[1] G.R. No.
L-24742 October 26, 1973
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES
CUENCO, CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO,
CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA CUENCO
GONZALEZ, respondents.
Settlement of estates; Jurisdiction; Venue; Residence of deceased not element
of jurisdiction, but of venue.—For purposes of determining what court has
jurisdiction in the settlement of a deceased’s estate, the residence of the deceased or
the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but
merely of venue.
Same; Same; Court first taking cognizance of settlement of the estate of a
decedent.—Section 1, Rule 73 on venue does not state that the court with whom the
testate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule
precisely and deliberately provides that “the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts.” A fair reading of the Rule—since it deals with venue and comity
between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction—indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of
the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other
courts. Conversely such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent’s last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their
minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that
the decedent died intestate may actually be false, may decline to take cognizance of
the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the
second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent’s alleged
last will. This is exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow’s filing
with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes’ intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City court,
awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu
court’s order was that ‘if the will was duly admitted to probate by the Quezon City
court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes’ intestate
petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the
exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
Same; Where Quezon City court did not act without jurisdiction in admitting
to probate will of decedent.—Under the facts of the case and where respondents
submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed
to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the said court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to
probate the decedent’s will and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in
accordance with the testator’s testamentary disposition.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Same; Testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings. —
ln accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even it at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed x x x. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that
should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall
continue as an intestacy.
Same; Jurisdiction; Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement
proceedings should be by appeal.—Under section 1, Rule 73, the Quezon City
court’s assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent’s estate on the basis of the will
duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the
first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile
therein—with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court—could not be
contested except by appeal from said court in the original case, except when want of
jurisdiction appears on the record.
Same; Jurisdictional facts in probate proceedings.—The “jurisdictional facts”
in probate proceedings under section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court are the death
of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the
probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left
his estate in such province.
Same; When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if
court had improper venue.—The mischievous effect in the administration of justice
of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court
and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same
proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious
to require comment.
Same; Same.—lt would be unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named
and entitled to be executrix of the decedent’s last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the
law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have
to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important matter of
the estate to take up with the probate court.
Venue; Supreme Court may order change of venue under its supervisory
authority over inferior courts.—In the Supreme Court’s exercise of its supervisory
authority over all inferior courts, it may properly determine that venue was properly
assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of
justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court’s exercise of
Page 1 of 117
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the deference and consent of Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the
the Cebu court) xxx and actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be heirs specified in the basic petition for the issuance of letters of
approved and authorized x x x. administration.2

TEEHANKEE, J.: In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of
the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition
Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21 November 1964, and its subsequent deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters
Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow and executrix in the said
Reconsideration. last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. Q-7898.
The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to
On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila
Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived by his widow, the herein
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964,
petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus
the Cebu court issued an order holding in abeyance its resolution on
Salvador, both surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta.
petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon
Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first marriage,
City shall have acted on the petition for  probate of that document purporting
respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion
to be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Manguera, Carmen Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita
Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the  probate proceedings
Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.
in the Quezon City court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents
to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did they challenge the
On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.
Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R),
Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion
alleging among other things, that the late senator died intestate in Manila on
to Dismiss, dated 10 April 1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing
25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death;
the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's petition
and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On
for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view
the same date, the Cebu court issued an order setting the petition for hearing
of the alleged exclusive jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in
on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and
Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 be
interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.
PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation in the City and Province of
Cebu.
In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to
dismiss, giving as a principal reason the "precedence of probate proceeding
The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new
over an intestate proceeding." 4 The said court further found in said order that
and modified one released on 13 March 1964, in view of the fact that the
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y
petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City. The pertinent portion of said order
court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that
follows:
respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the appointment of a special
administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of
the said court, giving as reasons the following: On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the
opposition and motion to dismiss reads as follows: "that since the
decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of
It will be  premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet
Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa
regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding, the requisite
Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March 1964 was not filed with the proper
publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied with.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 2 of 117
 Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 73
of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the
Court is made to understand that the oppositors do not mean to say
that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City when he died, the
intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate
proceedings in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of
the will should take precedence, but that the probate proceedings
should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last
proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court,
that could not also be entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of
the petition for the probate of the will indicates that Don Mariano Jesus
Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi
y Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus
Cuenco) of the petition for probate of the will shows that the decedent
at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is a
resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also
of the City of Cebu. He made the former as his first choice and the
latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has two
residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which
he himself selects or considers to be his home or which appears to be
the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus filing the instant petition
before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent
and once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is
to the exclusion of all others.5
Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City
court's said order of 11 April 1964 asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the
probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27 April
1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was
likewise denied.
On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for
probate of the last will of the decedent was called three times at half-hour
intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors
appeared and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing
in their absence.
As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City
court noted that respondents-oppositors had opposed probate under their
opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:
(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiary or some other persons for his
benefit;
(c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the
testator acted by mistake and did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto. 6
The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the
notice of the hearing had been duly complied with and that all the heirs had
been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the
three instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty.
Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr. Jose P. Ojeda, and of the
notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and
the documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates,
income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of donation) all indicating that
the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also
affirmed by him in his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15
May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament as
having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all
formalities of the law" and appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his
estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as
probated.
Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the
will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof,
respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case
CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case No.
Q-7898.
On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondents (petitioners therein) and against the herein petitioner, holding
that:
Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, covers both testate and
intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI having been
filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and
which first attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively
pass upon the factual issues of (1) whether the decedent left or did not
leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a resident
of Cebu at the time of his death.
Page 3 of 117
 Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the
Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding 2433-R), it follows that the said court
must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in which the
petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano
Cuenco (Special Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should
assert her rights within the framework of the proceeding in the Cebu
CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.
The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964,
Judge Amador Gomez of the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R,
stated that the petition for appointment of special administrator was
"not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be
premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . " It is sufficient to state in
this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the
court's jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is
acquired from the moment a petition is filed, but only to the exercise of
jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend
on the pronouncements of a trial judge.
The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as
follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and
directing the respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX,
Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to refrain
perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special
Proceeding Q-7898 pending before the said respondent court. All
orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said
respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected
therewith, are hereby annulled. The writ of injunction heretofore issued
is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965; hence the herein petition for
review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate
court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City
court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and
actions, particularly its admission to probate of the decedent's last will and
testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond
in compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
tied up with the issue submitted to the appellate court, to wit, whether the
Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the Cebu court's order of 10 April
1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over
intestate proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the
petition for probate of the document purporting to be the last will and
testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the
Cebu court respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition
or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon City court to proceed
without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes
Cuenco's motion to dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue, to proceed with the hearing of the petition and
to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution
and authenticity.
The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in
law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from
proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all
its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's
last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof
without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the
following considerations:
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts
of First Instance over "all matter of probate, both of testate and intestate
estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down
the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to
prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly
assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The cited Rule
provides:
Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
Province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of the
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court,
so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
Page 4 of 117
 proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Rule 73)8
It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs.
Co Ho9 as follows:
We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate
cases the place of residence of the deceased is regarded as a
question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to follow
this view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a
probate case has been submitted in good faith to the Court of First
Instance of a province where the deceased had not resided. All the
parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein
completely finished except for a claim of a creditor who also voluntarily
filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises
for the first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial
court for lack of residence of the deceased in the province. If we
consider such question of residence as one affecting the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which
have arisen in court will have to be annulled and the same case will
have to be commenced anew before another court of the same rank in
another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the prompt
administration of justice is too obvious to require comment. (Cf.
Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December 31,
1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the
estate of a deceased person shall be settled in the province where he
had last resided, could not have been intended as defining the
jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such
legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is
one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. (Attorney-
General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of
jurisdiction — Act No. 136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts
of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of
the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are
many courts of First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure,
Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place where each
case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of
the deceased is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter
but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that in the new Rules of
Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be
settled is properly called "venue".
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with
whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the
decedent's last will has been presented in another court where the decedent
obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it
stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to
take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance,
and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition
for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it
a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in
abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for  probate before that court. Implicit
in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and
improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to
the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the
parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as
claimed by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline
to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the
Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to
the  probate petition and the residence of the decedent within its territory and
venue.
3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance
of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Page 5 of 117
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition
since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take
cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore,
as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon
City court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the
estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before
it and assumed jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference
of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule
of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon
City court their opposition to probate of the will, but failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be
declared, as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in
admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the present case 13 is authority against
respondent appellate court's questioned decision.
In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate
proceedings over intestate proceedings in this wise:
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance
with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a
"probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is
equally true, however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in
this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course
of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is
found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate
of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that
state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being
required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings. 14
The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this
case, the Quezon City court) although opining that certain considerations
therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should
have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the
Cebu court] either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate
motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to
the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose
with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit
we say that it was not the proper venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely
a waivable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded
from doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that
petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y
Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his
opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344;
that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the existence
(presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of
the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962
when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of
Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on
April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the
dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that
date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but also to admit said will to
probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically, on October
31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over
the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a
premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this
Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower
court even if the latter was not the  proper venue therefor, if the net
result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other
court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where
the objection against said proceedings is raised too late. 16
Page 6 of 117
5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City
court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of
the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that
Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his
conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly
given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from
said court in the original case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly
provides:
... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal
from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Rule 73)
The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record" could probably be properly invoked, had such deference in comity
of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had
the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the
petition before it and assumed jurisdiction.
6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the
late senator, the appellate court while recognizing that "the issue is a
legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan  17 that.
... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever
court is considered to prevail in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case,
the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court.
Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the
deceased is a serious one, requiring both factual and legal resolution
on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the ordinary course
of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the
deceased was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will
purporting to be his also gives Cebu, besides Quezon City, as his
residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper
court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs.
Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al., G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.
In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of
the intestate petition first filed with it and deferred to the testate proceedings
filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will
and testament upon which would depend the proper venue of the estate
proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
and consent of the Cebu court — that Quezon City was the actual
residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the proper venue,
the Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the
practical ends of justice to still require the Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to
be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to
determine for itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon
City court had already so determined Quezon City as the actual residence at
the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this
factual finding based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should
likewise determine Quezon City as the actual residence, or its contrary
finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of
waiting and inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon
City.
7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it
is taken into consideration that Rule 76, section 2 requires that the petition for
allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such
"jurisdictional facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court
in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his residence
at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such
province."
This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that
"(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The notice by publication as a
pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole
world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court
is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The probate of a will by a
court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and
validity." 19 The Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even
if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the proper venue
notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting
the decedent's last will to probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix
thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set aside by a
writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's
appealed decision, and should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte,
supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition challenging the
Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing
the estate in accordance therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it
must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings
regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue
therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice Moran
in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of
considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial
court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the
Page 7 of 117
same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province
"is too obvious to require comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of
the decedent's relatives gets first to file a petition for settlement of the
decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule
73, section 1 provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different
courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so and creating
conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and
that venue is waivable, would be set at naught. As between relatives who
unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a race as to
who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of
whether the decedent is still in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the
decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and testament
and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire
consequences were certainly not intended by the Rule nor would they be in
consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.
9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under
all the applicable rules of venue, and despite the fact that the Cebu court
(where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the
Cebu court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the
Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen days (on March 12,
1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the
decedent's last will and petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly
entitled to preference in the administration of her husband's estate, 20 would
be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu
and submit anew the decedent's will there for probate either in a new
proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into
a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for
the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as already affirmed by
the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-
widow had their conjugal domicile.
It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and
entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in
accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue
and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money
and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she
has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule
73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's marriage has been dissolved with the death
of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to
be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased
spouse. Under the appealed decision, notwithstanding that petitioner resides
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in
Quezon City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and
exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in comity and consent of
the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and
petitioner would have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and
go to Cebu to settle and liquidate even her own community property and
conjugal estate with the decedent.
10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court
did not act without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of
discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
instead deferring to the testate proceedings filed just a week later by
petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the decedent's last
will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to
dismiss) showed the falsity of the allegation in the intestate petition that the
decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents never
challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of
10 April 1964 deferring to the probate proceedings before the Quezon City
court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.
For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have
acted without jurisdiction nor with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the
decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in
accordance with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled
doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down only a rule
of venue, not of jurisdiction.
Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's
order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner
as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be
overturned in a special civic action of prohibition.
11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its
supervisory authority over all inferior courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it
has done in the case at bar, that venue was properly assumed by
and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice
and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference
and consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will
and testament and appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without
bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and
actions taken in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized
rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly had and to repeat and
duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once
Page 8 of 117
more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in
fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of
incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the
conjugal residence of the decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed

decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and the petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by
respondents with the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered
dismissed. No costs.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 9 of 117
[2] G.R. No. 124715           January 24, 2000
RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK
TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC., ACTIVE
DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION
COMPANY, INC. respondents.
Succession; Testate and Intestate Proceedings; Probate
Courts; Jurisdiction; The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent .—The
determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends
upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.
Same; Same; Corporation Law; Ownership; Land Titles; Where real
properties included in the inventory of the estate of a decedent are in the possession
of and are registered in the name of corporations, in the absence of any cogency to
shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in
favor of said corporations should stand undisturbed.—Inasmuch as the real
properties included in the inventory of the estate of the late Pastor Y. Lim are in the
possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations,
which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents
should stand undisturbed.
Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction Doctrine;
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders or members—by legal fiction and
convenience it is shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character
alien to the persons comprising it.—It is settled that a corporation is clothed with
personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It may not
generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable
for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected
with it. Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the same vein,
a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity shielded by a protective
mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons comprising it.
Same; Same; Piercing the veil of corporate fiction requires the court to see
through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.—Nonetheless,
the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in First Philippine International Bank
vs. Court of Appeals, We enunciated: “x x x When the fiction is urged as a means of
perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a
monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil with which the
law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or stockholders who
compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an aggregation of
individuals, x x x”—Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see
through the protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. The corporate
mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just
but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist;
where public convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified
thereby, the corporate fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught.
Same; Same; Test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing
the veil of corporate fiction.—The test in determining the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction is as follows: (1) Control, not mere
majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances
but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or
existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to
commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory or other positive
legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of plaintiffs legal right; and
(3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or
unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent “piercing
the corporate veil.”—
Same; Same.—Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a
sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.
Same; Same.—Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot
be presumed.
Same; Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Affidavits; Affidavits are inadmissible
in evidence where the affiants were not presented during the course of the
proceedings.—Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not
merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to
adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of
corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the affidavits executed
by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the
aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the
hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are
inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the affiants were not at all presented during the
course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to
uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to
Page 10 of 117
apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and Title Nos. 613494, 363123, 236236 and 263236 are excluded from
jurisprudence. these proceedings.

BUENA, J.: SO ORDERED.

May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition 9 which
included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person? contained the following averments:

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review 3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the
on certiorari, the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April following business entities, to wit:
1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set aside the orders dated
04 July 19952 , 12 September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional
Business
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court. Address:
Entity
Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
estate is the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95- Marketing, Inc. Homes, Parañaque, Metro
23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, Manila.
represented by George Luy, Petitioner".1âwphi1.nêt
xxx     xxx     xxx
Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo
Speed Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are Distributing
Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.
corporations formed, organized and existing under Philippine laws and which Inc.
owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.
xxx     xxx     xxx
On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving Auto Truck 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,
spouse and duly represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March TBA Corp. Quezon City.
1995, a joint petition5 for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. xxx     xxx     xxx
Active Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the Distributors, Homes, Parañaque, Metro
inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion 6 for the lifting Inc. Manila.
of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain properties from the estate
of the decedent. xxx     xxx     xxx
Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy,
In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Company Quezon City or 92-D Mc-
Branch 93, sitting as a probate court, granted the private respondents' twin Arthur Highway Valenzuela
motions, in this wise: Bulacan.

Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered

to lift, expunge or delete the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718, 116719 and 5182
and it is hereby further ordered that the properties covered by the
same titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged
in business with the public as corporations, all their capital,
assets and equity were however, personally owned by the
late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and
officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation
of the above business entities were mere dummies of Pastor
Page 11 of 117
 Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes of
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with
the following banks: (a) Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b) First Intestate Bank
(formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
and in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.
5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name
of the above entities, were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during
his marriage with petitioner, to wit:
Corporation Title Location
xxx     xxx     xxx
k. Auto Truck TCT No. Sto. Domingo TBA
617726 Corporation Cainta,
Rizal
q. Alliance TCT No.
Prance, Metro Manila
Marketing 27896
Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or
Tax Declarations are hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".
7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late
Pastor Y. Lim, are all conjugal in nature, having been acquired by
him during the existence of his marriage with petitioner.
8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y.
Lim which petitioner could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will
submit to this Honorable Court the identities thereof and the
necessary documents covering the same as soon as possible.
On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion
issued an order10 , thus:
Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the
Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the
annotation of lis pendens in case said annotation had already been
deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718,
116719 and 51282.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494,
365123, 236256 and 236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included
in the instant petition.
SO ORDERED.
On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
administrator11 and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special
administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of
administration were accordingly issued.
In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew
private respondents' motion for exclusion, in this wise:
The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether
the corporations are the mere alter egos or instrumentalities of
Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves the piercing of
the corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Thus, in the case of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the
crucial issue decided by the regular court was whether the
corporation involved therein was the mere extension of the decedent.
After finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the
corporation are also assets of the estate.
A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that
the SEC's exclusive (sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy.
It is simply a suit to settle the intestate estate of a deceased person
who, during his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up
corporations as his instrumentalities.
SO ORDERED.
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed
by petitioner, issued an order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein
under enumerated are hereby ordered to comply strictly with this
order and to produce and submit to the special administrators,
through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from receipt of this
order their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time
deposits and other deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or
corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions made or
done concerning savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to
their receipt of this court order.
Page 12 of 117
 SO ORDERED.
Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14 , with an urgent
prayer for a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court
of Appeals questioning the orders of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a
probate court.
On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private
respondents, rendered the assailed decision 15 , the decretal portion of which
declares:
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action
for certiorari is hereby granted, The impugned orders issued by
respondent court on July 4, 1995 and September 12, 1995 are
hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by
respondent on September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner
corporations" bank accounts and records are concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner
Rufina Luy Lim now comes before us with a lone assignment of error 16 :
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the
lower court which merely allowed the preliminary or provisional
inclusion of the private respondents as part of the estate of the late
deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals
arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the
clear and explicit provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of
Court and thereby preventing the petitioner, from performing her duty
as special administrator of the estate as expressly provided in the
said Rules.
Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.
In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders
issued by the probate court which were subsequently set aside by the Court
of Appeals.
Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on
jurisdiction over probate proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 7691 17 , which introduced amendments to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, are pertinent:
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as
the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross
value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
— Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the
grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the
demand does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's, litigation expenses and costs shall
be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided
further, that where there are several claims or causes of
actions between the same or different parties, embodied in
the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective
of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions;
xxx     xxx     xxx
Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over
matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent.
Page 13 of 117
As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22 , We had occasion to elucidate, through
the principle that a probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa23 :
albeit provisionally, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory. Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court), acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,
In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the
extend its probing arms in the determination of the question of title in probate issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
proceedings. decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the
This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held: submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or
the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason
for the exception being that the question of whether or not a
. . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter
particular matter should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its
which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in
not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate
essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
be waived. . . .
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.
. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here,
19  the Torrens title is not in the decedent's name but in others, a
We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS :
situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule . . . .
(emphasis Ours)
. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under
the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate
the Torrens system and registered in the name of private respondent
court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in
corporations should be included in the inventory of the estate of the decedent
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court of
separate action which may be instituted by the parties.
whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in
nature, thus, not conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate
Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON action brought for the purpose of adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
21 
vs. RAMOLETE , We made an exposition on the probate court's limited
jurisdiction:
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are
registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence
It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID  24 is of great essence and finds
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or applicability, thus:
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence
said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on the other hand,
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not include,
administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary
bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for
action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. . . .
because the probate court cannot do so.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 14 of 117
 . . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that
if a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the
absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder
thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession
of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . . .
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence
was ever presented by petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title
of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties. Even so, P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes
collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:
xxx     xxx     xxx
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law.
In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the
property subject of the controversy was duly registered under the Torrens
system, We categorically stated:
. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question
was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered
by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third
parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the
respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from
the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the
property. . . .
Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the
Late Pastor Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of
private respondent corporations, which under the law possess a personality
separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of any
cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of
conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should stand
undisturbed.
Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents'
motion for exclusion. While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court,
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
acting in a restricted capacity and exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate
court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of certain
properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge,
albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true that
such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should
be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar
circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the
Torrens system in the name of private respondents, and as such were to be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the probate court obviously
opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the
impugned orders.
By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in
utter disregard of the presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private
respondents. Certainly, the probate court through such brazen act
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence
on this matter.
Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent
corporations are properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private
respondent corporations themselves. To rivet such flimsy contention,
petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized and
wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the
instant case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F" 26 and "G"27 of the
petition for review affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao
which among others, contained averments that the incorporators of Uniwide
Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and participation in the
organization and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added
that the persons whose names appeared on the articles of incorporation of
Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are mere dummies since
they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the
corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix
their respective signatures thereon.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for
that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it. 28
Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a
personality distinct and separate from its stockholders or members. In the
same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is an entity
Page 15 of 117
shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to
the persons comprising it.
Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29 , We
enunciated:
. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or
an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation,
the circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a
monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil
with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the
members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals. . . .
Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the
protective shroud which exempts its stockholders from liabilities that
ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one corporation from a
seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction. 30
The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced
when a corporation is just but the alter ego of a person or of another
corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public convenience is
defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate
fiction or the notion of legal entity should come to naught. 31
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate fiction is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or
complete stock control, but complete domination, not only of finances but of
policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will
or existence of its own; (2) Such control must have been used by the
defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the violation of a statutory
or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must
proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of
any of these elements prevent "piercing the corporate veil". 32
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient
reason for disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities. 33
Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely
acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to
adduce competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the
veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner on the
affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing
considering that the aforementioned documents possess no weighty
probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule. Besides it is imperative for us to
stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as the
affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the
lower court. To put it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of
said documents would be to relegate from Our duty to apply such basic rule
of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.
Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:
Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant's statements, which may thus be either
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being
hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness
stand to testify thereon.
As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of
Appeals correctly observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted
without jurisdiction in issuing said order; The probate court had no authority
to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the private
respondent corporations.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals
which nullified and set aside the orders issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12 September
1995 is AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the

