Army Code 71750

LAND COMPONENT HANDBOOK

(ENEMY FORCES)

This publication supplements the

Issue 1.0: GENFORCE series of publications
June 2001 which remain extant.
 CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

Copyright. This work is copyright and the intellectual property rights for this publication
belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). No material or information contained
in this publication should be released outside MOD establishments except as authorised by
both the sponsor and the MOD where appropriate.

Security Classification. This document is issued for the information of such persons only
as need to know its contents in the course of their official duties. Any person finding this
document should hand it in to a British Forces unit or to a police station for its safe return to
the MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. When released to persons outside Government service, this
document is issued on a personal basis and the recipient to whom it is entrusted, in
confidence, within the provisions of the Official Secrets Act 1991-1989, is personally
responsible for its safe custody and for seeing that its contents are disclosed only to
authorised persons.

Authentication. This publication is issued under the overall direction of the CGS. More
precisely, DGD&D is the sponsor and his staff have prepared the detailed contents of the
publication. Any comments or queries concerning this work should be addressed to
DGD&D, Attention RO1 Author.

Legal Status. This publication has no formal status in legal terms. The contents provide a
clear military guide based on the most recent experience and best practice available for
commanders and troops to utilise in their operations and training. Where range safety and
weapon drills are concerned the rulings and procedures described are to be treated as
mandatory requirements. Commanders are to exercise reasonable care and diligence in
adhering to safety procedures when in potentially hazardous situations.

Distribution. As directed by the sponsor.

Amendment.

Amendment No Date Amendment No Date

A suggestion/addition/subtraction form is at the back of this publication for use by readers

who wish to recommend suitable amendments. Any such suggestions should be
addressed to the Intelligence Wing, Defence Intelligence and Security School, Chicksands,
Shefford, Bedfordshire SG17 5PR.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

“I never underestimate the enemy ... I look at his capabilities and assume he has them until
we find out differently”

General N Schwarzkopf, 1991

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 i

 PREFACE

1. This publication has been provided to supplement the four publications on

GENFORCE which are now in the process of being converted to a NATO publication
in due course. It is hoped that this one Handbook will cover all the main
requirements needed to plan exercises based on the doctrine and capabilities of a
realistic potential enemy.

2. There are 5 Parts to this publication which are divided into suitable categories and
utilising different coloured pages for ease of reference. They are:

a. Part A Dealing with overall doctrine, organisation and the conduct of a

GENFORCE enemy.

b. Part B Covers the facts and figures for planning the use of GENFORCE
equipment.

c. Part C Provides an indication of how a GENFORCE enemy would operate

and the combat indications that may show on the battlefield.

d. Part D Provides a detailed physical description and in most cases a picture

of GENFORCE equipment.

e. Part E Sets out a suitable GENFORCE ORBAT for use in training exercises
in the field and at schools of instruction and training establishments.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 iii

 CONTENTS LIST

PART A

Chapter 1 Concepts and Doctrine for Enemy Forces

Chapter 2 The Organisation of Enemy Forces

Chapter 3 The Conduct of Operations for Enemy Forces

PART B

Chapter 4 Planning Guide for Use of Enemy Forces Equipment

PART C

Chapter 5 Enemy Forces Combat Indicator Guide

PART D

Chapter 6 Enemy Force Equipment Details and Recognition Guide

PART E

Chapter 7 Suitable GENFORCE Orbats

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 v

 PART A

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

 CHAPTER 1

CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINE FOR ENEMY FORCES

SECTION 1 - THE TWO ARMIES CONCEPT

1. The ‘Two-Armies’ Concept. Given the problems of organizing, training and, above
all, financing all units and formations to meet the highly demanding requirements of future
war, GENFORCE has adopted a “two armies” concept reminiscent of its World War II
approach.

2. Basic Forces. These comprise those formations stationed forward and mobilization
reserves in the interior.

a. Organisation. Both forward and reserve formations are manned largely by

conscripts. Some of the former, particularly in low threat areas, are manned at only
65-75% in peacetime, though they are fully equipped. These have a modified version
of the full training programme (ie, excluding cadre battalions) and practice
mobilization procedures regularly, with their reservists receiving refresher training.
The latter are fully kitted out only with combat equipment, often of older types, and
rely on civilian transport and some engineer assets being mobilized from the
economy. They are manned only at 20-25% and consequently do not do field
training above battalion level except on rare mobilization exercises. Currently, the
Basic Forces are being reorganized into cheaper, smaller, simpler and more easily
handled divisions than those of the traditional type.

b. Employment. The Basic Forces perform the less demanding wartime

missions. In defence, they absorb, disrupt and slow down or halt the enemy attack,
shaping the battlefield and winning time for counter-moves. In the offensive, they pin
and wear down the enemy and provide protection for the flanks of major offensive
efforts and for quiet sectors. In both phases of war they may be used to provide
reserves to meet enemy deep thrusts or air or sea landings.

3. Mobile Forces. These comprise a smaller proportion of the total ground forces than
the Basic Forces. They are, however, the cutting edge. In peacetime, the bulk of the mobile
forces are stationed centrally, ready to deploy to any theatre of military operations as
required. Some corps and brigades, however, are deployed forward in peacetime to areas
of high levels of threat in order to stiffen the Basic Forces there and provide formations fully
capable of operational manoeuvre.

a. Organisation. The Mobile Forces contain a high proportion of volunteer

soldiers. All formations are fully equipped with the latest types and are fully manned
in peacetime. They undergo a full and demanding training programme, including
frequent formation level field training exercises, and they are kept at a high level of
combat readiness. Formations are larger and more complex and more flexibly
structured than the traditional, triangular divisions (which do not vary): the numbers
and types of subordinate elements will be varied to suit the mission.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-1-1

 b. Employment. The Mobile Forces perform the strategically and operationally
decisive missions, supported by the Basic Forces. In the defensive, they conduct the
major counterattacks and offensives. In the offensive, they conduct deep operations
with decisive goals. The bulk of GENFORCE’s long-range combat capabilities are
held in the Mobile Forces, and it is expected that, in consequence, GENFORCE will
win the struggle for information and fire superiority in the areas where they are
committed.

4. Command and Control. To increase flexibility and responsiveness within drastically

shortened time periods, and also for reasons of economy, GENFORCE has removed two
levels of command. Progress in communications and the now high level of automation in
C4I has made this possible. Of particular importance, it has enabled GENFORCE to field
effective RFCs/RSCs. Great attention has been paid to Electronic Counter Counter
Measures (ECCM) to ensure continuity and security in C3, with frequency hopping, burst
transmission and automatic retuning in the face of jamming all being employed to degrade
electronic attack.

5. Levels of Combat and their Related Command Levels

Level of War Traditional Relationship Current Relationship

Strategic Theatre of Military Operations Strategic Grouping
Operational- Higher Army Group Basic Forces Mobile Forces
Strategic Formation
Operational Higher Army Army Corps
Formation
Tactical Division Division Brigade
Lower
Tactical Formation Regiment Regiment Battalion

Tactical Unit Battalion Battalion Company

Sub-Unit

SECTION 2 - THE PRINCIPLES OF GENFORCE

6. Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. In selecting the aim of any combat action,
GENFORCE commanders are taught to emphasise the destruction of the enemy. Tactical
commanders will have their aim closely defined by senior commanders and they will have
little latitude to vary it. GENFORCE commanders at brigade and battalion level will be
expected to demonstrate much greater initiative as to how to achieve their aim - a style of
mission command.

7. Surprise. Surprise is considered an increasingly important component of victory.

Regulations lay down a mandatory requirement for commanders at all levels to complement
all operational plans with a deception plan. In the defensive surprise confers the initiative
on the attacker and disrupts and unbalances the defender, enabling GENFORCE to impose
its style of warfighting on the enemy. In the defence, it enables GENFORCE to wrest the
initiative from the attacker and thus goes some way to negating the enemy’s superior
strength. Pre-emption is seen as a vital component of surprise in all situations.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-1-2

8. Activeness and Speed.

a. Significance of the Initiative. GENFORCE considers that all the strengths

of a good defensive position are outweighed by the advantages of possession of the
initiative that an attacker will have. An attacker dictates the course of events and
usually has better morale. GENFORCE endeavours to maintain an offensive state of
mind in it commanders.

b. Constant Pressure. Offensive action must be pursued around the clock,

regardless of weather. Where necessary, momentum is maintained through the
acceptance of casualties, as physical losses are more acceptable than the loss of
time, which is seen to be the most precious commodity in modern war.

c. Speed. In the offensive the creation of speed by high tempo operations will
unbalance the enemy and disrupt his command and control arrangements,
paralysing commanders and isolating forces for subsequent destruction. Bypassing
is preferred to assaulting, with the transition to the pursuit being sought as early as
possible. In the defence, emphasis is placed upon rapid regrouping and reaction by
reserves. In both phases of war, great stress is placed upon the speedy reactions of
air, missile and artillery strike systems and the use of air mobility to carry the battle to
the enemy’s depth.

d. Commander’s Initiative. Commanders are made aware of their superior’s

concept of operations and are expected to seize any opportunity to further his aims.
Nonetheless, while the “how” will often be left to subordinates, the “when” and
“where” will still tend to be closely controlled.

9. Concentration.

a. General. Success stems from the concentration of superior force at a

decisive time and place. Importantly, GENFORCE does not just examine relative
numerical strengths; it also considers the ratio of forces to space, particularly when a
defender is overstretched. Thus a defender with adequate force density will be
difficult to overcome unless by massive application of firepower to lower the force
density prior to tactical manoeuvre. Conversely, a defender stretched to cover an
excessive sector can be defeated by an attacker with little or no numerical
superiority, but possessing the initiative and freedom to concentrate his efforts at the
chosen point of attack.

b. Ratios. GENFORCE will accept a ratio of 1.5:1 in the strategic offensive, as

long as 3-4:1 can be achieved at the operational level. At brigade and battalion level
5-6:1 is sought against a prepared enemy on a main axis (although this does not
mean that the attack will be unimaginative and attritional), while 3:1 could be
acceptable on a secondary axis or against apartially prepared or overextended
defence.

c. Achieving Correlation of Forces. GENFORCE follows 5 complementary

approaches to the problems of concentration to achieve the requisite correlation of
forces in the offensive:

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-1-3

 i. Manoeuvre. In the offensive, given operational surprise, an
incompletely prepared and unbalanced enemy will be destroyed in a series of
meeting engagements. In defence, manoeuvre is even more important, as a
superior enemy cannot be defeated in an attritional struggle. Only manoeuvre
to create counter-concentrations, surprise and aggressive counter-moves will
bring success.

ii. Deception. An enemy must be persuaded, through deception and

feints, to concentrate his forces on false axes, thus reducing his combat
density on the chosen axes.

iii. Concentration of Fire. The use of preparatory fire and electronic

attack, coupled with precision weapons, will reduce a defenders strength. It
will also disrupt an attacker, making him vulnerable to counter-moves. At all
levels, a commander must be allocated sufficient resources necessary for
success.

iv. March Separately, Fight Together. Manoeuvre units will advance

rapidly from dispersed locations and converge at the last minute in the chosen
sector, choosing to attack from the line of march. The aim is to achieve
surprise, focusing on time and not space. The most dramatic method is the
use of air mobility.

v. Dispersal. Concentration areas are large to minimise the effect of enemy

strikes.

d. Maintaining a Favourable Correlation of Forces. To maintain the correct

correlation of forces, GENFORCE will aim to disrupt and slow down any enemy
attempts at regrouping once a break-through has occurred.

10. Action Throughout the Enemy’s Depth. The need to attack the enemy
simultaneously throughout the entire depth of his deployment is a long established
GENFORCE principle. Key to destabilising the defence are the disruption of enemy C3I
and logistic support, the fixing of operational reserves and the early seizure of vital ground
in depth. This requires the early use of tactical manoeuvre. Associated with this principle
of simultaneity is the identification of the enemy’s centre of gravity (CG), which will be the
decisive point for the application of force. Both sides’ CGs are likely to be focused on
groupings of key weapons systems and their associated C3I. Therefore, main and
subsidiary axes have largely been replaced by areas for the concentration of effort, with
main forces operating against and within the enemy’s depth. Thus, as part of
simultaneous action throughout the enemy’s depth, combined arms battalions will often be
sent out as raiding or forward detachments. Even with GENFORCE in defence, the
attackers plans are vulnerable to strike into his depth, with success being achieved only if
the attacker is prevented from mastering the area of long-range combat.

11. Realism. GENFORCE is acutely aware of the danger of overtasking, while

undertasking is considered to be unacceptable. The successful commander is the one who
best balances the risks he faces so that he can achieve his aim whatever counter-move the
enemy may undertake. Essential to this are effective reconnaissance and flexible
deployment of forces.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-1-4

12. Co-ordination. All GENFORCE commanders are taught to regard themselves as
combined arms commanders, as only this approach brings success. As all arms are
integrated into the battalion structure, working and training together, commanders can fully
understand their strengths and weaknesses and staffs become accustomed to coordinating
their actions.

13. Preservation of Combat Effectiveness of own Troops. GENFORCE is insistent

that victory is only achieved if friendly losses are held to an acceptable level while the
enemy’s are not. Therefore the mass army concept has been abandoned in favour of a
qualitative approach. GENFORCE currently sees 4 solutions to the problem:

a. Offensive Action. A surprise, in-depth offensive pursued at a high tempo will

prevent the enemy from organising his defence and effectively utilising long-range
weapons. Even in defence, offensive action against enemy C4I and deep strike
systems will be critical to reduce losses and maintain an effective, balanced posture.

b. Protective Measures. Passive protection measures such as camouflage,

concealment, the use of deceptive groupings, dispersion, the use of night and bad
weather to cover movement and security (especially electronic) are considered
crucial to survival at all levels of war. The enemy’s attention must be diverted away
from what should be his primary areas of concern, and stereotyping in the planning
and execution of missions should be avoided at all costs. Considerable stress is
placed on technological counter-measures to attack; even individual AFVs have
defensive aid suites to detect incoming missiles. Coupled with these defensive
measures, active measures to disrupt enemy strike and fire capabilities all help
preserve GENFORCE’s combat effectiveness.

c. Restoration of Combat Effectiveness. After devastating strikes the

restoration of combat effectiveness is achieved by combining relatively unscathed
elements with composite detachments, which themselves have been formed by
amalgamating badly mauled units.

d. Logistic Support. GENFORCE has devised a logistics system that can cope
with fast moving operations where boundaries are not clearly defined.

SECTION 3 - MANOEUVRE THINKING

14. General. GENFORCE sees future war as being inevitably one of manoeuvre. This
perception has strengthened some of its previous tenets, but it has also led to new thinking.
The fundamentals of manoeuvre warfare as identified by GENFORCE are as follows:

a. Command and Control. Senior commanders will closely coordinate the

actions of subordinates to exploit the decisive use of concentrated missile, artillery
and aviation assets, although a fast moving and changing battlefield will mean that
commanders at all levels will have to use their initiative. Tactical, all arms groupings
will be created to ensure that subordinate commanders can meet any challenges
without pausing to wait for reinforcement.

b. Designation of a Main Effort. Commanders will have to indicate clearly the

area of main effort.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-1-5

15. Focus on Enemy, NOT Terrain Objectives. The main effort will be directed
towards the destruction of the enemy’s main grouping (ie the cornerstone of his fighting
power). At the tactical and operational levels this will almost always be the enemy’s means
of controlling and waging long-range combat.

16. Act Faster than the Enemy can React. GENFORCE believes that the winner in
the battle for time will be the victor because enemy reactions will become increasingly
ineffectual.

17. Bold, Decisive Action. Success will only be achieved by taking the battle to the
enemy, especially in his depth. GENFORCE intends to attack the enemy’s CG
aggressively, taking appropriate risks to seize the initiative.

18. Avoid Strength, Attack Weaknesses. Although the destruction of key enemy
groupings is normally the aim at the tactical and operational levels, it is not approached in
an attritional manner. By exploiting the enemy’s weaknesses his C4I and logistic system
can be attacked, splitting his groupings into non-cohesive elements that can be destroyed
in detail. This does not conflict with the need to be decisive and concentrate on a main
effort as the way to the enemy’s main grouping will usually be through weak spots.

19. Interdependence of Firepower and Manoeuvre. Concentration of fire makes it

possible to generate manoeuvre, while manoeuvre makes it possible to bring fire to bear at
critical points.

20. Use of Reserves to Achieve a Decision. Reserves, which may be airmobile, can
be used to break an enemy that is on the brink. New reserves will always be created.

21. Command from the Front. Command should be exercised from the front, with
control from rear headquarters, to give the commander a personal feel to make correct
decisions in a timely manner.

22. Avoidance of Stereotype. Predictable actions will not only fail, but could also result
in unjustified and unacceptable losses.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-1-6

 CHAPTER 2

THE ORGANISATION OF ENEMY MOBILE FORCES

SECTION 1 – ORGANIC GROUPINGS

1. General. If the Basic Forces are GENFORCE’s shield, the Mobile Forces form the
sword. They are designed to deliver heavy blows in the pursuit of deep operations, though
where necessary, elements may be used to stiffen the defence on the main axis of an
enemy attack. While their main role is to provide the cutting edge of offensive or counter-
offensive action, the Mobile Forces are not structured purely for the offensive. As all battles
and operations are seen to comprise a mix of attack and defence and to involve broad
manoeuvre with open flanks, dedicated anti-tank elements are included at all levels from
battalion upwards; these are now combined arms groupings, with organic motor rifle,
artillery and air defence assets. Each unit and formation is designed to operate
independently where necessary, having all the combat and service support required to
ensure sustainability when detached from the parent formation. GENFORCE regards it as
axiomatic that any decentralization of decision making, any empowerment of tactical
commanders to use their initiative to achieve broad goals must be matched by appropriate
organizational structuring. Such commanders must be given the means with which they
can fulfil their mission without having to wait on reinforcement from above if their
independence is to have substance.

2. The Combined Arms Battalion. Non-linear combat increases the importance of

sustained, independent actions by units and sub-units fighting on separate axes or isolated
sectors, and of the flexibility, imagination and initiative of commanders at all levels. In future
war, GENFORCE has come to believe that overall success will depend on the capabilities
and actions of the smallest component of tailored force structuring - the combined arms
battalion. It requires rapid penetration into the depth and wide use of outflanking and
envelopment manoeuvres to deliver blows against the enemy’s flanks and rear. Old style
sub-units (ie, tank and motor rifle battalions) were not really up to meeting these demands.
It had long been the practice to reinforce standard battalions to execute independent
missions, but handling such ad hoc groupings often proved to be beyond the knowledge,
experience and, indeed, the capacity of their commanders. Recognizing this, GENFORCE
has made the battalion the basic combined arms unit in the Mobile Forces. The new tank
and mechanized and motor rifle battalions are well balanced entities that are composed of
elements that live and train together in peacetime instead of being hastily thrown together in
battle. They possess considerably more combat power (the equivalent of two traditional
battalions), a more flexible structure and greater sustainability than before, enabling them to
conduct independent or semi-independent actions over significant periods on an
increasingly lethal battlefield. They are now commanded
by experienced, staff-trained lieutenant colonels selected for qualities of imagination,
initiative and flexible minds, instead of the mere captains or junior majors of yore. They are
capable of acting immediately as forward, raiding or outflanking detachments without
requiring much or any reinforcement.

3. The Combined Arms Brigade. The traditional unit (ie, regiment) had three motor
rifle battalions and one tank battalion (vice versa in a tank regiment). GENFORCE came to
believe that this structure was relatively inflexible, and dissatisfaction was expressed with

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-1

the need to weaken a sub-unit if a combined arms grouping was to be formed by
reinforcement from another (GENFORCE never practised cross attachments). Moreover,
the traditional regiment lacked enough organic reconnaissance, artillery, air defence and
combat and service support to take on a truly independent role. The new style brigades are
a radical departure in force structuring. They are lower formations, not units. They are
distinguished from divisions by greater tailoring to achieve superior land-air mobility,
flexibility and sustainability at a lower level than before. They have about the same
manoeuvre strength as two and a half old style regiments, but almost the same combat and
service support as a former heavy division. This reflects the demands of the fragmented,
non-linear battlefield. They thus combine the high firepower of artillery for long-range
combat with the shock power of strong tank and motor rifle units and the organic ability to
undertake airmobile actions. Greatly strengthened air defence and engineer complements
will do much to increase survivability and capability for manoeuvre. (In this context, the
provision of short-range air defence within the air defence regiment will do much to improve
the survivability of artillery, logistics and command elements, which will no longer have to
rely totally on the area coverage of medium range systems.) Noteworthy innovations are
the inclusion of an EW company, a deception/camouflage company, a separate light motor
rifle battalion for use in the airmobile, anti-landing/raiding or combined arms reserve roles,
the formation of a combined arms anti-tank reserve (an expanded anti-tank battalion) and
the capability of using elements of the artillery regiment as a RFC.

4. The Combined Arms Corps. The new Corps is a higher (ie, operational) formation.
As such, it has no fixed composition, being tailored to its operational missions. The Corps
will comprise 4-6 manoeuvre brigades and is roughly equal in manoeuvre strength to three
old style divisions. It does, however, contain significantly more artillery and air defence
assets than those three divisions plus army troops, not to mention the very strong EW and
aviation components. These disproportionate increases reflect the growing importance of
indirect precision and ACM fire (including the delivery of remote mines and jammers), just
as the considerable fixed and rotary wing aviation element reflects the increasing
significance of the third dimension in non-linear, fragmented combat. In pursuance of the
deep operations theme, the corps disposed of powerful air assault and airmobile forces,
including a sizeable Special Purpose Forces (SPF) element. As the Corps will deploy in
considerable width and depth, significant resources are provided for area air and anti-air
landing/raiding defence (the latter provided by the light motor rifle brigade, which also
provides airmobile elements). To help meet the threat of precision attack, a separate
camouflage and deception battalion is fielded, its efforts being carefully coordinated with
those of engineer, chemical defence and EW troops. The new Corps is a large, complex
formation, but GENFORCE believes that improvements in C4I will make it sufficiently
controllable and flexible to be managed even on tomorrow’s battlefield.

SECTION 2 – DETAILED ORGANISATIONS

BATTALION ORGANISATION

5. General. A Mobile Forces Company is classified as a tactical ‘Sub-Unit’, the basic

building block of GENFORCE. A Battalion is classified as a tactical ‘UNIT’. The Mobile
Forces Battalion is equivalent to 2 x Basic Forces Battalions. They are well-balanced
entities that are composed of elements that live and train together in peacetime instead of
being hastily thrown together in battle. A Bn is commanded by a staff-trained Lt Col

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-2

selected for qualities of imagination, initiative and flexibility of thinking. There are 3 types of
Mobile Forces battalion.

6. Combined Arms Motor Rifle Bn. A Combined Arms Motor Rifle Bn is made up of:

a. Motor Rifle Coys (x3). Each Motor Rifle Coy has a total of 14 BMP. There
are 3 platoons each with 3 BMPs plus 1 BMP for the coy commander. Coy combat
support consists of a Support Weapons Platoon equipped with 4 BMP.

b. Tank Coys (x2). Each Tank Coy has a total of 13 tanks. There are 3
platoons each with 4 tanks plus 1 tank for the coy commander. Tank coys do not
have combat support.

7. Combined Arms Tank Bn. A Combined Arms Tank Bn is made up of:

a. Tank Coys (x3). Each Tank Coy has a total of 13 tanks. There are 3
platoons each with 4 tanks plus 1 tank for the coy commander. Tank coys do not
have combat support.

b. Motor Rifle Coys (x2). Each Motor Rifle Coy has a total of 14 BMP. There
are 3 platoons each with 3 BMPs plus 1 BMP for the coy commander. Coy combat
support consists of a Support Weapons Platoon equipped with 4 BMP.

8. Separate Light Motor Rifle Bn. A Separate Light Motor Rifle Bn is made up of:

a. Light Motor Rifle Coys (x3). Each Light Motor Rifle Coy has a total of 14
BTR. There are 3 platoons each with 3 BTRs plus 1 BTR for the coy commander.
Coy combat support consists of a Support Weapons Platoon equipped with 4 BTR.

9. ORBATS. In order to rationalise training and improve the understanding of

GENFORCE orders of battle a generic organisation used by instructors at schools and
training establishments around the Army is shown at the back of this publication in Part E.
These should be utilised by those planning exercises throughout the Army.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-3

 COMBINED ARMS BATTALION MR TK
II 69 55 BMP
26 39 TKS
0 0 BTR

MR COY MR COY MR COY or TK COY TK COY

14 BMP TK COY 13 TKS
1 x BMP (Comd) 1 x Tk (Comd)
3 x MR Pl (3 x BMP) Tk Pl (4 Tks)
(3 x RPG-29) Tk Pl (4 Tks)
(3 x RPK) Tk Pl (4 Tks)
SW Pl (4 x BMP)
(6 x PKM)
(6 x AT-13/METIS)

Fire Support Coordination Centre

AIR DEF ANTI-TK ARTY GRENADE LR ENGR RECCE

PL
BN BTY BN COY COY
(4 x BMP) (4 x 2A45) (24 x 2S31) (3 x BMP) (See ENGR Ops) (3 x BRM3K)
(8 x 2S6) (4 x 9P149) (8 x 1V12) (6 x AGS-17) (6 x BMP)
(12 x SA-16 (4 x BRDM3)
(IGLA))

Rear Services Coordination Centre

MAT SPT CHEM MAINT Rear SVCS Med
COY DEF COY COY SYCOY PT
As MR Coy
14 BMP

LIGHT MOTOR RIFLE BATTALION

II 63 x BTR

LT LT LT
MR COY MR COY MR COY
1 x BTR Comd
3 x MR Pl (3 x BTR)
(3 x RPG-29)
SW Pl (4 x BTR)
(6 x AT-13
(METIS))
(6 x PKM)

Support Weapons Company

AIR DEF ANTI-TK MORTAR GRENADE LR ARTY RECCE

PL
PL COY BTY BTY PL
(4 x BTR) (14 x BTR) (8 x 2B14) (3 x BTR) (8 x 2B16) (4 x BRDM3)
(12 x SA-16 (24 x AT-14 (9 x RPG-29 (6 x AGS-17) (9 x RPG-29)
(IGLA)) (KORNET))

MAINT SUP PL MED

PL PL

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-4

 SECTION 3 - BRIGADE ORGANISATION

10. Brigades were developed to command a smaller number of more capable and
flexible manoeuvre elements. Brigades speed up GENFORCE’s ability to react to the
changing tactical situation and are distinguished from Divisions by greater tailoring to
achieve superior land-air mobility, flexibility and sustainability. The brigade is classified as
a tactical lower formation. The Regt was found to be a redundant level of command.
Brigades have the same manoeuvre strength as 2.5 x Basic Forces Regiments. There are
3 types of Mobile Forces brigade.

11. Combined Arms Motor Rifle Bde. A Combined Arms Motor Rifle Bde is made up
of:

a. Motor Rifle Bns (x3). Each Motor Rifle Bn has a total of 69 BMP and 26
tanks. There are 3 Motor Rifle coys each with 14 BMP and 2 Tank Coys each with
13 tanks. Bn combat support consists of Air Defence Bn, Anti-tank Bty, Arty Bn,
Grenade Launcher Pl, Engr Coy and Recce Coy.

b. Tk Bns (x2). Each Tank Bn has a total of 39 tanks and 55 BMP. There are 3
Tank coys each with 13 tanks and 2 Motor Rifle coys each with 14 BMP. Bn combat
support is exactly the same as a Motor Rifle Bn.

c. Lt Motor Rifle Bn (x1). Each Lt Motor Rifle Bn has a total of 63 BTR. There
are 3 coys of 14 BTR. Bn combat support consists of Air Defence Pl, Anti-tank Coy,
Mortar Bty, Grenade Launcher Pl, Arty Bty and Recce Pl.

The total number of combat vehicles in a Combined Arms Motor Rifle Bde is:

317 BMP
158 Tanks
63 BTR

12. Combined Arms Tank Bde. A Combined Arms Tank Bde is made up of:

a. Tk Bns (x3). Each Tank Bn has a total of 39 tanks and 55 BMP. There are 3
Tank coys each with 13 tanks and 2 Motor Rifle coys each with 14 BMP. Bn combat
support consists of Air Defence Bn, Anti-tank Bty, Arty Bn, Grenade Launcher Pl,
Engr Coy and Recce Coy.

b. Motor Rifle Bns (x2). Each Motor Rifle Bn has a total of 69 BMP and 26
tanks. There are 3 Motor Rifle coys each with 14 BMP and 2 Tank Coys each with
13 tanks. Bn combat support consists of Air Defence Bn, Anti-tank Bty, Arty Bn,
Grenade Launcher Pl, Engr Coy and Recce Coy.

c. Lt Motor Rifle Bn (x1). Each Lt Motor Rifle Bn has a total of 63 BTR. There
are 3 coys of 14 BTR. Bn combat support consists of Air Defence Pl, Anti-tank Coy,
Mortar Bty, Grenade Launcher Pl, Arty Bty and Recce Pl.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-5

The total number of combat vehicles in a Combined Arms Tank Bde is:

169 Tanks
303 BMP
63 BTR

13. Separate Light Motor Rifle Bde. A Separate Light Motor Rifle Bde is made up of:

a. Lt Motor Rifle Bn (x3). Each Lt Motor Rifle Bn has a total of 63 BTR. There
are 3 coys of 14 BTR. Bn combat support consists of Air Defence Pl, Anti-tank Coy,
Mortar Bty, Grenade Launcher Pl, Arty Bty and Recce Pl.

b. Tk Bn (x1). Each Tank Bn has a total of 39 tanks and 55 BMP. There are 3
Tank coys each with 13 tanks and 2 Motor Rifle coys each with 14 BMP. Bn combat
support consists of Air Defence Bn, Anti-tank Bty, Arty Bn, Engr Coy and Recce
Coy.

