DAMODARAM SANJIVAYYA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY
VISAKHAPATNAM, A.P., INDIA

PROJECT TITLE:
Case Analysis of Challa Ramakrishna Reddy vs State of Andhra Pradesh

SUBJECT:
Constitutional Law - II

NAME OF THE FACULTY:

Assistant Professor, Mr. A. Nageswara Rao

Name of the Candidate: Sai Suvedhya R.

Roll No.: 2018LLB076
Semester: 4th semester

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT:

1
The final outcome of this project required a lot of guidance and assistance from many people
and I am extremely fortunate to have got this all along the completion of my project work.
Whatever I have done is only due to such guidance and I would like to thank them for the
same.

I thank my respected Constitution Law - II professor- Mr. A. Nageshwar Rao Sir, for giving
me an opportunity to do this project and the unfailing support and guidance which enabled
me to finish it on time.

I would like to express my gratitude to DSNLU for providing me with all the required
materials.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

2
● Name of the case--------------------------------------------------------------------------------04
● Citation-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------04
● Appellant and Respondent---------------------------------------------------------------------04
● Bench---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------04
● Laws Discussed---------------------------------------------------------------------------------04
● Facts----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------06
● Issues---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------07
● Observations of the court----------------------------------------------------------------------07
● Judgement---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12
● Cases referred-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------13
● Crowns Proceeding Act, 1947----------------------------------------------------------------14
● Conclusion---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------17
● Bibliography-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
18

3
NAME OF THE CASE:

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy & Ors1

CITATION:

(2000) 5 SCC 712

APPELLANT: State of Andhra Pradesh

RESPONDENT: Challa Ramkrishna Reddy

BENCH: Justice D.P.Wadhwa, Justice S.S.Ahmad

LAWS DISCUSSED:

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - ARTICLE 21 - Right to life - A prisoner whether convict,

under trial or detenu, have all Fundamental Rights including right to life and other basic
human rights--Right to life is one of the basic human rights--It is guaranteed to every person
by Article 21 of the Constitution and not even the State has the authority to violate that
Right--A prisoner, be he a convict or under trial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human
being. Even when lodged in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his Fundamental Rights
including the Right to Life guaranteed to him under the Constitution--On being convicted of
crime and deprived of their liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law,
prisoners still retain the residue of Constitutional rights. According to the definition under the
Prisoners Act, there is a convict, there is an under-trial and there is a civil prisoner who may
be a detenu under preventive detention law. None of the three categories of prisoners lose
their Fundamental Rights on being placed inside a prison. The restriction placed on their right
to movement is the result of their conviction or involvement in crime. Thus, a person is
deprived of his personal liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law which ,
as pointed out in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India2, must be reasonable, fair and just.

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - Doctrine of Soverign immunity - Article 300 - Negligence on

the part of Government Officer on account of which prisoner in jail died--Government cannot
take the defence of sovereign immunity--Even where a prisoner is killed in the jail in a bomb

1
(2000) 5 SCC 712
2
1978(1) SCC 248 : 1978(2) SCR 621: AIR 1978 SC 597

4
attack by outsider, it also would be due to negligence of jail authority and therefore, suit for
compensation will be maintainable against the Government. If the act or omission
complained of is not alleged to be in pursuance of the statutory authority, this article would
not apply. This article would be attracted to meet the situation where the public officer or
public authority or, for that matter, a private person does an act under power conferred or
deemed to be conferred by an Act of the legislature by which injury is caused to another
person who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court to claim compensation for that Act. Thus,
when a public officer acting bona fide under or in pursuance of an act of the Legislature
commits a 'tort', the action complained of would be governed by this article. However this
article would not protect a public officer acting mala fide under colour of his office.

