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Contents
Foreword
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations: Part 5 is closely nested within its parent publication, AFM
Tactics for Stability Operations, which provides the land environment context for the delivery
of stability within a pan-government approach. The publication seeks to define the breadth of
capacity building operations across the mosaic of conflict.
In the past three years a focus of Defence Engagement and the increase in overseas training
tasks undertaken by the adaptable force has once again brought the importance of the
contribution of military capacity building to strategic force projection and the UK prosperity
building agenda to the fore. Land forces have a strong tradition of contributing to the
development of partner-nation armed forces through successive campaigns since WW2 and
presently through numerous smaller scale undertakings across Africa and the Middle East.
The most capable Iraqi forces during the Battle for Mosul in 2016/17 were the Counter Terrorism
Force; an organisation who had retained a mentored relationship with the US special forces since
the withdrawal of the bulk of US forces from Iraq in 2011. Thier success in the defeat of ISIS/
Daesh shows the strategic value of persistent engagement at the tactical, operation and strategic
level. This may not define a new paradigm of warfare, but certainly provides an effective model
for delivery of UK Defence objectives ‘by, with and through’ a partner.
Capacity building at the tactical level is fundamentally a human endeavour which demands new
skills of our soldiers; an aptitude for language, a capacity to empathise with the cultures and
motivations of others; and an ability to adapt teaching materials and styles to the needs of the
indigenous force. But we must not lose sight of the fact that UK credibility to conduct such tasks
is founded on our professional excellence and warfighting acumen.
This doctrine has been developed closely with me as the Land proponent for capacity building.
It therefore captures the experience gleaned from the plethora of overseas training tasks
undertaken in the past three years, and the operational successes achieved in combination with
our partners. The doctrine has additionally been used to support planning during Exercise RHINO
CHARGE 18, which featured an intervention and downstream capacity building scenario, which
has served to validate the utility of this. I commend it to all personnel preparing for Defence
Engagement and capacity building missions overseas.
March 2018
Capacity Building Doctrine Hierarchy
ABCA Security
NATO Allied
Force Capacity
Building Handbook
0
iv | Army Field Manual I TFSO Capacity Building - Part 5
2
LAND DN 13/03 SFA in ii. U
DN 17/04 Security
ADP Land Operations
Afghanistan K Forces Assistance
O
DN 15/03 Land p
s
AFM Tactics
Contribution to
: for Stability
Defence Engagement Ops (TFSO)
t
h
UK land and joint doctrine
D
AFM TFSO Part 1 AFM
e TFSO Part 2 AFM TFSO Part 3 AFM TFSO Part 4
AFM TFSO Part 5
Counter-Irregular f Peace Humanitarian Stabilisation &
Capacity Building
Activity e Support
n
Assistance Reconstruction
c
e
Legend:
c
ADP - Army doctrine dublication
o AJP - Allied joint publication JDN - joint doctrine note
AFM - Army field manual DNn - doctrine note JDP - joint doctrine publication
t
JCN - joint concept note CIMIC
r
- civil-military cooperation
Contents
Contents
Preface
Scope. Army Field Manual (AFM) Tactics for Stability Operations, Part 5: Capacity Building
gives an overview and best practice for personnel deployed, or about to deploy, on capacity
building tasks overseas from a land perspective. It also provides the policy rationale for why
capacity building takes place. Tactical considerations pertaining to wider stability operations
are covered in the overarching AFM, Tactics for Stability Operations. A detailed breakdown of
tactics, techniques and procedures pertinent to capacity building can also be found separately in
the Stability Tactics Handbook, which will be held as a live publication on the Army Knowledge
Exchange (AKX)
Purpose. This publication is the primary source of doctrine for the UK land contribution to
capacity building elements of stability operations. Building on the foundations laid by higher-
level NATO, Defence and land doctrine, it provides the principles that guide UK land forces’
approach to capacity building within stability operations.
Application. AFM Tactics for Stability Operations Part 5: Capacity Building is required reading
for all staff officers and land force commanders from subunit upwards. They must explain the
doctrine to their subordinates and ensure that the whole land force operates in accordance
with its principles. It is also useful for allies, joint staffs, civil servants, contractors and civilians
working alongside land forces.
Background. This functional doctrine supersedes the Land Contribution to Defence Engagement
Doctrine Note, providing a broader contextual view of capacity building and acquiring best
practice both from an historical viewpoint, but also capturing lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan,
and other short-term training team (STTT) deployments. The UK has a deep historical legacy
and commitment to capacity building, having both trained and fought alongside local forces
throughout the history of the modern British state. It gained further experience in the twentieth
century with examples such as Malaya, Dhofar, and Sierra Leone. Case studies are included in
Part D.
This manual continues the evolution in land forces’ doctrine, using Army Doctrine Publication
(ADP) Land Operations as a framework. The AFM complements joint doctrine through reference
to JDP 05. Where possible, it also complements NATO doctrine and while not exhaustive, the
linkages to key NATO and joint publications are shown overleaf.
Contents
Contents
Contents
Foreword iii
Preface v
Contents vii
Part A - Context PA-1
chapter 1 - Introduction 1-1
Chapter 2 - The UK government approach to capacity building 2-1
Introduction 2-1
The role of security capacity building during military operations 2-5
Wider benefits of capacity building 2-8
Stabilisation 4A-2
Stability policing 4A-2
Chapter 7 - Execute – nature of capacity building across the mosaic of conflict 7-1
Introduction 7-1
Counterterrorism and counter-criminality 7-2
Defence Engagement 7-3
Security force assistance background 7-5
Security force assistance characteristics 7-6
Contents
Lessons 8-15
Conclusion 8-19
PART A
Context
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 1
Building
PART 5
Contents
Introduction
Contents
Contents
Chapter 1
Introduction
1-01. This Army field manual gives an overview and the best practice for personnel deployed, or
about to deploy, on capacity building tasks overseas or in the UK from a land perspective.
It also provides the policy rationale for why capacity building takes place. From this, flow
the fundamentals of the capacity building approach.
1-03. For structural reasons, this document concentrates upon the first, as it is most likely
to be the aspect of capacity building contributed to by land forces. Part 4 of this AFM,
Stabilisation and Reconstruction, deals with capacity building as part of the military’s
support to the initial restoration of essential services and interim governance tasks.
1-04. Capacity building should focus on establishing relationships, increasing access and
influence, developing and enhancing understanding, and building capability and
capacity for specified partner and host nations. It is not about conducting activity, but
the achievement of UK objectives, effects or impact.5 It therefore ought to be coherent,
coordinated and prioritised across Defence and government. Those involved in any
capacity building activity must have an understanding of the UK’s strategic plan for the
partner or host nation in which they are deployed, and their part in that plan.
1-05. Capacity building can be conducted outside of operations, both upstream and
downstream,6 and can also feature during conflict or crisis, as demonstrated by
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some capacity building activity can also be conducted
in the UK through the reciprocal deployment of the partner-nation elements requiring
training, or delivered through a third-party country. Programmes can be one-off (short
term) or sustained (long term). From a counterterrorism or counter-criminality perspective,
capacity building is normally upstream in nature, attempting to prevent, disrupt or
neutralise threats at source before they can be aimed at the UK or her interests overseas.
During conflict or crisis, capacity building will be a key element of a campaign plan to
build up the capacity of a partner nation to deal with immediate threats. Post-conflict or
crisis, capacity building helps to stabilise a state or region either through support to the
initial restoration of essential services, or through support to interim governance, and
with longer-term security capacity building. Capacity building is therefore a mixture of
defence, development and diplomacy.
1-06. From a Defence Engagement perspective, capacity building supports integrated and coherent
cross-government strategies in order to improve security and stability, prevent conflict and
other crises developing, and to achieve global influence by demonstrating a ‘shift from
confrontation to cooperation’.7 Central to Part A of this publication is the idea that capacity
building, as conducted by land forces, is only one way of supporting the aim of developing
a structurally stable state. Capacity building can occasionally take place in contexts other
than those of stabilisation such as warfighting. It can also take place outside the context of a
formally recognised state8 - these are covered in Part A, Chapter 2.
1-07. Capacity building can be applied specifically to the security sector. Security capacity
building is an integrated approach to the generation, employment, and
sustainment of local, partner-nation, or international security forces in support of
a legitimate authority.9 This covers security force assistance, and capacity building as an
element of Defence Engagement and counterterrorism/counter-criminality.
6 ‘Upstream’ refers to a period before an anticipated threat or crisis (often described as a ‘policy moment’) that compels the
international community, the UK Government and/or the affected country to act to attempt to prevent it. ‘Downstream’
describes activity carried out after the ‘policy moment’ or crisis. The perspective of an actor determines the ‘policy
moment’ : what may suddenly occasion overseas intervention for the UK may well have already been considered a crisis
for a number of years by those living, working and/or governing in the crisis area.
7 Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security (2010), page 79.
8 For example HMG provides capacity building to Kurdish forces but does not recognise the Kurdish regional government as
an independent entity from the Iraqi government.
9 ABCA Security Force Capacity Building Handbook, Edition 2 (1 July 2011), Glossary-3. ‘Host nation’ has been replaced
with ‘partner nation’ for this Army Field Manual.
Contents
The full spectrum approach has largely replaced the ‘integrated approach’ in the
UK lexicon, although some other government departments may still refer to it as the
‘integrated approach’. NATO uses the older term ‘comprehensive approach’. The full
spectrum approach is a whole-of-government approach to providing agile national crisis
response capabilities as well as routine Defence activity, coordinated through the National
Security Council in support of the goal of a secure and prosperous UK with global reach
and influence. See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, paragraphs 2-20 to 2-22.
Self-sufficiency refers in this instance to the extent to which a state or partner nation
has the ability to ensure its own stability and the security of its population and political
processes within its own resources. Recognising that no polity can be truly and entirely
self-sufficient, self-sufficiency remains the theoretical end of a structurally stable state. It
informs the capacity building principle of ‘cooperation not dependency’. See Chapter 1 of
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations for more on the concept of stability.
Human capital can be defined as the skills, knowledge, health and experience possessed
by an individual or population, viewed in terms of their sum value or cost to an
organization or country.
Host nation refers to countries where the UK’s intervention may be uninvited, or where
there may be no effective constituted or internationally recognised government with
which to work.
Partner nation indicates a more formal relationship between the UK and a partner
government, where there are explicitly agreed mutual interests and a letter of exchange,
memorandum of understanding, treaty or other such shared agreement as basis for UK
support.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 2
Building
PART 5
Chapter 2
The UK government approach to
capacity building
Introduction The UK government
approach to capacity
2-01. This chapter outlines how the UK government uses
building
capacity building as a part of stability operations and as
a tool to support its strategic objectives. It identifies the • National Security Strategy
key strategies and policies and provides the foundation • Building Stability
for the use of land forces conducting capacity building. Overseas Strategy
• International Defence
2-02. A number of policies and strategies provide direction for
Engagement Strategy
capacity building.10 These include:
• CONTEST
a. The UK approach to stabilisation. • Serious and Organised
Crime Strategy
b. The National Security Strategy (NSS).
• Linkage to stability
c. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). operations
• Linkage to counter-
d. The tri-departmental Building Stability Overseas
insurgency
Strategy (BSOS).
• Wider benefits of
e. The MOD’s International Defence Engagement capacity building
Strategy (IDES).
a. P1 – Protect political actors, the political system and the population. Power is
established and protected through force and the threat of force, thereby generating
security (a key enabling factor for stabilisation). Through building the capability and
capacity of the partner or host nation’s forces (army, police, paramilitary or border forces)11
this component can be enhanced in order to manage existing violence or to deter further
outbreaks. UK land forces may be capacity building during operations (in conflict and also
in direct combat) or conducting upstream or downstream capacity building.
2-04. The combined National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) serves as a strategic framework document. A new National Security
Strategy is scheduled for every five years and is predicated upon the Strategic Trends
Programme12 and the Defence Joint Operating Concept, founded on an analysis of the
strategic global context. The NSS sets out the UK’s strategic posture, vision, values and
approaches, and its national security objectives. Capacity building aids in achieving the
following national security objectives:
2-05. The 2015 SDSR describes our UK response to crisis, conflict and instability as one which
will use all the tools of national power available (diplomacy, defence, development,
intelligence, etc.), coordinated through the National Security Council (NSC). It describes
this variously as an ‘integrated’, ‘whole-of-government’, and ‘full spectrum’ approach.
This is complemented by our intent to ‘invest more in our alliances, build new stronger
partnerships, and persuade potential adversaries of the benefits of cooperation, to
multiply what we can achieve alone’. In this publication we will use the term full
spectrum approach to describe this concept.
2-06. Sitting beneath the NSS and SDSR, the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)
is an integrated cross-government strategy to address instability and conflict overseas.
It focuses on strengthening cross-government cooperation and improving performance
through three mutually supporting pillars:
a. Early warning through the anticipation of instability and potential triggers of conflict.
b. Rapid crisis prevention and response through appropriate and effective action to
prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating.
12 DCDC Global Strategic Trends (GST) – Out to 2045, fifth edition seeks to set the strategic context for wider defence and
security planning.
13 More detail on Protect, Project, Promote is in Chapter 2 of AFM Tactics for Stability Operations.
Contents
Figure 2-1. National strategy documents - core guidance for capacity building
2-07. The 2010 SDSR committed the government to produce the Building Stability Overseas
Strategy, which is one of several strategies stemming from the 2010 NSS. It is aligned
with related strategies, notably the counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST), the Organised
Crime Strategy, the Cyber Crime Strategy, and the International Defence Engagement
Strategy (IDES). It takes into account the government’s strategies in areas such as
proliferation and arms control, energy security, and climate change and resource
competition, which it complements. The 2015 NSS and SDSR also promoted the role of
Defence in building stability overseas.
UK forces conducting counter-sniper training with partner-nation elements as part of Op SHADER in Iraq
Contents
Defence Engagement Defence Engagement Defence Engagement MOD works closely Alongside diplomatic
ensures that the UK steers efforts to builds partners’ with diplomatic and efforts. Defence
understands other promote UK interests capability and capacity economic partners Engagement seeks to
nations’ defence and enhance national in support of good in government to build and maintain
perspectives and security by preventing governance and ensure the success of the relationships
equally that they and ending instability stability, and also to the UK as a trading which allow the UK to
understand UK intent and conflict overseas, enable interoperability nation. Defence-related influence partners and
and capability. by using diplomatic, with partners. industry support to international
Understanding of this military and security exports generates trade organisations in
nature is vital when tools including and enables partners. support of UK values
crises arise. deterrence. and interests.
Figure 2-2. Defence Engagement objectives’ relationship with the national security objectives
14 Land forces’ element (excluding Royal Marines and the RAF Regiment) of Defence Engagement comprises Army
International Activity. This includes: interoperability; security cooperation; capacity building; high-level international
engagement (HLIE) and senior working-level international engagement (SLIE); Army staff talks (AST); support to Defence
staff talks; deployment of liaison officers (LO) and exchange officers (EO); loan service; training and education (including
overseas training exercises (OTX) and international defence training (IDT)); Defence sections, and regimental affiliations
and alliances; support to Department for International Trade (Defence Security Organisation) (DIT DSO).
Contents
2-09. Counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST). CONTEST reflects changing terrorist threats and
incorporates revised policies. Its aim is to ‘reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas
from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence’.15 As part
of the ‘Pursue’16 workstream, the UK aims to work overseas, collaborating with other nations
and multilateral organisations, developing the capability and capacity of overseas partners,
in order to deal with threats at source. This can be challenging, particularly from a legal
perspective, and requires close coordination across government departments. The MOD can
contribute capacity building as one element of this strategy, and the Joint Counter-Terrorist
Training and Advisory Team (JCTTAT) is the MOD’s principal organisation for conducting CT-
specific capacity building. Priority will be in areas where the threat from terrorism is high, but
where the state lacks the institutional capacity to tackle the threat. The MOD contributes to
CONTEST using its military capability to disrupt terrorist groups overseas, as well as through
intelligence collection, counterterrorism capacity building for partner nations, and support
to overseas law enforcement and security agencies. Its support to conflict prevention work
also contributes to CONTEST objectives. In the event of a terrorist attack that exceeds the
capability or immediate capacity of the UK civilian response, the MOD can provide support to
‘prepare’ through military aid to the civil authorities.17
2-10. Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. The Serious and Organised Crime Strategy
addresses organised crime as a threat to national security and is aimed at reducing the
level of serious and organised crime, through the four pillars of activity shared with
CONTEST. Defence supports the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy through capacity
building in priority countries.
15 CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (July 2011), page 9.
16 CONTEST contains four workstreams: Pursue (to stop terrorist attacks); Prevent (to stop people becoming terrorists or
supporting terrorism); Protect (to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack); Prepare (to mitigate the impact of a
terrorist attack). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (July 2011), page 10.
17 CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism (July 2011), pages 122 to123.
18 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 05, Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution (July 2015), page17.
19 Building Peaceful States and Societies: a DFID practice paper, 2010, page 14.
20 Ibid, page 36, paragraph 86.
21 ADP Land Operations, pages 8-62 to 8-66.
Contents
Secure
Support development
(economic, infrastructure,
Develop Build social) stability and partner
Capacity or host-nation
Building government legitimacy
22 Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.4 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-insurgency (COIN).
23 AFM1-10 Countering Insurgency. This definition has been reordered prior to the publication of a new UK counter-irregular
activity doctrine in 2018.
24 Proxy warfare is defined as ‘warfare carried out by state or non-state paramilitary groups in support of a sponsor state’s
interests’. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 4/12, Intervention: Relationships With Paramilitary Groups (June 2012), Lexicon, Part
2.
Contents
Break-in operations initially progressed swiftly, and the Iraqi Counter Terrorist Service (CTS)
and Iraqi Army advancing from the north, south and east, seized outlying towns and villages
in the face of coordinated ISIS defensive operations. Progress slowed as troops encountered
fierce resistance from IS, including snipers, suicide bombers and shellfire. The campaign
in eastern Mosul was characterised and further complicated by an emerging threat from
modified, commercial sourced drones that ISIS used to drop modified conventional munitions
on partner forces; this had a disproportionate psychological effect on the Iraqi forces.
By January 2017 eastern Mosul was back under Iraqi government control, but the more complex
urban terrain in the west of the city, particularly in the densely developed and populated Old City
presented a more difficult challenge. The densely packed housing and narrow alleyways enabled a
relatively small number of militants to target advancing troops with snipers and suicide IEDs.