The total number of combat vehicles in a Separate Light Motor Rifle Bde is:

189 BTR
55 BMP
39 Tanks

14. The Bde Orbats are shown overleaf.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-6

 COMBINED ARMS BRIGADE MR TK
X 317 303 BMP
156 169 TKS (Manouevre Elms Only)
63 63 BTR

MR BN MR BN MR BN or TK BN TK BN LT MR
TK BN BN
(69 x BMP) (69 x BMP) (69 x BMP) (55 x BMP) (55 x BMP) (63 x BTR)
(26 x TANKS) (26 x TANKS) (26 x TANKS) (39 x TANKS) (39 x TANKS) (+ CS)
(+ CS) (+ CS) or (+ CS) (+ CS) (+ CSS)
(+ CSS) (+ CSS) (55 x BMP) (+ CSS) (+ CSS)
(39 x TANKS)
(+ CS)
(+ CSS)

AIR DEF SEP ANTI-TK ARTY ENGR ECM RECCE

BN
REGT REGT REGT COY BN
(12 x SA-13 (12 x 9P149) (54 x 2S19) (See Engr Ops) (See EW Ops) (See Recce Ops)
(STRELA-10)) (12 x 2A45) (24 x 1V12M)
(16 x SA-15 (6 x 2S19) (4 x PRP-4)
(TOR M-1)) (17 x BMP) (18 x 9A51
(+ CSS) (1 x BRM-3K) (PRIMA))
(4 x 2S6) (8 x 1V17)
(+ CS) (+ CSS)
(+ CSS)

MAT SPT SIGS MAINT Rear SVCS Med Deception/ Chem Def
BN BN BN SY BN BN Camouflage Coy
Coy
LIGHT MOTOR RIFLE BRIGADE
X 55 x BMP
39 x TANK (Manouevre Elms Only)
189 x BTR

LT LT LT TK BN
MR BN MR BN MR BN
(63 x BTR) (63 x BTR) (63 x BTR) (55 x BMP)
(+ CS) (+ CS) (+ CS) (39 x TANKS)
(+ CS)
(+ CSS

AIR DEF SEP ANTI-TK ARTY ENGR ECM RECCE

BN
BN REGT REGT COY BN
(6 x SA-13 (12 x 2A45M) (36 x 2A65) (See Engr Ops) (See EW Ops) (See Recce Ops)
(STRELA-10)) (12 x 9P148) (18 x 2A61)
(6 x 2S6) (6 x 2A61) (18 x 9A51
(12 x SA-16 (17 x BTR) (PRIMA))
(IGLA)) (1 x BRM-3K) (24 x 1V17M)
(4 x BTR) (4 x 2S6) (+ CSS)
(+ CSS) (+ CS)
(+ CSS)

Sigs Maint Mat Spt Med Deception/ Chem Def

Bn Bn Bn Bn Camouflage Coy
Coy

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-7

 SECTION 4 – CORPS ORGANISATION

15. General. Corps have been formed as a replacement for the Army. The Corps is
smaller and more agile than an Army but contains proportionally a much higher level of
capability to conduct long range battle. The Corps is classified as an OPERATIONAL
HIGHER FORMATION. They have the same manoeuvre strength as 3 x Basic Forces
Divisions. There is only 1 type of Corps.

16. Combined Arms Army Corps. A Combined Arms Army Corps is made up of 4-6
manoeuvre brigades. The types of Bde will vary according to role. It also has two additional
manoeuvre elements:

a. Combat Aviation Brigade. This exists to provide the air dimension for the
tactical battle. GENFORCE perceives the need for a dedicated component to
guarantee intimate air support at all times. Combat aviation consists primarily of
attack and transport helicopters but also includes day-oonly ground attack aircraft.

b. Air Assault Battalion. Being mounted in BMDs, air assault troops are
usually used for raiding actions or as forward detachments. In view of this, and the
elite nature of the battalion, it could well be used in greater depth than ordinary motor
rifle elements whether to mount raids or to seize an area of concern to the corps
commander.

17. Corps Combat Support. This consists of:

a. SSM Bde (x2). 18 x SS-21 (TOCHKA) per bde.

b. Arty Bde. 48 x 2A36, 48 x 2S5.
c. MBRL Bde. 72 x 9P140.
d. AT Bde. 36 x 9P149, 36 x 9P148, plus combat support.
e. SAM Bde. 24 x SA-17 (BUK M-2).
f. SAM Regt. 16 x SA-15 (TOR M-1).
g. EW elements.
h. Engr Bde.
i. Recce Bde.
j. RPV Sqn.

18. ORBAT. As shown overleaf.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-8

 COMBINED ARMS ARMY CORPS

CORPS

LT MR MBRL ARTY
TK BDE MR BDE SSM BDE
BDE BDE BDE
72 x 9P140 48 x 2A36
18 x SS-21 48 x 2S5
(TOCHKA)

SAM SAM RECCE CBT AVN ENGR

AT BDE
BDE REGT BDE BDE BDE
36 x 9P149 / 36 x 9P148 24 x SA-17 (BUK M-2) 16 x SA-15 (TOR M-1)
69 x BMP / 18 x 2S19
16 x 2S6

RADIO/RADAR RADIO/RADAR
PONTOON ASSLT SIGS INTERCEPT
RADIO
JAMMING
INTERCEPT
BR REGT XING BN REGT BN BN BN

RPV AIR FLAME SPF SMOKE MAT SP

THROWER
SQN ASSLT BN BN BN BDE

MED MAINT SAM TECH SAM TECH MED TPT EARLY

REG REGT BASE BASE BN WNG BN

REAR SVCS AIRFD TECH TFC CHEM DEF DECEPTION/ SEPRR

SY REGT COY CON BN CAM BN BN
BN

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-2-9

 SECTION 5 - RECONNAISSANCE

19. General. GENFORCE has always regarded reconnaissance (recce) as the most
important element of combat support. In future war, it will be even more critical than in the
past, given the increased range, accuracy and responsiveness of modern weapons
systems. As well as growing in importance, recce has changed its relationship with combat
systems. In the past, recce collected data which was then collated, analysed and evaluated
to turn it into intelligence. The resulting intelligence was then disseminated upwards,
downwards and sideways as appropriate and used in the formation of operational and
tactical plans and for targeting purposes. This process often took a long time. Victory in
long-range combat depends on a much more intimate link between recce and fire systems
than existed in the past. For this reason, recce is becoming intimately linked with fire
delivery systems and the old, sequential operation of recce and combat elements is giving
way to simultaneity. GENFORCE recce is tasked to gather three types of information.

a. Enemy Force. Information on the location, strength, composition, and

intentions of the enemy. The focus is on precision guided munitions (PGM),
chemical/nuclear delivery means, HQs communications nodes, artillery, air defence
and aviation.

b. Topographical. Information on routes, obstacles, key terrain, etc.

c. NBC Contamination. Identify contaminated areas, the type of contamination

and the limits of the area.

20. Recce Problems. GENFORCE identifies three particular problems facing recce in
future war:

a. The Non-Linear Battlefield. Combat will develop very unevenly and spread
over wider areas than in the past. Neither units or formations will enjoy secure flanks
or rear areas. Friendly and enemy forces will become intermingled and situations
will develop and change with great rapidity. Recce must be able to give timely
warning to commanders of rapidly developing threats. The intermingling of opposing
forces will obviously complicate greatly the problem of targeting, especially for
indirect fire systems. Developing an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system that
will operate reliably without allowing any possibility of the enemy jamming or
reproducing it is a major GENFORCE research and development task.

b. Completeness. As weapons systems become more and more capable, so

the requirement for their accurate location (and thereafter destruction) grows.
Today, GENFORCE believes that, for an attack to have a good chance of success, it
will generally be necessary to pinpoint 70-80% of possible targets and 90-100% of
the most critical ones.

c. Data Processing. At the same time as the battlefield is becoming more and
more complex and the requirement for intelligence greater and greater, the number
of sources and agencies at work producing information is growing. An enormous
amount of data pours into Command Posts (CP) and this has to be turned into
intelligence and targeting data very rapidly indeed. Just as important is the speed of
processing, for the side that acts faster will win the crucial battle for time. This has

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 10

 forced GENFORCE into the use of automated and semi-automated systems to
preclude time-lags.

21. Recce Principles. GENFORCE staffs and collectors stress the following principles
in intelligence work:

a. Purposefulness. At each level, all recce assets must work within a

coordinated recce plan using each to its full potential.

b. Continuity. Recce must be continuous, by day and night and in all weathers,
and the plan that drives it must be updated as the situation changes.

c. Aggressiveness. Acquiring intelligence will always be a struggle and the

recce battle must be waged aggressively, whether in attack or defence.

d. Timeliness. Only intelligence received in good time will enable commanders

to adjust their plans to a changing situation and thus retain or seize the initiative.

e. Security. GENFORCE is well aware that the scale of its recce effort and the
general and specific areas and objectives targeted may enable the enemy to learn a
lot about intentions and plans. Every effort is made to conceal the scale, missions
and targets of the recce effort.

f. Accuracy and Reliability. GENFORCE’s own enthusiasm for deception

breeds a fear of being deceived. An effort will always be made to confirm the
information provided by one source with the findings of another type of collector.

g. Integration. Increasingly, recce assets are required not merely to locate

targets but to guide weapons onto them and analyse the impact of their strikes.
Moreover, many of these targets will be moving and thus transient targets of
opportunity. This requires the vertical integration of some recce systems with
strike/fire systems.

h. Reserves. In this, the information age of warfare, commanders are expected

to retain a recce reserve, and, when that is expended, to create a new one.

22. Types of Recce Zones. Different levels of command are assigned recce and
engagement zones as follows:

a. Zone of Detailed Recce and Deep Fire Destruction. The depth of this zone
is determined by the effective range over the line of contact of the weapons systems
commanded by the headquarters. The width of the zone is that of the unit’s or
formation’s boundaries.

b. Zone of Immediate Fire Destruction. This is the zone in which most of the
unit/formation’s weapons can be brought to bear, where the enemy is generally
engaged immediately.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 11

 c. Zone of General Recce. Within this zone, the headquarters must be able to
monitor enemy activity sufficiently to ensure that its own plans are not disrupted by
unexpected enemy moves. For this reason, the zone overlaps boundaries.

d. Rear Recce Zone. Headquarters have to monitor enemy activity in their own
rear areas, especially the use of air landing, diversionary or bypassed elements.

23. Lines of Fire Coordination. These lines are used to separate the recce and
engagement zones at each level. Subordinate headquarters will not engage targets
beyond such a line. The superior headquarters may designate targets for its assets within
its subordinate’s zone of deep fire destruction and will inform the latter accordingly, freeing
the lower echelon to concentrate on other targets.

24. Operational Level Missions. An operational formation’s intelligence priorities may

well become missions for collectors in tactical formations operating in the enemy’s depth.
These are locations and activities of:

a. Formation HQs, Recce-Strike Complex (RSC) control centres and

communications centres/nodes.

b. Intelligence gathering assets.

c. Nuclear and precision weapons.

d. Electronic Warfare (EW) systems.

e. Air defence weapons, radars and control centres.

f. Airfields and forward operating sites.

g. Artillery groupings and their command, control and communications (C3).

h. Major enemy groupings.

25. Tactical Level Missions. In addition to meeting army/corps requirements, divisional

and brigade recce will be concerned with more local threats, targets and opportunities.
Priorities will be:

a. Enemy brigade, battalion and RFC CPs and communications.

b. Precision weapons, helicopter forward operating sites, MBRLs.

c. Air defences.

d. Other artillery and mortars and their fire plans.

e. The strength and dispositions of enemy defences, the location and

composition of attack groupings and reserves and their routes and waiting areas.

f. The positions and nature of field defences.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 12

 g. The extent and effectiveness of obstacles, both natural and emplaced, and
possible crossing points.

h. The identification of usable routes for manoeuvre units.

26. Brigade Recce Assets. The brigade recce battalion has three mechanised
companies of three platoons each.

a. RPV Company. The long-range platoon has three remotely piloted vehicles
(RPV) with a range of 70km (ie, a round trip totalling 140km) and an endurance of
over two hours, while the short-range platoon has three RPVs with a range of 30km
and an endurance time of only one hour.

b. Mechanised Companies. The three mechanised companies of the recce

battalion may either operate as company-sized recce groups (RG) or be broken
down into platoon-sized recce patrols (RP). Mechanised recce will operate right
across the formation front up to a depth of 50km and to the flanks as well in fluid
situations where flanks are open.

c. Long-range Recce Company. RPs from this company operate in greater

depth than the mechanised companies - up to 100km on occasion. Patrols either
infiltrate in their BTRs and BRDMs or are inserted by helicopter or even parachute.

d. The Radio and Radar DF and Intercept Company. The signals intelligence
(SIGINT) company can intercept and direction find (DF) high frequency (HF)
groundwave stations out to about 80km, and very high frequency (VHF) to 30-80km.
VHF DF may sometimes be good enough to target MBRLs. Radar DF can be
effective out to 50km, depending on terrain screening, and location will often be
accurate enough to target a MBRL strike.

27. Battalion Recce Assets. Combined arms battalions have an organic recce
company with BRM-3K and BMP. In addition, ordinary motor rifle platoons may be used as
RPs or CRPs. Battalions may deploy a variety of recce groupings. A scout vehicle on the
axis of advance is the absolute minimum, and as the battalion approaches the enemy a FP
will usually form part of the march security grouping.

28. Other Recce Assets.

a. Air. Brigades have their own scout helicopter assets. Helicopters are
frequently used by engineer and chemical troops to assess routes and obstacles and
areas of contamination behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT).

b. Engineer. It is common practice to reinforce recce patrols with an engineer

element. The engineer element may consist of a section with its own vehicle (BTR,
BRDM or IRM) or a couple of sappers travelling in one of the patrol’s vehicles.

c. NBC. All sub-units are responsible for continuous monitoring of their own
NBC state. In addition, chemical defence sub-units can provide specialist recce
teams. They may operate from their own vehicles (BRDM-RKh or RKhM) or travel in
a patrol’s vehicles.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 13

 d. Artillery. Each artillery battalion has two battlefield surveillance radars with a
range of 25- 30km. The most important target acquisition means are, however,
found in the brigade artillery recce battalion. This has a radar battery equipped with
battlefield surveillance radars and, more significantly the ZOOPARK system which
can locate artillery and mortars accurately enough for counter-battery purposes.
The POLE DISH radar DF equipment can be used to target enemy radars (especially
air defence radars).

29. Types of Reconnaissance Groupings. A grasp of the terminology used to

describe GENFORCE ground recce groupings is vital to an understanding of their tactics.
The following terms are used:

a. Recce Group (RG) or Detachment (RD). A RG may be formed from a

recce, motor rifle or tank company. It is used during mobile phases of operations on
the main axis, or to recce key objectives in depth. Company sized RGs are most
common. Battalion sized RDs are used to recce objectives which it may be
advantageous to seize and hold for some time, e.g. a river crossing. RGs and RDs
send out their own RPs and thus enable these platoon sized elements to operate
more independently of the main force and for longer periods. RGs and RDs are
often all arms groupings; typical RGs might be composed of a motor rifle company
with a tank platoon, engineer and chemical recce sections or a tank company with a
motor rifle platoon, engineer and chemical recce sections.

b. Reconnaissance Patrol (RP). A platoon sized element which may be

reinforced by engineer and NBC recce teams. RPs are sent out by recce battalions
and companies, by RGs and RDs and by leading tank and motor rifle battalions.

c. Separate Recce Patrol (SRP). A platoon sized element sent out by and
reporting directly to the lower formation or unit chief of recce. It may be reinforced by
engineer or chemical recce. SRPs may operate 10-20km ahead of march security
elements. They will be deployed on open flanks.

d. Combat Recce Patrol (CRP). A platoon sized element deployed from and
reporting to a tank or motor rifle battalion HQ which is acting as the Advance Guard
of a brigade advance. Again it may include engineer or NBC recce troops. CRPs
used in close contact with the enemy normally operate no deeper than their parent
battalion can support them by fire.

e. Forward Patrol (FP). A platoon sized patrol sent out by a vanguard as a

march security element. It is not primarily a recce element, but while carrying out its
primary mission will also be able to provide intelligence on the enemy for the
headquarters which deployed it. As it is a security element, it usually moves on the
road being used by the main body.

f. Patrol Section. A vehicle with a recce mission. Patrol sections may be the
only recce element when the risk of meeting the enemy is low. They may also be
sent to cover the flanks or rear of a sub-unit. All forms of patrol (RP, CRP or FP)
deploy a patrol section to the limit of visibility ahead of them (400-1200 metres).

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 14

 g. Deep Reconnaissance Patrol (DRP). A DRP operates independently in the
enemy’s rear area. Within a Bde it is almost certain to come from the Long Range
Reconnaissance Company. DRPs are usually section strength and are particularly
targeted on PGMs, headquarters and reserves.

30. Circumstances for Recce. The combination of recce groupings and techniques
used within a brigade area will vary with circumstances. The following paragraphs outline
the organisation of recce during different phases of battle.

a. Recce in the Advance. When advancing to contact and penetrating an

enemy covering force a GENFORCE brigade will cover its front with patrols, each
with a 2-3km sector. A RG will probably advance on the main axis; the remainder of
the front will be covered by RPs.

b. Recce During the Battle in the Enemy’s Depth. As a major attack is

launched on the enemy’s main defences, recce elements will stand ready
immediately behind the assaulting troops. When exploiting a breakthrough, units
and sub-units will operate with open flanks and additional CRPs, FSPs and RSPs
will be generated to cover them.

c. Recce in the Defence. In the defence there is considerable emphasis on the

use of static observation posts. If defending out of contact with the enemy, a CRP
and/or FP may be pushed forward. Second echelon battalions may also deploy
assets into the intervals between defence lines.

31. Recce Tactics. The most common methods of conducting recce include
observation, raids, ambushes and patrols.

a. Observation. Observation is, of course, the most common recce technique

in all forms of battle. Observation posts are most commonly deployed in more static
phases of the battle. They may be reinforced with engineer and chemical recce
troops and, at night or in bad weather, are often supplemented by listening
posts.

b. Battlefield Surveillance Radars and EW. With each mechanised recce

platoon being equipped with a radar and with each battalion of brigade artillery
regiment having a further two, there is a plethora of such battlefield surveillance
means. Being mounted in armoured vehicles, these are usually pushed well
forward. Those DF and intercept systems that are mounted in MT-LBu (TARAN
series) will also deploy close to the line of contact. The more vulnerable BBVs
carrying the older TURN series will deploy further back.

c. Raids. Raids are often used when in direct contact with the enemy to snatch
prisoners, documents or equipment and may be mounted by either specialist recce
or motor rifle troops. Specialist recce groups may also be tasked with raids deeper
into the enemy rear, against command posts or high priority targets.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 15

 d. Ambushes. The value of recce ambushes is increasingly stressed. Sub-
units may be specifically tasked to lay an ambush to capture prisoners, documents,
etc.

e. Patrols. In open, mobile forms of warfare which GENFORCE expects to

dominate the future battlefield, OPs, and perhaps raids and ambushes may be less
significant sources of intelligence than patrols sent out by marching units.

Recce Organisation

Bn Recce Coy
Lt Bn Recce Pl

4 x BRDM-3

Mech Pl Mech Pl Scout Pl

1 x BRM-3K 1 x BRM-3K 4 x BRDM-3

3 x BMP-2 3 x BMP-2
1 x LTD

Recce Bn X

Recce Recce Sigint LRR Coy RPV Coy Heli Flt

Coy Coy Coy

1 x BMP-2K 1 x BMP-2K 6 x R381 (TARAN) T1 1 x BRDM-2U 3 x KOLIBRI 6 x Mi34

3 x BRM-3K 3 x BRM-3K HF/UHF 6 x BTR 3 x STERKH 6 x LTD
10 x BMP-2 10 x BMP-2 6 x R381 (TARAN) T2 6 x BRDM-3
3 x LTD 3 x LTD VHF 2 x LTD
6 x Twin Box Radar DF
6 x Pole Dish

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 16

 Lt Recce Bn X

Recce Recce LRR Coy RPV Heli

Sigint
Coy Coy

3 x BRM-3K 3 x BRM-3K 4 x BTR

10 x BTR 10 x BTR 9 x BRDM-3
1 x BRDM-2U 1 x BRDM-2U 1 x BRDM-2
3 x LTD 3 x LTD 3 x LTD

Corps Recce Bde

X

BMP BMP
LRR Bn LRR Bn RPV Coy Heli Sqn
Recce Bn Recce Bn

2 x R-145BM 2 x R-145BM 2 x R-145BM 2 x R-145BM 6 x SHMEL-1 12 x Mi34

9 x BRM-3K 9 x BRM-3K 39 x BTR 39 x BTR
27 x BMP-2 27 x BMP-2 12 x BRDM-3 12 x BRDM-3
9 x LTD 9 x LTD 9 x LTD 9 x LTD

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 17

 SECTION 6 – ENGINEER ORGANISATION

32. General. The role of the engineer troops is to enhance the survivability and mobility
of their own forces, whilst degrading that of the enemy. Speed and mobility are considered
key factors influencing victory on the modern battlefield at both tactical and operational
levels.

33. Organisation for Combat. Even more than is the case with artillery, combat
engineer units do not always deploy as complete entities. The Chief of Engineers at each
level will use his resources to form task-orientated groupings in accordance with the
combined arms commander’s concept for battle and his instructions on engineer support.
These groupings will often include reinforcement from the senior commander (especially on
the main axis) as well as organic assets. They will not be permanent but will be reformed
and resubordinated as the operational and tactical situations change.

34. Movement Support Detachment (MSD). Crucial to the maintenance of momentum

is the work of the MSD.

a. Role. The MSD moves either before or after the vanguard, about 2 hours
ahead of the main body, and improves the axis of advance. It fills in cratering or
constructs bypasses; constructs bridges over minor gaps and improves the
approaches to and exits from them; clears and marks lanes through minefields. The
task of the MSD is seen as vital to both a rapid advance and to security: if its work is
not completed in time, the main body will be forced to halt, bunch onto the obstacle
and create a target for precision, artillery or air attack. Once the first echelon is
committed to battle, the MSD moves behind or prepares a route for the committal of
the second echelon.

b. Composition. A MSD may have motor rifle and tank troops and air defence
for protection (the former also providing unskilled labour), tracked diggers, dozers
with cranes, dump trucks, tank and truck launched bridges, mine detectors and
clearers, trucks with explosives and possible metal trackway, and NBC
reconnaissance.

c. Grouping. A MSD will be organised into two or three sub-groups. They are
the reconnaissance and clearance group (or a reconnaissance group and a
clearance group) and the road-bridge group. Grouping depends on terrain and the
tactical situation. It may be varied during the course of operations.

35. Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD). Motor rifle sub-units carry mines to create
local protective minefields. The MOD is, however, the basic building block of
GENFORCE’s counter-mobility effort. They are formed at every level from unit to strategic
grouping and are a standard feature of tactical and operational formation.

a. Tasks. MODs lay minefields, dig anti-tank ditches, carry out demolitions and
create other obstacles such as tree blow-down to block forest rides. In defence, they
help to prepare the obstacle system and, once the attack commences, they wait
concealed to create fresh obstacles on the most threatened directions. Whether on
the attack or in defence, they are used to: protect the deployment lines of
attacking/counter attacking forces; cover the flanks of formations/units; fill in gaps

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 18

 which exist or develop within operational or tactical formation; gain time for the
mounting of counter moves; cover gun lines; help to seal in encircled forces; create
deceptive obstacles as part of the overall deception plan. MODs normally work in
close conjunction with the anti-tank reserves during the course of an operation or
battle, their work materially contributing to their survivability and to the stability of
their defence.

b. Composition. MODs are built around minelayers. Higher formation

minelayers can be used to reinforce the MODs of subordinate formations or units as
well as to form up to 2-3 MODs of their own. In addition to minelayers, MODs will
have trucks with extra mines, explosives for demolition and the creation of
obstacles, and they will often have dozers, road harrows and mechanical ditchers for
obstacle creation and digging in elements of the anti-tank reserve.

c. Tactics. In the offensive, the MOD will usually move forward with the anti-
tank reserve, either on an open flank or in a central position ready to deploy to any
threatened direction: in the latter case, they usually advance behind the first
echelon to ensure a prompt response to any threat. In defence, they lurk concealed
in hides on a threatened axis or flank, or in a central position, often between the first
and second echelon. GENFORCE considers that the element of surprise is very
important in mine warfare. Minefields laid in advance can be discovered by enemy
reconnaissance and timely measures can be undertaken to overcome them. It is
therefore often more efficient to lay a minefield during the course of a battle,
preferably at the last minute, directly in the path of a developing threat. Such a use
of mines is not only tactically advantageous, but economical in resources: this may
be an important consideration when supplies are limited, eg, when a hasty defence
is adopted during operations in the enemy’s depth.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 19

 Engr Coy (Bn) (Not
found in Lt MR Bn)
2 x MTU-72
1 x IMR-2
2 x KMT-7
1 x BAT-M
3 x UR-88 POD
Bde Engr Regt
1 x PJM-2 III
1 x MDK-3
3 x GMZ
2 x UMZ
2 x MTLB
1 x BRDM-2U

Engr Cbt Assault Road/Bridge Technical

Recce Engr Crossing Construction Coy(**)
Coy Bn Bn Coy

3 x IRM
3 x MTLB
3 x IMP Detector Sapper Coy Sapper Coy Mine Coy Amphibious Hvy Hvy Const Pl Support Pl Posn Prep Hvy Plant Spec Tasks
2 x BRDM-2RKH Pl Amphibious Pl Pl Pl
3 x IGLA 3 x MTLB 3 x MTLB (*2)8 x MTK Pl 12 x TMM-3 2 x Concrete Mixer
*BTR *BTR (*6)9 x GMZ (*6)12 x PTS 1 x E-305V 1 x Sawmill 5 x BAT-2 1 x KMS 2 x Water
2 x IMR-2 2 x IMR-2 *6 x UMZ 6 x PKP 20/*6 x PMM-2 2 x BAT-2 (+Trl) 2 x K-61 1 x E-305V Purification
8 x NDL-10 1 x BRDM-2 2 x D114 2 x IMR-2 3 x BAT-2
1 x K-61 2 x MMZ555 4 x MDK-2 2 x MMZ-555
1 x E-305V
1 x BRDM-2
2 x PKT
3 x PZM

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 20

 Lt MR Bde Engr Regt
(As Bde Engr Regt except)

(*?) Figures in brackets apply

(**) Tech Coy differs:
3 x TMK
3 x BAT-M
1 x MDK-3
1 x E305V X
1 x KMS

Corps Engr Bde

HQ & Cbt Assault Pontoon Road/ Engr

SVC Engr Crossing Bridging Bridge Obstacle
Coy Bn Bn Bn Bn Bn

10 x BTR-80 4 x BTR-80 12 x PTS 32 x PMP 12 x BAT-2 9 x GMZ

10 x RPG-7 4 x RPG-7 6 x PKP (Centre) 4 x IMR-2 3 x PMR-3
5 x SA-16 2 x SA-16 8 x NDL-10 4 x PMP 4 x MDK-2 6 x BTM
2 x IRM 6 x IMR-2 6 x PMM-2 (Ramp) 6 x GRADER 8 x MDK-2
4 x BRDM-2 8 x MTK 1 x K-61 2 x KRAZ-260 15 x Dump 4 x IMR-2
2 x BRDM-2 12 x BMK-T Truck 2 x BAT-M
8 x BRDM-2 2 x BRDM-2u

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 21

 Corps Pontoon Bridging Regt III

Regt HQ Pontoon Pontoon Pontoon Tech

& Spt Bridging Bridging Bridging Engr
Coy Bn Bn Bn Coy

3 x BRDM-2 32 x PMP (Centre) 2 x BRDM-2 32 x PMP (Centre) 4 x TMM

3 x BREM-1 4 x PMP (Ramp) 4 x PMP (Ramp) 8 x PTS-2
2 x IRM 12 x BMK-T 12 x BMK-1 3 x BTM
8 x BRDM-2 8 x BRDM-2 6 x BAT-2

Pontoon Bridge Pontoon Bridge

Coy Coy

3 x BRDM-2 2 x BRDM-2
16 x PMP (Centre)
2 x PMP (Ramp)
6 x BMK-T

PMP Pl Powerboat Pl

16 x PMP (Centre) 6 x BMK-T

2 x PMP (Ramp)
1 x BRDM-2

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 22

 II

Corps Assault Crossing Bn

Bn HQ & Assault Assault Assault Tech

Spt Crossing Crossing Crossing Support
Coy Coy Coy Coy Coy

2 x BRDM-2U 12 x PTS-2 2 x BRDM-2 12 x PTS-2 3 x IMR-2

6 x PKP 6 x PKP 2 x BAT-2
8 x NDL-10 8 x NDL-10 2 x BTM
8 x PMM-2 8 x PMM-2 1 x K-61
1 x K-61 1 x K-61
4 x BRDM-2 4 x BRDM-2
Amphib Pl Hvy Amphib Pl

12 x PTS-2 8 x PMM-2
6 x PKP 1 x K-61
8 x NDL-10 2 X BRDM-2

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 2 - 23

 CHAPTER 3

THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS FOR ENEMY FORCES

SECTION 1 - ATTACK

1. Forms of Tactical Action. At the tactical level, there are basically four forms of
action:

a. Frontal (Splitting) Attack. This is usually the least favoured form of attack
as it is predictable. It is employed where there is no alternative or where
GENFORCE’s superiority is so marked that the enemy can be overcome with little
difficulty. Ideally, the main blow is delivered against a relatively weak sector or on a
boundary. Splitting attacks are designed to divide the enemy grouping into non-
cohesive fragments so that they cannot properly coordinate their actions in a timely
fashion.

b. Shallow Envelopment (Outflanking). The main attack is delivered to a

(usually weak) flank with the aim of rolling up the defence.

c. Deep Envelopment (Turning Movement). The shallow envelopment is

designed to destroy the forces along the line of contact immediately. If, however, the
enemy has reserves capable of intervening straight away it is considered expedient
to defeat these before, or preferably simultaneously with, launching rear attacks on
the main defending forces.

d. Double Envelopment (Encirclement). Tactical formations, let alone units,

will rarely be strong enough to encircle a significant enemy grouping by themselves.
Two may, however, combine to execute such a manoeuvre.