CUSTODIAL DEATH - Fundamental rights available to the prisoners - Custodial death - A

prisoner has all basis human rights and those basic rights cannot be defeated by raising
archaic defence of immunity--In case a custodial death due to negligence of Jail officials,
held the legal heirs of the deceased were entitled to compensation from the State
Government. The whole question was again examined by the Supreme Court in Common
Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India and Others in which the entire history relating
to the institution of suits by or against the State or, to be precise, against Government of
India, beginning from the time of East India Company right up to the stage of Constitution,
was considered and the theory of immunity was rejected in this process of judicial
advancement. Kasturi Lal's case has paled into insignificance and is no longer of any binding
value. The Supreme Court has already awarded compensation to the persons who suffered
personal injuries at the hands of the officers of the Government including Police Officers and
personnel for their tortious Act. Though most of these cases were decided under Public Law
domain, it would not make any difference as in the instant case, two vital factors namely,
police negligence as also the sub-Inspector being a conspiracy are established as a fact.

LIMITATION ACT, 1963 - ARTICLE 72 - Defence of sovereign immunity - Article 72 - In

a suit for damages on account of death in the judicial custody, defence raised that in view of
Article 72 the suit was barred by limitation--Defence of sovereign immunity also not
available--In the circumstances of the case, Article 72 also not attracted. Since the Sub-
Inspector of Police himself was in conspiracy, the act in not providing adequate security at
the jail cannot be treated to be an act or omission in pursuance of a statutory duty, namely,
Rule 48 of the Madras Prison Rules, referred to by the High Court. Moreover the action was
wholly mala fide and, therefore, there was no question of the provisions of Article 72 being

5
invoked to defeat the claim of the respondents as the protection of shorter period of
limitation, contemplated by that Article, is available only in respect of bona fide acts. The
High Court was justified in not applying the provisions of Section 72 and invoking the
provisions of Article 113 to hold that the suit was within time.

FACTS:

Challa Chinnappa Reddy and his son Challa Ramkrishna Reddy were involved in Criminal
Case No.18/1997 of Owk Police Station in Baganapalle Taluk of Kurnool District. They were
arrested on 25th of April 1977 and on being remanded to judicial custody on 26th of April
1977, they were lodged in Cell No.7 of Sub-jail, Koilkuntla. In the night between 5th and 6th
of May 1977, at about 3.30 A.M., some persons entered the premises of Sub-jail and hurled
bombs into Cell No.7 as a result of which Challa Chinnappa Reddy sustained grievous
injuries and died subsequently in Government hospital, Kurnool. His son Challa Ramakrishna
Reddy who was also lodged in Cell No.7, however, escaped with some injuries. Challa
Ramakrishna Reddy and his four other brothers as also his mother filed a suit against the
State of Andhra Pradesh claiming a sum of Rs.10 lacs as damages on account of the
negligence of the defendant which had resulted in the death of Challa Chinnappa Reddy. The
suit was contested by the State of Andhra Pradesh on two principal grounds, namely, that the
suit was barred by limitation and that no damages could be awarded by the respect of
sovereign functions as the establishment and maintenance of jail was part of the sovereign
functions of the State and, therefore, even there is any negligence on the part of the Officers
of the State, the State not liable in damages as it was immune from any legal action in respect
of its sovereign acts. Two suits are contentions were accepted by the trial court and the suit
was dismissed. On appeal, the suit was decreed by the High Court for a sum of Rs.1,44,000/-
with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the suit till realisation. It is
this judgment which is challenged in this appeal. Ms. K.Amreshwari, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh has contended that the suit was barred by
time as the period of limitation, as provided by Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was
only one year and since the act complained of took place in the night intervening 5th and 6th
of May, 1977, the suit which was instituted on 9th of June, 1980, was barred by time.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has, on the other hand, contended
that the period of limitation would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963
which prescribed a period of three years from the date on which the right to sue accrued.
Article 113 contended by the residuary Article and since the nature of the present suit was not

