Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Philosophical Certainty
Author(s): Harry G. Frankfurt
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul., 1962), pp. 303-327
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183430
Accessed: 23/06/2010 18:30
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to The Philosophical Review.
http://www.jstor.org
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
303
HARRY G. FRANKFURT
304
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTr
305
HARRT G. FRANKFURT
306
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
307
HARRT G. FRANKFURT
gencies implied by the belief are not such that failure of them can be
absolutely precluded in the light of prior empirical corroborations of
what is believed. However improbable, it remains thinkable that such
later tests could have a negative result. Though truth of the belief
itself implies a positive result of such later tests, the evidence to date
does not imply this as more than probable ... [quoted p. 286].
When Lewis says that the failure of the consequences of his
belief to occur is not "absolutely precluded in the light of prior
empirical corroboration of what is believed," he seems to be
saying that the evidence for thinking these consequences will
occur does not entail their occurrence. This interpretation of his
position is suggested again by his statement that the evidence that
the consequences of his beliefwill occur "does not imply this as more
than probable." Lewis apparently bases his claim that it is not
certain that the consequences of his belief will occur on the fact
that there is no deductively compelling evidence that they will
occur, but only evidence which renders their occurrence probable.
In other words, Lewis apparently regards IIIa as established by
III2.
Malcolm accepts III2 as a true statement. The soundness of
the Verification Argument, then, turns on the question of whether
or not III2 entails IIIa. That is, it turns on the question of whether
an empirical statement can be certain if it is not entailed by the
evidence for it, or whether any evidence can properly be regarded
as conclusive which does not entail the conclusion based upon it.
Malcolm's opinion is that III2 does not entail IIIa, but his
argument in behalf of this opinion is unsatisfactory.
In order to facilitate discussion of these statements and their
relationships, Malcolm uses "R" to refer to the statement of the
grounds for believing that the consequences of an empirical
statement will occur; and he uses "c" to refer to the statement
that those consequences will occur. Thus, II2 may be expressed
as "R does not entail c"; and IIIa may be expressed as "It is not
certain that c." Now he acknowledges that "there is a tempta-
tion" to believe that II12 implies IIIa and that "it is easy to be
misled" into thinking that it does. However, he asserts that "it
does not . . . follow from the fact that R does not entail c either
that it is not certain that c is true or that R does not state the
308
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
309
HARRT G. FRANKFURT
310
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
III
311
HARRY G. FRANKFURT
312
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
313
HARRY G. FRANKFURT
314
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTr
315
3
HARRYoG. FRANKFURT
3i6
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
IV
Malcolm is anxious to show that empirical statementsmay be
certain, while other philosophers are equally anxious to show
that they cannot be. But what precisely is at issue in this contro-
versy? What is the difference between being certain and being
uncertain? It is not of much use to answer by saying that a
statement is certain if and only if it is supported by conclusive
evidence, for this only shifts the focus of attention to another
expressionwhose meaning is equally unclear. Instead of searching
for expressionssynonymous to or correlative with expressionslike
"certain," we must make our understanding more concrete.
I suggest that the "cash value" of a claim of certainty lies in
the claimant's willingness to take the risks he associates with
accepting the statementsfor which he claims certainty. Whenever
someone understands a statement, he supposes that there are
some consequences of action which will occur if the statement is
true and others which will occur if it is false. If he adopts a belief
in the statement, therefore, he stakes something on its truth. An
error on his part may result in nothing worse than trivial disap-
317
HARRY G. FRANKFURT
318
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
319
HARRY G. FRANKFURT
3\2O
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
321
HARRT G. FRANKFURT
322
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTr
whether I was willing to take far greater risks on the same evi-
dence.
323
HARRr G. FRANKFURT
324
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTY
325
HARRr G. FRANKFURT
326
PHILOSOPHICAL CERTAINTT
HARRY G. FRANKFURT
HarpurCollege
327