2. Types of Attack. There are four principle types of attack in GENFORCE (The type
of attack is defined in terms of the enemy’s tactical position).

a. Attack from the Line of March. Such an attack is executed by a force which
has not been in direct fire contact with the enemy beforehand. It is mounted against
a defending enemy, usually from an assembly area in the depth but it is increasingly
likely to happen unexpectedly in the fluid conditions of future war. In either case,
there is no pause in a Forming Up Area (FUP). The troops flow directly from march
into pre-battle and thence battle formation.

b. Attack from a Position of Close Contact. This attack is conducted by a

force already in close contact with the enemy. GENFORCE believes it will be less
frequent than attacks from the march in future war, when manoeuvre will
predominate. On tomorrow’s battlefield, it will most likely occur when a force that
has failed in an attack from the march is ordered to renew the attack.

c. Meeting Battle. A meeting battle is an attack on an enemy who is also on the

offensive. GENFORCE believes that this will be the most common form of combat
on the manoeuvre-dominated, ever-changing battlefield of the next war.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-1

 d. The Pursuit. This is an attack on an enemy attempting to withdraw.

3. Objectives. Objectives for GENFORCE are generally lines on a map, similar to

phase lines, and not keyed on terrain. The objective for a GENFORCE attacking force is to
destroy the enemy between itself and its objective. The two types of objectives are
immediate and subsequent. When a subsequent objective is met, the attacking force is
then given a direction to continue the attack by higher headquarters. Depths for objectives
are:

Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion MF Bn Coy

Immediate 50 km 20-25 km 20-25 km 6-8 km 2-3 km 2-3 km 0.5 km 1st
Ech def Pl

Subsequent 100 km 50-60 km 50-60 km 20-25 km 6-8 km 6-8 km N/A

4. Echelons: GENFORCE will attack in two echelons when the enemy is defending in
depth and while attacking on GENFORCE’s main axis. The first echelon will contain 1/2 to
2/3ds of GENFORCE’s combat power and the second echelon the remainder. The first
echelon’s mission is to achieve the immediate objective. When this is done, the
commander may commit the second echelon to attack towards the subsequent objective.
The first echelon will then revert to a combined arms reserve.

GENFORCE will use a one-echelon formation when the enemy is not defending in depth or
when attacking along a secondary axis. If a one-echelon formation is used, the
GENFORCE commander must keep a combined arms reserve at all times.

GENFORCE will commit the second echelon only to reinforce success and not as a
replacement for the first echelon. The second echelon will be committed through gaps
between the first echelon units or around a flank. Forward passage of lines is rarely used
and avoided by GENFORCE commanders. The second echelon will be well supported by
artillery, air and smoke when committed.

5. Tactical Exploitation Echelons. At the tactical level, exploitation echelons may be

used to unhinge the defence, attack key targets and destroy the cohesion of the defence.
Thus, Tactical Exploitation Echelons pave the way for for the subsequent committal of
operational level exploitation groupings which will convert tactical success into operational
success. Four principle types of Tactical Exploitation Echelons are:

a. Raiding Detachment. Bn sized element inserted into the depth of the enemy
to destroy and disrupt enemy C2, Reserves, Artillery, Air Defence and other targets.

b. Forward Detachment. Organised at Div/Bde level usually a Combined Arms

Bn with the mission to penetrate deep into the enemy’s rear and seize key terrain or
targets (e.g. river crossing points, nuclear delivery means, fuel dumps, or link-up
with air assault detachments).

c. Outflanking Detachment. Formed at Regt to Bde/Div. Combined Arms Coy

or Bn sized carries out a shallow attack on enemy’s flank or rear.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-2

 d. Air Echelon. Airmobile or Air Assault Troops. These Tps have missions
similar to the other echelons above and are used when penetration of the enemy’s
depth on the ground is not possible.

6. Reserves. The difference between an echelon and a reserve as far as GENFORCE

is concerned is that reserves do not receive specific missions when a battle is planned.
They are created with an eye to increasing the offensive effort, reinforcing or even replacing
elements of the first echelon, undertaking missions unforeseen that always arise, often
suddenly, during the course of an operation. GENFORCE forms six different types of
reserve, though not all may be created for every battle.

a. Combined Arms Reserve. Where a second echelon is formed, there will

usually be no combined arms reserve at the tactical level. On the other hand, if a
battle is likely to develop in a highly fluid, unpredictable fashion, the commander is
likely to dispense with a second echelon and instead create a combined arms
reserve. This could well be the same size as a second echelon would have been. It
will differ from the latter in not being pre-tasked as its mission is essentially
unforeseeable.

b. Airmobile Reserve. Even at the tactical level, it is usual to form an airmobile

reserve. This will almost always be the divisional or brigade light motor rifle battalion
or elements thereof. This may be used to seize vital ground in the enemy’s depth,
execute raids, conduct vertical envelopment, help to counter enemy air-landings,
form or reinforce a flank detachment or group.

c. Anti-Tank Reserve (ATR). These are automatically formed at formation and

often at unit level to repel counter attacks and/or provide flank security. They also
have some capability for dealing with enemy air landings. They are usually based on
anti-tank units which, now that they have MR, artillery and air defence assets, are
capable of operating independently. The ATR provides an economy of force
grouping that can deal with developing armoured threats without having to weaken
an attack echelon or combined arms reserve and thereby compromise its viability.

d. Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD). These are engineer groupings with

rapid minelaying, ditching and other obstacle creating means. Each ATR is
supported by a MOD.

e. Anti-Landing Reserve (ALR). The enemy will, like GENFORCE, mount

airmobile and air assault raids on deep fire resources, HQs etc and may attempt to
disrupt the actions of second echelons/reserves with air delivered forces. To cope
with such threats, all formations create an ALR to deal with those elements that
succeed in penetrating air defences.

f. Special Reserves. GENFORCE formations usually create reconnaissance,

air defence and engineer, chemical defence and medical reserves. These are
usually employed to reinforce efforts on the main axis and/or to cope with
unforeseen problems.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-3

7. Frontages: GENFORCE will attack on a broad front and narrow for the final assault.
Frontages are:

Division Brigade Regiment Battalion MF Bn Coy

Zone of 20-30 km 15-25 km Up to 2-3 km Up to 5 km N/A
Advance 10 km
Assault 6-8 km 4-8 km 3-4 km 1-1.5 km 2-3 km 0.5-1.5 km
frontage

8. Axes. In planning an attack, a GENFORCE commander will always designate an

axis of main effort. He will concentrate the bulk of his effort on this axis to ensure that he
obtains the force ratio required to guarantee success.

9. Surprise and Deception. The more powerful weaponry becomes, the more
emphasis GENFORCE places on the need to achieve surprise. This becomes particularly
true where GENFORCE does not enjoy the desirable level of superiority in numbers, when
surprise is seen to compensate for a degree of deficiency. Tactical and operational
regulations remind commanders of the mandatory requirement for every plan for battle to
contain measures to conceal their own forces’ locations and intentions and to deceive the
enemy. GENFORCE sources discuss several means of achieving these aims.

a. Selection of the Attack Sector. In the past, GENFORCE sought to deliver

its main blow to the weakest part in the enemy’s front, in poor defensive regions or
between unit boundaries. This often meant attacking where the terrain was deemed
unsuitable on the basis that the best going for an armoured thrust is an area
weak in anti-tank weapons. While these are still favoured, GENFORCE now also
considers the possibility of achieving surprise by attacking a strong sector. Powerful
fire strikes followed by attacks from the rear (made possible by vertical envelopment)
as well as from the front can result in penetration of sectors previously deemed
unassailable.

b. Concentration Areas and Forward Routes. Modern surveillance means

that attack groupings will be well concealed in dispersed assembly areas prior to the
delivery of the blow. These need to be 20-30 km from the line of contact.
Concealment moving into and in occupation of assembly areas is vital, and waiting
time should be minimal. Bad weather, terrain, or reflective devices may be
employed to mask the enemy in its real and dummy locations and routes to the line
of contact.

c. Waiting Areas. During long rest halts or when waiting for committal, units
and formations occupy waiting areas. All round defence is prepared with a balance
between air defence and security. Electronic signals are kept to a minimum, and the
Brigade camouflage and deception coy execute passive deception and concealment
measures. Due to the effectiveness of ground surveillance such areas are not
located closer than 20 kms from the line of contact. Villages and towns are favoured
due to their intrinsic IR signatures and ease of concealment. Woods are favourable
too, however GENFORCE will not move more than 200 m into a wood because of
the danger of enemy use of incendiary munitions and tree blowdown. Gullies and

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-4

 ravines offer the possibility of rapid creation of overhead concealment. A combined
arms battalion will need 12-15 square km.

10. Force Ratios. GENFORCE considers the following to be the optimum correlation of
forces to achieve success:

a. The Main Attack. A 5-6:1 superiority in tanks and IFVs.

b. A Secondary Attack. A 3:1 ratio.

c. A Pinning or Deception Attack. A ratio of 1:1 is adequate to give the

impression of a serious attack.

d. Passive Sectors. GENFORCE will accept risk in these sectors to a 1:2 ratio
in order to create sufficiently favourable ratios in principle attack sectors.

e. Meeting Battle. GENFORCE considers a 1.5:1 ration sufficient for success.

SECTION 2 - DEFENCE

11. General. Soldiers trained in GENFORCE-style tactics believe that offensive action
is the decisive form of combat in achieving victory on the battlefield. Consequently, units
only go on the defensive in order to create conditions favourable to resume the attack.
DEFENCE is a temporary phase.

12. Reasons for Assuming the Defence.

a. Economy of Force. To permit the concentration of the requisite superiority

for an attack in one sector, some formations will often be responsible for long
passive sectors. This is a role particularly suited to machine-gun artillery
divisions.

b. Counter Attacks. During offensive operations, counter attacks will usually be

repulsed by defensive action.

c. Losses. When a unit or formation outruns its logistic support and/or suffers
such serious losses that it can no longer sustain offensive action, it may have to
transition to defence.

d. When the Enemy is Considerably Superior. Even during the course of an

offensive, the enemy may concentrate a stronger force on a given sector, or inflict
such attrition on an attacking grouping through long-range fire that it is forced onto
the defensive. Defeat in a meeting battle will force a grouping onto the defensive
(and often adjacent units as well).

e. Consolidation of Captured Areas. Forward and airmobile detachments and

operational manoeuvre groups (OMGs) will generally be required to seize and hold
ground in the interests of the main force’s advance.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-5

13. Factors of Success. The goal of any defensive action is to create favourable
conditions for the ultimate defeat of the enemy through offensive action. The
accomplishment of this will be a balance of three fundamental factors (depending on the
situation).

a. The Enemy. Such losses must be inflicted on the enemy as to deprive him of
further offensive capability while still retaining combat effectiveness of friendly forces.

b. Spatial. It is desirable to retain as much ground as possible, but GENFORCE

is prepared to give up terrain, at least temporarily, as long as critical areas are held
(including those the retention of which is essential for counter blows to succeed).

c. Temporal. Time must be won for the deployment of further forces from the
depth, the regrouping of forces and the creation of shock groupings for counter
blows.

14. Types of Defence.

a. Positional Defence. Positional defence is the norm when:

i. adequate forces are available to achieve an efficient density of weapons

(especially anti-tank)

ii. key areas must be held

iii. the terrain lends itself to this form of defence

Positional defence does not imply that every metre of the forward edge is to be
defended to the death and, if necessary, retaken by automatic counter attack.
GENFORCE accepts that penetration is inevitable. It designs its defence to ensure
that a break-in cannot be converted into a penetration which will enable the enemy to
generate tactical, let alone operational manoeuvre tensure that a breakthrough is
achieved. The aim is to ensure that penetrations are only achieved on axes
acceptable to GENFORCE and at a cost in time, casualties, disruption and loss of
momentum unacceptable to the enemy.

b. Manoeuvre Defence. Manoeuvre defence is now a co-equal form, intended

to economise forces on less important axes and/or to buy time for the deployment of
forces from the depth and/or passive sectors in order to create a positional defence
in depth or mount a decisive counter blow. In manoeuvre defence, the aim is to
wear down the enemy’s strength and deny him operational momentum by defending
on successive, deeply echeloned lines but refusing to become decisively engaged
on any of them.

15. Frontages and Depths in Positional Defence (km).

Division Brigade Regiment Battalion MF Bn Company Platoon

Frontage 20-30 15-25 10-15 3-5 5-7.5 1-1.5 Up to 0.4
Depth 20-30 15-25 10-15 2.5-4 4-10 Up to 1 Up to 0.3

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-6

16. Defensive Positions. The first belt of the main defensive area usually comprises
three or possibly four positions. Subsequent belts will comprise 2-3 positions. Each
position is designed for defence or delay, often alternating between one and the other.

a. Defended Zone. A division or brigade will defend a zone of varying width,

occupying two defensive positions simultaneously and sometimes holding key terrain
in a third with its anti-landing reserve.

b. Defended Area. A defended area is GENFORCE parlance for a battalion

TAOR. Defensive positions are planned as a series of mutually supporting defended
areas.

c. Strongpoints. Within defended areas, companies and platoons are

organised in mutually supporting strongpoints.

17. Aims of Positional Defence. The aims of a defensive battle will include some or all
of the following:

a. Repel an attack or counter attack by superior forces

b. Inflict maximum losses on the enemy

c. Support the development of an attack on an important direction

d. Hold vital tactical or operational lines or areas

e. Cover the flank of a higher formation’s main grouping

f. Restore the combat capabilities of the formation or unit when it has taken
such heavy casualties that it cannot continue to attack

g. Create favourable conditions for the initiation of an attack, either by the

defending grouping or by other formations

18. The Obstacle System. Natural obstacles are exploited wherever possible to
provide protection for positions and individual defended areas and strongpoints and to
canalise the attack. These are reinforced and supplemented by an integrated system of
minefields, anti-tank ditches and traps, demolitions and wire obstacles. GENFORCE starts
by implementing the obstacle plan in front of the forward edge and in the covering zone. It
then, as time and resources permit, extends it both in front of the forward edge and into the
depth of defence.

19. Covering Forces. A covering force is normally established when GENFORCE is

out of contact with the enemy. However, it can be created in a limited manner when in
contact. The covering force has the following missions:

a. Determine the enemy’s strength, composition and axes.

b. Force the enemy to deploy prematurely.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-7

 c. Canalise the enemy into the strongest part of the defence.

d. Force the enemy to concentrate and offer GENFORCE a massed target.

e. Deceive the enemy as to the true location of the main defensive area.

f. Wear down the enemy.

20. There are three principal types of covering force at the tactical level.

a. Combat Security Outpost (CSO). A unit commander may well order that a
second echelon company temporarily detach a platoon to form a combat security
outpost on an approach not covered by a forward position. Sited up to 2 km in front
of the forward edge, the outpost will defeat enemy reconnaissance and prevent an
attack taking the first echelon by surprise.

b. Forward Position (FP). Forward positions are ordered by division or brigade

but planned in detail and provided by first echelon units (from their second echelon).
They are reinforced coy in strength, deployed 3-6 km beyond the forward edge on
the most threatened axis for their parent unit. The troops in the forward position are
tasked with the defeat of enemy reconnaissance, the repulsing of probing attacks
and thus with misleading the enemy as to the true location of the forward edge.

c. Forward Detachment (FD). A forward detachment is organised at army, or

less usually, division/brigade level, and only when there is no covering force out in
front. It is formed from the first echelon lower formation in whose zone it is operating
and its battle is controlled by that headquarters. In a brigade it will consist of a
combined arms battalion reinforced with artillery, engineer, air defence and anti-tank
assets. The forward detachment is pushed up to 20 km in front of the forward edge
and will delay on 2-3 lines before reverting to formation reserve or second echelon
for refurbishment.

21. Echelons. As in the offensive, a force may be deployed in one or two echelons. In
general terms, a two-echelon deployment is usual on the most threatened axis and a one-
echelon deployment is more appropriate to secondary axes. One echelon formations are
also adopted when the defender has suffered heavy casualties but still has to cover a
considerable frontage.

a. First Echelon. The tasks of the first echelon are to:

i. repel enemy attacks with maximum losses

ii. prevent penetration or channel it into a pocket for destruction
iii. hold vital ground if penetration cannot be avoided
iv. to support the second echelon or reserve in carrying out counter moves

In the past, two-thirds to three-quarters of a grouping were usually deployed in the

first echelon. It is now increasingly common, where circumstances allow, for only
about a half to be so employed.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-8

 b. Second Echelon. The tasks of the second echelon are to:

i. reinforce the efforts of the first echelon

ii. conduct counter penetration

iii. launch counter attacks

At unit level, counter penetration is the more usual employment. Even at

division/brigade level, there will rarely be enough strength to eliminate any but the
most minor penetration unaided, and counter attacks will generally be part of a larger
scheme of manoeuvre.

c. Combined Arms Groupings. Within motor rifle formations and units,

commanders generally strive to keep a strong element in the second echelon or
reserve because the tanks’ armoured mobility and firepower can be most effectively
used in counter attack and counter penetration roles. In tank formations and units
there is a strong tendency to concentrate subordinate motor rifle elements in the first
echelon because of their advantages in holding ground and providing OPs and
sentries.

22. Reserves. Given that the enemy will possess the initiative, at least in the early
stages of the battle, reserves assume an even greater importance in the defence than they
do in the attack.

a. Combined Arms Reserve. This is fundamental to the maintenance of

stability in defence. It may: replace combat ineffective elements of the first echelon;
conduct counter penetration; destroy raiding detachments; mount its own counter
attacks or join in those mounted by the second echelon; using elements of its
composition, carry out deceptive moves or impart animation and realism to dummy
groupings.

b. Anti-Tank Reserve (ATR) and Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD).

These provide the first line counter penetration forces: it is hoped that their timely
committal on threatened axes will be enough to stabilise the situation and thus
preserve the combined arms reserve or second echelon. They are also important in
covering the deployment and supporting the committal of counter blow forces and in
providing flank protection.

c. Anti-Landing Reserve (ALR). The enemy will undoubtedly try to destabilise

the defence through vertical envelopment and air-mobile raids. Each division or
brigade, and where possible each unit will form an ALR.

d. Airmobile Reserve. Where a formation has guaranteed lift for its separate
light motor rifle battalion, an airmobile reserve is formed. This can be used not
merely for counter penetration but also for raiding actions in the enemy’s depth. If,
being on a minor axis, a formation is unlikely to have lift made available, the light
motor rifle battalion may form part of the second echelon or combined arms or anti-
landing reserves.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A-3-9

 e. Special Reserves. Reconnaissance, air defence, engineer and chemical
defence reserves will usually be held to plug gaps, replace losses and support
counter moves.

23. Counter Attack. A counter attack is an offensive turn in a defensive operation or

battle: ie, it is mounted against an enemy who still possesses the initiative. It is used to
wrest the initiative from the enemy and achieve a turning point in the battle. It will only be
made if its outcome will substantially influence the future course of the battle and if it is all
but assured of eliminating the enemy penetration.

SECTION 3 – TACTICAL MARCH PROCEDURES

24. General. To move his forces, a GENFORCE Commander will adopt two different
types of march formation: the Administrative March and the Tactical March. The
Administrative March is used when enemy contact is considered unlikely. Vehicles will be
usually grouped together in packets determined both by speed and movement capability
rather than true combat groupings. However, even in the Administrative March, tactical
requirements are still uppermost in a GENFORCE Commanders mind. Traffic control points
will be set up to control March organisation and security patrols and air defence (AD) assets
will be deployed in order to ensure maximum force protection. When a GENFORCE
Commander considers enemy contact likely, he will order the march to adopt a more
tactical posture. This new march formation is called the Tactical March.

25. Aim. The Tactical March allows a Commander to deploy rapidly from column, in
pre-formed groupings tailored for combat, directly into battle.

26. Definition. The Tactical March formation normally begins in an assembly area,
where formations and sub-units ‘shake out’ from their Administrative March and carry out
any last minute maintenance, logistic and administrative tasks. The March itself is
characterised by both a high rate of movement and tight control by the Commander, who
normally insists on radio silence until contact with the enemy is established. There are two
main factors which really define the March: March Security and March Organisation, both
fundamental to the March’s effectiveness.

27. March Formation. There is no stereotypical march formation but will be determined
by the following factors:

a. mission d. his own capability

b. terrain it will move through e. meteorological conditions

c. the nature of the enemy threat

28. March Security.

a. Advance Guard. The primary element of March Security within the Tactical
March formation is the Advance Guard (Adv Gd). In terms of a Combined Arms Bde,
this is usually a Tank or Motor Rifle Battalion, which moves ahead of the Main Body
(MB), along the main axis. The roles of the Adv Gd are:

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 10

 i. To prevent an attack from striking the main body before it can deploy.

ii. To drive back enemy recce.

iii. To clear minor opposition from its axis.

iv. If strong opposition is met - to seize a favourable line to support the

deployment of the Main Body into battle.

b. Structure. The Advance Guard consists of three main components:

i. Combat Recce Patrol (CRP). A platoon sized element which is

usually reinforced with either NBC, engineer Recce, artillery C2 and perhaps
EW. This grouping is usually a CA formation.

ii. Vanguard (Van Gd). A company sized element which is usually

reinforced with artillery (1 bty of 2S31) or mortars, anti-tank elements and
engineers. This grouping is usually a CA formation.

iii. Main Guard. This is a tank or motor rifle Battalion minus, either from
the second echelon of a Brigade’s first echelon Battalion or a Battalion from a
Brigade’s second echelon. It is minus because it has given up the assets that
form the CRP and Vanguard.

c. Action on Contact. If the Advance Guard makes contact with an enemy

element it will try to brush it aside. If the CRP and/or Vanguard cannot move the
enemy, it will pin the enemy in place to allow the main guard to pivot to an enemy
flank or rear and destroy it. This is known as:

PIN ------- PIVOT ------ and DESTROY

d. Other March Security Elements are:

i. Forward Patrols. Forward Patrols (FP) are the most common form of
March security and can be found throughout the Tactical March formation.
Thus, the Vanguard of first echelon Battalions Advance Guards, Main Guards,
Forward Detachments, etc will all probably be led by FPs. Although these
patrols have a secondary reconnaissance function, their primary mission is
force protection. They operate close to the Main Bodies of theTactical March,
(generally between 1-2 km ahead) and travel along the Main Bodies actual
route. The majority of FPs are normally platoon sized and may have either
NBC or engineer Recce assets included within the grouping. However, the
FP can be as small as a scout section or indeed a single scout vehicle.

ii. Flank Security Patrol (FSP). FSPs can be deployed in appropriate

tactical security situations. Normally, they will comprise of a MR/Tk Pl, which
may be reinforced with Engineer and/or NBC reconnaissance assets.

iii. Rear Security Patrol (RSP). RSPs can be deployed in the

appropriate tactical security situation. Normally, they will comprise of MR/Tk

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 11

 Pl, which may be reinforced with Engineer and/or NBC reconnaissance
assets.

iv. Scout Section/Scout Vehicle. This is the minimal March Security

element. A scout section or vehicle may be sent ahead of the CRP/FP to act
independently. Scout Sections are also frequently deployed on the open
flanks of sub-units.

v. Rear Guard. Rear Guards have a similar role and are similar in size to
that of the Advance Guard formations. However, full Rear Guards are only
deployed when there is a serious threat from the rear or where elements are
conducting a withdrawal.

vi. Rear Security Group (RSG). If the threat to the rear is weak, then a
RSG may deploy instead of a full Rear Guard.

vii. Flank Detachments. A Flank Detachment is normally a CA Coy

grouping found on the flank nearest the enemy. It is usually augmented with
Anti-Tank (AT), Engineer (MOD) and Air Defence (AD) assets. If the threat is
especially great, a CA AT Battalion may be deployed. Flank Detachments can
move either in bounds from one blocking position to another or March in
parallel, level (5-10 km laterally) with the head of the Main Body of the
formation.

viii. Flank Security Group (FSG). FSGs are deployed on a potentially

threatened flank but where the threat does not warrant a Flank Detachment.
An FSG may be reinforced with AT/Engineer (MOD) assets.

ix. Movement Support Detachment (MSD). (See Engineer Operations).

Engineer assets will provide an MSD for each axis that is being exploited.
The composition of each MSD will vary according to the importance of the
axis and the problems that it expects to encounter. Its primary mission is to
enhance freedom of movement.

x. Mobile Obstacle Detachment (MOD). (See Engineer Operations).

The MOD will come under the control of the AT unit, subsequently, the MOD
will be found in a Flank Detachment or with the AT Reserve. Its primary
mission is the laying of man-made obstacles and the enhancement of natural
obstacles to restrict the freedom of movement of the opposing forces.

e. March Security Principles. Once in a combat zone, stronger March security

elements will be deployed, including the use of Forward Detachments to conduct
close or deep battle operations ahead of the main formation. If a meeting battle,
attack against an ill-prepared or extended enemy, or pursuit is anticipated, the first
echelons will normally be tank heavy. Artillery groups (CAGs, BAGs and BnAGS)
also usually move in the first echelons so that if required, rapid fire support can be
provided to the lead elements of the formation. Additionally, Movement Support
Detachments (MSD), tailored to the ground and the level of enemy route denial, will
immediately follow behind either the forward March security elements or the
Advance Guard Battalions. At both the operational and tactical levels, anti-tank

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 12

 reserves and Mobile Obstacle Detachments (MOD) will move to a threatened flank
or forward with the March’s Main Guard, ready to deploy to either flank if required.

29. Table 1 shows an example of how security elements of the Tactical March MAY be
deployed. It is only an example, as there are many variations the GENFORCE Commander
can use to protect his forces.

Table 1 – An Example of Elements of Tactical March Security

30. Planning Factors.

a. Routes. In normal terrain, a CA Bde will move within a zone of up to 25 km

wide. Wherever possible within this zone, the CA Bde will normally advance on 2-3
routes, with an additional 1 or 2 more being identified, in case the original ones are
denied by the enemy. The existence of these alternate routes minimises any delay
and disruption likely to be caused by enemy action. Additionally, lateral routes are
normally reconnoitred, and even improved so that axes can be shifted rapidly in the
interests of tactical manoeuvre. In normal terrain, a CA Battalion mostly advances
along a single route until it begins to deploy into battle formation. However, the CA
Bn Commander will have identified a secondary route in case the enemy is able to
deny him further progress on his original axis of advance.

b. Intervals and Road Space. The standard interval between vehicles within
columns in the Tactical March is 25-50 meters. 100 meters separates companies,
whilst 3-5 km separates battalions from other packets within a Brigades Main Body.
Larger intervals separate other major groupings. The Advance Guard usually travels
up to 30 km in front of the Main Body whilst within the Advance Guard itself, the
Vanguard is normally approximately 5-10 km from the Main Guard. All told, a CA
Battalion acting as an Advance Guard will require approximately 25 km of road
space in the Tactical March formation. In addition, a Brigade advancing on two

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 13

 routes, will have a total depth of 185 km. Table 2 indicates GENFORCE planning
distances when moving in the Tactical March formation.