Despite coalition efforts to minimise the collateral impact of operations and the judicious use of
precision munitions the fighting caused extensive damage to Mosul’s infrastructure, buildings and
archaeological sites, most significantly to the bridges across the Tigris River, schools and hospitals
(both of which were used by ISIS for defensive ops in a deliberate ploy to complicate coalition
targeting decisions) and to Mosul airport. As Iraqi forces completed their final assaults in the Old
City towards the Tigris river, in June 2017, the ancient Great Mosque of al-Nuri, was destroyed
by ISIS.
25 A line of operation/effort is a line linking decisive conditions or points in time and space on the path to the centre of
gravity. Lines may be functional, thematic or environmental. For further detail see AFM Command, Chapter 6, Section 2
and Army Joint Publication (AJP) 5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning, paragraph 0238.
26 Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Future Character of Conflict, page 36.
Contents
Niche coalition capabilities were central to the operational approach and critical
in outmatching the opponent. Full motion video ISTAR assets were essential but
demonstrated limitations in dismounted close combat due to the complexity of the urban
makeup of Mosul. The forward deployment of joint tactical air controllers to synchronise
coalition fires was particularly significant. Modern GMLRs, mortars, and cannon artillery
were highly effective. Understanding of electronic warfare capabilities, by necessity,
became a core competency at the tactical level. Heavy engineer platforms proved vital.
2-15. Aside from benefiting the UK’s Prosperity Agenda, successful, persistent capacity building
can have other advantages:
a. Through improving the ability for UK Armed Forces to interoperate with allies and
partner or host nations (at tactical and operational levels, within the context of
operations).
c. By providing a mechanism by which the UK military can learn from other actors, allies
and partner nations, including the development of awareness and understanding,
personal skills, confidence and credibility – in short, ‘experiential learning’.
27 UKTI is part of the Department for International Trade (DIT). See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Chapter 6, Appendix
1 to Annex A.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 3
Building
PART 5
Contents
Chapter 3
Capacity building within a military
framework
Introduction
Capacity building within a
3-01. This chapter describes the high-level joint force and land military framework
component doctrine for the delivery of security sector
• Army International
and indigenous force capability development in support
Activity (AIA)
of the wider governmental approach. Integrated action
• Defence Engagement
is the land contribution to joint action which may draw
• Human security themes
on all Defence’s capabilities. The tactical functions,
which include capacity building and are blended to build
integrated action, are described within this context. The
role of persistent Defence Engagement and its contribution to building capacity
and supporting the military contribution to stability are integral to this approach and
are explained.
Tactical functions
3-02. Tactical functions are the primary levers of influence, representing the full breadth of
the force’s activities that are integrated when orchestrating and executing operations.
Capacity building is a tactical function principally directed towards actors. Integrated
action blends lethal and non-lethal actions (the use and orchestration of capabilities and
activities) to have effects (the immediate, first order consequence of actions as they are
perceived and experienced by the target actors) on the understanding, physical capability,
will and cohesion of the audience.28 Organised into attainable objectives, these effects
are ultimately realised in people’s minds, influencing their decision making, to achieve
the desired outcomes (the second order consequences of our actions, defined in terms
of human behaviour). From a capacity building perspective, integrated action is shown at
Figure 3-1.
28 Understanding is defined as ‘the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context,
insight and foresight required for effective decision-making’ JDP 04 Understanding and Decision-making, second edition).
In a capacity building context this is developing mutual understanding of each other (relationships), the task (attainment of
objectives) and the environment. Physical capability - in a capacity building example, this is improving the effectiveness of
a partner nation’s forces through developing its physical capability. Will and cohesion - in a capacity building example, this
can be achieved through consistent training deliveries.
Contents
Unit X
empowered
Unit X
morale
improved Unit X
operations in
Area Y
disrupting
Unit X enemy
Partner-nation Partner-nation
successfully
training module training
operating in
conducted completed
Area Y
Enemy in
Area Y
Audiences will and cohesion
Non-lethal Objectives in Area Y undermined
actions complete witness
enemy disruption
Enemy in
Area Y isolated and
discredited (in
the eyes of
Desired
audiences)
outcomes
Effects
achieved
3-03. Capacity building will have desired outcomes directed towards those partner or host-
nation elements. In this example it also has indirect outcomes focused towards an enemy
who are subsequently affected by the partner or host-nation trainees. The effects can
impact on enemies (disrupted, will and cohesion undermined), actors (partner or
host-nation trainees’ morale increased, empowered), and audiences (civilian population in
the area witness partner or host-nation success, enemy forces isolated and discredited).
There may of course, also be a series of potential unintended effects which must be
planned for.
Types of operation
Warfighting Alds analysis and articulation of complex missions and
provides essential gearing required to sequence
a series of tactical activities
Security Stability operation (NATO - crisis response)
Within the operations themes, certain types of operation exist. They are not mutually
exclusive and are often concurrent with other types of operation within the mosaic of
conflict. As doctrinal definitions, they do they necessarily correspond to UK Defence
planning tools or assumptions, but aim to aid analysis of complex missions and provide
the gearing required to sequence tactical activities to achieve operational objectives.
Unlike NATO doctrine, ADP Land Operations includes capacity building as a discrete type
of operation.
Within all types of operation, land forces conduct all or some of a range of tactical
activities, often concurrently. The balance between the different activities varies from one
operation to another over time. The three stability activities related to capacity building
are described in Part B.
Capacity building is seen as one of the eight tactical functions, alongside command,
intelligence, manoeuvre, fires, information activities, protection and sustainment. Tactical
functions are a device that helps commanders to organise activities into intelligible
groups; they have no effects themselves, whereas the activities do. Few, if any, stand
alone. For example, capacity building needs to be commanded and sustained and is likely
to have information activities and protection dimensions. Like all other physical activity,
capacity building enhances and is enhanced by information activities.
Contents
3-04. Army International Activity (AIA). AIA supports the achievement of Defence effects
and objectives. It sees the Army persistently and actively engaged overseas, and is
international by design. Through AIA the Army enhances its ability to understand,
shape and respond to emerging opportunities, threats and trends. Regional alignment
to specified countries and regions drives much of this interaction. This allows the Army
to develop understanding, establish relationships, increase access and gain influence to
better coordinate Army activity and deliver Defence Engagement effect. AIA is focused
on interoperability, security cooperation and capacity building. None of these exclusively
supports or replaces any one Defence Engagement activity although there are varying
degrees of overlap between elements. They are the Army’s ways to achieve the ends of
the International Defence Engagement Strategy.29
3-05. Interoperability. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively and
efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.30
3-06. Security cooperation.31 This promotes close bilateral Army-to-Army relationships with
specified partner nations: fostering exchanges; developing insight and understanding; and
growing capability.
The Future Land Operating Concept strongly articulates the value and future need
for military capacity building. UK engagement with partner forces should reflect the
increasing importance of improving host-nations’ military capabilities so that they
can provide effective security on their own terms, either domestically or as part of an
international intervention elsewhere.
Indigenous capacity building and upstream security assistance is likely to play a key role
in generating the necessary indigenous capability, mass, insight and understanding that
the UK will need in these environments in the future. The concept demands ‘strategic
sensitivity’; requires complex relationships to be fostered and developed; and continuous
service and engagement abroad.
Local security forces, correctly trained and equipped, serve as a powerful force-multiplier
in preserving regional stability. They can also change the geometry of a campaign and
ultimately provide the means to return power to the local people.
3-07. Capacity building. From an AIA perspective, capacity building concerns efforts to
optimise indigenous security forces, build institutional capacity and provide support to
institutional reform and/or gain greater local, national or regional influence. It leads to
better regional understanding and is often conducted with countries on the fringe of
areas of potential conflict. Closer cooperation leads to better ‘day one’ understanding
should conflict arise, and provides land forces with better situational awareness, a
network in place, and linguistic and cultural expertise.32 From an AIA perspective capacity
building does not include restoration of essential services, support to interim governance
tasks or security force assistance (SFA) as these elements of capacity building are pertinent
in the wake of crisis/conflict.
Integrated action. Integrated action is the land tactical adaptation of joint action
and involves the application of the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to
change and maintain the understanding and behaviour of audiences to achieve a
successful outcome. These capabilities may belong to the land force, or to joint, inter-
governmental, inter-agency, non-governmental, private sector or multinational actors. It is
the manifestation of joint action in the land environment and requires sophisticated and
continual understanding , has audiences as its major consideration, integrates lethal and
non-lethal capabilities to create effects and is outcome-focused. Capacity building is one
of the non-lethal methodologies utilised to achieve an outcome. The process of capacity
building can aid in the development and deepening of situational awareness, context,
insight and foresight.
Contents
Upstream Downstream
Weight of effort
Combat operations
Understand
3-10. Figure 3-1 illustrates this for a hypothetical situation; it is not intended to be viewed
as linear or present a misleading clarity between crisis and non-crisis. We must accept
that it is possible that our intervention may destabilise a state if conflict sensitivity
is not applied.34 At all times, the overall military response should involve Defence
Engagement activities, not least because those activities make a major contribution to our
understanding of the operating environment or theatre in question.35
34 Conflict sensitivity means acting with the understanding that any initiative conducted in a conflict-affected environment
will interact with that conflict and that such interaction will have consequences that may have positive and negative
results. See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Chapter 2 for more detail.
35 JDN 1/15 Defence Engagement, paragraph 1.7.
Contents
Joint and integrated action focuses on actors and adversaries/enemies. Capacity building initially affects the actor but
with a view to impacting adversaries and enemies. Kurdish Peshmerga forces receiving basic C-IED training in Iraq.
Defence Engagement
3-11. International Defence Engagement is ‘the means by which we use our defence assets
and activities short of combat operations to achieve influence’.36 Defence Engagement
is one of the major outputs of Defence, requiring coordination across the Services, Joint
Forces Command (JFC) and cross-government. Defence Engagement aims to achieve
three national security objectives: protect our people; promote prosperity; and protect
our global influence. This can be achieved through international Defence Engagement
objectives: develop understanding; prevent conflict; capability and capacity building;37
promote prosperity; and access and influence.
3-12. While capacity building is an element of one of the Defence Engagement objectives, it
can also contribute to achieving the other four. The Army Defence Engagement Policy
Directive provides high-level policy and direction on three areas: capacity building is one
area, but this also has applicability to the other two areas – interoperability and security
cooperation. Capacity building may lead to greater levels of interoperability and security
cooperation between the UK and the partner nation in which capacity building is taking
place. While a large element of Defence Engagement is conducted at the operational
and strategic levels, tactical-level activity has the capacity to deliver strategic objectives or
effects/impact for the UK; land forces therefore have a key role to play.
Contents
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 4
Building
PART 5
Chapter 4
Capacity building approach
and principles
The fundamental military capacity building lesson is that we must embed and
partner UK forces with indigenous troops if we are attempting to develop their
capability whilst in contact with the enemy. Embedding also gives us greater
leverage to shape their conduct of operations and provides greater situational
awareness. Op TELIC Mission Exploitation
Operations in Iraq January 2005 – May 2009 (Op TELIC 5 – 13) An Analysis from the Land Perspective
Introduction
4-01. Chapter 4 serves to provide a baseline of understanding Capacity building
approach and principles
in the delivery of capacity building operations; specific
guidance on executing the breadth of capacity building • Capability building
tasks may be found in Chapter 7. This chapter looks approach
at the approach to capacity building that should be • Capability building
taken, and provides a framework and principles to guide principles
capacity building activity. The annex to this chapter
defines the terms used in capacity building by the UK
and her allies.
4-03. The Joint Counter Terrorist Training and Advisory Team (JCTTAT) provide a niche
counterterrorism capacity building function. Liaison training teams (LTT) develop the
liaison and training design which facilitates the deployment of mission support teams
(MST); these bespoke training cadres may be drawn from across Defence or from a
relevant public or private sector and are, thereby, well placed to provide the specific effect
required within integrated action. However, irrespective of how the military capacity
building contribution is force generated or structured, the key throughout is to ensure
an efficient and intelligent application of UK capabilities, aligned to cross-government
direction, with robust prioritisation and coordination.
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4-04. The UK aims to conduct its capacity building efforts using the following approaches:
b. Deliver specialist activity. While generalist military skills and competence are often
required in order to establish credibility with partner and host nations and to make
training work, many other countries, be they the partner or host nation or countries
competing with the UK for influence, can deliver that generalist training. Specialist
training, by contrast, is often what is required to improve capability and capacity in the
partner or host nation.
c. Bespoke to the context. Short-term training teams (STTT) with specialist manpower
can be deployed for limited duration capacity building tasks to meet a specific
requirement. Larger-scale force packages can be generated in order to provide the
partner nation with a broader capability, such as the development of the Afghan
National Army in Afghanistan during Operation HERRICK.
d. ‘By, with and through’. The UK seeks to work jointly with partner or host nations
towards the same end – that of building host or partner-nation capacity to stabilise
their own polity.39 The UK approach is not to take on another partner or host nation’s
core responsibility of securing its people and state on its behalf. Rather, the aim is to
help the partner build greater security and stability themselves. In certain instances,
assistance in the form of the provision of funding or information may be undertaken
by the UK or CJIIM actors other than land forces in order to build host or partner-
nation capacity. This is most clearly illustrated by coalition operations in Iraq since
2014 (Op INHERENT RESOLVE/Op SHADER) where tactical, dismounted close combat
operations have been conducted by the host nation’s force; with coalition niche
capabilities, including intelligence, air and fire support, and political, operational and
tactical advisers; thereby, effecting the defeat of ISIS (the UK objective) and wider
influence through the partner. This is an approach TE Lawrence would recognise and
his famous quote remains a mantra for capacity building:
Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably
well than you do it perfectly. It is their way and you are there to help them, not win
it for them.
TE Lawrence
g. Neutralise adversaries.
h. Gain and maintain popular support.
4-06. The principles for capacity building operations are nested within the fourth principle
of stability operations, ‘foster partner-nation governance and capacity’ and provide
guidelines for conducting capacity building tasks across the breadth of upstream, in crisis
and downstream interventions. They are focused on the audience (partner-nation trainees,
UK training teams and UK planners and decision makers), while also considering coalition
partners who may be conducting activity in the same area, either independently or as an
element of the overall effort. They also span from the tactical through to the strategic
level, and remain applicable throughout. The principles are as follows:
Ad
dit
ion
al c
Unity of
apa
effort Culture &
city
people first
Understand Primacy of
All actions Honest MOE
political
buil
the context audible & impact
purpose Foster partner-
ding
nation governance
& capacity
Recognise Cooperation
principle
not
Operate in partner
priorities
Apply
dependency
accordance bespoke
local
with the law solutions
s
Gain and maintain
Prepare for
popular support
the long term
Provide
security for the Anticipate,
population learn and
Neutralise adapt
adversaries
Figure 4-1. Capacity building principles and their relationship with the principles of stabilisation
4-07. Recognise partner-nation priorities and needs. The ability to understand the environment
in which the partner or host-nation security forces live and operate, and the make-up of the
trainees can determine the overall outcome of the capacity building programme.40
Where there has been previous engagement in a region, previous reporting should be studied
to ensure relevance, coherence and progression. Understanding should be developed through
the build-up phase in the UK (prior to and during pre-deployment training), during any
familiarisation package in country (including the reception, staging, onward movement and
integration (RSOI) phase), and should be refined throughout training delivery with a focus on
building social, cultural, political and historical empathy.
4-08. Capacity building activities must be prioritised to ensure any changes to the plan -
whether driven by the UK, coalition or partner nation - may be reacted to and that
focus may be targeted on activities that will have the greatest impact with the resources
and time available; the identification of a main effort is key. Contingency plans should
be developed at the earliest opportunity, and be continuously refined. Nuanced
understanding of the environment will aid anticipation. All personnel deployed on
capacity building therefore need to be pragmatic, diplomatic and retain a flexible mindset
to provide creative solutions to the breadth of challenges that may be presented.
40 Understand is defined as ‘the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context’. Joint
Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04 Understanding.
Contents
4-09. Apply bespoke, local solutions with realistic goals. All capacity building undertaken
by land forces should be coherent with other UK actors, previous capacity building efforts
and outputs. Contractors may also be employed as part of a whole force approach.41
If working as part of a coalition, or as an element of an international organisation,
detailed direction is required to coordinate all contributing nations and agencies. Issues
which may affect the ‘UK brand’; impact on the training or capacity building standards; or
fall outside UK policy guidance should be highlighted at the earliest possible opportunity.
4-10. While the UK agenda will define the objectives, effects and impact to be delivered during
a capacity building task, local factors may inhibit the achievement of all the aims of the
capacity building programme. The partner nation will have their own aims and their
requirements may not always complement the UK view. UK capacity building efforts
should aspire to offer guidance and principles to the partner nation, not prescriptive
explanation on how to do a given activity; however, the most effective capacity building
encourages partner-nation input to enable local solutions to be developed. Imposed,
UK centric solutions are unlikely to be adopted by the partner nation. Short-term gains
which may adversely affect longer-term development must be avoided. However, there
may be occasions where early in-country activity is appropriately focused on short-term
confidence building rather than effects,impact or objectives in order to achieve early
momentum.
4-11. Environmental, religious, or cultural factors, the experience of indigenous forces, the lack
of equipment or other local resource shortfalls (lack of food, trainees not being paid,
and non-arrivals as examples) may compromise programme delivery. The end-state of the
partner-nation unit is unlikely to be a full capability. If a programme is constrained focus
should be placed on “brilliance in the basics”.42
41 The whole force approach concerns the appropriate mix of individuals within each group of Defence actors that contribute
to operations. It places human capability at the heart of decision-making, ensuring that outputs are delivered by the right
mix of capable and motivated people. ADP Land Operations. Use of contractors is covered in Chapter 6.
42 Hoffmann, quoted in Counterinsurgency Doctrine, Operations and Challenges (2010), Rid & Keaney, page 95.
Contents
Force generation construct. Commander Field Army (CFA), through GOC 1 (UK)
Division continues to develop capacity building activity, to build up regional understanding
and establish relationships and influence, while supporting the government’s prosperity
agenda. CFA will ensure that the understanding generated by the regionally aligned
brigades and specialised infantry battalions is shared across land forces, both during
routine peacetime engagement and in the event of contingent operations. 1 (UK) Division
will be made available to inform operational design as appropriate and to assist in the
operational gearing during any transfer of responsibility from a regionally aligned brigade
to a deploying force. Less demanding operations, or operations in areas where the host
nation has sufficiently capable military units, but requires niche capability support, may
see the deployment of UK forces under a ‘by, with, through’ operational design.
