused Eutiquio Peligrino arrived. He saw him enter the
clinic, [go] directly to the secretary who picked up the phone, and
then he saw Dr. Feliciano going out of the room and conferr[ing]
with the accused. Thereafter, they entered the room of Dr.
Feliciano. About 15 to 20 minutes, he saw the other members of
the team rushing to the office of the doctor, and after a short
while, they came out from the office with accused Peligrino.
Agent Ragos handed him the brown envelope and the blue bag of
the accused, and then they proceeded to the NBI office where he
brought the accused to the Office of the Forensic Chemist who
examined him upon presentation of the request (Exhibit E-I).
After the examination, he was given a certification by the
Forensic Chemist (Exhibit E).
“Dimpna Dacudao Bermejo, a Forensic Chemist of the NBI
declared:
[‘]Q Miss Witness, do you remember whether you were in your
office on October 15, 1991?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you give any technical assistance during that date? Q Are you familiar with the subject?
A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q What kind of technical assistance did you give on that Q If he is in this Court, will you be able to identify him?
date?
A Yes, sir.
A [At] 5:00 of October 15, a certain agent Raul Ancheta came
to my laboratory with a letter request asking for a
detection of fluorescent powder [on] a person. xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx (Witness pointing to a person in Court who when asked gave his
name as Mr. Eutiquio Peligrino.)

PROS. CAOILI
May I request, Your Honor, that this letter request for
Chemistry examination, disposition form dated October
15, 1991 be marked as Exhibit E-1[.]
Q How did you conduct the examination?
A I brought the person [to] our dark room and then I exposed
his left and right arms[,] palm[a]r aspect[,] under the UV
light.

xxxxxxxxx
PJ GARCHITORENA

Q What did you do upon getting this request for examination

Miss Witness? Q What is UV light?

A I examined the letter request whether the contents [were] A Ultra-Violet light.
in order, then I asked him to bring the subject in my
presence and I right away proceeded to my examination.
PROS. CAOILI Q Where is it now?
A Witness presenting a document to the Fiscal which is
entitled Physics Report Number P-91-140 dated 17
Q What [were] your findings?
October 1991.
A The said Peligrino was found to be positive [for] the
presence of fluorescent powder.
Q On this report, there is a signature above the typewritten
name Dimpna Bermejo[;] whose signature is that?
Q Did you [put] your findings in writing?
A My signature, sir.
A Yes, sir.

PROS. CAOILI
Q There is already here a certification which is already
May I request your Honor, that this Physics Report No. P91-
marked as Exhibit E signed by one Dimpna Bermejo. Will
140 be marked as Exhibit E-2.
you please go over the same and tell me if you know this
document?
A Yes, I was the one who made that document. Q Aside from your report, did you prepare any diagnosis
showing where you found this fluorescent powder in the
person of Mr. Peligrino?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir.

Q It states here that this is only a temporary certification and

xxx xxx xxx
[the] official report follows. Did you make that official
report?
A Yes, sir. PROS. CAOILI
 Your Honor, may I request that these two (2) diagnos[e]s
presented by the witness be marked as Exhibit E-3 for [the] “The records disclose that the prosecution presented
dorsal portion and Exhibit E-4 for the palm[a]r side. documentary evidence consisting of Exhibit A which is a letter-
complaint dated 10/11/91 of the complaining witness addressed
to Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI[;] Exhibit B an NBI routine slip
xxx xxx xxx emanating from Asst. Director Aragon; two (2) sworn statements
of Dr. Feliciano marked as Exhibit[s] C and D which were all
offered as part of the testimony of the said doctor; Exhibit E
Q There is a note written in pencil in Exhibit E-3, [on] the which is a certification dated October 15, 1991 by the NBI
bottom portion. Will you please explain to the Honorable Forensic Chemist Dimpna Bermejo together with her Physics
Court what is that note? Report No. P91-140 (Exhibit E-2); all offered as part of the
A That note states that subject was found to have declaration of witness Bermejo; Exhibit F – xerox copy of the
fluorescent powder [o]n the front shirt, pants and right genuine thirty P100 bill[;] three authorities to issue payment
arm. order (Exhibits H, I & J); a letter of authority issued by BIR Director
Viray (Exhibit K); Exhibit L which is the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of
NBI Agents; Exhibits M and N[,] the booking sheet and Arrest
xxx xxx xxx Report and Arrest Information Sheet respectively for accused
Peligrino; Exhibits O and P[,] the booking sheet & Arrest Report
and Arrest Information Sheet respectively for accused Buenafe;
Q Miss Witness, whose hands are those which were Exhibit Q[;] the Report of the Arresting NBI Agents regarding the
examined supposed to [be]? entrapment; Exhibit R which [consists of] some notes of Dr.
Feliciano; Exhibit S which is a letter dated 11/26/92 of BIR Deputy
A [They] belonged to the subject Peligrino. Commissioner Santos to Dr. Feliciano; Exhibit T[,] the
inventory/list of documents seized from accused Peligrino[;] and
[Exhibit] U[,] the referral letter of Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI
Q How about the palm[a]r section, does it also belong to the
to the Ombudsman. These exhibits were admitted as part of the
subject Eutiquio Peligrino?
testimonies of the witnesses who testified thereon.”[9]
A Yes, sir.[’]
Version of the Defense

Inasmuch as petitioner did not submit his version of the facts, we
quote the Sandiganbayan’s narration of the defense evidence as
follows:
“The defense was abject denial. Stoutly asserting their innocence,
and abjuring the inculpation with vehemence, both accused took
the witness stand, and presented Prosecutor Carlos Montemayor
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to drive [home] their point.
They also submitted as documentary evidence Exhibits 1 to 21
which were admitted by the Court in its Resolution of October 28,
1994.
“The testimony of accused Buenaventura V. Buenafe may be
capsulized as follows:
‘That he is 59 years old, married and a Revenue Officer IV with
designation of Supervisor in the Bureau of Internal Revenue; that
he first came to know Dr. Feliciano when he served a letter of
authority for the examination of the 1988-89 books of account of
the doctor to establish his tax liability; that said letter of authority
was issued by the [d]eputy [c]ommissioner of [i]nternal [r]evenue
(Exhibit 9) which has a [life-time] of 30 days within which to be
served and since Examiner Eutiquio Peligrino was on leave he
took it upon himself to serve the same personally on the doctor
at the latter’s office; that since the letter of authority came about
pursuant to a letter of denunciation of the doctor-complainant,
he was checking on the veracity of the said letter of denunciation
and except for the item in the said letter of denunciation about
his ownership of ten (10) cars as the doctor said he ha[d] only
three expensive cars [but] he was able to confirm that the subject
[was] living in Forbes Park, ha[d] been treating more than thirty
(30) patients a day, ha[d] a share in Puerto Azul, ha[d] an island
off Atimonan, and ha[d] many househelps; that he charged
P200.00 per consultation from low income patients but with
respect to foreigners he asked for a package-deal $1000 for
consultation, laboratory examination, etc.
‘After the interview, he was told by the complainant that the
latter’s accountant would be coming to his office later on, and
true to form, one Elen Quijencio representing herself as
accountant of the doctor, came to his office, bringing some
papers but not the book of accounts. He referred him to his co-
accused Eutiquio Peligrino, and after their examination, he found
out that instead of the reported income of [o]ne [m]illion [pesos]
(P1,000,000.00) a year the doctor [should] have reported [t]hree
[m]illion pesos (P3,000,000.00) per year. He told the accountant
of his computation who retorted that she would inform the
doctor of the same.
‘About the end of August 1991, the accountant called him in his
office and relayed the information that the doctor [was]
amenable to pay fifty thousand ([P]50,000.00) pesos more or less,
and so he consulted his superior and assessing that it was
reasonable, [an] authority to issue payment order (ATIPO) was
prepared. (Exhibits H, K and J also Exhibits 10, 10-A & 10-B
respectively). The aggregate amount to be paid by the
complainant including surcharges, interest and compromises as
appearing in the three ATIPO [was] P51,858.57.
‘On October 10, 1991 upon invitation of the complainant, he and
co-accused went to the former’s office bringing with them the
ATIPO’s in anticipation of the payment, but the complainant
requested x x x postponement of the payment, and told them to
come back the following day; the next day, the complainant-
doctor pleaded again for postponement. He then left the ATIPO
[with] his co-accused Peligrino.
‘On October 16, thirty minutes after arrival in his office, he was
called by the new [d]irector at the latter’s office where an NBI
agent was waiting. He was then invited to the NBI office to
identify the papers or documents seized from Mr. Peligrino. At
the NBI Office, he was informed that he was the mastermind of
the extortion aborted by the entrapment laid by the NBI and the
complainant on Mr. Peligrino, and when he denied the same, he
was brought before Prosecutor Carlos Montemayor in the Office
of the Ombudsman where he saw the NBI Agent presenting the
boodle money, and where he was told by the Prosecutor to go
home when the NBI agent could not answer the Prosecutor’s
question why he (Buenafe) was there.’
“On the other hand, accused Eutiquio A. Peligrino, 51 years old,
married and a BIR examiner made the following declaration:
‘That he ha[d] been a BIR examiner for thirteen (13) years, and
sometime in June or July 1991 he was assigned as examiner at
Revenue District 22, Manila and at the same time one of the
members of the Special Project Committee supervised by his co-
accused; that he came to know Dr. Feliciano in the early part of
July 1991 when he was assigned to examine the latter’s books of
accounts, that when the accountant of the said doctor went to
his office she brought only the working sheets, list of employees
and some of the withholding taxes, and not the most vital
document which [was] the books of accounts[;] nonetheless he
made a preliminary assessment based on the information given
by his superior co-accused Buenafe; that when the accountant
[came] back, he told her that if she want[ed] to make a
compromise she [could] talk to his superior.
‘On October 10, 1991 co-accused Buenafe told him that they had
to go to the clinic of Dr. Feliciano in order to present the
[A]uthority to [I]ssue Payment Order. They were entertained by
the Doctor who told him that the check for the payment was not
yet prepared, and requested them to return the following day.
Again when they went there the next day, the Doctor informed
them the check [was] not yet ready since he was very busy.
‘On October 15, 1991 while in his Manila District Office 22, co-
accused Buenafe gave him three (3) copies of [A]uthority to
[I]ssue [P]ayment [O]rder and instructed him to deliver the same
to Dr. Feliciano, and get the check if it is already prepared. He
arrived at the Office of the Doctor at around 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. and
went directly to the reception hall where he told the receptionist
that his purpose in going there [was] to inform the Doctor of the
due date of the ATIPO, and to pick up the check if it [was] already
ready.
‘He was allowed to enter the clinic where he gave the Doctor the
copies of ATIPO. The Doctor asked the whereabouts of Atty.
Buenafe and requested the copies of the ATIPO for xeroxing.
While waiting for the ATIPO to be xeroxed, Dr. Feliciano asked
him if he would accept payment in cash to which he said No and
he would accept only check payable to the BIR. Thereafter, the
Doctor took a brown envelope from his drawer, threw it in front
of him and said ‘yan ang bayad.’ The envelope landed close to his
arms and so he pushed it asking: ‘What is that sir? My purpose in
coming here is to get the check in payment for the BIR’. Instead
of answering him, the Doctor stood up and told him he [was]
going to get the xerox copy of the ATIPO.
‘The Doctor returned followed by two (2) persons one of whom
grabbed his hands from behind while the other standing behind
him wanted him to hold the envelope but he resisted[,] placing
his hands against his chest, and since the two men realized he
[could] not be forced to hold the envelope, they let him go, picked
the envelope and pressed it against his breast.
‘He was brought to the NBI office where in one room, a chemist
examined him to detect the presence of fluorescent powder.
During the examination, he asked the chemist which of his hand[s
was] contaminated and the chemist answered ‘none’. Then, she
looked up to the escort behind him, and after that, started
examining his hands, shirt and pants, and then began encircling
portions on the diagram in front of her. Then he was
fingerprinted.
‘The following day, October 16, 1991 his co-accused arrived and
they were brought before Fiscal Montemayor of the Ombudsman
who asked the NBI why the envelope supposedly containing the
money was still sealed. He [could] not remember how the NBI
agents replied, but Fiscal Montemayor let go [of] his co-accused
while he was asked to post bail.’
“The defense also presented Carlos Montemayor, 59 years old,
married and a Special Prosecutor III in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Ombudsman[,] who testified as follows:
[‘]Q Mr. Witness, can you tell us whether a big brown envelope
was presented to you by the NBI during the inquest
preliminary investigation?
A I can not exactly remember if there was an envelope
submitted by the NBI during the inquest investigation.
What I remember having x x x seen and [having been]
presented by the NBI [were the] xeroxed copy of the
marked money and several affidavits.
Q You mentioned that what [were] presented were only
xeroxed copies of the marked money. Did you see the
original of the marked money?
A I am not sure whether it was presented to me or not.
Q How about the diagram of the hands of the alleged persons
[and] the presence of fluorescent powder, can you tell if
you have seen them on that day?
A No, what was presented to me was the Forensic Chemistry
Report.[’]
“Answering the queries of the Court, he declared: Q Was Mr. Peligrino asked about the entrapment itself?
A I believe so.
[‘]PJ GARCHITORENA
Q Was he confronted in some way with the findings of the
NBI with regard to the forensic powder?
Q Mr. Montemayor, at that time that you were conducting
the inquest examination[,] was the accused Peligrino A I can not remember anymore, sir.
presented to you?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Was the Forensic Report of the NBI presented [in] his
presence?
Q Did you ask him any question? A Yes, sir.
A Well, my companions asked [him] questions x x x because
we were three who conducted the inquest examination.
Q Did he protest in anyway the process by which the forensic
examination was conducted?
xxx xxx xxx A No, because he waived the right to preliminary
investigation.

Q Was there any question addressed by the panel to Mr.

Peligrino at the time with respect to the evidence? Q Be that as it may, did he in any way [protest] the
proceedings or [protest] that the forensic examination was
A Yes, your Honor.
irregular or otherwise. . .
A No protest whatsoever.
xxx xxx xxx

Q Was he confronted with any statement?

A He was confronted with the testimony or allegations of Dr. Q And in this particular case Mr. Peligrino was calm and
Feliciano[.] apparently not at all unsettled?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did he make any comment?
A He denied [them]. Q He was calm in other words?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Was the denial general or specific?
A General. Q And in his calm condition he did not say the NBI maltreated
him?
A No, Your Honor.
Q He denied any attempt to extort money from Dr. Feliciano?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Or that the entrapment or any of the proceedings were
conducted in any manner different from what the NBI
Q Did he make any protest [or] misbehavior by the NBI? should do?
A No, sir. A He did not protest.[’]

“The documentary evidence adduced by the defense consist[s] of

Q Did you see him under [some] kind of fear or stress about
Exhibits 1 and 2, [which are] the affidavits of accused Buenafe
the NBI? Did he feel afraid?
dated Nov. 7 and December 18, 1991 respectively; Exhibits 3 and
A I have not noticed any unusual appearance of the accused 4, which are the affidavits of Felicidad Viray[,] then Regional
Peligrino, Your Honor. Director of the BIR and that of Antonio Panuncialman[,] then
[c]oordinator of the Special Project Committee of the BIR;
Exhibits 5 and 6, the certifications of BIR Revenue District Officer
xxx xxx xxx Mamerto Silang, Cruz[;] and Exhibit 7 the affidavit of one Roselyn
Dy all tending to show the efficiency of accused Buenafe as a BIR
employee. To prove the extent of Dr. Feliciano’s practice, Exhibits
8 and 8-a consisting of [a] letter of some ‘concerned doctors OB-
Gyne,” and a brochure were presented. The letters of authority
already marked as Exhibits K, H, J & I were adopted by the defense
as Exhibits 9, 10, 10-A & 10-B[;] while Exhibits M, N, O, & P of the
prosecution were adduced by the accused as their Exhibits 11, 11-
A, 12 and 12-A. Exhibit 13 is the Counter-affidavit of accused
Peligrino while Exhibits 14 is a copy of a Memorandum for Hon.
Mauro Castro[,] the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal[; Exhibit] 14-a
is a copy of an information charging Dr. Feliciano [with] the crime
of Simple Slander, [Exhibit] 14-B is another information also
charging the doctor [with] Simple Slander[;] Exhibit 15 is another
Memorandum for Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro recommending
dismissal of the charges of Falsification of Private Document and
Use of Falsified document against Dr. Feliciano[; Exhibit]15-A is a
copy of another Memorandum for Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro
recommending dismissal of the three charges for perjury against
the doctor[;] Exhibit 16 is another Memorandum for dismissal of
the charge of perjury against the complainant-doctor[;] while
Exhibit 17 is a certification by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal certifying the filing of five (5) criminal charges
against the doctor[;] Exhibit 18 is a copy of the complaint (civil
case) of the doctor against his own children – Dr. Antonio
Feliciano Jr. and Ma. Isabel Feliciano – all these Exhibits (14 to 18
inclusive) were submitted to show that complainant [was] a very
troublesome person. [The a]ccused also presented Exhibits 19, 20
and 21 [which are a] certification of the Dismissal of the
Administrative case filed by Dr. Feliciano against accused
Buenafe, as well as [a] certification anent his semestral
accomplishment, and a letter of the Metropolitan Hospital
Administrator to x x x BIR [C]ommissioner Ong commending
Buenafe respectively.
“While Exhibits 1 to 21 were admitted by the Court in its Minute
Resolution of October 28, 1994 there was nothing said of Exhibits
22 and 23 but considering that they were annexes to the Joint
Stipulation of Facts, the Court is constrained to consider them
even if virtually they were not the object of a formal offer. Exhibit
22 is Revenue Special Order No. 30-91 dated April 2, 1991 signed
by BIR Com. Jose Ong appointing Antonio Panuncialman and
Buenaventura Buenafe as Head & Team Leader respectively of
the Committee on Special Projects, Revenue Region 4-A Manila,
while Exhibit 23 is the same as Exhibit 21.”[10]
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its well-written 40-page Decision, the Sandiganbayan ruled
that all the elements of the offense described in Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act),[11] had been proven. Being a public officer,
specifically an examiner of the BIR, Peligrino had the right to
intervene in the subject transaction. He was a member of the
Special Project Committee tasked to verify the tax liabilities of
professionals, particularly physicians, within the jurisdiction of
Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila.
Based on the testimony of private complainant, the NBI agents’
entrapment scheme, and the positive results of the chemical
examination done on petitioner, the latter was found by the anti-
graft court to have demanded and received money for his
personal benefit in connection with private complainant’s tax
liabilities. After noting that they had no improper motive to
testify against petitioner, the court a quo accorded full faith and
credence to the testimonies of the NBI agents and the
complaining witness.
As regards Buenafe, however, the Sandiganbayan held that there
was no sufficient proof that he had conspired with petitioner:
“[A]ll told, as to this accused, there were whispers of doubt anent
his culpability, which the prosecution despite its commendable
efforts, has failed to still. Such doubt must set him free.”[12]
Hence, this Petition by Peligrino.
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
“I. That the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that petitioner
demanded and received the envelope with the boodle
money;
“II. That the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioner on
the basis of the lone testimony of Dr. Feliciano, an admittedly
discredited witness;
“III. That petitioner was denied his right to equal protection of the
law.”[13]
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition[14] has no merit.
First Issue:
Demand and Receipt of
“Boodle Money”
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019,
as amended) provides:
“SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts
or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law,
the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
“(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person,
in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law.
x x x x x x x x x.”
The elements of this offense were summed up in Mejia v.
Pamaran,[15] and we restate them here: (1) the offender is a
public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a
share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the offender or
any other person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction
with the government (5) in which the public officer, in an official
capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the Special Project
Committee tasked “x x x to undertake verification of tax liabilities
of various professionals particularly doctors within the
jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila x x x.” Since the
subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from
private complainant, the right of petitioner to intervene in his
official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5)
of the offense are present.
However, petitioner disputes the prosecution evidence
establishing that he demanded and received grease money in
connection with the transaction.
Specifically, he contends that the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion
that he demanded money from complainant was based merely
on an assumption that was not supported by any evidence. He
avers that he merely informed complainant of his tax deficiencies,
and that it was the latter who requested the reduction of the
amount claimed.
We are not convinced. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three
distinct acts -- (1) demanding or requesting; (2) receiving; or (3)
demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the
government and any other party, wherein a public officer in an
official capacity has to intervene under the law. These modes of
committing the offense are distinct and different from each
other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant
conviction.[16] The lack of demand is immaterial. After all,
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 uses the word “or”
between requesting and receiving.
Averring that the incident in complainant’s clinic was a frame-up,
petitioner contends that there could not have been any payoff,
inasmuch as there was no demand.
Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by evidence acquired
during an entrapment, as the giver or briber is usually the only
one who can provide direct evidence of the commission of this
crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted to in order to apprehend a
public officer while in the act of obtaining undue
benefits.[17] However, we have to distinguish between
entrapment and instigation.
In “instigation,” officers of the law or their agents incite, induce,
instigate or lure the accused into committing an offense, which
the latter otherwise would not commit and has no intention of
committing. In “entrapment,” the criminal intent or design to
commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the
accused, and the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
commission of the crime.[18]
Frame-up, like alibi, is invariably viewed with disfavor because, as
a line of defense in most criminal prosecutions of this nature, it is
easily concocted, common or standard.[19]