Grouping Distance Remarks

Bde Recce Operates 20-30 km in front
of ADV GD

ADV GD Operates up to 30 km in 1. CRP is deployed, may

front of Main Body operate 3-5 km in front of
VAN GD.

2. FP if deployed, may
operate behind the CRP, but
within 1-2 km.

3. VAN GD moves 5-10 km

in front of Main Guard.

4. ADV GD likely to cover a

total distance on the ground
of approx 25 km.

Main Body Distance covered on the Distance between Bn size

ground approx 130 km groupings will be approx 3-5
km. Between Bde size
groupings approx 5-10.

Table 2 – Planning Distances Between Groupings

Within the Tactical March Formation

31. Order of March: Brigade Main Body. The relative placing of manoeuvre units and
artillery will vary greatly with circumstances. Some general principles still apply, however.
If the Brigade is advancing on the Corps main axis, Corps assets, such as Corps artillery
would be moving forward within that particular Brigade. Similarly, if the Brigade faced
significant water obstacles in its advance, then it would be augmented by extra assault
crossing and bridging assets which, would travel well forward within the formation. In
addition, the following principles still apply:

a. Bde Fwd CP. Usually moves at or near the head of the column in between
the Main Guard and the head of the Main Body, always on the main axis.

b. Bde Main CP. Moves on the main axis (usually after the artillery).

c. Artillery. Generally moves well forward so that it offers timely support to the
advanced units.

d. Air Defence. Distributed throughout march columns so that on deployment

they will cover the whole unit.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 14

 e. Rear Services. Most of the rear services come at the tail of each column.
Some medical/recovery elements may be distributed throughout the column.

f. Anti-tank. Elements of AT are associated with Engr (MOD) and placed in

flanking unit.

g. Lt MR Bn. The Lt MR Bn normally moves to the rear of the column on the

main axis and acts as an Anti-Landing Reserve (ALR).

32. Tactical March Formation Examples. Table 3 shows two examples of the type of
Tactical March formations which may be deployed by GENFORCE. They are ONLY
examples as there are many different combat groupings which could be used by a
GENFORCE Commander.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 15

CA Brigade Formation where Enemy is to the Front but there is a Flank Variant

Note: In both examples, two routes are being used: a main route to the north and a subsidiary route to the
south in the first example and in the second, a subsidiary route to the north, a main route in the centre with
flank protection moving to the south.

MAIN AXIS
FSP

SVCS

ADV MSD FWD SA-15 MAIN ENG SVCS ALR RSP

GD + SA-13 + SA-13 BTY RES + SA-13
PL (RECCE RES) BTY

Up to 130 km
Up to Up to
30 km 25 km

SECONDARY
AXIS

SVCS
+
ADV MSD MOD SA-15 SA-15 SVCS RSP
GD + SA-13
PL

1. CA BDE IN MARCH FORMATION WHERE ENEMY ARE IN FRONT

SECONDARY
AXIS

SVCS

MAIN ADV GD SA-15 RSP

AXIS

SVCS
-
ADV MSD FWD SA-15 MAIN ENG ALR SA-15 SVCS RSP
GD + SA-13 + SA-13 RES + SA-13
PL BTY BTY
& RECCE
RES

- -
FLANK MOD SA-15 RSP
DET

FSP SA-13 (AD AMBUSH)

2. CA BDE IN MARCH FORMATION WHERE ENEMY ARE IN FRONT BUT THERE IS A FLANK VARIANT
33. March Performance Characteristics. Tables 4, 5 and 6 provide doctrinal data on
the speed, distances and zones of advance a GENFORCE Commander would hope to
achieve. Once again, they are doctrinal aims and will in reality, vary considerably according
to factors such as terrain, threat, and maintenance requirements.

AVERAGE SPEEDS OF MARCH COLUMNS (KMH)

Muddy, Hilly,
Paved Roads Dry Dirt Roads
Urban
Day Night Day Night Day Night
Motorised Column 3-40 25-30 20-25 18-20 10-15 8-10
Mixed Column 20-30 14-20 15-20 12-15 10-12 1-8

Note: The average speed is 15-25 KPH. Speed increases over open terrain and if
threatened by precision guided munitions. Speed decreases at night, in mud or dirt
roads.
Table 4

DAILY MARCH PERFORMANCE (KM)

Muddy, Hilly,
Paved Roads Dry Dirt Roads
Urban
Motorised Column 250-350 180-300 80-180
Mixed Column 200-350 120-240 80-140

Notes: 1. The intervals are normally: 25-50M between vehicles

50-100M between Pls and Coys,
3-5Kms between Bns,
5-10Kms between Bde size groups

2. Rest Halts are: Short halt 20-30 minutes every 2-3 hours
Long halts 2-4 hours if forced march of
12-24 hours being conducted.

Table 5

March Performance Parameters

Corps Bde Bn Coy

Frontage of Advance (km) 20-30 15-25 up to 5 N/A
Number of Routes 2-4 2-3 1-2 N/A
Assault Frontage 4-10 4-8 2-3 up to 500 m
Depth of Obj Immediate 20-25 20-25 2-3 up to 500 m
Subsequent 50-60 50-60 6-8 N/A

Table 6

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 17

 SECTION 4 – RIVER CROSSING

General

34. Attitudes About Water Obstacles. There was a time when GENFORCE purported
to regard river and canal crossings as routine actions that could be executed from the
march without a pause either before the obstacle or in the bridgehead and with little
slackening of offensive impetus. In practice, this proved difficult to live up to, even in
training. Now obstacle crossings are regarded as being amongst the most potentially
dangerous and difficult of operations. Ferry and bridge sites and the concentrations of
troops behind them are very vulnerable to ACM, particularly precision, strikes. At any stage
in a formation’s attempt to cross, the enemy may be able to sever the links between a
bridgehead and the forces waiting to cross and destroy the former in a counter attack
before it has become sustainable and inflict severe damage on the latter as they bunch on
the obstacle.

35. Equipment. Recognising that water crossings will loom as large in future war as in
the past (in withdrawal and regrouping as well as in the advance), GENFORCE has given
an amphibious capability to as many combat vehicles as possible and provided generous
quantities of engineer crossing means.

a. Combat Equipments. Given favourable bank and bottom conditions, tanks

can schnorkel across a river up to 5.5m deep. BMPs and BTRs, some of the lighter
SP artillery pieces and some air defence vehicles can swim provided the entry and
exit gradients are not more than 20-25% and 25-30% respectively (though wheeled
vehicles are limited to an exit gradient of 10-12%) and provided the current is not
more than 2m per second.

b. Engineer Equipments. With their organic tank-launched bridges MT-55 or

MTU-30, units can cross gaps of up to 20m in width, i.e. about 60% of the obstacles
they are likely to encounter. Brigade engineers also have TMM sets spanning up to
40m. Both tank bridges and TMM are Class 60. The PMM-2 and PP-91 systems,
held at formation level, can be used to construct medium or heavy ferries or bridges
over wide rivers. Amphibians with trailers can be used to transport soft-skinned
vehicles and artillery. A variety of assault boats are also available. In addition to the
considerable crossing means available to lower formations, army and corps possess
specialist assault crossing and bridging units as well as extra at TMM and MTU
bridging.

Forced River Crossings

36. Foresight. Should an opposed crossing of a major obstacle be inevitable, the

decision for it must be made well in advance: the corps commander issues combat
missions at least 1-2 days in advance of leading lower formations reaching the river or
canal so that combat groupings, engineer and air and air defence support, assault landings
and camouflage/deception measures can be organised ahead of time.

37. Level of Command. Combined arms battalions are deemed capable of dealing with
small obstacles. If a river or canal is 20-100m wide, forcing it will be a brigade task.
Medium sized and major rivers (100-150m wide and over) must be organised at corps or

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 18

SG level respectively. The following paragraphs will concentrate on forcing actions by
lower formations.

38. Reconnaissance. Even more detailed reconnaissance than normal is required,

especially by engineers. During the approach to the obstacle, continuous and active
reconnaissance is conducted by RPVs, mobile patrol and static OPs.

39. The Approach to the Obstacle. The tactical formation of a brigade must be
adjusted as the obstacle is approached in order to force it from the march without a
potentially dangerous pause for reorganisation in front of it. Motor rifle units should lead as
they can use the amphibious capabilities of the BMP, ATGM vehicles and light artillery to
cross without preparation. Artillery and chemical troops need to be well forward as an
opposed crossing usually requires heavy fire support and smoke cover on the approaches
and during the crossing. Consolidation of the bridgehead too will require strong artillery
support to compensate for the initial absence of tanks. Engineer mine clearing means and
amphibians will also have to move well up the tactical march column as it will be essential
to get tanks, medium artillery and air defenders into the bridgehead as rapidly as possible
to ensure its early expansion to a viable size and its retention in the face of counter attacks.

40. Seizing a Bridgehead Early. Almost invariably, an attempt will be made to

establish a bridgehead before the advanced guards of the formation arrive. Ideally, this will
already have been done for the brigade by an operational air landing or OMG elements. If,
however, self-help is required, a forward detachment and/or an air landing detachment or
group will be despatched to seize a crossing if there is any chance of doing so before the
enemy can establish a strong defence. A forward detachment will move at least 2-3 hours
ahead of the main body, but it may well be expected to seize and hold a crossing for up to
12-18 hours before relief, depending on the enemy’s ability to react and the availability of
fire support. It will of course have attached assault crossing means. An air landing force
may be used to seize a bridgehead, either before the forward detachment, which will then
reinforce it, or independently. In the latter case, given its lack of armoured firepower and
paucity of air defence, it will not be expected to hold for as long as a forward detachment.

41. Assault Crossing by the Main Forces. Where there is no bridgehead secured
beforehand and a forcing is necessary, and if the enemy is weak, advanced guard
battalions will try to gain a foothold before the arrival of the main body. For this purpose,
each might receive a heavy ferry and an amphibian platoon. These attacks are likely to be
supported by vertical envelopment of the defence by the air assault or airmobile
detachment or group. If the enemy is too strong for a crossing to be ‘bounced’, unit level
assaults with full artillery and attack helicopter support will be mounted. First echelon
battalions will seize bridgeheads which will deny the enemy direct fire, at least by small
arms, against ferry, amphibian, fording and schnorkeling sites. Having secured some
viable battalion sized bridgeheads, second echelon elements will cross using tank fords or
schnorkeling and engineer assets. Bridgeheads will then be linked up into two combined
arms battalion-sized ones. Subsequent action at formation level will depend on the enemy
strength and reactions and the senior commander’s concept. The formation’s second
echelon may be used to link up bridgeheads until there is a brigade seized one through
which second operational echelon elements may develop the offensive. If the enemy is
weak, however, the formation may pass its own second echelon through the most
developed bridgehead and continue the advance.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 19

42. Crossing Sites. The number of crossing sites will depend on the terrain, the
enemy’s strength and deployment and the tactical formation of the brigade. As a rule, each
first echelon motor rifle battalion will require one swim site per first echelon company
(against token resistance, all may cross in the first echelon) and 1-2 alternates. Once the
first echelon is over and there is a site free from at least small arms fire, heavy ferries and
amphibians use the same sites (perhaps using smoke cover against long-range anti-tank
weapons). Tanks, artillery and air defence cross using these means and fording or
schnorkelling sites where these exist.

43. Timings. For example a Motor Rifle Battalion forcing a river crossing from the
march.

Time Action
H-1.5 hrs CRP reaches obstacle in area selected as a result of previous
reconnaissance by senior commander.
Battalion commander gives his orders for the forcing.
Heliborne OP made available.

H-20 mins Artillery preparation begins.

H-5 mins Tanks and anti-tank weapons deliver direct fire.

H-Hr Two first echelon companies swim across in BMPs supported by direct and
indirect fire and possible attack-helicopters.

H+30 mins Second echelon Motor Rifle company crosses. In a combined arms
battalion amphibious anti-tank weapons also cross.

H+1-2 hrs Tank company crosses on heavy ferries.

Artillery battalion crosses, one battery at a time.

H+2 hrs Bridgehead consolidated to depth of about 3 km.

Enemy counter attacks repulsed.

Notes:

a. The BnAG and even elements of the BAG could support the crossing.

b. Smoke cover could be used to conceal approaches to the obstacle.

c. The attack could be coordinated with a heliborne assault.

d. If BMPs cannot exit the river, they can be beached on the far bank and recovered
later.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 20

 SECTION 5 – ANTI-TANK FORCES

44. General. While GENFORCE has always stressed the importance of anti-tank
reserves (ATR), their significance has grown in recent decades. This is partly because
major armies are now almost totally mechanised, so defence must first and foremost be
anti-tank in nature. Units and formations will now routinely find themselves with no secure
flanks or rear areas, for combat will develop in an uneven, non-linear fashion. Armoured
threats and counter threats will often develop suddenly and unexpectedly and therefore, it is
important for the combined arms commander to have in hand assets with which he can
execute counter moves without weakening his main grouping. The ATR (along with the
MOD) provide the economy of force grouping which is dedicated to meeting armoured
thrusts and counter thrusts.

45. Missions. The ATR and MOD work together as a team, with the latter under the
command of the former. The MOD may, however, be temporarily detached when the level
of threat is low to carry out obstacle creation in support of defending forces before reverting
to its main role.

a. On the Defensive. Missions include:

i. reinforcing the anti-tank defence of the first echelon on important axes

ii. carrying out counter penetration against armoured groupings that have
wedged into the defence or are penetrating into the depth

iii. covering gaps in defensive formation, or boundaries or flanks

iv. protecting the deployment lines of counter attack groupings or SOUs or

raiding detachments/groups

v. gaining time for the mounting of a counter attack

vi. countering air landings

b. In the Offensive. Missions include:

i. covering the flanks of attacking groupings

ii. repulsing counter attacks

iii. covering the committal of second echelons, OMGs or raiding or forward

detachments/groups

iv. sealing lines of retreat for encircled forces

v. consolidating captured lines or areas

vi. countering air landings

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 21

46. Composition. The growing importance of the ATR and MOD and the requirement
for them to act autonomously have led to their expansion into combined arms groupings
with greater mobility and survivability than before. An anti-tank brigade will comprise 3-4
battalions (which may be deployed as a complete formation or deployed as 2-4 separate
groupings). However, the composition of an ATR and MOD will always to tailored to the
mission assigned to the parent unit or formation, the likely strength of the enemy and the
terrain.

47. Location in Combat Formation. The ATR and MOD are usually collocated or at
least very close together for ease of defence against air and all forms of ground attack and
for command and control reasons.

a. In defence, they locate somewhat to the rear of the first echelon of the parent
grouping.
b. In attack, the whole or at least part of the ATR is likely to be used in the fire
preparation. During the advance, the ATR and MOD are usually found far forward,
often at the head of the unit or formation’s main body. Alternatively, they could form
a flank detachment, or part of one, covering an open flank from which a threat is
though likely to emanate.

48. Helicopters. GENFORCE commonly uses helicopters in the ATR and MOD role.
Transport helicopters can rapidly surface-lay a minefield and land infantry strong in
manpack anti-tank weapons. Attack helicopters can engage armour so halted or execute
ambushes against columns. The mobility, regardless of terrain limitations, speed and range
of action of these assets fit them well for the task of imposing casualties and a check on the
enemy’s advance. They are vital in this role in manoeuvre defence, when combating
enemy forces in the friendly depth and in fast developing offensive or defensive actions.
They are not, however, considered a substitute for ground troops in all circumstances as
they cannot hold ground.
SECTION 6 – INTEGRATED FIRE SUPPORT
49. The Place of Artillery in GENFORCE Thinking. GENFORCE has always put the
greatest possible stress on the role of artillery in combat. Foreign observers have often
been mesmerised by GENFORCE’s tank and infantry strength, but GENFORCE has
traditionally regarded artillery as the main battle-winner.

a. In the Offensive. In the offensive, artillery was the principal means by which
an advantageous force ratio was achieved on chosen sectors, gaps were blasted
through the defence, the enemy’s tactical reserves were destroyed or disrupted and
counter attacks were repulsed. It was the effective action of artillery that was
primarily responsible for creating conditions in which tactical and subsequently
operational manoeuvre could be generated.

b. In Defence. In defence, artillery was the principal means by which the

attacker’s preparations were disrupted and any force that reached or penetrated the
forward edge was repulsed and counter attacks executed successfully.

50. Growing Importance. If anything, the role of artillery has grown in significance as
far as GENFORCE is concerned. Fire superiority was always regarded as the pre-condition

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 22

for success in the attack - ie, the attacker had to be able to execute his fire missions while
reliably suppressing counter fire. It was also the cornerstone of defence; even if it could
only be achieved for a limited time at the crucial point in battle. In future war, artillery will be
restored to the sort of dominance it enjoyed before the large scale mechanisation of armies,
thanks to its ability to locate and immediately destroy even individual, moving armoured
targets to depths of 70 km and more (with MBRLs) or even hundreds of km (with cruise or
ballistic missiles).

51. The Basic Principles in allocating missions and organising subordination of missile
and artillery units are fourfold:

a. Centralised Control. GENFORCE believes in exercising control at the

highest possible level to ensure maximum flexibility, maximum effort a the decisive
point and logistic economy. The ability to manoeuvre massed fires laterally and in
depth, made possible by the contemporary improvements in reconnaissance, target
acquisition, communications, automated assistance to decision making, weapons’
range and lethality can only be fully exploited with centralised direction. Centralised
control does not, however, extend to the details of fire planning in most instances.
The senior commander will establish the area for the concentration of effort and the
scale of that effort, timings and the target priorities. Lower echelons choose the
method and form of inflicting fire damage.

b. The Struggle for Fire Superiority is always the first priority task for the
missile and artillery + troops (in close co-operation with EW and aviation).

c. Priority for Support. GENFORCE continually stresses the importance of

concentration of effort and the reinforcement of success. Thus, in allocating artillery
to subordinate formations and units, an even distribution is reflected in favour of
massing support on the main axis. In the attack, resources will be switched from the
support of less successful elements to aiding those making the best progress. In
defence, they will bolster the position of those forces in greatest need.

d. The Basic Fire Unit. When employing non-precision ammunition fired by

tube artillery, GENFORCE will engage small targets with a single battery. A raiding
or outflanking group or a vanguard or flank guard based on a motor rifle or tank
company may be reinforced by a battery. Normally, however, the basic fire unit is
the battalion.

52. Groupings. GENFORCE Artillery is formed into task oriented groupings. The size,
composition and level of control of these groupings depends on the strength of the enemy,
the mission of the supported unit and whether that unit is on a main or supporting axis. The
aim is to achieve the maximum concentration of fire support on the decisive point of the
battlefield.

a. Battalion Artillery Group (BnAG). The BnAG consists of elements of the

Battalion Artillery Battalion (2S31/2B16) and assets from the Brigade Artillery
Regiment (2S19). It is usually deployed 1-4 km from the FLOT.

b. Brigade Artillery Group (BAG). The BAG consists of elements of the

Brigade Artillery Regiment (2S19/9A51/2A65/2A61) plus assets from the Corps

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 23

 Artillery Bde and Corps MBRL Bde. These groups are used as directed from above
to contribute to the long-range battle (eg, by suppressing air defences in support of
friendly air penetrations or the insertion of airmobile or ground raiding forces). Their
main role, however, is the fire support of the manoeuvre elements of their formation.

c. Corps Artillery Group. Formed by combining all Corps assets. These are
used first and foremost for deep fire missions, to carry on the struggle for electronic
fire superiority. Their primary targets will be enemy artillery, C2 entities, helicopter
forward operating sites, EW facilities and air defence systems. They will also
manoeuvre massed fires in support of manoeuvre elements, to suppress strong
resistance, damage and disrupt reserves and break- up counter attacks.

53. Deployment. GENFORCE tends to deploy artillery well forward, especially in the
offensive. There are three reasons for this:

a. The need to reach as deep as possible.

b. The increase in expenditure norms as range lengthens.

c. The time required to relocate artillery (by deploying forward, it can ensure
continuity of fire support for attacking units for longer before having to displace).

Artillery moves according to the “RULE OF THIRDS”. When 1/3 of the artillery’s range
remains in front of the manoeuvre units, the artillery will move 1/3 of its force forward. Only
1/3 of an artillery unit’s assets will be moving at any one time. A bound may be as long as
10 kms.

54. Conduct of Fire. GENFORCE moves artillery batteries, platoons and individual
guns within an assigned firing position area to escape enemy counter battery fire. Within
this area the battery commander selects a primary position and one or more temporary
firing positions 300-400m away from the previous. The battery fires for 3-4 mins then
moves to an alternate position. Average reaction times from receipt of fire orders to first
round on the ground are as follows:

a. Mortar battery - 1-1.5 mins

b. Artillery battalion - 2-3 mins

c. MRL battery - 4 mins

d. BnAG - 4 mins

e. BAG - 5 mins

55. Fire Planning. Artillery fire is usually the basic means by which a favourable
correlation of forces is achieved for the attack. GENFORCE calculates scientifically its
artillery requirements in terms of the number of weapons and rounds needed to produce a
given effect on enemy targets. GENFORCE defines various levels of effect that may be
sought by bombardment. The combined arms commander specifies the effect required and

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 24

on that basis the artillery commander calculates how many rounds have to be fired to
achieve it.

a. Harassing Fire. This is used to inhibit manoeuvre or force the enemy to

move and thus provide targets for air attack and to damage enemy morale.

b. Neutralisation. Artillery fire at this level inflicts minimal damage but

paralyses the defence during, and for a very short period of time after the
bombardment. This is the minimum acceptable effect if an attack is to succeed and
fire has to be timed precisely to see the attacking troops onto the defended position.
Neutralising fire is usually employed only against an enemy assessed to be weak
and when insufficient time is available to artillery reconnaissance to establish
precisely the enemy’s positions.

c. Suppression is the effect achieved on a sub-unit by the infliction of about

30% casualties to men and equipment. It will render the target grouping combat-
ineffective for a period of minutes to hours as the morale effect of the bombardment
will render even the uninjured troops incapable of offering organised resistance and
command and control will be disrupted. GENFORCE commanders will normally aim
to achieve at least suppression before subjecting even a hastily defended position to
attack by tank and motor rifle troops.

d. Disruption. By inflicting 25-30% casualties on an attacking force,

GENFORCE believes that it will effectively break up an enemy attack.

e. Destruction is to all intents and purposes achieved if 50-60% losses are

suffered by an enemy grouping or 70-90% of an individual target. The target
grouping will cease to exist as a fighting force for up to 24 hours (depending on its
morale state, availability of replacements, command and control restoration, etc).
Destruction is seen as the only worthwhile objective when engaging missile or MBRL
units or, increasingly, artillery.

56. Command and Control. Artillery commanders will try to co-locate with the
manoeuvre commanders they are supporting. Artillery Command and Observation Posts
(COPS) will be formed at Battery and Battalion levels using specialised armoured vehicles.
Tracked Artillery units will use the 1V12 series and wheeled Artillery will use the 1V17
series. There are eight of these vehicles in an Artillery Battalion. Requests for Artillery
support during a battle are passed over the command net and not the artillery net. Artillery
groups will fire only with the manoeuvre commander’s approval.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 25

 Artillery Organisation

Combined Arms Bn
Arty Bn
II

NB Arty Bty sub to

2 x 1V12 Series Sep Lt MR Bn has
8 x 2B16
8 guns per Bty

Mortar Mortar Mortar

Bty Bty Bty

8 x 2S31 8 x 2S31 8 x 2S31

2 x 1V12 Series 2 x 1V12 Series 2 x 1V12 Series

Bde Arty Regt

III

6 GUNS/MRL PER BTY

Arty Arty Arty Bty/ MBRL Arty Recce

Bn Bn LT ARTY BN Bn Bn

18 x 2S19 18 x 2S19 18 x 2S19 18 x 9A51/PRIMA 2 x ARK (Rice Bag)

(18 x 2A65) (18 x 2A65) (18 x 2A61) 8 x 1V17 Series 2 x PRP-4
8 x 1V12M Series 8 x 1V12M Series 8 x 1V12M Series 2 x PRP-4 2 x AZK-5
(8 x 1V17M Series) (8 x 1V17M Series) (8 x 1V17M Series) 2 x STERKh Complex
2 x PRP-4 2 x PRP-4 2 x PRP-4 2 x ZOOPARK-1
(1 x PRP-4) (1 x PRP-4) 3 x POLE DISH

NB Lt MR Bde Arty Regt shown in bold

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 26

 Corps Arty Bde
X

8 GUNS PER BTY

Towed Arty Towed Arty Sp Arty Sp Arty Arty Recce

Bn Bn Bn Bn Bn

24 x 2A36 24 x 2A36 24 x 2S5 24 x 2S5 2 x ARK (Rice Bag)

8 x 1V17 Series 8 x 1V17 Series 8 x 1V12 Series 8 x 1V12 Series 2 x PRP-4
1 x PRP-4 1 x PRP-4 2 x PRP-4 2 x PRP-4 2 x AZK-5
3 x STERKh Complex
2 x ZOOPARK-1
3 x POLE DISH

Corps MBRL Bde

Comd & Ctl MBRL MBRL MBRL MBRL Tgt Acq

Bty Bn Bn Bn Bn Bn

4 x BMP-2 18 x 9P140 18 x 9P140 18 x 9P140 18 x 9P140 2 x ARK (Rice Bag)

4 x RPG-16 8 x 1V17 Series 8 x 1V17 Series 8 x 1V17 Series 8 x 1V17 Series 4 x PRP
2 x RKHM-4 2 x PRP-4 2 x PRP-4 2 x PRP-4 2 x PRP-4 3 x AZK-5
4 x R145BM 1 x RKhM-4 1 x RKhM-4 1 x RKhM-4 1 x RKhM-4 4 x STERKh Complex
2 x ZOOPARK-1

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 27

Corps SSM Bde
X

TOCHKA TOCHKA TOCHKA

Bn Bn Bn

6 x SS-21/ 6 x SS-21/ 6 x SS-21/

Tochka TELs Tochka TELs Tochka TELs
3 x SS-21/ 3 x SS-21/ 3 x SS-21/
Tochka TxLdrs Tochka TxLdrs Tochka TxLdrs
1 x R145BM 1 x R145BM 1 x R145BM

BN 1 x ARTY BN BDE 1 x ARTY REGT

CORPS 1 x ARTY BDE NB Each Unit will have its own CSS
1 x MRL BDE REGT (54 x 9P140) (NOT SHOWN)
2 x SSM BDE (18 x SS-21 per Bde) Higher level units will have its own CS
(NOT SHOWN)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 28

 SECTION 7 - AIR DEFENCE

57. Mission. The air defender’s mission is to prevent enemy air action from interfering
with the actions of manoeuvre forces. Ideally, this is accomplished by destroying the air
enemy before it can perform its recce or target acquisition or deliver its ordnance.

58. Phases of Air Defence. Air defence incorporates three related efforts involving all
services and branches of the armed forces.

a. Destruction of the Air Enemy on the Ground. Whenever possible, the fight
is taken to the enemy as part of the struggle for electronic-fire superiority. Enemy
aircraft are attacked on the ground, air bases are closed, C3I systems and logistic
support facilities are destroyed or suppressed. These missions are accomplished
against fixed wing aviation by missile troops, the Air Force, EW units and raiding and
SPF detachments, groups and patrols.

b. Destruction of Aircraft on Distant Approaches, before they penetrate

friendly airspace is the task of longer range SAMs, EW units and fighter aviation.

c. Destruction of Aircraft Penetrating Over Manoeuvre Forces is the joint

responsibility of fighter aviation, EW and the air defence of the ground forces.

59. Resources. GENFORCE has fielded a variety of early warning radars with different
but overlapping frequencies for target tracking and missile guidance. As well as weapons
of physical destruction, numerous ECM equipments are also deployed.