4-12. Culture and people before skills and equipment. Contextualising the human
characteristics44 of the partner nation can be helped through studying the three distinct
themes below. This list is not exhaustive and provides a start point from which to study
the human terrain of the partner-nation trainees.
(2) Religion.
(3) Culture.
(4) Language.
(5) Customs.
(1) Behaviour.
(2) Motivation.
(3) Attitude.
(4) Perception.
(5) Intellect.
(6) Values.
c. The physical characteristics of individual humans (trainees)
(1) Health.
(2) Fitness.
UK training team with Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq. Working closely with partner-nation forces allows for honest,
objective assessments.
4-16. ’Gifting’ of equipment is a vital element of capacity building but must be planned and
be in line with the current status of partner-nation training, capacity and capability. It
must be a coherent element of the training plan (with long-term sustainment and an
accounting system in place), should conform to MOD gifting rules, and must also be
cleared in advance by the operational and strategic headquarters, after FCO advice and
direction. If equipment is ‘gifted’ as part of a UK or coalition timetable (for example at
the end of a financial year to utilise a funding line), the partner nation may not be in
a position to receive it or use it, and it is likely to have an adverse effect on the overall
training plan. Interoperability may also be desired in some cases.
4-17. Ensure all actions are auditable. In order to achieve long-term impact, a project must
maintain a level of continuity and consistency through successive regional engagements.
Maintaining an audit trail of actions taken and progress achieved supports handover,
longer-term project management and continuity. Ensuring an auditable record is
maintained provides protection if the partner-nation unit carries out activities that sit
outside the UK’s ethical standards or values. In achieving desired objectives or effects/
impact, programmes should also provide value for money. For example, value for
money and MOE is central to the justification of CSSF expenditure to FCO local strategy
boards. Expressing effect in value for money terms also supports national and regional
prioritisation, allowing funding to be diverted to other priority regions or areas.
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ANNEX A TO CHAPTER 4
Capacity building
4A-01. The full spectrum approach to increasing a partner nation’s ability to achieve
self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital,
development and reconstruction (ABCA Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB)
Handbook and UK interpretation).
Defence Engagement
4A-03. The means by which we use our Defence assets and activities, short of combat
operations, to achieve influence (Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/15 Defence Engagement).
Demobilisation
4A-04. The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defence-
based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national
security and economic vitality.
Disarmament
4A-05. The collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition,
explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the
local population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms
management programmes.
Reinsertion
4A-08. The immediate assistance (usually cash) provided to demobilised combatants to allow
them to return home and support themselves and any dependents until such time as
their reintegration programmes commence.
Reintegration
4A-09. The process through which demobilised combatants receive amnesty, re-enter civil
society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local
population.
Stabilisation
4A-13. NATO - Stabilisation is an approach used to mitigate crisis and promote legitimate
political authority, using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence,
re-establish security, end social, economic and political turmoil ... and set the conditions
for long-term stability (AJP-3.4.5 Allied Doctrine Doctrine for Military Support to
Stabilization and Reconstruction).
Stability policing
4A-15. A set of police-related activities which contributes to the restoration and/or upholding
of the public order and security, rule of law, the protection of human rights (AJP-3.22
Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing).
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PART B
Delivery
AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 5
Building
PART 5
Contents
Chapter 5
Planning and preparation
Cultural awareness
5-02. Time spent during the pre-deployment phase gaining an understanding of the
background and culture of a country and region will ensure that those deploying are
better prepared to both deal with the potential threats that they will face, but also to
better understand the training audience. UK land forces need to be outward-facing rather
than introspective and develop an inquisitive mindset. Background and facts on the
country and its population, including its history will provide a context and perspective,
thereby ensuring that rapport and empathy can be quickly built. Those individual
relationships with partner-nation personnel may again, determine how well the capacity
building is received or the project progresses; the use of discussions, diplomacy, gentle
persuasion, rather than issuing of orders will allow for local solutions to be incorporated
into the final product. An element of collaborative planning with the partner nation will
help to shape the capacity building programme into one that suits the environment and
the training audience.
Contents
5-03. Developing a tolerance for a culture that is different from the UK should also be
considered. For example, behaviour that appears bad through a Western prism may
be perfectly acceptable in the partner nation; ‘the difficulty lies in understanding the
threshold of unacceptable behaviour – often this can only be established through
experience, trial and error’.45 All activity however, should be based on core values
(human-rights compliant, gender awareness and protection against sexual violence, rule
of law, legitimate, accountable, and in accordance with international humanitarian law).
Capacity building activities can either be overt or discreet, based on the situation and the
requirements of the partner nation, or national/multinational constraints.
Phase 1
Scoping phase
Scoping, visits to identify Aim: To identify capability
capability gaps and gaps and opportunities Phase 2
opportunities for for capacity building Development
capacity building with phase
Phase 5 the partner nation
Development Confirmation of the Aim: To identify training
phase partner nation’s training needs, design course(s)
needs (TNA completed) and produce an
Identifying what has been and generation of an
Aim: To recover personnel, engagement plan
delivered in terms of
training,objectives and
capture lessons, produce Develop engagement plan (design
and development of the
post-operational report training module(s))
strategic effect
(measure of effectiveness (POR) and subsequently understanding
(MOE) and make
recommendations or
evaluate
throughout
further deliveries
(exploitation) all phases
Phase 4 Phase 3
Training Mission
delivery phase preparation phase
Execution of the engagement Aim: To deliver Selection and preparation of Aim: To prepare to
plan, refinement of the manpower and establishing operate effectively and
delivery, ongoing validation appropriate world-class
training equipment requirements so that safely in the deployed
and reporting. The aim environment
should be to deliver initial those deploying can operate
training (T1) through to effectively and safely, and have
train-the-trainer (T3) progression the necessary skill-sets required to
deliver the task, and achieve mission
success. Includes pre-deployment
training (PDT)
45 Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study, page 2-4_9.
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5-04. Receipt of an appropriate directive will initiate the operations process to conduct capacity
building. 46 The five phases of deployment below show a relatively mechanistic linear
approach, although in reality the process will be iterative, overlapping and performed as a
continuous loop. It provides a generic framework against which to plan and prepare for a
capacity building task.
a. Scoping phase (plan). This combines UK-based preparation with an initial country
(scoping) visit, or visits by forward elements of the UK forces deploying and, where
necessary, appropriate subject matter experts or functional specialists to identify
capability gaps and opportunities for capacity building with the partner nation; a
statement of requirement (SOR) should be produced if not already received within
the tasking. An estimate and intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) should
be developed to build understanding and threat assessments and force protection
mitigation measures also cultivated. Activity is synchronised with that of other UK and
coalition partners to ensure coherence, and to reduce the threat of capacity building
fratricide. Likely funding streams are identified.
d. Mission delivery phase (execute). This is the execution of the engagement plan,
refinement of the delivery, ongoing validation and reporting. It should be conducted
in whichever profile is most suitable for the location, threat and desired outcome
of the task. Redundancy should also be built in to this phase. Capacity building is
not a ‘quick-fix’ and this delivery is most likely to be part of a broader multi-year
programme. The aim should ultimately be to deliver initial training (T1) through to
train-the-trainer (T3) progression.
e. Evaluation phase (assess). This phase identifies what has been delivered in terms
of training, objectives and strategic effects/impact, evaluates it in the context of
the partner-nation engagement programme or regional need (measurement of
effectiveness (MOE)) and makes recommendations for further deliveries (exploitation).
Other activities include delivering comprehensive backbriefings to key stakeholders and
46 The phases of deployment conform to the Defence systems approach to training (DSAT).
47 Including mission-specific training (MST).
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Understand
Objectives Re-evaluate
Evaluate
set
Establish
baseline Expose Identification of ‘Funnel of
capability existing individuals based capability’
TTPs/Doctrine on performance
(Future Commanders)
Figure 5-2. Example of the development of a training programme with two training modules
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48 Joint Service Publication (JSP) 822, Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education, Part 2, Guidance, page
166.
49 An example of a coalition capacity building headquarters is the Train, Advise and Assist Commands (TAAC) adopted
under Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT in Afghanistan. Based on the previous regional commands from ISAF, TAACs were
established in Kabul, Kandahar, Jalabad, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat.
50 See Annex A to Chapter 4 for definitions.
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Funding
5-10. Capacity building can be funded from a number of areas both within the MOD (such
as the Defence Assistance Fund (DAF)51 and from external sources; through the tri-
departmental Conflict, Stability & Security Fund (CSSF) (MOD/FCO/DFID) in support of
the BSOS52 and the Counterterrorism Programme Fund (CPF), linked to CONTEST. Army
funding can be utilised for training, exchange and liaison posts.
d. Driver training.
51 DAF (North) covers NATO and Europe Policy (NEP) countries; DAF (South) covers International Policy and Planning
(IPP) countries; DAF (FAB) covers all tier 1 courses; DAF (CT) covers specific counterterrorism-related activities; Defence
Engagement Provision (DEP) covers the promotion of the ‘operationalisation’ of the International Defence Engagement
Strategy (IDES) through specific DE-focused projects and programmes.
52 This was previously split into regional conflict pool funding lines.
53 The SERE package may include evasion plan of action (EPA) training.
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Annex A to Chapter 5
Advise (Action). Counsel and inform of the implications of adopting a certain pattern of behaviour, beliefs or
attitudes (SOHB)
Assist (Action). Help someone, typically by doing a share of the work (OED)
Assess (Action). Pose a judgement after comparing measured performances against a standard (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Augment (Action). Provide a self-contained element to the partner-nation forces to contribute a specific effect (time-
based) (ABCA SFCB Handbook). Make something great by adding to it (OED)
Compel (Effect). Force, through kinetic or non-kinetic action, a group or individual to undertake a desired course of
action (COA) (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Confirm (Action). Provide current information of previous reporting within a specified degree of certainty and/or
accuracy (SOHB)
Coordinate (Action). Bring functions, systems or entities operating in the same environment in proper relation in
order to avoid counterproductive results such as duplication of effort or mutually negating actions (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Demonstrate (Action). Deceive the enemy by making a show of force without seeking contact (SOHB, STANAG
2287))
Deploy (Action). Move forces within areas of operation; position forces into a formation for battle, relocate forces to
desired areas of operation (SOHB)
Detect (Action). Discover the presence or absence of a unit, object, activity, situation, event or person(s) of
significance (SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Disembark (Action). Unload personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment from ships,
aircraft, rail or road transport (SOHB)
Dislocate (Effect). Deny an individual or group(s) the ability to bring strength(s) to bear, or to persuade that strength
is irrelevant (SOHB)
Divert (Effect). Draw attention from the point of the principal activity, in so doing masking the intended operation or
draw forces down a route or direction of own choosing (SOHB)
Educate (Action). An activity to teach the benefits or consequences of patterns of behaviour (SOHB). Develop an
individual or organisation’s intellectual capacity, knowledge and understanding (AJP-3.16)
Embark (Action). Load personnel and/or vehicles and their associated stores and equipment onto ships, aircraft, rail
or road transport (SOHB)
54 Effects are the change brought about in a target by the consequences of action or activity, but may also be achieved by
other effects. Effects are therefore the commander’s desired outcome in relation to the friendly forces. Actions describe
a physical or observable activity carried out in order to achieve the commander’s desired effect(s). Multiple tasks can be
given to subordinates and tasks may be specified or implied. The Staff Officers’ Handbook (SOHB) 2014, page. 4.1.2_1.
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Emphasise (Action). Add further credibility or information which will enhance effects of existing operations and
further develop key messages and themes (SOHB)
Empower (Effect). Promote confidence, authority, accountability and responsibility in an individual or group(s)
(SOHB)
Enable (Action). Provide means, conditions or authority to make possible (SOHB) Provide services that underpin and
facilitate other Security Force Assistance (SFA) work (AJP-3.16)
Exploit (Effect). To take advantage of another individual or target group(s)’ weaknesses or vulnerabilities (SOHB)
Expose (Action). Make visible, reveal something undesirable or injurious (SOHB, AJP-3.10)
Generate (Action). Assisting someone to develop the systems, structures and manpower that will be required to
build a sustainable local force capability (AJP-3.16)
Identify (Action). Determine, the status (including friendly or hostile nature) of the detected unit, object, activity,
situation, event or person(s) (SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Liaise (Action). Maintain contact or intercommunication between elements of military forces to ensure mutual
understanding and unity or purpose of action (SOHB)
Maintain. Take supply and repair action to keep a force in condition to carry out a mission (SOHB)
Mentor (Action). Develop capacity through example and/or advice through planning and preparation, execution and
lessons captured/after action review (AAR) phases (SOHB, JDN 6/11)
Monitor (Action). Develop or maintain situational awareness, pattern of life or atmospherics of a geographical area,
activity or situation (SOHB)
Organise (Action). Give orderly structure to (SOHB, JDP 0-01). Assisting someone to shape its local forces
(AJP-3.16)
Partner (Action). An approach to relationship building (usually with an indigenous force) through direct assistance
and shared endeavour that creates the right conditions, spirit and capabilities to achieve a formal and enduring
strategic partnership (SOHB, JDN 6/11)
Promote (Action). Advocate or advance awareness of an individual, organisation and/or courses of action (SOHB)
Protect (Effect). Prevent the enemy, environment or disease from having effect on an individual or group(s)
(SOHB, DN 11/17)
Recognise (Action). Classify the capability of the unit, person(s), object, event, situation or activity, of potential
military significance (SOHB)
Reconstitute (Action). Expand force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, including the raising of new
units and formations and the expansion of industrial capacity to support the procurement of equipment and stocks
(SOHB)
Recuperate (Action). Replace resources (following the use of military force) in preparation for future operations
(SOHB)
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Regenerate (Action). Activate, in full or part, existing force structures and infrastructure, including the restoration of
manning, equipment and stocks to designated levels (SOHB)
Reinforce (Action). Strengthen in-place forces with additional personnel or equipment (SOHB)
Relief-in-Place (Action). An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in
an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of
operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered
(SOHB, APP-06(c))
Reorganise (Action). Internally distribute personnel and equipment in a formation or unit to render it battleworthy
again, albeit maybe at a reduced size (SOHB)
Replenish (Action). Refill or restock a unit to a predetermined level, pressure or quantity (SOHB)
Resupply (Action). Provide with or obtain a fresh supply to maintain required levels (SOHB)
Stabilise (Effect). Impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services
and support civilian agencies (SOHB)
Support (Effect). Aid, complement or sustain another force, individual, or group(s) (SOHB)
Sustain (Action). Maintain the necessary levels of combat power for the duration required to achieve objectives
(SOHB, JDP 0-01)
Take-over (Action). Accept responsibility from another force for the conduct of operations (SOHB)
Track (Action). Maintain identification and location of a unit, activity, situation or person(s) (SOHB)
Train (Action). Teach an individual or organisation knowledge, a skill or type of behaviour through instruction and
practice (AJP-3.16)
Transport (Action). Move equipment, personnel or materiel from one location to another (SOHB)
Understand (Effect). Develop knowledge, insight, context and intent of a unit, object, activity, situation, event or
individual or group(s) (normally to inform subsequent operations or decisions) (SOHB)
Warn (Action). Pre-planned provision of information to provide warning of a specified situation, event or activity
(SOHB)
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Annex B to Chapter 5
5B-01. The moral dilemma. There may be occasions when the partner nation places an
issue into the lap of their UK partners. This is likely to be principally a moral issue; one
involving human rights/international humanitarian law (IHL), proportionality, sexual
and gender-based violence, women, peace and security, gender mainstreaming, child
soldiers, corruption or overall behaviour. UK partners should not just accept that
this is normal for that particular theatre and will need to strike a balance between
doing nothing (‘complicity’) and walking away (‘abdication’). Guidance, education
and teaching should be attempted in order to shift the partner nation towards legal
compliance and accountability, while reporting of inappropriate activity must be made
to the UK chain of command at the earliest opportunity.
5B-02. Human rights training and education. Human rights are rights inherent to all human
beings, whatever their nationality, place of residence or ethnic origin, colour, religion,
language, or any other status. All people are entitled to their human rights without
discrimination, and they are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.55 Violations
and abuses of human rights deny individuals their fundamental moral entitlements,
and include genocide, torture, slavery, rape, enforced sterilisation or medical
experimentation, and deliberate starvation. Conflict typically leads to an increase in
human rights violations, and violations may lead to further violence. The protection of
human rights is therefore central to conflict resolution. UK forces conducting capacity
building tasks must have human rights training and education as a central tenet of all
that they do – training should be prioritised or weighted to reflect the importance of
this area. They must also develop an understanding behind the underlying reasons why
human rights abuses and violations are occurring in an area, country or region in order
to cogently reason with partner-nation elements, to better comprehend societal norms,
and to provide practical alternatives to this behaviour.
5B-03. Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) training and education. The term
‘gender-based violence’ refers to violence that targets individuals or groups on the
basis of their gender. Sexual violence includes sexual exploitation and sexual abuse. It
refers to any act, attempt, or threat of a sexual nature that result, or is likely to result
in, physical, psychological and emotional harm. Sexual violence is prevalent in conflict
and may be used as a method of warfare. It is likely therefore that some element of
training and education in this area will form part of any capacity building training plan
if partner-nation forces are deemed susceptible or vulnerable to carrying out SGBV
violations.56
5B-04. Women, peace and security and gender mainstreaming. This UN campaign aims to
address the culture of impunity that exists for sexual violence crimes in conflict, while
raising awareness, promoting international cooperation, and increasing the political will
and capacity of states to do more. The UK has a national action plan which looks to
build national capacity of partner nations as an integral element of tackling conflict and
instability. Capacity building tasks should therefore determine UK outputs in this field
and design training in line with the national action plan.57
5B-05. Child soldiers. A child is a person below the age of 18, unless the law of a particular
country set the legal age for adulthood younger.58 Note that UK doctrine59 in a
captured persons (CPERS) context, classes people aged 15, 16 or 17 as juveniles. This
distinction is explained further in AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Chapter 10,
Annex B as is the broader issue of child soldiers. Child soldiers are children who have
been conscripted into armed forces or groups who have been used to participate
actively in hostilities.60 UK forces training partner-nation elements must make every
effort to identify any potential children among training audiences and ensure that
they are initially safeguarded and then removed from any training being conducted by
the UK. The UN produces an annual report on children and armed conflicts, and this
provides up-to-date context.61
57 See AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Annex A to Chapter 10 for more detail.
58 UN Convention on the Rights of a Child.
59 Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 1-10 Captured Persons (CPERS) Edition 3.