Petitioner denies that he received payoff money from
complainant. According to him, receive, as contemplated in the
offense charged, connotes a voluntary act coupled with
knowledge. Hence, where the giving of the money affords the
accused no opportunity either to refuse or to return it to the
giver, no punishable offense ensues.[20] Petitioner claims that
the 40 seconds or less that the boodle money was in his hands
was merely a momentary possession that could not prove
“receipt,” which the law requires for the offense charged to be
consummated.
We disagree. In Cabrera v. Pajares, acceptance was established
because the accused judge placed the bribe money between the
pages of his diary or appointment book, despite his protestations
that the money bills landed on the open pages of his diary, only
after he had flung them back to the complainant.[21]
In Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan,[22] this Court overruled the
finding of acceptance, because it was improbable for the accused
to accept bribe money in front of her office mates and in a public
place, even if the money had been handed to her under the table.
Furthermore, the accused therein shouted at the complainant,
“What are you trying to do to me?” That is not the normal
reaction of one with a guilty conscience.
Furthermore, the Court held in the said case that there must be a
clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so
offered and consider it as his or her own property from then on.
Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show acceptance is not sufficient to lead
the court to conclude that the crime has been committed. To hold
otherwise would encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up
public officers by simply putting within their physical custody
some gift, money or other property.[23]
The duration of the possession is not the controlling element in
determining receipt or acceptance. In the case at bar, petitioner
opened the envelope containing the boodle money, looked
inside, closed it and placed the envelope beside him on the table.
Such reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery,
especially considering that he was not supposed to accept any
cash from the taxpayer. The proximity of the envelope relative to
petitioner, as testified to by NBI Agent Ragos, also belies
petitioner’s contention that he refused the bribe.
A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent
execution of a wrongful act is presumed to be both the taker and
the doer of the whole act.[24]
Second Issue:
Credibility of Complaining Witness
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan with inconsistency.
Supposedly, while stating on the one hand that complainant was
not a credible witness on account of his character, on the other
hand it accorded credibility to his testimony that petitioner had
received the boodle money. Likewise, petitioner adds, the same
court found complainant’s testimony insufficient to establish
Buenafe’s complicity, yet deemed the same testimony sufficient
to prove petitioner’s guilt.
The Sandiganbayan findings adverted to are as follows:
“While the Court is reluctant to consider this declaration of the
offended party as satisfactory proof that the accused [therein
petitioner] requested or demanded x x x the sum of P200,000 not
only because it was vehemently denied by the accused but
likewise considering the nature and character x x x [or] person of
the said offended party (Exhibit 14 to 18), we are at a loss why in
the ensuing event, particularly in the entrapment laid out by the
complainant and the NBI agents, this accused was present and x
x x a brown envelop[e] containing the ‘boodle money’ was
retrieved [from him]. x x x.”[25]
Obviously, the anti-graft court did not tag complainant as a
discredited witness. It simply said that his testimony by itself was
not sufficient evidence of the commission of the offense. But,
taken together with the other pieces of corroborating evidence,
it established a quantum of evidence strong enough to convict
petitioner. While the case is weakened by the many suits filed for
and against complainant, the court a quo did not say that he was
not at all worthy of belief.
We see no cause to fault the lower court. The assessment of the
credibility of a witness is primarily the function of a trial court,
which had the benefit of observing firsthand the demeanor or
deportment of the witness. It is well-settled that this Court will
not reverse the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses in the absence of arbitrariness, abuse of discretion or
palpable error.[26]
It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the
evidence presented by the parties, as well as to accord full faith
to those it regards as credible and reject those it considers
perjurious or fabricated.[27]
Petitioner further contends that he tested positive for fluorescent
powder, because the NBI agents had pressed the envelope to his
body.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner failed to ascribe to the NBI
agents any ill motive to deliberately implicate him. No malice was
imputed, either, to the chemist who had examined and found him
positive for the chemical; thus, we see no cogent reason to
disbelieve her testimony. In the absence of any controverting
evidence, the testimonies of public officers are given full faith and
credence, as they are presumed to have acted in the regular
performance of their official duties.[28]
Third Issue:
Right of the Accused to the Equal Protection of the Law
Petitioner asserts that he should be accorded the same treatment
and, thus, acquitted because of his right to the equal protection
of the law. After all, the Sandiganbayan believed the testimony of
Buenafe that the latter had not asked for any payoff money; and
he was, thus, cleared of the charge against him.
We disagree. Petitioner alludes to the doctrine that if the
conviction of the accused rests upon the same evidence used to
convict the co-accused, the acquittal of the former should benefit
the latter.[29] Such doctrine does not apply to this case. The
strongest pieces of evidence against petitioner were the ones
obtained from the entrapment, in which Buenafe was not
involved. Hence, the evidence against petitioner and that against
his co-accused were simply not at par with each other.
All in all, petitioner failed to show that Sandiganbayan had
committed any reversible error. Quite the contrary, it had acted
judiciously and correctly. Hence, this recourse must fail.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 146368-69, October 23, 2003 ]
MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, PETITIONER, VS. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action
for certiorari assails Sandiganbayan Resolution[1] dated May 8,
2000, denying petitioner's Motion to Quash[2] the Information in
Criminal Case No. 23848, for violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. No.
3019,[3] as amended. Petitioner also impugns said court's
Resolution[4] dated November 9, 2000, denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Sometime in February 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang,
Northern Samar, passed Resolution No. 93-132,[5] authorizing
the municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the Philippine
Army's 53rd Engineering Battalion, to be utilized in the
improvement of Laoang's Bus Terminal. Resolution No. 93-132
likewise mandated the municipal government to shoulder the
expenses for fuel, oil, and the subsistence allowances of the
heavy equipment operators for the duration of the project.
Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army equipment was diverted
by the petitioner, who was then the town mayor[6] of Laoang, to
develop some of her private properties in Rawis, Laoang,
Northern Samar. A concerned citizen and ex-member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G. Poso, Sr., filed a
complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other municipal
officers[7] with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), Visayas, for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Acting on the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Alfonso S.
Sarmiento of the OMB ordered herein petitioner and her co-
accused to submit their respective counter-affidavits and other
controverting evidence. Thereafter, in a Resolution[8] dated
August 16, 1995, investigator Sarmiento recommended the filing
of the appropriate criminal action against petitioner for violation
of Sections 3(c) and (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.[9] Despite
strenuous opposition and objections by the defense, on August 1,
1997, two informations were filed against her at
the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23847 and
23848, to wit:
(1) Criminal Case No. 23847
That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in
the Municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime herein charged
in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of
her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
cause undue injury to the Government and give unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to herself and spouses Mr. and
Mrs. Chupo Lao when she, in the discharge of her official or
administrative functions, caused the improvement or
development of her private land in Barangay Rawis through the
use of the equipment and resources of the Philippine Army, to
the damage and prejudice of the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]
This, however, was amended on October 27, 1998, so that
Criminal Case No. 23847 would read as follows:
That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in
the Municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime herein charged
in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of
her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
cause undue injury to the Government and give unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to her husband, Hector Ong,
herself, and/or her family and to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao
when she, in the discharge of her official or administrative
functions, caused the improvement or development of a private
land owned by her husband, Hector Ong, herself and/or her
family in Barangay Rawis through the use of the equipment and
resources of the Philippine Army, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
(2) Criminal Case No. 23848
That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in
the Municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime herein charged
in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of
her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, request or receive, directly or indirectly, a gift, present
or other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five (5)
drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another from the spouses
Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-
Ong, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will
secure or obtain, any Municipal Government permit or license
anent the operation of the bus company, JB Lines, owned by the
aforenamed spouses, in consideration for the help given or to be
given by the accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[12]
On September 15, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with
the Sandiganbayan alleging in the main that: (1) the informations
especially in Criminal Case No. 23848, failed to allege facts
constituting an offense; (2) that the officer who filed the
information has no authority to do so; and (3) that the accused
was deprived of her right to due process and to the speedy
disposition of cases against her.
On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion
to Quash. Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration but this was
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan in its order dated
November 9, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition with assigned errors faulting
respondent court as follows:
RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT FAILED TO
DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH
CLEARLY DO NOT ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS CONSTITUTING THE
OFFENSE HENCE FAILING TO ALLEGE A PRIMA FACIE CASE
AGAINST PETITIONER, ACCUSED THEREIN.
RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATIONS FILED BY AN OFFICER WHO HAS NO AUTHORITY
TO DO SO AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE HEAD OF THE
PROSECUTION DIVISION OF RESPONDENT COURT HAD
RECOMMENDED THE DISMISSAL OF SAID CASES.
RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS AGAINST
ACCUSED WHO HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND
SPEEDY DETERMINATION OF THE CASE IN CLEAR DISREGARD OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT'S RULINGS THAT INORDINATE DELAY IN
THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS WOULD
WARRANT DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.[13]
Simply put, we find that the sole issue for resolution now is
whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred or gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner,
particularly on the ground that the information in Criminal Case
No. 23848 does not constitute an offense. The other assigned
errors are, in our view, without sufficient merit and deserve no
further consideration.
Petitioner claims that in a criminal prosecution for violation of
Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019 as amended, the law requires that the
gift received should be "manifestly excessive" as defined by
Section 2(c) of the same Act. She adds that it is imperative to
specify the exact value of the five drums of diesel fuel allegedly
received by Mayor Ong as public officer to determine whether
such is "manifestly excessive" under the circumstances.[14]
The fundamental test of the viability of a motion to quash on the
ground that the facts averred in the information do not amount
to an offense is whether the facts alleged would establish the
essential elements of the crime as defined by law. In this
examination, matters aliunde are not considered.[15]
Petitioner is charged specifically with violation of Section 3(c) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The pertinent portions of
said law provide:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
...
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present
or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another,
from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any
Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given
or to be given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
...
Based on the foregoing, the elements of the offense charged in
the assailed information are as follows: (1) the offender is a public
officer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain,
for a person any government permit or license; (3) he directly or
indirectly requested or received from said person any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for
another; and (4) he requested or received the gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help
given or to be given.[16]
In the instant case, we find that the information in Crim. Case No.
23848 alleged that: (1) accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a
public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, (2)
committed the crime charged in relation to, while in the
performance and taking advantage of her official functions, (3)
did request or receive directly or indirectly, a gift, present or
other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five drums of
diesel fuel, for herself or for another, from spouses Mr. and Mrs.
Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has
secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, a Municipal
Government permit or license anent the operation of the bus
company, JB Lines, owned by said spouses, in consideration for
help given or to be given by the accused. After considering
thoroughly this averment as formulated by the prosecution, we
are not prepared to say that the impugned information omitted
an element needed to adequately charge a violation of Section
3(c) of R.A. 3019.
Petitioner pleads that the pertinent statute must be read in its
entirety. She argues that a provision of R.A. 3019 such as Section
3(c) must be interpreted in light of all other provisions,
particularly the definition of "receiving any gift," under Section
2(a) thereof, which reads as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms.- As used in this Act, the term -
...
(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or
indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the public
officer's immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member
of his family or relative within the fourth civil degree, either by
consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the
gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive.
...
Petitioner contends that pursuant to her reading of the above
provision, the value of the alleged gift must be specified in the
information. But note that Section 2(c) abovecited mentions a
situation where (1) the value of the gift is manifestly excessive;
(2) from a person who is not a member of the public officer's
immediate family; and (3) even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity.
In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present case applies
regardless of whether the gift's value is manifestly excessive or
not, and regardless of the occasion. What is important here, in
our view, is whether the gift is received in consideration for help
given or to be given by the public officer. The value of the gift is
not mentioned at all as an essential element of the offense
charged under Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to require
the prosecution to specify such value in order to comply with the
requirements of showing a prima facie case.
Evidently the legislature is aware that in implementing R.A. 3019,
it will be precedents that will guide the court on the issue of what
is or what is not manifestly excessive.[17]
In sum, we are constrained to rule that respondent court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in denying petitioner's
motion to quash the information filed against her in Criminal Case
No. 23848. This ruling, however, is without prejudice to the actual
merits of this criminal case as may be shown during trial before
the court a quo.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23848
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
HONORIO TIBON Y DEISO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Parricide is the most terrible and unnatural of crimes.[1]
It is said that, in Romulus' time, there was no penalty for parricide
because it was considered a crime too evil ever to be committed.
While parricide in those days referred to the murder of one's own
parent or ascendant, the killing of one's own offspring, which the
term's modern meaning now includes, is equally horrendous and
deserving of the stiffest penalty.
This is an appeal from the February 25, 2009 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406, which affirmed the
August 2, 2005 Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 98-169605-06 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26 in Manila. The RTC
found accused-appellant Honorio Tibon guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of parricide.
The Facts
Two Informations charged Tibon of the following:
Criminal Case No. 98-169605
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1998, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one KEEN GIST TIBON Y
SUMINGIT, 3 years of age and his legitimate son, by then and
there stabbing him several times on the chest with a bladed
weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said KEEN GIST TIBON Y
SUMINGIT stab wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
Criminal Case No. 98-169606
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1998, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one REGUEL ALBERT
TIBON Y SUMINGIT, 2 years of age and his legitimate son, by then
and there stabbing him several times on the chest with a bladed
weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said REGUEL ALBERT TIBON
Y SUMINGIT stab wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death thereafter.
At his arraignment, Tibon entered a plea of "not guilty." A trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented witnesses Senior Police Officer 3
(SPO3) Jose M. Bagkus; Francisco Abella Abello, Jr., Tibon's
neighbor; Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Emmanuel Aranas of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory; Gina Sumingit,
Tibon's common-law wife and mother of the two victims; and
Renato Tibon, brother of Tibon. Tibon was the sole witness for
the defense.
During trial, the following facts were established:
Accused-appellant and his common-law wife Gina Sumingit
(Gina) lived together as husband and wife since 1994. They had
two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert
(Reguel).[2] They lived with accused-appellant's parents and
siblings on the third floor of a rented house in C.M. Recto,
Manila.[3] Due to financial difficulties, Gina went to Hong Kong to
work as a domestic helper, leaving accused-appellant with
custody of their two children.[4] After some time, accused-
appellant heard from his sister who was also working in Hong
Kong that Gina was having an affair with another man. After the
revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his
two children.[5]
On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m.,
accused-appellant's mother[6] and his siblings, among them
Zernan and Leilani, went to accused-appellant's room. They saw
accused-appellant with KenKen and Reguel. The two children
appeared lifeless and bore wounds on their bodies. When
accused-appellant realized that his mother and siblings had seen
his two children lying on the floor, accused-appellant stabbed
himself on the chest with a kitchen knife, to the shouts of horror
of his mother and siblings. He tried to end his life by jumping out
the window of their house.[7] Accused-appellant sustained a
head injury from his fall but he and his two children, KenKen ande
Reguel, were rushed to Mary Johnston Hospital by his siblings
Renato and Leilani and some of their neighbors. Once at the
hospital, accused-appellant received treatment for his injuries.
The two children, however, could no longer be revived.[8]
Gina called long distance on December 13, 2008 and asked
about KenKen and Reguel. When told about the stabbing
incident, she immediately flew back to Manila the next day.[9]
Dr. Aranas acted on a written request from the Western Police
District (WPD) Homicide Division and the Certificates of Identity
and Consent for Autopsy signed by KenKen and Reguel's aunt
Leilani Tibon. His examination of the victims' cadavers showed
that Reguel, who was attacked while facing the assailant,
sustained abrasions on the forehead, cheeks, and chin and five
(5) stab wounds, four (4) of which were caused by a sharp bladed
instrument and fatal. The doctor further observed that for a two-
year old to be attacked so violently, the killer must have been
extremely angry.[10]
The body of three-year old KenKen sustained three (3) stab
wounds on the left side of the chest, which were likewise fatal, as
these pierced his heart and left lung.[11]
WPD Police Investigator SPO3 Bagkus interviewed Tibon while he
was undergoing treatment from stab wounds on the chest and
head injuries under police security at the Jose Reyes Medical
Center. After being informed by SPO3 Bagkus of his constitutional
rights, Tibon confided that he was despondent and voluntarily
admitted to stabbing KenKen and Reguel.[12] Tibon's sister
Leilani, likewise, told SPO3 Bagkus that Tibon was responsible for
the killings. [13]
Gina confronted Tibon at the hospital where he was confined. She
said the latter confessed to stabbing their children and begged
for her forgiveness. She added that he even wrote a letter again
the next year asking to be forgiven. Supported by receipts, she
claimed that she spent PhP 173,000 for the wake and funeral of On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and found that
her two children. When asked if she could quantify the damage the defense did not overcome the presumption of sanity. The
caused to her in terms of money, she said it was for PhP appellate court stressed that evidence of insanity after the
500,000.[14] commission of an offense may be accorded weight only if there is
also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or
Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as simultaneous to the commission of the crime. It reduced the
defense. He said that he could not recall what happened on the penalty meted to Tibon to reclusion perpetua.
night he allegedly stabbed his two children. He also could not
remember being taken to the hospital. He said he was only The fallo of the CA decision states:
informed by his siblings that he had killed KenKen and Reguel,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 2 August 2005 decision
causing him to jump off the window of their house.[15]
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 26) in Criminal Case
The Ruling of the Trial Court No. 98-169605-06 finding accused-appellant Honorio Tibon y
Deiso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide on
two (2) counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as
The RTC found for the prosecution. It gave full faith and credit to
to penalty. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of
the witnesses who testified against Tibon. In contrast, Tibon's
death imposed upon accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion
testimony was found unworthy of belief. In spite of his defense
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
of insanity, the trial court noted that he was in full control of his
faculties before, during, and after he attacked his two
SO ORDERED.[17]
children. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused HONORIO TIBON
Tibon maintains his innocence on appeal to this Court.
y DENISO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of two (2) counts of Parricide, and sentencing him in each case to
On August 3, 2009, this Court notified the parties that they may
suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and to pay the heirs of the
submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The parties
victims KEEN GIST TIBON and REGUEL ALBERT TIBON P75,000.00
manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of
each as civil indemnity.[16]
the records already submitted.
The Issue
The Ruling of the Appellate Court

