Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure

ISSN: 2378-9689 (Print) 2378-9697 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsri20

The Centerville Virtual Community: a fully

integrated decision model of interacting physical
and social infrastructure systems

Bruce R. Ellingwood, Harvey Cutler, Paolo Gardoni, Walter Gillis Peacock,

John W. van de Lindt & Naiyu Wang

To cite this article: Bruce R. Ellingwood, Harvey Cutler, Paolo Gardoni, Walter Gillis Peacock,
John W. van de Lindt & Naiyu Wang (2016) The Centerville Virtual Community: a fully integrated
decision model of interacting physical and social infrastructure systems, Sustainable and
Resilient Infrastructure, 1:3-4, 95-107, DOI: 10.1080/23789689.2016.1255000

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Sustainable and Resilient Infrastructure, 2016
VOL. 1, NOS. 3–4, 95–107
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23789689.2016.1255000

The Centerville Virtual Community: a fully integrated decision model of

interacting physical and social infrastructure systems
Bruce R. Ellingwooda, Harvey Cutlerb, Paolo Gardonic, Walter Gillis Peacockd, John W. van de Lindta and
Naiyu Wange
a
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Center for Risk-based Community Resilience Planning, Colorado State University, Fort
Collins, CO, USA; bDepartment of Economics, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO, USA; cDepartment of Civil and Environmental Engineering,
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, IL, USA; dDepartment of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning, Texas A&M University, College
Station, TX, USA; eSchool of Civil Engineering and Environmental Science, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

Enhancing community resilience in the future will require new interdisciplinary systems-based Received 23 October 2016
approaches that depend on many disciplines, including engineering, social and economic, and Accepted 27 October 2016
information sciences. The National Institute of Standards and Technology awarded the Center for KEYWORDS
Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning to Colorado State University and nine other universities Civil infrastructure; life cycle
in 2015, with the overarching goal of establishing the measurement science for community engineering; natural hazards;
resilience assessment. The Centerville Virtual Community Testbed is aimed at enabling fundamental resilience; risk-informed
resilience assessment algorithms to be initiated, developed, and coded in a preliminary form, and decision
tested before the refined measurement methods and supporting data classifications and databases
necessary for a more complete assessment have fully matured. This paper introduces the Centerville
Testbed, defining the physical infrastructure within the community, natural hazards to which it is
exposed, and the population demographics necessary to assess potential post-disaster impacts on
the population, local economy, and public services that are described in detail in the companion
papers of this Special Issue.

1. Introduction
Community resilience depends on the performance of the
built environment, including buildings, integrated trans-
portation systems, telecommunication facilities, water/
wastewater systems, and power generation and distribu-
tion systems, and on supporting social, economic, and
public institutions which, individually and collectively, are
essential for immediate response and long-term recovery
within the community following a disaster. The resilience
of a community is defined by the ability of its physical
and non-physical infrastructure (core built environ-
ment, social institutions, and its people) to return to a
level of normalcy within a reasonable time following the
occurrence of an event. Community resilience goals are
based on socioeconomic needs and objectives (such as
post-disaster recovery) and may differ for each commu-
nity based on demographics, resources, and past experi-
ence with hazards. Science-based measurement tools to
evaluate performance and resilience at community scales,
fully integrated supporting databases, and risk-informed
decision frameworks to support optimal technical and
social policies aimed at enhancing community resilience
are at a rudimentary stage of development; many are
empirical in nature, with a dearth of supporting phys-
ics-based modeling methodologies. Modeling the resil-
ience of communities and cities to natural disasters and
advancing best practices from research to implementation
depends on many disciplines, including engineering and
socioeconomic and information sciences.
Traditional engineering approaches to risk manage-
ment are standards-based, and focus on the performance
of individual hazards and facilities. Recent disasters have
revealed shortcomings in building practices that focus
on performance of individual facilities; specifically, the
inability of individual facilities to perform their func-
tions because of failure of other community infrastruc-
ture systems that these facilities depend on to function.
These standards are promulgated by different professional
groups and agencies, with essentially no coordination in
their development. Additionally, the levels of performance