wrong-doing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.34

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 16 of 117
[3] G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA
B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Settlement of estate; Venue; Jurisdiction; Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court prescribing the court where a decedent’s estate shall be nettled, which in at
the place of his residence or where the estate is located, relates to venue and not
jurisdiction.—The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 specifically the clause “so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate,” is
in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: “Settlement of
Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes.” It could not have been intended
to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is
one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another, x x x A fortiori, the place of
residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of
letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue.
Same; Same: Same; The term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 on settlement of
a decedent’s estate refers to his actual residence as distinguished from his legal
residence or domicile.—We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term “resides”
connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or
domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence” is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature—residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor, x x x In other words, “resides,” should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat.
Same; Same; Evidence; Death certificate is admissible to prove the residence
of the deceased at the time of his death.—A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
Same; Same; Court’s discretion to choose the special administration should
be bused on reason, equity, and justice.—Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a
special administrator does not tie in the probate court. That, however, is no authority
for the judge to become partial, or Lo make his personal likes arid dislikes prevail
over, or his passions, to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based
on reason, equity, justice and legal principle.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Same; Same; Special administrator; The rules applicable in the choice of a
regular administrator should be applied in the appointment of special administrator
for a decedent’s estate.—There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for the judge
to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all
others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the
decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a
portion CM the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of
a property.
Same; Same; Venue; Supreme Court may decree, under its supervisory
authority over courts, that venue was transferred from one trial court to another.—
Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring
to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is
sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a
petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same
time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8,
1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
Page 17 of 117
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the
appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor
of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed
that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the
Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading
and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse
interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable
as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition
for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule.
This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the
First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original
petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the
estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not
possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original
and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and
real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and
(3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion
to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that
the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a
full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea
Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973,
one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of
properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action,
jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section 2,
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the properties
Page 18 of 117
subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and
that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a
previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all
papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the decedent with
the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B.
Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words
like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion
to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already
been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's
motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting
the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her
original petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of
the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further
held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed
as special and regular administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27,
1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in
view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack
of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the
first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove
the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power
allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of
the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973,
insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her:
(a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as
special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final
liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding
amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver
to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the
estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all
certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia,
whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of
Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death
was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G.
Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba,
Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or,
in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court,
viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration
of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and
supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and
the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the delivery of certain
properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the
court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling
the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the
Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia
G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The
case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1,
1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Page 19 of 117
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February
10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the
motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon
a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the
office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed
Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the
proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975. She
manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738
should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings
before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have
not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court
of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals.
This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975,
an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that
the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the
parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still
pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge
Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition
for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for
the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the
validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January
12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on
February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari
in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter
stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of
the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his
last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the
court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically
the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of
the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and
Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over
the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the
court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by
procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority
shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is
Page 20 of 117
not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely,
the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the
person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of
something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the
procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do
with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is
just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of
First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes
the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place
of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is
upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the
province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of
his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex
vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes
and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length
of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary. 11
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his
death. In her original petition for letters of administration before the Court of
First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on
April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of venue. For her,
the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also
resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate
presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other
papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition,
Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of
residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death
certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia
G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of
residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney
dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels
of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring
part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina
B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba,
Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of
residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative
that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is
subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states:
"When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed
waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that
in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B.
Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue
assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a
mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
Page 21 of 117
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper
venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims
preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80
provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions
causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only
proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority
for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes
prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion
must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no
reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice
of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the
appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to
consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator
in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in
the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right
of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent,
besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would
have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly
than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may
affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the
widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia
maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G.
Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any
successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima
facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be
emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing
court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the
decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is
one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the
court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient
reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated
therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of
candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the
First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the
name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents
and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa
B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court
of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts
may properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by
and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate
be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be
disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to
transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-
42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special
administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate
obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia
Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with
costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 22 of 117
[4] G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of
MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Letters of Administration; Under Section
1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate
of a decedent should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.—Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be
filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death: Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied). The term “resides” connotes ex vi
termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This
term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions
and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
“residence,” in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Marriages; Void Marriage; In a void marriage,
it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. —
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can
be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. It must be
pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling
in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), applicable four-square to the case at
hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent
after the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages,
to wit: [C]onsequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will
be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense
for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party
may attack a void marriage.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Letters of Administration; Section 2 of
Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person; An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor.—Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a
petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person,
thus: Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration.—A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far
as known to the petitioner: (a) The jurisdictional facts; (b) The names, ages, and
residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent; (c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) The
name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. But no defect in
the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration. An “interested
party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate
proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28 November 2008 Decision
rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
Page 23 of 117
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the Order dated March 24,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED
in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of
Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseo’s
common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein
petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.
Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by
her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. 3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been
contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live
Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her
late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters
of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. 5 The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, 7 the petition for settlement
of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las
Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of
Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The
lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas
City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The dispositive of the RTC
decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any
disqualification or incompetence to serve as administrator, let letters of
administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be
issued to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this
Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28
November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV
No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of
Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the
RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND
THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF
LAS PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED
TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
Page 24 of 117
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of
jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and
"domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 15 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. 18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be
faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of
the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on
the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac
where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of
his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the courts. Both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the
time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985,
Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is
void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital
feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’
position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and
her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’ submission that the
lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence
on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate
court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court. 21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals
erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void
marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the
source of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. 22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in
no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to
wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of
either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why
the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. 24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken
place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which
may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 25
Page 25 of 117
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional
rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity
thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia,
and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such
cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia,
we now proceed to determine whether or not the decedent’s marriage to
Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less
than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed
by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas,
Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent evidence of marriage
and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to
the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries
therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first marriage was
celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of
marriage can no longer be found in the National Archive, given the interval of
time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing
that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio. 27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that
Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request
that administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters
of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names
and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are
prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of
administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in
the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to
those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to
share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With
the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway
this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right
of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
Page 26 of 117
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law,
is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. 29 Having
a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the
purview of the law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and
7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 27 of 117
[5] G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District) THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
Judiciary Act of 1948; Courts of First Instance; Jurisdiction over probate
matters defined.—Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Section 44, paragraph [4]),
Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of
probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons—whether they died testate or intestate.
Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased
persons; Venue; General rule.—The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First
Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former
Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate.
Same; Same; Testate proceedings enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.—
In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction. testate proceedings for
the Settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the
course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that
the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for 'the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is
understood to be without prejudice ,that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding- shall continue as an intestacy,
Same; Same; Same; Where intestate proceedings had been commenced, the
probate of will should be filed in same court; Reasons.—Where intestate proceedings
before a court of first instance had already been commenced, the probate of the will
should be filed in the same court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending intestate proceeding.
This is especially true where the party seeking the probate of the will had been
informed or had knowledge of the pendency of the intestate proceedings. It is not in
accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved,
which would be the result if the probate of will were f iled in another court.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Same: Same; Venue; Waiver of improper venue by laches.—It is well settled
in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and.
such waiver may occur by laches where, a party had been served notice of the filing
of the probate petition for about a year and allowed the proceedings to continue for
such time before filing a motion to dismiss the same.
Same; Same; Question of acknowledgment as a natural child of testator may
be presented to probate court.—A party claiming to be an acknowledged natural
child of testator is entitled to intervene in proceedings for the probate of will of
testator if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as
to be able to submit f or determination the question of his acknowledgment as a
natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate
court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether
or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed an original petition
for certiorari — docketed as G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan
Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts of First Instance of Negros
Occidental and of Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to hereinafter as
the Negros Court and the Manila Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be rendered annulling the
orders of 19 April 1963 (Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of
respondent Negros court dismissing the first instituted Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K')
of respondent Manila court denying petitioner's omnibus  motion to
intervene and to dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, both special proceedings pertaining to the settlement of
the same estate of the same deceased, and consequently annulling all
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396; supra, of the
respondent Manila court as all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties pending these
proceedings, petitioner prays for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona
and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding with Special Proceeding No.
51396, supra, until further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing its Special Proceeding
No. 6344, supra, and failing to declare itself 'the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the deceased Don Juan
Page 28 of 117
 Uriarte y Goite as prescribed in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent Manila court erred in failing to dismiss its Special
Proceeding No. 51396, supra, notwithstanding proof of prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was granted and issued by this
Court on October 24, 1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same respondents a pleading
entitled SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS — docketed in this
Court as G.R. No. L-21939 — praying, for the reasons therein stated, that
judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued by the Negros Court on
December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his record
on appeal and the second denying his motion for reconsideration, and further
commanding said court to approve his record on appeal and to give due
course to his appeal. On July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring
action on this Supplemental Petition until the original action for certiorari
(G.R. L-21938) is taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R. L-21938 filed their answer
traversing petitioner's contention that the respondent courts had committed
grave abuse of discretion in relation to the matters alleged in the petition
for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner filed with the Negros Court a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite
(Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural
son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said
decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for
his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner's
motion the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank as special
administrator on November 13, 1961 and two days later it set the date for the
hearing of the petition and ordered that the requisite notices be published in
accordance with law. The record discloses, however, that, for one reason or
another, the Philippine, National Bank never actually qualified as special
administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the two private respondents
herein, filed an opposition to the above-mentioned petition alleging that he
was a nephew of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a
Last Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated copy whereof has
been requested and which shall be submitted to this Honorable Court upon
receipt thereof," and further questioning petitioner's capacity and interest to
commence the intestate proceeding.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent,
commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan
Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following
grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will,
there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2)
that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate
said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of the alleged Will were
attached to the Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the
Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's
motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending
before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order having been denied on
July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal, appeal bond
and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this
court on questions of law. The administrator with the will annexed appointed
by the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the
approval of the record on appeal, and under date of December 7, 1963 the
Negros Court issued the following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by the petitioner on July
27, 1963, be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for being
incomplete. In the meantime, before the said record on appeal was
approved by this Court, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
before the Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte, Petitioner, vs. Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938,
bringing this case squarely before the Supreme Court on questions of
law which is tantamount to petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this
Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the certiorari, the record on
appeal filed by the petitioner is hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed the supplemental petition
for mandamus mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
Page 29 of 117
intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the
proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said
court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344 of the Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same court, during
the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite, Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment
for his compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child. Clearly inferrable
from this is that at the time he filed the action, as well as when he
commenced the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet been
acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte y Goite. Up to this time, no final
judgment to that effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special proceeding before the Negros
Court has not gone farther than the appointment of a special administrator in
the person of the Philippine National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to
qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after proper proceedings were had
in Special Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the
document submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition
for probate appearing not to have been contested. It appears further that, as
stated heretofore, the order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963
denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus Motion for Intervention,
Dismissal of Petition and Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to dismiss the special proceeding
pending before the Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were attached a
copy of the alleged last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed
with the Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore, that almost from
the start of Special Proceeding No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner
Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last will and of the
proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition for certiorari are (a)
whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No.
6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b) whether the Manila Court
similarly erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the
Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44, paragraph (e)], Courts of First
Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that
is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons — whether they died testate or intestate. While their jurisdiction over
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
such subject matter is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced,
is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, now Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a
decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had
estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident
alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance
in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance
are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city where the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. From this
premise petitioner argues that, as the Negros Court had first taken
cognizance of the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of said
decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344), the Manila Court no longer had
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396 intended to
settle the estate of the same decedent in accordance with his alleged will,
and that consequently, the first court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344, while the second court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the
distribution of the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will, is a "probate
matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction,
testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it
has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the
estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last
will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings
for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Page 30 of 117
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to whether Juan Uriarte
Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of
Juan Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court — particularly in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 — or was entitled to commence the corresponding
separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila Court.
The following considerations and the facts of record would seem to support
the view that he should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros
Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an appropriate motion for
said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344. In
the first place, it is not in accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation,
especially if several courts would be involved. This, in effect, was the result of
the submission of the will aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place,
when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, he had already informed
the Negros Court that the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in
Spain, of which a copy had been requested for submission to said court; and
when the other respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to
dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court
a copy of the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it may be inferred
that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew before filing the petition for probate with the
Manila Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the
Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the same deceased person.
As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it seems quite clear that in his
opposition to petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had
expressly promised to submit said will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to
the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose
with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit
we say that it was not the proper venue  therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue  is merely
a waiveable  procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from
doing so by laches. It is enough to consider in this connection that petitioner
knew of the existence of a will executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since
December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was
served with notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the
Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court
since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and
for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that
date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with
the will annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail
the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court
and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered
that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower
court even if the latter was not the  proper venue therefor, if the net result
would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of
similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection
against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, Judge
Fernandez of the Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to sustain the
contention of the petitioner that inasmuch as the herein petitioner has
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory acknowledgment by the
decedent such action justifies the institution by him of this proceedings. If the
petitioner is to be consistent with the authorities cited by him in support of his
contention, the proper thing for him to do would be to intervene in the testate
estate proceedings entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the Court of
First Instance of Manila instead of maintaining an independent action, for
indeed his supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is of his doubtful
character pending the final decision of the action for compulsory
acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter that petitioner is entitled to
prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask
for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for
determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the
deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court,
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether
or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural
child (II Moran on Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13
Phil. 249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227,
and Jimoga-on vs. Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition for mandamus  (G.R. No. L-21939),
We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in view of the conclusions heretofore
stated, the same has become moot and academic. If the said supplemental
petition is successful, it will only result in compelling the Negros Court to give
due course to the appeal that petitioner was taking from the orders of said
court dated December 7, 1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the
Page 31 of 117
order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344, and the second
being an order denying petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said
order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result of what has been said
heretofore beyond petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can not be
other than that the intended appeal would serve no useful purpose, or, worse
still, would enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he can no longer
question the validity of said orders.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby

rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a result, the petition
for certiorari filed in G.R. No. L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition
for mandamus  docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are hereby dismissed. The
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With costs
against petitioner.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 32 of 117
[6] G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y.
BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO
Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS, vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE
A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Words and Phrases; Cause
of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another.  It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint.―Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a
cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a
complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears
solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.
Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be
maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be
averred by the defendants.
Same; Civil Law; Succession; Matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.―In the case of Heirs
of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 581 SCRA 70 (2009), the Court, citing several other
precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must
be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case: Jurisprudence
dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit
for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must take precedence
over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently
ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for
the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status
or right. In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the
declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an
independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals x x x: In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the
Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedent’s estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.
Same; Same; By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special
proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue
to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the Regional Trial Court had consequently rendered judgment thereon,
or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.―By way of exception, the need to
institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had
voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed
and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing
exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to
institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the
parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso
E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246. 5 In their complaint,
they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless
on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-
77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the
aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his
Page 33 of 117
name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638, 7 to the prejudice of petitioners
who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. 8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. 9 Further, by
way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c)
the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no
showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s
lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, 11 finding
that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso.
It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship
with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as
the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory
heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of:
(a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a
Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a
passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on
which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance
was issued.14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or
not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this relation, a complaint
is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely
on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless
of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants. 19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the
same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be
true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in
the corresponding special proceeding 20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In
the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, 21 the Court, citing several other
precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful
heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this
case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not
in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made
only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration
of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent
civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
Page 34 of 117
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child
who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in
an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for

the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of
practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the
issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. 24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,

appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved,
ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether

the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it. 25 Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship
cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In
this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s
heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined
in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement
should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-

2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding
to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 35 of 117
[7] G.R. No. 128314      May 29, 2002
RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
JAO, respondents.
Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; The estate of an
inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in
the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.—The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had
—in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon
City, where they actually stayed before their demise? Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules
of Court states: Where estate of deceased persons be settled.—If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours) Clearly, the estate
of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted
in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of
his death.
Same; Same; Same; Factors Considered in Determination of Residence.—
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al., where
we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent
had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining
residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the
decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at
the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein permanently. While it appears that
the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical
convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their
permanent residence.
Same; Same; Same; Death Certificates; Recitals in death certificates as to the
residence of the decedent at the time of death are admissible in evidence and
presumed to be correct.—The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible
in evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a
quo. We agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates
were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their
parents’ death.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Court refers to residence at the time of
death, not the permanent residence or domicile.—The death certificates thus
prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time of death, over the
numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents
presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by
the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court
of Appeals, we held: x x x x x x x x x the term “resides” connotes ex vi
termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This
term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature—residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary.
Same; Same; Same; It does not necessarily follow that the records of a
person’s properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides, and neither
can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where
he establishes his domicile.—It does not necessarily follow that the records of a
person’s properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it
be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he
establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from
that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and
business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the
question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an
individual’s choice and peculiarities.
Same; Same; Same; Venue; Words and Phrases; Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning—as thus
defined, “residence,” in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a
person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.—At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws
when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special
Page 36 of 117
proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals and Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. All told, the lower court
and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the
decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag
and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The
decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal
properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99,
over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-
8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that
he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother,
Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly,
Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any
accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents
and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper
venue.2 He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s
actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used
to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to
old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street,
Quezon City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence previously
executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s
affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor
vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually
resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a
matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their
last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said
document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the
decedents’ residence on the death certificates in good faith and through
honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that
their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely
transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the
same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard.
The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence
of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents showing
otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the
position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the
petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. 8 After
the parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the trial court
designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate
of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was
denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued
separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the fact that
Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents.
Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea
V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature
appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own
admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court
DENIES for lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of
Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Page 37 of 117
 WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of
the court a quo having been shown, the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge
is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997. 12 Hence, this petition for
review, anchored on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND
IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE
COURT.
II. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE
OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY
INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF
RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL
PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS
DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE RATHER THAN
THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY
THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR
THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN
A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED
IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING
VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A
DECEASED.
V. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO
THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN
THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE
DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES
CITY.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
VI. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE
OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE
MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO.
Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be
had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or
in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring
ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters
of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where
the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et
al.,14 where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the
place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the
time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following
factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to
choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently. 15 While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for
Page 38 of 117
medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City
as their permanent residence.1âwphi1.nêt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio  were different from those in the case at bar. The
decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of
transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then
suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase
a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able
to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move
therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that
Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical
presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have
transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to
sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in
his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were
both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was
petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our
mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized
his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner
failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year
earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were
thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We
agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates
were accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over
their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the
time of their parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at
the time of death,  over the numerous documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not
to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but
to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as
the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents
have been living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time
prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on
record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to
petitioner’s assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents’
physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the
decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any
substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings stemmed from an
erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held
to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule
4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the
former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of
serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is
significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the
settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and
where most of the decedents’ properties are located.
Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.
Page 39 of 117
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are
kept in the place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed
that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he
establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place
different from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains
extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be
formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates

between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings.
In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled
that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 21 All told,
the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the
settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon
City court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 40 of 117
[8] G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner, vs. JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS,
Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM,
EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
Civil Law; Wills; Testate proceeding, proper where decedent died with two
wills.—A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
Same; Same; Probate of will mandatory; Settlement in an intestate proceeding
of an estate of a person who died testate, anomalous; Consolidation of intestate case
with testate proceeding, proper; Case at bar.—The probate of the will is mandatory
(Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Paño, L-42088.
May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case
should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the
testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
AQUINO, 
The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to
annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by Branch 20 of the
Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a
probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at
78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by
his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and
Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which
ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as conjugal property
of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children
of the first marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the
estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
country, the testator said: têñ.£îhqwâ£
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
I purposely have made no provision in this will for my
daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my daughter, Elsa
Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have
provided for each of them in a separate will disposing of my
Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm
and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third
Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of
Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe
Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C,
pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition  filed in
Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated April 10,
1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two wills and
the codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4,
1978 "by and between the attorneys for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm,
Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife),
Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda
and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the
intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate. It was signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B.
Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-
fact of Maxine and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and
Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be
designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm's
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half
conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be
less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa Mesa, Manila (par.
4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate".
It recognized that the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm
(par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share
equally in the Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and Juanita Morris
should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable
estate and marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25,
Page 41 of 117
1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp.
75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that
forty- three days after Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter of the
first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo
B. Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the settlement of his estate.
She was named special administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground
of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She
also moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to
the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found
in pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine,
through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg,
p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the
behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators.
Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and
approval of the court, they sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called
Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and
Juanita allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out
that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc., was incorporated by Ethel
and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90,
testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold
for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by
lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated
to Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth
(1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-142, Record). No mention
at all was made of the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced
Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion
moot considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and
project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he
was no longer connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc. when the
Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who
negotiated the sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to
sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of
Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that Maxine
paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no
objection to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The
court noted the certification as in conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no
movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm
Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the
Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present
intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that
motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm
filed again its appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for
Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that the
firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11,
1978, when it filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished
the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was then
superseded by lawyer Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. —  On
September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of
Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition
praying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that
the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters
of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel
and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them
and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to
the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise
agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm
died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.
Page 42 of 117
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack
of merit in his order of October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be
dismissed, or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and
heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah
compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23,
Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills
and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and
98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is
anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated
with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to
dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders,
notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is

dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 43 of 117
[9] G.R. No. 159507             April 19, 2006
ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.
Actions; Venue; The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) is given to the plaintiff but not to the plaintiff’s caprice
because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.—Petitioner Saludo’s
complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal
action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which
reads: SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions.—All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. The choice of
venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to
plaintiff’s caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The rule on
venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every
action and proceeding. The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the
RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where
plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.
Same; Same; Residence; Domicile; Words and Phrases; The term
“residence” as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the
courts of first instance means the place of abode whether permanent or temporary,
of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from “domicile” which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
—The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo
was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and
consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 75 SCRA 124 (1977), the Court had the
occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term “residence” for purposes of
venue, thus: In Koh v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 298 (1976), we explained that the
term “resides” as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the
courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary,
of the plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from “domicile” which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
“It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules
to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into
consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is,
likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal
contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of
Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this
distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory
must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless
persons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The definition of “residence” for purposes
of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term “domicile”; When
parsed, the term “residence” requires two elements—(1) intention to reside in the
particular place, and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.—As a member of the House of Representatives,
petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the
requirements for the said position, including that he was then a resident of the district
which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of
election law, the term “residence” is synonymous with “domicile,” thus: x x x [T]he
Court held that “domicile” and “residence” are synonymous. The term “residence,”
as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x It can be readily
gleaned that the definition of “residence” for purposes of election law is more
stringent in that it is equated with the term “domicile.” Hence, for the said purpose,
the term “residence” imports “not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.”
When parsed, therefore, the term “residence” requires two elements: (1) intention to
reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, “the
place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and
remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of
residence for the purposes of election law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; For purposes of venue, the less technical
definition of “residence” is adopted; Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one’s domicile; Since a congressman, or the lone
representative of a particular district, has his residence (or domicile) therein as the
term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have
had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions.—For
purposes of venue, the less technical definition of “residence” is adopted. Thus, it is
understood to mean as “the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile.” Since petitioner Saludo, as
Page 44 of 117
congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his
residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws,
necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of
venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the
domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its
popular sense. This is because “residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Following the definition of the term
“residence” for purposes of election law, a congressman for a particular locality
not only has the intention to reside therein but also the personal presence therein,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.—Petitioner Saludo was the
congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to
possess the qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident
therein. And following the definition of the term “residence” for purposes of election
law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he
also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern
Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for
purposes of venue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Community Tax Certificates; The fact that a
party’s community tax certificate was issued in a place other than where he claims
to be a resident of is of no moment because the same does not preclude his having a
residence in another locality for purposes of venue.—The fact then that petitioner
Saludo’s community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment
because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same
does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A
man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence.
Evidence; Judicial Notice; Words and Phrases; Courts are allowed “to take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions”; The concept of “facts of common knowledge” in the context of
judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are “so commonly known in the
community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as
to make it indisputable among reasonable men”; The fact of a congressman being
duly elected could be properly taken judicial notice of by a trial court, the same
being a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.—That
petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the
court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo’s
residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was representing, could be taken judicial
notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
“to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.” Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, including its
Constitution. The concept of “facts of common knowledge” in the context of judicial
notice has been explained as those facts that are “so commonly known in the
community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as
to make it indisputable among reasonable men.” Moreover, “though usually facts of
‘common knowledge’ will be generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient
as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the
trial court sits.” Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected
representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be properly taken judicial notice
of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the
community where it sits.
Same; Same; A congressman’s residence in his province where he was elected
could be properly taken judicial notice of by the trial court.—Petitioner Saludo’s
residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by
the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the
qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives is
having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping; A verification and a certification of non-forum shopping that states that
the petitioner read the contents of the petition and that the same are true and correct
of his own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand,
clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of the Rules of
Court.—Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads: Sec. 4. Verification.—Except
when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be
verified which contains a verification based on “information and belief,” or upon
“knowledge, information and belief,” or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as
an unsigned pleading. Petitioner Saludo’s verification and certification of non-forum
shopping states that he has “read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and
the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the
basis of the records at hand.” The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance
with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G.
Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated May 22,
Page 45 of 117
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed
decision directed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and
enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in
said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of
improper venue. The petition also seeks to reverse and set aside the
appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American
Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-
President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of
Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte. The case was
raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a
Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives
and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the
other hand, defendant (herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation
doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other
credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE
Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants
(herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX,
and may be served with summons and other court processes at their office
address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor
of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued
to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's
daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the
United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred when
petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel
Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates from the
Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi
Tanaka.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they
resulted from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's
account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000.
Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of
account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment in
June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were
canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded
feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched
political and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which
were committed in gross and evident bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay
him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the
complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of
action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the
complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid
because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that
respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover,
notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not
allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax
certificate, which was presented when he executed the complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay
City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner
Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the
said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case
for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of
Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or
Objections to the Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that
any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and
unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district
thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to
take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he
possessed all the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that
of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his
admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City
only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the
same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate is not
determinative of one's residence.
Page 46 of 117
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the
affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of
the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents.
The court a quo likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue
was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was
and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern
Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to
dispell any and all doubts about his actual residence. As a high-ranking
government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial
notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual
residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the
case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing
venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the
permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances,
in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at
a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at
place of his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991]) 3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied
the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the
appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting
of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary
restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting
respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid.
It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated
September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge
thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo
against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal
actions may be commenced and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of plaintiff.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate
court, because not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte.
Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The
appellate court pronounced that, for purposes of venue, the residence of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence
or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of
Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile"
in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation
with the term residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws
that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while
residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact,
this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary
Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving
stateless persons.
xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place
of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile." 6 (Italicized
for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern
Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community tax certificate, as
indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, which was issued at Pasay City. Similarly, it referred to the same
community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed
against respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160, 7 the
community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is
located.8 It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also
representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing
circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions
Page 47 of 117
of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him and no longer required
proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent
congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be
taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had
yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of
Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was
actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the
court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It
opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or
Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the option
of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is
not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred
upon him by the Rules of Court. 9 Further, fundamental in the law governing
venue of actions that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is
fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party
litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e.,
to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of
justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due
course to respondents' affirmative defense of improper venue in order to
avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with
the court a quo was only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or
even to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being a
powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance
could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors
Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil
action before the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping"
considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the
appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders
must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent
judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to
desist from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The
temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of
preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in
the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages
that private respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the
issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are
not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case
for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or
any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the
appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion
for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with the
Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-
mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in
a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the
undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman
of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence
(sic) of said district;
(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the
basis of improper venue due to the alleged judicial admission of
herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored
applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; and1avvphil.net
(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner
violated the rules on venue, and even speculated that herein
petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to
vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the
appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was
improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one
of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident
of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Page 48 of 117
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the
court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4
of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to
plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the
Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed
to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and
evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. 15 The option of
plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where
defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If
plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place. 16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his
complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He
alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte to
comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding
that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the
filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that
petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay
City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court
as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner
Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the
court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento, 17 the Court had
the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for
purposes of venue, thus:
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed
in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance
means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff
or the defendant, as distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules
of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by
the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by
taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of
justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an
established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary
stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well
emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October,
1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval
v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that -
'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to
indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place
of domicile, but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for
emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule
4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may
be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
Page 49 of 117
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully
convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after
the retirement of his wife from government service to justify his bringing of an
action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely
of no moment since what is of paramount importance is where he actually
resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action, to
comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of
Court, on venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of
the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al.
(G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-
42670), decided on November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited
cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean?
Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of
his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex
vi termini 'actual residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or
domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute
or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules -
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and
not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between
the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in
its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary." 18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the
representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it
states that "it may be conceded that private respondent ever so often travels
to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower
house."19
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was
correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the
said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district which he
was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election
law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The
term "residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of
election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile."
Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore,
the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the
particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law." 23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of
"residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence,
not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." 24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the
district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term
is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to
have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal
actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner
Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular
sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Page 50 of 117
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals 25 is misplaced.
Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the
facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance
in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident
of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement,
plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident therein at
the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his
domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go back there
after retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking.
To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms,
imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of
Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo.
Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the
qualifications for the said position, including that he was a resident therein.
And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election
law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte,
but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in
Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a
resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of
a person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a
country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino).
Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile can
exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention
to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would
have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation
purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his
business in the City of Manila, he would have residence in all three places
(Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212,
1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his
actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he
stays there with intention to stay there permanently.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose
of exercising his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political
purposes where he also lives or stays physically, personally and actually then
he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be
preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr.
as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required
by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at
Pasay City is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be
considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a
residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue. A man can have but one
domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone
district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was
admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held
that, as such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he
was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo
cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the
Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice
has been explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the
community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known
to as to make it indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though
usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known throughout the
country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the
local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner
Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time
could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being
a matter of common knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be
properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that,
under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or
representative to the House of Representatives is having a residence in the
district in which he shall be elected.
Page 51 of 117
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo
cannot be characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his
part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not
properly verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or
based on authentic records.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states
that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same
are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the
basis of the records at hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial
compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in
Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on

"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 52 of 117
 [10] G.R. No. 45904           September 30, 1938

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G.