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLLANT.
The Ruling of this Court
Tibon argues that the exempting circumstance of insanity was
established, therefore overthrowing the presumption of sanity.
Combined with Tibon's testimony, Tibon's medical record with
the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) and his strange
behavior allegedly show an unstable mind deprived of
intelligence. That he had no recollection of the stabbing incident
is further proof of his insanity. His criminal act of stabbing his
children was, thus, involuntary.
The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on
the other hand, rebuts the argument of Tibon by asserting that
his mental state, as ascertained by the NCMH, referred to his
condition to stand trial and not his mental state before and during
the commission of the crimes with which he was charged.
Furthermore, Tibon's non-recollection of the stabbing incident
does not prove his insanity and amounts merely to a general
denial. The People argues that, contrary to the requirements on
establishing insanity, Tibon was unable to present any competent
witness who could explain his mental condition. Lastly, the
reduction of civil indemnity from PhP 75,000 to PhP 50,000 is
recommended, since the crimes were not attended by any
aggravating circumstances.
We affirm Tibon's conviction.
The Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother,
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of
parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused.[18]
This appeal admits that parricide has indeed been committed.
The defense, however, banks on Tibon's insanity to exempt him
from punishment.
The defense has unsatisfactorily shown that Tibon was insane
when he stabbed his two young sons. Article 12 of the Code
states:
Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval. x x x

The aforementioned circumstances are not easily available to an
accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather
than the rule in the human condition.[19] While Art. 12(1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is
exempt from criminal liability, unless that person has acted
during a lucid interval, the presumption, under Art. 800 of the
Civil Code, is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the
exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving
it[20] with clear and convincing evidence.[21] It is in the nature
of confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits
to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not
guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused's
insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding
or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he
is charged.[22] We agree with the Solicitor General that the
mental records Tibon wishes to support his defense with are
inapplicable to the theory he espouses. The NCMH records of his
mental health only pertain to his ability to stand trial and not to
his mental state immediately before or during the commission of
the crimes.
The change in Tibon's behavior was triggered by jealousy. He
acted out of jealous rage at the thought of his wife having an
affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not
equivalent to insanity. Nor is being despondent, as Tibon said he
was when interviewed by the police. There is a vast difference
between a genuinely insane person and one who has worked
himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason
or good judgment in what he does.[23] We reiterate
jurisprudence which has established that only when there is a
complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of
insanity be considered.[24]
It is apt to recall People v. Ocfemia[25] where this Court ruled
that the professed inability of the accused to recall events before
and after the stabbing incident, as in the instant case, does not
necessarily indicate an aberrant mind but is more indicative of a
concocted excuse to exculpate himself. It is simply too convenient
for Tibon to claim that he could not remember anything rather
than face the consequences of his terrible deed.
The requirements for a finding of insanity have not been met by
the defense. As the appellate court noted, Tibon's unusual
behavior prior to and after he committed parricide do not meet
the stringent standards on an insanity plea as required by this
Court. The presumption of sanity has not been overcome. In
contrast, the prosecution, as found by the lower courts,
sufficiently established evidence that Tibon voluntarily killed his
two children on the night of December 12, 1998. On this matter,
We find no reason to reverse the findings of fact made by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
A final word. Parricide is differentiated from murder and
homicide by the relationship between the killer and his or her
victim. Even without the attendant circumstances qualifying
homicide to murder, the law punishes those found guilty of
parricide with reclusion perpetua to death, prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines). The
commission of parricide is punished more severely than homicide
since human beings are expected to love and support those who
are closest to them. The extreme response of killing someone of
one's own flesh and blood is indeed unnatural and tragic. Tibon
must thus be handed down the harshest penalty for his crimes
against his innocent children.
Penalty Imposed
In view of RA 9346, the appellate court correctly modified the
sentence of Tibon to reclusion perpetua.
Pecuniary Liability
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may
be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the
victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[26]
The Solicitor General recommended the reduction of civil
indemnity from PhP75,000 to PhP50,000. However, recent
jurisprudence pegs civil indemnity in the amount of
PhP75,000,[27] which is automatically granted to the offended
party, or his/her heirs in case of the former's death, without
need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission
of murder, homicide, parricide and rape.[28] People v.
Regalario[29] has explained that the said award is not dependent
on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense.
According to Art. 2199 of the Civil Code, one is entitled to
adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by him that
is duly proved. This compensation is termed actual damages. The
party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or
the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award
therefor.[30] We note that the trial court failed to award actual
damages in spite of the presentation of receipts showing wake
and funeral expenses (Exhibits "R," "R-1," "R-2," "R-4," and "R-5")
amounting to PhP173,000. We therefore grant said amount.
Moral damages are also in order. Even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering, it has been
recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death brings
emotional pain and anguish,[31] more so in this case where two
young children were brutally killed while their mother was away.
The award of PhP75,000.00 is proper pursuant to established
jurisprudence holding that where the imposable penalty is death
but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to RA 9346, the
award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00.[32]
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court should have
made accused-appellant account for PhP30,000 as exemplary
damages on account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance,
which was alleged and proved, in the crime of parricide.[33]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406 convicting accused-
appellant Honorio Tibon y Deiso of parricide is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant should pay the heir of
the victims:
(1) Civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 for each victim;
(2) Actual damages of PhP 173,000;
(3) Moral damages of PhP 75,000 for each victim; and
(4) Exemplary damages of PhP 30,000 for each victim.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. JESUS
PAYCANA, JR., APPELLANT.
DECISION
TINGA, J,:
Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged[1] with the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37. Appellant
pleaded not guilty during the arraignment.[2] Pre-trial ensued, in
which appellant admitted that the victim Lilybeth Balandra-
Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife.[3]
Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting
up self-defense, claiming that it was his wife who attacked him
first. In view of the nature of self-defense, it necessarily follows
that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-month pregnant
wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child.
The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the
victim; Angelina Paycana (Angelina), appellant's eldest daughter
who personally witnessed the whole gruesome incident;
Barangay Tanod Juan Parañal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen Beltran, who
conducted the autopsy; and Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the
embalmer who removed the fetus from the deceased's body.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26
November 2002, at around 6:30 in the morning, appellant, who
worked as a butcher, came home from the slaughter house
carrying his tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener.[4] His
wife was preparing their children for school and was waiting for
him to come home from his work. For reasons known to him
alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times.[5] Tito, whose house
is at back of appellant's house, heard his daughter shouting for
help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near
the door and her feet were trembling. But seeing appellant, who
was armed, he stepped back. Angelina told Tito by the window
that appellant had held her mother's neck and stabbed her. [6]
Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth
after she stabbed him first. According to him, they had an
altercation on the evening of 25 November 2002 because he saw
a man coming out from the side of their house and when he
confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer. On the
following morning, he told her that they should live separately.
As appellant got his things and was on his way out of the door,
Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in wresting the knife
from Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not
aware of the number of times he stabbed his wife because he was
then dizzy and lots of blood was coming out of his wound.[7]
The trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated 14 April
2005.[8] The case was automatically appealed to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Rule 122 Section 3(d) of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.[9] The appellate court denied appellant's appeal in a
decision dated 30 May 2007.[10] Appellant filed a notice of
appeal dated 14 June 2007 before the Court of Appeals.[11]
The Court is not convinced by appellant's assertion that the trial
court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-
defense in his favor.
Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed
by the trial court.[12] In the absence of any showing that the trial
court failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court
below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in
a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling
reason, therefore, exists for this Court to disturb the trial court's
finding that appellant did not act in self-defense.
Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense.
An accused who interposes self-defense admits the commission
of the act complained of. The burden to establish self-defense is
on the accused who must show by strong, clear and convincing
evidence that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no
criminal liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code[13] requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1)
an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) a reasonable
necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or
repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.[14]
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked.[15] Appellant's claim of self-defense was belied by the
eyewitness testimony of his own daughter Angelina, which was
corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law Tito and the
medical findings. Angelina's testimony was very clear on how her
father strangled and stabbed her mother just as she was about to
greet him upon arriving home. She begged her father to stop, and
even tried to grab her father's hand but to no avail.[16] Tito ran
to appellant's house as he heard his daughter Lilybeth's
screaming for help, and he saw her lying prostate near the door
with her feet trembling. He moved back as he saw appellant
armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the window that
appellant had held her mother's neck and stabbed her.[17]
Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended
to appellant's wound, testified on cross-examination that the
injuries suffered by appellant were possibly self-inflicted
considering that they were mere superficial wounds.[18]
In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further
negated by the physical evidence in the case. Specifically, the
number of wounds, fourteen (14) in all, indicates that appellant's
act was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined effort
to kill his victim.[19] The victim died of multiple organ failure
secondary to multiple stab wounds.[20]
The Court agrees with the trial court's observation, thus:
Angelina who is 15 years old will not testify against her father
were it not for the fact that she personally saw her father to be
the aggressor and stab her mother. Telling her grandfather
immediately after the incident that accused stabbed her mother
is part of the res gestae hence, admissible as evidence. Between
the testimony of Angelica who positively identified accused to
have initiated the stabbing and continuously stabbed her mother
and on the other hand, the testimony of accused that he killed
the victim in self-defense, the testimony of the former
prevails.[21]
The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted
appellant of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion in the killing of his seven (7)-month pregnant wife.
Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of
parricide[22] is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the
relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.
The testimony of the accused of being married to the victim, in
itself, may also be taken as an admission against penal
interest.[23]
As distinguished from infanticide,[24] the elements of
unintentional abortion[25] are as follows: (1) that there is a
pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such pregnant
woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is
intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the
fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that the child
be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent
existence.[26] However, even if the child who was expelled
prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is
abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6
months is not viable.[27] In the present case, the unborn fetus
was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.
The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article
48[28] because by a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant
committed the grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave
felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime is committed
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies.
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances.
Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for
the most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court
of
Appeals properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the
appellant to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346.[29]
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the
offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the former's death,
without need of further evidence other than the fact of the
commission of any of the aforementioned crimes (murder,
homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages
may be separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral
damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the
complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art. 2217 of
the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the
crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances
duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the discretion of the
courts.[30] Hence, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by
the trial court to the heirs of Lilybeth is in order. They are also
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as
awarded by the trial court.[31]
In addition to the civil liability and moral damages, the trial court
correctly made appellant account for P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages on account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance,
which was alleged and proved, in the crime of parricide.[32]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. Nos. 130634-35, March 12, 2001 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
MANOLITO OYANIB Y MENDOZA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint
decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and
parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty[2] of
six (6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as maximum,[3] and to pay P50,000.00
civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus Esquierdo, and
to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the
death of his wife, Tita T. Oyanib.[4]
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2) separate
informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with
murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a hunting
knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and
wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon him the
following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of evident
premeditation."[5]
Criminal Case No. 6018
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, having conceived and (sic) deliberate intent to
kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault,
stab and wound his wife, as a result of said attack, the said Tita
Oyanib died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code."[6]
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty
of accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the
police authorities[7] and was immediately detained at the Iligan
City Jail.[8]
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations against him and
translating them into the Visayan dialect.[9] He pleaded not
guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial
court conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and
Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3,
1979[10] and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived
in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated,
with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2) children. Tita
rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas
(hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place where her family
lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo
and his family were watching TV at the sala located at the ground
floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City, they
heard a commotion coming from the second floor rented by Tita.
The commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When
it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to check.[11]
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and
sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo
(hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latter's stomach. Jesus was
wearing a pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito
what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police.
Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She died
on the way to the hospital.[12]
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation
Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan
City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of September 4, 1995,
while he was on duty, he received an information regarding a
stabbing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan,
Iligan City.[13]
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying
face up with several stab wounds in different parts of the body.
Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the crime scene, he
recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to check
on Tita; he was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the
suspect in the killing of Jesus and Tita.[14] The incident was
recorded in the police blotter as Entry No. 137138.[15]
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal
Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and
Tita.[16] Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those
inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were
fatal.[17] The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and
multiple stab wound chest and abdomen."[18]
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal
wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the abdomen.
The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic
shock and multiple stab wound."[19]
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments,
Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained
custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the
separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn's house for two (2)
months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence,
located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the
second floor.[20] The rented space consisted mainly of
a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that
if one enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to
the sala and from the sala, directly to the door of the adjoining
room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and
exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with
Manolito.[21] In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time,
he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a very
intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan
City.[22] Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He
censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife.
They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him.[23]
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter
Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National
High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two
(2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school.
Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the
afternoon the next day, Manolito went to Tita's house to ask her
to attend the school meeting in his behalf.[24]
Upon reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of romance"
(kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock
using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having
sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were
down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito
immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5'9" in height and
weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him
to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this
opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room
upon seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay
bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time
shouting "kill him Jake, kill him Jake."[25]
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the
abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again.
Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken
Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the
left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts
of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her paramour. It was
at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was
renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what
had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because
he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to
Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friend's neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing
his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the
following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for
Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over
radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded
the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct
2, Nonocan, Iligan City.[26]
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his
wife's place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense.
Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live "It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject
together.[27] to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed in Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code.
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint
decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the "Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive
crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads: imprisonment.
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and
"SO ORDERED.
pronouncements and having carefully observed the demeanor of
witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused MANOLITO
"Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim.
"MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Case No. II-6018) and appreciating the two (2) mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender
"Presiding Judge"[28]
without any aggravating circumstances to consider, this Court
sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
imprisonment as follows: interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court to
the Supreme Court.[29]
"1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:

Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both

To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE
under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of
(1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY
the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly
to EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus
committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the basic issue
Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay
of whether accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under
the costs.
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.[30] He questioned the trial
court's appreciation of the facts and the evidence, contending
"2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence
material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of the
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to
lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph
indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to
graphically showed that Jesus' pants were wide open, unzipped
pay the costs.
and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any
underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the
other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-
appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he killed the victims under the
exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying
him the exempting privilege under the Article.[31]
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour.
He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory
and an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present `where
the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed.'"[32]
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to
prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential
elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person
surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them
in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter)
or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse.[33] Accused must prove these elements by clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable.
"The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife
must concur with her flagrant adultery."[34]
There is no question that the first element is present in the case
at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove to
the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the
testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted
within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his
wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that
accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his
wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by
jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and
kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she
reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he
stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib
y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to
surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording
the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of Article
247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v.
Wagas:[35]
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the
scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But
killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can
only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante
delicto; and it must be resorted to only with great caution so
much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the
sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter."
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos.
II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months
of destierro.[36] He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City,
nor within a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan
City.[37]
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca
to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence
imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing
the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences
to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to
inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an
appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement
informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of
an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses
Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated
Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of
Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill
and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with
an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times
KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which
caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which
also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD
AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby
inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused
the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced
the crimes of murders as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The
Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca,
Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit relationship apparently
began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar
examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence in
Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban,
Leyte. On the morning of that date he went to the bus station to
go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he
was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back
to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but
the bus had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov.
28, 1985). The accused, then proceeded to the residence of his
father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at
the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and
Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and
Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got
his revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-
in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went
to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at
around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went
back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his
wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it
was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh
playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his
rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado
who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused
(pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously
of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a
result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and
abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold
Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to
remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C).
His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she
was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who
received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to
work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent
P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00
for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed
judgment, the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER
frustrated murder as charged in the amended information, and ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not
II.
consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE
Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant spouses
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of
Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
(P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
247 reads in full:
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional
Koh and defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was
circumstances. — Any legally married person who, having
away in Manila; that the accused had been deceived, betrayed,
surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
upon his acts. Considering all these circumstances this court
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
believes the accused Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive
clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
reduction or commutation of his death sentence. shall be exempt from punishment.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to
President of the Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila. parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of
age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their
SO ORDERED. 3
parents.
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity
the court a quo: of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this
article.
I.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted
provision applies in the instant case. There is no question that the
accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this
case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went
out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247
prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married
person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These
elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed
between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife
having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter
was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the
continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-
appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused
"shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after
surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that
he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires
that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-
product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not
define an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the
Code, the above-quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely
provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically
to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to a legally
married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or
daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another, and shall kill any or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries,
considering the enormous provocation and his righteous
indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be criminally
liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious
physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only
with destierro. This penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a
case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a
punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where
physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is
exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or
the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious
physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as
to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e.,
that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the
exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused
from criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and
thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and,
incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an
interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating
and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral
element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . .
constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability
or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential
element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that
must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil.,
368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more
manifest when we consider that its counterpart in the old Penal
Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provisions
(Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There
can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general
provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and
separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants
a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or
the infliction of serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He
is banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by
either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in
this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant
for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-
appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a
finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the
imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant
to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree.
The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the
Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense
is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-
appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his
rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by
the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is
totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was
not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that
before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an
waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to
absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We
nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him
liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that
is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or
negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was
incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no
showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her
injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only
ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating
her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we
therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in
its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED.
The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days
to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has
been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these
penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and
Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for
hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for
Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 175315, August 09, 2010 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ELIZER BEDUYA
AND RIC BEDUYA, APPELLANTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In this appeal, we are tasked to determine whether the appellants
killed the victim with abuse of superior strength for which they
were convicted of murder.
Factual Antecedents
For our review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00161 which affirmed with modification the
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,
Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental, finding appellants Elizer
Beduya (Elizer) and Ric Beduya (Ric) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of murder. The Information against the
appellants contained the following accusatory allegations:
That on or about the 6th day of May 2002, at about 12:15 o'clock
midnight, more or less, in barangay Baga, Municipality of Pana-
on, province of Misamis Occidental and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill, with abuse and taking advantage of their superior strength,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, box
and then stab one DOMINADOR S. ACOPE[,] SR. with the use of a
knife hitting him on the left hypochondriac area which caused his
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of taking
advantage of superior strength[.][3]
Both appellants were arrested. They entered separate pleas of
"not guilty" during their arraignment.[4] After the termination of
the mandatory pre-trial conference,[5] trial ensued.
The Prosecution's Evidence
and said that Elizer pointed a knife at him. As the Beduya
brothers entered the yard of the victim's house, Bughao hid
himself. While in hiding, he saw the Beduya brothers approach
the victim after they were advised to go home since it was already
late. The Beduya brothers did not heed the advice and instead
Ric slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed him. The victim
retaliated by striking them with a piece of wood he got hold
of. Elizer and Ric ran away but one of them stumbled on the pile
of firewood and the clothesline in the yard before they succeeded
in departing from the premises.