CONTACT  Bruce R. Ellingwood  Bruce.Ellingwood@colostate.edu

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
96   B. R. ELLINGWOOD ET AL.
that they produce are inconsistent; nor are the measures
of safety and functionality consistent with the large uncer-
tainties in natural hazards. As a result, risks from com-
peting natural hazards cannot be benchmarked, making
it difficult to compare the effectiveness of risk mitigation
strategies. Finally, risks due to natural hazards may not be
properly priced by insurance or financial institutions or
by governmental agencies.
The need for advancing best practices for commu-
nity resilience has been highlighted by the performance
during the past two decades of the built environment
under natural disasters, and the impact of such disasters
on the socioeconomic institutions and systems neces-
sary for community well-being. The effects of disasters
as Hurricanes Andrew, Katrina, and Ike, Superstorm
Sandy, the Northridge Earthquake and the Joplin, MO
Tornado are well-known from the extensive post-dis-
aster reports in the literature (e.g. Dashti et al., 2014;
Kuligowski, Lombardo, Phan, Levitan, & Jorgensen, 2014;
Maranghides & McNamara, 2016; National Institute of
Standards and Technology [NIST], 2006; van de Lindt
et al., 2007). The losses due to such events are increas-
ing more rapidly than the growth in population or the
Gross Domestic Product. The potential exists for even
larger losses in the future, given that population and
infrastructure development in hazard-prone areas of the
United States are increasing dramatically. Moreover, in
recent years, there has been growing evidence that global
climate change may affect both the frequency and severity
of the extreme events from natural hazards. The poten-
tial effect of climate change-related hazards on civil infra-
structure facilities is likely to become a major concern
for urban developers, regulatory authorities, and other
decision-makers (American Society of Civil Engineers
[ASCE], 2015). Finally, life cycle performance, sustain-
ability, safety, reliability, and risk have become emergent
issues for civil infrastructure systems exposed to recur-
ring extreme natural or man-made events, which involve
large (and often deep (Cox Jr, 2012)) uncertainties. Public
and private resources available to manage risks to natural
hazards are limited and must be targeted to maximize the
benefits to communities.
The national imperative of community resilience
(National Academies, 2012) has been recognized at the
Federal level through 21 (PPD-21), issued in 2013. To
advance resilience assessment in response to this a call
for action, numerous agencies have initiated programs
to enhance resilience on multiple scales, including the
U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) through its RSB
and CRISP initiatives, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) through its community resil-
ience initiatives, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) through its Centers of Excellence focused on
critical infrastructure programs and its Regional Resilience
Assessment Program (RRAP), the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) through its Complex
Adaptive System Composition and Design Environment
(CASCADE) program. A number of states – California
and Oregon, to name two – also have state-wide initia-
tives. The Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities
Program (http://www.100resilientcities.org) is typical
of similar programs spearheaded by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), while the SPUR program in San
Francisco (Poland, 2013) directed at earthquake hazards
and the Boulder, CO Community Resilience Program
(http://www.bouldercounty.org/flood/communityresil-
iency/pages/default.aspx) directed at floods typify local
government-sponsored local initiatives. These programs
all seek a fundamental understanding of the interdisci-
plinary science and engineering underlying community
resilience, while decidedly pursuing practical implemen-
tations in which community management may play a
significant role.
Based on a prior needs assessment (McAllister, 2013),
the NIST developed the Community Resilience Planning
Guide (NIST, 2015), now being adopted by many commu-
nities in the U.S., and established the Center of Excellence
for Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning in 2015.
Consistent with NIST’s fundamental mission, the Center’s
overarching goal is to establish the measurement science
and technology to understand what makes a community
resilient. The center’s research program is being conducted
in three major research thrusts. Thrust 1 is developing a
multidisciplinary computational environment with fully
integrated supporting databases, known as IN-CORE
(Interdependent Networked Community Resilience),
which will enable the interrelationships between phys-
ical and social infrastructure systems that determine
community resilience to be fully understood and will
facilitate resilience planning and risk communication
among stakeholders. Thrust 2 is producing a standard-
ized data ontology, robust data architectures, and effec-
tive data management tools to support the computational
environment developed in Thrust 1. Thrust 3 is validating
the resilience data architecture through a series of testbeds
and hindcasts that stress the process of data collection,
its integration into the computational modeling environ-
ment, and decision algorithms. All thrusts and tasks are
directed to eventually enabling community leaders and
decision-makers to answer the following questions: How
resilient is my community? What decisions and invest-
ments should we make to improve resilience and make a
measurable improvement in my community? How can I
deal with uncertainty and risk in natural hazards?
Community resilience assessment is inherently an inter-
disciplinary endeavor, involving engineers, climatologists,

and geophysicists, computer science and information/
communication technology, social, economic, and politi-
cal sciences (including the law), and philosophy/ethics. All
disciplines must interface with community stakeholders
and decision-makers to effectively advance best practices
for community resilience. To this end, the center has ini-
tiated several testbeds and hindcasts to give specialists in
vastly different fields the motivation and experience to
work in interdisciplinary teams toward a common pur-
pose on common community models. The Centerville
Virtual Community Testbed, introduced in this paper and
described in more detail in the other papers in this Special
Issue, is aimed at enabling the fundamental algorithms
in IN-CORE to be initiated, developed in a preliminary
form, and tested at an early stage of the center research
program before the refined measurement methods, data
ontology, and databases for modeling physical and social
infrastructure systems and networks have fully matured.
In particular, its primary purpose is to test the modeling
and linkages between relatively simple but inter-depend-
ent representations of physical infrastructure systems and
the socioeconomic systems within the community, and to
inform the development of algorithms to estimate impact
of extreme events and recovery trajectories of systems that
are essential for its resilience (Xiao & Van Zandt, 2012).
The Centerville Virtual Community Testbed is designed
specifically to stress the algorithms that later will be
incorporated in IN-CORE, to allow issues of scalability in
community infrastructure modeling to be addressed, and
to inform the development of more refined community
Figure 1. Plan of Centerville.
SUSTAINABLE AND RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE   97
resilience assessment methods later in the center research
program.
This paper introduces the Centerville Virtual
Community Testbed, summarizing its basic built envi-
ronment and demographics. These features are elaborated
in the five remaining papers in this Special Issue.
2.  Description of Centerville
Centerville is a city of approximately 50,000, situated in
a Midwestern State in the United States. It is a typical
middle-class city in most respects, with a median house-
hold income that is close to the U.S. average, although
there are pockets of low-to-moderate income residents.
The population of Centerville is growing at approximately
1.5% annually. The Centerville economy is reasonably
well diversified, and consists of light manufacturing and
industrial facilities, commercial/retail, finance and pro-
fessional services, health care, education, public services,
and tourism.
A schematic of Centerville is shown in Figure 1. The
city is approximately rectangular in shape, 8 by 5 miles (13
by 8 km) in dimension. The Rock River runs through the
center portion of the city, and there is a railway line that
follows the east side of the river. The western side of the
city is hilly. There are seven residential neighborhoods,
with a high-income/low-density (HI/LD) development
abutting the western hills, and a mixture of middle-in-
come (MI), low-income (LI) residential areas around and
east of Interstate Highway I-99, which runs north–south.
98   B. R. ELLINGWOOD ET AL.