60 Law of Armed Conflict.
61 Details on children and armed conflict can be found in AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Annex B to Chapter 10. Child
Soldiers: A Handbook for Security Sector Actors, published by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research
(UNITAR), also provides guidance.
62 Details on corruption can also be found in Doctrine Note 16/02 Human Security: The Military Contribution, Chapter 6 and
AFM Tactics for Stability Operations, Part 1, Counter-Irregular Activity.
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AFM TFSO
Capacity Chapter 6
Building
PART 5
Contents
Chapter 6
Execute - general information
6-03. Force protection measures can be complicated if working within a coalition; some
nations may be over-prescriptive or risk averse, while others will have no system in place
for recognising or dealing with threats. The UK commander will have to determine a
common ground, while having the ability to report any force protection concerns up the
chain of command. The ability to individually track all personnel and their movement
in country is also vital. These threats include adversarial, insider, environmental and
project; commanders need to conduct dynamic risk assessments and be able to formulate
effective risk management or mitigation plans. Consequence management plans should
also be concurrently developed.
6-04. Adversarial threat. A number of adversaries may exist in a state/region in which capacity
building is taking place. While terrorists and insurgents are normally viewed as the most
dangerous, the most prevalent threat may come from criminals; the presence of a deployed UK
personnel provides opportunities to nefarious groups. Building a rapport with a local population
in the vicinity of locations inhabited by UK personnel will also provide an external ring of goodwill,
and may aid in the identification and mitigation of threats. Locally employed contractors (LEC)
with access to the training camp should also be viewed with a degree of caution. Basic drills will
also reduce the threat (avoid pattern setting, consider posture and profile) and the perpetual
implementation of operations security (OPSEC). Rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills which consider
potential issues and scenarios will also increase confidence among UK force elements, aid in the
development of ‘actions on’, and further reduce the potential impacts if threats arise.
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6-05. Insider threat. An insider threat is the potential for an attack by, or facilitated by, a
person (or persons) who has a position of trust with capacity building personnel by virtue
of their employment, status, access or facilitation. This may lead to an insider attack (or
‘green on blue’) which occurs when a person, or persons, in a position of trust initiates an
act of violence against the capacity building personnel. Perpetrators of an insider attack
possess motive, intent and capability, and need opportunity in order to attack. Insider
attacks are characterised by surprise, speed and shock. The insider threat can be reduced
by conducting vetting/background checks, biometric enrolment, through the development
of personal relationships, and the development of mutual understanding and respect
between the capacity building elements and the partner-nation forces. Cultural awareness
(adaptability, empathy,63 rapport-building, respectfulness, self-reflection, self-control) is
therefore key in determining what offends, and the development of an environmental
awareness will allow for the identification of ‘atmospheric’ changes which may provide
warning of impending issues. All UK personnel need to be ‘outwardly relaxed, but
inwardly alert’64 at all times.
6-06. Force protection posture. Force protection measures can be implemented (both overt
and discreet) which may include a stand-alone guard force (UK elements should not
be relying solely on a partner-nation guard force for protection), a ‘guardian angel’
65
element and arming of trainers. The routine arming of trainers allows for a more
discreet force protection posture depending on whether the weapon carriage is overt
or covert. While many of the force protection measures will be specified in the orders
that a capacity building programme receives, many of the escalatory and de-escalatory
measures will be driven by the local commander on the ground; a specific insider threat
strategy for the local environment needs to be developed and continually reviewed.66 Any
change in posture based on ‘atmospherics’, ‘social combat indicators’ or threat should be
implemented immediately, with guidance from the chain of command to follow in slower
time.
63 Empathy consists of two stages: the ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling; and then responding to
their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.
64 Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study (November 2014), page 2-3-B-1.
65 Guardian angels are designated armed individuals, pairs, or small groups of personnel whose sole purpose is to protect
the capacity building team who are in close proximity to the partner-nation forces. This protection can be intimate, in
overwatch, overt or discreet. They must be separate from routine activity, and must be focused solely on the principal force
protection task.
66 Lesson from the Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study (November 2014), page 6-2_2.
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6-08. Project threat. Threats within the operating environment may be directed towards the
capacity building project, thereby causing it to falter or fail. This can be through funding,
individuals or units (including rivals), environmental or through changed circumstances.
For example, a human rights violation or other illegal, unethical or immoral actions
conducted by UK-trained partner-nation elements may place the project at risk, or a
change of regime could place future activity in jeopardy. Plans should have inherent
contingency and redundancy anticipating the unpredictable and fragile nature of capacity
building deployments. A recent example of these unanticipated issues surrounding
capacity building saw a UK training team in Mali having to reduce their training plan by
50 per cent due to the inability of the Malian authorities to feed their trainees. The troops
could only be trained in the morning and had to be sent home in the afternoon.
Language requirements
6-10. While it is not essential to be able to speak fluently in the language of the partner nation
and/or any coalition allies, having the rudiments (key and common phrases) will help
to break down the language barrier. Maximum time between being warned off and
deploying should be devoted to language training; some of the other traditional elements
of training may need to be sacrificed to fulfil this requirement. Force elements who have
been assigned to specific countries/regions, should be able to adopt a more formal long-
term plan to develop language ability. Once formal qualifications have been achieved,
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these should be recorded to ensure that individuals with an aptitude are able to fully
utilise their skills. Army education centres should be consulted to provide both resources
and guidance.
Use of interpreters67
6-11. While some partner nations may have English as a principal language, most capacity
building activities will require the use of interpreters; they are key elements to a training
or mentoring plan as they facilitate communication and understanding. Relationships
established with interpreters are vital. This must be considered from the outset as a lack
of effective interpreters may degrade the mission or even lead to mission failure. Civilian
and/or security force interpreters are both effective, although utilising elements of the
training audience who can speak English should be avoided. There may be a diverse range
of regional dialects or language differences between soldiers and officers. Occasionally,
there may therefore be a requirement for further translation from the partner nation’s
official language to a regional one. There can also be issues between interpreters and
67 Tactics, techniques and procedures for working with interpreters is in the Capacity Building Handbook.
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Use of contractors
6-12. For specific niche subjects, or if there is a gap in Defence capability to generate resources,
contractor support may be required. Planning should seek to identify and highlight
opportunities for contractor cooperation or collaboration where utility, productivity and
efficiency can be improved. Contractors should be integrated with UK force elements at
the earliest possible stage and receive suitable pre-deployment training. Force protection
of contractors may be a UK responsibility, and command relationships will also need to be
formally established and adhered to (including arrangements for disciplinary action). There
is also likely to be an element of oversight and verification by the military training team to
ensure that the ‘UK brand’ remains of the highest standard, while additionally determining
the levels and ownership of risk in using contractors. The contractor’s aims need to be
aligned with the overall capacity building design - set the requirements accurately, and be
aware that contractors may look to leverage profit. This can run counter to the efficiency
of the capacity building intervention. The use of contractors should not be viewed as an
appendage to the capacity building plan, and must be fully integrated.
A UK contractor delivering international humanitarian law training as part of the European Union
Training Mission in Mali
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6-13. Criteria for utilising contractors should include: their experience; relevance of
expertise; track record in delivering previous programmes (including other government
departments); ability to work at scale; and value for money.
‘The interpreters were vital. We should not forget they have been in Mali all along and
many know the North [of the country where an insurgency is taking place]. I think, in
some respects, we should see them far more as cultural advisers. Some people might
caution against that use, but I found them important for giving me background and
context. We found they could actually operate very effectively in the capacity of being a
teaching assistant for us.’
‘Delivering mobile training caused constraints in that we had no means to feed and water
the Malian soldiers and had to accommodate with ‘workarounds’ for their travelling and
attendance issues. We could offer no sustenance (as you would in a fixed-base scenario);
this accommodation on our part impacted upon both the time constraint and their
motivation. The Malian moral component was definitely affected by this.’
‘Whenever we could, we used our past experiences to tell them a story of a situation to
initiate the thinking we sought from the Malians, or to emphasise a learning point. Our
vignettes served a purpose in several ways, as they also aided our relationship-building
with them. Honest (candid) sharing is very effective in proving that we are there to work
as partners, rather than impose any hierarchical relationship.’
Communication
6-15. The capacity building force elements will need to have an ability to communicate in
theatre and also back to the UK. If working alongside coalition partners, or as part of
an international organisation, there is the added requirement to establish and maintain
further links. Basic radio links need to be established, as well as more complex systems
(video teleconference (VTC), satellite) and the use of an experienced communications
specialist as a member of the force structure should be considered. This is particularly
pertinent to the theatre-UK link.
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Reporting chain
6-16. The capacity building deployed element will need to determine reporting chains both
within theatre and back to the UK. This includes normal daily routine, operational
(including G2) reporting and G1 requirements. Personnel reporting may require the
production of dual UK/international reports, based on the different requirements.
Sharing of information
6-17. The release of sensitive or classified information to partner-nation forces and institutions
must be authorised beforehand to prevent actionable intelligence being used in a manner
that may embarrass HMG and create operations security (OPSEC) issues. Capacity building
staff and commanders must clarify both political and policy direction concerning release
authority and disclosure early in the planning process. It is recognised however, that the
inability to share information with partner-nation forces may at times run contrary to
immediate operational requirements and logic, and could also jeopardise relationships
between the capacity builders and their partners. As the capacity building relationship
deepens information sharing policies should be reviewed to reflect a greater degree of
trust between the UK and its partners. Overcautious release policies are likely to prevent
the development of deeper trust with certain actors.
6-19. Personnel deployed on capacity building tasks can assist the prospects for Defence exports
in the following ways:
a. Acting as the ‘eyes and ears’ for overseas capability gaps and requirements.
c. Being aware of UK defence and security industry capabilities, products and prospects.
f. Providing training support to equipment sales contracts when requested and endorsed
by the MOD and DIT DSO.
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6-20. Codes of behaviour.68 Capacity building forces should observe the following rules when
supporting UK defence and security exports:
a. Do not compromise the Army’s reputation, their own integrity or the capacity building
activity they are primarily engaged in by being seen to be an overt salesman.
b. Ensure their support has been endorsed by both MOD export policy and DIT DSO – aim
to receive appropriate pre-deployment briefing from them.
c. Receive a briefing by the in-country Defence section before contact with the partner
nation or in-country UK industry representatives. Refer any issues arising from meeting
engagements with the latter two to DIT DSO.
d. Only comment on in-service equipment that they know and have knowledge or
experience of its use.
e. In the absence of lines to take, adopt a non-committal position before referring the
matter to DIT DSO.
6-21. Achieving coherence. Figure 6-1 shows the three steps that should be adhered to, in
order to achieve coherence between capacity building activities and defence exports.
Governance
68 More detail is in special operating instructions (SOIs) for Army Defence Engagement personnel dealing with the defence
and security industry (6 February 2015).
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6-22. Governance and process. Capacity building and export activity must be properly
cohered and coordinated through a recognised governance structure, and with robust
underpinning processes. The following principles apply:69
a. CFA leads on capacity building, D Cap leads on interoperability and ACGS is the Army’s
proponent for Defence Engagement.
b. All land forces’ capacity building activity is subordinate to, and guided by, the regional
and country strategies.
f. DIT DSO must be involved wherever possible in all Land Delivery Plans (LDP)
development work and major capacity building planning.
69 More detail is held in the Army Defence Engagement Policy and MOD Export Policy DIN.
70 There may be a different nomenclature for these documents in the partner nation, or they may not exist.
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AFM TFSO
Pub Title
Capacity Chapter 7?
Building
PART 5
Contents
Chapter -Title?
Execute nature of capacity
building across the mosaic of
conflict
Contents
Contents
Chapter 7
Execute – nature of capacity
building across the mosaic of
conflict
The British decided relatively early (I think in 2005 or 2006) not to embed Military
Transition Teams (MiTT) in the Iraqi Army in Basra, although we were prepared
to do so when Iraqi forces were temporarily detached to Baghdad. The argument
against MiTTs at the time was that we could not guarantee their protection; since
we were so short of troops we could not provide them dedicated support at the
same time as running our own operations. In retrospect this was a poor decision:
resourcing MiTTs should have been the FIRST use of our troops, before our own
operations.
Colonel Richard Iron, Basra 2008: Operation Charge of the Knights, British Generals in Blair’s Wars (2013)
71 Adapted from Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA).
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Weight of effort
Upstream Combat operations Downstream
Engage to Engage to
promote Engage to Engage to
prevent instability Engage to win stabilise promote security
security and and prosperity
prosperity
Understand
Figure 7-1. Counterterrorism and counter-criminality capacity building within a wider capacity building context
7-03. Counterterrorism is all preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce
the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts,
to respond to terrorist acts.72 Land forces involved in capacity building as an element
of counterterrorism will principally be special forces and through the provision of force
elements to the Joint Counter Terrorist Training and Advisory Team (JCTTAT). In the future,
the specialised infantry battalions may be employed in this area. Special forces have an
extensive range of skills which can be taught to the military, police or other civilian law
enforcement agencies in permissive or non-permissive environments, either covertly or
overtly, depending on the situation. JCTTAT designs, establishes, coordinates, evaluates,
supports and monitors counterterrorism capacity building programmes in priority
countries in support of the UK government’s counterterrorism strategy (CONTEST). JCTTAT
is a Joint Forces Command (JFC) asset.
7-04. Counter-criminality is the action focused on preventing organised criminal groups from
escalating their activities to the point where they become a threat to allied forces.73
Wider counter-criminality capacity building will be in support of police or other specialist
agencies, and can be through the provision of niche skills.
7-05. Direction is provided in the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy which uses the
CONTEST framework of the 4Ps: pursue; prevent; protect; and prepare. Examples of land
forces providing support to counter-criminality have been through aviation and border
security, and anti-poaching. Some Defence Engagement activities can also have an impact
in the counter-criminality sphere.
Defence Engagement
7-06. Capacity building conducted as an element of Defence Engagement again sits in the
upstream or pre-conflict area, aimed at preventing conflict, building stability and gaining
influence for the UK. While a deterrence effect can be achieved aimed at enemies/
adversaries, Defence Engagement actively seeks to reassure, persuade and empower
partner nations through relationships and collaboration. Defence Engagement therefore
may also be conducted during a crisis alongside other security capacity building elements
such as security force assistance. Additionally, Defence Engagement can continue into the
downstream or post-conflict areas. This is shown in Figure 7-2.
Weight of effort
Upstream Combat operations Downstream
Engage to Engage to
promote Engage to Engage to
prevent instability Engage to win Stabilise promote security
security and and prosperity
prosperity
Understand
Figure 7-2. Defence Engagement within a wider capacity building context Security Force Assistance (Sfa)
7-07. Security forces assistance includes all UK or coalition activities that develop
and improve, or directly support, the development of local forces74 and their
associated institutions in crisis zones.75 Security force assistance relates to, or its
implementation will impact upon, other UK or coalition concepts, policies and operations
including: security sector reform (SSR); stabilisation and reconstruction(S&R); military
assistance;76 couter-insurgency (COIN); stability policing; support to initial restoration of
74 Local forces are defined by NATO as ‘indigenous, non-NATO, military security forces’. AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for
Security Force Assistance (SFA), page vii.
75 Ibid, page 1-1.
76 Ibid, page viii. Military assistance is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly
assets through organizing, training, advising, mentoring or the conduct of combined operations (NATO agreed definition).
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essential services and interim governance tasks. During conflict, security force assistance
as a component of capacity building will often be a key element of a campaign plan.
7-08. Security force assistance is distinct in the cycle of capacity building in that it is conducted
principally during crisis or conflict. This is shown in Figure 7-3.
Weight of effort
Upstream Combat operations Downstream
Security force
assistance (SFA)
Defence Engagement activities to reassure, persude, empower, deter
Engage to Engage to
promote Engage to Engage to
prevent instability Engage to win stabilise promote security
security and and prosperity
prosperity
Understand
Figure 7-3. Security force assistance within a wider capacity building context
Operation SHADER, Iraq. The blurring between downstream capacity building and conflict
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Advisor force elements are best drawn from a formed unit, augmented as required, and
structured to provide their own force protection. Unity of advisor effort is vital and the
approach proved effective and resilient through Op HERRICK. Soft skills such as rapport,
empathy and cultural awareness are essential for advisor success but hard combat skills
must underpin an advisor’s skill-set as they are often in combat situations. Good combat
skills also present the right image to the indigenous force. Immersion provided the
important conceptual training for preparing for this role.
Indigenous force Tiger Teams, mentored by Special Forces, made a significant contribution
to the enablement of ISAF operations in Southern Afghanistan. A Tiger Team comprised
a section of 6 policemen from the partnered Afghan Territorial Force (ATF) equipped
as a light-role rifle section. This section was mentored and enabled by two SF mentors
who provided the interface between the Tiger Team and the Combined Force unit with
which it was embedded. Living side by side they operated as one cohesive unit. The
genuine Afghan lead provided an Afghan face and voice to a partnered Combined Force;
enhanced understanding, intelligence collection and influence activities; ensured culturally
attuned injects to shuras; enabled access to sensitive sites; and harnessed Afghan
intuition.
7-11. In situations where the UK has formal lead security responsibility for securing the partner
state, security force assistance should focus on achieving conditions which permit the
transition of that formal responsibility back to the partner-nation government. However,
security force assistance is equally likely to take place in contexts where we are supporting
the partner nation but have not assumed responsibility for the security of that state. In
these instances security force assistance should focus on building the effectiveness of the
trained force. There may be occasions when security force assistance is directed towards
governments that are not formally recognised by the international community in order to
stabilise a region or destabilise a regime which it is HMG’s policy to oppose.77
77 For example, training of the Peshmerga in Kurdistan and the Somaliland Police in Somalia.
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Figure 7-4. Bespoke security force assistance guide for a specific operational area (Afghanistan)
78 Taken from AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA). They are termed ‘imperatives’ in the NATO
doctrine, but this Army field manual has amended this to ‘characteristics’ to better reflect that they provide guidance
rather than a dogmatic process that must be rigidly followed. ‘Comprehensive approach’ has been replaced by ‘full
spectrum approach’ to reflect UK policy and doctrine.
79 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan (2013).
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b. Full spectrum approach. Security force assistance must be planned, executed and
assessed through integration between civil and military actors and organisations in
order to achieve common objectives – junior commanders need to analyse, appreciate
and articulate why and how they are contributing to a national full spectrum approach.