6
covered by any other Article of the Limitation Act, it would be governed by the residuary
Article, namely, Article 113 and, therefore, the suit, as held by the High Court, was within
limitation. The learned counsel argued by the other question for the parties with all the
vehemence at their command was the question relating to the immunity of the State from the
legal action in respect of their sovereign acts. It was contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the prisons all over the country are established and maintained either by the
Central Government or by the State Government as part of their sovereign functions in
maintaining law and order in the country and, therefore, the suit for compensation was not
maintainable. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the contrary, has contended that the
theory of immunity, professed by the appellant in respect of sovereign acts, has since been
exploded by several decisions of this Court and damages have been awarded against the State
even in respect of custodial deaths.

ISSUES:

Q1) Whether the state is immune from the acts of its police officers according to the principle
of sovereign immunity?

Q2) Whether this suit is time barred according to the limitation act or not?

OBSERVATIONS OF THE COURT:

What is Sovereign immunity?

A safeguard given to the person working under the sovereign order when he unfollow the
prescribed way or method or committees any contractual breach or any other liabilities.

This can be divided into two

(i) Contractual Liability

(ii) Tortuous liability.

Contractual Liability:

Art 299 and 300 discuss about the Sovereign liability.

Art 299 (1) All contract made in the exercise of executive power of the union or a
state shall be expressed to be made by the President or by the Governor of the State
has been the case may be.

7
 (2) All such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that
power shall be executed on behalf of the president or the Governor.

(3) Its execution must be by such persons and in such manner as the president or the
Governor may direct or authorise.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhikaraj Jaipuria v. Union of India1 has held it:

"it is clear from the words "expressed to be made" and "executed" that there must be a
formal written contract ... The provisions of Article 299(1) are mandatory in character
and any contravention thereof nullifies the contract and makes it void. The provisions
of Article 299(1) have not been enacted for the sake of mere form, but they have been
enacted for safeguarding the Government against the unauthorised contract. The
provisions are embodied in the constitution on the ground of public policy on the
ground of protection of general public and these formalities cannot be waived or
dispensed with."

The provisions have been embodied to protect the general public as represented by the
government. The terms of the Article have therefore been held to be mandatory and not
merely directory. In 1962, the Court repelled the foregoing view taken in the case of
Chaturbhuj v. Moreswar2 and came to lay down in the case of Bhikaraj v. Union of
India that the provisions of Article 299 are mandatory and a contravention thereof, would
render the contract void. If so, the pettiness of the contract or the administrative practice was
of no avail.

In view of Article 299(1) there can be no implied contract between the government and
another person, the reason being that if such implied contract between the government and
another person were allowed, they would in effect make Article299(1) useless, for then a
person who had a contract with the government which was not executed at all in the manner
provided under Article 299(1) could get away by saying that an implied contract may be
inferred on the facts and the circumstances of the particular case.

It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.P.Chowdhary v.State of
Madhya Pradesh that :

"In view of the provisions of Article299(1) there is no scope for any implied contract.
Thus, no contract can be implied under this Article. If the contract between the

8
 Government and a person is not incompliance with Article 299(1), it would be no
contract at all and would not be enforceable as a contract either by the Government or
by the person."

The Court justified this strict view by saying that if implied contracts between the
government and other persons were allowed, they would in effect, make Article 299(1) a
dead letter, for then a person who had a contract with the government which was not
executed at all in the manner provided under Article 299(1) could get away by pleading that
an implied contract be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case.

However, the Courts have also realised that insistence on too rigid observance of all the
conditions stipulated in Article 299 may not always be practicable. Hundreds of government
officers daily enter into a variety of contract, often of a petty nature, with private parties. At
times contract are entered through correspondence or even orally. It would be extremely
inconvenient from an administrative point of view if it were insisted that each and every
contract must be affected by a ponderous legal document couched in a particular form.3

The judicial attitude to Article 299 has sought to balance two motivations

On the one hand, to protect the Government from unauthorised contracts; and

On the other hand, to safeguard the interests of unsuspecting and unwary parties who enter
into contract with government officials without fulfilling all the formalities laid down in the
Constitution.