There is also a sizeable mobile home park adjacent to Table 2. Centerville employment by sector.
one of the industrial facilities, which is typical in many Sector Employees Employment (%)
Midwestern cities. Centerville has two commercial/retail Retail 8087 25
districts, one of which is along I-99 and the second is along Manufacturing 1923 6
Services 7921 25
the main East–West route through town. There are two Construction 2375 7
large (also known as ‘big-box’) stores near the intersec- Health care 3081 10
Education 589 2
tion of I-99 and HW0 in a newly developed area in the Professional business services 2795 9
southern part of the city. Local government facilities are Utilities 519 2
in the older center of town, near the river. There are two Government 4842 15
Total 32,132
relatively large industrial facilities, each of which employ
upward of 250–300 people. The first is a manufacturing
plant for a national marketer of light-frame steel storage Table 3. Centerville firms by sector.
buildings commonly used for industrial and agricultural
Sector Number of firms Percent of firms
storage, airports, and other repair facilities. The second is Retail 338 30.6
a storage and trans-shipment facility for an international Manufacturing 45 4.1
shipping company. There are several other smaller indus- Services 364 32.9
Construction 195 17.7
trial facilities. Many of these are located along the Rock Health care 80 7.2
River or a railroad which parallels the river. The hospital Education 7 .6
Professional business services 68 6.2
is a relatively large facility, which serves Centerville and Utilities 4 .4
the surrounding county and employs approximately 475 Government 4 .4
Total 1105  
professional and support staff. There are four public ele-
mentary schools, two middle schools, and one commu-
nity high school. There are no higher education facilities low-probability moderate to major seismic hazards. It is
in Centerville, although one of the State universities is also close to ‘tornado alley,’ and while it has not suffered a
located approximately 50 miles away. Only limited public direct hit, an EF3 tornado touched down two years ago in a
transportation is available, and most residents depend on rural area 10 miles west of the city. Thus, both earthquake
private automobiles for transportation. and tornado hazards must be considered in assessing the
resilience of the Centerville community. The Centerville
3.  Demographics of the Centerville population Testbed utilizes scenario tornado and earthquake hazards
in order to replicate the spatial correlation in the hazard
A summary of the demographics of the Centerville pop- demand on the built environment. Descriptions of the
ulation is presented in Table 1. tornado and earthquake hazards used in the Centerville
Twenty percent of households are headed by an indi- Testbed are provided in (Amini & van de Lindt, 2014; Lin
vidual with a college education, 60% by a high school & Wang, 2016; Standohar-Alfano & van de Lindt, 2014).
graduate, and 20% by an individual with less than a high
school diploma. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the number of
firms and employment by sector. 5.  The Centerville built environment
The physical infrastructure of the Centerville built
4.  Hazard identification and exposure environment is modeled with four physical infrastructure
components and systems – buildings, transportation
Centerville is located approximately 50  miles from the systems, water and electric power systems. These four systems
New Madrid Seismic Zone, and thus is susceptible to are selected for three reasons: (1) The fragility modeling
process for these four components is most mature, (2) They
Table 1. Population demographics of Centerville. represent three distinct infrastructure topologies: buildings
are distributed and discretized infrastructure, while
Demographic Value
Total population 50,000
transportation, water and power infrastructure systems
Total households 19,684 are described by networks, albeit of different resolutions,
Total male (proportion) .50 and (3) The interdependence between two systems – water
Total female (proportion) .50
0–17 years (proportion) .19 and electrical power – can be examined (see Guidotti
18–64 years (proportion) .64 et al., 2016 in this issue). All four systems are essential to
65 years and over (proportion) .17
Median household income $51.646 the health and welfare of any community, and thus must
Total owner occupied (proportion) .50 play a central role in any community resilience assessment,
Total renter occupied (proportion) .50
regardless of community size or location.
 SUSTAINABLE AND RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE   99