60. Types of Air Defence Organisation. GENFORCE recognises three different

methods of organising air defence, usually in practice using a mix of all of them.

a. Point Defence is established on the perimeter of an important target to

destroy aircraft on their approach to their mission execution line. Such defence can
also be used on likely avenues of approach to surprise the enemy before he
reaches the target. The advantage of this form of defence is that it allows
concentration on likely approaches and targets. However, it is only useful against
low and very low level attack as it cannot have an envelope sufficiently large to
preclude the launching of stand-off weapons.

b. Linear Defence is designed to create a continuous barrier to attack well in

front of the enemy’s main targets. This enables the engagement of attackers on the
distant approaches, but it possesses low stability as the enemy can drive a corridor
through the line on a narrow axis.

c. Area Defence creates a perimeter round an area which contains several

important targets. Such a defence can be stable and effective, but may not be able
to cope with low or very low penetrators making good use of terrain.

d. Point-Area or Point-Area-Line Defence is generally adopted by

GENFORCE. This combines the immediate defence of key targets and axes with
the creation of a general umbrella coverage. It forces the air enemy to concentrate

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 29

 and/or to attack at altitudes where accuracy of weapons’ delivery becomes
problematical.

61. Air Surveillance. GENFORCE air defence radars at all levels are integrated into an
overall system covering all the defended airspace. Most early warning radars are held at
SG and corps levels allowing higher formation air defence commanders to make a rapid
and informed assessment of the threat and pass both information and fire missions down to
the appropriate fire units. Corps early warning battalions will deploy their radars 10km or so
from the line of contact, giving them the ability to detect medium and high altitude targets up
to 160km in the enemy’s depth and low flying aircraft out to 80km. SG will establish a
second line of radar posts about 50km behind the first to give depth.

62. Tactical Air Defence. Defence against low to medium level threats is exclusively
the province of the ground forces’ air defence and of attack helicopters in the anti-helicopter
role. Deployments will, of course, change with the tactical situation and the deployment of
supported formations and units.

a. On the March, air defenders are distributed throughout the march columns.
Up to 30% of weapons conduct air surveillance on the move and all are ready to
open fire immediately. Elements may deploy ahead to cover choke points such as
defiles or bridges.

b. Attack and Defence. An area point system is created. Special attention is

paid to any open flank.

i. Brigade. Where elements of higher formation air defence are

deployed within the lower formation’s area, their coverage and capabilities are
taken into account in deploying organic resources. The SA-15 regiment will
cover the entire formation area, but giving priority to the defence of the first
echelon, the main CP and artillery. Deploying as close as 5km from the line
of contact, the forward batteries will reach up to 7km over it. Formation level
SA-13s are used to give point defence for important targets in depth.

ii. Unit. To ensure efficient command and control, this is generally the
lowest level at which air defence is deployed, though detached sub-units
(forward or raiding detachments) are often reinforced with some air defenders
from either unit or formation. The disposition of unit assets will take into
account the coverage and capabilities of any SA-15 battery which is in the
unit’s sector. 2S6s, SA-13 and SA-16 give point defence, priority going to
manoeuvre elements, CPs and artillery. The former usually cover the troops
on the main axis as the 2S6 is the most capable system. Some SA-13s or
2S6s will deploy about 1000-1500m from the line of contact sometimes even
nearer, to be able to hit targets 7km beyond it.

c. Increasing Survivability. To increase the survivability of air defence

weapons, they avoid stereotype in their deployment. Weapons are supposed to
relocate to an alternative fire position 1-km distant after enemy recce aircraft or
RPVs have passed nearby and after any engagement, or routinely after 4-6 hours at
unit level and after 8-12 hours for formation SAMs. Whenever possible, especially in
defence, dummy SAMs are deployed to reduce casualties from air defence

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 30

 suppression. Other deception measures include changing emitter characteristics,
regulating operating times for radars and controlling their use, camouflage and
jamming and the use of smoke.

d. Readiness Status. A constant, high level of readiness to repulse air attacks

will wear out crews and equipment. GENFORCE has a system of alert states that
are proportionate to the threat.

i. Alert State 3 is the lowest. Weapons are serviced and checked, but
remain switched off and crews are stood down. It requires 30 minutes to be
ready to fire. Most weapons are held at this state in waiting areas or
conducting marches in depth.

ii. Alert State 2 means that weapons are ready for action after a short
period of preparation and crews are on reduced manning. The time into actin
is 10-15 minutes. On the march, most weapons are in State 2, with about
50% going up to State 1 as the line of contact is approached.

iii. Alert State 1. Weapons are fully manned and ready for immediate
engagement with support systems warmed up and ready to control fire. All air
defenders are at this state when units are in pre-battle or battle formation,
when negotiating water obstacles or defiles or in complicated situations.

e. Effectiveness of Tactical Air Defence. GENFORCE believes than the

effectiveness of its weapons, expressed as the probability of a hit with a single
missile launch or gun engagement, is as follows:

i. SA-15 - 90%

ii. SA-13 & SA-16 - 50%

iii. 2S6 - 85% (missile) 60% (guns)

f. All Arms Air Defence. GENFORCE does not leave air defence entirely to
the specialists. All personnel are instructed in aircraft recognition and all sub-units
are exercised in firing against low or very-low flying aircraft. Tank and other
vehicle mounted heavy machine guns and BMP cannons are considered the
mainstay of all-arms air defence, but troops are also taught to use small arms to
place a box of fire in the path of approaching aircraft.

SECTION 8 - COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS

Commanders and Staffs

63. The Commander. GENFORCE exercises the principle of ‘one man command’.
This means that all decisions are made by the commander and that he is responsible for all
aspects of his command. Everything in the GENFORCE systems stems from the
commander’s decision. All plans flow downward. Initiative is not discouraged but it must
be exercised in strict accordance with the senior commander’s plan. However, at the
tactical level, junior officers and NCOs are usually inexperienced and, therefore, cannot be

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 31

expected to act without instructions. The commander is responsible for the combat
capability of subordinate formations and units, the organisation of combat operations, the
maintenance of uninterrupted troop control and the successful conduct of combat missions.
He clarifies the mission he has received (i.e., determines his formation’s place in the senior
commander’s concept of operations). The commander makes his own intelligence estimate
from the data supplied by the chief of intelligence and, with advice from the chiefs of
combat and combat support arms and the rear, makes an assessment of his own forces.

64. The Commander’s Decision. Everything stems from the commander’s decision.
The decision-making process begins when the commander receives a warning or combat
order from the senior commander. His first steps are to clarify the mission and assess the
situation.

a. Clarification of the Mission. The commander must make sure that he

understands the senior commander’s concept for the operation or battle and his own
formation or unit’s role in it. Having done so, he will make a time appreciation and,
through his chief of staff, set in train any measures which are required immediately
and issue warning orders to his subordinates.

b. Assessment of the Situation. His assessment is made in the sequence:

enemy forces; own forces; flanking forces and those operating in the enemy’s depth;
terrain; the air and precision and (where applicable) the NBC situation; weather and
time of day. Details of the assessment’s content are given in Table 1. Having
decided on the possible options open to him, a formation level commander will have
his chief of staff test the validity of each using computer modelling. He will then
arrive at his decision.

c. Components of the Decision. The decision will include:

i. The Concept for the Operation or Battle. The commander will specify:
which enemy groupings are to be destroyed, with what resources in what
order; the area/sector of main effort; the organisation of combat groupings
and the broad nature of the manoeuvre to be employed. This section will
become the most important part of the subsequent order.

ii. Missions are laid down for organic and attached formations/units/sub-
units.

iii. Co-ordination. The commander indicates objectives, phase lines,

targets, timings and boundaries.

iv. Measures for Service Support and C2 Organisation. When time is

limited, these will be left to the chief of staff. Indeed, when time is very
pressing, co-ordination instructions are also delegated to the staff.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 32

Table 1 – The GENFORCE Process of Assessing the Situation and Reaching a
Decision in Attack

Deductions by Commander and

Function Main Issues Considered
1. Clarify the Senior Commander’s Concept of Battle:
Senior
Commander’s From Senior Commander’s orders identify:
Mission (a) Which enemy he plans to attack and how.
What percentage of destruction will be
inflicted on the enemy.
(b) His sector of main effort and penetration
sector.
(c) Main targets for precision electronic,
artillery and air strikes.
(d) Combat formation and nature of
manoeuvre.
(e) Own mission: incl aim, immediate and
subsequent missions and timings, reinforcing
or supporting assets, boundaries, penetration
sector, routes and deployment times.
2. Assess the Major elements in assessment include:
situation
(a) Composition of enemy force and combat
(a) Assess the capability.
enemy (b) Density of enemy forces to depth of
immediate and subsequent missions.
(c) Defence lay-out, incl fire and obstacle
plans.
(d) Boundaries, HQs, COMCENs, logistic
sites.
(e) Morale of troops and personal qualities of
comd.
(f) Enemy options during battle, incl sector of
main effort, counter-attack plans, air strikes.
(b) Assess own Headings include:
forces
(a) Effective fighting strength, incl morale.
(b) Combat capabilities, classified by arm of
service.
Influence on Plan
Deductions
(a) Own unit’s role in Senior
Commander’s plan.
(b) Where to attack and required rate
of advance.
(c) What percentage of losses will be
suffered.
These deductions guide the
commander in planning:
(d) His own sector of main effort and
penetration sector.
(e) His combat formation and
manoeuvre plan.
(f) Outline missions for
subordinates.
(g) Priorities in planning battle.
Deductions
(a) Main enemy groupings.
(b) Strong and weak points of
defence.
(c) Probable enemy concept of
operations.
These deductions guide the
commander to plan:
(d) Outline plan, incl sector of main
thrust, and combat formation.
(e) Subordinates’ missions.
(f) Combat support plan (incl final
recce plan).
Deductions
(a) General condition of own force.
(b) Any requirement for regrouping.
These provide guidance in:

(c) Selecting sector of main thrust,

(c) Assess Assess their position, nature of operations,
Flanking Units missions, incl tempo of attack. Includes
assessment of 2nd/exploitation echelon lines
of deployment and axes.
combat formation, sub-unit missions,
plan for deployment.
Deductions
(a) Influence of flanking units on air
operations.
(b) Priorities of operation with flanks.

These provide guidance in planning:

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 33

 (c) Sector of main thrust (to link with
flanking units).
(d) Measures to co-ordinate with
flanking units.
(d) Assess Terrain Terrain is assessed in the sequence: Deductions

(a) In the assembly area. (a) Effect of terrain on

(b) From line of departure to line of contact.
(c) In depth of enemy position and under the
main headings:
General nature of terrain, effects on
observation, fire and camouflage and
concealment possibilities.
(e) Assess (a) Water barrier conditions.
Hydrography, (b) Weather, incl temperature, winds, clouds,
Meteorology, times fog, visibility.
of year and day (c) Hours of light and darkness and timings.
accomplishment of mission.
(b) Most favourable axes for
operations. These provide guidance
in planning:
(c) Sector of main effort and
penetration sector.
(d) Routes, deployment lines,
objectives. 2nd/exploitation echelon
commital line, river crossing sectors.
Deductions
Effect on operations and on
employment of various weapons by
either side.

Used as guidance in planning:

(a) Sector of main thrust, combat

formation.
(b) Measures to anticipate changes
in conditions, eg floods, snow storms,
etc
(f) Assess (a) Possibilities of using local resources, incl Deductions
Economic/Social repair facilities, medical facilities and
and Political communications. Effect on combat operations and
Conditions in (b) Mood and attitude to war and to own measures to exploit local resources.
Combat Zone troops of local population.
3. Selection and The commander proceeds to select the most appropriate decisions which is outlined
Formulation of the under the following headings:
most appropriate
Decision 1. Concept of Operations
(a) Which enemy to rout and how, including the percentage of destruction to be
achieve.d
(b) Main targets to be hit.
(c) Axis of main effort, combat formation, manoeuvre plan.

2. Missions of sub-units, incl groupings, objectives, axes, timings and the

percentage of losses that is acceptable in own forces.

3. Cooperation
How to co-ordinate operations in terms of objectives, plane and time.

4. Support
Combat support, command and control.

The decision, once approved by the Senior Comd, is passed to the staff and forms the
basis of the plan which they produce.

65. Implementing the Decision. The decision is reported to the senior commander for
his approval. Once this is secured, it is passed to the chief of staff and subordinates for
translation into detailed plans and instructions. Detailed and precise orders are issued only

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 34

for the initial phase of an operation or battle as enough hard data will rarely be available to
allow an accurate forecast of the development of the situation in future war.

Command Posts

66. Command and control is exercised through a series of command posts (CP), their
numbers and size depending on the level of command. Security of CPs is considered very
important and is ensured by a number of measures.

a. Siting. CPs are well dispersed and camouflaged and communications

facilities are remoted to lessen the chance of the actual command element being
located as a result of enemy direction finding (DF).

b. Defence. CPs are a high priority for air defence. Ideally, they are also placed
near second echelon/reserve units to gain protection from ground attack. Engineer
support is normally arranged to dig in and camouflage key elements.

c. Manoeuvre. By British standards, CPs are relatively small. They are also
very mobile, particularly at the tactical level and they displace frequently.

67. Types of CP. There are six different types of CP, though not all are formed by lower
level units or formations.

a. Main CP. At all levels from unit upwards, this is the principal focus of control.
The main CP is run by the Chief of Staff who directs the formation/unit staff in
translating thecommander’s decision into plans and orders. Main co-ordinates the
movement and deployment of units and formations and monitors their combat
effectiveness.

b. Forward CP. Unit and brigade commanders like to move with their first
echelon on the main axis in offensive operations to obtain personal observation of
key sectors and maintain contact with their sub-unit/unit commanders. They are
accompanied by a small group of principal advisers, eg, the chiefs of operations,
intelligence, EW, artillery, air defence, engineers.

c. Alternate CP. This is established laterally from the main CP, usually
commanded by the first deputy commander. It is not a step-up, but a reserve CP,
available to assume control if main is destroyed. It is not formed at unit or sub-unit
levels.

d. Airborne CP. These may be established by commanders of strategic

groupings (SG), corps or brigades. They are needed when operations become very
fluid and spread over a wide area, and to maintain continuity of control when other
CPs are displacing.

e. Rear Control Point. From this CP, the Chief of the Rear organises logistic
support for the concept of operations he receives from main. He monitors supply
states and reports them to main. He also controls rear area security.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 35

 f. Command and Observation Post (COP). The only sort of CP formed by
sub-units, COPs will often be formed by unit and sometimes brigade commanders
also. Such CPs are kept very small.

68. CP personnel are divided into three groups, each works a 16 hr shift with 8 hr rest.
The CPs are highly mobile being mounted in armoured vehicles. When the main is moving,
continuity of control is maintained by either handing over to the forward or airborne CP, or,
more rarely, to the alternate CP. Usually key staffs will be moved to the new location by
helicopter to reduce time spent away from their posts.

69. CP Staff. The staff release the commander from having to solve administrative and
technical problems, thereby allowing him to concentrate on the battle.

a. Chief of Staff. The chief of staff is also a deputy of the commander. As such
he is the only officer eligible to issue orders and instructions on behalf of the
commander to formations and units. He runs the main CP and controls the battle
during the commander’s absences.

b. Chief of Operations. The chief of operations prepares warning orders,

calendar plans and combat directives. He also prepares some of the calculations
required for the commander to make his decision and he plays a key role in planning
the operation.

c. Chief of Reconnaissance. The chief of reconnaissance is responsible for

preparing the reconnaissance plan.

d. Chief of Combat Arms. The chief of combat arms is responsible for the
conduct of the electronic-fire engagement. In fulfilling this role, he works in close co-
operation with the chiefs of reconnaissance, operations, missile troops and artillery,
army aviation and air defence, the deputy chief of signals for EW and the air force
commander.

e. Chief of Signals. The chief of signals organises signal communications and

the redeployment and relocation of CPs.

f. Chief of Special Combat Forces. The chief of special combat forces

prepares and implements the plan for operational concealment and deception. He
works closely with the chiefs of operations, reconnaissance, signals, air defence,
engineers, chemical defence troops.

g. Deputy Commander for Rear Services. The deputy commander for rear
services is the commander of logistic assets and rear area security forces.

h. The First Deputy Commander. The first deputy commander may fulfil
several operational roles and will replace the commander in the event of his
incapacitation.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 36

Communications

70. Brigade signals battalions provide radio and radio relay communications down to unit
level and for forward, main, alternate and rear CPs. Battalions may operate with all stations
on the same net. In this case, with more than 40 or more stations on the same net, strict
radio discipline is required to avoid chaos. Radio intercept, DF and jamming pose a large
threat to any military operations in the future. GENFORCE is aware of this and where
possible alternative means of communication are used, e.g. line in defensive areas and
along March routes. As a general rule, radio comms are kept to a minimum until contact
has been made.

SECTION 9 - ELECTRONIC WARFARE

71. General. For several decades now, electronic warfare (EW) has been treated as an
integral part of all combat actions. By the 1990s, it had become so important that it was
being regarded as the equal to fire in its impact on combat. Major investment has been
made in all aspects of EW, from Electronic Support Measures (ESM) satellites through
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) munitions and jammers to reducing the vulnerability of
equipments to EMP and enemy Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).

72. Concepts. GENFORCE sees the electronic struggle as a whole, with victory
depending on success in all its areas. The EW staff have responsibility for emission control
and communications security as well as for attacks on enemy systems.

a. Intelligence Gathering. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) and direction finding

(DF) are totally integrated into the overall intelligence effort.

b. Offensive Activity is concentrated on key systems in the enemy’s depth and

on the main axis. A careful selection is made of what frequencies can be jammed
and at what times.

c. Defensive Measures. Considerable attention is paid in training to operating

in an EW environment.

d. Deception. EW is seen as vital to the success of any deception plan.

Emitters are used to replicate CPs, traffic control nets, air defence zones, etc.

73. ECM. The estimated GENFORCE goal is for the destruction or disruption of at least
50% of the enemy’s C3I and fire control communications.

a. Critical Time. The critical time is the sum of the time required to complete a
sequence of steps: collection and reporting of data; evaluation and decision; issue of
orders and preparation; completion of action. The aim of EW is to disrupt the
enemy’s critical time phasing to the extent that the perishable information on which
decisions are based becomes obsolete and goals cannot therefore be achieved.

b. Target Priorities. Targets are assigned a priority according to their expected

relative impact on the battle. These are generally as follows, though they may be
altered as the situation develops:

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 37

 i. Precision delivery means and their associated control systems.

ii. Conventional field artillery, air support and air defence.

iii. CPs, communications centres, OPs and radar stations.

iv. Reserves and logistic support.

c. Methods of Engagement. When a target is located, a command decision is

made at brigade level or above as to whether it should be exploited for intelligence
purposes, jammed or destroyed. Destruction is usually preferred but it depends on
the accuracy of the position fix and the availability of a suitable weapons system.

74. Intelligence Gathering. Essential to the success of EW is the timely collection,

collation and interpretation of intelligence. Every effort is made in peacetime to build up
the enemy’s electronic order of battle and in wartime, all sources contribute to the picture,
though the main ones are electronic intercept and DF. The latter are organised as follows:

a. SG. A SG can deploy ESM satellites. It is also likely to deploy at least one
EW brigade.

b. Army/Corps. Each higher formation has a SIGINT regiment. Radio sub-

units are tasked against communications from corps to division, and radar elements
against enemy airpower. All formation artillery regiments also deploy a ground radar
locating system.

c. Brigade. Lower formation recce battalions contain a SIGINT company, and

the artillery regiment has the battlefield radar locating system. Intercept and DF
posts, both brigade and corps are set up very close to the line of contact, within 3-6
km for VHF and 10-30 km for HF groundwave.

75. Jamming. Deliberate use will be made of conventionally generated EMP to defeat
enemy emitters. Other methods used are as follows:

a. Radar. GENFORCE has not deployed active jammers against battlefield

radars, presumably because destruction is preferred and their high radiated power
and directional nature make their accurate location relatively easy. However, corps
EW units do deploy jammers against enemy proximity fused rounds.

b. Radio. There will be at least one active radio jamming regiment per SG, a
battalion per corps and a company in each brigade. Most elements will be deployed
in direct support of formations to attack UHF, VHF and HF groundwave nets.
Tactical and operational-tactical jammers deploy well forward, within 3-6 km of the
line of contact, or 10 km for HF groundwave.

c. Computers. Attacks on enemy computer systems through virus implant are

viewed as a force multiplier of potentially decisive significance. Every attempt will be
made in peacetime to introduce bugs into the software of potential enemies, adding
a whole new dimension to the principle of surprise.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 38

 SECTION 10 - LOGISTICS

General

76. The Nature of the Logistic System. GENFORCE commanders believe that there
will be no continuous front line in the next war. Instead, combat will have a highly fluid,
dynamic character and will spread over a wide area. On this sort of battlefield,
GENFORCE does not consider wholly appropriate the traditional logistics system whereby
forward divisions collect supplies from dumps to the rear and evacuate rearwards their
casualties and damaged equipment. Rather, they insist that formations must be prepared
to live off mobile stocks, at least for a few days, and not depend on constant resupply from
higher formation. Medical and repair facilities must move well forward to work in areas
where there has been heavy fighting and casualties are concentrated. Combat is also
expected to take place round the clock (with the cover of darkness becoming an
increasingly illusory advantage for logisticians). There are consequently increased
demands on logistic support and for a higher level of operational security for logistic units.
Accordingly, the logistic support for lower formations has been increased. Mobile Forces’
brigades and corps have a tail comparable in size with their larger predecessors, thus
raising their sustainability. To prevent identification and attack, their resupply logistic units
are prepared to move almost as frequently as the combat units they support and other
logistics elements (workshops, hospitals, etc) are organised to keep up with and support
the combat troops.

77. The Supply System. It is considered essential to maintain stock levels at or near
the norm for as long as possible in all formations and units. This means that, when
interdiction, enemy counter moves or even the rapid pace of operations interferes with or
even cuts the logistic cord, formations can continue combat action by eating into their
mobile stocks until such time as resupply lines are reopened.

78. Supply Priorities. The usual order of priorities for supply is:

a. precision and other ACMs

b. POL

c. technical material

d. conventional ‘dumb’ ammunition

e. food, medical supplies, clothing

Ammunition Supply

79. General. In terms of complexity as much as of the weight to be moved, ammunition

supply, particularly artillery ammunition, is normally the biggest headache facing
GENFORCE logisticians. It will normally amount to well over half the total tonnage
(depending, of course, on the intensity of combat: the figure used to be as high as 70-80%,
but precision and other ACMs have significantly reduced the amount which needs to be
moved). Getting the right number of the right calibre and type of rounds to the right place at

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 39

the right time will be a challenging task, especially where the routes available are limited in
number and have suffered battle damage or route denial.

80. Holdings. To simplify logistic planning and standardise ordering and issuing
procedures, GENFORCE uses accounting units called ‘units of fire’ (UF) comprising a given
number of rounds per weapon. All the ammunition held by the brigade is in the form of
mobile stocks, replenished daily to maintain established levels. This ensures ready
availability, ability to weather an interruption of supply or an unanticipated increase in
consumption, possession of an emergency reserve and the ability to cope with highly
mobile operations.

81. Artillery Supply. Once the commander has made his plan and designated the
groupings to be supported, his Commander Missile, Rocket and Artillery Troops works out a
fire plan and the resulting ammunition requirements. The Chief of Missile and Artillery
Armaments then designates ammunition dumps to supply the ammunition and coordinates
its delivery with the Chief of the Rear and the recipient units. The Chief of the Rear
provides the transport for delivery. Ideally, there will be time for corps transport to deliver
ammunition to brigade artillery regiments before the attack. This ‘supplementary reserve’
preserves the lower formation’s ‘mobile reserves’ intact.

82. Expenditure. In defence on the enemy’s main axis, a brigade will expect to expend
over 3 UF per day, whether the defence is prepared or hasty. With the widespread use of
ACMs, GENFORCE anticipates a considerable reduction in the number of rounds required
to achieve the suppression or destruction of many targets. On the other hand, artillery is
expected to destroy a higher proportion of enemy weapons than previously and is now
responsible for the delivery of most RDMs and remote jammers. In all, expenditure in each
phase of combat is expected to be perhaps 10-15% less than before. Tank ammunition
expenditure is likely to be at a rate of about 1 1/2 UF per day against a defending enemy
and in a meeting battle and much less in other forms of action, but it is less of a problem,
requiring about one third of the lift required for the artillery. Small arms and air defence
ammunition, mines, explosives and other natures pose very much smaller lift problems,
their weight being almost insignificant compared with that of artillery and tank combined.
The total size of the ammunition supply task amounts to shifting about 2,500/2,000 tonnes
for each first echelon brigade per day when engaged in breaking through a prepared
defence, about 2,000/1,600 tonnes for a hasty defence and over 1,400/1,120 tonnes for a
meeting engagement.

Ammunition Holdings within a Division/Brigade

Location Arty Tk IFV ATGM SAM SAA

With Weapons 1 1 1 1 1 1
In Bn and Regt Tpt 2 2 2 2 4 1
In Div/Bde Tpt 2 2 2 2 2 1

Total 5 5 5 5 7 3

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 40

 Some Standard Units of Fire (Rounds per weapon)

Artillery (a) Rds AFVs Rds ATk Rds

MBRL 9P140 32 Med Tk T-95 Gun 40 SP 9P148 10-14
PRIMA/9A51 150 ATGM 6 9P149 12
Cannon 200
GUN 2S-5 60 GUNS 2A45M 60
2A36 50 T-80U Gun 39
ATGM 6 ATGM AT13 8
HOW 2S-19 80 AT14 8
2S-31 80 T-80B Gun 33
2A-61 60 ATGM 6
AD Rds
MOR 2B-16 50 T-72B Gun 39 SA-17 12
2B-14 120 ATGM 6 SA-15 8
2S6(SAM/gun) 16/5700
Inf Wpns Rds IFV BMP-3 Gun 40 SA-13 8
ATGM 8
AG-17 300 Cannon 50
RPG-29 8
PKM 2500 BMP-2 ATGM 4
Cannon 500

BTR-90 ATGM 4
Cannon 500

BTR-80 Cannon 300

BTR-70 HMG 300

Note: (a) Numbers given are HE rounds only. Special natures (precision, fuel-air, cluster,
RDM, incendiary, smoke, remote jammers etc) have to be provided separately,
according to need. Relative scarcity of ACMs means that their issue will be rationed,
particularly to formations and units not at the point of the logistic main effort.

Fuel Supply

83. General. The fuel supply problem is more easily controlled than that of ammunition,
despite the fact that it will sometimes account for over half the total weight to be moved.
Firstly, the number of different types of fuel and lubricants which have to be moved is very
limited compared with the many forms of ammunition. Secondly, at least 20% of the POL
can be moved forward as far as the corps rear by pipeline, thus obviating a dependence on
road transport. Thirdly, captured stocks can be utilised.

84. Holdings. The POL accounting equivalent to the UF is the ‘refill’, the amount of fuel
carried in a vehicle’s internal fuel tanks. The road range of most GENFORCE A and B
vehicles with one refill is approximately 500 km. A brigade normally carries 3 refills of
diesel (including the vehicles’ initial fill), with another 3 at corps level and two or three times
that at SG.

85. The Supply System. The bulk of fuel required by SG is pumped to it through
permanent and field pipelines. Most corps bases, at least on important axes, are also fed
by a pipeline from SG. These tactical pipelines are laid at a rate of about 30 km per day
across country (manual) or 60-75 km per day (automatic), with mobile pumping stations

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 41

every 14 or so km. In 24 hours, 800 tonnes of fuel can be passed through 100mm pipe, or
2,000 tonnes through 150mm pipe up to 150 km. To move fuel further forward, bowsers
are normally used.

86. Consumption. GENFORCE planners believe that each brigade will need around
200/160 tonnes of fuel per day to maintain itself in the field, with expenditure rising to over
500/400 tonnes daily in the attack or meeting engagement. With almost 600/480 tonnes
already in the vehicles and a further 1500/1200 carried in unit and higher formation
transport, a brigade has enough stocks for 3-5 days of combat.

Equipment Maintenance, Recovery and Repair

87. Importance. Recovery and repair of damaged materiel plays a crucial part in the
sustainability of GENFORCE formations. Rapid repair, rather than the provision of
replacement equipments, is the basic means whereby combat strengths are maintained.
GENFORCE expects up to one third of all AFV ‘kills’ to prove irreparable. Of the
remainder, it expects to put back into action within 1-2 days.