Under Article 299(1), a contract can be entered into on behalf of the Government by a person
aurhorised for the purpose by the President, or the Governor, as the case may be. The
authority to execute the contract  on behalf of the government may be granted by rules,
formal notifications, or special orders; such authority may also be given in respect of a
particular contract or contract by the President/Governor to an officer other than the one
notified under the rules. Article 299(1) does not prescribe any particular mode in which
authority must be conferred; authorization may be conferred ad hoc on any person.4

Article 300 provides that:

3
Original edition with original – the constitution of India. New Delhi: government of India. 26 Nov 1949
4
The Hindu N. Ram. issn 0971 – 751.

9
(1) The Government of India may sue or be sued by the name of the Union of India and the
Government of a State may sue or be sued by the name of the State and may, subject to any
provisions which may be made by Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of such State
enacted by virtue of powers conferred by this Constitution, sue or be sued in relation to their
respective affairs in the like cases as the Dominion of India and the corresponding Provinces
or the corresponding Indian States might have sued or been sued if this Constitution had not
been enacted.

(2) If at the commencement of this Constitution:

(1) any legal proceedings are pending to which the Dominion of India is a party, the
Union of India shall be deemed to be substituted for the Dominion in those
proceedings; and

(2) any legal proceedings are pending to which a Province or an Indian State is a
party, the corresponding State shall be deemed to be substituted for the Province or
the Indian State in those proceedings.

Principles Underlying Contractual Liability of State

(1) Reasonableness, fairness: The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally
as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by
Article 14 and it must characterize every State Action, whether it be under the authority of
law or in exercise of executive power without making of law.

It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive
Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the
individual. Every action of the executive Government must be informed with reason and
should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare
minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether
the exercise of the power involves affection of some right or denial of some privilege.5

In the case of Y. Konda Reddy v. State of A.P. 6 it was held that like all its actions, the
action even in the contractual field is bound to be fair. It is settled law that the rights and
obligations arising out of the contract after entering into the same is regulated by terms and

5
The constitution of India : Role of Ambedkar on april 2 2015
6
(1997) AIR ,AP 1221

10
conditions of the contract itself. It is settled principle of law that the Court would strike down
an administrative action, which violates any foregoing conditions.7

In a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is the duty of the State to do what is
fair and just to the citizen and the State should not seek to defeat the legitimate claim of the
citizen by adopting a legalistic attitude but should do what fairness and justice demand.8

(2) Public Interest: Public interest is the paramount consideration. There may be situations
where there are compelling reasons necessitating the departure from the rule, but there the
reasons for the departure must be rational and should not be suggestive of discrimination.
Every action of the public authority or of the person acting in public interest or any act that
gives rise to public element should be guided by public interest. 9 If actions bear insignia of
public law element or public character they are amenable to judicial review and the validity
of such action would be tested on the anvil of Article 14. Distinction between public law and
private law remedy is now narrowed down. 10 Appearance of public justice is as important as
doing justice. Nothing should be done which gives an appearance of bias, jobbery or
nepotism.11 Person holding public office must exercise his power in public interest and for
public good.12

3. Contractual Liability: Article 299(2) immunises the President, or the Governor, or the
person executing any contract  on his behalf, from any personal liability in respect of any
contract  executed for the purposes of the Constitution, or for the purposes of any enactment
relating to Government of India in force. This immunity is purely personal and does not
immunise the government, as such, from contractual liability arising under a contract that
fulfils the requirements under Article 299(1).13 The governmental liability is practically the
same as that of a private person, subject, of course, to any contract to the contrary.14

The Courts have adopted this view on practicable considerations. Modern government is a
vast organization. Officers have to enter into a variety of petty contract, many a time orally or
through correspondence without strictly complying with the provisions under Article 299. In

7
Jain ,mahabirprashad (2010) ; Indian constution
8
Lecture by professor Parmanad Singh, Jindal Gobal Law school
9
Austine, Granville, 2003, oxford university press.
10
IBID
11
Basu, Durga das (1984). intro to the constitution.
12
Dash, Shreeram Chandra (1968). The constitution of India.
13
Khana, hans 1981 Introduction to constitution.
14
Kashyap, Subhash 1994 – our constitution of India, National Book Trust of India.