UTULO, applicant-appellee,
vs. LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

1.EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF

ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON; EXCEPTIONS.—Section 642 of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides in part that "if ,no executor is named in the will, or if a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates
the general rule that when a person dies leaving property in the Philippine Islands,
his property should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the
deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor
therein. This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596
and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the
heirs are of lawful age and there are .no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if the
property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary
partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property
constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.

2,ID. ; ID. ; ID.—When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid,

his heirs, whereafter, of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321;
Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fule vs. Fule, 46 Phil., 317).

3.ID. ; ID. : ID. ; CASE AT BAR.—There is ,no weight in the argument adduced by

the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary
so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased J. G. S.
As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of representation, it would
suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir
of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and
necessary party if she were living. In order to intervene in said intestate and to take
part in the distribution of the property it is not necessary that the administration of
the property of his deceased wife be instituted—an administration which will take up
time and occasion inconveniences and unnecess-sary expenses.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 53 of 117
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial
administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.
Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property (special
proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse
and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said
deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia
and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz
Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the
administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the province
without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother
and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial
administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No.
4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his
mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased
consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia
Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said
deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial
administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the
applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased
left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial
administration; but she stated that should the court grant the administration of
the property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as
she had a better right than the applicant. After the required publications, trial
was had and the court, on August 28, 1936, finally issued the appealed order
to which the oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal
which was certified and approved.
The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial
court, but these assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution,
namely: whether upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the
property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent
appointment of an administrator, and whether the appellant has a better right
to the said office than the appellee.
1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision
enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living property in the
Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is
subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same
Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in
writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or
applying for the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if
the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to
the competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the
summary partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all
the property constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law,
without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator.
Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a
person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether
of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration
and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings
In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of
articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to
all the property left by the deceased from the time of his death. In the case
of Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:
Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the
property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs
at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the
ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate,
the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property
immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If
they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by
mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by
a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the
division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is
certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the
settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the
heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason
why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of
an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in
the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator
has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the
estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate
Page 54 of 117
 and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among
themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the
heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they
intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are
any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they
have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.
In the cases of Malahacan vs. Ignacio, supra, Bondad vs. Bondad, supra,
and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated. And
in the case of Fule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the same
doctrine in the following language:
Upon the second question — Did the court a quo  commit an error in
refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule?
— it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the
present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against
his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.
In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659
and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a
deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to
his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546;
Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19
Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable
Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondad vs. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232;
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)
If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes
immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what
reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to
administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case
of Bondad vs. Bondad  (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano
Arellano, discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the
Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words,
the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased
ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the
death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed
and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the
absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter
upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they
desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement,
they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
case they cannot mutually agree in the division. (Sections 182-184,
196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is
no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and
expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among
the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against
the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra;
Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra.)
When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to
the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other
coowners or owners in common, and they may recover their
individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided
property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502;
Mcintyre vs. Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29 Miss.,
57.)
xxx           xxx           xxx
The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also
exist in the divisions of personal as well as the real property. If they
cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such
personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is
maintenable where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of age,
and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity
thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)
It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of
being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It
may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several
parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well
as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as
well as of the whole. (Pickering vs. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A.,
698; Pipes vs. Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12
Cal., 20.)
We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a
doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had
followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would not have
been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are now.
There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that
his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have
legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia
Page 55 of 117
Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the
representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he
is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a
forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living . In order
to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property
it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife
be instituted — an administration which will take up time and occasion
inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.

2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties

has preferential right to the office of administrator.

The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to the
applicant-appellee. So ordered.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 56 of 117
[11] G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.
Special Proceedings; Administration of Estate; The determination of what
properties should be included in the inventory is within the competence of the
probate court, but such determination is merely provisional, subject to a final
decision in a separate action which may be brought by the parties.—Petitioner asks
this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the
deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of
documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an
unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the
estate of the deceased. The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court
before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the
best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the
assets of the decedent’s estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees
of some of the assets, if any. The function of resolving whether or not a certain
property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court.
However, the court’s determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the
parties.
Same; Same; Appointment of Administrator; Judicial administration and
appointment of an administrator are superfluous when a deceased died without
debts.—It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the
estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting
to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and
compelling reasons. Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are
not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long
and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has
been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment
of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.”
Same; Same; Same; Where the claims of the heirs of the deceased may be
properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings, judicial administration of estate
is unnecessary.—The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks
appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties
of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the
hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the
opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only
real property left has been extra-judicially settled, to an administration proceeding
for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted
or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, the claims of both parties as to
the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition
proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event. We,
therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are
pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good
reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the
costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the
surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the
deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions
which need to be resolved in this case.
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed
away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived
by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas
Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-
83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition,
private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas
Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left
no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left
several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security
System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300
square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally,
that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in
London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of
the estate of the deceased.
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the
petition of private respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the
deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if
Page 57 of 117
an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate
be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed
private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of
Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of
Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and
personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within
three months after receipt of the order. 3
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case
to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of
private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15,
1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the
following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not
a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts
left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria
Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the
deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the
death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively
to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted
letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive
beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name
of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to
defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally,
the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled
between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs
of the deceased.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to
decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to
appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the
court in charge of the intestate proceedings.
Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not
belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as
aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier
of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion
of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. 5
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position
to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the
assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the
transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether
or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the
competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only
provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in
a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de
Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the
administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be
unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below
discussed.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same
should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an
executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of
Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there
are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the
property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not
preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the
estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an
ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so
if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be
noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no
debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an
action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the
estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without
good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long
and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It
has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the
Page 58 of 117
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to
proceedings . 12 an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily
expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the
the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where
creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case. the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.

In one case, 13 We said: We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration,
there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres
Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not
de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration
have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but
proceeding.
only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at
loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of
because respondents succeeded in sequestering some who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister
assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.
because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions
as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial
to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the
proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private
of one heir. respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by
Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as
administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking SO ORDERED.
such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and
the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. 14 In still
another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the
appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife,
as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity
to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since
he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate
proceedings of the latter.15

We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only
two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The
parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at
once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only
conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as
administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the
hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of
the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a
judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of
Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 59 of 117
[12] G.R. No. 211153
AMPARO S. CRUZ; ERNESTO HALILI; ALICIA H. FLORENCIO; DONALD
HALILI; EDITHA H. RIVERA; ERNESTO HALILI, JR.; and JULITO
HALILI, Petitioners
vs. ANGELITO S. CRUZ, CONCEPCION S. CRUZ, SERAFIN S. CRUZ, and
VICENTE S. CRUZ, Respondents
Civil Law; Succession; Under the law, “[t]he children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal
shares.”—Under the law, “[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from
him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.” In this case, two of
Concepcion’s coheirs renounced their shares in the subject property; their shares
therefore accrued to the remaining coheirs, in equal shares as well.
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Extrajudicial Settlement of Estates;
Prescription; The action for the declaration of nullity of the defective deed of
extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe.—While the CA was correct in ruling in
favour of Concepcion and setting aside the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement, it
erred in appreciating and ruling that the case involved fraud — thus applying the
four-year prescriptive period — when it should have simply held that the action for
the declaration of nullity of the defective deed of extrajudicial settlement does not
prescribe, under the circumstances, given that the same was a total nullity. Clearly,
the issue of literacy is relevant to the extent that Concepcion was effectively
deprived of her true inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the June 25, 2013
Decision2 and January 29, 2014 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV. No. 96345 which, respectively, granted herein respondents'
appeal and reversed the June 1, 2010 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 75 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM, and
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
5
In an Amended Complaint  filed on April 6, 1999 and docketed with the
RTC as Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM, respondents Angelito S. Cruz,
Concepcion
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
S. Cruz (.Concepcion), and Serafin S. Cruz. alleged that they - together with
their
siblings, petitioner Amparo S. Cruz (Amparo) and Antonia Cruz (Anton
inherited a 940-square-meter parcel of land (the subject property) from their
late parents, spouses Felix and Felisa Cruz, which land was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. ON-658; that on July 31, 1986, the parties
executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate covering the subject
property, on the agreement that each heir was to receive an equal portion of
the subject property as mandated by law; that in 1998, when the subject
property was being subdivided and the subdivision survey plan was shown to
respondents, they discovered that Antonia was allocated two lots, as against
one (1) each for the respondents; that Antonia’s allocation of two lots
contravened the agreement among the heirs that they would receive equal
shares in the subject property; that Amparo and Antonia were able to
perpetrate the fraud by inducing Concepcion – who was illiterate – to sign the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, which was written in the English
language, without previously reading and explaining the contents thereof to
the latter; that Amparo and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of
Conception’s ignorance and mental weakness, deceiving and cajoling her
into signing the deed of extrajudicial settlement, to her damage and injury;
and that Antonia passed away, but left as her heirs herein petitioners Ernesto
Halili, Alicia H. Florencio, Donald Halili, Editha H. Rivera, Ernesto Halili, Jr.
and Julito Halili, who are in possession of the two lots allocated to Antonia.
Respondents thus prayed, as follows:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be rendered as follows:
1. Declaring null and void the extra-judicial settlement executed by the
parties on July 31, 1986:
2. Declaring one of the lots adjudicated to defendant Antonia Cruz-Halili to
the common fund;
3. For such other relief just and equitable under the circumstances;
4. To pay the cost of this suit.6
In their Answer,7 petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the July 31,
1986 deed of extrajudicia1 settlement of estate had been voluntarily and
freely executed by the parties, free from vitiated consent; that respondents'
cause of action has prescribed; that the complaint failed to state a cause of
Page 60 of 117
action; and that no earnest efforts toward compromise have been made. By
way of counterclaim, petitioners prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's foes, and costs of suit.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated June 1, 2010, pronouncing as
follows:
From the foregoing, the main issue is whether or not the extrajudicial
settlement is null and void on grounds of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or
mistake.
xx xx
Besides, while the Extra-Judicial Settlement was executed and signed on
July 13, 19868 x x x, and alleged fraud was discovered on May 12, 1986
when
subdivision survey was conducted x x x and defendants started to build their
houses x x x this petition was filed only on August 14, 1998 or more than 10
years from date of execution or date of discovery of alleged fraud. Under Art.
1144 Civil Code, actionable documents prescribes [sic] in 10 years. However,
if a property is allegedly acquired thru fraud or mistake, the person obtaining
it is, by force of law, considered an implied trustee for the benefit of the
person deprived of it, in which case the action based thereon is 10 years
from date of registration of the extra-judicial settlement or issuance of new
certificate of title (Art. 1456 Civil Codex xx). Hence, this petition is not barred
by prescription. As the period is not too long nor short, laches has not yet set
in.
Moreover, fraud, as basis of the Complaint, is not delineated therein with
particularity. Under Sec. 5 Rule 8, fraud must be alleged specifically, not
generally. Nonetheless, apart from such allegations, no clear and convincing
evidence was presented by plaintiffs. For one, while plaintiff Concepcion
Cruz- Enriquez is admittedly only grade 3 and could hardly understand
English as what is written in the extra-judicial settlement which was not even
allegedly fully explained to her, it appears that she can absolutely read and
write, and understand English albeit not fully. And as she is deeply interested
in her inheritance share, she is aware of the import and consequences of
what she executed and signed. For the past 10 years, there is no way she
could feign ignorance of the alleged fraud and make passive reactions or
complaint thereof. Being adversely interested in the property, her
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
apprehensions were purely in the state of her mind, if not unilateral and
afterthought.
Secondly, just like any other contracts, parties in an extra-judicial settlement
arc given wide latitude to stipulate terms and conditions they feel fair and
convenient beneficial to one and prejudicial to the other. By tradition and
good customs, equality is relaxed if only to buy peace, or out of compassion
or courtesy. So long as not contrary to strict provisions of the law, the
supremacy of contracts shall be respected.
Being consensual, extra-judicial settlement is deemed perfected once mutual
consent is manifested. Notarization being a mere formality, whatever its
infirmity cannot invalidate a contract but at most, merely ensue to
administrative sanction on the part of their notary. Even so, unless a strong
clear and convincing evidence is shown, a document, one appeared
notarized [sic], becomes a public document. As between a public document
and mere allegations of plaintiffs, the former prevails xx x.
Thirdly, for the past 10 years from 1996 [sic] when they forged an extra-
judicial settlement and defendants admittedly started constructing their house
and even made a subdivision survey, plaintiffs also occupied their allotted
lots but never complain [sic] and even attended their reunions x x x. Other
heirs also waived or sold shares to Amparo and Antonia Cruz x x x. Parties
were even unified and unanimous in surrendering dominion of their parents'
ancestral house in favor of Antonia Cruz alone x x x. As such, two lots would
necessarily accrue to Antonia Cruz, and only one lot each should belong to
other heirs. If the heirs are contented and unanimously confom1able, it is
quite absurd that only plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-Enriquez was disagreeable
and yet, after the lapse of 10 years. Her conduct then belies her present
claim of being defrauded and prejudiced xx x. And in the interpretation of
stipulations. clarification may be had from such subsequent acts of the
parties x x x. Even so, in case of conflict or dual interpretations, its validity
shall be preferred x x x.
Fourthly, other than simply alleging that her sisters Amparo Cruz and Antonia
Cruz prepared the extra-judicial settlement, and made a house-to-home visit
to have it signed by their brothers and sisters including plaintiff Concepcion
Cruz-Enriquez, no other independent facts aliunde has [sic] been adduced to
substantiate or the least corroborate actual fraud. Fraud cannot be
presumed. It must be proven. Mere allegation is not evidence. Rather, if ever
both defendants were eager to have it signed, their motive appears to be
solely to reduce in writing their imperfect title over a thing already pre-owned.
Peremptorily, following the tenet ''allegata et non probata," he who alleges
has the burden of proof Thus, the burden of proof lies on the pleader. He
Page 61 of 117
cannot be allowed to draw preponderance of evidence on the weakness of binding effect even if it is not set aside by direct legal action. Neither may it
the respondent. Otherwise, the relief being sought must necessarily fail xx x be ratified. An action for the declaration of nullity of contract is
Hence, this case must be dismissed. imprescriptible.