5.1.  Centerville building inventory – occupancies Table 4. Building occupancy and number of units.
and construction types Residential 13,538
Single-family with 1 Dwelling Unit Per Structure 13,436
The building inventory in Centerville covers a wide array Multi-family with 48 Dwelling Units Per Structure 102
of construction. Although the older section of town Commercial/retail/government 800
adjacent to the river dates back to early in the twenti- Retail establishments 250
Professional/personal/financial services 450
eth century, most of the current construction dates from Entertainment 100
the post-WWII era or later, and a significant amount of Industrial 125
Special/miscellaneous 10
retail and residential development has occurred around Grade schools 4
the perimeter of Centerville since 1980. There was a large Middle Schools 2
High school 1
construction push in the decade following WWII, espe- Regional hospital 1
cially in single-family residences. The vast majority of Fire stations 2
buildings are three stories or less in height; in the retail and
industrial sectors, these include steel braced frames, ordi-
nary reinforced concrete frames and reinforced masonry Table 5. Building construction in Centerville.
bearing wall buildings. The older section of town around Occupancy ID Building types
the river contains a significant stock of one- and two-story Residential R1 SF, 1-story, Wood, 1400 ft2, 1945–1970
unreinforced masonry buildings, many of which have R2 SF, 1-story, Wood, 2400 ft2, 1985–2000
R3 SF, 2-story, Wood, 3200 ft2, 1985–2000
been converted to residential lofts during the past 20 years R4 SF. 1-story with basement, Wood, 2400 ft2,
as people have begun to migrate back to the center of 1970–1985
the city. Table 4 summarizes the number of buildings by R5 MF, 3-sto, 48-unit multi-family (12,000 ft2/
floor), 1985
occupancy type. R6 SF, Mobile home
Table 5 summarizes the basic 16 building archetypes, Commercial/retail C1 1-story, Steel Braced frame, 50,000 ft2, 1980
C2 2-story, RC frame, 50,000 ft2, 1980
in terms of occupancy and structural systems, that are C3 2-story, Reinforced masonry, 25,000 ft2, 1960
used to assemble the building inventory of Centerville. C4 Tilt-up concrete 125,000 ft2 (similar to a
Walmart or Home Depot), 1995
These buildings are of different structure types and ages Industrial I1 2-story, steel braced frame, 100,000 ft2, 1975
(and thus design criteria). Damage to buildings in dif- I2 1-story, steel braced frame, 500,000 ft2, 1995
Special S1 4-story, Hospital, RC, 30,000 ft2/floor, 1980
ferent occupancy categories due to natural hazards may S2 2-story, Fire Station, Reinf. masonry, 10,000
result in different socioeconomic impact (job loss, dis- ft2, 1985
placement or dislocation of residents in the community, S3 3-story, School, RC, 100,000 ft2, 1990
S4 1-story, School, lightly reinforced masonry,
resource loss, etc.). Building ID C4 is included to capture 100,000 ft2
the economic impact of retail facilities, e.g. a Walmart or
Home Depot, because these are major sources of jobs in
Centerville. The buildings listed in the table are relatively performance and social performance and economic
simple, but are sufficient to capture the impact of the sce- impact of the natural hazards.
nario hazards considered herein on the Centerville build- Past resilience assessment of buildings has focused on
ing inventory. The uncertainties in building performance minimizing direct and indirect losses through enhanced
under earthquake and tornado hazards for four damage system robustness as well as more effective recovery strat-
states – minor, moderate, extensive, and complete – are egies (Bruneau et al., 2003; Chang & Shinozuka, 2004;
captured by fragility curves, which describe the condi- Cimellaro, Reinhorn, & Bruneau, 2010). The direct losses
tional probabilities that buildings suffer these damage are estimated using fragility functions for structural and
states, given a single-variable intensity measure from the non-structural components, while the indirect losses are
scenario hazard. In the case of the scenario earthquake, assessed using recovery functions that reflect the goals of
the intensity measure is the spectral acceleration at the the community. Furthermore, previous research on dam-
fundamental period of the building, while for the scenario age and loss estimation for building portfolios (Ploeger,
tornado, the intensity measure is the 3-s gust wind speed. Atkinson, & Samson, 2010) generally has treated individ-
Typical seismic fragilities for a steel braced frame and ual building damage and losses as if they were statistically
for a steel frame with partially restrained connections, independent, leading to an underestimation of total losses
both designed for a region of moderate seismicity, are (Vitoontus & Ellingwood, 2013). Only recently has the
illustrated in Figure 2(a) and (b) (Kinali & Ellingwood, positive quadrant dependence in demand, damage, and
2007). Further details on the building fragility modeling loss been considered (Lin & Wang, 2016; Lin, Wang, &
process for the building archetypes in Table 5 are summa- Ellingwood, 2016; Vitoontus & Ellingwood, 2013). This
rized in Lin and Wang (2016). These building fragilities paper focuses on prompt effects of a natural hazard, and
provide the interfaces between building infrastructure defers recovery modeling to a later study.
100   B. R. ELLINGWOOD ET AL.