88. The System. The system is based on the accomplishment of repair as far forward
as possible with repair facilities being moved to the scene of combat rather than waiting for
damaged equipment to be evacuated to them. Priority is given to light repairs taking a
maximum of three hours.

a. Unit. The combined arms battalion platoon recovers casualties to a damaged

vehicle collection point. The unit repair shop, located nearby, then classifies them
and does as many light repairs as it can before following the combat elements to
their next area of battle.

b. Brigade. The brigade maintenance battalion moves forward to an area

conveniently located near the scene of the heaviest fighting and sets up repair points
for AFVs and artillery and for other vehicles. It will tackle the light repairs left undone
by unit, and in the unlikely event that these are completed before the battalion moves
on, it will begin on medium repairs. Even brigade assets will, however, expect to
move two or even three times in a day if the advance is very swift, though the
damaging effect such frequent moves may have on repair rates can be lessened by
leapfrogging elements forward. If the formation is conducting manoeuvre defence or
withdrawal, efforts will concentrate on recovery and repair of lightly damaged
vehicles and the destruction of those left on the battlefield.

c. Corps. Organic assets are limited to a single maintenance battalion each for
armoured vehicles, wheeled vehicles and artillery. In addition, there is one recovery
and one repair battalion for tanks and one vehicle recovery company (and repair
units for special equipments). Working in the corps area, there will, however, be
substantial SG assets, the numbers depending on the importance of the axis and the
severity of the fighting that is anticipated. These will deploy to points convenient for
the various damaged vehicle collection points established by the lower formations
and will carry out as many repairs as possible before the momentum of the advance
demands their forward displacement. They try not to fall back more than 60-80 km
from the line of contact. In defence or withdrawal, they will concentrate on
evacuation and repair of lightly damaged vehicles.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 42

Medical

89. General. The medical system is designed to return as many soldiers as quickly as
possible to duty, and, apart from emergency life saving treatment, priority is given to those
men who can be put back into action.

90. The System. Medical units move forward with the troops they are supporting,
setting up facilities in areas where heavy fighting is taking place.

a. Unit. In the Mobile Forces, the combined arms battalion has a large medical
platoon capable of giving treatment, though stabilisation and are its main functions
and detailed work is left to brigade.

b. Brigade. The medical battalion can handle up to 500/400 casualties in 24

hours. Serious cases are sent on to corps or direct to SG after any necessary
stabilising treatment. Serious surgery and extended care are practised only at the
operational level. Casualties likely to recover in 10-15 days are held at brigade,
which has facilities for up to 500/400. These men can then be returned to units of
the formation needing replacements. It is not anticipated that the brigade medical
battalion will be able to handle the heavy casualty load involved in a penetration
battle. Indeed, it will be overstretched by the first day’s fighting and will be unable to
move even after two days. Thus, each first echelon lower formation will be
augmented by 1-2 separate medical detachments from SG resources. These
medical units will leapfrog forward, moving every two days on average.

c. Corps. Corps resources are deployed to support the axis likely to see the
most casualties. Separate medical detachments reinforce forward brigades,
supplementing their effort and easing the problem created by frequent moves by the
lower formation battalions. A further 2-4 separate medical detachments are kept as
a medical reserve to deal with the sudden influx of mass casualties which will result
from enemy surge operation and/or deep strikes. Also operating in the Corps rear,
60-80 km from the line of contact will be mobile hospital bases from SG. One is
deployed in support of every 2-3 brigades in contact.

Deployment of Tactical Level Logistic Units

(average distances in km from the line of contact)

Brigade Combined Arms Bn

Logistics Element
Attack Defence Attack Defence
Sup, ammo and fuel pts (a) 20-40 25-45 4-6 6-10
Tech obsn pt and recycling Up to 8 Up to 10 1-2 2-4
repair gp
Assy pt for damaged vehs 15-30 25-45 - -
Med pt/post/fd hospital (b) 10-20 10-20 2-4 5-6
Notes: (a) There should be more than 40km separating formation and unit supply points, even
during a rapid advance which will tend to stretch supply lines.

(b) Unit medical teams will allocate casualty collecting detachments with armoured
ambulances to sub-unit sectors.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 43

 SECTION 11 - NBC

Nuclear Weapons

91. General. Nuclear weapons are seen as having a role at every level of war.
Strategically, they deter attack on the homeland. Operationally, their unique characteristics
make them peculiarly well suited to certain tasks, eg, the destruction of air bases and
hardened C2 entities, of nuclear weapons whose location is known only approximately and
of forces concentrating in and deploying from the depth. Tactically, they can substitute for
immense volumes of conventional fire.

92. Nuclear and Conventional Operations Contrasted. Even if the escalation to a

strategic exchange can be deterred, GENFORCE thinks that a conflict conducted with
weapons of mass destruction between sides of approximately equal capability is likely to be
indecisive as well as almost unimaginably destructive. Their widespread use is almost
certain to end rather quickly all purposeful military activity.

Biological Weapons

93. General. Biological weapons are of increasing interest to GENFORCE. Medical

and pharmaceutical research is bringing effective prophylaxis within reach. Biotechnology
has opened up the possibility of speedy and covert production of significant quantities of
agents tailored to task and of vaccines for the protection of friendly forces. Potentially a key
strategic or operational capability, biological warfare (BW) is not, however, seen as yet to
have tactical value.

94. Definition. BW agents are living micro-organisms which are intended to cause
disease or death in man, animals or plants and which depend for their effects on their ability
to multiply in the victim. It is this capacity for self-multiplication that distinguishes them from
inanimate chemical agents and makes them more effective casualty producers. BW agents
fall into three broad categories.

a. Bacteria. These are microscopic, unicellular organisms that, when used as

BW agents, may cause disease in man, animals or (rarely) plants. They can be
cultured on simple nutrient sources and produced in bulk. A few bacterial agents
(eg, anthrax) can form spores, a resting form which will germinate in favourable
conditions.

b. Rickettsia. These are microscopic, unicellular organisms that are similar to

bacteria. The majority are strict parasites that can grow only in the living tissues of a
suitable animal host. They are generally more difficult to produce in bulk than
bacteria.

c. Viruses are the smallest and simplest of the micro-organisms. All are strict
parasites that grow only within the tissues of a suitable animal or plant host. They
can be produced in cell cultures or by harvesting tissue from an infected host. Viral
BW agents could be developed against man, animals or crops.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 44

 d. Fungi are large mico-organisms that are somewhat more complex than
bacteria. They can be cultured on simple nutrient sources and produced in bulk.
Like bacteria, some species produce toxins. They are best suited as anti-crop
agents.

95. Mode of Attack. Surprise is an essential feature of BW. This can take two forms,
ideally in combination. The agent should be difficult to identify and, following identification,
be difficult or impossible to treat effectively within an acceptable time scale. There are
many methods of dissemination depending on a number of factors. Some means are
outlined here, but the list is not exhaustive.

a. Sabotage. Covert action by SPF or state-sponsored terrorist groups can be

used to contaminate water supplies and/or food stuffs. Aerosol sprays can be
disguised as lighters, fly-sprays, deodorants, etc and used to attack indoor
personnel.

b. Area Attacks. Insect vectors can be used to spread disease amongst

animals and possibly thence to people. Aerosol attacks can be either on or off-
target. Delivery systems could include everything from vehicles, crop sprayers or
boats for covert attacks through to more obviously military means such as aircraft,
low observable RPVs or missiles.

Chemical Weapons

96. General. In contrast to nuclear and biological weapons, chemical weapons (CW)
are seen as essentially tactical weapons, though their area of employment (e.g. against
logistics installations or air bases) could have operational effects. Their casualty-producing
effect, particularly against troops ill-equipped and/or trained to defend against them, can be
very great over a substantial area. At least of equal importance, persistent agents will
significantly disrupt, degrade and above all slow down all forms of military activity without
creating collateral damage which will inhibit friendly manoeuvre. The main effect of CW is
to reduce the momentum of operations and greatly to increase the stress on troops.

97. Stockpiles. Estimates of GENFORCE’s holdings vary, but they are said to amount
to a minimum of 40,000 agent tonnes. GENFORCE is known to practise the field filling of
chemical munitions despite the dangers inherent in this procedure: this is a task for the
Chemical Defence Troops.

98. Currently Fielded Agents. Those agents known to be available are as follows:

a. Blood. Hydrogen Cyanide (AC) is a highly non-persistent, fast acting agent

whose effects depend on inhalation. Blood agents will be used on targets that are to
be attacked immediately following the chemical strike as they disperse very rapidly
and create no downwind hazard.

b. Vesicants. Mustard (H), thickened mustard and lewisite (L) are persistent to
very persistent agents. Although these agents are not lethal they will cause large
casualties and over burden medical services and force troops to operate in full IPE.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 45

 c. Nerve. GENFORCE fields four traditional nerve agents, the non-persistent
Sarin (GB), semi-persistent Soman (GD), persistent thickened Soman (VR-55) and
VX. All are highly toxic, and will be used to prepare ground for an assault (by troops
wearing full IPE), or for harassing e.g. GB. The others are used according to the
persistence required to deny enemy ground or equipment. GENFORCE has
introduced two new nerve agents, N5 and N7. These are binary agents with,
respectively 5-8 times toxicity of VX and 10 times that of GD.

99. Delivery Means. Where the casualty producing effect is the primary concern,
GENFORCE stresses a combination of surprise and massive concentration of agent.
GENFORCE can hit targets throughout the enemy’s tactical and operational depth using
the same delivery means that are used for HE and ACMs.

a. Blood Agent, which requires particularly large concentrations to be effective,

delivered by large aerial bombs or heavy MBRLs.

b. Non-persistent Nerve Agent (GB), which is used for instantaneous effect, is

delivered by aerial bombs, MBRLs or tube artillery of 120mm or greater.

c. Semi-persistent and Persistent Agents can be delivered by any of the

above systems or by SSM or cruise missiles.

SECTION 12 - HELIBORNE AND AIRBORNE FORCES

100. Heliborne. Given the payload/range limitations and vulnerability of helicopters, most
heliborne assaults will be confined to tactical and operational-tactical depth of the defence.
The most important role of an air assault unit will be to act as a raiding detachment or
group. Other missions include:

a. Seizure of vital ground.

b. Against enemy reserves.

c. Preventing withdrawals.

d. Vertical envelopment.

e. Deception.

f. Seizure of an airhead.

g. Counter penetration.

h. Anti-air landing.

101. Ordinary motor rifle troops can be employed in this role more commonly for shallow
penetration operations. At Army/Corps level there are Air Assault Bn mounted in BMDs.
The size of the force will depend on the mission, its planned duration and the available lift.
A battalion, with its own combat support elements combined with supporting helicopter and
FGA sorties could hold out for up to 18-24 hrs. The landing area may be up to 2km by 2km

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 46

for a company group and 5km by 5km for a battalion. A company will require 5 mins to land
its men and equipment; a battalion needs 10-15 mins. Combat helicopters and FGA aircraft
will provide cover for the duration.

102. Helicopter Lift. The norms for the helicopter lift requirement are:

a. Motor Rifle Coy with a Mortar Pl: 4 x Mi-8; 3 x Mi-26. 10-15 mins required
loading the heavy equipment.

b. Motor Rifle Bn and reinforcements: up to 20 x Mi-8; 17-18 x Mi-26/Mi-6. May

take up to 30 mins to load.

103. Airborne. Airborne troops are used for operational and strategic missions. Their
very existence can be expected to exert a powerful negative influence on the enemy,
inhibiting his planning and deployment. Missions for parachute assaults include, in
approximate order of importance depending on the operational situation:

a. Destruction of strategic nuclear forces.

b. Seizure of vital ground.

c. Destruction or disruption of higher level C3.

d. Destruction of key air defence systems.

e. Destruction or neutralisation of key reinforcement ports and airheads.

f. Block routes.

g. Destruction or disruption of key industrial facilities.

h. Destruction of logistics installations.

i. Disruption of enemy transportation infrastructure.

j. Seize an airhead or a port.

k. Support partisan operations.

104. As with heliborne forces, the size of an airborne assault is tailored to missions
requirements. Major determining factors are the enemy strength, especially in the main
battle tanks and aircraft, whether and for how long ground has to be held and, inevitably,
the lift available. A raiding grouping would be likely to be quite small, perhaps a group of a
BMD company with some air defence and a mortar or artillery battery, or perhaps a
battalion sized detachment for deeper raids. A battalion with its supporting elements could
probably hold out for 18-24 hrs. The mounting area would be around 20-30 km from the
FEBA.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 A - 3 - 47

 PART B

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

 CHAPTER 4

PLANNING GUIDE FOR USE OF ENEMY EQUIPMENT

Origin

1. Genforce is equipped with material of Russian origin. This is because, by and large,
the Russians produce the most effective equipment and weapons to be found outside
NATO and the aim of the Genforce package is to present British and allied forces with a
most challenging present to near-future enemy for high intensity conflict exercise purposes.

Capabilities

2. The characteristics of the equipment and weapons given in the following section is
drawn from a variety of Russian and Western open sources. Where such sources disagree
on an essential element of information or where it is omitted altogether, the author has,
having taken advice, make an informed guess. Where recourse to this expedient has
proved necessary, as asterisk (*) has been placed by the Item’s name/designator.

3. As Genforce is intended to provide a near-future as well as present day enemy, a

very few equipments are included that should, doctrinally, be fielded but which are not yet in
service. These are marked with a double asterisk (**).

Nomenclature

4. The Russian designation/name has been used throughout. Where it would be helpful
to NATO users, the NATO designation has been added afterwards in brackets, eg S-300
PMU1 (SA-10d).

EQUIPMENT LISTING (BY TYPE)

Page
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES B-4-3
GROUND/AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES B-4-4
MULTI-BARRELLED ROCKET LAUNCHERS B - 4 - 4 to 5
SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY B - 4 - 6 to 8
TOWED ARTILLERY B-4-9
MORTARS B - 4 - 10
TOWED ANTI-TANK GUNS B - 4 - 11
SELF-PROPELLED ANTI-TANK GUN B - 4 - 12
MEDIUM TANKS B - 4 - 13 to 14
TRACKED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARMOURED B - 4 - 15 to 16
PERSONNEL CARRIERS

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-1

 Page
WHEELED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARMOURED B - 4 - 17
PERSONNEL CARRIERS
TANK DESTROYERS B - 4 - 18 to 19
RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES B - 4 - 20 to 21
ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES(a) B - 4 - 22 to 23
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES B - 4 - 24 to 25
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES/GUNS B - 4 - 26
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES B - 4 - 27
MINELAYING EQUIPMENT B - 4 - 28
REMOTE MINING SYSTEMS B - 4 - 29
MINE CLEARING EQUIPMENT EXPLOSIVE FILLED LINE CHARGES B - 4 - 30
MINE PLOUGHS AND ROLLERS B - 4 - 30
ARMOURED ENGINEER VEHICLES B - 4 - 31
TACTICAL BRIDGING B - 4 - 32 to 33
FERRIES, AMPHIBIANS AND RAFTS B - 4 - 34
ENGINEER: FIELD FORTIFICATION/DOZER B - 4 - 35
PORTABLE FIELD FORTIFICATION B - 4 - 36
INFANTRY ROCKET/GRENADE LAUNCHERS B - 4 - 37
SMALL ARMS AND MACHINE GUNS (a) B - 4 - 38
ARMOURED AND TRACKED LOGISTICS VEHICLES B - 4 - 39
SOFT-SKINNED, WHEELED LOGISTICS VEHICLES B - 4 - 40 to 41
REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES B - 4 - 42
HELICOPTERS B - 4 - 43 to 44
COMBAT AIRCRAFT B - 4 - 45 to 48
TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (FIXED WING) B - 4 - 49
TANKER, ELINT AND AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING/CONTROL B - 4 - 50
AIRCRAFT
AIR-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES B - 4 - 51
AIR-TO-SURFACE GUIDED MISSILES B - 4 - 52
AIR-DELIVERED GUIDED BOMBS B - 4 - 53
UNGUIDED AIR-TO-SURFACE ROCKETS B - 4 - 54

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-2

 SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES

Technical
Oka-2 (SS-26)* Tochka U (SS-21)
Characteristics
Range (km) 500 20-120
CEO (max range, m) 30 15
Warhead weight (kg) 700 450
Warhead types Nuc, CW, FAE, conv EMP ICM, Nuc, CW, FAE, conv,
HE Frag EMP, ICM, HE Frag
Penetration aids Warhead manoeuvre and decoys
Guidance Inertial, with navsat update Inertial with MMW radar
and MMW radar terminal homing Terminal homing

Time into action Under 30 Under 20

(min)
TEL and transloader BAZ-6909 (8x8)
Unit of fire 4 (1 on TEL, 1 on transloader,
2 on resup veh with
alternative warheads)
BAZ5921 (6x6, amph)
5 (1 on TEL, 2 on
transloader, 2 on resup
veh, with alternative
warheads

Technical
R-17 (Scud-D)
Characteristics
Range (km) 300
CEP (max range, m) 50
Warhead weight (kg) 985
Warhead types Nuc, CW, FAE, ICM, HE-Frag, conv EMP
Penetration aids -
Guidance Inertial with digital scene matching
Time into action (min) under 30
TEL and transloader MAZ-543P (8x8)
Unit of fire 4 (1 on TEL, 1 on transloader, 2 on
resup veh with alternative warheads)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-3

 GROUND/AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

Technical
Kh-SD* Kh-101*
Characteristics
Range (m) 300 3000
Cruise altitude (m) 40-110 30-70
Speed Mach 8 Mach 7
CEP (m) 20 12-20
Warhead weight (kg) 410 400
Warhead types Nuc, CW, concrete Nuc, CW, ICM dispenser, HE
penetrator, ICM dispenser, Frag
HE Frag
Guidance Inertial with navsat mid- Inertial with navsat mid-
course guidance and TV course guidance and electro-
command guided terminal optical guided terminal
homing homing head
TEL and transloader MAZ-543 (8x8) MAZ-543 (8x8)
Unit of fire (GLCM) 5 (2 on TEL, 1 on 4 (1 on TEL, 1 on transloader,
transloader, 3 on reup 2 on resup veh)
veh)
Aircraft (ALCM) TU-22M3 (8xmsls) TU-22M3 (4xmsls)
TU-95MS (14xmsls) TU-95MS (8xmsls)

MULTI-BARRELLED ROCKET LAUNCHERS

Technical 9A52 9P140 BM-21

Characteristics (Smerch) (Uragan) (Grad)
Calibre (mm) 300 220 122
Range, min-max (km) 20-70 (100) (a) 8.5-35 (40)(a) 5-20.5 (b)
No of Tubes 12 16 40
Munitions (sub-munitions, HE Frag, ICM & HE Frag, ICM & HE Frag, RDM
SM) (each 72xSM), ARM RDM (each RDM (12xSM), CW,
30Xsm), ARM, TGSM, FAE, CW,
TGSM (5Xsm), incend incend (b)
FAE, CW, incend
Beaten zone of one salvo 67 42 4
(ha)
Time into/out of action 3/3 3/3 10/2
(mins)
Transloader load (rkts) 12 16 -
Reload time (mins) 20 15-20 10-20
Unit of Fire 24 32/48 120
Vehicle MAZ-543 (8x8) ZIL-135AM (8x8) URAL 375D
(6x6)
Max speed (road, kph) 60 65 80
Range (road, km) 850 500 550
Weight (loaded, kg) 43,700 20,000 13,700

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-4

 Technical 9A51
BM-21V
Characteristics (Prima)
Calibre (mm) 122 122
Range, min-max (km) 5-20.5 (36) (a) 5-20
No of Tubes 50 12
Munitions (Sub- HE Frag, RDM HE Frag, RDM
munitions, SM) (12xSM), (12xSM), CW,
TGSM (2xSM), CW, incend (b)
incend
Beaten zone of one salvo 19
(ha)
Time into/out of action 5/2 3.5/2
(mins)
Transloader Load (rkts) 50 -
Reload time (mins) 10-20 6-8
Unit of Fire 150 36
Vehicle URAL 4320 (6x6) GAZ-66 (4x4) BMD
Max speed (road kph) 80 85
Range (road, km) 990 575
Weight (loaded, kg) 13,900 6,000

Notes: (a) Estimated range of new rkts.

(b) Can also fire improved Prima rkts.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-5

 SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY

Technical 2S-7M 2S-5 2S-19

Characteristics (Pion) (Giatsint) (Msta-S)
Calibre (mm) main 203 152 152
armament
Calibre (mm) - 7.62 12.7
secondary armament
Range (km) 37.5 (RAP 47) 28.5 (RAP 40) 24.7 (base bleed
29)
Rate of fire (rpm) max 2.5 5-6 7.8 (burst)
Rate of fire sustained 30-60 per hour 1.5-2 per min 2 per min
Weight of HE round 110 (RAP 103) 46 43-45
(kg)
Ammunition types Nuc, CW, HE frag, Nuc, CW, HE CW, HE frag,
concrete piercing, frag, RDM(9xATk Flechette, RDM
ICM (180xSM), or 36xAP), conv (10xATk or 40xAP),
conv EMP EMP, ICM ICM (70xSM),
RDM(10xATk or (64xSM), smk, LGP(a), jammer,
80xAP) illum smk, illum, HEAT

UF (main armament) 40 (8 in veh) 60 (30 in veh) 80 (50 in veh)

Time into/out of action 5-6/3-5 2-3/2 2/2
(min)
Weight (kg) 47,000 28,200 42,000
Max speed (roads, 50 63(35/25, 60(35/25
kph) tracks/cross tracks/cross
country) country)
Range (roads/km) 500 500 500
Amphibious/deep No/No No/No (fords 1m) fords 1m, deep
wade wades 5m
Dozer blade No No Yes
Protection Armoured against shell splinters, small arms fire.
DAS routinely fitted.

Technical 2S-3M1 2S-1M 2S-31

Characteristics (Akatsiya) (Gvozdika) (Vena)
Calibre (mm) main 152 122 120
armament
Calibre (mm) 7.62 - 7.62
secondary armament
Range (km) 20 (base bleed 15.3 (RAP 22) 13(RAP 17)
24)
Rate of fire (rpm) max 5(2-3 for 3 mins) 7-8(2-3 for 6 8-10
mins)
Rate of fire (rph) 60 100 100
sustained

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-6

Weight of HE round 43.5 21.7 20.5
(kg)
Ammunition types CW, HE Frag, CW, HE, CW, HE frag(c)
Flechette Flechette, Flechette, LGP(b),
RDM (8xATk or LGP(b), smk, smk, illum, HEAT
34xAP), LGP(a), illum, HEAT
smk illum, HEAT,
Jammer
UF (main armament) 60 (46 in veh) 80 (40 in veh) 80(50/70 in veh) (d)
Time into/out of action
(min)
Weight (kg) 27, 500 15,700 16,900/19,000(d)
Max speed (kph) 60(35-25 tracks/ 60-70(35/25 70
cross country) tracks/cross
country)
Range (roads/km) 500 500 500
Amphibious/deep No/No (fords 1m) 5 kph in water 5 kph in water
wade
Dozer blade No No Yes
Protection Armoured against shell splinters and small arms fire.
DAS routinely fitted.

Notes: (a) Krasnopol, range 18 km, hit probability 0.8-0.9.

(b) Kitolev-2/2M, range 12/14 km, hit probability 0.8-0.9.
(c) Ammunition as effective as 152mm despite smaller round.
(d) BMD-3 chassis/BMP-3 chassis.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-7

 SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY

Technical 2S23 2S-12 2S-9

Characteristics (Nona-SVK) (Sani) (Nona-S)
Calibre (mm) main 120 120 120
armament
Calibre (mm) 7.62 - -
secondary armament
Range (km) 8.8(RAP 12.8) 7.1 8.8(RAP 12.8)
Rate of fire (rpm) max 8-10 15 6-8
Rate of fire (rph) 6-8
sustained
Weight of HE round 20.5 16 20.5
(kg)
Ammunition types HE, HEAT, illum, HE, HEAT, illum, HE, HEAT, illum,
smk, LGP(a) smk LGP(b) smk, LGP(a)
UF (main armament) 50 (30 in veh) 80 (48 in veh) 50 (25 in veh)
Time into/out of action 0.5/0.5
(min)
Weight (kg) 14,500 11,900 8,700
Max speed (roads, 80 62 60
kph)
Range (roads, km) 500 500 500
Amphibious Yes Yes Yes
Protection Armoured against shell splinters and small arms fire.
DAS routinely fitted.

Notes: (a) Kitolev -2/kitolev-2M, range 12/14 km, hit probability 0.8-0.9.
(b) Gran: range 7.8 km, hit probability 0.8-0.9.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-8

 TOWED ARTILLERY

Technical 2A36 2A65 2A61

Characteristics (Giatsint B) (Msta-B)
Calibre (mm) 152 152 152
Range 27(RAP 40) 24.7(base bleed 15.9(base bleed
29) 19)
Rate of fire (rpm) 5-6(burst), then 3-4 7.8(burst) then 5-6 6-8
max
Rate of fire 1 per min 2 per min 2 per min
sustained
Weight of HE round 46 43-45 43-45
(kg)
Ammunition types Nuc, CW. HE Frag, CW, HE Frag, CW, HE Frag,
Flechette, ICM Flechette, ICM Flechette,
(40xSM), (42xSM), ICM (42Xsm), RDM
RDM (34xSM), RDM (36xSM), (36xSM), LGP(a),
LGP(a), jammer, LGP(a), jammer, jammer, smk, illum,
smk, HEAT, illum, smk, illum, HEAT HEAT
conv EMP
UF 50 60-100 60
Towing veh KRAZ 260 (6x6) KRAZ 260 (6x6) ZIL-131, MT-LB
Towing speed 60 80(road),60(tracks), 80
(road, kph) 20-25 (cross country)

Weight (kg) 9,760 7,000 4,300

Technical 2B-16
D-20
Characteristics (Nona K)
Calibre (mm) 120 152
Range 8.7(how), 7.1(mor), 13(RAP) 20 (base bleed 24)
Rate of fire (rpm) max 8-10 5
Rate of fire (rpm) 6-8 65 (one hour)
sustained
Weight of HE round 20.5(how), 16(mor) 44
(kg)
Ammunition types How: HE-Frag, cargo, RAP, CW, HE-Frag, RDM (8xATk or
LGP(b) 34xAP), LGP(a), smk, illum,
Mor: HE-Frag, smk, incend, illum HEAT, jammer
UF 80 60
Towing veh GAZ-66 (4x4) URAL-375D, KRAZ-260
Towing speed (road 80 80 (road), 60 (tracks)
kph)
Weight (kg) 1,200 5,700

Notes: (a) Krasnopol: range 18 km, hit probability 0.9.

(b) Kitolev-2/2M, range 12/14 km.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B-4-9

 MORTARS

Technical 2B14 2B9

Characteristics (Podnos) (Vasilek)
Calibre (mm) 82 82
Range (m) 125-4300 80-4720
Rate of fire (rpm, max) 24-30 100(at automatic)
Ammunition types HE, smk, illum, incend HE, smk, illum, incend, HEAT
Bomb weight (kg) 3.1 3.1
Unit of fire 120 300(4 rd clips)
Weight of weapon (kg) 42 632
Vehicle/prime mover Manpack or mounted in veh GAZ-66 (4x4) (a)

Technical M-160
2B11
Characteristics (MT-13)
Calibre (mm) 120 160
Range (m) 480-7100 750-8000
Rate of fire (rpm, max) 15 3
Ammunition types LGP(b), HE, smk, illum, HE, smk, illum, incend
incend
Bomb weight (kg) 16 40.8
Unit of fire 80
Weight of weapon (kg) 210 (297 in travel mode) 1300 (1470 in travel mode)
Vehicle/prime mover GAZ-66(a)

Notes: (a) Towed or protee.

(b) Gran: range 7.5 km, hit probability 0.9.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 10

 TOWED ANTI-TANK GUNS

Technical 2A45M
MT-12
Characteristics (Sprut B)
Calibre (mm) 100 125
Range (km, max indirect) 8.2 (HE) 12.2(HE)
Range (m), max direct, 1000(HEAT), 2000(APDS), 1000(HEAT), 2100(APDS), 4-
effective) 4000 (ATGM) 5000(ATGM)
Rate of fire (max, rpm) 6 (aimed) 6-8
Ammunition types HE, HEAT, ATGM(a) HE, HEAT, ATGM (b),
APFSDS APFSDS
UF 80(HEAT:APDS = 3.5) 60 (6x rds on APU)
Towing veh MTLB URAL-4320, MTLB
Towing speed (road kph) 70 80
Auxiliary propulsion unit
(APU) No Yes
Speed, dirt track (APU, - 10-14
kph)
Time into/out of action ½ 1½-2/2-2½
(min)
Weight 3100 6500(6800 with APU)

Notes: (a) Bastion (AT-10). See ATGM section.

(b) Refleks (AT-11). See ATGM section.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 11

 SELF-PROPELLED ANTI-TANK GUN

Technical
SU-125**
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) main armament 125 (a)
secondary armament 1x30, 1x7.62 (b)
Ammunition types main armament APFSDS, HEAT, HE Frag, Refleks
cannon ATGM
AP, HE
Basic load 40 shells, 6xATGM, 500x 30 mm
Rate of fire (rpm) 6-8
Max effective range (m) gun 2000(+)
Max effective range (m) ATGM 5000
Combat weight (kg) 39000
Power to weight ratio (hp/t 30
Ground Pressure (kg/cm2) 0.7
Max road/cross country speed (kph) 90/50
Road range (km) 500
Amphibious Yes, with collapsible screen
Protection Indirect protection is given by very low
(turretless) silhouette. With weight of
turret eliminated, very thick, composite
ceramic armour is provided for the hull.
Third generation ERA and forward firing
smoke discharges are fitted together with
active and passive DAS.