And as plaintiffs filed this petition relying on their unilateral perception that The appellants' pleading was for declaration of nullity of the deed of
plaintiff Concepcion Cruz-Enriquez was prejudiced by the 2 lots for defendant extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, this did not necessarily mean that
Antonia Cruz, they and defendants shall each bear their own costs of appellants' action was dismissible.
litigation and defense.
Granting that the action filed by appellants was incompatible with their
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Complaint is hereby allegations, it is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations that
ordered DISMISSED. Costs de-officio. determine the nature of the action. The court should grant the relief
warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.
SO ORDERED.9 (Citations omitted) In this case, the allegations in the pleading and the evidence adduced point
to no other remedy but to annul the extrajudicial settlement of estate because
of vitiated consent.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the
Respondents appealed before the CA, which completely reversed and set
contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the
aside the RTC's judgment and the parties' deed of extrajudicial settlement.
concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and the cause which
The appellate court held:
constitutes the contract. The area of agreement must extend to all points that
the parties deem material or there is no consent at all.
The sole issue in this case is whether the consent given by appellant
Concepcion to the subject extrajudicial settlement of estate was given
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be
voluntarily.
intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should
be free; and (c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated
We hold that it was not. by error; freedom by violence, intimidation or undue influence; and
spontaneity by fraud.
Although the action commenced by appellants before the trial court was a
declaration of nullity of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, the case Here, appellant Concepcion clearly denied any knowledge of the import and
was clearly an action to annul the same. A distinction between an action for implication of the subject document she signed, the subject extra-judicial
annulment and one for declaration of nullity of an agreement is called for. settlement. She asserted that she does not understand English, the language
in which the te1ms of the subject document she signed was written. To quote
An action for annulment of contract is one filed where consent is vitiated by a part of her testimony, translated in English, as follows:
lack of legal capacity of one of the contracting parties, or by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. By its very nature, annulment Q: Did you have occasion to read that document before you affixed your
contemplates a contract which is voidable, that is, valid until annulled. Such signature on it?
contract is binding on all the contracting parties until annulled and set aside
by a court of law. It may be ratified. An action for annulment of contract has a
A: The document was written in English and me as well as my brothers and
four-year prescriptive period.
sisters, we trusted our younger sister, sir.
On the other hand, an action for declaration of nullity of contract presupposes
Q: That is why you signed the document even though you did not understand
a void contract or one where all of the requisites prescribed by law for
the same?
contracts are present but the cause, object or purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, prohibited by law or
declared by law to be void. Such contract as a rule produces no legal and A: Yes, sir.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 62 of 117
Court:
Did you not ask your younger sister Amparo to read this document
considering it was in English? I will reform the question.
Q: But you don't know how to read English?
A: No, your Honor.
Q: When you saw that the document was in English, did you not ask your
younger sister to read the document before you affixed your signature?
A: No, your Honor.
Q: Why did you not ask Amparo to read the document to you considering that
it was in English and you don't understand English?
A: Parti-partihan daw po at nagtiwala ako, your Honor.
Appellant Concepcion invoked Articles 24 and 1332 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provide:
ART. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must
be vigilant for his protection.
ART. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a
language not understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person
enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully
explained to the former. xxx
Article 1332 was a provision taken from [A]merican law, necessitated by the
fact that there continues to be a fair number of people in this country without
the benefit of a good education or documents have been written in English or
Spanish. The provision was intended to protect a patty to a contract
disadvantaged by illiteracy, ignorance, mental weakness or some other
handicap. It contemplates a situation wherein a contract is entered into but
the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake or fraud
committed by the other.
Thus, in case one of the parties to a contract is unable to read and fraud is
alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof
have been fully explained to the former. Where a party is unable to read, and
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
he expressly pleads in his reply that he signed the voucher in question
'without knowing its contents which have not been explained to him,' this plea
is tantamount to one of mistake or fraud in the execution of the voucher or
receipt in question and the burden is shifted to the other party to show that
the former fully understood the contents of the document; and if he fails to
prove this, the presumption of mistake (if not fraud) stands unrebutted and
controlling.
Here, at the time appellant Concepcion signed the document in question, she
was with appellee Amparo. Appellant could not possibly have read the
contents of the extra-judicial settlement and could not have consented to a
contract whose terms she never knew nor understood. It cannot be
presumed that appellant Concepcion knew the contents of the extra-judicial
settlement. Article 1332 of the Civil Code is applicable in these
circumstances.
Although under Art. 1332 there exists a presumption of mistake or
error accorded by law to those who have not had the benefit of a good
education, one who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a
contract must establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not
merely by preponderance of evidence. Hence, even as the burden of proof
shifts to the defendants x x x to rebut the presumption of mistake, the plaintiff
xx x who allege(s) such mistake (or fraud) must show that his personal
circumstances warrant the application of Art. 1332.
In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of appellant
Concepcion was not sufficiently rebutted by appellees. Appellees failed to
offer any evidence to prove that the extrajudicial settlement of estate was
explained in a language known to the appellant Concepcion, i.e. in Pilipino.
Clearly, appellant Concepcion, who only finished Grade 3, was not in a
position to give her free, voluntary and spontaneous consent without having
the document, which was in English, explained to her in the Pilipino. She
stated in open court that she did not understand English. Her testimony as
quoted above is instructive.
Due to her limited educational attainment, appellant Concepcion could not
understand the document in English. She wanted to seek assistance.
However, due to the misrepresentation, deception and undue pressure of her
sister appellee Amparo, petitioner signed the document. Appellant
Concepcion was assured that she would receive her legitimate share in the
estate of their late parents.
Later on, appellant Concepcion found out that appellee Antonia received two
(2) lots compared to her siblings, including appellant Concepcion, who
respectively received one (1) lot each. This was a substantial mistake clearly
Page 63 of 117
prejudicial to the substantive interests of appellant Concepcion in her
parent's estate. There is no doubt that, given her lack of education, appellant
Concepcion is protected by Art. 1332 of the Civil Code. There is reason to
believe that, had the provisions of the extrajudicial agreement been
explained to her in the Pilipino language, she would not have consented to
the significant and unreasonable diminution of her rights.
Atty. Edgardo C. Tagle, the officer who notarized the extn1judicial settlement
did not state that he explained the contents to all the parties concerned, The
records or the subject document for that matter, do not reflect that he
explained the contents of the document to appellant Concepcion nor to the
other parties in a language or dialect known to all of them. Significantly, the
appellants even denied their presence during the notarization of the
document.
Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is controlling,
having remained unrebutted by appellees. The evidence proving that the
document was not fully explained to appellant Concepcion in a language
known to her, given her low educational attainment, remained uncontradicted
by appellees x x x the consent of petitioner was invalidated by a substantial
mistake or error, rendering the agreement voidable. The deed of extrajudicial
settlement between appellants and appellees should therefore be annulled
and set aside on the ground of mistake.
In Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled
that a contract may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent, even if the
act complained of is committed by a third party without the connivance or
complicity of one of the contracting parties. It found that a substantial mistake
arose from the employment of fraud or misrepresentation. The plaintiff in that
case was a 70-year old unschooled and unlettered woman who signed an
unauthorized loan obtained by a third party on her behalf The Court annulled
the contract due to a substantial mistake which invalidated her consent.
By the same reasoning, if it is one of the contracting parties who commits the
fraud or misrepresentation, such contract may all the more be annulled due
to substantial mistake.
In Remalante v. Tibe, the Supreme Court ruled that misrepresentation to an
illiterate woman who did not know how to read and write, nor understand
English, is fraudulent. Thus, the deed of sale was considered vitiated with
substantial error and fraud. x x x
xx xx
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the
deed of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the
discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.10 The
records show that appellants' complaint was filed on 17 August 1998 or
twelve (12) years from the execution of the deed. However, as appellants arc
deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon the
publication of the same in a newspaper on June 5, 10 and 27, 1995, this
Court rules that the present action has not prescribed.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in ruling as it did.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated 1 June
2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal is
REVERSED. 'The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.11 (Other citations omitted)
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied via the
second assailed January 29, 2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
In a November 9, 2015 Resolution, 12 this Court resolved to give due course
to the Petition.
Issues
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling that the respondents' cause of
action for annulment has not prescribed, and that it ignored
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of respondents indicating the
absence of fraud or vitiation of consent in the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz.
Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply13 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions,
petitioners essentially insist that respondents' cause of action for annulment
has prescribed, since they filed Civil Case No. 1380-98 SM only in 1998, or
12 years after the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate
on July 31, 1986; that pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, 14 a cause of
action based upon a written contract - such as the subject deed of
extrajudicial settlement - must be brought within l 0 years from the execution
thereof; that even assuming that the four-year prescriptive period based on
fraud applies as the CA ruled, respondents' cause of action already
prescribed, as the case was filed only in 1998, while the supposed fraud may
be said to have been discovered in 1986, when they learned of the survey
Page 64 of 117
being conducted on the subject property; that respondents' actions belied
their claim, in that they did not object when petitioners built their home on the
lots allotted to them and never registered any objection even during family
gatherings and occasions; that the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement -
being a notarized document - enjoys the presumption of regularity and
integrity, and may only be set aside by clear and convincing evidence of
irregularity; that it is a matter of judicial notice that a pre-war third-grader has
the education of a high school student; and that the findings of the trial court
must be given weight and respect.
Respondents' Arguments
In their Comment15 seeking denial of the Petition, respondents reiterate the
correctness of the CA's assailed Decision; that the deed of extrajudicial
settlement, being written in English, was calculated to defraud Concepcion -
who could not read nor write in said language; that owing to the fact that she
trusted petitioners, who were her sisters, she was cajoled into signing the
deed without knowing its contents; that the deed was notarized in the
absence of most of the parties thereto; that the prescriptive period to be
applied is not the 10-year period under Article 1144, but the four-year period
as held by the CA, to be computed from the discovery of the fraud - since
respondents discovered the fraud only in 1998; and that the factual issues
raised by petitioners have been passed upon by the CA, and are thus not
reviewable at this stage.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The present action involves a situation where one heir was able - through the
expedient of an extrajudicial settlement that was written in a language that is
not understood by one of her co-heirs - to secure a share in the estate of her
parents that was greater than that of her siblings, in violation of the principle
in succession that heirs should inherit in equal shares.
Thus, Antonia - represented in this case by her surviving heirs ·- received two
lots as against her siblings, including respondent Concepcion, who
respectively received only one lot each in the subject 940-square-meter
property. This she was able to achieve through the subject 1986 deed of
extrajudicial settlement - which was written in English, a language that was
not known to and understood by Concepcion given that she finished only
Grade 3 elementary education. With the help of Amparo, Antonia was able to
secure Concepcion's consent and signature without the benefit of explaining
the contents of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement. For this reason,
Concepcion did not have adequate knowledge of the contents and
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
ramifications of the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement; she was left
unaware of the sharing arrangement contained therein, and realized it only
when Antonia attempted to subdivide the subject property in 1998, and the
plan of subdivision survey was shown to Concepcion - which revealed that
Antonia obtained two lots. Consequently, Concepcion filed Civil Case No.
1380-98 SM on August 17, 1998.
In short, this is a simple case of exc1usion in legal succession, where coheirs
were effectively deprived of their rightful share to the estate of their parents -
who died without a will - by virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial
settlement or partition which granted a bigger share to one of the heirs and
was prepared in such a way that the other heirs would be effectively deprived
of discovering and knowing its contents.
Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares." 16 In this case, two of
Concepcion's co-heirs renounced their shares in the subject property; their
shares therefore accrued to the remaining co-heirs, in equal shares as well. 17
In Bautista v. Bautista,18 it was held that -
As gathered from the above-quoted portion of its decision, the Court of
Appeals applied the prescriptive periods for annulment on the ground of fraud
and for reconveyance of property under a constructive trust.
The extra-judicial partition executed by Teofilos co-heirs was invalid,
however. So Segura v. Segura19 instructs:
x x x The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of
the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property.
Under the rule, 'no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.' As the partition
was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for
the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed
after two years x x x
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action
to have it annulled does not prescribe.
The above pronouncement was reiterated in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop
Uy,20 where the Court ruled:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion
should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were
Page 65 of 117
admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not
properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon
them and consequently, a total nullity.
Section l, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. x x x
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further
elucidated in Segura v. Segura, thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question
which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.1aшphi1 The
rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the rune heirs who were entitled to equal shares in
the partitioned prope1ty. Under the rule 'no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.' As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge
the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution...
However, while the settlement of the estate is null ru1d void, the subsequent
sale of the subject properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon,
Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents is valid but only with respect
to their proportionate shares therein. It cannot be denied that these heirs
have acquired their respective shares in the properties of Anunciacion from
the moment of her death and that, as owners thereof: they can very well sell
their undivided share in the estate.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the
present action has not prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA the
prescriptive period of 2 years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement finds no
application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived
of their lawful participation in the subject estate. Besides an action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe' in
accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code. (Citations omitted)
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Then again, in The Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao v.
Prudencio,21 the above pronouncements were echoed, thus:
Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor
participation in the Extra-Judicial, the same is a total nullity. It is not binding
upon them. Thus, in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, which involves facts
analogous to the present case, we ruled that:
[I]n the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have
participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoda were admittedly excluded
and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented
therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity.
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further
elucidated in Segura v. Segura, thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 docs not apply to the partition in question
which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule
covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in
the partitioned property. Under the rule 'no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof.' As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge
the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, while the CA was correct in ruling in favor of Concepcion and setting
aside the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement, it erred in appreciating and
ruling that the case involved fraud - thus applying the four-year prescriptive
period - when it should have simply held that the action for the declaration of
nullity of the defective deed of extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe,
under the circumstances, given that the same was a total nullity. Clearly, the
issue of literacy is relevant to the extent that Concepcion was effectively
deprived of her true inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.
With the foregoing disposition, the other issues raised by the petitioners are
deemed resolved.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The subject July 31, 1986
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate is hereby DECLARED NULL AND
VOID, and thus ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the petitioners.
Page 66 of 117
SO ORDERED.
[13] G.R. No. 168692               December 13, 2010
FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL
TAYCO, Petitioners, vs. Heirs Of Concepcion Tayco-Flores, namely:
LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE F. BESA, MONELE FLORES, PERLA FLORES,
RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO FLORES, PURISIMA FLORES, and
FELIPE FLORES, Respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons.—
The above findings of fact of the trial court must be accorded respect. It is a
hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons,
because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to analyze and weigh
evidence by the parties all over again.
Same; Same; In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case.—In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of
review, this Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances,
it does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case. The CA, therefore, erred in
disregarding the factual findings of the trial court without providing any substantial
evidence to support its own findings.
Same; Contracts; Extrajudicial Settlements; An extrajudicial settlement is a
contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not relieve a party
from the effects of a contract; In the construction or interpretation of an instrument,
the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued.—An extrajudicial
settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not
relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the
contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise investment. However, in the
construction or interpretation of an instrument, the intention of the parties is
primordial and is to be pursued. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control. If the contract appears to be contrary to the evident
intentions of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. The denomination
given by the parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of the contents. In
this particular case, the trial court, based on its appreciation of the pieces of evidence
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the signatories was contrary to the
questioned document’s content and denomination.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals'
Decision2 dated November 17, 2004 and the reinstatement of the Regional
Trial Court's Decision3 dated October 2, 2001.
The records contain the following facts:
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado, their
children, petitioner Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and
Consolacion Tayco inherited the following parcels of land:
1. A parcel of land (Lot 1902pt.), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo,
Aklan with the area of 9,938 square meters, bounded on the NE by
Lots 1848 & 1905; on the SE by Lots 1903 & 1904; on the NW by
Lots 1895, 1887, 1890 and 1808, covered by OCT No. (24360) RO-
1569 under ARP/TD No. 01025 in the name of Diega Regalado with
assessed value of ₱15,210.00;
2. A parcel of land (Lot 1896), situated at Buswang New, Kalibo,
Aklan, with the area of 2,123 square meters, bounded on the NE by
Lot 1898-C; on the SE by Lot 1897; on the SW by New Provincial
Road; and on the NW by Lot 1893, covered by OCT No. (24101) RO-
1570, under ARP/TD No. 01087 & 01088 in the name of Diega
Regalado with assessed value of ₱6,910.00; and
3. A parcel of land (Lot 2960), situated at Andagao, Kalibo, Aklan,
with the area of 4,012 square meters, bounded on the NE by Lot
2957-J; on the SE by Lot 2961-H; on the SW by Lot 2660; and on the
NW by Lot 2656, covered by OCT No. (23813) RO-1563, under
ARP/TD No. 01782 in the name of Diega Regalado with assessed
value of ₱4,820.00.4
Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco Tayco and his sister
Consolacion Tayco executed a document called Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation
of Sale of Shares,5 transferring their shares on the abovementioned
Page 67 of 117
properties to their sister Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was
notarized and, on March 16, 1991, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and
Consolacion Tayco executed the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in
Three (3) Parcels of Land.6
Consolacion Tayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-
Flores died on January 14, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed
a case for nullity of documents and partition with damages with the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate
of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares and
the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null
and void; thus, he is still entitled to his original shares in the parcels of land.
According to him, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was executed at that
time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in need of money and wanted
the properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the mortgage did
not push through and that he requested his sister to cancel the said Deed, to
which the latter ensured that the same document had no effect. However, he
further claimed that without his knowledge and consent, her sisters
Concepcion and Consolacion executed another document entitled
Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to
have the tax declarations and certificates of title covering those three parcels
of land transferred in the name of Concepcion. He also alleged that he came
to know of the said facts only when he had the property surveyed for the
purpose of partition and some of the heirs of Concepcion objected to the said
survey.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Francisco Tayco, the dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in
favor of the plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring the document entitled, Extrajudicial Settlement of the
Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of
Shares (Annex A, Complaint), and the document entitled
Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land
(Annex B, Complaint), as null and void;
b) Declaring the three (3) parcels of land subject of the above
documents to be co-owned by the plaintiff (½ share) and defendants
(½ share);
c) Ordering the parties to submit to the court a Project of Partition
indicating the specific portion allotted to them within 30 days from
receipt of this decision; in case of disagreement, the Court shall
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
order the sale of all the three (3) parcels with the proceeds to be
divided equally between plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants
on the other;
d) Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of ₱10,000.00
representing litigation expenses, and ₱5,000.00 as attorney's fees,
plus cost.
e) The claim for moral and exemplary damages are hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.7
In ruling that the assailed documents were null and void, the RTC
ratiocinated that the extrajudicial settlement is a simulated document to make
it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner of the properties, so
that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral for a prospective
loan and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial
institution did not materialize, hence, the document had no more effect.
Consequently, according to the trial court, since the first document was
simulated and had no force and effect, the second document had no more
purpose and basis.
The respondent-heirs appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of
Appeals, and on November 17, 2004, the latter reversed the former's ruling,
disposing it in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us REVERSING the assailed decision of the lower court and a
new one entered declaring defendants-appellants absolute owners of Lot
Nos. 1902, 1896 and 2620. The complaint of plaintiff-appellee is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.8
In reversing the trial court's findings, the CA reasoned out that the
genuineness and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was not
disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized. It added that the
recital of the provisions of the said document is clear that it is an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of deceased Diega Regalado and that petitioner and
his sister Consolacion confirmed the sale of their shares to Concepcion.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 but was denied10 by the same
court. Thus, the present petition.
The petitioner raised this lone issue:
Page 68 of 117
CAN THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF
THE DECEASED DIEGA REGALADO WITH CONFIRMATION OF SALE OF
SHARES DIVEST CO-HEIR AND CO-OWNER FRANCISCO TAYCO OF
HIS SHARES IN THE THREE (3) PARCELS OF LAND IN QUESTION? 11
Under question is the validity of the document that contains the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased, Diega Regalado. The trial court
ruled that it is null and void based on its assessment of the facts, while the
CA adjudged it valid based on its examination of the said document. Under
Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme
Court, it is clearly enunciated that only questions of law may be set
forth.12 Questions of fact may not be raised unless the case falls under any of
the following exceptions:13
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of
fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.
This case clearly falls under one of the exceptions and after a careful review
of the facts of the case, this Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means
of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should
they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action for partition. x x x.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
xxxx
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of
making it a public document14 that can bind third parties. However, this
formal requirement appears to be superseded by the substantive provision of
the Civil Code that states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in
the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision
among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by
the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property
regardless of the form it takes. x x x15
The trial court, after a keen determination of the facts involved in the case,
clearly articulated its findings as to the inconclusiveness of the required
publication and the notarization of the document purportedly containing the
extrajudicial settlement in question, thus:
At the outset, the document, Exhibit A, was executed at Lezo, Aklan which is
about ten kilometers from Kalibo where all the parties are residents.
Defendant had to hire a tricycle from Kalibo to bring the parties to Lezo.
Assuming that a certain Engr. Reynaldo Lopez was helping the defendants at
that time in this transaction, he is also a resident of Kalibo, Aklan which is the
center of Aklan where almost all the lawyers have their offices. Engr. Lopez
has also his office here. Why would he still recommend the execution of this
document particularly in Lezo and before that particular alleged Notary
Public? This sounds incredible.
Defendants alleged that the document was published in a newspaper of
general circulation of Aklan but no affidavit of such publication was
presented. Only an alleged receipt from Engr. Lopez was presented (Exh. 2)
but does not prove its purpose.16
The above findings of fact of the trial court must be accorded respect. It is a
hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed except for strong and
valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. It is not a function of this Court to
analyze and weigh evidence by the parties all over again. 17
Page 69 of 117
Anent the true intent of the signatories of the questioned document appearing
to be an extrajudicial settlement of an estate, the trial court found the
following facts:
Plaintiff alleged that Exhibit A was executed just to accommodate his sister
Concepcion Tayco to be able to offer as collateral the property in order to
raise money for the marriage of her son Ruperto Flores. But the property was
never encumbered because it was then Martial Law (TSN, 10/14/98, pp. 3-4;
5/6/99, pp. 5-6). This testimony of the plaintiff was never rebutted or denied
by the defendant, Ruperto Flores, who himself testified for the defendants. In
fact, he even admitted that he got married after the execution of Exhibit A
(TSN, 2/16/01, pp. 15-16). This allegation by the plaintiff, therefore, must
stand.
Defendants argue that if their intention was to mortgage the property in
raising money, there was no need for the execution of Exhibit A but only a
Special Power of Attorney would suffice. This would be the quickest way if
the bank would be amenable, but the latter would be more protected if the
title of the property are already transferred in the name of the mortgagor. For
them, it has only to rely on the certificate of tile if it decides to deal with it. 18
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine
that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered
into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was
doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a foolish or unwise
investment.19 However, in the construction or interpretation of an instrument,
the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. 20 If the terms of
a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control. 21 If the contract
appears to be contrary to the evident intentions of the parties, the latter shall
prevail over the former.22 The denomination given by the parties in their
contract is not conclusive of the nature of the contents. 23 In this particular
case, the trial court, based on its appreciation of the pieces of evidence
presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the signatories was contrary
to the questioned document's content and denomination.1avvphi1
Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final conclusion as to the nullity
of the document in question, correctly discussed the lack of consideration in
so far as that part of the document which embodies the confirmation of the
sale of shares of siblings Francisco and Consolacion to Concepcion. Thus:
The consideration of ₱50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq. meters real
property in Kalibo, Aklan even way back in 1972 is definitely way below the
market value. Even if we take into consideration the filial love between
siblings (Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 233), still, the difference between the
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
market value then and the purchase price is very great. Even for a market
value of ₱1,000.00, a consideration of ₱50.00 only plus filial love would still
be greatly disproportionate. Certainly, the 1/3 share of plaintiff exceeds
₱1,000.00. The filial love between siblings may affect the discrepancy
only if the difference between the market value over the selling price is
slight. (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that Exhibit A is merely a simulated
document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores is the owner of
the properties so that it will be easy for her to use the same as collateral for a
prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not materialize or if it did after the
obligation thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null and
void and without effect. As the evidence disclosed that the intended loan with
any financial institution did not materialize, hence, immediately thereafter, the
document had no more effect.24
As to the other questioned document or the Confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in Three Parcels of Land, the nullity of the first document renders it
void because its effectivity is anchored on the validity of the first document.
The Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in Three Parcels of Land came into
fruition merely to confirm the existence of the first document. It was executed
on March 16, 1991, when petitioner Francisco Tayco was still alive.
Nevertheless, the said document was signed only by Consolacion and
Concepcion, which prompted the trial court to make the following
observations:
As to Exhibit B, it is surprising why only the two sisters participated in its
execution while the plaintiff who is still very much alive and also a resident of
New Buswang, Kalibo, Aklan was excluded. This document is a confirmation
of the execution of Exhibit A where the plaintiff is a party. The plaintiff would
have also been made a party to this document so that he could have
confirmed the sale of his share had it been so. Could it be, therefore, that
defendants did not want the plaintiff to know this document so that they can
obtain the transfer of the titles and the tax declarations in their names without
his knowledge? Unfortunately, however, plaintiff accidentally discovered the
transfer when he tried to survey the property for ultimate partition. 25
To reiterate, in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, this
Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it
does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented
by the contending parties during the trial of the case. 26 The CA, therefore,
erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court without providing
any substantial evidence to support its own findings.
Page 70 of 117
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals' Decision dated November 17, 2004
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, dated October 2, 2001,
is UPHELD and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 71 of 117
[14] G.R. No. 161220               July 30, 2008
SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO
substituted by their heirs, namely: Isabelita, Renato, Rosadelia and
Gorgonio, Jr., surnamed Benatiro, and SPOUSES RENATO C.
BENATIRO and ROSIE M. BENATIRO, Respondents, vs. HEIRS OF
EVARISTO CUYOS, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-
Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos, and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos, Respondents.
Actions; Annulment of Judgment; Due Process; The remedy of annulment of
judgment is extraordinary in character and will not so easily and readily lend itself
to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments; Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court provides that annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC
may be based “only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,”
jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional ground therefor.—The
remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character and will not so easily
and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final judgments. Sections 1
and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse to it, viz.: Section 1. Coverage.
—This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Section
2. Grounds for annulment.—The annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if
it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition
for relief. Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that
annulment of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based “only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction,” jurisprudence recognizes denial
of due process as additional ground therefor.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Extrinsic Fraud,” Explained; While the
Court finds that the Court of Appeals correctly annulled the trial court Order
approving the compromise agreement embodied in the Commissioner’s Report, the
Court finds that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is
no sufficient evidence to hold the Commissioner or any of the heirs guilty of
fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack of due process .—An
action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent
act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to
the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court. While we find that the CA correctly annulled the
CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the
ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or
any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for
lack of due process.
Same; Same; Presumption of Regularity; While, under the general rule, it is to
be presumed that everything done by an officer in connection with the performance
of an official act in the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be
overcome by evidence to the contrary.—Petitioners point out that the Commissioner
was an officer of the court and a disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section
3(m) of the Rules on Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed. While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that
everything done by an officer in connection with the performance of an official act in
the line of his duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by
evidence to the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as
absence of the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the
signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner’s Report, as well as absence of evidence
showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be competent proofs of
irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Succession; Settlement of Estates; Extrajudicial Settlement of Estates; Due Process;
Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding, and the rule plainly states that
persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby, and contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued
before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon, and not after such an
agreement has already been executed; The publication of the settlement does not
constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part
in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution; The requirement of
publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to
deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate.—In Cua v.
Vargas, 506 SCRA 374 (2006), in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed
constructively notified of and bound by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of
the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when the extrajudicial
settlement and partition has been duly published, we held: The procedure outlined in
Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that
persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not
be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any
deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested
parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and
not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among
heirs. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the
heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice
Page 72 of 117
after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the
protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful
participation in the decedent’s estate. In this connection, the records of the present
case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents,
having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of the present
complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned. Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what
matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement
was arrived at, which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the
Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of a trial court in approving a Commissioner’s
Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the
conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard,
was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law—such Order which approved a void
Commissioner’s Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.—We also find
nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a hearing to
validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of
the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the
Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the
conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard.
The CFI’s action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that
no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the
assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner’s
Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
Judgments; Due Process; Where the assailed Order is a void judgment for
lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at all—it cannot be the source of any
right or of any obligation, and it never acquires finality.—Considering that the
assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it is no judgment at
all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation. In Nazareno v. Court of
Appeals, 378 SCRA 28 (2002), we stated the consequences of a void judgment,
thus: A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the petitioner
in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned decision of the
Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to have become final and
executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision is deemed non-existent. Thus,
there was no effective or operative judgment to appeal from. In Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison, this Court held that: x x x [A] void
judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment, but may be
entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought
to be given to it. It is attended by none of the consequences of a valid adjudication. It
has no legal or binding effect or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot
affect, impair or create rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no
protection to those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
judgment are themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is
regarded as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no
judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they were
in before the trial.
Same; Same; Laches; Words and Phrases; The Court of First Instance’s (CFI’s)
order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches; The principle of laches or “stale
demands” ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.—The CFI’s order being null and void, it may
be assailed anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or
final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches. Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be
declared null and void and set aside. We find no merit in petitioners’ claim that
respondents are barred from assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from
its finality on ground of laches and estoppel. Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
provides that an action for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be
filed within four years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before
it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of laches or “stale demands” ordains
that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand—each case is to be determined according
to its particular circumstances; It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result; An
action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe.—There is no
absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat
justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the
principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result. In
this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in February 1998
and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001. Moreover, we find that
respondents’ right to due process is the paramount consideration in annulling the
assailed order. It bears stressing that an action to declare the nullity of a void
judgment does not prescribe.
Page 73 of 117
 DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision 1 dated July 18, 2003
of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution 2 dated November 13, 2003
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
65630.3
Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with
nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria,
Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died
leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu covered
by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731,
000732, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.
On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria)
represented by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the Court
of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a
petition4 for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP)
No. 24-BN entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Evaristo Cuyos,
Gloria Cuyos-Talian, petitioner." The petition was opposed by Gloria’s
brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty. Yray).
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their
respective counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had
come to an agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even date
issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix of the estate. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo
Cuyos and including the undivided half accruing to his spouse Agatona
Arrogante who recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos
Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after posting a nominal bond of
₱1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975, the CFI stated that
when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria
and her brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their respective counsels,
appeared; that Atty. Yray, Francisco’s counsel, manifested that the parties
had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels
suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty. Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be
appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and
to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the court. In the same
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Order, the Court of First Instance (CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered
him to make a project of partition within 30 days from December 12, 1975 for
submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo stated that
he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause
their appearance on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference or meeting to arrive
at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud
and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three
heirs could not be located in their respective given addresses; that since
some of the heirs present resided outside the province of Cebu, they decided
to go ahead with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who were present:
1. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during
the time that Francisco Cuyos, one of the heirs, was administering
the properties of the estate (without appointment from the Court) as
having been properly and duly accounted for.
2. Agreed to consider all income of the properties of the estate during
the administration of Gloria Cuyos Talian, (duly appointed by the
Court) also one of the heirs as having been properly and duly
accounted for.
3. Agreed to consider all motions filed in this proceedings demanding
an accounting from Francisco Cuyos and Gloria Cuyos Talian, as
having been withdrawn.
4. Agreed not to partition the properties of the estate but instead
agreed to first sell it for the sum of ₱40,000.00 subject to the
condition that should any of the heirs would be in a position to buy
the properties of the estate, the rest of the eight (8) heirs will just
receive only Four Thousand Pesos (₱4,000.00) each.
5. Agreed to equally divide the administration expenses to be
deducted from their respective share of ₱4,000.00. 9
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of
the heirs, informed all those present in the conference of her desire to buy
the properties of the estate, to which everybody present agreed, and
considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo explained that the delay in the
submission of the Report was due to the request of respondent Gloria that
she be given enough time to make some consultations on what was already
Page 74 of 117
agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976
that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the
information that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed
upon, provided she be given the sum of ₱5,570.00 as her share of the estate,
since one of properties of the estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray
their father's hospitalization.
Quoting the Commissioner’s Report, the CFI issued the assailed
Order10 dated December 16, 1976, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to
be in order, the same being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement
as embodied in the report of the commissioner is hereby approved. The
Court hereby orders the Administratrix to execute the deed of sale covering
all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos Benatiro after the
payment to her of the sum of ₱36,000.00. The said sum of money shall
remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration expenses
and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon
order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs. 11
The CFI disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of
₱5,570.00, as the same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present
during the conference.
In an Order12 dated January 11, 1978, the CFI appointed Lope Cuyos
(Cuyos) as the new administrator of the estate, purportedly on the basis of
the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it appeared that she was already
residing in Central Luzon and her absence was detrimental to the early
termination of the proceedings.
On May 25, 1979, administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale13 over the six parcels of land constituting the intestate estate of the late
Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a consideration of the sum of
₱36,000.00.
Sometime in February 1998, the heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria
Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique
Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud Cuyos (respondents),
allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729,
000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother
Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely,
20-14129, 20-14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were
issued in Columba’s name; and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles
covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were issued in favor of Columba; that
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
some of these parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of
spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and daughter-in-law,
respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer
certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently
discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order dated December 16,
1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 25, 1979.
Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the
Department of Justice, which on June 13, 2000 dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.14
Salud Cuyos brought the matter for conciliation and mediation at
the barangay level, but was unsuccessful.15
On July 16, 2001, Salud Cuyos, for herself and in representation 16 of the
other heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, 17 and
Enrique, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of the Order dated
December 16, 1976 of the CFI of Cebu, Branch XI, in SP No. 24-BN under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. They alleged that the CFI Order dated
December 16, 1976 was null and void and of no effect, the same being
based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular;
that such report practically deprived them of due process in claiming their
share of their father's estate; that Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares executed an
affidavit, as well as the unnotarized statement of Gloria stating that no
meeting ever took place for the purpose of discussing how to dispose of the
estate of their parents and that they never received any payment from the
supposed sale of their share in the inheritance; that the report was done in
close confederacy with their co-heir Columba, who stood to be benefited by
the Commissioner's recommendation, should the same be approved by the
probate court; that since the report was a falsity, any order proceeding
therefrom was invalid; that the issuance of the certificates of titles in favor of
respondents were tainted with fraud and irregularity, since the CFI which
issued the assailed order did not appear to have been furnished a copy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale; that the CFI was not in custodia legis of the
consideration of the sale, as directed in its Order so that it could divide the
remainder of the consideration equally among the heirs after paying all the
administration expenses and estate taxes; that the intestate case had not yet
been terminated as the last order found relative to the case was the
appointment of Lope as administrator vice Gloria; that they never received
their corresponding share in the inheritance; and that the act of petitioners in
manifest connivance with administrator Lope amounted to a denial of their
right to the property without due process of law, thus, clearly showing that
extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.
Page 75 of 117
Herein petitioners contend that respondents' allegation that they discovered
the assailed order dated December 16, 1976 only in February 1998 was
preposterous, as respondents were represented by counsel in the intestate
proceedings; thus, notice of Order to counsel was notice to client; that this
was only a ploy so that they could claim that they filed the petition for
annulment within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they have been in
possession of the six parcels of land since May 25, 1979 when the same was
sold to them pursuant to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that
no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed order; that
Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he attested to having received his
share of the sale proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were
estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16, 1976, as it had
already attained the status of finality.
On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING REASONS, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Order issued by the Court of First Instance of
Cebu Branch XI dated December 16, 1976 as well as the Certificates of Title
issued in the name of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro and the subsequent transfer
of these Titles in the name of spouses Renato and Rosie Benatiro are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Further, SP Proc. Case No. 24-BN is hereby
ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued. 18
The CA declared that the ultimate fact that was needed to be established
was the veracity and truthfulness of the Commissioner’s Report, which was
used by the trial court as its basis for issuing the assailed Order. The CA held
that to arrive at an agreement, there was a need for all the concerned parties
to be present in the conference; however, such was not the scenario since in
their separate sworn statements, the compulsory heirs of the decedent
attested to the fact that no meeting or conference ever happened among
them; that although under Section 3(m), Rule 133 on the Rules of Evidence,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of an official duty, the
same may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence to prove the
contrary.
The CA noted some particulars that led it to conclude that the conference
was not held accordingly, to wit: (1) the Commissioner’s Report never
mentioned the names of the heirs who were present in the alleged
conference but only the names of those who were absent, when the names
of those who were present were equally essential, if not even more
important, than the names of those who were absent; (2) the Report also
failed to include any proof of conformity to the agreement from the attendees,
such as letting them sign the report to signify their consent as regards the
agreed mechanisms for the estate’s settlement; (3) there was lack or
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
absence of physical evidence attached to the report indicating that the
respondents were indeed properly notified about the scheduled conference.
The CA then concluded that due to the absence of the respondents' consent,
the legal existence of the compromise agreement did not stand on a firm
ground.
The CA further observed that although it appeared that notice of the report
was given to Atty. Lepiten and Atty. Yray, lawyers of Gloria and Francisco
Cuyos, respectively, the same cannot be taken as notice to the other heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos; that a lawyer’s authority to compromise cannot be simply
presumed, since what was required was the special authority to compromise
on behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement entered into by a
person not duly authorized to do so by the principal is void and has no legal
effect, citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void compromise agreement,
the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein
petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the
properties to Columba Cuyos-Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the compromise
agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale was void
and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that Columba paid the sum of
₱36,000.00 to the administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the
testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he received his share of the
proceeds but without indicating the exact amount that he received; that even
so, such alleged payment was incomplete and was not in compliance with
the trial court’s order for the administratix to execute the deed of sale
covering all properties of the estate in favor of Columba Cuyos-Benatiro after
the payment to the administratrix of the sum of ₱36,000.00; that said sum of
money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the
remainder shall, upon order of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even
furnished the trial court nor was said money placed under custodia legis as
agreed upon; that the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the
Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not yet been terminated
and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the appointment of
Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the
parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations
and Transfer Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with
fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the
certificates of title and the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot
Page 76 of 117
be made a legal basis of their ownership over the properties, since to do so
would result in enriching them at the expense of the respondents; and that it
was also evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of extrinsic
fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully litigate their
case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a
proper remedy where the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies,
such as new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take
through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it
annulled the 24 year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an
official act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity - based merely on
belated allegations of irregularities in the performance of said official act.
Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case,
extrinsic fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's
order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. 20
Subsequent to the filing of their petition, petitioners filed a Manifestation that
they were in possession of affidavits of waiver and desistance executed by
the heirs of Lope Cuyos21 and respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares 22 on
February 17, 2004 and December 17, 2004, respectively. In both affidavits,
the affiants stated that they had no more interest in prosecuting/defending
the case involving the settlement of the estate, since the subject estate
properties had been bought by their late sister Columba, and they had
already received their share of the purchase price. Another heir, respondent
Numeriano Cuyos, had also earlier executed an Affidavit 23 dated December
13, 2001, stating that the subject estate was sold to Columba and that she
had already received her share of the purchase price on May 18, 1988. In
addition, Numeriano had issued a certification24 dated May 18, 1988, which
was not refuted by any of the parties, that he had already received ₱4,000.00
in payment of his share, which could be the reason why he refused to sign
the Special Power of Attorney supposedly in favor of Salud Cuyos for the
filing of the petition with the CA.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA committed a reversible error in
annulling the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved the
Commissioner’s Report embodying the alleged compromise agreement
entered into by the heirs of Evaristo and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos.
We rule in the negative.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
The remedy of annulment of judgment is extraordinary in character 25 and will
not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties aggrieved by final
judgments. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 47 impose strict conditions for recourse
to it, viz.:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of
Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have
been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
Although Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that annulment
of a final judgment or order of an RTC may be based "only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction," jurisprudence recognizes denial of
due process as additional .ground therefor.26
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud will lie only if the
fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. 27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there
is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a
trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that
the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having
his day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December
16, 1976, we find that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic
fraud, as there is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the
heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed order is void for lack
of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the
agreement of the heirs and to prepare the project of partition for submission
and approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Taneo to set a
time and place for the first meeting of the heirs. In his Commissioner’s
Report, Atty. Taneo stated that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of
Page 77 of 117
Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the place, where the subject
properties were located for settlement, by sending them subpoenae
supplemented by telegrams for them to attend the conference scheduled on
February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also alleged that out of the nine heirs, only
six attended the conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the
Commissioner did not state the names of those present, but only those heirs
who failed to attend the conference, namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and
Enrique who, as stated in the Report, based on the return of service, could
not be located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would establish that the alleged
subpoenae, supplemented by telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the
scheduled conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact, respondent
Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs, who was presumably present in
the conference, as she was not mentioned as among those absent, had
executed an affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998 attesting, to the fact that she
was not called to a meeting nor was there any telegram or notice of any
meeting received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on December 17,
2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and Desistance 31 regarding this case, it was only
for the reason that the subject estate properties had been bought by their late
sister Columba, and that she had already received her corresponding share
of the purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that retracted her
previous statement that she was not called to a meeting. Respondent Gloria
also made an unnotarized statement 32 that there was no meeting held. Thus,
the veracity of Atty. Taneo’s holding of a conference with the heirs was
doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed convened for
the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties,
since they were not even required to sign anything to show their attendance
of the alleged meeting. In fact, the Commissioner's Report, which embodied
the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged
attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto.
It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to
arrive at a compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it
was imperative that all the heirs must be present in the conference and be
heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. Considering
that no separate instrument of conveyance was executed among the heirs
embodying their alleged agreement, it was necessary that the Report be
signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the heirs was indeed
held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a
disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on
Evidence, there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an
officer in connection with the performance of an official act in the line of his
duty was legally done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to
the contrary. We find the instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of
the names of the persons present in the conference, absence of the
signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as well as absence of
evidence showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to be
competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.
Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the
conference was not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of
the CFI.
Petitioners attached a Certification 33 dated August 7, 2003 issued by the
Officer In Charge (OIC), Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 11, to
show that copies of the Commissioner’s Report were sent to all the heirs,
except Salud and Enrique, as well as to Attys. Lepiten and Yray as
enumerated in the Notice found at the lower portion of the Report with the
accompanying registry receipts.34
In Cua v. Vargas,35 in which the issue was whether heirs were deemed
constructively notified of and bound by an extra-judicial settlement and
partition of the estate, regardless of their failure to participate therein, when
the extra-judicial settlement and partition has been duly published, we held:
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte
proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not
participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon
(i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an
agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant
case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to
the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same
was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs
Page 78 of 117
of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the
records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of
the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly
before the filing of the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these
extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are
concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what matters is whether the
heirs were indeed notified before the compromise agreement was arrived at,
which was not established, and not whether they were notified of the
Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called
to a hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the
Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing
conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite the statement therein
that only six out of the nine heirs attended the conference, thus, effectively
depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action was
tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall
be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the assailed
Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's
Report, is a void judgment for lack of due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners’ contentions that all the parties in the
intestate estate proceedings in the trial court were duly represented by
respective counsels, namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray
for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to settle the case
amicably, they manifested such intention through their lawyers, as stated in
the Order dated January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the estate
of a deceased person need not hire his own lawyer, because his interest in
the estate is represented by the judicial administrator who retains the
services of a counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal representative
not only of the estate but also of the heirs, legatees, and creditors whose
interest he represents; that when the trial court issued the assailed Order
dated December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's Report, the parties’
lawyers were duly served said copies of the Order on December 21, 1976 as
shown by the Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC, Clerk of
Court; that notices to lawyers should be considered notices to the clients,
since, if a party is represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and
pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon receipt of such order by
counsels, any one of the respondents could have taken the appropriate
remedy such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new trial or a
petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper time, but they failed to do so
without giving any cogent reason for such failure.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
While the trial court's order approving the Commissioner’s Report was
received by Attys. Yray and Lepiten, they were the lawyers of Gloria and
Francisco, respectively, but not the lawyers of the other heirs. As can be
seen from the pleadings filed before the probate court, Atty. Lepiten was
Gloria’s counsel when she filed her Petition for letters of administration, while
Atty. Yray was Francisco’s lawyer when he filed his opposition to the petition
for letters of administration and his Motion to Order administrarix Gloria to
render an accounting and for the partition of the estate. Thus, the other heirs
who were not represented by counsel were not given any notice of the
judgment approving the compromise. It was only sometime in February 1998
that respondents learned that the tax declarations covering the parcels of
land, which were all in the name of their late mother Agatona Arrogante, were
canceled; and new Tax Declarations were issued in Columba’s name, and
Original Certificates of Titles were subsequently issued in favor of Columba.
Thus, they could not have taken an appeal or other remedies.
Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due
process of law, it is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or
of any obligation.38
In Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,39 we stated the consequences of a void
judgment, thus:
A void judgment never acquires finality. Hence, while admittedly, the
petitioner in the case at bar failed to appeal timely the aforementioned
decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, it cannot be deemed to
have become final and executory. In contemplation of law, that void decision
is deemed non-existent. Thus, there was no effective or operative judgment
to appeal from. In Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System vs. Sison,
this Court held that:
x x x [A] void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by any
tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it. It is attended by none of the
consequences of a valid adjudication. It has no legal or binding effect or
efficacy for any purpose or at any place. It cannot affect, impair or create
rights. It is not entitled to enforcement and is, ordinarily, no protection to
those who seek to enforce. All proceedings founded on the void judgment are
themselves regarded as invalid. In other words, a void judgment is regarded
as a nullity, and the situation is the same as it would be if there were no
judgment. It, accordingly, leaves the parties litigants in the same position they
were in before the trial.
Thus, a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any
right nor of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
Page 79 of 117
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and
any writ of execution based on it is void: "x x x it may be said to be a lawless
thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed anytime, collaterally
or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action
or proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches.41 Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving
it must be declared null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from
assailing the judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground
of laches and estoppel.
Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to
said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio. No
reversible error was thus committed by the CA in annulling the judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision dated July 18, 2003
and Resolution dated November 13, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch XI, Cebu and the Heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos are DIRECTED to proceed with SP Proceedings Case No.
24-BN for the settlement of the Estate of Evaristo Cuyos.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that an action for

annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four
years from its discovery and, if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is
barred by laches or estoppel.

The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.42

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of

demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances.43 The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate
fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the
doctrine of laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result. 44

In this case, respondents learned of the assailed order only sometime in

February 1998 and filed the petition for annulment of judgment in 2001.
Moreover, we find that respondents' right to due process is the paramount
consideration in annulling the assailed order. It bears stressing that an action
to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 45

Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and
binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 80 of 117
[15] G.R. No. 199885
JESUSA DUJALI BUOT, Petitioner vs. ROQUE RASAY DUJALI,
Respondent
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion for Reconsideration; Section 2 of
Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. What it prohibits is a second
motion for reconsideration filed by the same party involving the same judgment or
final resolution.—Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation.
What it prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party
involving the same judgment or final resolution. In the present case, Buot’s motion
for reconsideration was only her first motion challenging the Order dismissing her
petition for administration of Gregorio’s estate. The RTC clearly erred in denying
her motion on the ground that it is a second motion for reconsideration prohibited
under the Rules.
Administrative Proceedings; Intestate Succession; When a person dies
intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to judicial administration
proceedings.—When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be
subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however, several
exceptions. One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court. This Section states: Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs.—If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the
office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an
ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the
entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The
parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation
in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to
himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition
precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said
register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent. The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of
general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. According to this provision, when the deceased left
no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate
among themselves without judicial administration. The heirs may do so
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
extrajudicially through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of
Deeds. In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for
partition.
Same; Section 1 of Rule 74 does not prevent the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file an
action for partition.—Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to
file an action for partition. In Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, 92 Phil.
273 (1952), we said: [S]ection 1 [of Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from
instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if
they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While
section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit,
or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they
have good reasons to take a different course of action. Said section is not mandatory
or compulsory as may be gleaned from the use made therein of the word may. If the
intention were otherwise the framer of the rule would have employed the
word shall as was done in other provisions that are mandatory in character.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Jesusa Dujali Buot (Buot) challenged the Orders of Branch 34 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Panabo City, dated September 19, 2011 2 and
December 8, 2011,3 dismissing her petition and denying her subsequent
motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Buot filed before the RTC a petition4 for letters of administration of the estate
of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). In her petition, Buot alleged that she
was a surviving heir, along with Roque Dujali, Constancia Dujali-Tiongson,
Concepcion Dujali-Satiembre, Marilou Sales-Dujali, Marietonete Dujali,
Georgeton Dujali, Jr. and Geomar Dujali, of Gregorio who died
intestate.5 Buot annexed6 to her petition a list of Gregorio's properties that are
allegedly publicly known. She claimed that since Gregorio's death, there had
been no effort to settle his estate. Roque Dujali (Dujali) purportedly continued
to manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs.
Buot further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied her request to
settle the estate.7 Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an administrator be appointed to
preserve Gregorio's estate; (2) a final inventory of the properties be made;
(3) the heirs be established; and (4) the net estate be ordered distributed in
accordance with law among the legal heirs.8
Page 81 of 117
Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss, 9 arguing that Buot had no
legal capacity to institute the proceedings. He asserted that despite Buot's
claim that she was Gregorio's child with his first wife Sitjar Escalona, she
failed to attach any document, such as a certificate of live birth or a marriage
certificate, to prove her filiation. Dujali, on the other hand, attached a
certificate of marriage between Gregorio and his mother Yolanda Rasay. This
certificate also indicated that Gregorio had never been previously married to
a certain Sitjar Escalona. Thus, as Buot failed to prove that she is an heir,
Dujali prayed that her petition be dismissed outright.
Buot filed her comment10 to Dujali's opposition with motion to dismiss. She
argued that under the Rules of Court, only ultimate facts should be included
in an initiatory pleading. The marriage certificate and certificate of live birth
which Dujali demands are evidentiary matters that ought to be tackled during
trial. Nevertheless, to answer Dujali's allegations, Buot attached to her
comment a copy of the necrological services program11 where she was listed
as one of Gregorio's heirs, a certification12 from the municipal mayor that she
is Gregorio's child, and a copy of the Amended Extrajudicial
Settlement13 dated July 4, 2001 which includes both Buot and Dujali as
Gregorio's heirs. Notably, this Amended Extrajudicial Settlement pertained to
parcels of land not included in the list of properties annexed in Buot's petition.
On May 3, 2011, the RTC denied Dujali's motion to dismiss. It agreed with
Buot that the issues raised by Dujali are evidentiary matters that should be
addressed during trial.14
Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration. 15 He argued that under the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence, a party's lack of legal capacity to sue
should be raised in a motion to dismiss. Further, he took issue with the
existence of the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement. According to him, when
an estate has no debts, recourse to administration proceedings is allowed
only when there are good and compelling reasons. Where an action for
partition (whether in or out of court) is possible, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding.
The RTC, in its Order dated September 19, 2011, granted Dujali's motion for
reconsideration. It held that under the law, there are only two exceptions to
the requirement that the settlement of a deceased's estate should be
judicially administered--extrajudicial settlement and summary settlement of
an estate of small value.16 According to the RTC, in the case of Buot's
petition, administration has been barred by the fact that Gregorio's estate has
already been settled extrajudicially as evidenced by the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement. It also noted that Gregorio had no creditors since
Buot failed to allege it in her petition. 17 Since recourse to judicial
administration of an estate that has no debt is allowed only when there are
good reasons for not resorting to extrajudicial settlement or action for
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
partition, the RTC dismissed Buot's petition. Buot filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied in its Order dated December 8, 2011.
According to the RTC, not only was Buot's motion a second motion for
reconsideration prohibited under the Rules, there was also no sufficient
reason to reverse its earlier dismissal of the petition. 18
Buot filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court challenging the RTC's Orders on pure questions of law. In her petition,
Buot argues that her motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited second
motion for reconsideration. Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states
that a prohibited second motion for reconsideration is one filed by
the same party. In this case, Buot's motion for reconsideration was her first,
since the motion for reconsideration subject of the Order dated September
19, 2011 was filed by Dujali. She also argued that the Amended Extra judicial
Settlement did not cover all of Gregorio's properties. 19
Further, Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a petition
for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to pursue an ordinary
action for partition. In her case, she claims that there are good reasons
justifying her recourse to administration proceedings: (1) the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover the entire estate; (2) there has been no
effort to partition the property; (3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot' s status as
an heir; (4) other heirs have been deprived of the properties of the estate;
and (5) other heirs, particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou Dujali, have
already manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an
administrator.20
In his comment,21 Dujali argues that Buot is not an interested person allowed
to file a petition for administration of the estate. While she claims to be
Gregorio's heir, public documents, such as Buot's certificate of live birth and
the certificate of marriage between Gregorio and Yolanda Rasay, reveal
otherwise. Dujali also attached to his comment certain documents that
appear to show that there has been an extra judicial settlement of some of
the prope1iies of the estate and that Buot has already received her share
from the proceeds of the sale of these properties by the true heirs. 22 Further,
he explains that Buot was only allowed to participate in the Amended
Extrajudicial Settlement by Gregorio's legitimate heirs out of humanitarian
considerations, not because she is a true heir. All these, Dujali argues,
clearly indicate that there is no good and compelling reason to grant Buot's
petition for administration.23
In her reply,24 Buot contends that the issue of whether she is a person
interested in the estate is a matter that should be raised during the trial by the
RTC of her petition for administration.
Page 82 of 117
We deny the petition.
First, we must emphasize that this is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This recourse to the Court covers only a
review of questions of law. In this case, the question of law presented before
us is whether the RTC properly dismissed the petition for administration on
the ground that there has already been an extrajudicial settlement of certain
properties of the estate. An additional question of procedure raised here is
whether the RTC was correct in holding that Buot's motion for
reconsideration should be denied as it is a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration.
All other issues raised in the pleadings before us are questions of fact that
we cannot resolve at this time. As we shall shortly explain in this Decision,
these questions of fact ought to be resolved by a trial court in the appropriate
proceeding.
We will first rule on the procedural issue raised in the petition. In its Order
dated September 19, 2011, the RTC held that Buot's motion for
reconsideration is a second motion for reconsideration prohibited under the
Rules of Court. Thus, the motion was denied. We reviewed the motions filed
by the parties before the RTC and rule that the RTC erred in its finding.
When Buot filed her petition for administration, Dujali filed an opposition with
a motion to dismiss.1âwphi1 When the R TC denied his motion to dismiss,
Dujali filed a motion for reconsideration. This led to the RTC's issuance of the
Order of September 19, 2011 granting Dujali's motion for reconsideration and
holding that Buot's petition for administration should be dismissed. It was
only at this point that Buot filed, for the first time, a motion seeking for
reconsideration of the Order which declared the dismissal of her petition for
administration. Clearly, this is not the motion for reconsideration
contemplated in Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. - No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be
entertained.
Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. What it
prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed by the same party
involving the same judgment or final resolution. In the present case, Buot's
motion for reconsideration was only her first motion challenging the Order
dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate. The RTC
clearly erred in denying her motion on the ground that it is a second motion
for reconsideration prohibited under the Rules.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Nevertheless, we rule that the RTC properly ordered the dismissal of Buot's
petition for administration.
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally be subject to
judicial administration proceedings.25 There are, however, several
exceptions. One such exception is provided for in Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court. This Section states:
Sec. I . Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. - If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the
office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement,
whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition,
or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the
filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the
affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of
deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved
as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under Section 4 of this rule. It
shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition
for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the
decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof
According to this provision, when the deceased left no will and no debts and
the heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves
without judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially through a
public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds. In case of
disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for partition.
Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings if they have good reasons for choosing not to file
an action for partition. In Rodriguez, et al. v. Tan, etc. and Rodriguez, 26we
said:
Page 83 of 117
[S]ection 1 [of Rule 74] does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if
they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition.
While section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as
they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action of partition, it does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of
action. Said section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from
the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the
framer of the rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other
provisions that are mandatory in character.x x x27 (Italics in the original.)
Since such proceedings are always "long," "costly," "superfluous and
unnecessary,"28 resort to judicial administration of cases falling under Section
1, Rule 7 4 appears to have become the exception rather than the rule.
Cases subsequent to Rodriguez emphasized that "[w]here partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons." 29
In Pereira v. Court of Appeals,30we had the opportunity to explain what the
"good reason exception" means. What constitutes good reason depends on
the circumstances of each case. We said:
"Again the petitioner argues that 'only when the heirs do not have any dispute
as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does
section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties
are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because
respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The
argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated,
questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the
heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially
where such property is in the hands of one heir."
In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as
administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking
such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and
the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration. In still another
case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the
appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife,
as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity
to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since
he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2 intestate proceedings
of the latter.31 (Citations omitted.)
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Thus, in Pereira, we refused to allow administration proceedings where the
only reason why the appointment of an administrator was sought so that one
heir can take possession of the estate from the other heir. We held that this
was not a compelling reason to order judicial administration. We added that
in cases like this, "the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the
deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where
the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event." 32
We have reviewed the reasons which Buot proffers to warrant the grant of
her petition for letters of administration and rule that these do not suffice to
warrant the submission of Gregorio's estate to administration proceedings.
That the extrajudicial settlement in this case did not cover Gregorio's entire
estate is, by no means, a sufficient reason to order the administration of the
estate. Whether the extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate
and whether an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate
may be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to
order the administration of the estate. Parties seeking to challenge an
extrajudicial settlement of estate possess sufficient remedies under the law
and procedural rules. As to Buot's other allegations that: (1) there has been
no effort to partition the estate; (2) that Dujali challenges her status as an
heir; (3) that other heirs have been deprived of the estate; and (4) these heirs
are amenable to the appointment of an administrator, we find that none of
these allegations actually prevent the filing of an ordinary action for partition.
In fact, if it is indeed true that there has been no effort to partition Gregorio's
entire estate, the filing of an action for partition before the proper court will
leave his heirs with no choice but to proceed. An action for partition is also
the proper venue to ascertain Buot's entitlement to participate in the
proceedings as an heir.33 Not only would it allow for the full ventilation of the
issues as to the properties that ought to be included in the partition and the
true heirs entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the
appropriate forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to
ascertain if partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Orders of
Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court, Panabo City, dated September 19,
2011 and December 8, 2011 are AFFIRMED insofar as they ordered the
dismissal of the petition for letters of administration.
SO ORDERED.
Page 84 of 117
[16] G.R. No. 224849, June 06, 2018
HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES, NAMELY: ROSARIO M. DANGSALAN,
EVELYN M. SANGALANG, NENITA M. SALES, ERNESTO JOSE
MORALES, JR., RAYMOND MORALES, AND MELANIE
MORALES, Petitioners, v. ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN, REPRESENTED
BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO TORRES, Respondent.
Actions; Jurisdiction; In the case of Macasaet v. Co, Jr., 697 SCRA 187
(2013), the Supreme Court (SC) stated that “[j]urisdiction over the defendant in an
action in rem or quasi in rem is not required, and the court acquires jurisdiction
over an action as long as it acquires jurisdiction over the res that is the subject
matter of the action.”—The partition of real estate is an action quasi in rem.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that, for the court to acquire
jurisdiction in actions quasi in rem, it is necessary only that it has jurisdiction over
the res. In the case of Macasaet v. Co, Jr., 697 SCRA 187 (2013), the Court stated
that “[j]urisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not
required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it acquires
jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action.”
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Summary Judgments; Summary
judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there
appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no
important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages.—A summary
judgment in this jurisdiction is allowed by Rule 35 of the Rules of Court. According
to the case of Wood Technology Corporation, et al. v. Equitable Banking
Corporation, 451 SCRA 724 (2005), it is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham
claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. It is granted to settle
expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved,
except the amount of damages. Thus, said the Court in the case of Viajar v. Judge
Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684 (1979), as cited in Caridao, et al. v. Hon. Estenzo, et al., 132
SCRA 93 (1984): Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or
promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to
such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of
them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of
a trial.
Genuine Issue; Words and Phrases; In Evangelista v. Mercator Finance
Corp., 409 SCRA 410 (2003), the Supreme Court (SC) has already defined a
genuine issue as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, set up in bad faith and
patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.—
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In Evangelista v. Mercator Finance Corp., 409 SCRA 410 (2003), the Court has
already defined a genuine issue as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, set up in bad
faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial. According to Spouses Pascual v. First Consolidated Rural Bank (Bohol), Inc.,
817 SCRA 219 (2017), where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedu ments; Summary Judgments; In Caridao, the
Supreme Court (SC) nullified the summary judgment issued by the trial court when
the rules on summary judgment was applied despite the absence of a motion from the
respondent asking for the application thereof; Even in the pretrial stage of a case, a
motion for the application of summary judgment is necessary.—In Caridao, the
Court nullified the summary judgment issued by the trial court when the rules on
summary judgment was applied despite the absence of a motion from the respondent
asking for the application thereof. The Court said: And that is not all, The (sic)
nullity of the assailed Summary Judgment stems not only from the circumstances
that such kind of a judgment is not proper under the state of pleadings obtaining in
the instant case, but also from the failure to comply with the procedural guidelines
for the rendition of such a judgment. Contrary to the requirements prescribed by
the Rules, no motion for a summary judgment was filed by private respondent.
Consequently, no notice or hearing for the purpose was ever conducted by the trial
court. The trial court merely required the parties to submit their affidavits and
exhibits, together with their respective memoranda, and without conducting any
hearing, although the parties presented opposing claims of ownership and possession,
hastily rendered a Summary Judgment. The trial court was decidedly in error in
cursorily issuing the said Judgment. x x x Still, in the more recent case
of Calubaquib, et al. v. Republic of the Phils., 652 SCRA 523 (2011), the Court once
more was asked to determine the propriety of the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court judge in the absence of any motion filed by the parties for that purpose. In
that case, the trial court judge opined that “the basic facts of the case were
undisputed” and that, even after the parties’ refusal to file a motion for summary
judgment, the trial court rendered a judgment sans trial. In ruling for the nullity of
such issued judgment, the Court said that: The filing of a motion and the conduct
of a hearing on the motion are therefore important because these enable the court
to determine if the parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against,
the motion are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the
finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense
to the action. x x x Even in the pretrial stage of a case, a motion for the application
of summary judgment is necessary. In the recent case of Spouses Pascual v. First
Consolidated Rural Bank (BOHOL), Inc., 817 SCRA 219 (2017), Justice Bersamin
pointed out that: To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such
judgment has earlier been filed, the pretrial may be the occasion in which the
court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or
summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pretrial judge may
Page 85 of 117
then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by
filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34
(Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of
Court. The pretrial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the
pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment,
the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion. x x x Indeed, Calubaquib even
proceeded further in saying that the “nonobservance of the procedural requirements
of filing a motion and conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting
aside of the summary judgment.”
Civil Law; Succession; Partition; The question of who shall inherit which part
of the property and in what proportion is in the province of the partition of the estate
of a deceased.—The Court now focuses its attention to the factual milieu
surrounding the present case. To begin with, the Court is of the opinion that the
petitioners, from the beginning of the proceedings, have already submitted an issue
of fact that definitively calls for the presentation of evidence. They have, for all
intents and purposes, presented a genuine issue that should have foreclosed the
rendition of a summary judgment. Particularly, while the petitioners have not
questioned the fact that the subject property belonged to their progenitor, Jayme, they
have, however, asserted that herein respondent has “no more right of participation”
over the same. The Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-Claims
claimed that: 7.4. Astrid Morales Agustin has no more right or participation —
Plaintiff’s supposed share in the property, together with her siblings, have long been
conveyed to herein defendant Ernesto Morales by said plaintiff’s own parents, the
late Simeon Morales and Leonila Morales. Thus, plaintiff has no more footing to
demand partition of the lot for her benefit. x x x. In fact, the original respondent in
this case, the father of herein petitioners, attached in his pleading “several
handwritten receipts showing payment of their share to the property, then called
‘camarin.’” In the RTC’s decision, the trial judge hastily dismissed this argument and
asserted that: The alleged written documents of debt of plaintiffs’ parents Simeon
Morales and Leonila Albano Morales are not genuine issue of material facts because
these documents have no effect on the partition of the subject lot, not debts of the
intestate estate of the spouses Jayme Morales and Telesfora Garzon and they are not
binding upon the plaintiffs herein. In affirming this decision, the CA even opined
that the issue raised by herein petitioners is “of no moment in the instant case of
partition” because the respondent was “asserting her right as a co-owner of the
subject property by virtue of her successional right from her deceased father Simeon
Morales, who was once a co-owner of the said property, and not from Jayme and
Telesfora Morales.” These opinions, however, are reversible errors on the part of
both the trial court and the CA. The question of who shall inherit which part of the
property and in what proportion is in the province of the partition of the estate of a
deceased. That an heir disposed of his/her aliquot portion in favor of another heir is a
matter that should be fully litigated on in a partition proceeding — as in this case.
Same; Same; In the case of Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, et al. v. De
Borja,  46 SCRA 577 (1972), the Supreme Court (SC) has already ruled that an heir
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
to an inheritance could dispose of his/her hereditary rights to whomever he/she
chooses.—In the case of Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, et al. v. De Borja, 46
SCRA 577 (1972), the Court has already ruled that an heir to an inheritance could
dispose of his/her hereditary rights to whomever he/she chooses. This is because:
[A]s a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor-in-interest, there is no
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share
is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Further, still
according to Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, this alienation by the heirs of
their aliquot portion of the inheritance is recognized by no less than the Civil
Code, viz.: [A]nd as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of
Francisco’s death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it. As owner
of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by
Article 1088 of the present Civil Code: Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified
in writing of the sale of the vendor. If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a
stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Summary Judgments; The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) did not only commit reversible error by rendering a
summary judgment despite the presence of a genuine issue, it also committed
reversible error by applying the rules on summary judgment despite the absence of
any motion from any of the parties that prayed for the rule’s application.—When the
petitioners herein asserted that the respondent has “no more right of participation”
over the subject property because the successional rights of the respondent’s parents
over the same has already been conveyed to the petitioners’ father, the petitioners
tendered a genuine issue. They were in fact stating that the respondent’s parents
exercised their right to sell, exchange, or compromise their undivided inchoate share
of their inheritance from Jayme, and, as the Court ruled in Alejandrino, the
respondent’s parents intended a partition of the property as defined in Article 1079 of
the Civil Code. The truthfulness of this allegation, however, could only be
ascertained through the presentation of evidence during trial, and not in a summary
judgment. More, the RTC did not only commit reversible error by rendering a
summary judgment despite the presence of a genuine issue, it also committed
reversible error by applying the rules on summary judgment despite the absence of
any motion from any of the parties that prayed for the rule’s application.
Civil Law; Partition; Generally, an action for partition may be seen to
simultaneously present two (2) issues: first, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff
is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned; and second, assuming
that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of
how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants, i.e., what
Page 86 of 117
portion should go to which co-owner.—Generally, an action for partition may be
seen to simultaneously present two issues: first, there is the issue of whether the
plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned; and second,
assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary
issue of how the property is to be divided between the plaintiff and
defendants, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner. The Court must
emphasize, however, that this definition does not take into account the difference
between (1) an action of partition based on the successional rights of the heirs of a
decedent, and (2) an ordinary action of partition among co-owners. While oftentimes
interchanged with one another, and although in many ways similar, these two
partitions draw legal basis from two different sets of legal provisions in the Civil
Code of the Philippines (Civil Code).
Same; Succession; Partition; Under the law, partition of the inheritance may
only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an
ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by
the testator himself, and  (4) by the third person designated by the testator.—To
begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis from Article
777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of the death of the decedent. As such, from that moment, the heirs,
legatees, and devisees’ successional rights are vested, and they are considered to own
in common the inheritance left by the decedent. Under the law, partition of the
inheritance may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by
the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration
proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the
testator. A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when the
appointment of an executor or administrator is dispensed with. One is through the
execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate. Another, which is the focal point of this case, is through the ordinary action of
partition.
Same; Same; Same; According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may
resort to an ordinary action of partition of the estate of the deceased if they disagree
as to the exact division of the estate, and only “[i]f the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or
legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose.”—According to Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an ordinary action of partition of the estate of
the deceased if they disagree as to the exact division of the estate, and only “[i]f the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose.”
The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the special
proceeding on the settlement of the estate. The reason is that, if the deceased dies
without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the estate for the heirs and the creditors, much less, the
necessity to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Same; Same; Same; Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.—
Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should
conform to the law governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and not only
to the law governing ordinary partition. These pertinent provisions of the law could
be found in Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions Common to Testate and
Intestate Successions), Section 6 (Partition and Distribution of the Estate) of the
Civil Code. Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are
two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such
heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. Partition, the Civil Code adds,
is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. Thus, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.
Same; Same; Same; Collation; On account of this partition, Article 1061 of the
Civil Code requires the parties to collate the properties of the decedent which they
may have received by way of gratuitous title prior to the former’s death.—On
account of this partition, Article 1061 of the Civil Code requires the parties to collate
the properties of the decedent which they may have received by way of gratuitous
title prior to the former’s death, to wit: Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the
lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition. (1035a) x x x On the procedural aspect, the partition of the
estate based on the successional rights of the heirs, as herein mentioned, is required
by Rule 74 of the Rules of Court (Summary Settlement of Estate) to follow the rules
on “ordinary action of partition.” This pertains to Rule 69 (Partition), Section 13 of
the same rules, which states that: Section 13. Partition of personal property.—The
provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal
property, or of both real and personal property, insofar as the same may be
applicable. (13) x x x Once legally partitioned, each heir is conferred with the
exclusive ownership of the property, which was adjudicated to him/her.
Same; Same; Same; An ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically
of real property, is governed by Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership.—An
ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically of real property, is governed by
Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership. Article 484 of the Civil Code provides
that there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. It further provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership; each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. This partition may be
made by agreement between the parties, or by judicial proceedings, which, like the