5.2.  Social demographics 10,785 people in 4246 households. This neighborhood

As shown in Figure 1, there are seven distinct residen-
tial zones in Centerville, labeled Z1–Z7. Each residen-
tial area is defined as a collection of Census Tracts and
Block Groups by the U.S. Census Bureau, as summarized
in Table 6.
Residential Zone 1 is the HI/LD area of Centerville,
located west of I-99 in the hills. This neighborhood has
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. Typical fragilities for low-rise steel frames designed for
regions of low-to-moderate seismicity. (a) Seismic fragilities for a
two-story partially restrained steel frame, (b) Seismic fragilities for
a four-story partially restrained frame.
has the highest percentage of upper income households
and the lowest proportion of minority households. A
very small percentage of families in the neighborhood
live without access to a vehicle and a small percentage
used food stamps during the previous year.
Residential Zone 2 is an MI/LD area, located south of
Main St on the far east side of town. This neighborhood
has 7790 people in 3067 households. In this zone, 4% of
the inhabitants live without access to a vehicle and 5%
used food stamps during the previous year. Residential
Zone 3 is a second MI/LD area, located north of Main St
on the far east side of town. This neighborhood has 7549
people in 2972 households; in contrast to Zone 2, there
are a high proportion of renter-occupied households, 8%
of which live without access to a vehicle and 13% of which
used food stamps during the previous year. Residential
Zone 4 is the MI/HD area located south of Main St and
near I-99, with 4559 people in 1795 households. It is a
mixed majority–minority neighborhood, in which 12%
of families live without access to a vehicle and 16% used
food stamps during the previous year.
Residential Zone 5 is an LI/LD area, located south
of Main St, and sandwiched between the retail/busi-
ness area and the heavy industrial area, comprising
4714 people in 1856 households. The race and ethnic-
ity of the population in this area is similar to that of
Centerville as a whole. In this neighborhood, 20% of
families in the neighborhood live without access to a
vehicle and 17% used food stamps during the previous
year. Residential Zone 6 is an LI/HD area, located north
of Main St and east of the Rock River, with 4826 people
in 1900 households. The area is a majority–minority
mix, with a somewhat higher proportion of African-
American and Hispanic or Latino households. A large
percentage (12%) of families in the neighborhood live
without access to a vehicle and 19% used food stamps
during the previous year. Finally, residential Zone 7 is

Table 6. Number of Census Tracts, Block Groups, and buildings in each residential zone.
  Residential zone
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7
HI/LD MI/LD MI/LD MI/HD LI/LD LI/HD Mobile
Number of Census 3 2 3 3 3 6 2
Tracts
Number of Block 6 8 8 9 8 12 6
Groups
R1 SF, 1-story, Wood 0 767 300 2567 1856 700 0
R2 SF, 1-story, Wood 2000 700 300 1000 0 0 0
R3 SF, 2-story, Wood 50 0 0 0 0 0 0
R4 SF. 1-story, Wood, 2196 800 200 0 0 0 0
with basement
R5 MF, 3-sto, 48-unit 0 0 0 1200 0 3696 0
Wood
R6 Mobile Homes 0 0 0 0 0 0 1352

the Mobile Home Park of Centerville, located north of
Main St and east of a light industrial area. This neigh-
borhood has 9774 people in 3848 households. This
neighborhood also contains a majority–minority mix,
with the highest concentration of non-Hispanic Blacks
(37%) and a relatively high concentration of Hispanics
(34%). Furthermore, 23% of families in the neighbor-
hood live without access to a vehicle and 29% used food
stamps during the previous year.
Age, race, ethnicity, vacancy rates, and other demo-
graphic proportions summarized for the seven zones
above are based on other moderate-income communities
of similar population using American Community Survey
data collected between 2006 and 2010. Income data for
Centerville is based on Fort Collins Public Use Micro
Data (PUMS) (Cutler, Shields, Tavani, & Zahran, 2016).
Aggregating the data into seven relatively large neighbor-
hoods results in considerable socio-demographic hetero-
geneity within these areas, which might mask racial/ethnic
homogeneity (segregation) that would be evident in lower
levels of aggregation. Furthermore, household structure
was simplified, with the assumption that the total popu-
lation for each residential zone consisted of 2.54 persons
per household. While Centerville represents a simplified