This can be achieved through orchestration, coordination and deconfliction, and
must include the replicated partner-nation actors and organisations. Developing a
partner nation’s capability and capacity will usually involve a long-term and complex
process aimed at developing its forces and infrastructure.80 All security force assistance
activities therefore must complement the partner nation’s establishment, psyche and
instruments of national power. A guiding principle for working with partner
nations is that everything we do must be ‘beside, with and through’ the
partner nation.
d. Trust. Developing and maintaining mutual trust between all parties involved in security
force assistance is key.
e. Leadership. Security force assistance requires the personal interaction between all
parties (military and civilian) at all levels. Effective leadership is therefore critical and
the linkage and personal interaction between leaders on all sides and levels will reduce
the complexity of the process.
f. Legitimacy. If security force assistance activities are perceived as legitimate, the actors
and audiences are likely to support them and strengthening the legitimacy of the
partner-nation government is essential to security force assistance efforts. Authority is,
thus, dependent upon the interplay between the perceived legitimacy of the mission
mandate; the manner in which it is implemented; the consent of the local population
and security actors; and their expectations of the mandate.
g. Rule of law. A nation’s security policies and practices must be founded upon the rule
of law and linked to a broader justice sector. Security force assistance activities should
promote the rule of law, including developing the police and a functioning justice
system and contain appropriate human rights and gender focus. If the rule of law is
not upheld by the partner nation’s security forces legitimacy will be undermined.
h. Strategic communication. This is integral to mission planning and execution, and will
aid the development of a shared understanding of security force assistance activities.
The communications strategy should align with the stated intent and agreed policies
and objectives between the partner nation and other agencies, highlighting credible
80 Capability is the ability for a partner nation to do something, while capacity is the amount that a partner nation can
absorb.
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results, and promoting legitimacy aimed at building trust and transparency. A coherent
narrative will help to create a positive perception of the security force assistance
mission within local, regional and international communities, while maintaining the
UK’s freedom of action.
l. Sustainability. A nation’s institutions may take years to develop which may be at odds
with rapid progress or the timescale of transition/disengagement. Security transitions
should be based on an effective political settlement and should be apolitical and
not undermine any future political progress. There should also be a balance across
combat, combat support, logistic support, healthcare,81 administrative and legal
elements. The effects of security force assistance must be sustainable after transition
or disengagement, and should ideally be part of a wider security sector reform (SSR)
process. Long-term success will depend on developing sustainable security frameworks
and organisations, which must deliver effective day-to-day operations, management
and oversight. Commanders planning security force assistance should consider and
review:
(3) The sequencing of withdrawing enablers as the partner nation transitions towards
self-sufficiency.
(4) Continuing to build partner-nation capacity in specialist areas that will require
time and investment.
(5) Ongoing external defence requirements of the partner nation, brokered by either
a treaty or agreement (within a formal legal framework).
81 Healthcare support can include areas such as environmental health, basic health education and promotion, and longer-
term effects to drive down infant and perinatal maternal mortality.
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7-13. While these characteristics provide generic security force assistance advice, it is also
important to produce nuanced guidelines for each specific operational theatre. The
example in Figure 7-5 shows the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) principles
developed for security force assistance activities in Afghanistan in 2013.
One command,
one mission
Mirror the Afghan
chain of commmand
This is Afghanistan
Always adopt an Afghan perspective
One Afghan, one adviser
Allow the individual adviser to own
SFA is based on Afghan needs
and develop the relationship
Mission Focus on ‘why and how’ not ‘what to do’
Mindset Approach
82 A gendarmerie is sometimes referred to as a ‘third force’ - a cross between a community police service and a military force.
83 A gendarmerie is sometimes referred to as a ‘third force’ - a cross between a community police service and a military force.
84 AJP-3.16, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA), page IX.
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Combat
Reinforce
Security
Peace support
Peacetime military
engagement
Figure 7-6. The reinforcement requirement within stability policing. The reinforcement of a partner-nation police
force may take place if it had previously been replaced by an international police force and needs to reassume its
duties, if the partner-nation police force did not have sufficient capabilities or to enable restructuring, training or
capability development.
7-16. Certain skill sets or specialised training, such as conducting public order, close protection,
marksmanship or first aid, may be suited to military force elements. There may also
be situations where police trainers are restricted to bases and can provide theoretical
training, but will not be able to mentor the partner nation in the field. The police training
and mentoring role may therefore be best suited to qualified reserves. Another option
for the UK land forces may be to employ formed units to provide force protection for
deployed police mentors, thereby providing indirect assistance to stability policing.
Replacement Reinforcing
Effective civil
policing
Policing capacity
Limited civil
policing
Enforcement
of
public order
Lawlessness
Figure 7-7. The partner-nation ‘policing gap’. The aim of police capacity building will be to aid in closing of the gap
between current capability (red line) and the capability required (dotted line).
7-17. Structure of police training. General training normally comprises three categories:
a. Basic level. Aimed at developing basic police skills such as ethics, legal, basic weapon
training, physical training, general policing and patrol duties.
c. High level. Aimed at senior officers and headquarters staff officers looking at strategic
implications of management, resources, information gathering, and strategy.
7-19. Militia. There may be occasions when a local force or militia element requires some
form of capacity building. The term militia is widely used to describe local forces or other
non-standard/irregular security forces that are usually associated to an ethnic group, tribe,
region, village, neighbourhood or individual.87 Many of the capacity building principles
87 AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, page 2-8.
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and security force assistance characteristics remain relevant, but there may need to be an
added focus on accountability, chain of command, human rights and a greater emphasis
on oversight.
88 First World signifies the industrialised capitalist countries of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand. See the Global Firepower List for details on the rankings of military forces.
89 For more detail on security cooperation and interoperability see Defence Engagement doctrine.
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Generating – assisting a PN to develop the systems, structures and manpower that will be required to build a
sustainable local force capability. Organising – Assisting a PN to shape its local forces
Training – teaching an individual or organisation knowledge, a skill or type of behaviour through instruction and practice
Educating – developing an individual or organisation’s intellectual capacity, knowledge and understanding
Enabling – providing services that underpin & facilitate other SFA activities
Assisting – providing support or sustainment capabilities that the PNSF requires to meet their objectives
Augmenting – providing a self-contained element to the PN forces to contribute a specific effect (time-based)
7-21. The activities must be coherent, synchronised and tailored to each partner-nation force to
which the activity is directed.90
7-22. NATO security force assistance guidance on activities focuses on the mnemonic, ‘GO
TEAM’ – Generate, Organise, Train, Enable, Advise, Mentor. These activities are included
in the paragraphs below, but this chapter has been developed from a UK-specific
perspective taking into account lessons learned and experience (historic and recent)
and is broader than the NATO guidance; for example, equipping, educating, assisting,
augmenting, accompanying, monitoring, and partnering are included. The NATO
framework does have utility and can be used when operating within a NATO or other
coalition mission but the UK will principally use the operations process (plan, prepare,
execute, and assess).91 Its security force assistance framework is shown in Figure 7-9.92
Enable
Assess
Advise Transition
and
evaluate Mentor
90 Recent UK security force assistance activities have been described as TAA (Train, Advise, Assist), T3A (Train, Advise, Assist,
Accompany), TAAMA (Train, Advise, Assist, Mentor, Accompany); TA3MA (Train, Advise, Assist, Mentor, Accompany); T &
E (Train and Equip), TEA3 (Train, Equip, Advise, Assist, Accompany) and Train to Understand.
91 At the tactical level, this equates to a series of phases – scoping; development; mission preparation; mission delivery; and
evaluation.
92 More detail can be found in AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA). The ABCA Security Force
Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook describes an ‘OTERA’ framework – Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild/Build, and Advise/
Assist, page 3-1. US SFA doctrine reflects a variation with ‘OTERA–A’ – Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild and Build, Advise
and Assist, and Assess. US Army Field Manual 3-22, Army Support to Security Cooperation, page 4-3.
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7-23. Generating. Generating activities assist a partner nation to develop the systems,
structures and manpower that will be required to build a sustainable local force
capability.93 This will require identification, resourcing and then the resolution of any
partner-nation capability gaps; individuals, specialists or complete units. The process may
include recruiting, selecting and potentially vetting of those personnel (including leaders),
and can span the period from initial intervention through to transition. Infrastructure
improvements may also be a key element. It will require consensus from key partner-
nation stakeholders. Interlinked to the generation process is the organisation of the
partner nation.
7-25. Equipping. To equip is to supply a partner nation with necessary items for a
particular purpose. Procurement or ‘gifting’ of equipment must be conducted as part of
a coherent training and sustainment plan and be suitable to the operating environment
and threats faced. Areas of consideration should include the ease with which the
equipment can be operated; its maintainability; and long-term support and sustainment,
including costs. In some cases, interoperability with UK or coalition forces may be
considered, and UK exports as part of the prosperity agenda may also be a factor. When
looking at the threats that the partner nation may face in the future, longer-term plans
should aim to improve the partner nation’s equipment so that it can deal effectively with
enemies/adversaries. This may also entail bringing in specialists to provide the appropriate
level of expertise and support required to field the equipment effectively.
7-26. Training and educating. Training and educating are generally the most visible and
better-understood elements of capacity building. The aim of training is to teach an
individual or organisation knowledge, a skill or type of behaviour through
instruction and practice. Education develops an individual or organisation’s
intellectual capacity, knowledge and understanding. All training and educating
activity needs to be planned and structured, aimed at developing a partner nation’s
capability, and ideally towards their own sustainable solution.
7-27. Enabling. NATO security force assistance doctrine refers to ‘enabling’, whereby services
are provided to facilitate other security force assistance activities, particularly
93 AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA). ‘Host nation has been replaced by ‘partner nation’.
94 Paraphrased from the ABCA Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook, page 6-6.
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b. Providing services linked to joint functions such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD),
air or sea lift, basic medical treatment, route clearance, air support, and intelligence,
surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR).
95 These activities are taken from AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA), page 2-4.
96 ABCA Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) Handbook, page 6-10. ‘Host nation’ has been replaced by ‘partner nation’.
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97 This can be through focused requests for information (RFI) and commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR), or as
an element of the intelligence collection plan (ICP).
98 Either in the conduct of, or the manner of, the partner nation’s employment of the unit.
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7-32. The level of monitoring will be determined by the UK or coalition, but principally based
on the acquiescence of the partner nation (consensual). Monitoring is one element of
the NATO-defined ‘military assistance’ and monitoring reports can be produced for UK,
coalition and partner-nation action, as required. Novel methods of monitoring have
been mis-labelled as ‘novel accompanying’ or ‘virtual advising’ and include using global
positioning systems (GPS) and action cameras such as the GoPro Hero on partner-nation
individuals to track their progress during training and on operations, or through the use
of ISR including unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). This can provide a system which allows
the partner nation freedom from those accompanying them, and allows them to make
decisions without recourse to UK or coalition individuals serving alongside them.
7-33. Advising. An adviser is someone who can recommend a course of action, offer
advice, or inform another party, about a fact or situation.99 Advising aimed at
improving capability and capacity, and is about persuasion, proposition and suggestion
rather than compulsion or commanding, and advice should be both relevant and timely.
It is therefore a personal and professional relationship where mutual trust and confidence
will determine the level of influence that an adviser can have with a partner nation.
An adviser may also be able to provide the partner nation with specific support or
sustainment capabilities such as air support, fires, medical evacuation and intelligence.
An adviser may deploy into a well-developed operational environment (such as Iraq or
Afghanistan), into austere, high-threat environments with little UK support available,
or into relatively benign areas as one component of ‘upstream or downstream capacity
building’. The level of advising should be conditions based, and may increase or decrease
depending on the prevailing circumstances and effects or objectives desired. Other actors
in the region who are providing advice to the partner nation should be identified and
their roles and relationships understood, as this may have an effect on what the UK
can achieve. This publication focuses on generic principles and guidance, which can be
adapted to the operating environment in which the adviser is deployed. Advising is one
element of the NATO-defined ‘military assistance’. Desirable qualities in military personnel
engaged in advising tasks may be found at Annex B.
7-34. Mentoring and coaching. Mentoring is the highest form of advising, as a mentor is
empowered to take the lead where appropriate and mentoring has been described as a
‘mindset not a skill set’.100 A mentor is defined as an experienced and trusted adviser
who provides counsel and leadership to another person, or organisation, by
agreement.101 A mentor may also be able to provide the partner nation with specific
99 Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces, page 3-12.
100 Directorate Land Warfare (DLW) Operation HERRICK Campaign Study, page 2_4_5.
101 JDN 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces (December 2011), page 3-11.
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capabilities such as air support, fires, medical evacuation and intelligence. However, with
the long-term aim to move towards transition, all opportunities for the partner nation
to move away from this reliance should be developed. Mentoring is one element of the
NATO-defined ‘military assistance’.
7-35. Levels of mentoring support.102 There are four basic levels of mentoring support:
a. Level 1 – Direct.
b. Level 2 – Support.
c. Level 3 – Coach.
d. Level 4 – Delegate.
102 Paraphrased from the Op HERRICK Operational Mentoring & Liaison Team (OMLT) & Police Mentoring Team (PMT) Aide
Memoire, Version 2 (18 December 2008), page 33.
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7-36. Coaching. Coaching provides partner forces with professional advice on how to attain
their goals. It focuses on achieving specific objectives, usually within a defined time
period. It is concerned principally with performance and the development of definable
skills. They help the learner to develop the skills of listening to themselves and self-
observation which can lead to a more rapid acquisition of skills and modifications to
behaviour. Mentoring and coaching use similar skills and approaches, but coaching is
short-term task-based and mentoring is a longer-term relationship. The differences are
summarised below:
Mentoring Coaching
Ongoing relationship that can last for a long period Relationship generally has a set duration.
of time. Generally more structured in nature and meetings are
Can be more informal and meetings can take place as scheduled on a regular basis.
and when the mentee requires some advice, guidance Short term (sometimes time-bounded) and focused on
or support. specific development areas/issues.
More long term and takes a broader view of the Coaching is generally not performed on the basis that
individual. the coach needs to have direct experience of their
The mentor is usually more experienced and qualified client’s formal occupational role, unless the coaching
than the mentee. Often a senior person in the is specific and skills-focused.
organisation who can pass on knowledge, experience Focus is generally on development/issues at work.
and open doors to otherwise ‘out of reach’
opportunities. The agenda is focused on achieving specific,
immediate goals.
Focus is on career and personal development.
Coaching revolves more around specific development
Agenda is set by the mentee, with the mentor areas/issues.
providing support and guidance to prepare them for
future roles.
Mentoring revolves more around developing the
mentee professionally.
7-38. There are two partnering concepts based on the position of UK personnel within the
partner-nation forces, and these are termed as embedding and integrating.
7-39. Factors. In order to have an effective partnership, the following factors apply:
a. Shared risk. Each partner bears an appropriate share of risk in the alliance. No partner
should have a disproportionate level of risk.
c. Shared rewards. Each partner shares appropriately in the rewards; partners must
work together to create mutual wins.
d. Shared vision. Partners must share a common view of the objectives, results and
outcomes of the relationship.
e. Shared values. Partners must share a common value system and complementary
culture. This value system is the bedrock of the relationship, providing the means,
motivation and commitment to resolve problems within the relationship and, more
importantly, the actual growth of the relationship.
7-40. Partnering must take place at all levels to be effective, and partnered forces will share
bases and live together; it is a relationship based on trust and equality. Partnering should
also be concurrently taking place with civilian agencies and ministries. Partners will
aim to plan, rehearse and execute missions together, thereby sharing risk. Partnering
seeks to combine resources and leverage each other’s strengths while compensating for
weaknesses; this will therefore improve overall combat effectiveness.
104 See JDN 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces, pages 3-14 to 3-15 for more detail.
105 Ibid, pages 3-15 to 3-16 for more detail.
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Advise and Assist (A&A). A&A operations were conducted from within a secured coalition
base location and typically mentored partner force 1* commanders and above. These operations
involved facilitating and influencing by means of counsel; and the development of partner national
operational capacity through a relationship build on trust. A&A operations also mentored partner-
force planning activity and advised on the best coordination of the partner-force plan with coalition
niche capabilities supporting the operation; this included the sharing of intelligence, ISR provision,
the deconfliction of joint effects and sustainment arrangements.
Expeditionary Advise and Assist (EA&A). EA&A comprised short duration (generally
less than 24hrs) A&A operations conducted forward of coalition bases to a separate
location cleared of enemy activity and behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT).
EA&A operations completed similar liaison tasks to A&A operations but enabled lower
level engagement with partner forces. EA&A operations did not extend to direct
support to the partner on combat operations where direct contact with the enemy was
anticipated.
Advise, Assist and Accompany (A3). A3 operations were conducted alongside partner
forces at the FLOT. Coalition personnel conducting A3 operations did not advance beyond
the last cleared position.
Advise, Assist, Accompany, Enable (A3E). A3E operations were advisory operations
conducted behind the FLOT where Iraqi forces required specific coalition support whilst
engaged in combat to directly enable operational effect. These capabilities included JTACs
and fire control for lethal fires and air warfare teams (AWT). A3E teams operated for
extended periods alongside 1* Iraqi formations and below; however, they were placed
neither in locations where direct contact with the enemy was anticipated nor advance
forward of the last cleared position.
7-41. Partnering outcomes. The following partnering outcomes should be aimed for:
a. Partner-nation self-reliance.
b. Improved interoperability between the partner nation (among its units) and the UK.
7-42. The mutual benefits of partnering. From the UK’s perspective, partnering allows for local,
contextual understanding to be developed, both short and long term, particularly when
developing an intelligence picture of a country/region. The partner nation will know
the terrain, people and local nuances. They can engage with the people and know and
understand the local powerbrokers, thereby allowing effective leverage to be applied
when necessary. It also presents opportunities for the UK to gain experience from local
forces which may have better-developed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), and
considerable combat experience. It allows for maintenance of situational awareness if
transition is taking place.
7-44. The partner nation can gain from UK operational and specialist experience and expertise,
increasing their confidence and developing their own capabilities. The partner nation
may also be able to access UK specialist capability such as medical support to operations,
ISTAR, offensive support, counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) and quick reaction
forces (QRF).
7-45. Frictions and challenges. Those UK elements conducting partnering have been offered
advice such as ‘be comfortable with being uncomfortable’106 or ‘be comfortable with
chaos’.107 They must develop a depth of understanding, adapt rapidly to local culture and
be cognisant of the nuances and characteristics that each partnered organisation will
have; all solutions therefore have to be bespoke. The UK elements should also be aware
of the level of buy-in that the partner nation has to the process, as this has the potential
to dramatically affect progress and results. A number of challenges will be encountered;
from the need to balance operations security (OPSEC) with the requirement to divulge
timely information in order to build trust and allow for a common operating picture,
through to force protection and the insider threat (‘green on blue’). Use the ‘need to
know, need to share, need to use’ methodology as a basic rule.108
7-46. Operational behaviour of the partner-nation force must also be understood and any
potential risks managed or mitigated; how will they behave, what are their rules of
engagement, what levels of corruption exist, how will they treat prisoners as examples?