Page 87 of 117
procedural aspect of the partition by virtue of successional rights, is governed by
Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; When the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is
yet another property that needs to be partitioned among the parties, they were
actually invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on Co-ownership, but on
Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil Code — the
provision on collation.—In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late
Jayme Morales. The land being sought to be divided was a property duly registered
under Jayme’s name. Necessarily, therefore, the partition invoked by the respondents
is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme. As such, when the petitioners
alleged in their answer that there is yet another property that needs to be partitioned
among the parties, they were actually invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on Co-
ownership, but on Succession, which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil
Code — the provision on collation. It is therefore proper for the trial court to have
delved into this issue presented by the petitioner instead of disregarding the same and
limiting itself only to that singular property submitted by the respondent for partition.
As the case of Gulang v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 246 (1998), said: In case the
defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the
plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiff’s action for partition but, on
the contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of
whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not.
Same; Same; Same; In the case of Gatmaitan v. Medina, 109 Phil. 108 (1960),
Justice J.B.L. Reyes warned: x x x A partial distribution of the decedent’s estate
pending the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much
as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced.—Lest it be misunderstood, the
law does not prohibit partial partition. In fact, the Court, in administration
proceedings, have allowed partition for special instances. But the Court should
caution that this power should be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial
partition and distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the
division of the entire estate. In the case of Gatmaitan v. Medina, 109 Phil. 108
(1960), Justice J.B.L. Reyes warned: The lower court, we believe, erred in rendering
the order appealed from. A partial distribution of the decedent’s estate pending
the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced . The reason for this strict
rule is obvious — courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate of the
decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and all the
rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance. x x x In this case, the Court is
of the opinion that there is no cogent reason to render the partition of one of Jayme’s
properties and totally ignore the others, if any. Absent any circumstance that would
warrant the partial partition and distribution of Jayme’s estate, the prudent remedy is
to settle the entirety of the estate in the partition proceedings in the court a quo.
Besides, as stated by the Court in Gulang, it is quite unnecessary to require the
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that of partition
originally instituted. This would entail wastage of additional time and resources,
which could already be avoided through consolidated proceedings in the court a quo.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J.:
While the Court could not hold the bonds of familial relationships together
through force, it could hope to deter any further degradation of this sacred tie
through law.
The Case
Challenged before the Court via this Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 101991, promulgated on August 13, 2015, which affirmed
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of Laoag City, in
Civil Case No. 14438-12, dated November 22, 2013. Likewise challenged is
the subsequent Resolution3 of the CA promulgated on April 21, 2016, which
upheld the earlier decision.
The Facts
The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales
(Jayme), who was the registered owner of a parcel of land with
improvements, designated as Lot No. 9217-A, and located at Barangay Sto.
Tomas, Laoag City.4 The subject property is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-37139, more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 9217-A, Psd-01-062563, being a portion of Lot 9217,
Cad. 195, Laoag Cadastre, L.R.C. Rec. No. 1212), situated at Brgy. Sto.
Tomas, City of Laoag, Prov. of Ilocos Norte, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the
SE., along Line 1-2 by A.M. Regidor St. (8.00 m.w.); on the SW., along line 2-
3 by Provincial Road (15.00 m.w.); on the NW., along line 3-4 by Lot 9217-B
of the subd. plan; on the NE., along line 4-1 by Lot 9218, Cad. 195, Laoag
Cadastre. Beginning at a point marked "1" of Lot 9217-A on plan, being N. 51
deg. 18' E., 154.84 m. from BLIM No. 2, Cad. 195, Laoag Cadastre. 5
The respondent initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia
Morales,6 another one of Jayme's grandchildren and the respondent's cousin,
for the partition of Jayme's property. They alleged that they, together with the
Page 88 of 117
petitioners and their other cousins, were co-owners of the subject property by
virtue of their successional rights as heirs of Jayme.
For clarity of the discussion, the heirs of Jayme and his wife, Telesfora
Garzon, who both died intestate, were their four (4) children:
1. Vicente Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein
deceased defendant Ernesto Morales (substituted by his heirs who
are now petitioners herein); (b) Abraham Morales (also deceased);
(c) former plaintiff and, eventually, defendant Lydia Morales (now
also deceased); and (d) original defendant Angelita Ragasa;
2. Simeon Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) herein
respondent Astrid Morales Agustin; (b) Leonides Morales; (c)
Geraldine Morales-Gaspar; and (d) Odessa Morales;
3. Jose Morales, who was survived by his children: (a) Victoria Geron;
(b) Vicente Morales; (c); Gloria Villasenor; (d) Amalia Alejo; (e) Juliet
Manuel; (f) Rommel Morales; and (g) Virgilio Morales (now
deceased);
4. Martina Morales-Enriquez, who was survived by her children: (a)
Evelina Lopez; (b) Emeterio Enriquez; (c) Elizabeth Somera; and (d)
Bernardita Alojipan.7
In response to the respondent's complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales filed an
answer, which admitted the allegations in the complaint, and interposed no
objection to the partition, "provided that their present positions on the subject
property are respected."8
On the other hand, Ernesto Morales, as one of the heirs of Vicente Morales,
filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He
alleged that herein respondent has no cause of action against the petitioners
because: (1) the proper remedy should not be a complaint for partition but an
action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme and his wife; and (2)
herein respondent has no more right of participation over the subject property
because the same has long been conveyed to Ernesto Morales (as
substituted by herein petitioners) by the respondent's parents, Simeon and
Leonila Morales.9
Meanwhile, per the Order of the RTC dated April 22, 2009, summons to the
heirs of Martina Morales-Enriquez, who were at that time residing abroad,
were allowed to be served personally. 10 They were subsequently declared to
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
be in default.11 In response, one of Martina Morales-Enriquez's heirs,
Emeterio Enriquez, filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over his person because he was not furnished with a
copy of the Amended Complaint.12
In the hearing dated February 8, 2012, the RTC heard the testimony of the
respondent. There being no other witnesses to be presented, the respondent
manifested that she was ready to submit her formal offer of exhibits. 13
After a protracted hearing on motions and other incidents of the case, the
RTC rendered its decision on November 22, 2013 via  a summary judgment
in favor of herein respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING DISQUISITIONS, the
Court finds preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs and judgment
is hereby rendered:
(1) Decreeing the partition of Lot No. 9217-A above-stated in the following
mannfer (sic) and proportion of one-fourth (1/4) share each each (sic) of the
direct heirs of the late spouses Jayme Morales and Telesfora Garzon,
namely: (1) Vicente Morales, who was succeeded by right of representation
by his children Ernesto Morales (duly substituted by his heirs), Abraham
Morales, Angelina Ragasa and Lydia Morales; (2) Simeon Morales, who was
succeeded by right of representation by his children Odessa A. Morales,
Geraldine Morales Gaspar, Leonides A. Morales and Astrid A. Morales-
Agustin; (3) Jose Morales who was succeeded by right of representation by
his children, Ronnel Morales, Morales, (sic) Victoria Morales, Vicente
Morales, Manuel Morales, Gloria Morales, Virgilio Morales, Amelia Morales
and Juliet Morales; (4) Martina Morales, who was succeeded by right of
representation by her children, Emeterio Morales-Enriquez, Evelina Morales
Enriquez-Lopez, Elizabeth Morales Enriquez-Somera and Bernardita
Morales Enriquez-Alojipan;
(2) Adjudicating in favor of the above-named heirs by right representation
(sic) their respective one-fourth (1/4) share each of the group of heirs by right
of representation over the above-stated Lot No. 9217-A; and
(3) Ordering the parties to submit their common project of partition of the
subject lot with utmost dispatch for approval by the Court;
(4) To pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC ruled that: (1) the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be
partitioned without need of any settlement or administration
proceeding;15 and (2) the RTC properly and lawfully rendered summary
Page 89 of 117
judgment despite the absence of any motion from any of the parties praying
for the application of the rules thereon.16
Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which thereafter
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision on August 13, 2015.
The CA opined that the settlement of the entire estate of the late spouses
Jayme and Telesfora is "of no moment in the instant case of
partition"17 because the respondent was "asserting her right as a co-owner of
the subject property by virtue of her successional right from her deceased
father Simeon Morales, who was once a co-owner of the said property, and
not from Jayme and Telesfora Morales."18
Further, the CA ruled that an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court is an action quasi in rem,  and thus, "jurisdiction over the impleaded
defendants-heirs is not required since the trial court has jurisdiction over
the res  or the subject property which is the subject matter of the action for
partition."19
Finally, the CA ruled that summary judgment in this case is proper despite
the absence of any motion from any of the parties. In support hereto, the CA
ratiocinated that the parties prayed for resolution of all "pending
motions/incidents" during the hearing on September 18, 2013, and acceded
to the RTC pronouncement therein that its resolution "shall be considered as
a decision in the said case for partition."20
The fallo of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Laoag City dated November 22, 2013 is
AFFIRMED.
Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its
decision via a Resolution dated April 21, 2016.21
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The petitioners anchor their prayer for the reversal of the CA decision and
resolution based on the following grounds:
(1) THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT WERE VOID
CONSIDERING THAT NOT ALL THE DEFENDANTS WHO ARE
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES WERE EVER SERVED WITH
SUMMONS IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS.
(2) THE [CA] MANIFESTLY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE
NECESSITY OF HAVING THE ESTATE OF THE PARTIES'
INTESTATE PREDECESSORS (i.e. SPOUSES JAYME AND
TELESFORA MORALES) BE DETERMINED AND SETTLED FIRST
BEFORE THE DISTRIBUTION AND/OR PARTITION OF ANY OF
THE PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF SAID ESTATE.
(3) THE [CA] MOST UTTERLY ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT ALTHOUGH IT
WAS UNDISPUTABLY RENDERED WITHOUT ANY PRIOR
MOTION AND HEARING THEREFOR, AND IN THE FACE OF
PENDING INCIDENTS WHICH INCLUDE THE: (a) MOTION TO
DISMISS OF DEFENDANT EMITERIO ENRIQUEZ ON THE
GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON
ROOTED ON THE LACK OF SUMMONS SERVED UPON HIM, (b)
THE NON-SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO DEFENDANT ANGELITA
RAGASA, AND (c) THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL
FOR THE PLAINTIFF (HEREIN RESPONDENT).22
In essence, the Court is called upon to rule on the following issues: (1)
whether or not the partition of the subject property is proper despite the
absence of the settlement of the estate of the deceased registered owner
thereof; (2) whether or not the RTC could motu proprio apply the rule on
Summary Judgment; and (3) whether or not the RTC could validly render a
decision even in the absence of proof of proper service of summons to some
of the real parties in interest in a quasi in rem  proceeding.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the arguments presented and the evidence
submitted, the Court finds partial merit in the petition.
First, on the Procedural Issue of Improper Service of Summons
The petitioners question the acquisition by the RTC of the jurisdiction to
decide on the instant case. After a judicious study of the relevant factual
antecedents, the Court rules against the petitioner and in favor of the findings
of the RTC and the CA.
Page 90 of 117
The partition of real estate is an action quasi in rem.23 Jurisprudence is
replete with pronouncements that, for the court to acquire jurisdiction in
actions quasi in rem, it is necessary only that it has jurisdiction over
the res. In the case of Macasaet vs. Co, Jr.,24 the Court stated that
"[j]urisdiction over the defendant in an action in rem or quasi in rem is not
required, and the court acquires jurisdiction over an action as long as it
acqmres jurisdiction over the res that is the subject matter of the action."25
In the case of De Pedro v. Romansan Development Corporation, 26 the Court
clarified that while this is so, "to satisfy the requirements of due process,
jurisdiction over the parties in in rem and quasi in rem actions is
required."27 Thus, regardless of the nature of the action, proper service of
summons is imperative and that a decision rendered without proper service
of summons suffers a defect in jurisdiction.28
According to De Pedro, the court may acquire jurisdiction over the thing by
actually or constructively seizing or placing it under the court's custody. [29 In
the landmark case of El Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 30 the Court has
already ruled that:
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result
either from a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result from the
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of
law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made
effective. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the filing of the complaint before the RTC which sought to
partition the subject property effectively placed the latter under the power of
the court. On this front, none of the parties challenged the RTC's jurisdiction.
But more than this, in compliance with De Pedro,  there is in this case proper
service of summons to the defendants. In no uncertain terms, the CA found
that: (1) the heirs of Vicente Morales received summons, filed an Answer,
and actively participated in the trial; (2) the heirs of Jose Morales filed their
Answer and admitted to the allegations in the complaint; and (3) the heirs of
Martina Morales were duly served with summons, copies of the complaint,
and actively participated in the trial.31
Even the trial court authoritatively concluded the same in saying that:
As borne out from the record of the case, Summons and a copy of the
Complaint was served upon and received by defendant Emeterio Enriquez in
Virginia Beach on June 25, 2009 as per verified Affidavit of Service of one
Nancy G. Wood. Defendant Bernardita Alojipan in Trenton, MI received on
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
July 4, 2009 a copy each of Summons and Complaint as per verified Affidavit
of Service of one Herb Alexander. Defendant Elizabeth Somera received in
Hanover Dirk, Illinois on June 27, 2009 a copy each of the Summons and of
the Complaint as per verified Affidavit of Service of one George Pierce and
defendant Evelina Lopez received in Trenton, Michigan on July 4, 2009 a
copy each of Summons and Complaint as per verified Affidavit of Service
issued by Herb Alexander.32
None of the petitioners' submissions are sufficient to justify the Court's
deviation from these factual findings by the CA, which affirmed the
jurisdiction of the RTC. By necessary implication, therefore, the Court must
perforce rule against the petitioners on this ground.
Second, on the Issue of Summary Judgment
A summary judgment in this jurisdiction is allowed by Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court.33 According to the case of Wood Technology Corporation, et al. vs.
Equitable Banking Corporation,34 it is a procedure aimed at weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation. It is granted to
settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important
issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. [35 Thus, said the
Court in the case of Viajar vs. Judge Estenzo,36 as cited in Caridao, etc., et
al. vs. Hon. Estenzo, etc., et al:37
Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly
dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a
doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the
parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the
facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial. 38 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A reading of the foregoing would reveal that, in the application of the rules on
summary judgments, the proper inquiry would be whether the affirmative
defenses offered by herein petitioners before the trial court constitute
genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. 39 In other words, the crucial
question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify a
summary judgment?40
In Evangelista vs. Mercator Finance Corp.,41 the Court has already defined a
genuine issue as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence,
as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, 42 set up in bad
faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
Page 91 of 117
trial.43 According to Spouses Pascual vs. First Consolidated Rural Bank
(Bohol), Inc.,44 where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or
contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a
trial.
More, the propriety of issuing a summary judgment springs not only from the
lack of a genuine issue which is raised by either party, but also from the
observance of the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such judgment.
Thus, in Caridao,  the Court nullified the summary judgment issued by the
trial court when the rules on summary judgment was applied despite the
absence of a motion from the respondent asking for the application thereof.
The Court said:
And that is not all, The (sic) nullity of the assailed Summary Judgment stems
not only from the circumstances that such kind of a judgment is not proper
under the state of pleadings obtaining in the instant case, but also from the
failure to comply with the procedural guidelines for the rendition of such a
judgment. Contrary to the requirements prescribed by the Rules, no
motion for a summary judgment was filed by private
respondent. Consequently, no notice or hearing for the purpose was ever
conducted by the trial court. The trial court merely required the parties to
submit their affidavits and exhibits, together with their respective memoranda,
and without conducting any hearing, although the parties presented opposing
claims of ownership and possession, hastily rendered a Summary
Judgment. The trial court was decidedly in error in cursorily issuing the
said Judgment.45  proceedings, have already submitted an issue of fact that definitively calls for
Still, in the more recent case of Calubaquib et al. vs. Republic of the
Phils.,46 the Court once more was asked to determine the propriety of the
summary judgment rendered by the trial court judge in the absence of any
motion filed by the parties for that purpose. In that case, the trial court judge
opined that "the basic facts of the case were undisputed" 47 and that, even
after the parties' refusal to file a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
rendered a judgment sans trial. In ruling for the nullity of such issued
judgment, the Court said that:
The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are
therefore important because these enable the court to determine if the
parties' pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion
are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the
finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no
defense to the action.48 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Even in the pre-trial stage of a case, a motion for the application of summary
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
judgment is necessary. In the recent case of Spouses Pascual vs. First
Consolidated Rural Bank (BOHOL), Inc.,49 Justice Bersamin pointed out that:
To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment
has earlier been filed, the pre-trial may be  the occasion in which the
court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings
or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial
judge may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of
such judgment by filing the necessary motion.  Indeed, such motion is
required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule
35 (Summary Judgment)  of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge
cannot motu proprio  render the judgment on the pleadings or summary
judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse
party is entitled to counter the motion. 50 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied, citations omitted)
Indeed, Calubaquib even proceeded further in saying that the "non-
observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting
a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary
judgment."51
On the basis of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court now focuses its
attention to the factual milieu surrounding the present case. To begin with,
the Court is of the opinion that the petitioners, from the beginning of the
the presentation of evidence. They have, for all intents and purposes,
presented a genuine issue that should have foreclosed the rendition of a
summary judgment.
Particularly, while the petitioners have not questioned the fact that the subject
property belonged to their progenitor, Jayme, they have, however, asserted
that herein respondent has "no more right of participation" over the same.
[52
 The Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-Claims
claimed that:
7.4 Astrid Morales Agustin has no more right or participation – Plaintiff's
supposed share in the property, together with her siblings, have long been
conveyed to herein defendant Ernesto Morales by said plaintiff's own
parents, the late Simeon Morales and Leonila Morales. Thus, plaintiff has no
more footing to demand partition of the lot for her benefit. x x x. 53
In fact, the original respondent in this case, the father of herein petitioners,
Page 92 of 117
attached in his pleading "several handwritten receipts showing payment of
their share to the property, then called 'camarin.'" 54
In the RTC decision, the trial judge hastily dismissed this argument and
asserted that:
The alleged written documents of debt of plaintiffs' parents Simeon Morales
and Leonila Albano Morales are not genuine issue of material facts because
these documents have no effect on the partition of the subject lot, not debts
of the intestate estate of the spouses Jayme Morales and Telesfora Garzon
and they are not binding upon the plaintiffs herein. 55
In affirming this decision, the CA even opined that the issue raised by herein
petitioners is "of no moment in the instant case of partition" 56 because the
respondent was "asserting her right as a co-owner of the subject property by
virtue of her successional right from her deceased father Simeon Morales,
who was once a co-owner of the said property, and not from Jayme and
Telesfora Morales."57
These opinions, however, are reversible errors on the part of both the trial
court and the CA. The question of who shall inherit which part of the property
and in what proportion is in the province of the partition of the estate of a
deceased. That an heir disposed of his/her aliquot portion in favor of another
heir is a matter that should be fully litigated on in a partition proceeding—as
in this case.
In the case of Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, et al. vs. De Borja, 58 the
Court has already ruled that an heir to an inheritance could dispose of his/her
hereditary rights to whomever he/she chooses. This is because:
[A]s a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or vested
immediately from the moment of the death of such causante  or predecessor
in interest, there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting
capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate.59
Further, still according to Intestate Estate of Josefa Tangco, this alienation by
the heirs of their aliquot portion of the inheritance is recognized by no less
than the Civil Code, viz:
[A]nd as already shown, that eventual share she owned from the time of
Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could not bar her selling it.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
As owner of her undivided hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in
favor of whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized and
provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights
of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they
do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in
writing of the sale of the vendor.
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then  a
fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden ."60 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In yet another case, Alejandrino vs. Court of Appeals, 61 the Court has ruled
that "when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he
expresses his intention to 'put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs.'
Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-
owner of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it
takes."62 The Court based this assertion on Article 1082 of the Civil Code,
which states that:
Art. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-
heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although
it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, when the petitioners herein asserted that the respondent has "no more
right of participation" over the subject property because the successional
rights of the respondent's parents over the same has already been conveyed
to the petitioners' father, the petitioners tendered a genuine issue. They were
in fact stating that the respondent's parents exercised their right to sell,
exchange, or compromise their undivided inchoate share of their inheritance
from Jayme, and, as the Court ruled in Alejandrino, the respondent's parents
intended a partition of the property as defined in Article 1079 of the Civil
Code.63
The truthfulness of this allegation, however, could only be ascertained
through the presentation of evidence during trial, and not in a summary
judgment.
More, the RTC did not only commit reversible error by rendering a summary
judgment despite the presence of a genuine issue, it also committed
reversible error by applying the rules on summary judgment despite the
Page 93 of 117
absence of any motion from any of the parties that prayed for the rule's
application.
In their Motion for Reconsideration on the RTC decision, the petitioners
argued that none of the parties prayed for the issuance of a summary
judgment. They further averred that the "unilateral declaration of the trial
court that the resolution supposedly on the pending motions/incidents will
also be considered as the resolution of the partition case cannot take the
place of the required motion and hearing." 64 In fact, they were adamant in
clarifying that:
12.3. The supposed reiteration by the trial Court of its declaration that the
"pending motions/incidents" were considered submitted for resolution as
embodied in its Order dated October 29, 2013 could not have warranted
the motu proprio summary judgment. To begin with, the appellee herself in
her Appellee's Brief, concedes that what were submitted for resolution during
the October 29, 2013 hearing were the same pending motions as stated
earlier, and could not have been the case of partition itself. It can be culled
even from the assailed Decision of the trial Court itself that what were
submitted for resolution were the then pending incidents and not the main
case for partition itself.65 (Citations omitted)
In their petition, the petitioners reiterated this assertion, to wit:
27. To the clear understanding of the parties including Atty. Cortes, the
pending incidents at the time were the Motion to Dismiss filed by
defendant Emeterio Enriquez questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court
over him for lack of service of
summons; the Opposition thereto filed by herein respondent; the Reply of
Emeterio Enriquez to the opposition of the appellee; the Rejoinder to the
reply; and the Motion to Withdraw filed by therein counsel of herein
respondent.
28. Unpredictably and beyond the expectation of the defendants
including herein petitioners, the trial court rendered a summary
judgment as embodied in its Decision dated 22 November 2013. The
presiding judge and ponente  of said decision soon retired on March 2014.66
Even the respondent did not deny the petitioners' allegation that no motion
was filed to apply the rules on summary judgment. In addition, in its decision,
the trial court itself admitted to having issued the same motu proprio, as none
of the parties herein moved for such summary judgment. It stated that:
x x x [S]ummary judgment maybe (sic) rendered in this case upon the own
initiative of the Court as none of the parties moved for such summary
judgment to be rendered in this instant case despite the glaring and
apparent existence of no genuine issue on material facts, sham defenses
had been put by the defense or mere general denial of the cause of action for
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
partition judicially demanded by the plaintiffs had been alleged by the
defendants.67 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, that the trial court rendered a summary judgment despite the absence
of any motion calling for its application was in clear contravention of the
established rules of procedure. To be sure, on the strength of the Court's
unequivocal pronouncements
in Caridao,68Viajar,69Calubaquib,70 and Pascual,71 which require the
observance of the procedural guidelines for the rendition of summary
judgments, the RTC committed reversible error, and the RTC and CA
decisions must perforce be annulled and set aside.
On the Issue of Partition and the Settlement of Estate
On the basis of the discourse above, there should have been no further
necessity to discuss the final issue herein presented. Nonetheless, for the
guidance of the RTC in resolving the instant case, a discussion of the nature
of the partition is in order.
The petitioners argue that an administration proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased is a condition that has to be met before any
partition of the estate and any distribution thereof to the heirs could be
effected.
While the Court does not agree with this assertion by the petitioners, the
Court, nonetheless, agrees that the trial court should have collated Jayme's
other properties, if any, prior to the promulgation of any judgment of partition
in accordance with the laws on Succession.
Generally, an action for partition may be seen to simultaneously present two
issues: first, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of
the property sought to be partitioned; and second, assuming that the plaintiff
successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the
property is to be divided between the plaintiff and defendants, i.e., what
portion should go to which co-owner.72
The Court must emphasize, however, that this definition does not take into
account the difference between (1) an action of partition based on the
successional rights of the heirs of a decedent, and (2) an ordinary action of
partition among co-owners. While oftentimes interchanged with one another,
and although in many ways similar, these two partitions draw legal basis from
two different sets of legal provisions in the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil
Code).73
To begin with, the laws governing the partition of inheritance draws basis
Page 94 of 117
from Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. As
such, from that moment, the heirs, legatees, and devisees' successional
rights are vested, and they are considered to own in common the inheritance
left by the decedent.
Under the law, partition of the inheritance may only be effected by (1) the
heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for
partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator
himself, and (4) by the third person designated by the testator. 74
A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when the
appointment of an executor or administrator is dispensed with. One is
through the execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate.75 Another, which is the focal point of this case, is
through the ordinary action of partition.76
According to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the heirs may resort to an
ordinary action of partition of the estate of the deceased if they disagree as to
the exact division of the estate, and only "[i]f the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose." 77
The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the
special proceeding on the settlement of the estate. The reason is that, if the
deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the
appointment of an administrator to administer the estate for the heirs and the
creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive the real owners of their
possession to which they are immediately entitled.78
Thus, an action for partition with regard to the inheritance of the heirs should
conform to the law governing the partition and distribution of the estate, and
not only to the law governing ordinary partition. These pertinent provisions of
the law could be found in Title IV (Succession), Chapter 4 (Provisions
Common to Testate and Intestate Successions), Section 6 (Partition and
Distribution of the Estate) of the Civil Code.79
Particularly, according to Article 1078 of the Civil Code, where there are two
or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is owned in common by such
heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased. 80 Partition, the Civil
Code adds, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in
common among those to whom it may belong. 81 Thus, every act which is
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.82
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In addition, and on account of this partition, Article 1061 of the Civil Code
requires the parties to collate the properties of the decedent which they may
have received by way of gratuitous title prior to the former's death, to wit:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory
heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the
account of the partition. (1035a) (Emphasis supplied)
On the procedural aspect, the partition of the estate based on the
successional rights of the heirs, as herein mentioned, is required by Rule 74
of the Rules of Court (Summary Settlement of Estate) to follow the rules on
"ordinary action of partition." This pertains to Rule 69 (Partition), Section 13
of the same rules, which states that:
Section 13. Partition of personal property. — The provisions of this Rule
shall apply to partitions of estates composed of personal property, or of
both real and personal property, in so far as the same may be applicable.
(13) (Emphasis supplied)
Once legally partitioned, each heir is conferred with the exclusive ownership
of the property, which was adjudicated to him/her. 83
In contrast, an ordinary partition of co-owned property, specifically of real
property, is governed by Title III of the Civil Code on Co-ownership.
Article 484 of the Civil Code provides that there is co-ownership whenever
the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. 84 It
further provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership; each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. 85 This partition may be
made by agreement between the parties, or by judicial proceedings, 86 which,
like the procedural aspect of the partition by virtue of successional rights, is
governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, while both partitions make use of Rule 69 as the procedural rule that
would govern the manner of partition, the foregoing disquisitions explicitly
elaborate that the bases of the ownership are different, and the subject
matters concerned are also different—one speaks of the partition of
the estate to distribute the inheritance to the heirs, legatees, or devisees,
whereas the other speaks of partition of any undivided thing or right to
Page 95 of 117
distribute to the co-owners thereof. the estate in the partition proceedings in the court a quo. Besides, as stated
by the Court in Gulang,  it is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file
In the case at hand, the parties are the heirs of the late Jayme Morales. The another action, separate and independent from that of partition originally
land being sought to be divided was a property duly registered under instituted.91 This would entail wastage of additional time and resources, which
Jayme's name. Necessarily, therefore, the partition invoked by the could already be avoided through consolidated proceedings in the court a
respondents is the partition of the estate of the deceased Jayme. quo.