version of neighborhood and worker structure, the rep-
resentation is sufficiently accurate to test the social and
Figure 3. Primary transportation network in Centerville.
SUSTAINABLE AND RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE   101
economic algorithms that are interfaced with the models
of physical infrastructure response to natural hazards.
5.3.  Transportation systems
Transportation infrastructure is comprised of mul-
ti-modal systems, such as bridge and roadway networks,
heavy and light-rail, airports, and port and maritime sys-
tems. Common themes in transportation system resilience
include models of component reliability under multiple
hazards, network performance, recovery, and impacts on
community functions. There is a significant body of work
on performance of transportation infrastructure subjected
to a single hazard, with emphasis on resilience assessment
of bridge networks (Bocchini & Frangopol, 2012; Ghosh,
Rokneddin, Padgett, & Dueñas-Osorio, 2014; NIST, 2016;
Sánchez-Silva, Frangopol, Padgett, & Soliman, 2016).
Work on other modes of transportation (e.g. railways, port
facilities) and on the role of spatial and temporal effects,
especially as they impact damage and functionality across
large-scale transportation networks, is much more limited.
Figure 3 shows the primary roadway network connecting
the residential, commercial/retail, and essential facilities
in Centerville (Zhang & Wang, 2016; Zhang, Wang, &
Nicholson, 2016). There are four bridges – B1, B2, B3,
and B4 – which connect the population centers to major
102   B. R. ELLINGWOOD ET AL.
commercial/retail employers, governmental facilities, the
high school, and the regional hospital on the west side of
the Rock River.
5.4.  Water system
Water systems are essential for public health and welfare,
and their main function is to provide a safe and relia-
ble supply of potable water. Water distribution networks
are large, distributed systems, and are subject to aging
and deterioration which may diminish their capability to
respond to extreme natural hazards (Kumar & Gardoni,
2014). Residential, commercial, industrial, and other users
depend on five key capabilities of the network: supply,
treatment, pumping, storage, and transmission (NIST,
2016). Earthquake-induced damage to buried pipelines
may cause leakage and pressure losses, resulting in a boil
order or inability to supply, i.e. loss of full functionality.
Loss of electrical power for pumping can disrupt supply
and cause a cascade of infrastructure failures that may
affect public safety and the economy on a regional scale.
Centerville’s major source of water is the Rock River and
it has its own water treatment facilities. The Centerville
Department of Public Works is responsible for designing,
constructing, operating, and maintaining the city’s water
and wastewater infrastructure. The model of the major
water distribution system is illustrated in Figure 4. Only
large diameter trunk lines are represented explicitly in
the model, while the small diameter distribution lines are
Figure 4. Water network in Centerville.
included in the demand nodes. This is a sufficient resolu-
tion for assessing the system performance at a community
scale under hazard events. It might be observed that the
water system is congruent to the major roadway system
summarized in Figure 2; it is common practice in urban
development to utilize the right-of-way for transportation
systems to locate other distributed infrastructure systems.
Additional details on the water system are provided in
Guidotti et al. (2016).
5.5.  Electrical power system
Electric power systems are comprised of generation, trans-
mission, and distribution systems, and are essential to
the proper functioning of most other civil infrastructure.
Most of the models used in previous resilience assess-
ment focus on the behavior of the generation facilities,
transmission towers, and substations and transformers,
but few focus on the towers and poles that comprise
the bulk of the distribution systems. Many researchers
have used some form of functionality models that cap-
ture the behavior of the physical network (see Ouyang &
Dueñas-Osorio, 2012 for a comprehensive review) or sys-
tems-based fragility models (e.g. Reed, Friedland, Wang,
& Massarra, 2016). The inclusion of the electric power
network in the Centerville Virtual Community Testbed
and the examination of its performance under scenario
tornado hazard (Unnikrishnan & van de Lindt, 2016) and
its interconnectivity with water pumps for seismic hazard