There is also the risk of fratricide as different force elements attempt to work together
in generally complex environments. The use of UK assets will usually decrease over time,
and there is also a balance to be struck with developing the partner nation and allowing
for independence, while also providing credible battle-winning force elements, such
as surveillance, artillery, aviation, C-IED, and medical support to operations. There is a
danger that dependency on specialist or battle-winning UK assets can be created.
7-47. Processes that hold any degree of complexity should be simplified to ensure that the
partner nation is comfortable with it. These can be adapted by the partner nation as
they become conversant with these processes; the planning process is a case in point.
Reversionary planning and simple teaching aids should be used whenever possible.
106 Boyd, Walking the Tight Rope – a District Advisory Team in Transition, Combat 2014, page 78.
107 Willing, ‘Be Comfortable with Chaos’ – Planning with 3/215 Brigade Headquarters, Combat 2013, page 46.
108 Task Force Helmand (TFH) Afghan Uniformed Police Smartbook (2011), page 7.
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7-48. While the aim should be to partner at all levels, and in all disciplines, a balance will need
to be struck based on resources, the mission and the partner nation’s capacity to receive
UK elements. The aim should be to have joint headquarters and joint command and
control at all levels. It should be noted that it is easier to partner and shape behaviour at
the tactical level, while greater difficulties arise once the operational and strategic levels
are reached. Headquarters-level partnering should complement actions taking place on
the ground and operations rooms and planning activity should be joint; civilian interfaces
should also mirror this partnered effect. Specific partnering for command elements and
specialist areas should be conducted, if it sits within the overall plan; these areas include
logistics, intelligence and close support (fires). The ideal scenario is to combine ‘top-
down’ with ‘bottom-up’ partnering.
7-49. Partnering with a single organisation will present a simplified process, but it is likely that
the UK will need to partner with multiple groups and actors, such as Army and police. A
simple and coherent approach is therefore vital to ensure that frictions that already exist
between partner-nation forces are not increased or widened. This is further complicated
when working within a coalition.
7-50. Training centres. An element of partnering may be the establishment and running of
training centres for the partner nation. This should again complement the partnering
activity occurring in the operational theatre. Recent examples include the Iraqi Military
Academy al-Rustamiyah (IMAR), Helmand Police Training Centre (HPTC). An historical
example comes from the British campaign in Malaya (1948-60).
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7-51. Partnering commanders. The following guidance has been developed from recent
operational experience, focused on those who have responsibility for partnering
commanders.
Transition
7-52. The final element of capacity building is transition. Transition is the transfer of
responsibility and authority from UK forces to a partner nation.109 The UK definition
of security transition which provides more depth is:
7-53. It is the culmination of a process which may have involved generating, organising,
training/educating, augmenting, enabling, assisting, monitoring, advising, mentoring and
partnering with a partner nation. It may also be coordinated with other peace building
processes such as a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. It
requires comprehensive and coherent tri-departmental (FCO-DFID-MOD) coordination at
all levels of planning, preparation, sequencing and implementation in order to create the
best conditions for successful transition. Transition is likely to be conducted in contact
or a highly competitive/dynamic environment, so will be complex and may contain
significant risks. It is also likely to be multinational and inter-agency in nature. As transition
109 What does Transition Look Like? The Military Contribution to Transition, Issue 1 (August 2011), page 8-1.
110 JDN 6/11, Partnering Indigenous Forces, page 2-23.
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progresses, UK situational awareness and influence is likely to decrease, and this needs
to be factored in to any plan. Transition is unlikely to be linear in nature and is usually
gradual and progressive. It is also likely to be unique in character due to international,
regional, national, and local factors and dynamics. Transition will occur at variable speeds
in different areas, often producing differing outcomes, and the partner nation is unlikely
to have full capability at the culmination of the process – to that end, transition is unlikely
to have a clearly defined or precise end-state. This will also be allied to whether the
end-state is time or conditions-based (or an amalgam of the two). A successful transition
however, implies that the partner nation will not revert back to conflict and have
sufficient resilience mechanisms in place to prevent conflict in the future. Figure 7-10
shows a simple linear process with projected force levels, highlighting that at the critical
stage, a troop ‘surge’ may be required.
Transition
Conflict Post-conflict
Assessment Implementation
Surge?
Partner nation
Force levels
Time
7-54. If the transition process is carried out too quickly or prematurely, development may be
undermined and there could be a requirement to revert back to a previous stage of the
evolution. There may also be shocks and setbacks; a durable solution is the aim, and this
can be aided through having shared aims and objectives with the partner nation. Local
ownership, engagement and integration, and coherent communications will also reduce
friction.
7-55. Transition is a strategic issue but at the tactical level, commanders need to determine if the
partner-nation elements alongside whom they are working, are at the required standard to
allow effective transition to take place. Honest reporting is essential to ensure that the chain
of command knows the ‘ground truth’ and can adjust its policy, funding, resources, timelines
and decisions accordingly. On operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the operational-level
monitoring process has been labelled ‘M2T’, (monitoring, mentoring and training) which
describes military support to the partner nation during transition. This publication therefore
provides guidance at the tactical level; high-level direction and more detail on transition is
contained in Joint Doctrine Note 6/10 Security Transitions and the Military Contribution to
Transition (Issue 1). UK and US lessons on transition from Iraq are at Annex F.
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7-56. Transition is a progressive process and is likely to be managed in two phases; assessment,
followed by implementation.
7-58. The characteristics of security force assistance111 and NATO security transitions
considerations112 also provide guidance when conducting transition.
Trust
Leadership
Legitimacy Legitimacy
Rule of law
Transparency
Strategic communications
Sustainability Sustainability
Transition
111 Security force assistance imperatives taken from AJP-3.16 Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance (SFA).
Redefined as characteristics in this publication.
112 AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, pages 3-14 to 3-15.
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a. Set and continuously ‘refresh’ mindsets. Develop cultural empathy and the skills to
influence. Remain dispassionate and avoid the ‘soap opera’, report what you see, not
what you think you see. ‘It is more about chemistry than physics.’
c. Information activities – have a consistent and coherent message. This will help
the partner-nation units to understand what is going on, and must also be focused
on the partner-nation elements that will take over any UK responsibilities as transition
takes place. It will also aid the information campaign aimed towards the local
population.
d. ‘Gifting’ and fielding. Understand the issues and nuances of ‘gifting’ and fielding,
and ensure that the partner nation has the capacity and knowledge to receive
equipment. This is a tangible element of the ‘transactional relationship’.
c. Retaining the necessary level of influence as resources draw down. This can be
achieved through the establishment of relationships, or through the retention of
control of high-value specialist capabilities (the transactional relationship).
f. Training and developing the right mindset. Transition is a risky business and a flexible
mindset is required to deal with setbacks.
113 Paraphrased from Doctrine Note 13/03 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, page 33.
114 Details taken from UK and US Lessons from Iraq for Transition, The Military Contribution to Transition (Issue 1) (August
2011), Annex D
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g. Doing different with less. Force structures will be amended as transition takes place,
but evolvement should be conditions-based. There must also be a credible plan and
ability to reintervene if required, and it must be rehearsed.
Phases of transition
7-61. Assessment. Assessment must be considered at the start of any operation and be across
all lines of development, not just security. If it is restricted to a geographical area, its
surrounding regions must also be assessed. Assessment is the evaluation of status and
progress, based on levels of subjective and objective measurement – a diverse set of
expertise is required to gather and analyse data so that opportunities can be exploited
and future requirements predicted. The assessment threshold should be set to ensure
sustainability, thereby ensuring that development is not undermined.
Security force and civil capacity building. Coalitions must focus efforts to set the
conditions for the security forces to have the minimum essential capabilities prior to
transition. This requires the coalition to identify what these capabilities are at the earliest
opportunity and develop plans to achieve the desired end-state. Embassy efforts to build
civil capacity should be supported and amplified where practicable.
Coherency and risk. Transition will occur at different speeds in different areas and
will often result in different outcomes. Transition is an inherently risky business and it is
unlikely to go precisely according to plan. All partners must be prepared to accept that
the process can go backwards as well as forwards and plans must be robust enough to
take this into consideration.
Force structures. Force structures may also need to change over the process of
Transition. The evolving US laydown in Iraq was a good example of this with the
formation of ‘Advisory and Assistance Brigades’. Once the drivers of instability are
understood, a coalition must ensure that the most appropriate means are available and
used to target them, these will often require non-lethal effects, including information ops
and media ops to be brought to bear. Recognition that transition demands inter-agency
cooperation is required.
115 UK lessons are taken from Operations in Iraq (Op TELIC 6-13): An Analysis from the Land Perspective, and focus on
the post-Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS. The US lessons are from a presentation by the US Joint Center (sic) for
Operational Analysis, Transition to Stability Operations, dated 22 November 2010.
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b. Utility. Data from the assessment must be useable and add value, thereby informing
the planning process and enabling effective decision making.
c. Resourced. Planners and the assessment team must be realistic and efficient, and
must take into account the operational environment. Where resources are constrained,
areas should be prioritised.
d. Validity. Assessments must include a validation of the data and analysis (including
alternative interpretations of the data). The reliability of methods, findings and
recommendations is therefore extremely important.
116 Paraphrased from AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support, pages 3-16 to 3-17.
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Commander’s assessment
This focuses on the assessment of individual partner-nation
appendix
commanders through a subjective assessment of their capability.
This was a confidential element to the main CUAT, although a
sanitised version can be released to the partner-nation chain of
command.
The CUAT can provide a traffic light colour coded system of partner-nation progress, and is also
a useful tool for continuity during handovers.
7-64. Three steps to the assessment. There are three steps to the assessment:
(2) Recommendations are agreed on which areas qualify for the process. This will
take place after reviews have been conducted on each area.
Annex A to Chapter 7
Risk
7A-01. All capacity building activities involve an element of risk – the possibility that something
unpleasant or unwelcome may happen. 117 These risks also have the potential to impact
at different levels of operation. Risks from a capacity building perspective are shown
in the two theoretical models in Figures 7A-1 and 7A-2 and include the risk to UK
personnel,118 risk to the UK’s credibility and risk to the UK’s reputation.119 All risks should
be identified, evaluated (assess the impact and prioritise), managed and/or mitigated
(develop a response plan to reduce and/or control the risks), and these models only
provide broad guidance against activities and a generally observable pattern of risk.
They should not be treated as risk assessments – each capacity building task should
be assessed independently.120 Risk control and mitigation is complex, and actions can
have correlated and different effects to personnel, credibility and reputation in different
locations, with different audiences, and at different times.
Level of
risk
Risk to UK
credibility
Risk to
UK personnel
Risk to UK
reputation
Generate Organise/ Train/ Enable Assist Augment Accompany Monitor Advise Mentor/ Partner Transition
equip educate coach
Capacity building activities
Figure 7A-1. Capacity building risk model 1: Normal static or passive capacity building activities present standard
day-to-day risks to personnel that any military activity would produce, although each operating environment can
rapidly change based on local conditions or events. This is shown in the red line on the model above. As capacity
building starts to shift towards operating alongside the partner nation (enabling; assisting; augmenting; accompanying;
monitoring; advising; mentoring/coaching; and partnering) either as an advanced element of training oversight or
through participating in operations alongside force elements, the risk to UK personnel potentially increases. If UK force
elements are operating alongside the partner nation, the risk to UK credibility and reputation decreases as it affords the
UK visibility of partner-nation activity which can be monitored.
Level of
risk
Risk to UK
credibility Risk to UK
reputation
Risk to
UK personnel
Generate Organise/ Train/ Enable Assist Augment Accompany Monitor Advise Mentor/ Partner Transition
equip educate coach
Capacity building activities
Figure 7A-2. Capacity building risk model 2 shows a scenario whereby UK forces conduct static capacity building
activities only and this reduces the risk to UK personnel - this is shown in the red line. By solely conducting static
activities, the risk to UK credibility and reputation increases (shown in the green and blue lines respectively),
particularly if the partner nation wishes the UK elements to provide capacity building as an active or forward element
of operations. Once the static capacity building activities have been concluded, lack of UK oversight may allow the
partner-nation forces to conduct activity which could fall outside Western behavioural standards. While the model
again shows similar risk paths for UK credibility and reputation, this can differ in audiences, locations, and over specific
time periods.
7A-02. Risk to UK personnel may be mitigated through the numbers of troops deployed on
a capacity building task (although it can be argued that too many force elements can
actually increase the risk on occasion). Risk can be mitigated through the level of forces
deployed (special forces elements can operate in a higher individual and collective
risk environment for example), and also through the breadth and depth of training
conducted for those force elements deploying. Use of technology and employment of
contractors may further mitigate risk.
7A-03. Risks to the reputation of the deployed force may arise from ethical failings; the safety,
security, and sustainability of the capacity building mission; and the quality of UK force,
the training delivered, and their performance working alongside a partner nation.
These are all areas demand careful and thorough planning, with contingency plans and
consequence management measures in place to reduce or manage the risk.
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Annex B to Chapter 7
Characteristics required
in a good adviser121
7B-01. The selection of the right person as an Characteristics required in a good adviser
adviser is key, and the length of tour can
• Patience
also have an effect on the progress to be
• Bearing
made. Individuals must be professional
• Intellect
(a role model), possess basic values
• Maturity
and standards, good manners, and
• Manners
sound cultural awareness. The experience,
• Humour
ages, gender and ranks (and credibility)
• Respectful of culture
of advisers, should be based on the
• Insight
criteria of the advisees and the culture
• Self-reliance
of the partner nation. A longer tour is
• Stoicism
preferential, but a similar effect can be
• Perseverance
achieved by consistently deploying the
• Humility
same UK force elements into theatre
• Enthusiasm
for sustained periods, with breaks in
• Professionalism
between. This allows the UK element
122
b. The humility to respect a different culture and its customs, and to pay deference to
partner-nation commanders (whether or not that respect has been earned).124
c. The patience, stoicism and perseverance to accept and impose small, steady
development steps, while accepting repeated and frequent setbacks.
121 Doctrine Note 13/03 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, page 32, with some additional characteristics, based on
operational reports.
122 JCTTAT deploys two or three-man liaison training teams (LTT) into partner nations over sustained periods. They provide a
liaison and oversight function to the actual teams delivering training, and build up deep relationships with key partner-
nation personalities over protracted periods. The periods spent back in the UK between training deliveries provide respite
for the LTT, and creates a sustainable solution.
123 Paraphrased from Doctrine Note 13/03 UK Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan, page 32.
124 It is also key to understand how a partner nation conducts activity, and to accept that their method may be better than
ours.
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f. The social skills to quickly build robust working relationships that will help make
advising effective and resolve conflicts between individuals and groups.
h. Sufficient knowledge to advise the partner-nation forces who may have significantly
more combat experience than their advisers.
In June 1916, the Arab Revolt led to the capture of Mecca, Jidda and Taif; however,
significantly the Turks were able to reinforce rapidly as a result of a failure to capture the
main rail line. Lawrence was amongst those sent to investigate and met with Amir Feisal,
son of the ruler of the Hejaz; the two developed an immediate rapport.
Lawrence and Arab forces captured Aqaba in July 1917 and following this, Feisal moved
his headquarters to Aqaba, placing his force under the command of General Allenby,
the British commander in Palestine. Allenby provided the Arabs with guns, ammunition,
gold and deployed small numbers of British, French and Indian troops in a liaison and
mentoring capacity.
Allenby planned a large, combined arms attack against the Turks for September, 1918.
Lawrence was asked by Allenby to launch a diversionary attack on the Turks at an
important rail junction at Deraa in advance of the main Allied assault. This and the wider
operation were successful and Feisal and Lawrence entered Damascus in triumph.
Lawrence lived among those Arabs who fought the Turks, going out of his way to
befriend them. He lived the life of a Bedouin, always doing more than those he fought
with, riding his camel further and pushing his body harder. He ate what they ate which
led to a number of debilitating stomach ailments. But by doing this, he earned the respect
of those who fought with him.
a. Set and continuously refresh mindsets and review assumptions (‘intellectual curiosity’).
(3) Listen.
(4) Remain dispassionate and avoid the ‘soap opera’; report what you see, not what
you think you see.
(2) Allow the partner-nation unit to generate their own operational design and
sustainable solutions.
(3) Do not try to impose or ‘stretch to fit’ UK models onto the partner nation.
(1) In order to maintain and enhance the partner nation’s nerve, will and confidence
(particularly during transition phases).
(2) In order to allow partner-nation forces to connect to the local population, shaped
by their own media/public affairs officers.
e. Force protection – constantly review postures at every location and by day and night.127
(1) The greatest force protection measure will be the relationship developed with the
partner-nation forces.
(3) Use cultural and language advisers to understand ‘atmospherics’ and act as a
temperature gauge.
(4) Ensure there are robust guardian angel and adviser team force protection
measures.
(5) Continually conduct weapon training and range practice to ensure currency and
confidence.
7B-04. An adviser should ideally have a period of ‘immersion training’128 in the theatre of
operations, whereby individuals spend a period of time working alongside those
currently in post. This allows for development of training design, consistency of
approach and also reduces the overall risk during handover periods.
7B-05. An adviser must be capable of a ‘hands-off’ approach, supporting the partner nation to
solve a problem; advisers can drive partner-nation dependency on adviser-led solutions.
There is however, a balance to be struck between short-term gain (instilling confidence)
against long-term institutional development or enduring progress. This may instil a
tension between commanders who want to demonstrate progress, with advisers who
need to continually develop advisees at a different or slower tempo (this may be based
on the pace that the advisee wishes, or is physically able, to develop for example). There
also needs to be a sensible, pragmatic approach to the level of development that a
partner nation needs. A 100 per cent solution is neither practical, nor required in most
cases.
7B-06. There may be occasions when the UK is requested to ‘advise and assist’ a partner
nation. ‘Assist’ can also be referred to as ‘support’. Assistance can be in many forms
but the principal areas of assistance will be in the form of mentoring or partnering,
although it can also include the provision of resources, key or niche skills, or
information. Training/education can also be a key element and may be conducted either
as part of the mentoring/partnering process, or as a stand-alone activity.