As such, when the petitioners alleged in their answer that there is yet another
property that needs to be partitioned among the parties, they were actually
invoking the Civil Code provisions, not on Co-ownership, but on Succession,
which necessarily includes Article 1061 of the Civil Code—the provision on
collation. It is therefore proper for the trial court to have delved into this issue
presented by the petitioner instead of disregarding the same and limiting
itself only to that singular property submitted by the respondent for partition.
As the case of Gulang vs. Court of Appeals87 said:
In sum, the factual milieu of this case presents questions of facts which are
crucial in the complete resolution of the controversy. The Court finds
sufficiency in the trial court's decision with regard to the summons directed
against the warring heirs—as submitted by the respondent, but also finds
error in the trial court's refusal to delve into the genuine issue concerning the
partition of the subject property—as submitted by the petitioners. In the end,
only a full-blown trial on the merits of each of the parties' claims—and not a
mere summary judgment—could write finis on this family drama.

In case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution of the
themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101991 dated August 13, 2015 and April
plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its 21, 2016, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner is ORDERED REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, of Laoag
or not.88 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) City for further proceedings. The trial court judge is ORDERED to hear the
case with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Nonetheless, lest it be misunderstood, the law does not prohibit partial
partition. In fact, the Court, in administration proceedings, have allowed
partition for special instances. But the Court should caution that this power
should be exercised sparingly. This is because a partial partition and
distribution of the estate does not put to rest the question of the
division of the entire estate. In the case of Gatmaitan vs. Medina,89 Justice
J.B.L. Reyes warned:

The lower court, we believe, erred in rendering the order appealed from. A
partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final
termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as
possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases,
such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The
reason for this strict rule is obvious — courts should guard with utmost zeal
and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof
be adequately protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in
the inheritance.90 (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the Court is of the opinion that there is no cogent reason to
render the partition of one of Jayme's properties and totally ignore the others,
if any. Absent any circumstance that would warrant the partial partition and
distribution of Jayme's estate, the prudent remedy is to settle the entirety of
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Page 96 of 117
[17] G.R. No. 115181             March 31, 2000
MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR.,
TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY
AVELINO, respondents.
Wills and Succession; Testate and Intestate Proceedings; Administrators.—
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or
the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent’s estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the
order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. Same; Same; Same; Exceptions to the
Rule Requiring Appointment of Administrator.—The exceptions to this rule are
found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 which provide: “SECTION 1. Extrajudicial
settlement by agreement between heirs.—If the decedent left no will and no debts
and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means
of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition . . . “SEC. 2. Summary
settlement of estates of small value.—Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand
pesos, and that fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon hearing, which shall be
held not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months from the date of the
last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after
such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed
summarily, without the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without
delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are
the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion and divide it
among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court shall then find
to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal
capacity, or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if
otherwise, shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the
portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The court shall make such
order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and all orders and
judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of
the clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be
recorded in the proper register’s office.”
Same; Same; Same; When a person dies without leaving pending obligations,
his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor
apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.—The heirs succeed
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the
latter’s death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the
estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a
person dies without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit
the property for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.
Same; Same; Same; Partition; A complete inventory of the estate may be done
during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts.—In a last-
ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is
nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be
determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of the estate may be done
during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence, the
Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did
not err in converting petitioner’s action for letters of administration into an action for
judicial partition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the more expeditious remedy of partition is
available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to
submit to administration proceedings, and the court may convert an heir’s action for
letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the other
heirs.—Nor can we sustain petitioner’s argument that the order of the trial court
converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no
basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court’s
order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the
heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is
possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We
have held that where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the
heirs, then the heirs or the majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings. The trial court appropriately converted petitioner’s
action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of
the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals when it found the trial court’s action procedurally in order.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 16, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its
Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441
Page 97 of 117
converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters of administration to
an action for judicial partition.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the
late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina
Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark
Anthony all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr.
Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private
respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No.
Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She
asked that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by
filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial
partition which petitioner duly opposed.
On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge issued the assailed Order
which reads:
Acting on the "Motion to Convert Proceedings to Action for Judicial
Partition", considering that the petitioner is the only heir not
amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs
manifested their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of
the deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into judicial partition of the
estate of deceased Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to
submit a complete inventory of all the real and personal properties
left by the deceased. Set the hearing of the judicial partition on
APRIL 13, 1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all the parties
and their counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated June 16, 1993.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, in
granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court rendered the assailed
decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and
accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was
denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE
PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER REMEDY
PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE CHARACTER AND
EXTENT OF THE DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in this case, the sole
issue here is whether respondent appellate court committed an error of law
and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding that a
partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is possible in the
instant case as no determination has yet been made of the character and
extent of the decedent's estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles
v.  Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that when the existence of
other properties of the decedent is a matter still to be reckoned with,
administration proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the same. 4 In
addition, petitioner contends that the estate is in danger of being depleted for
want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for
conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an
action for judicial partition. The conversion of the motion was, thus,
procedurally inappropriate and should be struck down for lack of legal basis.
When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to
Page 98 of 117
furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate
shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. 5 The
exceptions to this rule are found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 74 6 which
provide:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age or the
minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly
authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit
by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of
deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. . .
Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever
the gross value of the estate of a deceased person, whether he died
testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that
fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
of the estate by the petition of an interested person and upon
hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more
than three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice
which shall be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and
after such other notice to interested persons as the court may direct,
the court may proceed summarily, without the appointment of an
executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper,
allowance of the will, if any there be, to determine who are the
persons legally entitled to participate in the estate and to apportion
and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the
estate as the court shall then find to be due; and such persons, in
their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity, or by their
guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise,
shall thereupon be entitled to receive and enter into the possession
of the portions of the estate so awarded to them respectively. The
court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of
the proceedings, and all orders and judgments made or rendered in
the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the clerk, and the
order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded
in the proper register's office.1awp++i1
The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the
deceased at the moment of the latter's death. 7 Section 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without
need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without
leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
for judicial administration, nor apply for the appointment of an administrator
by the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left
no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age." 9 With this finding, it is our
view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists
that there is nothing to partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate
have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a complete inventory of
the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the
estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's
action for letters of administration into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court
converting an action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition
has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for
the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides
that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no
extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may
be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more expeditious
remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of
them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. 10 The
trial court appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of
administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of the private
respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals
when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Page 99 of 117
[18] G.R. No. 229775, March 11, 2019
LILIBETH ESPINAS-LANUZA, ONEL ESPINAS, AS HEIRS OF
LEOPOLDO ESPINAS, AND THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF DARAGA,
ALBAY, PETITIONERS, v. FELIX LUNA, JR., ARMANDO VELASCO AND
ANTONIO VELASCO, AS HEIRS OF SIMON VELASCO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
J. REYES, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the June 13, 2016
Decision1 and the January 26, 2017 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 104306 which affirmed the December 2, 2014
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legazpi City, Branch 1 in Civil
Case No. 10955, a case for annulment of extrajudicial settlement.
The Antecedents
During his lifetime, Simon Velasco (Simon) was the owner of several
properties including the land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 20630, situated in Namantao, Daraga, Albay (subject property). Simon
had four children, namely, Heriberto Velasco (Heriberto), Genoviva Velasco
(Genoviva),4 Felisa Velasco (Felisa),5 and Juan Velasco (Juan). Felix Luna,
Jr. (Felix), is the son of Genoviva, while Armando Velasco and Antonio
Velasco are the children of Heriberto (collectively, respondents).
Respondents allege that Juan and Felisa, through deceit, connivance, and
misrepresentation, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale
dated May 14, 1966, which adjudicated the subject property to Leopoldo
Espinas (Leopoldo), son of Felisa. They further contend that they discovered
the fraud in 2010 when they came to know that Tax Declaration No. 02-040-
0147 was issued in Leopoldo's name.
In their defense, Lilibeth Espinas-Lanuza and Onel Espinas (petitioners),
children of Leopoldo, argue that when Simon died intestate, his children
agreed to partition his estate such that the property situated in Magogon,
Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva and the parcel of land located in Ting-ting,
Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto. On the other hand, the subject
property was the joint share of Juan and Felisa who subsequently executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale on May 14, 1966, conveying the
subject property to Leopoldo.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision dated December 2, 2014, the RTC ruled that the co-owners of
Simon's properties were his children, Genoviva, Felisa, Juan and Heriberto. It
held that as co-owners of the subject property, Felisa and Juan enjoyed full
ownership of their portions and they had the right to alienate the same. The
trial court added that the sale by Felisa and Juan of their respective
undivided shares in the co-ownership was valid and the vendee, Leopoldo,
became the owner of the shares sold to him. It concluded that the heirs of
Heriberto and Genoviva were co-owners of Leopoldo in the subject property.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the evidence for the [petitioners] not having been
preponderant on their claim, the court rules in favor of the [respondents] and
now declare that [respondents] FELIX LUNA, JR., ARMANDO VELASCO
and ANTONIO VELASCO, are co-owners with [petitioners] LILIBETH
ESPINAS-LANUZA and ONEL ESPINAS, of Cadastral Lot No.
13507 situated in the Municipality of Daraga, Albay.
By whatever manner Cadastral Lot No. 13507 is listed for tax purposes in the
Office of the Municipal Assessor of Daraga, Albay the same does not alter
the fact that it is a parcel of land in co-ownership.
Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 6
The CA Ruling
In a Decision dated June 13, 2016, the CA adjudged that Heriberto and
Genoviva were excluded in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement entered into by Juan and Felisa as there was no showing that
Heriberto and Genoviva were already deceased when the deed was
executed. It noted that the extrajudicial settlement adjudicated and sold
properties which still formed part of the estate of Simon and were, therefore,
co-owned by his heirs. The appellate court emphasized that under Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. It
opined that fraud had been committed against the excluded heirs, thus, the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale must be annulled. The CA
disposed the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack
of merit. SO ORDERED.7
Page 100 of 117
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in
a Resolution dated January 26, 2017. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari, wherein petitioners raised the following errors:
I. THE [CA] ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
UPHOLDING THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC-ALBAY, BRANCH 1
THAT FELIX LUNA, JR., ARMANDO VELASCO AND ANTONIO
VELASCO ARE CO-OWNERS WITH [PETITIONERS] LILIBETH
ESPINAS-LANUZA AND ONEL ESPINAS OF CADASTRAL LOT
NO. 13507 SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF DARAGA,
ALBAY[;]
II. THAT THE [CA] ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IGNORING THE ACTUAL PARTITION ALREADY
DONE BY GENOVIVA, HERIBERTO, FELISA AND JUAN, ALL
SURNAMED VELASCO LONG BEFORE THE SALE OF LOT NO.
13507 IN FAVOR OF LEOPOLDO ESPINAS ON MAY 14, 1966[;
and]
III. THAT THE [CA] ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT IGNORED THE PRESENCE OF LACHES
AND PRESCRIPTION IN PETITIONERS' FAVOR ALLEGING
FRAUD HAS BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE EXCLUDED
HEIRS.8
Petitioners argue that all of Simon's children were given their respective
hereditary shares from the estate; that the property situated in Magogon,
Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva, while the property situated in Ting-ting,
Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto; that the subject property was given
to Juan and Felisa as their share in the estate; that Juan and Felisa knew
that their brother and sister had already been given their due shares in the
estate of Simon, thus, when they sold the subject property to Leopoldo, they
no longer deemed it necessary to have Genoviva and Heriberto sign the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale; that the land given to Juan and
Felisa was under the name of Simon, thus, they had to execute a deed of
extrajudicial settlement in order to transfer the subject property to Leopoldo;
that the distribution of Simon's properties shows that there had been a
partition; that the heirs of Simon had been in possession of their respective
hereditary shares; and that Genoviva and Heriberto never questioned the
ownership of Juan and Felisa during their lifetime nor the sale made in favor
of Leopoldo.9
In their Comment,10 respondents counter that a deed of extrajudicial partition
executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and
consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious; and that after the death of
Simon, his children never partitioned his estate.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In their Reply,11 petitioners contend that "a parol partition may also be
sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of
ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition:"12 that for more than 44 years, no one among the heirs of Simon
ever bothered to question Leopoldo's open possession of the subject
property which was the joint hereditary share of Felisa and Juan; that
Leopoldo's open and notorious possession of the subject property for 44
years supports the presumption that there was already an actual partition
among the heirs of Simon.
The Court's RulingThe petition is meritorious.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common
among those to whom it may belong. 13 It may be effected extrajudicially by
the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of
deeds.14
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive
nor an inherent element of a contract of partition. 15 Since registration serves
as constructive notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if
no creditors, are affected.16 Moreover, even the requirement of a written
memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected
by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction
is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely
a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. 17
Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to
be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.18 Furthermore, in Hernandez v. Andal,19 the Court explained that:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts
of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely or partly
performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has
actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving
an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts
of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
Page 101 of 117
equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in
accordance with the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partitions may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to
be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto
have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in
severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise
recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance,
or have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition
out of the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there
was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a
court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by
the parties.
In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot,20 the Court declared, viz.:
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the
presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition
may be presumed. It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and
occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years,
and acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an
actual partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court,
which had been lost and were not recorded.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that upon the death of Simon, his
children, Genoviva, Heriberto, Juan and Felisa, orally partitioned the estate
among themselves, with each one of them possessing their respective
shares and exercising acts of ownership. Respondents did not dispute that
the property situated in Magogon, Camalig, Albay went to Genoviva while the
property situated in Ting-ting, Taloto, Camalig, Albay went to Heriberto.
Further, they did not raise any objection to the fact that the subject property
was given to Juan and Felisa as their share in Simon's estate. It must be
emphasized that no one among the children of Simon disturbed the status
quo which has been going on from the year 1966. To be sure, Genoviva and
Heriberto were not without knowledge that the subject property was
transferred to Leopoldo and that the latter had introduced improvements
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
thereon. They could have easily questioned the transfer, but they chose to
remain silent precisely because they were already given their respective
shares in the estate. Hence, it can be gleaned unerringly that the heirs of
Simon agreed to orally partition his estate among themselves, as evinced by
their possession of the inherited premises, their construction of
improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for taxation
purposes their respective shares. Actual possession and exercise of
dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with an alleged
partition are considered strong proof of an oral partition. 21
In addition, a possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title
thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a better right. 22 Also, under
Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who possesses in the concept of an owner
has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title, and
he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Moreover, Article 433 of the Civil
Code provides that actual possession under a claim of ownership raises a
disputable presumption of ownership. Here, aside from respondents' bare
claim that they are co-owners of the subject property, they failed to adduce
proof that the heirs of Simon did not actually partition his estate.
Finally, laches has set in against respondents, precluding their right to
recover the subject property. In De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel,23 the Court declared:
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right, taken
in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice
to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the
assertion of a right which works disadvantage to another because of the
inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of the property
or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of society, ordains
that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid
claim. It is different from and applies independently of prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the
effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a
question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies in equity,
whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time,
laches is not. Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. (Citations
omitted)
The elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint
Page 102 of 117
and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the SO ORDERED.
complainant's rights, having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not
held barred.24