Notes: (a) Fixed gun, hull mounted.

(b) In semi- retractable cupola. Cannon has anti-helicopter capability out to
4km.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 12

 MEDIUM TANKS

Technical
T-80B T-80U T-72B(a)
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) main 125 125 125
armament
Calibre (mm) secondary 1x12. 7AA, 1x12.7AA, 1x12.7AA,
armament 1x7.62 coax 1x7.62 coax 1x7.62 coax
Ammunition types APFSDS, HEAT, APFSDS, HEAT, APFSDS, HEAT,
HE-Frag, Refleks HE-Frag, Refleks HE-Frag, Kobra
ATGM(b), ATGM(b), ATGM
Flechette Flechette
Basic load 33xshells, 39xshells, 39xshells,
6xATGM 6xATGM 6Xatgm
500x12.7, 450x12.7, 300x12.7,
1250x7.62 1250x7.62 2000x7.62
Rate of fire, gun (rpm) 6-8 6-8 6-8
Max effective range (m) 2000(+) 2000(+) 2000(+)
gun
Max effective range (m) 5000 5000 5000
ATGM
Combat weight (kg) 42,500 46,000 45,000
Power to weight ratio(hp/t) 25.9 27.2 18.9
Ground pressure (Kg/cm2) 0.86 0.93 0.9
Max road/cross country 70/40 70/40 60/45
speed (kph)
Road range (km) 335/500 335/500 480/650
with/without aux
tanks
Fording(m) with/without 1.8/5 1.2/6 1.8/5
preparation

Protection Indirect protection is given by the low silhouette of 2.2m.

T-72 has an early laminated armour and T-80 has a new
generation composite ceramic armour. Thickness is much
the same as on modern western tanks (but without the same
weight penalty as GENFORCE tanks are smaller). All tanks
carry third generation ERA, have forward firing smoke
dischargers and a self entrenching blade. All carry the Shtora
passive protection system which detects an enemy IR or
laser painting of the vehicle and counters it. All can also be
fitted with either the Drozhd, Gordeniya or Arena active DAS
which detect and destroy incoming missiles or anti-tank
rockets.
Notes: (a) T-72 is now found exclusively in reserve divisions.
(b) Details of ATGM can be found in the ATGM section.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 13

 Technical
T-95**
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) main armament 135
Calibre (mm) secondary 1x30 coax, 1x7.62 coax
armament
Ammunition types APFSDS, HEAT, HE FRAG, Ataka ATGM (gun): AP, HE
(Cannon) 40xshells, 6xATGM, 500x30mm,
1250x7.62mm
Rate of fire, gun (rpm) 6-8
Max effective range (m) gun 2500
ATGM 8000
Cannon 2000
Combat weight (kg) 45500
Power to weight rates (hp/t) 28
Ground pressure (kg/cm2) 0.86
Max road/cross country speed 70/40
(kph)
Road range (km) with/without 450/550
aux tanks
Fording with/without 1.5/5
preparation

Protection With the 3 man crew in the hull and a compact,

unmanned turret, the tank has a very low silhouette.
Armour protection is probably greater than in T-80U and
passive and active DAS are fitted.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 14

 TRACKED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARMOURED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS

Technical MT-
BMP-3 BMP-2
Characteristics LB(c)
Calibre (mm) main 100 gun, coax 30 30 7.62
armament cannon
Calibre (mm) secondary 1x7.62 coax, 2x7.62 1x30(GL),
armament bow
Ammunition types HE Frag (100 mm), AP, HE (Cannon),
Basnya ATGM(a), AP HE(GL), Konkurs
and HE(30mm) ATGM(a)

Basic load 40 x 100mm, 8XaTGM, 500xCannon, 350x 2,500

500x30mm, grenades
600x7.62mm 4xATGM, 2000x7.62
Rate of fire (rpm) 8x10XhE frag, 250-500(Cannon),
330x30mm 350 (GL)
Max effective range (m) 4000(Gun), 2000(Cannon)(b), 1,000
2000(Cannon)(b), 1700(GL),
4000(atgm) 4000(ATGM)
Crew and passengers 3 + 7(d) 3 + 7(d)
Combat weight (kg) 18,700 14,500 2 + 10
Power to wright ratio (hp/t) 26.7 20.7 11,900
Ground pressure (kg/cm2) 0.6 0.64 20.2
Max road speed (kph) 70 65 0.46
Road range (km) 600 600 62
Amphibious Yes, up to 10 kph Yes, up to 7 kph
Dozer/entrenching blade Yes Yes, up
to 4.5
kph
Protection Against small arms fire and shell splinters. Forward firing
smoke grenade dischargers fitted. DAS now fitted on many
BMPs.

Notes: (a) Details of ATGM can be found in ATGM section.

(b) Ranges against light AFVs, double against personnel. High elevation of
weapon also makes cannon useable against helicopters out to 4 km.
(c) Used as APC in arctic and to an extent in desert conditions. Main
employment is as prime mover and base vehicle for other systems,
especially 9P149 anti-tank system.
(d) Vehicle commander is section commander and normally dismounts with
the infantry.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 15

 Technical
BMD-3(a) BMD-2(a) BTR-D(a)(c)
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) main 30 30 2x7.62(bow)
armament
Calibre (mm) secondary 1x30(GL) 1x7.62(coax),
armament 1x7.62(coax), 1x7.62(bow)
1x5.45(bow)
Ammunition types AP and AP and HE(cannon)
HE(cannon); Konkurs ATGM
HE(GL), Basnya
ATGM
Basic load 300xcannon, 300xcannon, 4000
200xgrenades, 2980x7.62, 4xATGM
4Xatgm,
2000x 7.62
Rate of fire (rpm) 250-500(cannon), 250-500(cannon),
350(GL) 350(GL)
Max effective range(m) 2000(cannon) (b), 2000(cannon) (b), 1000
1700(GL) 1700(GL)
Max effective range 4000 4000
(m, ATGM)
Crew and passengers 3+7 2+5 1 + 12
Combat weight (kg) 13,200 8000 8000
Power to weight ratio (hp/t) 34 30 30
Ground pressure (kg/cm2) 0.49 0.5 0.5
Max road speed (kph) 70 60 60
Road range(km) 500 500 500
Amphibious Yes, up to 10 kph Yes, up to 10 kph Yes, up to 10
kph
Protection Against small arms fire and shell splinters. Forward firing
smoke grenade dischargers fitted. DAS can be fitted on
BMDs.

Notes: (a) All BMDs are air-droppable, in the case of BMD-3 with the crew inside
the vehicle.
(b) Ranges against light AFVs, double against personnel. High elevation of
weapon also makes cannon useable against helicopters out to 4 km.
(c) Mainly seen as prime mover, command vehicle and in anti-tank version
BTR-RD.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 16

 WHEELED INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES AND ARMOURED PERSONNEL
CARRIERS

Technical
BTR 90 BTR 80A BTR 70
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) main 30 30 14.5
armament
Calibre (mm) secondary 7.62mm coax 7.62 coax 7.62 coax
armament
Ammunition types AP and HE, AP and HE
Konkurs ATGM(a)
Basic load 500xcannon, 300xcannon 500x14.5
3xATGM 2000x7.62 2000x7.62
2000x7.62
Rate of fire (rpm) 250-500 250-500 600
Max effective range (m) 2000(b) 2000(b) 2000
cannon
Max effective range (m) 4000 4000
ATGM
Crew and passengers 3 + 10 2+8 2+8
Combat weight 17,000 14,550 13,600
Configuration 8x8 8x8 8x8
Power to weight 17-9 19.1
ratio(hp/t)
Max road speed(kph) 80 90 90
Road range 600 600 600
Amphibious Yes, up to 10 kph Yes, up to 10 kph Yes, up to 10 kph

Protection Against small arms fire and shell splinters. Forward firing
smoke grenade dischargers fitted.

Notes: (a) Details of ATGM can be found in ATGM section.

(b) Ranges against light AFVs, double against personnel. High elevation of
weapon makes cannon usable against helicopters out to 4 km.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 17

 TANK DESTROYERS

Technical BTR RD BTR 80A

9P148
Characteristics (Robot) (Shturm-S)
ATGM Konkurs and Shturm S or Ataka Konkurs and
Faktoriya Faktoriya
Basic load 12 and 12(a) 12 10xKonkurs or
6xKonkurs
and 8xFaktoriya
Rate of fire (rpm) 3-4 3-4 3-4
Range, min-max 75-4000 and 70- 400-5000 or 100- 75-4000 and 70-
(m) 2500 6000 2500
Msl flight speed 210 and 180 345 or 320 210 and 180
(m/s)
Warheads Tandem HEAT, HE Tandem HEAT, FAE Tandem HEAT, HE
and FAE and FAE
Guidance SACLOS (b) SACLOS (b) SACLOS (b)
Command link Wire (IR tracking) Radio Wire (IR tracking)
Weight (kg) 8000 11900 7000
Power to weight 30 20.2 26
ratio (hp/t)
Ground pressure 0.5 0.46 0.6
(kg/cm2)
Max road speed 61 62 100
(kph)
Speed in water up to 10 up to 4.5 up to 10
(kph)
Road range (km) 500 500 750
Base vehicle BTR-D MT-LB BRDM

Technical
9P151 (c) 9P150** (c)
Characteristics
ATGM Khrizantema Groza**
Basic load 15 15
Rate of fire (rpm) 3-4 3-4
Range, (min-max (m) 250-6000 100-10000
Msl flight speed (m/s) 400 up to 1200
Warheads Tandem HEAT, FAE Tandem HEAT, FAE
Guidance SACLOS FOG + GPS (non-line
of sight top attack)
Command link Automatic radar
quidance/semi automatic
laser beam-riding

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 18

 Technical
9P151 (c) 9P150** (c)
Characteristics
Weight (kg) 16700 16700
Power to weight ratio(hp/t) 27.2 27.2
Ground pressure (Kg/cm2) 0.58 0.58
Max road speed (kph) 70 70
Speed in water (kph) up to 10 up to 10
Road range (km) 600 600
Base vehicle BMP-3 BMP-3

Notes: (a) One firing post and 12 x Faktoriya carried in vehicle for dismounted
employment, though Fakroriya can also use vehicle launcher.
(b) Operator can be remoted up to 20m from vehicle to engage with vehicle
left hull down to enemy.
(c) Two targets can be engaged simultaneously, or one by two missiles using
both guidance systems.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 19

 RECONNAISSANCE VEHICLES

Technical BRM-3K
BRDM-3** (c) PRP-4
Characteristics (Rys)
Main armament 30 30 7.62
calibre (mm)
Secondary 7.62 7.62
armament
calibre (mm)
Ammunition types AP-I, HE-I, HE-T, HE AP-I, HE-I, HE-T AP-I
Frag
Rate of fire (rpm) 330 (30mm), 250-500mm, 250
250(7.62mm) 600(7.62mm)
Basic load 600x30mm, 500x30mm, 2000
2000x7.62 2000x7.62
Max effective range 2000(30mm) (a), 2000(30mm), 1500
(m) 1500(7.62mm) 1500(7.62mm)
Combat weight (kg) 18700 8000 14500
Power to weight 26.7 26 20.7
ratio(hp/t)
Ground pressure 0.6 0.6 0.6
(kg/cm2)
Max road speed 70 100 65
(Kph)
Road range (km) 600 750 575
Amphibious Yes, up to 10 kph Yes, up to 10 kph Yes, up to 7 kph
Radio range (km) 100(moving), 350
(stationary)
Radar range (km) 10 (vehs), 4 (pers) 10 (vehs), 4 (pers) 20 (fall of shot 10)
Laser RF range up to 10 km up to 10 km up to 10 km
(km)
Other equipments LTD, TI and active LTD, TI and active TI and active pulse
pulse NODs (b) pulse NODs NODs

Notes: (a) Ranges against light AFVs, double against personnel. High elevation of
weapon also makes cannon usable against helicopters out to 4 km.
(b) OP can be remoted up to 6 km from veh.
(c) Other variants: BRDM-2 ATGM(9P148); BRDM-2U (command); BRDM-
2RKh (chemical recce).

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 20

 Technical RknM IRM
Characteristics (Chemical Recce) (Engineer Recce)
Calibre of armament (mm) 14.5 and 7.62 coax 7.62

Rate of fire (rpm) 70 and 250 250

Basic load 500 and 2000 2000

Max effective range(m) 2000 and 1500 1500

Crew 3 6

Combat weight (kg) 13000 17200

Max road speed (k) 60 52

Road range (km) 500 500

Amphibious Yes, up to 6 kph Yes, up to 12 kph (can

also op, submerged depth
10m)

Special capabilities Detects and identifies CW Detects mines (land and

agents, determines underwater), determines
radiation levels, marks load bearing cap of terrain,
areas of contamination. depth of rivers and profiles
Pers carried for of banks, bottom,
dismounted recce conducts survey.
Two-4 men carried for
dismounted recce.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 21

 ANTI-TANK GUIDED MISSILES (a)

Technical 9K115M Metis 9M111M 9K111 Konkurs Kornet

Characteristics M Factoriya M (AT-14)
(AT-13) (AT-4b) (AT-5)
Range min/max 40/1500 75/2500 75/4000 100-5500
(m)
Msl flight speed 167 180 210 229
(m/s)
Warheads Tandem HEAT, Tandem Tandem HEAT, Tandem HEAT,
FAE HEAT, HE FAE FAE
Guidance SACLOS SACLOS SACLOS SACLOS
Command link Wire(IR Wire(IR Wire(IR tracking) Laser beam rider
tracking) tracking)
Weight with firing 23.8 34.9 49 46
post (kg)
Launch platform Manpack(8) Manpack(8) 9P148(BRDM)(1 9P148(BRDM)(1
(with nos of msls 0), BMP-2, 0), BMP-2,
carried) BMD-2(4) BMD-2(4)
Manpack (8) Manpack (8)

Penetration (mm, 900 460 800 1200

RHA)

Technical 9K114 Shturm 9M112 9K120 (Refleks) 9k116

Characteristics S (Kobra) (AT-11B) Bastion/Basnya
(AT-6a) (AT-8) (AT-10)
Range min/max 400/5000 100-4000 100-5000 100/400, 5000
(m)
Msl flight speed 345 345 313 227
(m/s)
Warheads Tandem HEAT, Tandem HEAT Tandem HEAT Tandem HEAT
FAE
Guidance SACLOS SACLOS SACLOS SACLOS
Command link RF RF Laser beam rider Laser beam rider
Launch platform 9P149(MTLB) T-80B(4),T- T-80U(6),T- BMP-3(8),BMD-
nos of smls (12), Mi-28(16) 72B(4) 80B(4), 2A45M 3(4), MT-12
carried)

Penetration (mm, 800 700 700 600

RHA)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 22

 Technical 9K120 Ataka* Vikhr* Groza**
Characteristics (AT-6b) (AT-16)
Range min/max 600/6000 500/7000 100/10000
(m)
Msl flight speed 320 800 up to 1200
(m/s)
Warheads Tandem HEAT, Tandem HEAT, Tandem HEAT, FAE
FAE FAE
Guidance SACLOS SACLOS FOG + GPS for non-line of sight
top attack
Command link Laser beam Laser beam rider
rider or RF
Launch platform Mi-28(16), Ka-52(16),Mi-28 9P150 (BMP3) (10)
(with nos of msis Ka-52(16) Su-25TM
carried) 9P149(MTLB)
(12)

Penetration (mm, 800 800 1000

RHA)

Technical 9M123 Khrisantema

Characteristics (AT-15)
Range min/max(m) 250-6000
Msl flight speed (m/s) 400
Warheads Tandem HEAT, FAE
Guidance Fire and forget and SACLOS

Command link Automatic radar and semi automatic laser

beam rider (b)
Launch platform (with nos of msls carried) BMP-3(15)

Penetration (mm, RHA) 700

Notes: (a) All have a night fighting capability (max range 3500m) thanks to TI sights.
(b) Two targets may be engaged simultaneously, or one by two missiles using
both guidance systems.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 23

 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Technical S-300 PMU1 S-300V1 S-300V1

Characteristics (SA-10d) (SA-12a) (b) (SA-12b) (b)
Target Detection 300 250 250
Range (max, km)

Target engagement 25-150 (25-40) 8-75 (8-45) 13-100(13-40)

Range (min-max, km),
ac(SSM)

Altitude of engagement 25-300000 (2000-25000) 25-25000 1000-30000

min-max, m), ac(SSM) (2000-25000) (2000-25000)

Max SAM speed (m/s) 1900 1700 2400

Max target speed (m/s) 3000 3000 3000

Guidance principle Track via msl Inertial, semi active radar homing

Nos tgts tracked/ 100/6 70/24

engaged
simultaneously

Nos msls guided up to 12 per bty up to 48 per bty

Nos msls per TELAR/ 4/4 (a) (48 in bty) 4/4 (c) 2/2 (c)
transloader

Unit of fire 8 12 6

TELAR MAZ-543M (8x8) MT-T (tracked) MT-T (tracked)

Time into/out of action 5/5 5/5 5/5

(min)

Associated radars BIG BIRD (surv/tracking), BILL BOARD (surv, tgt

(NATO designation) CLAM SHELL (tgt acquisition), HIGH SCREEN (ABM
acquisition), FLAP LID tracking), GRILL PAN
(engagement) (engagement)

Notes: (a) Transloader can also be used as launch vehicle but guidance has to be
done by associated TELAR.
(b) S-300V1 battery normally has 4 anti-aircraft and 2 anti-missile TELARS,
with 3 x transloader-launcher vehicles. Sometimes, however, batteries are
pure air defence or anti-missile defence.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 24

 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Technical 9K37 Buk M2 BUK M1 9M330 Tor-M1

Characteristics (SA-17) (a) (b) (SA-11) (a) (SA-15) (a)
Target Detection 35/160(tgt 100 30
Range (max, km) 100m/over
1000m alt)
Target engagement 2.5-50 (b) 3-36 1.5-12(up to 6)
(min-max, km), range
ac (SSM)
Altitude of engagement 10-25000 15-22000 10/6000(a)
(min-max m)
Max SAM speed (m/s) 1200 1000 850

Max target speed (m/s) 1200 830 700

Guidance principle Semi-active radar Semi-active radar Command
homing homing
Nos tgts tracked/ 10/4 up to 6 2/1 per TELAR
simultaneously
Nos msts guided 2 per fire unit up to 12 2
simultaneously

Nos msls per 4/8(c) (48 in bty) 4/8(c) (48 in bty) 4/4
TELAR/transloader
Unit of fire 12 8 8
TELAR GM-352 (tracked) GM-352 (tracked) GM-352 (tracked)
Time into/out of action 5 from march, 1 after 5/5
tac mov
Associated radars SNOW DRIFT (surv, SNOW DRIFT SNOW DRIFT
(NATO designation) tracking, tgt (surv, tracking, tgt (surv, trg
acquisition), CHAIR acquisition), FIRE acquisition),
BACK (tracking DOME (tracking SCRUM HALF
engagement) engagement) (tracking
engagement)

Notes: (a) Can act as autonomous TELARS.

(b) Buk M2 has an ABM capability of unknown parameters.
(c) Transloader can also be used as launch vehicle but guidance has to be
done by associated TELAR.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 25

 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES/GUNS

Technical 2S-6M Tunguska

Characteristics (SA-19)(a)
Target Detection Range (max, km) 80 (DOG EAR), 18 (2S-6) (TELAR)

Target-Engagement Range (min-max, km), ac(a) 2.5-8(msl), 2-4(gun)

Altitude of engagement (min-max, m) 1.5-3.5 (msl), 0.3 (gun)

Max SAM speed (m/s) ave 600

Max target speed (m/s) 500

Guidance principle Radio Command (semi-automatic)

nos tgts tracked/engaged simultaneously 1/1

Nos msls guided simultaneously 2

Nos msls per TELAR/transloader 8/8

Unit of fire 16

TELAR GM325M (tracked)

Cannon 4x30mm
Rate of fire (rpm) burst of 83 or 250 per wpn
Range (m) 4000 (slant)
Altitude (m) 300
Nos of rds (system and resupply veh) 1900 + 3808

Time into/out of action (min)

Associated radars (NATO designation) DOG EAR (surv, regt), HOT SHOT
engagement

Cannon 2x30

Rate of fire (rpm) Burst of 83 or 250 per barrel

Range (m) 4000 (slant)
Altitude (m) 3000
Unit of fire (rds) 6000

Weight (kg) 1500

Prime mover GAZ-66, MTLB, BTR-D
Notes: (a) There is also an URAL-53234 (8x8) mounted version of the weapon
system (Pantzyr S-1) for rear area defence (eg of airfields, communication
nodes).
(b) Cross over range from cannon to SAM is normally 2000m.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 26

 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Technical 9K35 Strela 10 M3 9K38 Igia-N 9k310 Igia-M1

Characteristics (SA-13) (SA-18) (SA-16)
Target detection 45 (DOG EAR), - -
range
(max, km) 10 (SNAP SHOT)

Target engagement 0.8-5 500/2500m 500/2000

range (min-max, (approaching) (approaching)
km) 800-5000 (receding) 1000-5000 (receding)

Altitude of 10/3500 10/3500 10/3500

engagement
(min-max m)

Max SAM speed 520

(m/s)

Max target speed 420 360 (approaching) 360 (approaching)

(m/s) 320 (receding) 320 (receding)

Guidance principle IR homing (a) IR homing (a) IR homing (a)

Nos tgts tracked/ 1/1

engaged
simultaneously

Nos msts per 8 (incl 4 ready to Manpack Manpack

TELAR/transloader fire)

Unit of fire 8

TELAR MTLB

Associated radars DOG EAR (surv,

(NATO regt),
designation) SNAP SHOT
(engagement,
range only)

Note: (a) With counter-counter measures against IR decoys.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 27

 MINELAYING EQUIPMENT

Technical
GMZ-3 PMZ-4 Mi-38 (c)
Characteristics
Armament (mm) 1 x 7.62

Weight (kg) 28500

Max speed (kph, 60

roads)

Range (km, roads) 500

Fording 1m

Mine capacity 208 (a) depends on tow veh 330

(a) (b)

Minelaying rate
(kph)
surface laying up to 16 4-10 14
buried up to 6 2-3

Mine spacing (m 4-5.5 4-5.5 5.5-10

apart)

Reload time (mins) 15-20 15-20 15-20

Unit of fire 400 - -

Notes: (a) Only contact or proximity fuzed mines can be mechanically laid. Tilt fuzed
mines must be hand laid (or fuzes inserted after surface laying).
(b) Possible tow vehicle loads are BTR, 100-130; URAL-375, 350; ZIL-157,
200.
(c) Mines laid by chute.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 28

 REMOTE MINING SYSTEMS

Technical
UMZ PKM
Characteristics
Vehicle ZIL-131 (6X6) Manpack

Mine dispensers 6xlaunchers, each 30xtubes Single launcher tube of UMZ

Basic load 1152 x PFM-1S,

720 x POM-2, 180 x PTM3

Range (m) 30-100 (depends on mine 30-100 (depends on mine

type) type)

Dispensing speed (kph) up to 40

Depth of minefield (m) 15-240
Length of minefield (m) (a)
PTM-3-a-tk 600
POM-2s A-TK 5000
PFM-1S a-pers 3200
Reload time (mins) up to 120

Technical
KMGU VSM-1
Characteristics
Vehicle Gd att ac and hels Helicopters (Mi-38)

Mine dispensers Each KMGU has 8xsub- 4 x K-29 boom mounted

containers, each with 12 x containers, each 26 downward
PGMDM Atk mines or larger ejecting mine canisters with
nos of a-pers mines 7424 x PFM-1S
464 x POM-2, 116 X PTM-3

Range Depends on aircraft

Laying speed 400-800 kph at 50-200m up to 220 kph at 30-100m

Depth of minefield (m) (a) ? 50(b)

Length of minefield (m) ?

PTM-3-Atk 400
POM-2S Atk 4000
PFM-1S a-pers 2000

Notes: (a) Using one basic load.

(b) Random pattern of strip, with density only half that of strip laid by dispensing
chute.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 29

 MINE CLEARING EQUIPMENT
EXPLOSIVE FILLED LINE CHARGES

Technical
MTK-2 UR-88P (a) SPZ-2/4:BDT
Characteristics
Vehicle: Amph 2S-1 chassis carried in sects
(mod) on
Weight 11000 ZIL-131
Max road speed up to 60(30 cross
(kph) country)
road range (km) 500

Amphibious Yes, up to 4.5 kph

Line charge 3 x UR-77 rkts(a) rkt SPZ-2 winched across

projection minefield: SPZ-4 and BDT
can be pushed across by a
tk or towed by a plough tk

Range of rkts (m) 500 400

Lane cleared (m) up to 90 x 6 per rkt 115 x 6 up to 500 x 6

Note: (a) Pods containing 1 x UR-88 launcher each can be fitted to either side of a
tank turret.
MINE PLOUGHS AND ROLLERS
Technical
KMT-7 KMT-8 KMT-10
Characteristics
Plough vehicle med tk med tk BMP

Type of system plough and roller(a) plough plough

Lane cleared per 0.75 (plough), 0.81 0.75 with 1.9 gap track width of BMP
plough(m) (rollers) with 1.9 gap

Device to trigger tilt Yes Yes Yes

fuzes

Attachment to clear - Yes, full width Yes, full width

RDMs

Ploughing up to 12 up to 15 10-15
speed (max, kph) (b)

Notes: (a) Simultaneous use possible only on flat ground.

(b) Ploughing speed depends on the nature of the ground.
(c) AFVs can also carry a magnetic mine clearer, detonating mines 3-5m
ahead of the vehicle.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 30

 ARMOURED ENGINEER VEHICLES

Technical
IMR-2M BAT-2
Characteristics
Weight 44500 30000

Max road speed (kph) 60 60

Range (km) 480 500

Fording (m) 1.2 1.2

Equipment Dozer blade (clears routes Dozer blade (soil moving

at 5-10kph, fills ditches capacity 400m3/hr); crane;
and creates approaches at winch
230-300m/min); scraper-
ripper; crane with grab and
bucket atts; 2 x UR-77

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 31

 TACTICAL BRIDGING

Technical
TMM-3 (a) MTU-72
Characteristics
No of spans in set 4 1

Bridge length, emplaced (m) 25 (crosses 18m gap)

per span (m) 10.5 max 23

per set (m) 42 (crosses 40m gap) -

Bridge width (m) 3.8 3.8

Capacity (mt) 60 50

Assembly time (min) full set 45-60(day), 60-80 4

(night) (b) (c)

Trestle leg length (m) 1.7-3.2 (adjustable)

Launch vehicle KRAZ-255B (6x6) T-72

weight (kg) 9500 44700

speed (kph) 60 60
range (km) 700 500
Notes: (a) Max launch slope 10° lengthwise, 6° lateral. Cannot be used in rivers
deeper than 3.5m or with current exceeding 4m/sec.
(b) Average speeds; a well-trained crew can half these construction times.
(c) Bridge can be laid just under water for camouflage purposes, though this
takes 50% longer. It can also be linked to a PMP bridge as a ramp section.

Technical
PMP (c) PMM-2 PVD-20 (c, d)
Characteristics
No of spans in set 32 x centre, 4 x ramp 60 x treadway sects,
20 x boats (full set -
basic bridge is 10
treadways and 2
boats

Bridge length,
emplaced

per span (m) 6.75(centre)/6(ramp) 10

per half set (m) 119(60t), 281(20t)
per set (m) 227(60t), 389(20t) 100(45t) 88(6t) or 64(8t)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 32

 Technical
PMP (c) PMM-2 PVD-20 (c, d)
Characteristics
Bridge width( m) 6.5(60t), 3.8(20t)

Capacity (mt) 20 or 60 50 6 or 8

Assembly time 30(60t), 50(20t) (a, b) 50

(min)

Launch vehicle KRAZ-255B (6x6) MT-T GAZ-63 (4x4) (10 per

set)

weight (kg) 18600 2000

speed (kph) 70 45(10 in water) 90
range (km) 490 500 800

Notes: (a) Average construction time is 7m/min; a well trained crew can cut this by
over half.
(b) Bridge kept in position with BMK-150 boats (12 per set, 6 per half set).
(c) Sections can be redeployed by helicopters as underslung loads.
(d) Air portable/droppable.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 33

 FERRIES, AMPHIBIANS AND RAFTS

Technical
PTS-2 PMM-2
Characteristics
Role Amphibian(a) Heavy ferry(b)

Weight (kg) 17700 ?

Max load, land/water (kg) 5000/10000 50000

Max speed, land/water 42/11 45/10

(kph)

Range (km) 350 500

Max-load, PKP amph tlr 5000 -

(kg)

Notes: (a) Also used to lay portable trackway across beaches, obstacle exits.
(b) Also used as assault bridging (see tactical bridges section).