Acope, Jr. immediately proceeded to his uncle's house which was

Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the
40 meters away and sought his help. The incident was also
following case against the appellants emerged:
reported to their Barangay Captain, who responded by going to
the residence of the victim. Upon arrival, he saw the victim lying
On May 6, 2002, at around 11:45 p.m., Roy Bughao (Bughao) was
on the ground and bleeding from a stab wound. The victim told
carrying a torch on his way home from the birthday celebration
him that, "I will die because of this. x x x I was boxed by Ric and
of his cousin when Elizer and Ric suddenly appeared. Ric went
I was stabbed by Elizer."[7] He also told the Barangay Captain
around him while his brother Elizer pointed a knife. He drew back
that he had no previous quarrel with the Beduya brothers.
and swung the torch at them and shouted, "Why do you hurt me,
what is my fault?"[6] The Beduya brothers did not reply and
The Barangay Captain took the victim to the Jimenez Medicare
continued their assault. Bughao then scrambled for safety and
Hospital but was later advised to proceed to the MHARS General
ran towards the yard of victim Dominador S. Acope, Sr. (Acope,
Hospital in Ozamis City, where the police officer took the
Sr.) and hid in a dark area.
statement of the victim and Acope, Jr. On the next day, May 8,
2002, the victim died due to "septic and hypovolemic shock
At around 12:30 a.m. of May 7, 2002, the victim and his son,
secondary to stabbed wound."[8]
Dominador Acope, Jr. (Acope, Jr.), were roused from their sleep
by a voice coming from the road in front of their house. The
The Appellants' Version
victim went outside while his son peeped through the
window. The victim saw Bughao who readily identified himself
Elizer maintained that he did not commit any crime. On May 6,
2002, he went to Baybay, Punta, Panaon, to buy fish. He usually
carried a knife to slice and eat the fish while it is still raw. While
on his way home at 10:30 p.m., he was suddenly attacked and
struck by the victim and Bughao. He got hit several times with a
piece of wood and Bughao smashed his right foot. To defend
himself, he pulled out his knife and struck randomly. He had no
knowledge if he hit someone but his assailants fled. Eduardo
Eltagon (Eduardo) testified that he witnessed the event but he
did not interfere since he did not want to get involved.
Elizer continued to walk, and arrived home at 12:15 a.m. At 1:30
a.m., policemen came to his house and took him to a
hospital. They passed by the house of his brother Ric before
proceeding to their destination.
For his part, Ric testified that he was asleep at the time of the
incident. He stated that he went to sleep at eight o'clock in the
evening on May 5, 2002 and woke up at four o'clock in the
morning of the following day, May 6, 2002, when
the Barangay Captain and policemen came to his house with his
brother and asked him to come with them to the hospital.
The Trial Court's Decision
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the prosecution,
whose witnesses testified candidly on the events that resulted in
the death of the victim. On the other hand, the trial court found
as unreliable the witnesses presented by the defense. It held that
Eduardo, at 86 years of age, could not have seen the victim and
Bughao attacking Elizer 30 meters away with a flashlight as his
only source of illumination in the dead of night since a test on his
vision showed that he could not "see at a distance little more than
beyond his nose."[9] Moreover, it ruled that the injuries suffered
by Elizer were more consistent with the defensive blows from a
piece of wood the victim used to defend himself, rather than the
alleged assault on him by the victim and Bughao.[10]
The trial court also held that the circumstance of abuse of
superior strength that qualifies the killing of the victim to murder
is present in this case. According to the trial court, the appellants'
combined assault gave them the advantage over the victim who
must have been taken by surprise. The retaliation of the victim
with a piece of wood was done only after he had already been
stabbed.[11]
In disposing of the case, the trial court ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Elizer Beduya and Ric Beduya guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength without other modifying circumstances, the
court sentences them to reclusion perpetua and orders them to
pay in solidum the heirs of Dominador Acope P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, P6,000.00 as funeral expenses, P9,411.85 as
medical expenses, and P264,000.00 as lost earnings. With costs.
Accused are credited with the full time spent under preventive
detention since May 7, 2002.
SO ORDERED.[12]

The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review and
docketed as G.R. No. 158473. However, we referred it to the CA
in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo.[13] The
appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court's
decision and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision
is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of increasing the
award of the victim's heirs for the loss of earning capacity of the
victim [to] P408,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The Assignment of Errors
Still aggrieved, the appellants sought a final review of their case
raising the following as errors:
I Abuse of Superior Strength as a Qualifying
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE
[OF] THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGTH.[15]
During the pendency of the appeal, appellant Ric died of cardio
pulmonary arrest secondary to bleeding peptic ulcer as shown by
his certificate of death.[16] Accordingly, we dismissed[17] the
appeal insofar as said appellant is concerned. However,
judgment shall be rendered as to Elizer.
Our Ruling
There is partial merit in the appeal.
Circumstance in the Crime of Murder
Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which
is not parricide or infanticide, provided that any of the attendant
circumstances enumerated in Article 248[18] of the Revised
Penal Code is present. Abuse of superior strength is one of the
qualifying circumstances mentioned therein that qualifies the
killing of the victim to murder.
In this case, the trial and appellate courts commonly concluded
that there was intent to kill on the part of the appellants and that
they employed abuse of superior strength to ensure the
execution and success of the crime. The appellate court even
adopted the trial court's finding and conclusion that as Ric
punched the victim in the shoulder and appellant Elizer delivered
the fatal stab wound, this combined assault "gave them the
advantage over the victim who must have been taken by
surprise. Although the victim struck at accused with a piece of
wood, he did so only after he had been stabbed, causing the two
accused to run away."[19]
This reasoning is erroneous.
"Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."[20] "The
fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does
not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of
superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of
the aggressors and the victim."[21] The evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they
had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.[22] "To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the
person attacked."[23] The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the
parties.[24]
The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a
relative disparity in age, size and strength, or force, except for the
showing that two assailants, one of them (Elizer) armed with a
knife, assaulted the victim. The presence of two assailants, one
of them armed with a knife, does not ipso facto indicate an abuse
of superior strength.[25] Mere superiority in numbers is not
indicative of the presence of this circumstance.[26] Neither did
the prosecution present proof to show that the victim suffered
from an inferior physical condition from which the circumstance
can be inferred. In fact, there is evidence that the victim was able
to get hold of a piece of wood and deliver retaliatory blows
against the knife-wielder, Elizer.[27]
The events leading to the stabbing further disprove any finding of
deliberate intent on the part of the assailants to abuse their
superior strength over that of the victim. The testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses, on the whole, show that the incident
between the victim and his assailants was unplanned and
unpremeditated. The assailants were in pursuit of Bughao when
the victim advised them to go home since it was already late at
night. There was indeed no conscious attempt on the part of the
assailants to use or take advantage of any superior strength that
they then enjoyed. Particularly, it has not been clearly
established that the appellants, with an advantage in number,
purposely resorted to punching the victim and delivering a fatal
stab wound. Neither has it been shown that the victim was
simply overwhelmed by the fist blows delivered by Ric and Elizer's
act of stabbing him. The evidence on this matter is too
insufficient for a definitive conclusion. What has been shown
with certainty and clarity is the appellants' intent to kill, as shown
by the stab wound in the left side of the victim's body which
resulted in his death two days later. As the knife wielder, Elizer is
guilty of assaulting and killing the victim.
In view of the foregoing, we are compelled to rule out the
presence of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance. Hence, appellants' guilt must be limited to the
crime of homicide.
The Trial Court's Finding on the Credibility of the Prosecution
Witnesses
Elizer maintains that his guilt was not established beyond
reasonable doubt since the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution were incredible and materially inconsistent. He
argues that Acope, Jr. testified that the victim immediately went
out of his house and approached Bughao, but Bughao declared in
the witness stand that the victim came out of his abode 20
minutes after hearing his shout. He also finds it incredible that
Bughao did not bother to take the victim to the hospital and
report the incident to the police after the assailants fled the scene
of the crime.
We are not persuaded. It has been "consistently held that
appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses. We have sustained trial
courts in this respect, considering their vantage point in their
evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent x x x any showing of
serious error or irregularity that otherwise would alter the result
of the case."[28] Here, we find no serious irregularity.
Besides, the inconsistencies ascribed to the prosecution
witnesses involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect
their credibility. Said inconsistencies do not depart from the fact
that these witnesses saw the fatal stabbing of the victim by
Elizer. To the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they
appear to us "to relate to details of peripheral significance which
do not negate or dissolve the positive identification [by said
eyewitnesses of Elizer] as the perpetrator of the crime."[29]
Further, the failure of Bughao to immediately report the incident
to the police authorities and to extend help to the victim cannot
destroy his credibility as a witness. There is no standard of
behavior when a person becomes a witness to a shocking or
gruesome event.[30] "The workings of a human mind placed
under severe emotional stress are unpredictable and people
react differently x x x."[31] The determining factor to consider is
that Bughao testified in candid and straightforward manner and
implicated Elizer and Ric as the perpetrators of the crime.
Aside from the eyewitness testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, the dying declaration of the victim also established the
guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. He was well
aware of his imminent death and his declaration that Elizer was
responsible for his stab wound was made in the belief that he
would not survive his injury. The declarations by the victim
certainly relate to circumstances pertaining to his impending
death and he would have been competent to testify had he
survived in view of the general presumption that a witness is
competent to testify.
The victim also executed a Sworn Statement[32] on May 7, 2002,
while in serious condition in the hospital, declaring that the
appellants assaulted him and it was Elizer who delivered his fatal
stab wound. His dying declaration and sworn statement, taken
together with the findings and conclusions of the trial court,
establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.
The Penalty
Having established Elizer's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of homicide, he must suffer the penalty imposed by
law. The crime of homicide is punishable by reclusion
temporal.[33] Since there are no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its medium
period.[34] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,[35] he
should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of
which is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is that
properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., reclusion
temporal in its medium period.
Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be
imposed must be within the indeterminate term of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
The Award of Damages
The trial court awarded, and the appellate court affirmed, actual
damages to the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P6,000.00 as
funeral expenses and P9,411.85 as medical expenses incurred as
a result of the incident. However, our review of the records
revealed that the award was not substantiated by any
evidence. There was no competent proof on the specific
amounts of actual damages allegedly incurred and this omission
cannot be supplied by a broad and general stipulation during trial
that the victim's wife would testify on the damages brought
about by the commission of the crime. In the absence of proof
on the exact sum of actual damages, there was no basis for
granting the same. "Credence can be given only to claims which
are duly supported by receipts."[36] The award of actual
damages should consequently be deleted as there were no
receipts presented evidencing the expenses allegedly incurred.
However, as the heirs of the victim clearly incurred medical and
funeral expenses, P25,000.00 by way of temperate damages
should be awarded.[37] "This award is adjudicated so that a right
which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not
for the purpose of indemnification."[38]
When death results as a consequence of the crime, the heirs of
the deceased are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any
evidence or proof of damages.[39] Accordingly, we award said
sum to the heirs of the victim, Acope, Sr.
"Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide 3
without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the
victim. Consistent with this rule, we award the amount of = 22.667 x P18,000.00
P50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence."[40] = P408,006.00

The trial court was correct in awarding indemnity for the loss of
In applying the formula and computation for net income stated
earning capacity of the victim. However, the computation for this
above, the amount of loss of earning capacity is the exact sum of
award should be more accurate.
P408,006.00.

Acope, Sr., was 46 years old on the day he died.[41] He earned

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
an average of P3,000.00 a month as a farmer
and barangay tanod.[42] This is equivalent to the sum of
1. Elizer Beduya is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
P36,000.00 per annum. Pursuant to the American Expectancy
crime of homicide and shall accordingly suffer an indeterminate
Table of Mortality, which has been adopted in this jurisdiction,
prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
the formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity is
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
provided as follows:
of reclusion temporal as maximum;
Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income
- Living Expenses, e.g., 50% of Gross Annual Income) 2. Elizer Beduya is ordered to pay the victim's heirs the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the following P25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and
formula: P408,006.00 as indemnity for loss of earning capacity.

Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 - age of deceased)[43] SO ORDERED.

Accordingly, the unearned income of Acope, Sr., is:

EN BANC
X = 2(80-46) x (P36,000.00 - P18,000.00)
[ G.R. No. 153559, June 08, 2004 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO
COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE AND DANILO LOZANO,
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated
Murder in an information which reads:
That on or about the 6th of August 1995, at Brgy. San Pedro,
Lupao, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to
kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation,
availing of nighttime to afford impunity, and with the use of an
explosive, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
lob a hand grenade that landed and eventually exploded at the
roof of the house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly shrapnels
that hit and killed one ROBERT AGBANLOG, per the death
certificate, and causing Jerry Bullanday, Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo
Eugenio, Rey Camat, Emelita Agbanlog and Elena Agbanlog to
suffer shrapnel wounds on their bodies, per the medical
certificates; thus, to the latter victims, the accused commenced
all the acts of execution that would have produced the crime of
Multiple Murder as consequences thereof but nevertheless did
not produce them by reason of the timely and able medical and
surgical interventions of physicians, to the damage and prejudice
of the deceased’s heirs and the other victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, appellants pleaded “not guilty”.[2] Trial on the
merits then ensued.
As culled from the records, at around 7:00 in the evening of
August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday,[3] Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a
drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father,
Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San
Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was seated on the
banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the
companions of his son.[4]
As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed
appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which
fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by
scaling the fence of a nearby school.[5]
The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded
ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit
by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor.[6] They were
all rushed to the San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija
for medical treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before
reaching the hospital.[7]
Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted
the autopsy on the cadaver of Robert Agbanlog, certified that the
wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with the injuries
inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the direct cause of death
was hypovolemic shock due to hand grenade explosion.[8] The
surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog and
Gerry Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.[9]
SPO3 John Barraceros of the Lupao Municipal Police Station, who
investigated the scene of the crime, recovered metallic fragments
at the terrace of the Agbanlog house. These fragments were
forwarded to the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Division in Camp
Crame, Quezon City, where SPO2 Jesus Q. Mamaril, a specialist in
said division, identified them as shrapnel of an MK2 hand
grenade.[10]
Denying the charges against him, appellant Antonio Comadre
claimed that on the night of August 6, 1995, he was with his wife
and children watching television in the house of his father,
Patricio, and his brother, Rogelio. He denied any participation in
the incident and claimed that he was surprised when three
policemen from the Lupao Municipal Police Station went to his
house the following morning of August 7, 1995 and asked him to
go with them to the police station, where he has been detained
since.[11]
Appellant George Comadre, for his part, testified that he is the
brother of Antonio Comadre and the brother-in-law of Danilo
Lozano. He also denied any involvement in the grenade-throwing
incident, claiming that he was at home when it happened. He
stated that he is a friend of Rey Camat and Jimmy Wabe, and that
he had no animosity towards them whatsoever. Appellant also
claimed to be in good terms with the Agbanlogs so he has no
reason to cause them any grief.[12]
Appellant Danilo Lozano similarly denied any complicity in the
crime. He declared that he was at home with his ten year-old son
on the night of August 6, 1995. He added that he did not see
Antonio and George Comadre that night and has not seen them
for quite sometime, either before or after the incident. Like the
two other appellants, Lozano denied having any
misunderstanding with Jaime Agbanlog, Robert Agbanlog and
Jimmy Wabe.[13]
Antonio’s father, Patricio, and his wife, Lolita, corroborated his
claim that he was at home watching television with them during
the night in question.[14] Josie Comadre, George’s wife, testified
that her husband could not have been among those who threw a
hand grenade at the house of the Agbanlogs because on the
evening of August 6, 1995, they were resting inside their house
after working all day in the farm.[15]
After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution’s
evidence and convicted appellants of the complex crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder,[16] the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
Finding accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentencing them to
suffer the imposable penalty of death;
Ordering Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Robert Agbanlog
P50,000.00 as indemnification for his death, P35,000.00 as
compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages;
Ordering accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano to pay jointly and severally Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat,
Gerry Bullanday and Jaime Agbanlog P30,000.00 as indemnity for
their attempted murder.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Appellants contend that the
trial court erred: (1) when it did not correctly and judiciously
interpret and appreciate the evidence and thus, the miscarriage
of justice was obviously omnipresent; (2) when it imposed on the
accused-appellants the supreme penalty of death despite the
evident lack of the quantum of evidence to convict them of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) when it did not
apply the law and jurisprudence for the acquittal of the accused-
appellants of the crime charged.[17]
Appellants point to the inconsistencies in the sworn statements
of Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday
in identifying the perpetrators. Wabe, Camat and Eugenio initially
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on August 7, 1995 at the
hospital wherein they did not categorically state who the culprit
was but merely named Antonio Comadre as a suspect. Gerry
Bullanday declared that he suspected Antonio Comadre as one of
the culprits because he saw the latter’s ten year-old son bring
something in the nearby store before the explosion occurred.
On August 27, 1995, or twenty days later, they went to the police
station to give a more detailed account of the incident, this time
identifying Antonio Comadre as the perpetrator together with
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.
A closer scrutiny of the records shows that no contradiction
actually exists, as all sworn statements pointed to the same
perpetrators, namely, Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano. Moreover, it appears that the first statement was
executed a day after the incident, when Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat
and Lorenzo Eugenio were still in the hospital for the injuries they
sustained. Coherence could not thus be expected in view of their
condition. It is therefore not surprising for the witnesses to come
up with a more exhaustive account of the incident after they have
regained their equanimity. The lapse of twenty days between the
two statements is immaterial because said period even helped
them recall some facts which they may have initially overlooked.
Witnesses cannot be expected to remember all the details of the
harrowing event which unfolded before their eyes. Minor
discrepancies might be found in their testimony, but they do not
damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its material
whole, nor should they reflect adversely on the witness’
credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was
perjured.[18] Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters
serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a
witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case, the
crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the
senses.[19]
Moreover, it was not shown that witnesses Jimmy Wabe, Rey
Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday had any motive to
testify falsely against appellants. Absent evidence showing any
reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their
testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit.
The trial court is likewise correct in disregarding appellants’
defense of alibi and denial. For the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at
the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within
its immediate vicinity.[20]
Apart from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses
from that of Jaime Agbanlog’s residence, appellants were unable
to give any explanation and neither were they able to show that
it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the
crime. Hence, the positive identification of the appellants by
eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog, Rey Camat and
Gerry Bullanday prevails over their defense of alibi and
denial.[21]
It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat,
Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday were able to
identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre,
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because there was a
lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright.[22]
Appellants’ argument that Judge Bayani V. Vargas, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 38 erred
in rendering the decision because he was not the judge who
heard and tried the case is not well taken.
It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on
the basis of the record for the trial judge might have died,
resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth.[23] As far back as the
case of Co Tao v. Court of Appeals[24] we have held: “The fact
that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who
rendered the judgment and that for that reason the latter did not
have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses
during the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does
not render the judgment erroneous.” This rule had been followed
for quite a long time, and there is no reason to go against the
principle now.[25]
However, the trial court’s finding of conspiracy will have to be
reassessed. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio
Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George
Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a
single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him.
The trial court held that the mere presence of George Comadre
and Danilo Lozano provided encouragement and a sense of
security to Antonio Comadre, thus proving the existence of
conspiracy.
We disagree.
Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of
actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of
an illegal act is required.[26]
A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive
evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as
the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at
the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for
conspiracy transcends companionship.[27]
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did
not have any participation in the commission of the crime and
must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of
the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are
insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they
performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.
Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio
was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The
ratiocination of the trial court that “their presence provided
encouragement and sense of security to Antonio,” is devoid of
any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence
on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of
conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it
would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty
of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a
crime he did not commit.[28] There being no conspiracy, only
Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.
Coming now to Antonio’s liability, we find that the trial court
correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. For treachery to be appreciated two conditions must
concur: (1) the means, method and form of execution employed
gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) such means, methods and form of execution
was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. Its
essence lies in the adoption of ways to minimize or neutralize any
resistance, which may be put up by the offended party.
Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace
where the unsuspecting victims were having a drinking spree. The
suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous
combustion and the tremendous impact of the explosion did not
afford the victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less
defend themselves; thus insuring the execution of the crime
without risk of reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery
therefore attended the commission of the crime.
It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information
also alleges the “use of an explosive”[29] as an aggravating
circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can qualify the
killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code,[30] we should determine which of the two circumstances
will qualify the killing in this case.
When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of
explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying
circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence[31] support this view
but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of
attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should
qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be
relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.[32]
Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act
No. 8294[33] which also considers the use of explosives as an
aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the necessary
clarification insofar as the legal implications of the said
amendatory law vis-à-vis the qualifying circumstance of “by
means of explosion” under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
are concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should
be applied in the instant case.
R.A. No. 8294 was a reaction to the onerous and anachronistic
penalties imposed under the old illegal possession of firearms
law, P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the tumultuous years of
the Marcos dictatorship. The amendatory law was enacted, not
to decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and explosives, but
to lower their penalties in order to rationalize them into more
acceptable and realistic levels.[34]
This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction
of the corresponding penalties for illegal possession of firearms,
or ammunitions and other related crimes under the amendatory
law. Under Section 2 of the said law, the penalties for unlawful
possession of explosives are also lowered. Specifically, when the
illegally possessed explosives are used to commit any of the
crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death
of a person, the penalty is no longer death, unlike in P.D. No.
1866, but it shall be considered only as an aggravating
circumstance. Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 as amended by Section
2 of R.A. 8294 now reads:
Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Explosives. The penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in,
acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and
other explosives, including but not limited to “pillbox,” “molotov
cocktail bombs,” “fire bombs,” or other incendiary devices
capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or
causing injury or death to any person.
When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised
Penal Code or special law with the use of the aforementioned
explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devises, which results
in the death of any person or persons, the use of such explosives,
detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. (shall be punished with the penalty of
death is DELETED.)
x x x x x x x x x.
With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of the
term “xxx as an aggravating circumstance,” the unmistakable
import is to downgrade the penalty for illegal possession of
explosives and consider its use merely as an aggravating
circumstance.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty
for illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Also, Congress
clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating
circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal possession of
firearms and explosives when such possession is used to commit
other crimes under the Revised Penal Code.
It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend
the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely made the
use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to
in committing “any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal
Code.” The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of
explosives as a separate crime and to make such use merely an
aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already
defined in the Revised Penal Code. Thus, RA No. 8294 merely
added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating
circumstances specified in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
Like the aggravating circumstance of “explosion” in paragraph 12,
“evident premeditation” in paragraph 13, or “treachery” in
paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance
added by RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder
in Article 248.
Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still
cannot be made applicable in this case. Before the use of
unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately established
that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is
without the corresponding authority or permit to possess. This
follows the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm[35] which is a kindred or related
offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain
in the present case. Not only was it not alleged in the information,
but no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show that
the possession by appellant of the explosive was unlawful.
It is worthy to note that the above requirement of illegality is
borne out by the provisions of the law itself, in conjunction with
the pertinent tenets of legal hermeneutics.
A reading of the title[36] of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the
qualifier “illegal/unlawful ...possession” is followed by “of
firearms, ammunition, or explosives or instruments...” Although
the term ammunition is separated from “explosives” by the
disjunctive word “or”, it does not mean that “explosives” are no
longer included in the items which can be illegally/unlawfully
possessed. In this context, the disjunctive word “or” is not used
to separate but to signify a succession or to conjoin the
enumerated items together.[37] Moreover, Section 2 of R.A.
8294,[38] subtitled: “Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives”, clearly
refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale, or possession
of explosives.
What the law emphasizes is the act’s lack of authority. Thus,
when the second paragraph of Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by RA No. 8294 speaks of “the use of the
aforementioned explosives, etc.” as an aggravating circumstance
in the commission of crimes, it refers to those explosives, etc.
“unlawfully” manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired,
disposed or possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of the
same section. What is per se aggravating is the use of unlawfully
“manufactured … or possessed” explosives. The mere use of
explosives is not.
The information in this case does not allege that appellant
Antonio Comadre had unlawfully possessed or that he had no
authority to possess the grenade that he used in the killing and
attempted killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence was not
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of
the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requires the
averment of aggravating circumstances for their application.[39]
The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made manifest, the
crime committed is Murder committed “by means of explosion”
in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The
same, having been alleged in the Information, may be properly
considered as appellant was sufficiently informed of the nature
of the accusation against him.[40]
The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of
murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.
The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal
Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the
accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes
committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits
two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser
perversity than when the crimes are committed by different acts
and several criminal resolutions.
The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may
quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct
offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty
is imposed because the offender was impelled by a “single
criminal impulse” which shows his lesser degree of
perversity.[41]
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances,
including the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in
this case.[42] Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the
maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death.
The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
Three justices of the Court, however, continue to maintain the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority
to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert
Agbanlog civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral
damages. Pursuant to existing jurisprudence[43] the award of
civil indemnity is proper. However, the actual damages awarded
to the heirs of Robert Agbanlog should be modified, considering
that the prosecution was able to substantiate only the amount of
P18,000.00 as funeral expenses.[44]
The award of moral damages is appropriate there being evidence
to show emotional suffering on the part of the heirs of the
deceased, but the same must be increased to P50,000.00 in
accordance with prevailing judicial policy.[45]
With respect to the surviving victims Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday, the trial court awarded
P30,000.00 each for the injuries they sustained. We find this
award inappropriate because they were not able to present a
single receipt to substantiate their claims. Nonetheless, since it
appears that they are entitled to actual damages although the
amount thereof cannot be determined, they should be awarded
temperate damages of P25,000.00 each.[46]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision
of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 39 in Criminal
Case No. L-16(95) is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant Antonio
Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with
Multiple Attempted Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of death. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P18,000.00 as actual damages and likewise ordered to pay
the surviving victims, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat
and Gerry Bullanday, P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for
the injuries they sustained. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and
Danilo Lozano are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish
conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered
immediately RELEASED from confinement unless they are
lawfully held in custody for another cause. Costs de oficio.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act 7659 amending
Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this
Decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office
of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014 ]
ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the
offender. Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be
serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through
the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender before,
during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and
number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision
promulgated on September 27, 2006,[1] whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide
committed against Alexander Flojo under the judgment rendered
on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case No. 191-MD.[2]
Antecedents
The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:
x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at about ten o’clock in the evening,
Alexander Flojo (hereafter “Alexander”) was fetching water
below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St.,
Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De Guzman (hereafter
“Alfredo”), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter
“Lucila”), hit him on the nape. Alexander informed Lucila about
what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying,
“Pasensya ka na Mang Alex” and told the latter to just go up.
Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two
hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went
down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and
stabbed him on his left face and chest.
Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter
bleeding on the left portion of his body and begging for help.
Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino
immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride) and
brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon
arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered medical
assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency
room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes. Then, he was
brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was
confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander was transferred to
the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic)
further medical examination.
Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which
was on the zygoma, left side, and about one (1) cm. long. The
other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth
intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line measuring about
two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the
thoracic wall and left lung of the victim which resulted to blood
air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a duly proven.
thoracostomy tube to remove the blood. According to Dr.
Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the SO ORDERED.[4]
Mandaluyong City Medical Center, the second wound was fatal
On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been
and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical
proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the critical
intervention. (Tsn, July 8, 1998, p.8).
element of the crime charged, was not established; that the
injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks inflicted in
On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander.
the heat of anger during the fistfight between them; that he did
According to him, on December 25, 1997 at around midnight, he
not inflict the stab wounds, insisting that another person could
passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that
have inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight
point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back, causing the latter to
physical injuries on Alexander, for which he should be accordingly
throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a
found guilty.
fistfight ensued between them. They even rolled on the ground.
Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the petitioner’s conviction, viz:
the latter’s face.[3]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:
DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003 Decision of the Regional
PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is
court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., “JUNIOR,” hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the crime of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of SO ORDERED.[5]
the Revised Penal Code and in the absence of any modifying
The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
May 2, 2007.[6]
penalty of Six (6) Months and One (1) day of PRISION
CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day Issue
of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM.
Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant
doubt of frustrated homicide?
compensatory damages in the amount of P14,170.35
representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused
intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and
(3) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present.[7] Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none
of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 to be
present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of
the two other elements.
The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present
during the fistfight between him and Alexander. He claims that
the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally
emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only inflicted
minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he
appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be held liable only
for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the
necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not
sufficiently established. He avers that such intent to kill is the
main element that distinguishes the crime of physical injuries
from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only
if the intent to kill is competently shown.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the
intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and
then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as
differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed
from the commission of a felony by dolo.[8] Intent to kill, being a
state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the
time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v.
People,[9] we considered the following factors to determine the
presence of intent to kill, namely: (1) the means used by the
malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors
before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and
(4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and
the motives of the accused. We have also considered as
determinative factors the motive of the offender and the words
he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim.[10]
Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to
kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the
petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were
not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as the result
of a fistfight between them. The petitioner wielded and used a
knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate,
indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically,
one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his
face. The petitioner’s attack was unprovoked with the knife used
therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and
firmly proving the presence of intent to kill. There is also to be no
doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to
result into his death were it not for the timely medical
intervention.
With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already
performed all the acts of execution that should produce the
felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by
reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the timely medical
attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of
frustrated homicide.
We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the
findings of the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of
Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a
single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to support
the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more
compelling application when the lone witness is the victim
himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is
almost always regarded with indubitable credibility, owing to the
natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus
strive to remember the face of his assailant and to recall the
manner in which the latter committed the crime.[11] Moreover,
it is significant that the petitioner’s mere denial of the deadly
manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical
evidence corroborating Alexander’s statements. Under the
circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for
frustrated homicide.
The affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the
indeterminate penalty of “Six (6) Months and One (1) day of
PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One
(1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM”[12] fixed by the RTC
erroneous despite the CA concurring with the trial court thereon.
Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an
indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of
a maximum term and a minimum term.[13] The maximum term
is the penalty properly imposed under the Revised Penal
Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances;
while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of the Revised
Penal Code,[14] frustrated homicide is punished by prision
mayor, which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the penalty for
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present,
however, prision mayor in its medium period – from eight years
and one day to 10 years – is proper. As can be seen, the maximum
of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and
affirmed by the CA was not within the medium period of prision
mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four
years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor, as the maximum.
The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the
sum of P14,170.35 as compensatory damages “representing the
actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly
proven.”[15] We need to revise such civil liability in order to
conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,[16] we emphatically
declared to be “imperative that the courts prescribe the proper
penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a
reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery.” We explained why in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded
their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: “(1) the
legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed
upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by
his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by
the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or
waived.” Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the
Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That
the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the
Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and
justice.
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid
omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by law or
in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be
worthy of the name unless they thereby fully determine the rights
and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only
by a full determination of such rights and obligations would they
be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity
for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in their rendition
of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should
prescribe the legal penalties, which is what the Constitution and
the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the
wrong penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done
without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and
set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do
justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to
them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been
reserved or waived.[17]
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral
injuries because the offender committed violence that nearly
took away the victim’s life. “Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result
of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.”[18] Indeed, Article
2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the
victim in crimes resulting in physical injuries.[19] Towards that
end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that
P30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages.[20] In
addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
P30,000.00.[21] Both of these awards did not require allegation
and proof.
In addition, the amounts awarded as civil liability of the petitioner
shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of CALLEJO, SR., J.:
this decision until full payment by the accused.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision[1] of the
Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Branch
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
57, convicting appellants Armando Caballero, Ricardo Caballero
September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman,
and Marciano Caballero, Jr. of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-
Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE,
1217 and RTC-1218 and meting on each of them the supreme
and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
penalty of death and ordering them to pay damages; and of
years of prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 and imposing
one day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the
on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo civil indemnity of P30,000.00;
moral damages of P30,000.00; and compensatory damages of
P14,170.35, plus interest of 6% per annum on all such awards The Antecedents
from the finality of this decision until full payment;
and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in a compound
surrounded by a barbed-wire fence at New Sumakwel, Broce
SO ORDERED.
Street, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Living in the same
compound were Ricardo Caballero and his family; and Myrna
Bawin, the sister of Eugene Tayactac, and her family. Beside the
compound was the house of Leonilo Broce, a nephew of Wilma
EN BANC
Broce.
[ G. R. No. 149028-30, April 02, 2003 ]
In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby), Robito
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ARMANDO
(Bebot) and Marciano, Jr. (Jun), all surnamed Caballero, were
CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR.,
having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo in
AND ROBITO CABALLERO, ACCUSED.
the Mondragon Compound. At about 7:00 p.m. of said date,
Eugene Tayactac and Arnold Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, AND MARCIANO
of Wilma Broce which was across the Mondragon Compound.
CABALLERO, JR., APPELLANTS.
Eugene had dinner in the store while Arnold proceeded to the
house of Susana Broce, Eugene’s girlfriend, for a chat. Susana’s
DECISION
house was about 15 meters away from the store of Wilma.
Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked Eugene in
an angry tone: “Gene mopalit ka?” (Gene, will you buy?). Eugene
replied: “What is this all about? We don’t have any quarrel
between us.” Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the
barbed-wired fence of the Mondragon Compound. His brothers
Ricardo, Robito and Marciano, Jr. joined him. Ricardo and Robito
were armed with knives. When Wilma told Eugene that she was
closing the store already, he stood up and left the store on his
way to Susana’s house. At that time, Myrna Bawin, who was
standing by the window of their house saw her brother Eugene
going out of the store and proceeding to the house of Susana. She
called out to him and advised him to go home. Myrna then left
the window to pacify her crying baby.
As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound,
Armando suddenly grabbed Eugene towards the compound.
Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and
Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the
wooden pole supporting the clothesline and hit Eugene with it.
The latter tried to parry the blows of the Caballero brothers, to
no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three times. As
Eugene was being assaulted, Myrna returned to the window of
her house and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene. She
shouted for help for her hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed
the whole incident, was shocked to immobility at the sudden turn
of events.
From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion
and rushed to the scene to pacify the protagonists. Arnold told
the Caballero brothers: “Bay, what is the trouble between you
and Eugene?” However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and stabbed the
latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr.
and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed Arnold
on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of
a neighbor.
For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the
commotion was. He was, however, met by Robito who stabbed
him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and pleaded to his
uncle Lucio Broce for help: “Tio, help me because I am hit.” The
commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon
who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned
to the compound.
In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the
injured Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to the Planters Hospital for
medical treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the
stab wounds they sustained.
Dr. Filped A. Maisog performed an autopsy on the cadaver of
Eugene. He signed a postmortem report containing the following
findings:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Eugenio Tayactac, 22 years old, male,
single Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos
City, Neg. Occ. Place of Incident: New Sumakwel,
San Carlos City, Neg. Occ. Place of Examination:
San Carlos City Hospital Date & Time of Incident:
August 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M. Date & Time
Examined: August 3, 1994 @ 10:40 P.M.
Post-Mortem Findings:
= Stab wound (L) anterior chest 2 cm. 5th ICS MCL directed
postero laterally, lacerating (L) auricle of the heart, and the
(L) pulmonary artery and the left middle lobe of the lungs;
= Stab wound (R) anterior chest 2 cm. long 5th ICS
parasternal line directed posteriorly;
= Stab wound (R) posterior chest level 7th ICS 2 cm. long
directed anteriorly.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple
Stab wounds with Massive Hemothorax (L) and
Hemopneumothorax (R).[2]
He testified that the stab wounds could have been caused by a
sharp-edged single-bladed or double-bladed instrument, or by
three instruments.[3]
Dr. Jose Carlos L. Villarante performed an autopsy on the cadaver
of Leonilo. He signed a postmortem report containing the
following findings:
POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION
Name: Leonilo Broce, 22 years old, male, married
Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:45 P.M.
Post-mortem findings:
= Stab wound, (R) post chest, about the level of the 6th and
7th RICS, post. axillary line.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
organ injury.[4]
Dr. Edgardo B. Quisumbing attended to and operated on Arnold
Barcuma. He signed a medical certificate stating that Arnold
sustained the following injuries:
= Lacerated wound 2 cm. (R) forearm middle 3rd
= Incised wound 2 inches (L) forearm middle 3rd
= Stabbed wound, 2 inches in length (L) chest, anterior
axillary line at the level of the 7th intercostal space,
penetrating thoracic cavity and abdominal cavity.
On the witness stand, Dr. Quisumbing testified that the wounds CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
sustained by Arnold could have been caused by three different
They were also charged with the same crime for the death of
sharp-pointed instruments.[6] He further testified that Arnold
Eugene Tayactac in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No.
would have died because of the stab wound on his chest, were it
RTC-1218, which reads:
not for the timely medical intervention.
That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New
On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito, Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
were charged with Murder for the death of Leonilo Broce. The within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC 1217 reads: accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed
with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent to kill,
That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New
with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there,
Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one
accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed
EUGENE TAYACTAC, by striking the latter with use of pieces of
with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent to kill,
wood and stabbing him thereby inflicting upon said Eugene
with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there,
Tayactac physical injuries which resulted to the death of the
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons,
latter.
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one
LEONILO BROCE, by striking the latter with the use of pieces of
That an aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength
wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon said Leonilo
is attendant in the commission of the offense.
Broce physical injury described as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
= Stabbed wound (R) chest penetrating thoracic cavity.
Another Information was filed against the Caballero brothers for
and which injury caused massive hemorrhage which resulted to frustrated murder for the injuries of Arnold Barcuma. Docketed
the death of Leonilo Broce. as Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, it reads:
That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
attendant in the commission of the offense.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and helping one another, armed
with pieces of wood and hunting knives, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use
personal violence upon the person of one ARNOLD BARCUMA, by
striking him with the use of pieces of wood and stabbing him,
thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which would
have resulted to the death of said Arnold Barcuma, thus
performing all the acts of execution, which would have produced
the crime of “Murder”, as a consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it, by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused that is, the timely medical assistance rendered to said
Arnold Barcuma.
That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is
attendant in the commission of the offense.[9]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr., assisted by counsel, were
arraigned on September 15, 1994. They pleaded not guilty to all
the charges. Robito Caballero remained at-large.
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. invoked the defenses of
denial and alibi. They adduced evidence that Ricardo was
employed as electrician in the Office of the City Engineer of San
Carlos City. Armando was a motor cab driver. Robito resided in
H.C. Rigor Street, San Carlos City while Marciano, Jr. was a
resident of Don Juan Subdivision, San Carlos City and was
employed with the Victorias Milling Corporation.
On August 3, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Robito left San Carlos City and
went to Bacolod City. Armando went to the house of his brother
Ricardo to help in the construction of the latter’s house and to
take care of Ricardo’s fighting cocks while he was in his office.
Ricardo arrived home at 8:00 p.m. and had dinner with his family
and Armando. Momentarily, their sister Mila and their younger
brother Marciano, Jr. arrived in the house of Ricardo. Marciano,
Jr. allegedly was mauled by a group of men and sustained an
abrasion, a contusion and swelling of the left side of his face.
Ricardo and Armando brought their brother Marciano, Jr. to the
hospital for treatment. On August 4, 1994, Marciano, Jr. was
treated for:
= Linear abrasion (L) scapula region;
= Contusion (R) lower lip lateral side;
= Swelling left face.
No. of days of healing: 5-7 days barring
complication.[10]
Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing Eugene and
assaulting Arnold. They also denied having any altercation with
the victims. They also denied stabbing Leonilo. They had no idea
why Wilma, Arnold and Myrna would implicate them for the
deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment on May
7, 2001 finding all the three accused, now appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes charged, the In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them
decretal portion of which reads: conspired to kill Eugene and Leonilo and cause injuries to Arnold.
While the trial court stated that it was only appellant Armando
WHEREFORE, accused Armando Caballero, alias “Baby”, Ricardo
who stabbed Eugene, and only the accused Robito who stabbed
Caballero, alias “Ricky” and Marciano Caballero, Jr., alias “Jun”,
Leonilo, however, it concluded that all of them were equally liable
having been found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries of
offenses charged them as principals, are hereby sentenced to
Arnold.
suffer:
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217 for the murder of Leonilo Broce, In their Brief, the accused, now appellants assail the decision of
there being no mitigating circumstance present, with the the trial court contending that:
attendant aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
I
superior strength, the maximum penalty of death and to pay the
heirs of Leonilo Broce the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity;
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, for the murder of Eugene or
APPELLANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1217-1219 DESPITE THE
Eugenio Tayactac, there being no mitigating circumstance
FACT THAT THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of
REASONABLE DOUBT.
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the maximum penalty
of death; and to pay the heirs of Eugene Tayactac the sum of
P75,000.00 as indemnity; and II
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for Frustrated Murder, for having
seriously inflicted injuries upon the person of Arnold Barcuma THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE
which nearly resulted to his death, there being no mitigating AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND ABUSE OF
circumstance present, an imprisonment of twelve (12) years, as SUPERIOR STRENGTH ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) ACCUSED-APPELLANTS KILLED THE VICTIMS.
day, with no award as to damages, no evidence having been
introduced to establish, the same; and
III
To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.[11] THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH
PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON THE ASSUMPTION and another performing another for the attainment of the same
THAT INDEED THEY KILLED THE VICTIMS.[12] objective, their acts though apparently independent were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
The Court will delve into and resolve the first two assignments of
association, concerted action and concurrence of
errors.
sentiments.[15] The overt act or acts of the accused may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
reasonable doubt their respective guilt for the deaths of Eugene
moving them to execute or implement the criminal
and Leonilo and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. They assert
plan.[16] Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a
that the trial court committed reversible error in rejecting their
crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the
defenses of denial and alibi. They claim that at the time of the
commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose
incident they were in the San Carlos Hospital for the treatment of
and were united in their execution.[17] Once established, all the
the injuries of appellant Marciano, Jr.
conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of participation of each of them for in contemplation of
The appellants are partly correct.
the law, the act of one is the act of all.[18]
The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to
Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on
kill Eugene and assault Arnold; hence, they are criminally liable
mere inferences, conjectures and presumptions.[19] Mere
for the death of Eugene and for the injuries sustained by Arnold.
knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony
constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional
and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always predominantly
participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the
mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting
common objective and purpose.[20] Moreover, one is not
of minds and intent.[13] Conspiracy must be proved with the
criminally liable for his act done outside the contemplation of the
same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof
conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts
beyond reasonable doubt.[14] However, direct proof is not
done pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the
required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime.[21]
Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the
accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony, all
In this case, when appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store
the accused aiming at the same object, one performing one part
of Wilma whether the latter was going to buy something from the
store, Eugene was peeved and remonstrated that he and
Armando had no quarrel between them. Appellant Armando was
likewise irked at the reaction of Eugene because from the store,
appellant Armando stationed himself by the gate of the
Mondragon Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma.
Appellants Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined their brother,
appellant Armando at the gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused
Robito were armed with knives. When Eugene passed by the gate
to the compound, appellant Armando pulled Eugene to the gate
but when the latter resisted, all the appellants ganged up on
Eugene. Appellant Armando took the wooden support of the
clothesline and hit Eugene with it. Eugene was stabbed three
times on his chest even as he tried to parry the thrusts. When
Arnold rushed to the situs criminis to pacify the appellants and
accused Robito, appellant Ricardo stabbed him on the left side of
his body. The other appellants and accused Robito joined
appellant Ricardo and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed Arnold
anew twice on his forearm. Teresito Mondragon, the father-in-
law of appellant Ricardo intervened and forthwith, all the
appellants, including accused Robito returned to the Mondragon
Compound. Patently, all the appellants by their simultaneous
collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes
were united in one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause
injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed.
Hence, all the appellants are criminally liable for the death of
Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who
among the appellants stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on
Arnold. The act of one is the act of the others.
However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the
appellants are not criminally liable. The prosecution failed to
adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito
conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants did not actually see
Leonilo rushing out from his house to the situs criminis. They had
no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab Leonilo.
There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to prove
that all the appellants assisted the accused Robito in killing
Leonilo. It must be recalled that Leonilo rushed out of his house
when he saw the commotion, with the intention of aiding the
victim or pacifying the protagonists. He was, however, stopped
by accused Robito who suddenly stabbed him on the chest.
Leonilo retreated and asked for help. Wilma Broce testified that
only the accused Robito stabbed Leonilo:
Q After that, what happened next?
A Leonilo Broce came out of his house.
Q Where is the house of Leonilo Broce?
A Still located at Sumakwel.
Q In that case, the very house where Eugene
Tayaktak leaned on when he was ganged up
by the four?
A Yes.
Q What happened after that?
A When he came out from the house and saw A He appeared very weak and he was
that it was Eugene Tayaktak, he proceeded to staggering.
approach them but he was not able to
approach them because he was met by Robit
“Bebot” Caballero and stabbed by Robito Q Do you know where Eugene Tayaktak now?
Caballero.
A Already dead.