Figure 5. Electrical power generation, transmission, and distribution in Centerville.
(Guidotti et al., 2016) provide the opportunity to consider
its direct impact on the resilience of the community. The
transmission and distribution for electrical power in the
Centerville Community is illustrated in Figure 5. As with
the water system, the electrical power distribution system
utilizes the right-of-way for transportation systems.
6.  Measurement science for community
resilience planning
Community resilience assessment requires measurement
science to model performance of physical, social, and eco-
nomic infrastructure quantitatively; a set of metrics to
provide yardsticks of performance; and a risk-informed
decision framework that integrates these features into a
practical tool that reflects the uncertainties appropriately
and trades off investment versus consequences (Zhang &
Nicholson, 2016).
6.1.  The role of risk in community resilience
assessment
Risk has three fundamental ingredients: Likelihood (prob-
ability or mean annual frequency) of occurrence, which
characterizes the natural hazard and the response of infra-
structure to the demands it imposes; Consequences, in
terms of mortality and morbidity, direct and indirect eco-
nomic losses and downtime; and Decision Context, which
depends on the decision-maker and the overall socioec-
onomic and political framework in which the decision is
SUSTAINABLE AND RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE   103
made. The hazard is a potentially harmful event, action,
or state of nature. The potential for an earthquake or tor-
nado to damage a community is a hazard. The hazardous
event, if it occurs, has consequences – building damage or
collapse, loss of life or personal injury, loss of housing or
employment, economic losses, trauma or damage to the
environment – which must be measured in some manner.
Finally, there is the context, which provides a frame of
reference for the risk analysis, assessment, and decision.
As stakeholders to a community resilience assessment,
individuals, management groups, government agencies,
or other decision-makers may view risk differently (Slovic,
2000). Most individuals and small groups or communi-
ties are reluctant to undertake risky activities without an
expectation of some benefit; they are risk-averse, imply-
ing that they weigh losses more heavily than gains in
decision-making. On the other hand, governments and
large corporations, who tend to be self-insured, tend to
be risk-neutral, weighing gains and losses more or less
equally. Willingness on the part of individuals to accept
risk depends on whether the risk is undertaken voluntarily
or involuntarily and whether the individual perceives that
the risky situation can be managed. The element of famili-
arity or dread or the unknown in perception of risk plays a
significant role in whether the risk is tolerated or accepted.
The context also is determined by the necessity for risk
management, and how additional investment in risk
reduction is balanced against available resources. While
many design procedures for many physical infrastructure
facilities now are risk-informed (Ellingwood, 2001, 2007),
104   B. R. ELLINGWOOD ET AL.
acceptable risk in the built environment at the community
level remains undefined, a fact that is relevant to risk-in-
formed decisions regarding community resilience (Lounis
& McAllister, 2016). Risks associated with rare extreme
events invariably is relative, in the sense that they can be
determined only in the context of what is acceptable in
other activities, what investment is required to marginally
reduce the risk, and what losses might be incurred if the
risk were to increase. May (2004) has argued that rather
than to argue about what is acceptable risk, we should aim
at developing tools that would allow a decision-maker to
make informed choices about how to manage and mitigate
the risk.
A risk-informed decision process can be couched by
the following mathematical framework provided by the
theorem of total probability; in the simplest form, the
mean annual frequency, λLoss > θ, that the loss – severe
injury or death, direct damage costs, loss of housing units,
loss of employment, etc. – exceeds θ is:
∑ ∑
𝜆Loss > 𝜃 = H DS P[Loss > 𝜃|DS]P[DS|H]𝜆H (1)
in which λH = mean annual frequency of event H, often
expressed as a function of the intensity of the hazard
event (wind speed, spectral acceleration, or flood stage);
P[DS|H] = conditional probability of damage state, e.g.
negligible, minor, moderate, severe (HAZUS-MH, 2004);
and P[Loss>θ|DS] is the conditional probability that the
loss exceeds a limit on loss set by community leaders,
stakeholders, or regulatory authorities. The conditional
probability terms in Equation (1) often must be decon-
structed for practical analysis (Ellingwood, 2007), increas-
ing the dimensions and complexity of Equation (1) but
not its substance. Alternatively, the risk may be based on
a set of stipulated scenario events rather than on a hazard
with a random intensity, depending on the preferences of
the decision-maker and the difficulties in determining λH.
Each scenario hazard – e.g. the occurrence of a moment
magnitude Mw = 7 earthquake at an epicenter 40 km from
the center of Centerville at an epicenter 40 km from the
center of Centerville at 7 am on a Friday morning; the
occurrence of an EF4 tornado striking the business dis-
trict at 3:00 pm on a Wednesday afternoon – represents
a description of a unique event in time. For a scenario
event, the loss probability becomes conditional in nature:
∑ mance objectives for the community’s built environment
P[Loss > 𝜃|Hs ] = DS P[Loss > 𝜃|DS P[DS|Hs ] (2)
in which Hs = scenario event(s) selected. Equations (1)
and (2) also are the starting point for the calculation of
expected losses, E[Loss], if they, rather than mean annual
frequencies or probabilities of loss, are the decision varia-
bles of interest (Grossi & Kunreuther, 2005).
Equations (1) and (2) deconstruct the risk analysis into
its major constituents and required technical disciplines
and enable the design team and decision-makers to focus
on strategies where risk mitigation is most likely to be
achieved successfully and economically. The likelihood
of the hazard is measured by mean annual frequency, λH.
The conditional probabilities P[DS|Hs] or P[DS|Hs] are
determined by engineering analysis. P[DS|Hs] describes
the damage state for the structural system in terms of the
structural response quantities computed from the struc-
tural analysis. Finally, the conditional probability, P[Loss >
θ|Hs], requires an analysis of the socioeconomic impacts of
the various damage states. Clearly, risk-informed decision
is an interdisciplinary process.
Equations (1) and (2) each have their advantages and
drawbacks, depending on the situation. Equation (1)
can be used to assess risk for a spectrum of events and
to estimate losses over time (often on an annual basis,
as that is the common way of reporting λH and result-
ing losses). On the other hand, it may not be possible
or practical to identify and/or analyze the full spectrum
of hazards. Scenario analysis (Equation (2)) usually con-
siders a relatively small number of hazardous situations,
each of which may be described in considerable detail.
This allows the decision-makers to focus on events that
are deemed to be particularly significant to the civil infra-
structure within a community or, for example, a particular
building, bridge, or networked system. Specific scenario
risks are more easily communicated among stakeholders
and mitigation strategies are far more easily implemented
in regulating the built environment. However, the prob-
ability of each scenario generally cannot be calculated.
Thus, the probabilities in Equation (2) are conditional in
nature and the probability of overall loss cannot be annu-
alized or benchmarked against other commonplace risks.
The purpose here is not to judge the merits of these alter-
nate performance objectives (that is a major ingredient
of the goal-setting in community resilience assessment,
which must occur among stakeholders and is likely to vary
from community to community), but rather to note that
Equations (1) and (2) are sufficiently general to be adapted
to a variety of decision contexts. In any event, it is impor-
tant that the community, through its leaders, arrives at a
common understanding of how risk is to be measured,
as this will be required in evaluating whether the perfor-
and its supporting socioeconomic institutions are met.
6.2.  Community resilience metrics
The risk-informed decision framework summarized in the
previous section requires metrics that will enable the phys-
ical, social, and economic impacts of community decisions