11
such a case, if what has been done is for the benefit of the government for its use and
enjoyment, and is otherwise legitimate and proper, Section 7015of the Indian Contract Act,
1872 should step in and support a claim for compensation made by the contracting parties
notwithstanding the fact that the contract question has not been made as per the requirements
of Article 299. If Section 70 was to be held inapplicable, it would lead to extremely
unreasonable circumstances and may even hamper the working of government. Like ordinary
citizens even the government should be subject to the provisions of Section 70.

Similarly, if under a contract  with a government, a person has obtained any benefit, he can
be sued for the dues under Section 70 of the Act though the Contracts did not confirm to
Article 299.16 If the Government has made any void contracts, it can recover the same under
Section 65 of the Act.17

All that Section 70 provides is that if the goods delivered are accepted, or the work done is
voluntarily enjoyed, then the liability to enjoy compensation for the said work or goods
arises. What Section70 prevents is unjust enrichment and it as much to individuals as to
corporations and governments. It needs to be emphasized that Section 70, Contracts Act, does
not deal with the rights and liabilities of parties accruing from that from relations that
resemble those created by contracts.

JUDGEMENT:

Held that, the raise of plea of Sovereign Immunity which had failed in the present case
because there is illegal detention of the accused and it was subjected to torture in the jail. So,
the court stated that they didn’t find any merit to give immunity, so they dismissed the
appeal.

CASES REFFERED:

Karamshi v. State of Bombay18, a contract to supply the canal water was entered into by the
appellant with the minister, P.W.D. The canal Officer under the instructions of the
government repudiated the contract. The appellant’s plea for specific performance and
alternatively damages for breach of contract was not allowed for non-compliance of the

15
IBID
16
Lee, Sidney 1903, dictionary of National Biography.
17
The constitution of India, 56 th edition, J. N. Pandy.
18
AIR 1963 SC 1685

12
provisions of section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 corresponding with
Article 299 of the Constitution.

Bhikaraj Jaipuria v. Union of India 19 the court held that if the contract is not in the proper
form, it is not enforceable. So, where the purchase orders were not expressed to be made in
the name of the Governor General nor executed on his behalf but were signed by the
Divisional Superintendent, the appellant was not entitled to the resultant contract to claim
compensation.

Mulamchand v. State of M.P.20, the supreme court held that a contract not conforming with
the provisions of Article 299(1) could not be ratified as the enactment of article 299 was not a
mere formality and its provisions could not be dispensed with.

Chaturbhuj v. Moreshwar21, The court took the view that when the contract with the
government is not in the form of Article 299(1), the Officer who entered into contract could
be held personally liable under Section 230(3) of the Indian Contract Act.

Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union of India & Ors.22, in which the entire
history relating to the institution of suits by or against the State or, to be precise, against
Government of India, beginning from the time of East India Company right up to the stage of
Constitution, was considered and the theory of immunity was rejected. In this process of
judicial advancement, Kasturi Lal`s case (supra) has paled into insignificance and is no
longer of any binding value. 