Q Was LeoniloBroce (sic) hit when he was

Q What happened to Leonilo Broce, where is he
stabbed by Robito Caballero?
now?
A Yes. He immediately ran back and said: “Tio,
A The two of them were (sic) already dead.
help me because I am hit.”

Q Now, when did the trouble stop if it stopped?

INTERPRETER’S (observation)
A It stopped when Dodong Mondragon arrived.

Witness demonstrating by holding her left

armpit.
Q Was Eugene Tayaktak able to escape from the
attach (sic) of the Caballero brothers?
A Not (sic).
Q Now what happened to Eugene Tayaktak?
Q What did the accused do after the trouble
was stopped?
A They went inside the compound of his (sic)
father.
Q What happened next?
A Nothing happened. Both of them were
brought to the hospital.[22]

In sum, the trial court committed reversible error in convicting
the appellants of murder for the death of Leonilo. As this Court
held in People v. Flora:[23]
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the
death of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor Espinas. The
evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one
else. For acts done outside the contemplation of the conspirators
only the actual perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna,
21 SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:
“ ... And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable
only for acts done pursuant to the conspiracy. For other acts done
outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are
not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime,
only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here, only Serapio killed
(sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not even going to the aid
of his father Rafael but was fleeing away when shot.”
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt only of the murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He has no liability for
the death of Emerita Roma nor the injuries of Flor Espinas caused
by his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
Crimes Committed by Appellants
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty as co-
principals by direct participation of murder, qualified by
treachery. In order that treachery may be considered as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove
that
.... (1) the employment of means of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.[24]
Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the victim
is unarmed. The essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected
attack on the unarmed victim.[25]
In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that he
would be waylaid as he sauntered on his way to his girlfriend
Susana’s house. On the other hand, appellant Armando was
armed with a wooden pole while appellant Ricardo and accused
Robito were armed with knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene
was swift and unannounced. Undeniably, the appellants killed
Eugene with treachery.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty of
frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
Elements:
The offender performs all the acts of execution;
All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the
consequence; subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the
crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while
But the felony is not produced;
passing through the subjective phase. He did all that is necessary
By reason of causes independent of the will of the to consummate the crime. However, the crime is not
perpetrator.[26] consummated by reason of the intervention of causes
independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the
In the leading case of United States v. Eduave,[27] Justice
offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the
Moreland, speaking for the Court, distinguished an attempted
wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death
from frustrated felony. He said that to be an attempted crime the
of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.[28]
purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the
If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives,
moment when he has performed all the acts which should
the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if
produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention
the offender had no intention to kill the victim or frustrated or
to perform.
attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder
if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion
proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
of the acts constituting the crime included between the act
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act
number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the
performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result in
crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at
the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is objective.
the time the injuries are inflicted by him on the victim.
In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the
In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole.
subjective phase in the commission of the crime. The offender
Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito used knives. Dr.
does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts of
Quisumbing, who attended to and operated on Arnold, testified
execution which should produce the crime. He is stopped short
that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side of his
of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
body was mortal and could have caused his death were it not for
the timely and effective medical intervention:
On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which should result in the
 Q And how about the size and the depth of the
wounds and how big is each wound and how
deep.
A The first wound is 2 cm. and the 2nd is about
2 inches and the 3rd is 2 inches in the left,
penetrating the chest near the thorax along
the lateral line.
Q So, aside from the 3rd wound there are
wounds which are not really very serious?
A As I said before, the most serious is the
3rd wound.
Q So even without the other wounds the
3rd wound - - it could be the cause of the
death of the victim?
A Yes, Sir.[29]
It cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill
Arnold. The appellants performed all the acts of execution but the
crime was not consummated because of the timely medical
intervention.
Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because he was
unarmed and the attack on him was swift and sudden. He had no
means and there was no time for him to defend himself. In sum,
the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder.
The appellants’ denial of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos.
RTC-1218 and RTC-1219 cannot prevail over Wilma’s and Arnold’s
positive and straightforward testimonies that the appellants
killed Eugene and stabbed Arnold. Moreover, Wilma and Arnold
had no motive to falsely implicate the appellants for the said
crimes; hence, their testimony must be accorded full probative
weight.[30]
Equally barren of merit is appellants’ defense of alibi. Alibi as a
defense is inherently weak for it is easy to fabricate and difficult
to disprove. To merit approbation, the appellants were burdened
to prove with clear and convincing evidence that at the time the
crimes were committed, they were in a place other than
the situs of the crimes such that it was physically impossible for
them to have committed said crimes.[31] The appellants dismally
failed in this respect. They testified that they were at the house
of appellant Ricardo, which was conveniently near the place
where Eugene was killed and Arnold was assaulted. Moreover,
the records show that Marciano, Jr. was treated for his superficial
injuries on August 4, 1996, a day after the incident. This belies the
claim of appellants Ricardo and Armando that they were allegedly
in the hospital at the time of the incident.
Penalties Imposable on Appellants
The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellants in
Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 on its finding that treachery and
abuse of superior strength were attendant in the killing of
Eugene. The Solicitor General does not agree with the trial court
and contends that abuse of superior strength was absorbed by
treachery; hence, should not be considered as a separate
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the
appellants. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. Abuse of
superior strength, concurring with treachery is absorbed by
treachery.[32]
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since aside from the qualified circumstance of treachery,
no other modifying circumstance was attendant in the
commission of the crime, the proper penalty for the crime
is reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the Revised
Penal Code.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for frustrated murder, the
Solicitor General contends that the indeterminate penalty of
from 12 years of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, imposed
on the appellants is not correct. The Court agrees with the
Solicitor General. The penalty for frustrated murder is one degree
lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion
temporal.[33] The latter penalty has a range of 12 years and 1 day
to 20 years. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty should
be taken from reclusion temporal, the penalty for the crime
taking into account any modifying circumstances in the
commission of the crime. The minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor which
is one degree lower than reclusion temporal. Since there is no
modifying circumstance in the commission of frustrated murder,
the appellants should be meted an indeterminate penalty of from
nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium
period as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Civil Liabilities of Appellants
The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-
1218 to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac,
the amount of P75,000 by way of indemnity. The trial court did
not award moral damages to said heirs. This is erroneous. Since
the penalty imposed on the appellants is reclusion perpetua, the
civil indemnity should be only P50,000. The heirs of the victim
should also be awarded the amount of P50,000 as moral
damages.[34]
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the trial court did not award moral
damages to the victim Arnold Barcuma on its finding that the
prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove said
damages. The Court disagrees with the trial court. The victim
Arnold Barcuma himself testified on his injuries.[35] He is entitled
to moral damages in the amount of P25,000.[36] Having suffered
injuries and undergone medical treatment he is, as well entitled
to actual damages, which in the absence of evidence would,
nevertheless, entitle him to an award of temperate or moderate
damages, herein fixed at P10,000.
 Costs de oficio.
The Verdict of the Court
SO ORDERED.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), Branch 57, in
SECOND DIVISION
Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 up to RTC-1219 is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS: [ G.R. No. 185710, January 19, 2010 ]