127 For more information on force protection, see Doctrine Note 15/11 Op CARDEL – Countering the Insider Threat.
128 Draper, A window on the Afghan world; observations from living and working in the Helmand Police Headquarters,
Combat 2014, page 80.
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AFMTitle
Pub TFSO
Capacity Chapter 8
?
Building
PART 5
Contents
Chapter
Case studies
Title?
Contents
7B-8 |
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Case Study 1
Exercise Botswana Bayonet
(Upstream capacity building)
Background
8-01. A small seven-man team from the Infantry Training Centre (ITC) Catterick formed a short-
term training team (STTT) in May 2014 to produce a bespoke training module for a junior
non-commissioned officer (JNCO) cadre for the Botswana Defence Force (BDF). This would
form a precursor to further STTT tasks to be conducted in the future in the country, as a
wider element of Defence Engagement in Southern Africa. The Botswana Defence Force
is aiming to deploy all arms, but principally infantry-based battlegroups on peacekeeping
operations as part of the African Union within the African continent. The Botswana
Defence Force also has a national anti-poaching remit. It is well-equipped, and highly
motivated, but with an over-reliance on its officer corps in lieu of its non-commissioned
officers.
Preparation
8-02. The pre-deployment period was spent conducting administration, booking
accommodation, ensuring the correct levels of pay, completing medicals and inoculations,
passing the driving matrix test, taking periods of leave and was also focused on additional
familiarisation and training on the weapon systems that the team were likely to encounter
in Botswana. This included the Belgian FN rifle and also involved a trip to Leeds armouries.
There was also a formal brief by the reconnaissance party to accompany the mission
preparation training which focused on the production of lesson plans and suitable training
aids. This was not ideal as the reconnaissance team consisted of personnel who were not
conducting the task.
Deployment
8-03. The team deployed on a civilian flight via Johannesburg and were met in Botswana by
the British Peace Support Team (South Africa) (BPST (SA)). The first week was spent
continuing preparation for the course, and familiarisation with the training area and
physical training routes, in addition to meeting the BDF chain of command. Administration
for the course was also key during the first week; this included checking vehicles,
ammunition, classrooms, and recces, and concluded with an orders group to finalise the
training programme and main events list. Some issues resulting from having a separate
reconnaissance team needed to be resolved; these included having to re-recce routes
and training facilities/areas, and booking of transport for exercising troops along with
weapons, ammunition and rations.
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Students
8-04. The course commenced with 39 students from across the Botswana Defence Force, and
with a broad range of skills and experience. The UK training team therefore decided to
split the students into four equal sections with an even spread of cap badges, abilities
and skills. All had an appetite to learn and were enthusiastic to put new skills taught into
practice. The Botswana Defence Force was also well-resourced.
Training
8-05. The course was split into four phases:
d. Test phase.
Junior NCO activities and roles were divided between in-barracks and in the field.
8-06. The training module started with a ten-mile march carrying 16kg which provided a
baseline of fitness and mental robustness. It also allowed the instructors to gauge
the standard of the BDF students, and led to some minor adjustments to the training
programme.
We were unsure of their level of soldiering skills. To that end we added into the
training programme some start standard assessments. These proved vital and a
few of the training objectives were slightly tailored to the students’ capabilities.
8-07. The course was designed around a steep learning curve, focused on creating junior
leadership; infantry tactics were used as the principal conduit to achieving this aim.
8-08. Classroom lessons, teaching the theory, were followed by practical applications.
The lessons ranged from command leadership management (CLM) highlighting the
responsibilities of a non-commissioned officer, through to values-based leadership
(VBL)129 demonstrating the importance of the development of subordinates. Simple but
essential traits were discussed and emphasised focused on G1 personnel issues, including
ensuring timeliness, and having the correct equipment. Commencing with prescriptive
measures, the training progressed to employing duty students and then onto self-policing,
highlighting a progressive process, which allowed the Botswana Defence Force to assume
ownership once they had bought in to why these issues were important. This was further
reinforced once the students deployed into the field, and their use of a reports and
returns system, aligning G1 personnel issues with the G4 logistics.
Learning essential equipment administration skills. BDF students preparing for deployment into the field.
129 Values-based leadership is simply another way of expressing the act of setting the correct example, even in difficult
circumstances.
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8-09. Basic infantry lessons including the combat estimate and orders process were taught,
and were based on those conducted at the Household Division and Parachute Regiment
Centralised Courses (HDPRCC).
8-10. The first exercise focused on low-level skills such as harbour occupation and routine,
with inspections being a key part of the administration process undertaken by the UK
training team. The exercise also saw the practical application of the orders process and
the construction of model pits as the prelude to conducting section-level reconnaissance,
attacks and ambushes. The local training area used was 35km from the barracks and it
provided a large amount of varied and challenging terrain, and an element of remoteness
which simulated being deployed on operations. The distance between camp and the
training area also allowed for a more realistic exercise for the G4 logistic elements to
resupply those deployed.
Encourage partner-nation ownership. BDF instructing camouflage and concealment in the field.
8-11. The next series of lessons were then conducted back in the camp, further administration
was completed, and a long weekend allowed some rest and recuperation prior to the
start of the second exercise. This was a patrols/defensive exercise, allowing the students
to be split into multiples to provide a current operational context. An insertion patrol was
followed by the occupation of a defensive position which entailed digging in at night, a
skill that was unfamiliar to all the students, but which was successfully achieved by first light.
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8-12. The final exercise was a culmination of all the skills taught on the course, with practical
application allowing for testing and grading of all the students by the UK training team.
It commenced with a Cambrian Patrol-style march of 55km with checkpoints in obscure
and difficult-to-find locations, and with command tasks to be completed at each one.
There was then a period of enforced rest prior to the remainder of the exercise, which re-
emphasised previously taught skills but in a testing environment, and with tight timelines.
Elements of free-play were brought in, and section commanders had to deconflict to
bring together the final platoon attack.
8-14. Through shared experiences both trainers and trainees were able to gain new insights
into how other forces operate; as an example, the UK training team learned how the
Botswana Defence Force conduct anti-poaching operations, and experienced the realities
of surviving and operating in a southern African terrain and climate. It was a superb
vehicle for personal and professional development. A basic level of understanding on
Botswana, its people and culture was also achieved and relationships were established
with the Botswana Defence Force chain of command.
Support
8-15. The STTT was supported in country by the British Peace Support Team – South Africa
(BPST – SA), providing both assistance and advice.
The Liaison Officer knew the BDF well and if we had any problems, he was the
man to talk to and quickly solved the issue. He gave us a heads-up on the BDF and
their background and was able to provide advice on what to do in our spare time.
Having that top-cover made us feel confident in overcoming any issues we faced.
Case Study 2 -
Operation HERRICK
(Capacity building during conflict - security force
assistance (SFA))
8-18. Enabling the wide spectrum of indigenous capability evolved into the deployment
of formed units in specific advisory roles. This ranged from specialist mentoring of
indigenous special forces at tier 1 and tier 2 (at company or specialist task force level)
to the mentoring and training of the non-specialist army and police forces by battalion-
based units. The formation of the Brigade Advisory Group (BAG) and the Police Mentoring
Changing role of Police Mentoring
Advisory Group (PMAG) allowed formed combat units to deploy maintaining a degree
of their organic C2 and force protection structures therefore ensuring a coherence of
Advisory Group (PMAG)
advising across the indigenous security force pillars.
PARTNER
ISAF FOOTPRINT
MENTOR MENTOR
ASSIST ASSIST ADVISE
ENABLE ENABLE ENABLE LIAISON
TRAIN TRAIN TRAIN ENABLE/ADVISE
Op HERRICK 17 Op HERRICK 18
Figure 8-1. Police mentoring capability drawdown at the end of the campaign showing the
changing role of the Police Mentoring Advisory Group (PMAG)
8-19. The endstate that was achieved on Operation HERRICK 18 was the complete transfer of
lead security responsibility (September 2013), an increase in both situational awareness
and battlespace deconfliction by the Afghan National Security Forces and a complete ‘lift
off’ of UK mentoring assets to minimal numbers at ANSF Brigade and provincial levels
(Brigade Advisory Team (BAT)). This good practice will only address the enabling of non-
specialist ANSF units. Underpinning the generic ANSF advising and mentoring at the
end of the campaign was the introduction and implementation of Operation CARDEL to
mitigate and reduce the insider threat.
8-21. An over-complicated solution. After full ISAF scoping, the solution chosen was for
a NATO Training Mission (Afghanistan) (NTM (A))-delivered equipment and training
package. Initially it was never really given the attention it deserved, was over-ambitious
and arrived too late. However, the UK did provide an OF3 staff lead in HQ Regional
Command (South West) (RC(SW)) and there was a joint US-UK effort to deliver the chosen
training package. UK equipment was lent to do ad hoc training when there was spare
capacity. In hindsight hi-tech solutions proved inappropriate for the ANSF. It was not until
more low-tech means were adopted such as ground sign awareness (GSA) training, joint
patrolling and more human intelligence work, that real progress was made and a useful
capability was developed. This had fully matured by Operation HERRICK 18 and UK C-IED
was able to step back.
8-23. While ECM did not make ANSF invincible to IED threats, it did offer a protective ‘bubble’
of 50 metres for all those inside. It could be used mounted in vehicles or by dismounted
patrols when searching or confirming an IED. When dismounted it was not necessary
for the lead searcher to carry it. Its introduction provided the ANSF with a life-saving
capability which boosted morale and confidence at an important moment as they
expanded their forces.
Observation: The application of UK and NATO standards to the ANSF training problem
became an issue. What was really required was an ‘ANSF Good Enough’ solution which
could endure.
Lesson: There is a requirement for a permanent C-IED training cadre for indigenous
force training, which was not taken into core. There is now no training cadre with the
reduction of the Collective Training Advisory Cell (CeTAC).
d. Sensitive site access. TTs provided ISAF awareness of, and access to, sensitive or
religious sites thus reducing the possibility of cultural misunderstanding.
e. Call-out and engagement. TTs conducted call-outs of local nationals (LN) from
compounds, enabling collection and providing an Afghan lead to security patrols.
8-26. The success of the TT model was ensured by enduring SF support to the partnered
ATF. Subunits from the same SF unit provided the mentoring task force for eight years
providing continuity and coherence which CF units rotating every six-months could not
replicate. Other key factors contributed to success, among them:
a. Financial incentive. Partner forces were financed by their national chain of command
but also received substantial ‘top-up’ pay. This additional pay greatly increased
motivation, morale and loyalty. Additionally, an operational bonus was paid for
each day TTs were deployed in the field resulting in greatly increased enthusiasm to
participate in high tempo operations, or those with a longer duration.
b. Equipment. The ATF was equipped to a much higher standard than the majority of
ANSF soldiers. Night vision devices, laser light modules, and the enhanced training
TTs received greatly increased their operational capability and therefore their utility
to partnered ISAF units. The specialist equipment also increased ATF morale by giving
them a sense of pride, self-esteem and elevated status which further encouraged their
commitment and professionalism.
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Case Study 3 -
Capacity building in Nigeria
(Upstream capacity building and capacity building during
conflict)
Background
8-27. An Islamist insurgency has been ongoing in Nigeria since 1999, with several northern
regions adopting Sharia law, and violence between Christians and Muslims accounting
for thousands of deaths. Since 2009, an Islamist insurgent group known as Boko Haram
(translated to mean ‘Western Education is forbidden’) has been active and the death toll
in the country has dramatically increased. Nigerian government forces have struggled to
cope with the escalating conflict which has also spilled across the border into Cameroon.
Great Britain has a long-term relationship with Nigeria, and a large Nigerian diaspora
population resides in the UK.
A small tactical team has the ability to achieve operational and strategic effects
8-29. The deployment was in support of the in-country British Military Advisory Training Team
(BMATT), providing aid to the Nigerian government in containing the existential threat
posed by Boko Haram.
Mission locations
8-31. The three STTT elements deployed to the following locations: Makurdi (Benue State); Jaji
(Kaduna State); and Kachia (Kaduna State).
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The mission
8-32. To deliver infantry training packages to force elements drawn from 72 Special Operations
Battalion and the Nigerian Army School of Infantry in order to provide the Nigerian Army
with an enhanced light role infantry manoeuvre capability.
Training aim
8-33. The principal aim for both STTTs was to deliver a company group tactical pre-deployment
training (PDT) package in order to prepare subunits from 72 Special Operations Battalion
for a deployment to north eastern Nigeria where they would conduct offensive operations
against Boko Haram. Within nine weeks, STTT1 was able to achieve this goal, while STTT2
had to moderate its plan as their training window was reduced to four weeks, thereby
limiting their training to platoon level. In this case (and based on available resources
and the trainees’ start-state) a period of eight to ten weeks appeared to be the optimal
timeframe in which to deliver company-level training.
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STTT establishment
8-34. The STTT comprised the following personnel:
Support staff
General duties staff
RMO - Maj
CQMS - CSgt
2 x CMT1
3 x Pte
SASC - SSgt
Trg Team 1 Trg Team 2 Trg Team 3 Trg Team 4 Trg Team 5
Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt) Team Leader (Sgt)
Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl* Instructor- 2 x Cpl*
Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl Instructor- 1 x LCpl
Conduct of training
8-35. The training consisted of the following activities:
b. Live firing marksmanship training (LFMT)/Live firing tactical training (LFTT) ranges.
The trainees
8-36. The Nigerian trainees were highly motivated, attentive, receptive, and responded well to
the competitive elements of training. Their basic skills were generally good although there
were weaknesses in weapon handling and marksmanship. Their NCO cadres were also
above average age and this had an effect on their overall fitness levels. Their officers had
an understanding of doctrine, but their application at tactical level was limited, and many
had an aversion to attending training with their soldiers; this is a common weakness and
one that has to be addressed with full participation vital, particularly when establishing
esprit de corps (an important element of the moral component).
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The element of competition; the best soldier award presented at the end of each week
Lessons
8-37. Deployment timelines. Due to the urgent nature and tempo of the requirement, the
deployment timeline was compressed from the normal 105 days’ notice, and was further
squeezed by the additional requirements driven by the Nigerian partners. This created
a number of friction points (force generation, deployment, sustainment and command
and control (C2)). One uplift was requested by the BMATT in response to a larger than
expected partner-nation training audience, and a significant proportion of the timeline
was taken up between the statement of requirement (SOR) being produced by the BMATT
and 2 Royal Anglian receiving it. The importance of maintaining an active edge readiness
posture (ten days’ notice to move) whereby all Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs) were
kept up-to-date allowed the unit to focus its limited mission training windows on the pre-
deployment and mission-specific areas,132 in addition to the required administration and
preparation. The sooner that a unit can be warned off for a STTT deployment will enable
early and more detailed reconnaissance, aid force generation and SOR refinement, and
allow suitable resourcing and planning of PDT. It also presents suitable planning windows
for the partner nation who will be receiving the training.
8-38. Regional alignment. This deployment highlights the benefits of regionally aligning units
to geographical areas (specifically countries), allowing 2 Royal Anglian to deploy multiple
132 This included devising course programmes, lesson plans and planning administrative requirements for trainers and
students.
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elements into discrete areas within a target country, and simplified the force generation
procedures, particularly those conducted at short notice. This has also aided handovers
incountry, ensured that the relationship with the BMATT is close, and that a greater depth
of understanding of the operating environment in Nigeria has been developed.
8-39. Command and control (C2). There was initial confusion as to the C2 architecture of
the mission and this had an impact on the force generation process and delayed the
medical and force protection recces. Early resolution of this critical issue will therefore aid
preparation and allow for concurrent activity to take place.
8-40. Pre-deployment training (PDT). MATTs 1-9 is the mandatory start point with each
soldier also requiring Team Medic and SERE B qualifications, an environmental health
team (EHT) briefing, a G2 threat briefing and legal briefing (covering rules of engagement
(ROE)). The BMATT also provided a brief incountry RSOI package on arrival in Abuja. While
generic briefings are useful, more targeted lectures should be the aim, particularly area
rather than country-specific and also focused specifically on the threats. It would also
have been useful to have received training in soft engagement skills (communication,
negotiation and behaviour detection).
8-41. Movement issues. This included the difficulty in gaining visas (through the MOD visa
section to the Nigerian Embassy in London), conflicting advice on freight allowances
(Defence Supply Chain Operations and Movements (DSCOM) or mover specialists to be
engaged), and the use of French air assets and their conflicting regulations which led to
deployment delays (RAF Mil AT should be the norm, although civilian aviation can also be
used). Similar confusion was experienced during the redeployment back to the UK, and
the use of a forward deployed mover would have reduced this friction.
8-42. Human rights (HR) training/Law of armed conflict (LOAC). This was included in
the training package, and presents a challenge, not just in Nigeria. Troops can deliver a
certain level of training but there may be a requirement for specialists to conduct this
activity; many nations have varying concepts on human rights and rules of engagement,
and any transgressions can become a national ‘red-line’ issue.
All training is conducted with due regard for human rights and international
humanitarian law. Where necessary, other safeguards for potential human rights
violations will be put into place, including seeking high-level assurance that new
capabilities will not be used or misused for the commission of human rights
violations.
8-43. Subject matter expert (SME) training advice. Specialists deployed into training teams
can be force multipliers, and all STTTs should consider task-organising experts to their
teams in order to deepen the effects achieved. For this deployment a Small Arms School
Corps (SASC) senior NCO deployed with both STTTs and supervised the planning and
execution of range practices, in addition to providing education in the concepts and
application of safe systems of training.
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Marksmanship training
8-44. Force protection. Nigeria is a semi-permissive environment and the UK STTT adopted
appropriate and workable force protection plans for the periods when conducting
training, and during movement, an area of significant risk. The local commander’s ability
to constantly monitor atmospherics, to reduce pattern setting and to have the ability to
escalate or reduce force protection posture is a generic skill set across all capacity building
tasks. The use of local armed escorts is a double-edged sword, providing visible protection
but also ensuring that a low profile is more difficult to adopt.
8-45. Real-life support (RLS). This was provided through a combination of the BMATT and 72
Special Operations Battalion. Services provided included: laundry; food (NA chefs and UK
operational ration packs (ORP)); funds for supplementary rations; Internet and satellite TV;
mobile phones; and rest and recuperation (R&R) opportunities. The deployment of a UK
chef and field kitchen, however, would have greatly improved the quality of life for the
deployment period. The BMATT demonstrated the important utility of an in country UK
team with the support that it provided to the STTTs throughout.