Nilbati Behra v. State of Orissa23, the petitioner’s son aged 22 years was arrested by police
in connection with investigation of an offence of theft in a village and kept in police custody
with his hands tied. On the next day, the side of the railway track found his body. The mother
of the deceased sent a letter to the court alleging custodial death of her son claiming
compensation on the ground of violation of Art. 21 of the Constitution. The court treated this
letter as a writ petition under Article 32 and awarded Rs. 1.15 Lakhs as compensation to the
mother of the deceased. The court held that proceeding under Article 32 and Article 226 is a
remedy available in Public Law based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental

19
AIR 1962 SC 110
20
AIR 1968 SC 1218
21
AIR 1967 SC 203
22
AIR 1999 SC 2979
23
(1993) 2 SCC 746

13
rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply even though it may be
available in Private law based on an action based on tort.

D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal 24, would indicate that so far as Fundamental Rights and
human rights or human dignity are concerned, the law has marched ahead like a Pegasus but
the Government attitude continues to be conservative and it tries to defend its action or the
tortious action of its officers by raising the plea of immunity for sovereign acts or acts of
State, which must fail.

CROWNS PROCEEDING ACT, 1947:

Since at least the thirteenth century the rule has been that the Crown cannot be sued in its
own courts. Furthermore, when the hardship of this rule was mitigated by the development of
the petition of right as a means of proceeding against the Crown with the fiat of the Crown,
the maxim that ' The King Can Do No Wrong' prevented that remedy being available for
torts. A Crown Proceedings Committee was appointed in 1921 to consider the position, and
in 1927 produced a draft Bill, the main object of which was to put the Crown, so far as may
be, in matters of litigation in the same position as the subject. Nothing was done to facilitate
the passage of this Bill through Parliament, and it was only when in 1946 the House of Lords
in Adams v. Naylor25 and the Court of Appeal in Royster v. Cavey 26 drew attention to the
unsatisfactory state of affairs that steps to remedy the position were taken. The present Lord
Chancellor introduced a Bill which received the Royal assent on July 31, 1947, under the title
of the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947.

Section 2 (1) provides as follows: ' Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Crown shall be
subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age and
capacity, it would be subject:- (a) in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents;

(b) in respect of any breach of those duties which a person owes to his servants or agents at
common law by reason of being their employer; and

(c) in respect of any breach of the duties attaching at common law to the ownership,
occupation, possession or control of property.'

24
AIR 1997 SC 610
25
[1946] A.C. 543
26
4 [1947] K.B. 204

14
 (a) The proviso to section 2 (1) enacts that the Crown shall not be liable unless 'the act or
omission would apart from the provisions of this Act have given rise to a cause of action in
tort against that servant or agent or his estate'. This proviso seems to be based on a
misconception of the principle of vicarious liability. Uthwatt, J. has shown that even where
the servant acts within the scope of his employment, the liabilities of the servant and the
master are not necessarily one and the same.

Suppose, for example, that a driver of a government vehicle negligently knocks down his
wife. She cannot sue her husband, but it is clear from the decision in Smith v. Moss 27, that
had his employer not been the Crown, she could have sued that employer. Since the proviso
prevents an action being brought against the Crown unless one could have been brought
against the servant, it follows that the wife has no remedy. If the sole purpose of this proviso
is to prevent the Crown from being liable where acts of State would be a defence to its
servant, then it need not have been couched in such wide terms.

(b) Statutory Liabilities of the Crown: Nothing in section 2 (1) imposes on the Crown any
liability for breach of statutory duties. Section 2 (2) provides that the Crown shall be liable
for breach of statutory duty if the statute binds both the Crown and persons other than the
Crown and its officers. However, section 40 (2) provides (inter alia) that, except as therein
otherwise expressly provided, nothing in this Act shall ' affect any rules of evidence or any
presumption relating to the extent to which the Crown is bound by any Act of Parliament.
The result is that tortious liabilities of a statutory nature do not bind the Crown unless either
the particular statute or this Act provides to the contrary.32 The Act does provides that Part II
of Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935 and the Law Reform
(Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 shall bind the Crown. The following statutes do not
seem to affect the Crown. The Employers Liability Act; 1880, imposes restrictions on the
field of application of the rule of common employment. The Crown presumably remain free
from those restrictions whenever it pleads common employment nor will the obligation
imposed by the Housing Act, 1936 on landlords of certain houses to see that houses are
reasonably fit for human occupation bind the Crown as landlord. Most important of all, it
would appear unlikely that the Fatal Accidents Acts bind the Crown, with the result that if A
is killed by the negligence of a driver of a government vehicle, A's relatives will' have no
remedy under the Fatal Accidents Acts against the Crown.