In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants
not guilty of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, REVERSES the
judgment of the trial court and ACQUITS them of the said charge.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery, and are sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay in
solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amounts of
P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder under Article 248
in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code
and are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
The appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the victim
Arnold Barcuma the amount of P25,000 as moral damages and
P10,000 as temperate or moderate damages.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ROMULO TUNIACO,
JEFFREY DATULAYTA AND ALEX ALEMAN, ACCUSED. ALEX
ALEMAN, APPELLANT.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial
confession and the establishment of the existence of corpus
delicti in murder cases.
The Facts and the Case
The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused
Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman with murder
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City in
Criminal Case 8370.
Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992
some police officers from the Lagao Police Sub-Station requested
police officer Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police Station of
General Santos City homicide division to take the statement of
accused Alex Aleman regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon
Cortez. On his arrival at the sub-station, Tabucon noted the
presence of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO) who was conversing with those taken into custody
for the offense. When queried if the suspects would be willing to
give their statements, Atty. Besinga said that they were.
Some other police officer first took the statement of accused
Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer Tabucon next took the statement of
accused Aleman, whom he observed to be in good physical shape.
Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman
in Cebuano of his constitutional right to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was
willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in the affirmative.
When asked if he had any complaint to make, Aleman said that
he had none. When Aleman said that he had no lawyer, Tabucon
pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the
suspects in the case. Tabucon warned Aleman that anything he
would say may be used against him later in court. Afterwards, the
police officer started taking down Aleman's statement.
Accused Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with
accused Datulayta and Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June 6, 1992,
Dondon Cortez threatened to report his drinking companions'
illegal activities to the police unless they gave him money for his
forthcoming marriage. According to Aleman, Datulayta and
Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez in Tupi, South
Cotabato, for making the same threats and now they decided to
do it. They got Cortez drunk then led him out supposedly to get
the money he needed.
The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump site
and, as they were walking, accused Aleman turned on Cortez and
stabbed him on the stomach. Accused Datulayta, on the other
hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16 pistol[1] and shot
Cortez on the head, causing him to fall. Datulayta handed over
the gun to Aleman who fired another shot on Cortez's head.
Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to pump some bullets into
Cortez's body. Then they covered him with rice husks.
After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the
substance of it to accused Aleman who then signed it in the
presence of Atty. Besinga.
On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to the City
Prosecutor's Office where he swore to his statement before an
assistant city prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused Datulayta and
Aleman led Tabucon, the city prosecutor, and a police inspector,
to the dump site where they left their victim's body. After some
search, the group found a spot covered with burnt rice husks and
a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the body, they
found the shells of a 5.56 caliber gun and an armalite rifle.
On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga,
pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. After the prosecution
rested its case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to evidence
which the Court granted, resulting in the dismissal of the case
against him. On being re-arraigned at his request, accused
Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Homicide. The
trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of six years and one
day and to pay P50,000.00 to the victim's family.
For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to
psychiatric examination at the Davao Mental Hospital. But,
shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had escaped. He
was later recaptured. When trial in the case resumed, Aleman's
new PAO lawyer raised the defense of insanity. This prompted
the court to require the Provincial Jail Warden to issue a
certification regarding Aleman's behavior and mental condition
while in jail to determine if he was fit to stand trial. The warden
complied, stating that Aleman had been observed to have good
mental condition and did not commit any infraction while in jail.
Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty.
Besinga assisted accused Aleman during the taking of his
extrajudicial confession, the latter, however, recanted what he
said to the police during the trial. He testified that sometime in
1992, some police officers took him from his aunt's house in
Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought him to
the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit having
taken part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused, they
tortured him until he agreed to sign a document admitting his
part in the crime.
Accused Aleman also testified that he could not remember having
been assisted by Atty. Besinga during the police investigation. He
even denied ever knowing the lawyer. Aleman further denied
prior association with accused Tuniaco and Datulayta. He said
that he met them only at the city jail where they were detained
for the death of Cortez.
On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused
Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The court also ordered him to pay death indemnity of P70,000.00
and moral damages of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311,
the court rendered judgment on January 21, 2008, affirming the
decision of the RTC with the modification that directed accused
Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the heirs of Cortez, jointly
and severally, in the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as temperate
damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Aleman
appealed to this Court.
The Issues Presented
Accused Aleman raises two issues: a) whether or not the
prosecution was able to present evidence of corpus delicti; and
b) whether or not accused Aleman's extrajudicial confession is
admissible in evidence.
The Rulings of the Court
1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or
substance of a crime. The evidence of a dead body with a gunshot
wound on its back would be evidence that murder has been
committed.[2] Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain
result has been established, for example, that a man has died and
(b) that some person is criminally responsible for it.[3] The
prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond
reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial
or presumptive evidence.[4]
The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus
delicti since it did not bother to present a medical certificate
identifying the remains found at the dump site and an autopsy
report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds
that resulted in death; and the shells of the guns used in killing
the victim.
But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the
dead victim's body or even by the testimony of the physician who
examined such body.[5] While such report or testimony is useful
for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered,
they are not indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of
death.[6] Nor is the presentation of the murder weapons also
indispensable since the physical existence of such weapons is not
an element of the crime of murder.[7]
Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the
place pointed to by accused Aleman. That physical confirmation,
coming after his testimony of the gruesome murder, sufficiently
establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that
statement must be admissible in evidence.
2. There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible
must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing.[8] These
requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was
not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused
Aleman during the custodial investigation. Officer Tabucon
testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of his
statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty.
Besinga did not dispute this claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the
confession. The appellate court is correct in ruling that such
allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where the defendant
did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his
supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence
was presented, all these will be considered as indicating
voluntariness.[9] Here, although Aleman claimed that he bore
torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention
of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered
his oath.
Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit,[10] that long
questions followed by monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the
requirement that the accused is amply informed of his rights. But
this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke to
Aleman clearly in the language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty.
Besinga, even signed a certification that the investigator
sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and that he
was still willing to give his statement.
Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so
he did not fully realize the consequences of a confession. But as
the CA said, no law or jurisprudence requires the police officer to
ascertain the educational attainment of the accused. All that is
needed is an effective communication between the interrogator
and the suspect to the end that the latter is able to understand
his rights.[11] This appears to have been done in this case.
Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the
police fabricated Aleman's confession and just forced him to sign
it. The confession has details that only the person who committed
the crime could have possibly known.[12] What is more, accused
Datulayta's confession corroborate that of Aleman in important
details. Under the doctrine of interlocking confessions, such
corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person
implicated in it.[13]
The Court notes that, when it modified the award of civil damages
to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made both accused Aleman and
Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the damages as
modified. But the appeal by one or more of several accused
cannot affect those who did not appeal, except if the judgment
of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to
them.[14] Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay only
P50,000.00 in civil indemnity to the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred
in expanding that liability when he did not appeal from his
conviction.[15]
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court AFFIRMS the Court of
Appeals' judgment in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311 dated January 21,
2008 against accused Alex Aleman. The Court,
however, DELETES from such judgment the portion increasing
the civil liability of accused Jeffrey Datulayta who did not appeal
from the RTC decision against him.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 141080, September 17, 2002 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANECITO
UNLAGADA Y SUANQUE A.K.A. "LAPAD," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
For the murder of twenty-four-year old Danilo Laurel, ANECITO
UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias "Lapad" was charged and
subsequently convicted by the court a quo and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as temperate
damages, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.[1]
On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo
Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor from
Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang
Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2) hours later, or
around 11:00 o'clock that evening, Danilo asked Edwin to take a
short break from dancing to attend to their personal necessities
outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink
and bought two (2) bottles of Gold Eagle beer at a nearby store.
Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for
a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only about
three (3) meters from Danilo who was relieving himself when a
short, dark bearded man walked past him, approached Danilo
and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his
assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously,
a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo
and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones
and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch
helplessly as Danilo was being mauled and overpowered by his
assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be
given any medical assistance.
Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police invited
him to the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his statement
regarding the killing incident and, if necessary, to confirm the
identity of the suspect who was then in their custody. Thereat, he
executed an affidavit and affirmed before the police authorities
that the man under detention, whom he later identified as
accused Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who stabbed his
friend Danilo.
Dr. Rene Ortigas, surgical resident of the Corazon Locsin
Montelibano Memorial Hospital, testified that the post-mortem
examination showed that the victim sustained the following
injuries: (a) an 8 cm. stab wound, 2nd intercostal space AAL right
directed anteriorly, non-penetrating; (b) an 8 cm. stab wound,
4th intercostal MAL, directed postero-medially, non-penetrating;
(c) an 8 cm. stab wound, 6th intercostal space, mid-clavicular line,
directed postero-caudially, penetrating diaphragm and right
dome of liver causing massive hemorrhage, sequestered at right
hemithorax and abdomen; (d) an 8 cm. stab wound, 6th
intercostal space, mid-clavicular line left, directed postero-
laterally, non-penetrating; (e) an 8 cm. lacerated wound, antero-
lateral aspect right thigh; (f) a multiple contusion hematoma,
postero-medial aspect left elbow; and, (g) a multilinear abrasion,
zygomatic area left face. Dr. Ortigas opined that wound No. 3
proved to be the only fatal injury which lacerated the diaphragm
and right dome of the liver resulting in massive hemorrhage.
The defense presented a different picture of the story. Guglielmo
Laurel testified that on the evening of 27 January 1989 he was at
the dance hall when he met accused Anecito Unlagada. He was
all by himself. On the same occasion, according to Guglielmo he
also met Danilo Laurel and three (3) other companions although
only Edwin Selda was introduced to him. Soon after, Danilo and
his friends left the dance hall to drink liquor. An hour or so later,
Danilo's group returned to the dance hall. An altercation ensued
when the gatekeeper refused them entry without a gate pass.
From his vantage point of about forty (40) meters away,
Guglielmo observed that a rumble erupted. From a distance, he
saw a man, whom he later recognized as Danilo Laurel, fall to the
ground. He however belied having seen the accused Anecito
Unlagada anywhere near the scene of the crime. By his account,
the melee broke up only when a policeman fired a warning shot
in the air and the protagonists scampered away.
On cross-examination, however, Guglielmo Laurel asserted
positively that accused Unlagada was inside the dance hall
before, during and after the rumble, and stayed there even after
a policeman fired a warning shot. This testimony of witness
Guglielmo was corroborated by defense witnesses Jaime Umbiga
and Mariano Salazar.
PO3 Jomarie Sarrosa narrated that at around 11:30 in the evening
of 27 January 1989 he was inside his house entertaining some
visitors when suddenly he heard frantic shouts, "fight, fight!"
Answering the call of duty, he took his service pistol, went outside
and fired a warning shot in the air to break up the fight that was
going on some fifty (50) meters away. Instinctively, the
protagonists broke up and scampered away. When he went near
the place of the disturbance, he noticed a man with a deformed
hand sprawled on the ground. He however clarified that he
described the place as dark because there were no street lights.
PO3 Sarrosa lifted the prostrate body of the victim and asked a
barangay tanod to stay with the victim as he would call a tricycle
to seek emergency medical assistance. According to him, he
caused the incident to be entered into the police blotter while
Pfc. Tady and Cpl. Tañal investigated the killing incident. The
investigators informed him the following morning that they
already had a suspect by the name of "Lapad." He volunteered to
look for the suspect since he knew him.
Accused Anecito Unlagada testifying in his defense, recounted
that at around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27 January 1989 while
he was inside the dance hall, an altercation ensued near the gate
between the gatekeeper and a group of four (4) individuals who,
despite their disruptive behavior, were eventually allowed to get
through the gate. At around 11:00 o'clock, a gunshot suddenly
rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble had
taken place and that somebody was killed. But he came to learn
the victim's identity only the following morning when he and a
certain Lorenzo Patos were brought by a police officer to the
Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building, he
heard somebody asking who "Lapad" was and an alleged
eyewitness, who later turned out to be Edwin Selda, pointed to
him as the man referred to by that name. Anecito Unlagada and
Lorenzo Patos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against
them before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile
the case against Lorenzo was dismissed leaving Aniceto alone to
face the charge of murder.
The trial court gave full credence to the inculpatory testimony of
prosecution witness Edwin Selda because he was only three (3)
meters away from the victim when the latter was stabbed to
death. If it was true, according to the trial court, that at the
Municipal Building Edwin readily identified the person of accused
"Lapad" as the suspect, it was not by reason of any unlawful
suggestion but a spontaneous confirmation of his observation of
the perpetrator as vividly recalled by him.
The trial court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and
the testimonies of the defense witnesses negating Anecito's
culpability. The trial court explained that it was highly unusual
that the defense witnesses had their attention focused on the
accused all the time since they were there to witness and enjoy
the dance, characterizing their testimonies as a mere ploy
concocted to weave a picture of an innocent man in the person
of the accused.[2]
Accused Anecito Unlagada now assails his conviction on the
ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith and
credence to the lone and uncorroborated testimony of witness
Edwin Selda, and in finding that the crime of murder was
committed instead of "death caused in a tumultuous affray"
under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.
In an attempt to discredit the lone eyewitness, accused-appellant
posits the view that the circumstances of the place, the swiftness
of the attack, and the drunken state of the witness engender
serious doubt that the witness positively identified the
malefactor.
At the epicenter of most criminal cases is the issue of credibility
of the witnesses. In the instant case, a thorough review of the
records however reveals no plausible reason to disbelieve the
prosecution eyewitness. It will be recalled that when the fatal
stabbing occurred, Edwin was only three (3) meters away from
both the victim and his attacker, as opposed to the defense
witnesses who were standing fifty (50) or so meters away.
Edwin's physical proximity to the main protagonists and the locus
criminis afforded him the unenviable position of observing the
ghastly crime at very close range. The time the accused passed in
front of Edwin and when he mercilessly stabbed Danilo may be a
fleeting moment but such was sufficient to make a vivid and
lasting impression of the bearded perpetrator's image specially
so since the victim was a friend and a companion.
Neither can we accommodate accused-appellant's defense of
alibi. Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be rejected
when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and
positively established by an eyewitness because alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification.[3] Since no improper
motive has been ascribed to Edwin Selda, it creates the
presumption that no such motive in fact existed. In the absence
of any evidence showing why the prosecution witness would
have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such
improper motive existed and that the testimony is worthy of full
faith and credit.[4] The findings and conclusions of the trial court
on the credibility of the witness being unblemished by
arbitrariness and capriciousness, this Court is bound to accord
them great weight and even finality on appeal.
But, accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred in
convicting him of murder qualified by treachery and not "death
in a tumultuous affray."
"Death in a tumultuous affray" is defined in Art. 251 of The
Revised Penal Code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while
several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between while temperate damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
several persons who engage in a confused and tumultuous of another P50,000.00 should be deleted for lack of factual and
manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and legal basis.
the author thereof cannot be ascertained.[5] The quarrel in the
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
instant case is between a distinct group of individuals, one of
following MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant ANECITO
whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the
UNLAGADA y SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs
killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the
of the deceased Danilo Laurel P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus
defense suggests, a "tumultuous affray" within the meaning of
moral damages in the reduced amount of P50,000.00. Costs
Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-
against accused-appellant.
all, where several persons not comprising definite or identifiable
groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized SO ORDERED.
manner, resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.
Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was
FIRST DIVISION
relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his person when
suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, [ G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015 ]
approached the victim and stabbed him at the side. There was GUILLERMO WACOY Y BITOL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
completely without warning, the victim was caught by surprise,
and given no chance to put up any defense. [G.R. No. 213886]
The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal
Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. JAMES QUIBAC Y RAFAEL, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
should be imposed in its medium period which, as correctly
imposed by the court a quo, is reclusion perpetua. DECISION

The civil aspect of the case should however be modified in PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
consonance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition to Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the heirs of the decedent are on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated December 6, 2013 and
entitled to a reduced amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the Resolution[3] dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078, which, inter alia, found petitioners
Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac y Rafael
(Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide.
The Facts
In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were
charged with the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional
Trial Court of Benguet, Branch 10 (RTC), as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan,
Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each
other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick the stomach of one
ELNER ARO y LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt
traumatic injuries which directly caused his death thereafter.
That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at
around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 2004, he was eating
corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay,
Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby establishment.
Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin,
Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which,
Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was restrained from
doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken
to the hospital.[5]
At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt
abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and was set for
operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation
on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large intestines
meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire
abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from
the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the
operation, and while he was revived through cardiopulmonary
resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.[6] Due
to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against
the doctor's orders and eventually, died the next day. While Aro's
death certificate indicated that the cause of his death was
"cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and
generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an autopsy
performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death
was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic
injuries."[7]
In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied
the charge against them. They averred that while playing pool,
they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly
and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing Wacoy to shout and
pick up a stone to throw at Aro but Quibac pacified him. They also
claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy with a 2x3 piece of wood if not
for Quibac's intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and
then tripped and fell to the ground. Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin),
Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby,
cornered and kicked the latter, and the two engaged in a fist fight.
Quibac came over to pacify the two and told Wacoy to go
home.[8]
The RTC Ruling
In a Judgment[9] dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy
and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Death
Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of the RPC and,
accordingly, sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered them
to pay Aro's heirs the amounts of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.[10]
The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident
does not firmly establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired in the
killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither
categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the
mauling directly contributed to his death.[11] In this relation, it
opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution
has failed to show the extent and effect of injury [that Wacoy and
Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his death x x x,"
Wacoy and Quibac should be held criminally liable for the crime
of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray and not for
Homicide.[12]
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.[13]
The CA Ruling
In a Decision[14] dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified
Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of Homicide under Article
249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong, and accordingly adjusted their
prison term to an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA
also imposed a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum on
the damages awarded by the RTC pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[15]
In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and
straightforward testimony. In this relation, it observed that the
mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against
his credibility since there was no proof that his testimony was
driven by any ill motive.[16] However, contrary to the RTC's
findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac should not be
convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray
since there were only (2) persons who inflicted harm on the
victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray involving several
persons. Instead, they were convicted of the crime of Homicide,
with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of
their assault on Aro was only to maltreat or inflict physical harm
on him.[17]
Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for
reconsideration.[18] In a Resolution[19] dated July 21, 2014, the
CA denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration;[20] hence, the
instant petitions.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal
throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on
grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the
case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law.[21]
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's
ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac's conviction from Death
Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be
explained hereunder.
Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death
Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while
several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is
killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall be
punished by prision mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical
injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those
who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.
The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as
follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting
and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several
persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of
the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased; and (f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious
physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified.[22] Based on case law, a tumultuous affray takes place
when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage tumultuous affray.[26] Therefore, the CA correctly held that
in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some Wacoy and Quibac's act of mauling Aro was the proximate
person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be cause[27] of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held
ascertained.[23] criminally liable therefor, specifically for the crime of Homicide.