In this case, there is no question on the presence of the first element of

laches. The object of respondents' complaint before the trial court was to
annul the extrajudicial settlement in order to recover their shares in the
subject property, which is presently in the hands of petitioners. The second
element of delay is also present in the case at bar. Respondents' suit was
instituted in 2010, 44 years after the property was conveyed to Leopoldo in
1966. Again, respondents' predecessors-in-interest, Genoviva and Heriberto,
could not have been unaware of Leopoldo's open and continuous possession
of the subject property. The third element is also present in this case.
Petitioners had no inkling of respondents' intent to possess the subject
property considering that Simon's children never contested the conveyance
of the subject property to Leopoldo. As to the fourth element of laches, it
goes without saying that petitioners will be prejudiced if respondents'
complaint is accorded relief, or not held barred. Needless to say, laches has
set in against respondents, precluding their right to recover the subject
property.

Accordingly, considering that Felisa and Juan already owned the subject
property at the time they sold the same to Leopoldo on May 14, 1966, having
been assigned such property pursuant to the oral partition of the estate of
Simon effected by his heirs, petitioners are entitled to actual possession
thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The June 13, 2016 Decision and
the January 26, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
104306 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby
entered:

1) Declaring the land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.

20630, situated in Namantao, Daraga, Albay as the share of Juan
Velasco and Felisa Velasco in the estate of Simon Velasco; and
2) Declaring petitioners as lawful possessors of the property covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20630, situated in Namantao,
Daraga, Albay by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Sale executed by Juan Velasco and Felisa Velasco in favor of
Leopoldo Espinas, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 103 of 117
[19] G.R. No. 155733             January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE DECEASED
JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely,
HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO
VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA
DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA,
RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and
CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely,
RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA
DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA
RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R.
CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA
ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO
RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as
Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
Civil Law; Marriages; Although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.—Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage,
its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the
presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof.
The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least
be enough to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity
issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as
Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he
was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of
“Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,” more than adequately support the
presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.
Same; Same; Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed
to be in fact married.—Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the
law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be
living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
Same; Same; Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.—
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions
are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter
how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of
which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of
sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Same; Succession; The right of representation in the collateral line takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces) ; It
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.—We note, however, that the
petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces
of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by
grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and
sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. The records not
being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the
surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her
death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa
Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:
Same; Same; Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir of the estate. —Since
Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have
validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by
means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate.
Same; Paternity and Filiation; Under the new law, recognition may be
compulsory or voluntary; Cases of Compulsory Recognition.—Under the new law,
recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory in any of
the following cases: (1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of
the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; (2) when the child is
in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother) by the
direct acts of the latter or of his family; (3) when the child was conceived during the
time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; (4) when the child has in
his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. On the other hand,
voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in any authentic writing.
Page 104 of 117

Same; Same; Dual limitation in a judicial action for compulsory
acknowledgement: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.—
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child
from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this
did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the
lifetime of the putative parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed. In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim
compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on
February 28, 1974.
Same; Same; An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent.—The claim of
voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic
writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or
indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a
public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. Did
intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s
obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new
Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear
the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as
intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its
preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself
who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic
writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic
writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo
Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The
failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s claim.
Remedial Law; Settlement of Estate; Administrator; Words and Phrases; An
administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of
the decedent; Order of preference in the appointment of an administrator prescribes
in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.—An administrator is a person appointed
by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator.
Same; Same; Same; In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed; Order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators specially in cases
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
the management of the estates.—In the appointment of an administrator, the
principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially
in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May
11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55, 4 in
SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of
Appeals in its decision5 dated October 24, 2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado.6 The main issue in this case is relatively
simple:  who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the
decedents. However, it is attended by several collateral issues that
complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be
divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of
her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews
and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly,
his sisters,7 his nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de
facto adopted child10 (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado by one
Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple,
namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed
Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa
and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgado’s
life. Before him was Ramon Osorio12 with whom Felisa had a son, Luis
Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly
one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorio’s and
Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
Page 105 of 117
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married
is crucial to the claimants because the answer will determine whether their
successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. 13 If Ramon Osorio
and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their only child Luis
Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred
by the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate
families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his
heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as
they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never
married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence was ever presented
to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the
alleged marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname
Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got
married, his Partida de Casamiento14  stated that he was "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado"  (the natural child of Felisa Delgado), 15 significantly omitting
any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence
of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage
ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived
by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the petitioners herein.
Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an
affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed. According to
petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were
never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of
the contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal
certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Señorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence
of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean that no marriage
transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were
married on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
wife until the death of Josefa on September 8, 1972. During this period
spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives
and friends to have in fact been married. To support their proposition,
oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued
to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident
Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June
25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability
Resulting from Service in the Active Military or Naval Forces of the
United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the
Veterans Administration of the United States of America by Dr.
Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to
his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919; 18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated
that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no
children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters Guillermina
Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father
an illegitimate child,19 the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one
Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as
his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous
possession of that status from her birth in 1920 until her father’s demise. In
fact, Josefa Delgado’s obituary which was prepared by Guillermo Rustia,
named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report
card from the University of Santo Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her
parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has
no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly
acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to
compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and
Page 106 of 117
that she cannot claim voluntary acknowledgement since the documents she
presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code. 21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado,
Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of their ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath "[t]hat he ha[d] no
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by
legal fiction."23 The petition was overtaken by his death on February 28,
1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived
by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz,
and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely,
Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio
Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis
Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of the intestate
estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia" with the RTC
of Manila, Branch 55.25 This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the
sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustia’s late brother,
Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa Delgado vda.
de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting
from their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant in the direct
line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors
(respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was
amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to
dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of Guillermo Rustia was
concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the
petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly
threshed out upon submission of evidence.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her
sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as
administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to
the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the Petitions, and enumerated
elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the
said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8,
1972, and entitled to partition the same among themselves in accordance
with the proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole
and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to
the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and
the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by
the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and
declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their
settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding in accordance with
law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the
petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the
appointment as administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS
her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent
JOSEFA DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to
the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of
the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates, and is
likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her collections
of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question,
including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates
to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE
DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor
is hereby required to render an accounting of her actual administration of the
estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
Page 107 of 117
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground
that the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They then filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus30 which was dismissed by  the Court of
Appeals.31 However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the
parties’ oral arguments, the Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due
course to oppositors’ appeal in the interest of substantial justice. 32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the
Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors’ failure to file the record on
appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which
nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance
of the appeal. The pertinent portion of our decision 33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However,
under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be
excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial court’s pronouncements
as to certain matters of substance, relating to the determination of the heirs
of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate,
which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the
denial of the record on appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents’ intention to raise valid issues in the
appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as an attempt to
delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial court’s decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents’ Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from
the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial Court’s May 11, 1990 decision.
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the trial court’s
decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court of Appeals amended
its earlier decision.36 The dispositive portion of the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of the trial
court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo
Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado
(Campo) entitled to partition among themselves the intestate estate of Josefa
D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the
oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and
thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the proportion
referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her
appointment as administratrix of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in
relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee
of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease
and desist from her acts of administration of the subject estates and to turn
over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and
incomes due on the assets of the estates in question, including all
documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and
posting of the requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina
Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy within a
period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrator’s qualification and
posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr.
Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-
Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
Page 108 of 117
The issues for our resolution are:
1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact
which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. Presumptions
are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact.
Presumptions of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable. 37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid
marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their
cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and
friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife
was such that even the original petition for letters of administration filed by
Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had
simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the
testimony of a witness38 attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal
certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or unmarried
woman.39
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of
marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place.40 Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the
presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he
was married to Josefa Delgado43 and the titles to the properties in the name
of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than adequately
support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.44 No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of
the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they
primarily relied upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia
had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had
"lived together as husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the baptism
administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the
veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein, 46 such as the
alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who
had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans
toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in
marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things
in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they
would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned
status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio
must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or
disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so
Page 109 of 117
peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn
them.48 On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient
evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and
Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on
the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such
countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son
with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and
Caridad Concepcion’s  Partida de Casamiento49 identifying  Luis as "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado"  (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the
rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were
never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her
relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-
blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent
Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C;
then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and
legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably a
tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to
succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent
different from that of the former, would be allowing the illegitimate child
greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we
submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and
sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the prohibition on
reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not
apply to the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the
difference in category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is
no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same
parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same
footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood relation. We
submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers
and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and
sisters should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and sisters;
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share
equally.53
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by
full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother. Nonetheless, since they
were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them
are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews,
nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article
972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line
takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and
nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who
are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or
their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8,
1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records
not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who
were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado
at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil
Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could
not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1
of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir
to the estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. – If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument
filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may
do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit filed in the
office of the register of deeds.  x x x (emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Page 110 of 117
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child 58 of
Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only
upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity. 59 She, however,
claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia
only after the death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate
children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This draconian edict was,
however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain
successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they
were first recognized or acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the
offense coincides more or less with that of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of
the alleged father (or mother) 61 by the direct acts of the latter or of his
family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the
defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. 63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory
recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father Guillermo
Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere
ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the
courts.64 Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment
has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February
28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise
fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood
as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo
Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the
father to be his.67 Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo
Tomas and Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify
as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report
card of intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia.
The fact that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds
no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
or witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice
of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on
September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing
contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic
writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of
Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of
the obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to
intervenor’s claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia,
who was never adopted in accordance with law. Although a petition for her
adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was
dismissed upon the latter’s death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased
spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We
quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity
and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with
the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out,
otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven] by the person claiming its
existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of
Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-
ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent.
Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs
Page 111 of 117
of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990
sisters,69 nieces and nephews.70 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED. The assailed
October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration following modifications:

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the
intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court
prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor
is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed,
if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it may be
granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
1. Guillermo Rustia’s June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is
hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the
intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain
to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her
and (b) the children of any of Josefa Delgado’s full- or half-siblings
who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgado’s grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court is hereby
ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado
who are entitled to share in her estate.
3. Guillermo Rustia’s estate (including its one-half share of Josefa
Delgado’s estate) shall be inherited by Marciana Rustia vda.
de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares
shall be per capita) and the children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr.
(who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall
be per stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian
and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue to Carlota
be granted to such other person as the court may select.
Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs
of Guillermo Rustia, as joint administrators, upon their qualification
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined
interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order of preference by the trial court.
does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases
where
No pronouncement as to costs.
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in
SO ORDERED.
the management of the estates,72 a situation which obtains here.

It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons
of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee of the nephews and
nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

Page 112 of 117
[20] G.R. No. 204029               June 4, 2014
AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs,
except Emelinda R. Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the
CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil action.—
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held
that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned
only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had
allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the
parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it
defined during the pre-trial.
Same; Same; Affidavit of Self-Adjudication; An Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent.—In light of the
admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to
special proceeding will be but an unnecessary superfluity. Accordingly, the court a
quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent.
The second sentence of Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that
self-adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—x x x If there is
only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; Simulated Sales; The fact that
the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not
accord it the quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parol evidence
rule. The form of a contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act
valid.—In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents’ very own Answer
to petitioners’ Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of
the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to “facilitate the titling of the [subject]
property,” not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents
concede that petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property and that there
is no indication that respondents ever took possession of the subject property after its
supposed purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property
or, in the alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle
of ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
void. Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the quality of
incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule. The form of a
contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act valid. The rule on
parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides the exceptions: Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.—x x x
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written
agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms
agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the
written agreement. The term “agreement” includes wills.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the
Decision1 and Resolution2 dated March 30, 2012 and September 25, 2012,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035, which
reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 20, 2009 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Legazpi City, in Civil Case No. 10407.
The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:
On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina)
and Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and
revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 6, 2002 before the court a quo. In it,
petitioners alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos
(Eulalio) and Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3,
1964, survived by his wife Victoria, six legitimate children, and one
illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in
this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the mother of petitioner Salvador;
(3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5) Feliciano Abarientos; (6)
Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife Victoria eventually
died intestate on June 30, 1983.
On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City
consisting of two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters,
more or less, which was covered by Tax Declaration ARP No. (TD) 0141.
Page 113 of 117
In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her
daughter Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law
Domingo Gualvez (Domingo), respondents in this case, on the pretext that
the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the lot. It was only in
2003, so petitioners claim, that Avelina realized that what she signed was an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondents.
As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them,
Avelina sought the intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two
(2) documents in order to reinstate TD0141 and so correct the injustice done
to the other heirs of Eulalio.
In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of
the subject property. Paragraph 9 of their Answer reads:
Sometime in the year 2001, [petitioner] Avelina together with the other heirs
of Eulalio Abarientos brought out the idea to [respondent] Emelinda
Rebusquillo-Gualvez to have the property described in paragraph 8 of the
complaint registered under the Torrens System of Registration. To facilitate
the titling of the property, so that the same could be attractive to prospective
buyers, it was agreed that the property’s tax declaration could be transferred
to [respondents] Spouses [Emelinda] R. Gualvez and Domingo Gualvez who
will spend all the cost of titling subject to reimbursement by all other heirs in
case the property is sold; That it was agreed that all the heirs will be given
their corresponding shares on the property; That pursuant to said purpose
Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquillo with the knowledge and consent of the other
heirs signed and executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of [respondents] Gualvez. In fact, [petitioner] Avelina
Rebusquillo was given an advance sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱50,000.00) by [respondent] spouses and all the delinquent taxes paid by
[respondents].3
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 20, 2009 annulling
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not therefore
solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, Avelina did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was
only executed to facilitate the titling of such property. The dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as
follows:
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
1. The subject Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the Estate of the
Deceased Spouses Eulalio Abarientos and Victoria Villareal, dated
December 4, 2001 as well as the subject Deed of Absolute Sale,
notarized on February 6, 2002, covering the property described in
par. 8 of the Amended Complaint are hereby ordered ANNULLED;
2. That defendant City Assessor’s Officer of Legazpi City is hereby
ordered to CANCEL the Tax Declaration in the name of private
[respondents] spouses Gualvez under ARP No. 4143 and to
REINSTATE the Tax Declaration under ARP No. 0141 in the name
of Eulalio Abarientos;
3. By way of restitution, [petitioner] Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo is
hereby ordered to return or refund to [respondents] spouses
Domingo Gualvez and Emelinda Gualvez, the ₱50,000.00 given by
the latter spouses to the former.4
Assailing the trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the
CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public
document that has for its object the creation and transmission of real rights
over the immovable subject property. The fact that Avelina’s testimony was
not offered in evidence, so respondents argued, the signature on the
adverted deed remains as concrete proof of her agreement to its terms.
Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint filed by petitioners Avelina
and Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law for
those compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.
Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate on
September 1, 2009 leaving behind several living heirs 5 including respondent
Emelinda.
In its Decision dated March 30, 2012, the appellate court granted the appeal
and reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the
RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on petitioners’
allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that issues on
heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an
ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its
favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face.
Aggrieved by the CA’s Decision, petitioner Avelina, as substituted by her
heirs except respondent Emelinda, and petitioner Salvador are now before
this Court ascribing reversible error on the part of the appellate court.
Page 114 of 117
We find merit in the instant petition.
It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a
special proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court
had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine
who heirs are is sanctioned only if there is a good and compelling reason for
such recourse.6 Hence, the Court had allowed exceptions to the rule
requiring administration proceedings as when the parties in the civil case
already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during
the pre-trial.7 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,8 this Court held:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the
sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned
Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that
when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered
and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he
did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or
intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a
deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case - subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial x x x. (emphasis
supplied)
Similar to Portugal, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel
of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
Eulalio. It would be more practical, as Portugal teaches, to dispense with a
separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of petitioner
Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents
spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner
Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one
of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land. As confirmed by the
RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby admitted
the veracity of the following facts during the pre-trial:
IV – UNCONTROVERTED FACTS: (Based on the stipulation of facts in the
Pre-Trial Order)
A. x x x
B. [Petitioners] and private [respondents] spouses Gualvez admitted the
following facts:
1. Identity of the parties;
2. Capacity of the [petitioners] and private [respondents] to sue and
be sued;
3. [Petitioner] Avelina Abarientos-Rebusquilllo is not the only
surviving heir of deceased spouses Eulalio and Victoria Abarientos;
4. Petitioner Salvador Orosco is a co-owner/possessor of a portion of
the subject property;
5. Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco is the sister of Avelina Abarientos;
6. [Respondent] Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualves is a daughter of
[petitioner] Avelina A. Rebusquillo;
7. [Petitioner] Avelina Rebusquillo was born on Nov. 10, 1923;
8. The existence of Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of Estate of the
Deceased and Deed of Absolute Sale executed by [petitioner]
Avelina A. Rebusquillo on the subject property.9 (emphasis supplied)
In light of the admission of respondents spouses Gualvez, it is with more
reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary
superfluity. Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on
the validity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As
pointed out by the trial court, an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper
Page 115 of 117
when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The second sentence of
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is patently clear that self-
adjudication is only warranted when there is only one heir:
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. –– x x x If
there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by
means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact,
as admitted by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by
right of representation of his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured
herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the only daughter and
sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS AND VICTORIA
VILLAREAL."10 The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to
herself the inheritance left by her father invalid. The RTC did not, therefore,
err in granting Avelina’s prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and so
correct the wrong she has committed.
In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of
respondents was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not
in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject
property to respondents. As she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject property is still subject to
partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership of the subject
property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to
respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent
from the admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina
had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the
property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more
than a simulated contract.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former
takes place when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when
the parties conceal their true agreement. (emphasis supplied)
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative
simulation, when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for
any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy binds the parties to their real agreement.
11
In Heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato Ureta,  this Court
explained the concept of the simulation of contracts:
‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)
In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance
as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of
an absolute simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or
intended to produce legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of
the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void,
and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given
under the contract. However, if the parties state a false cause in the contract
to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively simulated and the
parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the essential
requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the
content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and
enforceable between the parties and their successors in interest. (emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents’ very own
Answer to petitioners’ Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge,
the purpose of the Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate the titling
of the [subject] property," not to transfer the ownership of the lot to them.
Furthermore, respondents concede that petitioner Salvador remains in
possession of the property and that there is no indication that respondents
ever took possession of the subject property after its supposed purchase.
Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the
alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of
ownership and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole
transaction void.12
Contrary to the appellate court’s opinion, the fact that the questioned Deed of
Absolute Sale was reduced to writing and notarized does not accord it the
quality of incontrovertibility otherwise provided by the parole evidence rule.
The form of a contract does not make an otherwise simulated and invalid act
valid. The rule on parole evidence is not, as it were, ironclad. Sec. 9, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. – x x x
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;
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 (c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their

successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills. (emphasis supplied)

The failure of the Deed of Absolute Sale to express the true intent and
agreement of the contracting parties was clearly put in issue in the present
case. Again, respondents themselves admit in their Answer that the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Absolute Sale were only executed to
facilitate the titling of the property. The RTC is, therefore, justified to apply the
exceptions provided in the second paragraph of Sec. 9, Rule 130 to ascertain
the true intent of the parties, which shall prevail over the letter of the
document. That said, considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale has been
shown to be void for being absolutely simulated, petitioners are not precluded
from presenting evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written
agreement.13

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March

30, 2012 and the Resolution dated September 25, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93035 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision dated January 20, 2009 in Civil Case No. 10407 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),Branch 4 in Legazpi City is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

‫ﻫ‬Assignment No. 2- Special Proceedings (Rule 73 and 74)

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