27
[1940] 1 K.B. 424

15
(c) Section 2 (6) provides that the Crown shall be liable only for the torts of those officers
directly or indirectly appointed by it and paid out of the Consolidated Fund or certain other
specified funds. Parliament, anxious to end the uncertainty prevailing at common law as to
who is within the immunity, has provided a rigid definition. This definition is too narrow to
include all public officials who have no employer other than the Crown vicariously liable for
their torts. Decisions such as Stanbury v. Exeter Corporation28 show that where public
officers, although appointed by the local authority, have duties cast upon them directly by the
law, the local authority is not liable for torts committed by them ill carrying out those duties.
Such officers, of which, perhaps policemen are quantitatively the most important, are outside
the definition in section 2 (6), and no one is vicariously liable for their torts.

Section 3 makes the Crown liable for infringements by its servants or agents of patents,
registered trademarks and copy- rights. This section was an addition to the Act made in
committee in the House of Lords. Since the definition of ' servant or agent' in section 2 (6)
only governs section 2, the Act provides no definition of servant or agent for the purposes of
section 3. Presumably, the vague common-law rules must be applied.

(d) Section 40 (2) (e) extends to the Crown in its capacity as highway authority the rule that a
highway authority is not liable for nonfeasance. The extension by the Trunk Roads Act, 1946,
of the Crown's control of highways makes this section more important.

It is surprising that the Act contains no provision excluding foreign torts from its operation.
An action will lie here against the Crown for a tort committed abroad if the act is not
justifiable by the law of the place where it has been committed."7 One consequence of the
Act is that a plaintiff injured either in Scotland or England by a tort of the Crown, can sue in
the courts of either court.

CONCLUSION:

The recent times have seen the citizens of the country being more and more proactive in
approaching the court to seek justice when their fundamental rights have been breached or
violated by the state. Challa Ramkrishna Reddy’s case is one such case which has become a
landmark in its own way regarding the subject of custodial death and custodial torture. This

28
[19)5] 2 I(.B. 838. Quacrc: Can the Crown he liable for torts of servants loaned to it? Cf. Farthinty v. f., [1948]
1 D.L.R. 385

16
case further dealt with a more controversial subject relating to sovereign immunity of the
state in regard to tortuous liabilities. This subject has long been debated by various courts in
various cases and finally the concept of sovereign immunity of the state has been done away
with. Especially after the Crowns Proceeding Act, 1947 the concept of ‘King can do no
wrong’ has been washed off. Now even the king and his servants are both liable for the
wrongs committed by them. This judgement was a highly important one to keep a check over
the abuse of power done by the executive in the name of the state. It stands as a symbol of the
independence of the judiciary and non tolerance of any injustice by the judiciary in aspect of
any kind of case.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

ACTS AND STATUTES:

 Article 21 and Article 30 of the Constitution of India

 Section 72 and 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963

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CASES REFERRED

 State of Andhra Pradesh vs Challa Ramakrishna Reddy

 Bhikaraj Jaipuria v. Union of India
 Mulamchand v. State of M.P
 Chaturbhuj v. Moreshwar
 Nilbati Behra v. State of Orissa
 D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal
 Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union of India & Ors

BOOKS REFERRED

 M P Jain Indian Constitutional Law

 J N Pandey Indian Constitutional Law

ARTICLES REFERED

 Street, H. (1948). Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. The Modern Law Review, 11(2),

129-142. Retrieved March 10, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/1090379

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