On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention
penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads: that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical injuries on
Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty
Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the
therefor in its maximum period,[28] pursuant to Article 49 of the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without the
RPC. The said provision reads:
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the
punished by reclusion temporal. crime committed is different from that intended. - In cases in
which the felony committed is different from that which the
The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was
offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be
killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying
observed.
circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is
presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher
qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or
than that corresponding to the offense which the accused
Infanticide.[24]
intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall
be imposed in its maximum period.
In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between
groups of persons in the course of which Aro died. On the
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower
contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only
than that corresponding to the one which the accused intended
two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one
to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its
defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking
maximum period.
turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor victim. There was
no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not
reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident.[25] Since Wacoy
be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also
and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro,
constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law
the latter's death cannot be said to have been caused in a
prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not
which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated to end the life of Aro.
crime shall be imposed in the maximum period.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac,
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply
the CA correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment for an
where the crime committed is different from that intended and
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, taking into consideration the
not intended by the offender result from his felonious act
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
(praeter intentionem),[29] as in this case. It is well-settled that if
the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors,
Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the
intent to kill is conclusively presumed.[30] In such case, even if
original amount of P50,000.00 each are increased to P75,000.00
there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with
each in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.[33] All
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
other awards, as well as the imposition of interest at the rate of
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and
six percent (6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the
holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
date of finality of judgment until the same are fully paid, are
thereof.[31]
retained.
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the
December 6, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2014 of the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are
wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners
Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In determining the
Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are
presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide
intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and external
Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
overt acts.[32] In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance
so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. They are
is available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the
indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the
mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs
of Elner Aro the amounts of P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and P75,000.00 as moral
damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 131421, November 18, 2002 ]
GERONIMO DADO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of
Appeals[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the
decision[2] dated April 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056, finding
petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso
guilty of the crime of homicide.
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo
Dado and accused Francisco Eraso were charged with murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay
Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza, Province of Sultan Kudarat,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one
SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned
weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter
which caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code of the Philippines, with the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of superior strength.[3]
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-
accused pleaded not guilty.[4] Trial thereafter followed.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses
Alfredo Balinas[5] and Rufo Alga[6] are as follows: On the night of
May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station
formed three teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay
Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of petitioner
SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso,
Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio
Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were
both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves
between petitioner, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and
accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle.
They were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and
were about 2 arms length away from each other. At around 11:00
of the same evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a
distance of 50 meters. Though it was a moonless night, they
noticed that he was half-naked. When he was about 5 meters
away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso,
who was on his right side, was making some movements. Balinas
told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light,
Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner, who was on the left side of
Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim
shouted, “Tay Dolfo, ako ini,” (“Tay Dolfo, [this is] me”)[7] as he
fell on the ground. The victim turned out to be Silvestre “Butsoy”
Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler
the team were ordered to intercept. Repentant of what he did,
accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas saying, “Pare, this was
not intentionally done and this was merely an accident.”[8]
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he
sustained. The post-mortem examination conducted on his
cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following results:
Gunshot wounds located at:
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter
of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially and exiting at the right inner arm,
about 4 cm below the elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter (Point of
Exit).
No powder burns noted.
2. (Point of Entry) – 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-
inner thigh, about 5 cm from the ischial spine. Exposed were the
damaged muscles, blood vessels and the surrounding tissues
along the femoral triangle. The wound coursed upwards toward
the pelvic area through the inguinal canal with blast injuries
noted [at] the urinary bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of the
ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the
surrounding vessels and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding
was noted along the injured pelvic area. Three (3) pieces of
irregularly shaped metallic slugs were recovered from the body;
one, silvery colored, along the iliac spine almost glued to the
bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder
substance; three, copper colored, embedded in blasted
substance almost on the pelvic floor. Hematoma noted along the
penile area.
No other injuries noted.[9]
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused
the death of the victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner
thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in the
pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped metallic
fragments. Dr. Antenor added that the position of the victim at
that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant
considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She
added that the wound on the victim’s right outer lateral arm
alone, would not bring about death, unless not immediately
treated.[10]
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the
three metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the
victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet,
thus:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
xxx xxx xxx
1. Evidence marked “SB-1” is a part of a copper jacket of a
caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel
of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.
2. Evidence marked “SB-2” and “SB-3” could be parts of the
lead core of evidence copper jacketed marked “SB-1”.
xxx xxx x x x.[11]
On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether
the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit “SB-2” and “SB-
3”) recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts
of “SB-1” which is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm.
jacketed bullet.[12]
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident,
he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. He claimed that while
waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team positioned
themselves beneath a big hole from which a big tree had been
uprooted. He was facing eastward while his companions, CAFGU
members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, were
facing southwards. When he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought
they were being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he
immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when
accused Eraso embraced and asked forgiveness from Alfredo
Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot.[13]
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the
rapid gun burst which he thought to be from their enemies came
from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm was then
broken making it difficult for him to move. Thus, when he heard
the gun burst, he did not turn to face the source thereof and
instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared that
his purpose in firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite the source of
the rapid gun burst was to demoralize their enemy.[14]
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused
Eraso of the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court
finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court hereby sentences the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and
Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late
Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was
duly established in relation to the expenses incurred for the
complete funeral services given to the deceased victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and
to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[15]
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals on June 26, 1997.[16]
A petition for review[17] was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but
the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 11,
1998,[18] which became final and executory on March 30,
1998.[19] Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has become final.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition
contending that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred: (1)
in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso;
and (2) in finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the
evidence presented by the prosecution.
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused
Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer
necessary to establish who caused the fatal wound inasmuch as
conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner
will readily show that the prosecution failed to allege the
circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information
states: “ x x x the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and
shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned
weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter
which caused his instantaneous death. x x x” Undoubtedly, the
information does not satisfy the requirement that conspiracy
must be conveyed in “appropriate language.”[20] The words
“conspired,” “confederated,” or the phrase “acting in concert” or
“in conspiracy,” or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear
in the indictment. The language used by the prosecution in
charging the petitioner and his co-accused contains no reference
to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from
the information. Absent particular statements in the accusatory
portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act
constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against
the petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his
own acts or omissions.[21] In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. To ensure that the due process rights of
an accused are observed, every indictment must embody the
essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable
particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place of
commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.[22]
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the
information, the same cannot be considered against the
petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Although the agreement need not be directly
proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must
nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense
itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per
se sufficient proof of conspiracy.[23]
In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso’s seemingly
concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a
spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to
kill the victim. Simultaneity alone would not be enough to
demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and
purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two
or more individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar, the
incident occurred at the spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there
should be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense.[24]
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or
omissions which can be proved to have been committed by him
personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if any,
should be determined on an individual rather than on a collective
basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer for the acts done
by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he
participated directly and personally in the commission of those
acts. It becomes important therefore to determine whether
petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the death
of the victim.
The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger
entrance wound as compared to a 5.56 mm. bullet which is of a
lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of
the victim must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet because
said wound had a bigger entrance than the wound sustained by
the victim on the right outer lateral arm.[25] However, this
conclusion is entirely devoid of basis because no evidence was
presented to substantiate said conclusions. What is decisive is the
result of the Ballistic Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician
Elmer D. Piedad, on the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the
fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that one of said
fragments, marked “SB-1,” “is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber
5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a
caliber 5.56 mm. firearm,”[26] and not a part of a .45 caliber
bullet.[27] Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:
Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of
paper … marked “A-1”. This refer to the very same Exhibit “A-1”?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x x
x xxx
Q: …Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1
is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet;
how did you arrive?
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper
jacket, that is upper part of the bullet, sir.
Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a
copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed]
bullet fired from [a] 5.56 mm., and I found out that the lands and
grooves of the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is
riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they have the same lands and
grooves.
Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?
A: A bullet comparison microscope.[28]
x x x x x
x xxx
ATTY. PASOK:
x x x x
x xxx
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the
composition of the bullet of [a] .45 caliber and that of [an]
armalite?
A: Copper jacket.
Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and
that of armalite?
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).
Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit “2”, SB
-1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be bullet from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-
16?
A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56
mm. and the lead core evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3
could be parts of the copper jacket evidenced (sic) marked SB-
1.[29]
x x x x
x xxx
Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit “3-A”, in page 2 under
the column, “Findings and Conclusions” and I quote:
“Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and ‘SB-3’ could be parts of the lead
core of evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked [as] ‘SB-1’. My
question, you said could be part of copper jacket marked SB-1,
are you telling the Court, you are sure that this Exhibits “SB-2”
and “SB-3” [are] not … part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-
1?
x
A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
COURT:
Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of
5.56 mm. caliber ammunition, would you say that the same
would be part of the lead core of the copper jacket of a different
caliber or ammunition?
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the
lead core could be parts. We cannot evidently conclude. It could
be parts of copper jacket evidenced marked SB-1.
There is no basis.
COURT:
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper
jacket?
x
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but
something in caliber .38 copper jacket, rubber putted and
lead (sic).
Q: How about .45 firearm?
A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper
putted (sic) or lead.
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
COURT:
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and
conclusion that the evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and SB-3
could be possibly parts of the lead core or the
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: Could be, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross for the prosecution.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
x x x x
x xxx
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic),
some lead.
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in
your findings in Exhibit “2”, particularly SB-1, you made it appear
that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not from a .45
caliber?
A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.
Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper
jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm…
because it is only a part.
COURT:
Q: But you said it could be a part?
A: It is a part, Your Honor.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and
copper jacket of .45 caliber?
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that
to a caliber 5.56 mm. copper jacket fired from armalite under a
microscope, the lands and grooves of the copper jacket and the
standard bullet fired from 5.56., they are the same in width.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen
x
marked SB-1?
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and
grooves is too wide, the lands and grooves of .45 caliber is very
wide.
They are not the same.
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm.
compared to a .45 caliber?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very
wide.[30]
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to
whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit “SB-
2” and “SB-3”) are indeed parts of the lead core of the “SB-1”,
which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed
bullet, must be resolved in favor of petitioner; that is, said
metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45
caliber bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under
equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in
equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The
equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is
found lacking.[31]
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic
fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired
by petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good
conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the
wound inflicted on the victim’s right outer lateral arm for the
same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral
certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from
petitioner’s .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The
Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired
his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to
prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the
victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether
petitioner aimed to kill the victim.[32] Intent to kill cannot be
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms
is dangerous to life.[33] Animus interficendi must be established
with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other
elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not
be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such
intent beyond reasonable doubt.[34]
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim,
petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge
of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code.[35] The
elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a
firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender
has no intention to kill that person.[36] Though the information
charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted
of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily
included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule
120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when
there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the
accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal
discharge of firearm is punishable with prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods There being no modifying
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and
eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886,
affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide
is SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado
guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11)
months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015 ]
ARNULFO A.K.A. ARNOLD JACABAN, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the
Decision[1] dated July 30, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu
City, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 13, Cebu City, finding petitioner guilty of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 8294.
An Information was filed with the RTC, Branch 13, Cebu
City[2] charging petitioner with violation of PD 1866 as amended
by RA 8294, to wit:
That on or about the 16th day of July 1999, at about 12:45 A.M.,
in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did
then and there have in his possession and control the following
articles, to wit:
1. One (1) cal. 45 pistol “Llama Gabilondo” with SN515090
2. One (1) stainless magazine for caliber 45 pistol loaded with
seven (7) rounds of Live ammunitions for caliber .45
3. Three (3) short magazines for caliber 5.56 mm containing fifty-
nine rounds of live ammos
4. Two (2) long magazines for caliber 5.56 mm containing fifty-
five (55) rounds of live ammos
5. One (1) Bandoler for caliber 5.56 mm
6. One (1) bullet [links] for caliber 7.62 mm with twenty-eight (28)
rounds of live ammos for caliber 7.62 mm
7. One (1) bullet clips for caliber 30 M1 Garrand Rifle containing
eight (8) rounds of live ammos
8. One (1) plastic sachet containing five (5) rounds of live ammos
for caliber 5.56 mm
9. Six (6) rounds live ammos for caliber 7.62 mm
10. One (1) pair Upper Handguard for caliber 5.56 mm M16 rifle
11. One (1) damage carrying handle for caliber 5.56 rifle.
without first securing the necessary license/permit issued
therefor from any competent authority.
Contrary to law.[3]
On July 19, 1999, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty
to the charge.[4]
Trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Evidence for the prosecution established that on July 15, 1999,
Police Senior Inspector Ipil H. Dueñas (P/SInsp. Dueñas) of the
now defunct Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) filed an Application for Search Warrant before Branch
22 of the RTC, Cebu City, to search the premises of [appellant's]
residence at J. Labra St., Guadalupe, Cebu City and seize the
following items.
One (1) 7.62 cal M-14 Rifle;
Two (2) 5.56 mm M16 Armalite Rifle;
One (1) 12 gauge Shotgun;
One (1) .45 cal. Pistol;
One (1) .9 mm cal. Pistol
A Search Warrant was then immediately issued to the applicant
by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos.
At about 12:45 in the morning of July 16, 1999, the search
warrant was implemented by P/S Insp. Dueñas as the team
leader, SPO2 Eric Mendoza, SPO2 Eric Abellana. PO1 Allan
Jalagpas, PO3 Epifania Manila Sarte and other members of the
PAOCTF. Before reaching appellant's house, the policemen
invited three (3) barangay tanods from Guadalupe's Barangay
outpost to accompany them to the house of the appellant.
Upon arrival to appellant's house, SPO2 Abellana served the
search warrant to appellant who was just inside the house
together with his wife and other ladies. Upon informing appellant
of the search warrant, he became angry and denied having
committed any illegal activity. P/SInsp. Dueñas assured appellant
that he had nothing to worry about if the PAOCTF would not find
anything.
The team proceeded to search the living room in the presence of
three tanods and the appellant himself. The team continued to
search the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 placed
in the ceiling. Appellant, who was at the living room that time,
rushed to the room and grappled with SPO2 Abellana but failed
to get hold of the gun.
After an exhaustive search was done, other firearms and
ammunitions were recovered from the searched premises. An
inventory was made at the living room of appellant in the
presence of appellant himself, the barangay tanods and other
persons present during the search. After appellant and the
witnesses signed the inventory receipt, the team proceeded back
to their office with appellant and the confiscated items.
Police Officer IV Dionisio V. Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and
Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police-Visayas (FED
PNP-Visayas), testified that he prepared a certification dated
April 29, 2002. Based on their office's master, appellant is not
licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition.
For the defense, they presented witness Felipenerie Jacaban,
older sister of the appellant, who testified as to her presence
during the conduct of the search. According to Felipenerie, at
about 12:45 in the morning of July 16, 1999, policemen
conducted a raid in the house of Gabriel Arda (uncle of appellant).
The policemen who implemented the warrant were looking for
his brother, herein appellant, so she went to appellant's house
and informed him that a raid was conducted at their uncle's
house and policemen were looking for him. When appellant
arrived at his uncle's house, policemen searched around the
house and a pistol was subsequently recovered. Felipenerie
claims that the recovered pistol was allegedly pledged by a
policeman to her father. She also testified that appellant never
made any protest and merely observed the proceeding.[5]
On July 12, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[6] convicting
petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding ACCUSED
ARNULFO a.k.a. ARNOLD JACABAN GUILTY of the crime of
violation of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 and sentences him
to a penalty of imprisonment of from SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS AND EIGHT
(8) MONTHS, as maximum, plus fine in the amount of P30,000.
With cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In so ruling, the RTC found that the prosecution had established
all the elements of the crime charged. Petitioner was in
possession of the firearm, ammunitions and other items with
intent to possess the same as they were found inside his house;
and he had no license or permit to possess the same from any
competent authority. The RTC did not give credence to
petitioner’s claim that he is not the owner of the house but his
uncle, Gabriel Arda, as the latter did not testify at all and was not
in the house at the time of the raid. It was petitioner and his wife
who were at the house at 12:45 a.m. of July 16, 1999; and that
petitioner did not protest his arrest.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA. After the respective
briefs had been filed, the case was submitted for decision.
On July 30, 2008, the CA issued its assailed Decision which
affirmed in toto the RTC decision.
The CA agreed with the RTC’s conclusion that the elements of the
crime charged were duly proved by the prosecution. Anent
petitioner’s claim of the alleged discrepancy in the testimony of
PO3 Sarte on the time the raid was conducted, the CA found the
same to be minor and did not damage the essential integrity of
the prosecution’s evidence in its material whole; and that such
discrepancy was explained by PO3 Sarte in her testimony.
Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioner.
Petitioner argues that the RTC decision finding him guilty of the
crime charged is premised on its erroneous conclusion that he is
the owner the house where the unlicensed firearms and
ammunitions were found. He reiterated his claim that there was
discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time the raid
was conducted.
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[8] As such, we are not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below. The findings of
facts by a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on the Supreme Court.[9] This rule, however, is not
without exceptions.[10] However, petitioner failed to show that
his case falls under any of the exceptions.
Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, provides:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if the
firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those
with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter
such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser calibered firearms
but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22
center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of
full automatic and by burst of two or three: Provided, however,
That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the existence of
subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed
or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for
it.[11] The unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential
element of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition.[12] What the law requires is merely possession,
which includes not only actual physical possession, but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s
control and management.[13]
Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession
without the requisite authority or license, coupled with animus
possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused,
conviction for violation of the said law must follow. Animus
possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of Anent petitioner's argument that the house where the firearm
which is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It was found was not owned by him is not persuasive. We quote
may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the with approval what the RTC said in debunking such issue which
accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.[14] was affirmed by the CA, thus:
If the accused is not really the owner of the house where the
Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the
firearm, ammunitions and other items were found, he should
crime charged under PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294. The
have
existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was
established through the testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was an
protested his arrest. But in the instant case Felipenieri (sic)
inventory of the items seized which was made in the presence of
Jacaban said that there was no protest at all.
the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all voluntarily
signed the inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized
If the accused is not really the owner of the house raided by the
items in open court.
police officers, what was he and his wife doing there at 12:45 in
the morning?
It was convincingly proved that petitioner had constructive
possession of the gun and the ammunitions, coupled with the
The defense asserted that the house of the accused was already
intent to possess the same. Petitioner's act of immediately
demolished when the road fronting it was widened. But the
rushing from the living room to the room where SPO2 Abellana
defense failed to present the tax declaration covering the said
found a calibre .45 and grappled with the latter for the possession
house before it was demolished.
of the gun proved that the gun was under his control and
management. He also had the animus possidendi or intent to xxx xxx xxx
possess the gun when he tried to wrest it from SPO2 Abellana.
Gabriel Arda, the alleged owner of the house did not testify. He
Petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearm was
was allegedly suffering from hypertension. The defense,
established by the testimony of Police Officer IV Dionisio V.
however, did not file a motion to take his deposition.
Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosive Division of the
Philippine National Police-Visayas (FED-PNP- Visayas) that
Felipenieri likewise testified that at the time of the raid, the
petitioner is not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or
owner of the house was not present. Her testimony bolsters the
ammunition based on the FED-PNP master list.
fact that Gabriel Arda is not really the owner of the house where evidence in its material whole, nor should it reflect adversely on
the raid was conducted.[15] the witness' credibility as it erases suspicion that the same was
perjured. Here, prior testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time of the
Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house
raid is considered only a trivial matter which is not even enough
where the items were recovered, the ownership of the house is
to destroy or discredit her credibility. Besides, she was able to
not an essential element of the crime under PD 1866 as amended.
explain her mistake when she previously stated that the search
While petitioner may not be the owner, he indeed had control of
was conducted at 12:45 noon of July 16, 1999 instead of 12:45 in
the house as shown by the following circumstances: (1) When the
the morning as she was hungry when she first testified. The
PAOCTF went to the house to serve the search warrant, petitioner
record likewise does not reveal that PO3 Sarte was actuated by
was very angry and restless and even denied having committed
ill-motive in so testifying against appellant. Thus, when there is
any illegal act, but he was assured by P/SInsp. Dueñas that he has
nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper
nothing to answer if they would not find anything, thus, he
motives, her positive declarations on the witness stand, made
consented to the search being conducted; (2) while the search
under solemn oath, deserve full faith and credence.[16]
was ongoing, petitioner merely observed the conduct of the
search and did not make any protest at all; and (3) petitioner did The RTC sentenced petitioner to an imprisonment of six (6) years
not call for the alleged owner of the house. and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years and
eight (8) months, as maximum, plus fine in the amount of
As to the alleged discrepancy in PO3 Sarte's testimony as to the P30,000.00. The CA upheld the RTC. Under PD 1866, as amended
time the search was conducted, we agree with the CA when it by RA 8294, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
found: classified as high powered, like cal. 45, is prision mayor minimum
and a fine of P30,000.00. Applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Appellant likewise questions the discrepancies in the testimony
Code, the maximum period of the imposable penalty cannot
of prosecution witness PO3 Epifania Sarte. Appellant contends
exceed prision mayor minimum in its medium period, there being
that PO3 Sarte could not even testify correctly as to the time the
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, i.e., six (6) years, eight
raid was conducted. According to appellant, the established fact
(8) months and one (1) day to seven (7) years and four (4) months.
on records shows that it was conducted past midnight of July 16,
The minimum period, as provided in the Indeterminate Sentence
1999 while witness PO3 Sarte asserted that it was conducted at
Law, shall be within the range of prision correccional in its
12:45 high noon of said date.
maximum period, i.e., four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day to six (6) years, the penalty next lower in degree to prision
It bears stressing that minor discrepancies might be found in her
mayor minimum.[17] Thus, the minimum penalty imposable
testimony, but this does not damage the essential integrity of the
must be modified. Albeit, PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, is
a malum prohibitum and that the Revised Penal Code is generally
not applicable, it has been held that when a special law, which is
a malum prohibitum, adopts the nomenclature of the penalties
in the Revised Penal Code, the latter law shall apply.[18]

While in 2013, RA 10951 entitled “An Act Providing for a

Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunitions and Providing
Penalties for Violation Thereof” took effect, the same finds no
application in this case as the law provides for stiffer penalties
which is not at all favorable to the accused.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the

Court of Appeals, dated July 30, 2008, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional in its maximum period, as
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor minimum in its medium period, as maximum,
and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.