8-46. Medical. An RMO and CMT1 were deployed providing a Role 1 capability. This was then
supported by a local Role 2 facility (a local hospital) with an aviation CASEVAC plan
through a civilian contractor. This is a typical medical model for global deployments. While
local facilities may be rudimentary and country-specific professional standards lower than
expected in UK facilities, there is utility in having the RMO deploy on any reconnaissance
trips so that limitations can be identified early.
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8-47. Partner-nation systemic issues. As is common across much of Africa, the Nigerian
Army suffered weaknesses in logistics, equipment care, weapon serviceability and
familiarisation, vehicle maintenance and availability, and lack of investment. This had a
tangible effect on the training that could be achieved and highlighted the issue that UK
training teams must remain flexible and pragmatic in their approach, and then tailor the
training accordingly. It also highlights the importance of the reconnaissance in identifying
these weaknesses early, and thereby better planning the actual training delivery with the
constraints known. There was also a lack of in country training aids, and the UK STTT had
to either import them, or locally produce.
8-48. Nigerian planning capacity is principally reactive, leading to problems with the
timely production of training resources. Tactics can be viewed as predictable and
outdated and combined arms integration is limited, both from organic support weapons
and external units. There is a lack of mission command, which stifles the development
of low-level leadership, in addition to a reluctance to share information. Many of the
equipment care and logistic issues are generic and commonly found by other STTTs in
all parts of the world, and simple measures related to equipment husbandry should be
factored in to all deployments.
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8-49. The moral component. The UK STTT were able to ply their trade, imparting knowledge
to the partner nation knowing that this was to be used immediately post-training in
combat operations. Instructors felt great pride in the knowledge that their partner-nation
trainees would be more professional and effective once deployed. Individually the UK
soldiers matured and gained rewarding experience as trainers and leaders, in addition to
experiencing a new and unusual environment, thereby providing both professional and
personal development; it is also retention positive.
‘Icebreakers’ (command tasks) used by the instructors helped create bonding between teams and reinforced teamwork
Conclusion
8-50. This deployment demonstrates that a well-prepared unit can deploy at short notice to
conduct tactical-level activities which provide strategic effect, and can set the conditions
for further higher-level engagement between the two partner nations. The activity
also delivered tactical success in north eastern Nigeria, highlighting the importance of
determining effects or objectives as the ultimate measurements of effectiveness (MOE) of
the STTT, rather than an output of Nigerian trainees. It was also hugely rewarding for the
UK soldiers on both professional and personal levels.
Contents
8-52. The security issue was further complicated by a coup d’état on 21 March 2012 staged by
a small element in the Malian armed forces under the lead of Captain Amadou Sanogo.
This group was angered by the policies of the government and forced the removal of the
President Amadou Toumani Touré.
8-53. In response to the gains made by the armed groups in the north, which was threatening
the capital Bamako, and on request of the Malian government, the French launched an
intervention into northern Mali known as Operation SERVAL on 11 January 2013 with
ground and air elements. This neutralised the armed elements and provided some stability
to the situation, allowing firstly ECOWAS134 and latterly the UN, through its mission
MINUSMA135 to gain a foothold in the country and start to deploy its civilian and military
components. Government control was restored in the south with jailing of the coup
leaders, re-establishment of a unified government and an election in September 2013 of a
new President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta.
133 Also known as Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en
Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO).
134 Economic Community of West African States. The Force deployed was known as AFISMA (African-led International
Support Mission to Mali).
135 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
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This business of being persistently engaged overseas provides you with the basis
that you can then operate with agility and with precision. I think a lot of us
looking in on what the French did in Mali have great respect for the insight and
understanding that they developed over many years in that part of Africa and then
were able to respond with agility and precision. It looked like they were taking
significant risk but they weren’t, because they knew what they were doing.
Chief of the General Staff, speech to Chatham House (17 February 2015)
EUTM-MALI
8-54. On 18 February 2013 at the request of the Malian authorities, the European Union
(EU) launched a training mission for the Malian armed forces. Involving 28 states,
it was mandated to help restore constitutional and democratic order through the
implementation of a road map, aid the Malian authorities to exercise their sovereignty
over the whole of the country and to neutralise organised crime and terrorist threats. It
trained Malian battlegroups known as GTIA136 at Koulikoro Training Camp (KTC) while
providing advice and expertise at the operational and strategic-levels through an advisory
task force (ATF) whereby individuals mentor partners within the Malian armed forces’
hierarchy and its Ministry of Defence.137
Mission area
8-55. The EUTM-Mali is not mandated to conduct combat operations and is bounded to the
south of the country through its mission area.
SAHARA OCC.
ALGÈRIE
Zouérat
AZAWAD
Tessalit Adrar
des ifoghas
MAURITANIE Tinzawaténe
Kidal
Tombouctou
Kiffa
Niger Gao
Mopti
Kayes Ségou NIGER
Ouagadougou
Bamako Niamey
BURKINA
Sikasso FASO
GUINÈE BÈNIN
CÔTE GHANA
D’IVOIRE
Figure 8-4. Mission area (in blue)
UK contribution
8-56. The UK provided a limited number of staff officers in key appointments in the mission
headquarters in Bamako, but its main element was based at KTC in the form of a joint
UK and Irish Training Team (UKITT). This comprised 27 soldiers, with an additional six
from the Irish Defence Forces (IDF) who conduct the tactical-level training of the Malian
GTIAs. The soldiers were mixed to form four coherent training teams with a command
element consisting of the officer commanding and his support staff. There was also a
small team from the UK Stabilisation Unit providing international humanitarian law (IHL)
training, a key element of the EUTM mission. The UK training team therefore provided
administration, pastoral and force protection support to the stabilisation unit personnel.
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UKITT HQ
OC – OF3
Ops Offr – OF2
G4 SNCO – OR6
RLD – OR2
Clerk – OR4
Medic – OR3
Armourer – OR1
Trg Team 1 Trg Team 2 Trg Team 3 Trg Team 4 (Sp Wpns)
1 x OF1 1 x OF1 (IDF) 1 x OF1 1 x OF1
1 x OR5 (IDF) 1 x OR5 (IDF) 1 x OR5 (IDF) 1 x OR5
2 x OR4 1 x OR4 2 x OR4 (1 x IDF) 2 x OR4 (1 x IDF)
1 x OR3 3 x OR3 1 x OR3 1 x OR3
1 x OR2 1 x OR2 2 x OR2 1 x OR2
The mission
8-57. The lead nation was provided by the French. There were 180 trainers, split into three
training companies, and a number of specialist elements. There was also a headquarters
staff, and enablers, including a German hospital and a joint Belgian/Spanish force
protection (FP) element. In total there were approximately 400 EU personnel in KTC with
80 staff manning the mission headquarters in Bamako.
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MCdr
SUPPORT
COS
GROUP
XO
J1 J2
ATF MED
… KTC
(+)
J4 J3 FP KTC Cdt
ROLE 1
J6 J5 MHQ Fwd
AIR
J8 J7 MEDEVAC
I
EOD TRAINING
LO JMED
FP
MEDICAL
VET HELO LO
Notes: Principal staff (yellow), Mission HQ branches (green), MCdr’s cabinet staff (red),
Koulikoro Training Camp (KTC) branches (blue); MSC – Mission Support Cell; ATF –
Advisory Task Force.
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BG
Staff
Recce Engr Tp
TACP
8-58. The basic training of the Malian armed forces took place centrally at KTC, utilising the
local region as a training area. KTC had a number of indoor and outdoor classrooms,
sandpits for models, and an obstacle course. The local area consisted of varied terrain
with thick scrub, rocky outcrops, wadis and open valleys; seasonal variations determined
suitability for lessons. There were also a large number of abandoned buildings which were
used with permission. It was suitable for company and GTIA-level exercises. There was an
OBUA complex near to KTC made up of a series of abandoned buildings known as ‘ghost
village’, and a 600 metre purpose-built ten-lane range at Tanabougou.
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8-60. Training was objectives-based, allowing training teams to be flexible in designing their
own training programmes, which were produced weekly for J7 approval. At the GTIA-
level there were four specific objectives to be achieved:
a. Offensive operations.
b. Defensive operations.
d. Advance to contact.
8-61. A series of tasks and missions are derived from these objectives, which had to be achieved
at section, platoon and company levels. They were underpinned by basic skills that each
soldier had to master. Good practice was shared between training teams during a weekly
trainers’ meeting. This meeting also allowed for control of training resources. Weekly
routine involved two days in the field, a day of shooting and mandatory medical and IHL
training. Daily routine started at 0630 hours with muster parade and physical training
with lessons commencing at 0830 hours and lasted for four hours. Lessons restarted at
1530 hours due to the heat and finished at 1730 hours. Periods in the field had more
flexible working hours. UK forces mentored counterparts, focusing on leadership training
and utilising the British Army’s values and standards as basic tenets of behaviour both for
themselves and their trainees. They also focused on International Humanitarian Law (IHL),
counter-indirect fire (C-IDF) and counter-IED training.
Additional training
8-62. Company commanders’ courses. Conducted at Koulikoro Training Camp (KTC).
8-63. Refresher training. Refresher training (also referred to as ‘mobile training’) of GTIAs
was also introduced in 2014. This focused on GTIAs as they returned from operations in
the north, and prior to their redeployment back on operations. It was initially conducted
for the first module in Kati which is in the vicinity of Bamako, but was extended to
conducting the training in Malian garrisons (hence the term ‘mobile training’). This
demonstrated a commitment to the Malian Armed Forces and highlights that potentially
logical Western solutions (continuing to train centrally in KTC) have to be balanced with
the needs and wishes of the partner nation (requested by the Malians to conduct the
‘mobile training’ in their home garrisons). This however, presented additional logistical
and force protection burdens on the EUTM.
Conclusion
8-64. This mission highlights the effects that can be achieved through shared endeavour within
a coalition. The UK contributed in a training capacity, but also through selected staff
appointments in the mission headquarters. The partner-nation trainees deployed straight
onto operations after the training, delivering tangible effects in stabilising northern Mali,
and a process was in place to effectively capture the measurements of effectiveness (good
and bad); this was achieved through Operation SERVAL interaction, open source reports
and by conducting formal debriefs with the GTIA when they returned from operations.
The mission has widened to include refresher training, ‘mobile training’, and also provided
selected niche courses based on the Malians’ needs and requirements. The mission had
an effect at the tactical level, but also focused on the operational and strategic levels
through the ATF.
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CASE STUDY 5 -
Operation SHADER (downstream capacity
building and capacity building during conflict)
Background
8-65. Operation TELIC in Iraq officially ended in 2011. In 2013 as the result of conflict in Syria
and worsening conditions in Iraq, an insurgency recommenced out of the ashes of al-
Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) with a new group, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).138
The Iraqi Army (IA) suffered a number of setbacks and limited UK reintervention was
required as part of a US-led counter-ISIL coalition. While the US have deployed under
Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, the UK operation name is SHADER. This précis highlights
UK involvement under one of four campaign aims supporting military operations -
capacity building and training. It provides a summary of lessons, observations and
insights into a ‘downstream capacity building’ task, albeit in a theatre where conflict has
reignited. This case study takes a number of diverse lessons from several iterations of
training.
Instant rapport was formed with our Peshmerga brothers. They proved to be
eager to learn, motivated and professional in their approach, their focus no doubt
sharpened by their impending deployment to Kirkuk.
138 Also referred to as Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State (IS) and Daesh.
Contents
8-67. This establishment was altered with the second deployment of 2 PWRR, shown in the
figure below.
8-69. HMG Training. A UK training team of 12 personnel delivered three HMG training
modules of five days each. The module included how to operate and maintain the HMG,
how to tactically employ them, and how to use the weapon system legally (rules of
engagement, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)). Basic weapon proficiency was poor and
detailed weapon handling training was essential, followed by weapon handling tests to
confirm proficiency. All zeroing was conducted at 25 metres after weapons had been
bore-sighted, but the partner nation lacked understanding of grouping and zeroing, and
this theory lesson should be planned for when dealing with partner-nation marksmanship
training. The marksmanship principles also provide a simple method of better ensuring
success for the partner nation when they progressed to live firing.
Lesson: Basic weapon handling, grouping, zeroing and marksmanship principles need to
be mastered before progressing to live firing.
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8-70. Live firing. The training location was situated on the outskirts of Irbil, and culminated
with a live-fire day to confirm that skills had been assimilated. The conduct of ranges was
difficult to coordinate as the partner nation was unfamiliar with normal live-firing rules
and conduct.
Observation: Use two interpreters, one to assist the range conducting officer (RCO) on
the firing point, and one to monitor the waiting details and assist with concurrent activity.
8-71. The words of command used during live-firing practices were often lost in
translation which added to the confusion among the firers, and caused them to
carry out incorrect drills.
Observation: The use of rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills on ranges prior to commencing
live firing will reduce the issues, and the use of extra safety supervisors should also be
considered.
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8-72. Infantry battle course (IBC). This was conducted during the 2 PWRR tour and fluctuated
in focus and scale. It was delivered over six weeks at Menila Training Centre (MTC) with
the UK training team instructing a company and company headquarters, and focused on
the key tenets of ‘shoot, move, communicate’. The training programme was informed by
the needs of the Peshmerga and was directed principally towards defence, but founded
on offensive soldiering skills of the individual, section and platoon. This developed low-
level competency. A concurrent training programme aimed at the company headquarters
centred on command and leadership, sub unit tactics and military decision making.
The culmination of the training brought the two elements together to conduct a rural
company manoeuvre exercise, with a secondary aim of preparation for a potential
battalion-level exercise if the competency allows.
8-73. Equipment. Personal protection equipment (PPE) was not readily available to the
partner nation, and it may have been useful to include this as an element of the gifting
package with the HMGs, although the UK training team may need to identify sizing
once in country and the equipment then being sent as a secondary package. In practice,
equipment was sourced in an ad hoc fashion incountry by the UK training team, but there
also needs to be an acceptance that range rules may not conform to UK standards.
8-74. Equipment care. The partner nation had little comprehension of equipment care,
particularly when dealing with weapon cleaning. Concurrent activity on static ranges was
focused on how to clean their weapons, and how to identify common basic faults.
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8-75. The final element of training was a maintainers’ package aimed at armourers, and this
also deliver a train-the-trainer (T3) module to their instructors.
Lesson: A T3 module provides the partner nation with the ability to train itself, and allows
the UK training team the ability to disengage if required.
8-76. Collective tactical training. Towards the end of the HMG module, an opportunity arose
in which to conduct further unplanned training – in this case collective infantry training
(dismounted close combat (DCC)). The units to be trained had previously received training
from US elements, were well-equipped and highly motivated. Their role was identified as
that which would achieve significant effect in the area of operations.
Insight: There may be opportunities to conduct further training, but it should be cleared
through the appropriate chain of command to ensure that it is coherent with the UK
strategic plan, and that it also conforms to the requirements of the partner nation. When
dealing with partner-nation units who have received training from other coalition partners,
it is useful to coordinate, to reduce the chance of ‘mentoring fratricide’.
8-77. A three-week training module was devised which had two elements; sharpshooter/
counter-sniper capability and a generic capability. The generic capability included:
a. Marksmanship.
b. Medical.
c. Basic C-IED.
d. HMG.
e. Individual skills and team tactics.
g. Officer mentoring.
8-78. Each of the two elements was run by officers and NCOs from Burma Company. A general
shortage of blank ammunition, both for UK trainers and to issue to the Peshmerga, had
a detrimental effect on the overall training module. Blank ammunition can be used in
demonstrations, and can highlight the importance of rates of fire, fire control orders, and
appropriate moments to switch fire – it aids visualisation.
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We quickly established that the Peshmerga are kinesthetic139 and visual learners,
and react much better to demonstrations and practical work than to theory
lessons. Our instructors would look to minimise the amount of talking they did
and to maximise the time available for soldiers to practice the drills being taught,
explaining the theory as they went along. Demo troops were effective at visually
communicating the key learning points of the lessons.
8-79. Support. The UK training team lived in a house allocated to them within a Peshmerga
camp and the partner nation provided real-life support (RLS), interpreters and force
protection (FP).
Observation: While there remain risks with dependency on the partner nation, each
deployment will have a different context and the transactional relationship can deepen
the relationship between the UK training team and the partner nation. It is also important
that the local UK commander on the ground can determine force protection requirements
(but with a line of communication up the UK chain of command) – “The Peshmerga took
the protection of the 2 YORKS personnel extremely seriously. Adding an overt sentry
threatened to offend the hosts and undo some of the rapport they had built, which in
itself affects force protection”.140
8-80. Resources. The UK training team deployed with a lack of strategic communications
equipment, and had to work around using RAF support helicopters (SH) communications
once in theatre. This was achieved through a secure satellite phone and beyond line of
sight (BLOS). There should also be the option of taking equipment such as electronic
countermeasures (ECM), enhanced combat body armour (ECBA), and personal locator
beacons (PLB). The team deployed with combat equipment marching order (CEMO) and a
black grip bag between two, based on the premise that ‘less is more’, and this provided
the ability to move quickly, extract easily, and also reinforced the ability of an infantryman
to remain comfortable in austere conditions. Large quantities of equipment were sent
forward to the UK training team without their request, consent or knowledge; this
created issues as there was no plan in place to either collect or store it.
8-81. 2 YORKS deployed without a government procurement card (GPC) and had to carry large
quantities of cash. This is a potential risk. To compound this issue, an overly prescriptive
process was put in place via the UK chain of command that meant authority had to be
sought prior to purchasing items, and then additional scrutiny was directed at how money
had been spent. This was a frustration to the UK training team and demonstrated a lack
of trust in the deployed commander. Mapping was not produced by the Geo Cell in time
for the deployment, and this process needs to be improved.
139 Kinesthetic is a learning style in which learning takes place by the students carrying out physical activities rather than
listening to a lecture or watching demonstrations. Kinesthetic learners are commonly referred to as ‘do-ers’.
140 Op SHADER Lessons Capture, dated 22 June 2015.
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8-82. Training. MATTs provided a suitable baseline, although additional training in survive,
evade, resist, extract (SERE),141 medical and driving (including civilian armoured vehicles
(CAV)). Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) refresher training was conducted prior to
deployment.
Conclusion
8-83. The Peshmerga were enthusiastic and eager to learn, and there was a noticeable
improvement in their skills on a daily basis. As one of the UK team leaders described:
The fact that the partner-nation forces were due to use their newly-acquired skills in
combat against ISIL also added to the professional satisfaction that the UK training teams
gained from this training delivery. This module also demonstrates the flexibility required to
deliver a planned package (heavy machine gun), with the ability to seize opportunities to
deliver further training in country, albeit with caution to ensure that it is suitable for the
partner nation and fits within the UK and coalition’s strategic plan.
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