regarding planning, sitting and design, construction and
rehabilitation/restoration to be predicted, deconstructed
and scrutinized. Such metrics should be quantifiable,
actionable, and scalable to different community sizes and
circumstances that may be unique to individual commu-
nities (Cutter, Burton, & Emrich, 2010; Francis & Behailu,
2014; NIST, 2015). Accordingly, the event {Loss > θ} in
Equations (1) and (2) should be interpreted in the broad-
est sense. In general, such metrics may be classified as
direct physical damage and repair costs, recovery time
and trajectory, economic vitality, and social well-being
(NIST, 2015). Recovery depends on performance or res-
toration requirements for physical infrastructure systems,
their condition prior to (and immediately following) the
event, and their spatial distribution (including logical
connections) within the community. Economic vitality
requires employment opportunities, adequate distribu-
tions of incomes within the community and a stable tax
base. Social well-being includes survival and physical
safety, including shelter, availability of essential goods and
services such as water, food and health care, and adequate
governance.
Numerous resilience metrics have been identified from
reviews of the literature. 1 Many of these metrics are ger-
mane to specific communities, and a further review is out-
side the scope of this paper. However, such reviews have
identified a subset of metrics that appear to be valid for
a wide variety of communities and contexts: (1) Damage
to physical infrastructure and direct economic losses,
expressed in both absolute terms and as a percentage of
appraised value; (2) Population dislocation; (3) Loss of
employment; (4) Decline in household income; and (5)
Declines in domestic output. Note that these metrics rep-
resent a combination of physical, social, and economic
infrastructure within a community. In evaluating the
immediate effects of a hazard event on a community, the
performance of physical infrastructure provides the ini-
tial conditions for the assessment of social and economic
impact. Conversely, identifying optimal strategies for
community restoration and recovery requires an inverse
analysis, in which target social and economic goals pro-
vide the initial conditions for developing risk-informed
design criteria for replacement or rehabilitation of dam-
aged or destroyed physical infrastructure (Lin, Wang, &
Ellingwood, 2016; Mieler, Stojadinovic, Budnitz, Comerio,
& Mahin, 2015). While certainly not all-inclusive, the
above metrics are sufficient to demonstrate how strategies
to address the short-term effects of a hazard event can be
considered in community resilience planning, and will
be used to illustrate this concept in the remaining papers
in this Special Issue. Note that mortality/morbidity is not
included in the list of metrics considered. For one thing,
there is a general belief that in most cases, the current
SUSTAINABLE AND RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE   105
generation of codes and standards used to design the built
environment do an adequate job of protecting life safety.
For another, mortality/morbidity may actually have less
effect on long-term community recovery than some of the
other metrics mentioned above.
7.  Summary and conclusions
The Centerville Virtual Community Testbed represents
a first step toward establishing the measurement science
to enable researchers to understand the factors that make
a community resilient. This will lead to assessing the
impact of hazards on communities and the development
of risk-informed decision strategies that optimize plan-
ning for and recovery from events in a manner consistent
with financial constraints and local values and preferences.
Centerville has been defined as a community with a spe-
cific building inventory, supporting public infrastructure
systems, socio-demographics, and metrics proposed to
measure its performance. The Centerville Testbed, by its
construction, allows issues of scalability in community
infrastructure modeling to be addressed and informs the
subsequent development of increasingly complex com-
munity resilience assessment methods used for planning
and decision purposes.
Note
1. 
The NIST-sponsored Community Resilience Panel for
Buildings and Infrastructure Systems has a Standing
Committee on Data, Metrics and Tools, which is
responsible for creating and refining methods for
community resilience assessment, prioritization,
modeling and testing in support of NIST’s Community
Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and
Infrastructure Systems (NIST, 2015).
Acknowledgment
The views expressed are those of the author/presenter, and
may not represent the official position of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology or the U.S. Department of
Commerce.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
The research herein was funded by the Center for Risk-Based
Community Resilience Planning, a Center of Excellence
funded through a cooperative agreement between the U.S.
National Institute of Science and Technology and Colorado
State University [NIST Financial Assistance Award Number:
70NANB15H044].
106   B. R. ELLINGWOOD ET AL.
Notes on contributors
Bruce R. Ellingwood is College of Engineering Eminent Scholar
and Co-Director of the Center for Excellence in Risk-Based
Community Resilience Planning in the Department of Civil
and Environmental Engineering at Colorado State University.
His main research and professional interests involve the appli-
cation of probability and statistics to structural engineering,
particularly to structural reliability theory and probabilistic
risk assessment. He is internationally recognized as an author-
ity on the technical development and implementation of prob-
ability-based codified structural design standards.
Harvey Cutler is a Professor of Economics in the Department
of Economics at Colorado State University. His research spe-
cializes in econometrics, computable general equilibrium
modeling of economic systems, and understanding the impact
of economic growth variables on urban and regional systems.
Paolo Gardoni is Professor of Civil Engineering in the
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. As Director of
the Mid-America Earthquake Center, he is leading the crea-
tion of multi-hazard approaches to engineering by conducting
interdisciplinary research, including structural engineering,
engineering ethics and public policy, to estimate damage and
vulnerability of civil infrastructure across regional and national
networks.
Walter Gillis Peacock is Professor of Urban Planning in the
Department of Landscape Architecture and Urban Planning
and the Director of the Hazard Reduction and Recovery Center
at Texas A&M University.  He is internationally known for his
research on disaster recovery, community resiliency, and social
vulnerability. He has constantly striven for his research to
make a difference in helping make our communities stronger
and more disaster resistant and sustainable places to live.
John W. van de Lindt is George T. Abell professor in
Infrastructure and Co-Director of the Center for Excellence in
Risk-Based Community Resilience Planning in the Department
of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Colorado State
University. Over the past two decades, his research has sought
to improve the built environment by focusing on performance-
based engineering of building systems exposed to earthquakes,
hurricanes, tornados and floods.
Naiyu Wang is an assistant professor in the School of Civil
Engineering and Environmental Science at the University
of Oklahoma, USA. Her work focuses on applications of
statistics and probability in civil engineering, structural safety
and reliability assessment, and risk-informed sustainable
decisions for civil infrastructure. She's especially interested
in resilience of civil infrastructure systems and the impact
of climate change on risk to civil infrastructure exposed to
natural hazards.
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