Technical
PMP RAFTS (a) PVD-20 RAFTS
Characteristics
Type (capacity in mt) 40 60 80 120 150 4 6 8

Length(m) 13.5 20-25 27 39.25 52.75 5.85 8.8 11.75

Rafts per set 16 10 8 5 4 10 6 4

Pontoons per raft 2 3 4 5+1 7+1 2 3 5

bank bank

Assembly time (min) 7 8 9 15 20 15 20 25

Note: (a) Rafts propelled by BMK-150 boats (12 per set, 6 per half set).

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 34

 ENGINEER: FIELD FORTIFICATION/DOZER

Technical
BTM-4 MDK-3 TMK-2
Characteristics
Weight (kg) 27600 40000 27200

Max speed (kph) 36 50 40

Range (km) 500 500 500

Trenching (m/hr) up to 1200 up to 200 up to 400

(400 gd frozen)

Depth/width of 1.5/1.1 2.9/3.5 1.5/1.1

trench (m)

Dozer blade No Yes (a) Yes

Earth moving 450

3
capacity (m /hr)

Crane No No No

Technical
PJM-2 BAT-M
Characteristics
Weight (kg) 12800 30000

Max speed (kph) 44 60

Range (km) 500 500

Trenching(m/hr) 180(35 gd frozen) -

140 (pit)

Depth/width of trench (m) 1.2/0.9 -

up to 3/up to 3.5 (pit)

Dozer blade Yes Yes

Earth moving capacity up to 180 150-450

Crane No Yes

Note: (a) As well as digging anti-tank ditches, MDK-3 has a ripper and road harrow
for route denial.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 35

 PORTABLE FIELD FORTIFICATION

Technical
Gorchak
Characteristics
Structure (a) Concrete cupola/weapons complex,
retractable

Armament 1 x Kornet, ATGM, 1 x AG-17 (30mm GL)

1 x NSV 12.7mm, 1 x PKM 7.62mm

Unit of Fire 4 x ATGM, 290 x 30mm grenades,

500 x 12.7mm, 1000 x 7.62mm

Weight (kg) 1000

Crew 2

Time to emplacement (hrs) 4

Note: (a) Two carried on ZIL-130 (4x2) truck.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 36

 INFANTRY ROCKET/GRENADE LAUNCHERS

Technical
RPG-16 RPG-27 RPG-29
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) 100(rocket) 105 105
Range max/effective 800/500 250/200 800/500
(m)
Rate of fire (rpm) 4-6 Disposable wpn 2
Ammunition Tandem HEAT Tandem HEAT Tandem HEAT
Unit of fire 20 1-2 per rifleman(a) 8
Weight of weapon (kg) 10.3 8 12
Penetration 500 750 750
(mm.RHA)

Technical
AGS-17 GP-25 RPO/RPO-A
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) 30 40 110/93
Range max/effective 1700/1000 400/50 500/300
(m)
Rate of fire (rpm) 50-100 40 Grenade Inchr/
Disposable wpn
Ammunition HE, HEAT HE FAE(b), smk(c)
Unit of fire 300 (mag holds 29) 10(2 per rifle sect)
Weight of weapon (kg) 31 1.5(underbarrel 11(3.5 for RPO)
wpn)

Notes: (a) Also widely issued to personnel whose primary role is non-combat.
(b) Effect equivalent to 152mm round, but relying on blast and flame rather
than splinter effect.
(c) Both weapons held by flame-thrower units. RPO is normal grenade
launcher and RPO-A is disposable. RPO-A can be issued to ordinary rifle
sub-units.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 37

 SMALL ARMS AND MACHINE GUNS (a)

Technical
AK-74 RPK-74 SVD PKM NSV (b)
Characteristics
Calibre (mm) 5.45 5.45 7.62 7.62 12.7
Rate of fire (rpm, 100 150 30 250 270
practical)

Range (m practical) 400 500 1000 1000 2000

Magazine capacity 30 or 40 40 10 belt fed belt fed

Weight (kg) 3.3 4.6 4.3 9 35.7

Notes: (a) There is also a range of SPF silent assault, sniper and underwater
weapons.
(b) Main use is as turret mounted AAMG.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 38

 ARMOURED AND TRACKED LOGISTICS VEHICLES

Technical
BGBM** MT-T MT-LV
Characteristics
Role Armoured arty ammo LCV Over snow LCV
tpt (ground pressure
is 0.27 kg/cm2)

Armament Calibre 1 x 12.7

(mm)

Weight (kg) 2000 25000 8500

Capacity (nos of 48 x 203 mm or

rds) 90 x 152 mm

Max load (kg) 6500 12000 4500 (2500 with tlr)

Max towed load - 12000 7000

(kg)

Max road speed 60 45 60 (50 with tlr)

(kph)

Amphibious No No Yes, at 5-6 kph

Range 500 500 500

Technical
BMM-1/3 GAZ-3403Z
Characteristics
Role Armd amb (1) and mob dressing stn Ammo/sups tpt
(3)

Weight (kg) 10000 4750

Capacity 9 x stretcher cases (1) 1000 kg

Max towed load 2000 kg

Max road speed (kph) 80 50

Amphibious Yes, up to 10 kph Yes

Range 500 500

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 39

 SOFT-SKINNED, WHEELED LOGISTICS VEHICLES

Technical
LuAZ-967M UAZ-469b UAZ-452 GAZ-66 (a)
Characteristics
Role/variants Lt airborne sp veh; Gen purpose Ambulance, LCV, prime
Battlefield casevac lt veh comd veh mover,
BBV

Weight (kg, 930 1650 1720 2000

empty)

Max load (kg) 1350; 2 x stretcher 695 800; 3 x stretcher 2000

cases cases; 3 x seated
patients

Max towed load 3000 850 850 2000

(kg)

Max road speed 75 100 95 90

(kph)

Max water 5-6 - - -

speed

Range (km) 410 750 500 875

Configuration 4x4 4x4 4x4 4x4

Technical URAL-377M
ZIL-131(a) URAL-375D (a) URAL-4320 (a)
Characteristics (b)
Role/variants LCV, bowser, prime LCV, bowser, LCV LCV, dump
mover, maint, dump BBV truck
truck comd, rcy

Weight (kg, 6700 8400 8020 7000

empty)

Max load (kg) 5000 (rds), 3500 4800 (rds), 5000 (rds and 7500 (dirt rds)
(cross country) 4000 (cross cross country)
country)

Max towed load 6500 (rds), 10000 (rds), 7000 (rds) 10000(rds),
(kg) 4000 (dirt rds) 5000 (dirt rds) 6000 (cross 7500 (dirt rds)
country)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 40

 Technical URAL-377M
ZIL-131(a) URAL-375D (a) URAL-4320 (a)
Characteristics (b)
Max road speed 80 75 75 75
(kph)

Range (km) 850 570 570 740

Configuration 6x6 6x6 6x6 6x4

Technical URAL5323
KRAZ-260B KamAZ-5320 KamAZ-4310
Characteristics (a)(b)
Role/variants LCV, bowser, tipper LCV, tipper LCV LCV

Weight (kg, 12750 7240 8400 8500

empty)

Max load (kg) 9000 (cross 8000 5000 (cross 10950

country) country)

Max towed load 30000 (rds), 10000 11500 5000 (cross 10000
(kg) (cross country) country)

Max road speed 80 85 85 80

(kph)

Range (km) 700 650 650 700

Configuration 6x6 6x4 6x6 8x8

Notes: (a) Variable tyre pressure system improves cross country performance.
(b) Some versions can carry dismountable flat racks (usually found in
formation level ammunition transport units).

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 41

 REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLES

Technical Shmel-1
Kolibri DR-5*
Characteristics (Sterkh) (a)
Radius (data link 60 180, 700 (c) 1000
range km)

Speed (kph) 100-180 up to 250 1100

Endurance (hrs) 2 8 1

Altitude (m) 100-3000 50-3500 50-6000

Sensors TV(b), IRLS or EW TV, IRLS or EW TV(b), IRLS or EW

Other fits ECM or laser ECM ECM

RF/LTD

Control Op con or pre- Op con or pre- Pre-programmed

programmed programmed

Nos controlled 2 2
simultaneously

Launch vehicle Mod BTR-D BAZ-135 or ac

Notes: (a) Shmel-1 is the RPV of the Sterkh system.

(b) With real time down-link.
(c) With second RPV as relay.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 42

 HELICOPTERS

Technical Ka-52 Mi-28

Mi-40
Characteristics (Hokum B) (a) (Havoc)
Crew 2 2 2+ asslt sect of 7

Armament: 1x30mm turret with 1x30mm turret with 1x23mm

cannon 500 x AP/HE rds 250 x AP/HE rds multibarrel
turret, 1 x 12.7mm
rear facing

4 pylons, each up to 12 x ATGM Vikhr 16 X ATGM Shturm 2 x ATGM or

M(AT-12)/Ataka S(AT-6)/Ataka (AT-9) 2 x AAM
(AT-9), or and 40 x 80mm
80 x 80mm unguided rkts
unguided rkts,
or 4 x AAM R-60
(AA-8)
R-73(aa-11) or Kh-
25MP (ARM)

Speed: max (kph) 300 300 310

cruise (kph) 270 270 260

Vertical rate of climb 600 816

(m/min)

Ceiling (m), 5800/4000 5800/3600 5500/3300

service/hover

Combat radius k/m 250 200 200

Endurance (hrs) 1.66 (4 with aux 2

tanks)

g limit +3 +3

Protection Cockpit armoured against 23mm. Wing tip ECM pods and
mounted ECM pods or chaff/flare chaff, flare
dispensers, RWR, IR and laser sensors. dispensers, RWR,
IR and laser
warning sensors

Other equipment LRF/LTD, FUR, LLTV

Note: (a) Also still seen is single seat version, Ka-50, whose performance is much
the same.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 43

 Technical Mi-26 Mi-34
Mi-38 (a)(b)
Characteristics (Halo) (c) (Hermit)
Crew 2 4 1

Cargo hold capacity 30 tps or 5000 kg 80 tps or 20000 kg(b) 3 passengers

(6000 kg external)

Speed:
max (kph) 275 275 220
cruise (kph) 250 250 180

Ceiling (m) 6500/2500 5900/1000 (full 4500/1500

service/hover load)

Range (km) 375 (5000 kg load/530 500 (13700 kg load) 600

(4500 kg load-eg 30
tps)

Endurance (hrs) 5-5.5

Notes: (a) There is a div/bde airborne CP version.

(b) The older Mi-17, of which Mi-38 is a derivative, is still seen in two ECM
versions, one for COMINT and comms jamming and the other for ELINT
and radar jamming. Both have a loiter time of 4 hours.
(c) There is an army/corps airborne CP version.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 44

 COMBAT AIRCRAFT

Technical
SU-27 MiG-29M
Characteristics
Role All weather air superiority and All weather air superiority
ground attack with ground attack
capability

Performance:

max speed (kph) sea- 1345/2500 1500/2445

level/height

service ceiling (m) 18000 18000

combat radius (km, max) 1500 (2300 with AAR) 1450 (2175 with AAR)

g limit +9 +9

Armament: Up to 4000 kg Up to 4500 kg

cannon (mm) 1x30 (150xrds) 1x30 (150xrds)

other natures, mixed In air to air role. 10xAAMs
(typically 2xR-27E, 2xR-27TE,
2xR-27EM/R-77 MRAAM; 4xR-
73 or R-60 SRAAMs).
In Gd Att role, KMGU cluster
bombs; 250/500 kg bombs; rkt
packs; Kh-58 ARM
In air to air role, AAMs
6xR-60T AT-60MK/R-
73A/R73E SRAAMs or 4
of these and 2xR-27R/
R-77.
In Gd Att role, 8x250 kg or
4x500 kg bombs; KMGU
cluster bombs; rkt packs;
Kh-58 ARM

Avionics:

radar Look-down/shoot down range Look-down/shoot down

100 km, tracks 10 tgts and range 100 km, tracks 10
engages 2 simultaneously tgts and engages 2
simultaneously

mission IRST, range 50 km; LRF and IRST, range 15 km

TD, range 10 km; possible
recce, ECM pods

self defence RWR; chaff/flare dispensers, RWR; chaff/flare

active ECM pods dispensers; internal ECM

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 45

 COMBAT AIRCRAFT

Technical
MiG-31M SU-25TM
Characteristics
Role All weather strategic All weather ground attack
interceptor

Performance

max speed (kph) 1500/3000 950/900 (cruise 650 at 200m)

sea level/height

service ceiling (m) 20600 1000

combat radius (km) 850 (1260 with AAR) 400 carrying 2000 kg at sea
level, 630 at height

max endurance (hrs) 3½ (7 with AAR)

g limit +5 (supersonic) +6.5

Armament: Max cmbt load 5000kg

Cannon - 1xtwin 30mm (200 rds)

AAMs 4xR-37 LRAAMs, 4xR-77 Ten pylons taking a combination

MRAAM, 4xR-73 SRAAMs
of:
8xmsl pack of Vikhr ATGM;
Kh-25ML, Kh-20L, Kh-31 ASMs;
Kh-58 ARM; KAB-500 LGB; S-
25 LG rkts; R-60, R-73 SRAAM

Avionics: Range 200 km, or 120 km in

radar look down mode (90 km and
70 km to rearwards), tracking
10 tgts and engaging 4
simultaneously

mission IRST. In 4xac gp, lead ac is TV, LRF and TD, IR pack
linked to gd auto guidance
network with other 3 having
auto data link to lead ac
permitting line abreast radar
sweep of zone 800-900 m
wide by 140° sector scanning
angles

self defence RWR RWR, chaff/flare dispensers, IR

jammer

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 46

 COMBAT AIRCRAFT
Technical
SU-34
Characteristics
Role All weather theatre
bomber
Performance:
max speed (kph) sea- 1400/1900
level/height
service ceiling (m) 18000
combat radius 2000 (3250 with AAR)
km, max)
g limit +9
Armament: 10 hard prints, carrying up
to 6000 kg
cannon (mm) 1x30 (150xrds)
other natures, mixed Air to air: Combination of:
R-73 SRAAM, R-77
MRAAM
Gd att: Kh-25ML, Kh-
25MP, Kh-29T, Kh-31, Kh-
59 ASMs; KAB-500 LGB;
KMGU cluster bombs; rkt
packs; Kh-58 ARM
Avionics: Multifunction high
radar resolution fwd looking and
rear facing
mission LRF and TD range 10 km.
Possible recce, ECM pods
self defence Internal ECM and possible
ECM pods; RWR: chaff
and flare dispensers
Issue 1.0: Jun 01
SU-35
All weather air superiority and
ground attack
1400/2500
18000
2000 (3250 with AAR)
+10
14 hard prints, carrying up to
8000 kg
1x30 (150xrds)
Air to air: Combination of: R-33E
R-27E, R-40, R-73A, R-77 AAMs.
Gd att: Kh-25ML, Kh-25MP,
Kh-29T, Kh-31, Kh-59 ASMs;
KAB-500 LGB rkt packs; KMGU
cluster bombs; Kh-58 ARM
Multimode terrain
following/avoidance, search range
165 km fwd and 60 km rearward,
tracking 24 tgts and engaging 6
simultaneously. Also rear facing
radar range 4 km engaging with
rear facing AAM
IRST, termal imaging airborne
laser designator, night/adverse
vis pod
Enhanced ECM, incl wingtip
pods; RWR; chaff and flare
dispensers
B - 4 - 47
 COMBAT AIRCRAFT

Technical SU-24
Tu-22M3
Characteristics MR/MP
Role All weather medium All weather recce(MR) and
bomber ECM(MP)

Performance:

max speed (kph) sea 1050/2000(900 cruise) 1200/1500

level/height

service ceiling (m) 13300 17500

combat radius (km) 1500-2200 depending on 2000 (3250 with AAR)

profile, speed, load

g limit +2.5 +6.5

Armament: 1xradar directed, tail 1 x six barrelled 23mm,

mounted, twin barrelled 4xR-60 SRAAM
23mm up to 24000kg.
18500kg of conv bombs;
3xKh-22 or 10xKh15-P
ASMs

Avionics:

radar Large nav/msl targetting Nav/terrain avoidance

radar

self defence RWR, IR warning, 8 x RWR, MWR, internal ECM,

multiple chaff/flare chaff/flare dispensers
dispensers

mission sensors MR; multimission SLAR,

IRLS, TV, cameras, ELINT
pod, optional laser pod, data
link to gd MP; radar and radio
jammers

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 48

 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (FIXED WING)

An-72
Technical II-76mf An-124
II-106 Tu-330 (Coaler)
Characteristics (Candid) (a) (Condor)
(b)
Payload:
paratroops/troops 125/140 (c) 57/68 -/88 (d)
weight (kg) 40000 80000 35000 11000 150000
Range (km, 80% of 3200 5000 3200 2700 4500(max
max payload) load)

Speed:
max (kph) 850 900 900 760 865
cruise (kph) 750-800 820-850 800-850 550-600 800-850
Ceiling (m) 11000 14000 10500
Protection IRCM flare IRCM flare
packs packs
Other features Tail gun STOL
turret

Technical An-26
An-70
Characteristics (Curl) (a)
Payload:
paratroops/troops 30/40 -/170
weight (kg) 5000 30000
Range (km) max 1780 3100(5350 with
payload 20000 kg payload)
Speed:
max (kph) 530 800
cruise (kph) 435 750
Ceiling (m) 8000 9000
Protection IRCM flare packs

Notes: (a) There is an airborne command post version

(b) Ambulance version carries 24 x stretcher cases.
(c) Can carry 225 troops with a second deck fitted.
(d) In pressurized cabin, additional to cargo load.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 49

 TANKER, ELINT AND AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING/CONTROL AIRCRAFT

Technical II-78M Technical IL-20

Characteristics (Midas) Characteristics (Coot-A)
Role Air to Air Refuelling Tanker (all Role ELINT/recce
weather) Range(km) 6500
Payload (fuel, kg) Wing tanks 9000; fuselage Cruising 625
tanks 28000 with 65000 Kg speed(kph) 800-10000
load 1000km; with 36000 Kg Operating
load 2500 height(m) SLAR, ELINT
Sensors
Speed:
cruising (kph) 750
refuelling (kph) 430-590
Ceiling:
cruising (m) 12000
refuelling (m) 2000-9000
Nos ac refuelled 1xhy bomber or 2xtac ac
simultaneously

Technical A-50
Characteristics (Mainstay)
Role Airborne Early Warning and Control

Range (km) 7300

Speed, 850/750
max/cruising (kph)

Ceiling, max (m) 15500(10000 operating)

Avionics:
general Detects and tracks high-low level large
and small aircraft and cruise msls over
land and water and directs fighter ops

radars Weather, nav and gd mapping, AEW & C

rotating radome

flight Satellite nav/comms and satellite datalink

to gd stns

self defence RWR; flare packs; wingtip ECM pods

Performance Normally operates on figure-of-eight

course at 10000m with 100km between
centres of the two orbits

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 50

 AIR-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILES

LRAAM MRAAM
Technical
R-33E R-77 R-27ER R-27ET R-27EM
Characteristics
(AA-9) (AA-12) (AA-10) (AA-10) (AA-10)
Warhead HE Frag/47 HE Frag/30 expanding expanding expanding
type/weight (kg) rod/39 rod/39 rod/39

Range/min-max 15-20 0.5-150 0.5-75 0.5-70 0.5-110

(km)

Tgt alt, min-max 25/28000 30000 20-27000 20-30000 10-37000

(m)

Tgt g ? 12/? 8/3500 8/? 8/?

load/speed
(kph)

Guidance inertial + Inertial + Inertial, Inertial, Inertial, radio

semi-active command radio command + update +
radar active radar update + IR seeker semi-active
homing homing (fire semi-active (all aspects) radar homing
and forget) radar
homing

SRAAM
Technical
R-73 RMD-1 R-73 RMD-2 R-60
Characteristics
(AA-11) (AA-11) (AA-8)
Warhead HE-Frag/7.4 HE-Frag/7.4 HE Frag/6.0
type/weight (kg)

Range, min-max 0.3-20 0.3-30 0.3-5

(km)

Tgt alt, min-max 5-20000 5-20000 20000

(m)

Tgt of load/speed 12/? 12/? 12/?

(kph)

Guidance Inertial + IR Inertial + IR IR seeker (all

seeker (all seeker (all aspects)
aspects) aspects)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 51

 AIR-TO-SURFACE GUIDED MISSILES

Technical
Kh-31P Kh-58E Kh-59M Kh-29L Kh-29T
Characteristic
(AS-17) (AS-11) (AS-18) (AS-14) (AS-14)
s
Warhead 90(HE 150 320(HE Pen) 320(HE pen) 320(HE pen)
weight (kg) blast/Frag) or 280
(cluster)

Range, min- ?-200 70-150 40-115 2-10 2-20

max (km)

Launch alt, ? 100-10000 200-5000 200-5000

min-max (m)

Max air speed 1000 ? 860-1000 ? ?

(m/s)

CEP (m) 2-3 1-2 ?

Guidance Anti-radiation (incl home Terrain Semi-active TV image

on jamming or on last contour laser homing (fire and
known loc of radar) matching, min forget)
alt 100m against static
targets or TI

Technical Kh-25ML Kh-25MP

Characteristics (AS-12) (AS-12)
Warhead weight (kg) 90 90 (HE blast/Frag)

Range, min-max (km) 10-20 10-60 (25 low launch)

Launch alt, min-max (m) ? ?

Max air speed (m/s) 850 900

CEP(m)

Guidance semi active laser on TI Anti-radiation

(latter, range 12 km)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 52

 AIR-DELIVERED GUIDED BOMBS

Technical
KAB-500Kr KAB-500L KAB -1500L KAB-1500L-F
Characteristics
Weight 560/380 AP 534/?HE 1500/1100 1560/1180HE
bomb/warhead AP
(kg)

Bombing 500-5000 500-5000 500-5000 1000-5000

altitude(m)

Guidance TV (day; air Laser Semi-active Semi-active

weather only) laser laser

CEP(m) 4-7 ? 7-10 (1-2 in 7-10

latest model)

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 53

 UNGUIDED AIR-TO-SURFACE ROCKETS

Technical
S-8KOM S-8BM S-8DM S-80M
Characteristics
Weight, 11.3/3.6 15.2/7.4 11.6/3.6 12.1/4.3
rkt/warhead (kg)

Calibre (mm) 80 80 80 80

Nos rkts per pod 20 20 20 20

Launch range 1.3-4 1.2-2.2 1.3-3 4-4.5

(km)

Effectiveness Shaped-frag, Concrete pen, FAE, 6kg of Illum, 2Mkd of

pen 400mm up to 800mm TNT equivalent light
armour steel reinf
concrete

Technical
S-130F S-13T S-250F (a) S-250FM (a)
Characteristics
Weight, 69/33 75/37.3 381/150 480/190
rkt/warhead (kg)

Calibre (mm) 122 122 340 340

Nos rkts per pod 5 5 1 1

Launch range 1.6-3 1.1-3 3 3

(km)

Effectiveness HE Frag (450 Concrete pen, HE Frag (6500 HE Frag, beaten

fragments) up to 1m steel fragments) zone 18 ha
reinf concrete

Note: (a) A semi-active laser guided version also exists.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 54

 ISTAR - EQUIPMENT AND CHARACTERISTICS

NAME NATO NAME TYPE CAPABILITIES LOCATION REMARKS

AZK-5 Sound Ranging 12 Km Div/Bde Arty Regt - Recce Mounted in 5 ZIL BBVs
Bn when not deployed, similar
to the old British Army
SRG
TARAN Sr EW 50 Km Div Recce Bn/Bde ECM Mounted on MTLB-U
Coy vehicles

SPIKE SQUARE EW DF 50 Km Corps/CAA RR Jam Bn

TWIN BOX EW Radar Intercept 40 Km Corps/CAA RR Mounted on GAZ 66 BBVs

Jam/Intercept Bn

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 55

AZK Wpn Location UK Div/Bde Arty Regt - Recce
Bn

ZOO PARK Wpn Location 8-10 Km Corps Arty Bdes/Div/Bde

Arty Regt - Recce Bn

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 56

 POLE DISH Radar DF Range 25 Km Div/Bde Arty Regt - Recce Requires 3 to make a
Bn baseline

BRM-1K Target Acquisition 3-4 Km Tracking personnel Div/Regt/Bde Recce BMP-1 ser vehicle fitted
TALL MIKE 7-10 Km Tracking Vehicles with TALL MIKE Radar

KOLIBRI UAV 180-800 Km Range

50-3500 Alt
Speed <250
8 hrs endurance

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 57

STERKH UAV 60 Km Range Corps Arty Bde/Div/Bde Mounted on a BMD
100-3000 Alt Arty Regt Recce Bn Airbourne chassis SHMEI-1
Speed 100-180 kph is the RPV NAME. Capable
2 hrs endurance of carrying ECM and Laser
Target Marker

DR-5 DRONE 1000 Km Radius

50-6000 Alt
Speed 1100 kph
1 hr endurance

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 58

 PRP-3/4 Surv Radar 20 Kms Range Detection Corps Arty Bde/Div/Bde BMP-1 se vehicle
SMALL FRED 7 Kms Tracking Arty Regt - Arty/Recce Bn

BIG FRED Surv Radar 20-25 Km detection

14 Km Location of Mortars

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 59

PPNR DOG EAR Surv Radar 50 Km Corps SAM Bde/Bde AD Mounted on a MTLB
Regt/Regt AD Bn vehicle

SAGE GLOSS Lazar Range 5-10 Km Ground/Vehicle mounted

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 B - 4 - 60

 PART C

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

COMBAT INDICATORS

Offensive

Meeting Engagement/Pursuit/Advance

Defence

Withdrawal

Nuclear Weapons

DECEPTION

Deception

Counter-deception

Annex A. Scenario Types

Appendix 1. Deception Plan – Illustration

INTRODUCTION

1. This guide is intended to assist intelligence staff in producing ISTAR collection plans,
in order to determine enemy intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities by the correct
identification and interpretation of combat indicators. In addition, a section explaining
deception and counter-deception has been included; these topics are relevant in
interpreting combat indicators.

2. Not all intelligence staff will have access to the ISTAR assets required to identify all
the indicators referred to in this guide, but a variety of indicators have been included in
order for the guide to be of use to as wide a range of intelligence staff as possible.

3. In many cases, GENFORCE norms and tactics have been adopted in the guide.
The inclusion of them is considered valid because GENFORCE/FSU legacies in former
client states include equipment and doctrine. In addition, many tactics are common to all
armies regardless of the origin of their doctrine.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-i

 CHAPTER 5

ENEMY FORCES COMBAT INDICATOR GUIDE

SECTION 1 - OFFENSIVE

ACTIVITIES REMARKS
Reconnaissance Indicator
Increase in air Air reconnaissance is usually more active prior to an attack
reconnaissance. and is a likely indicator to possible objectives.
Increase in patrols (esp Confirmatory route recce may be indicative of en intended
Engr and armd). main routes.
Administrative build-
up
Forward movement of These assets are usually located near the EFLT and co-
bridging assets. located with tactical units of the attacking force.
However, such assets may also be echeloned to the rear.
Forward dumping of Build-up of logistics and maintenance assets indicates
fuel and ammunition. increased capability to support offensive operations. Supply
and evacuation points usually are located forward for an
attack. Technical observation points are established close to
the EFLT. Repair and evacuation groups are located at
assembly points close to the EFLT to repair or evacuate
damaged vehicles.
Increase in medical Existing hospitals may be commandeered or staff
installations. supplemented by military medical personnel. Field hospitals
established and medically-trained civilians recruited and
reservists recalled. Forward medical units usually move to
support anticipated medical and evacuation requirements.
Stoppage of Probable mobilisation of forces.
leave/calling up of
reserves.
Abnormal logistic radio To expedite supplies to units about to conduct offensive
traffic on command operations commanders may get personally involved.
nets.
Establishment of Additional airfields may be used on the premise that they may
auxiliary airfields and not be targeted by ISTAR assets. They may also be used to
activation of dormant disperse air assets and to support increased logistic
ones. operations.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-1

 Tactical build-up Indicator
Conducting drills and Drills or rehearsals may precede major attacks. This is
rehearsals in rear areas. particularly true of attacks against fortified positions or
strongly defended river lines.
Establishing or Counter-reconnaissance screens are used to cover possible
increasing counter- assembly areas, routes of troop movement of regrouping of
reconnaissance screen. forces to be used in the attack.
Reconnaissance and Patrols recce FF obstacles to determine a plan for clearing
destruction of FF lanes. The patrols will generally only destroy such obstacles
defensive obstacles. that will not disclose the direction of the main attack.

Formation of an OMGs are formed preceding an offensive operation, usually

Operational Manoeuvre Bde sized for Corps or Army in the case of GENFORCE.
Group (OMG). They are generally committed before the conclusion of the 1st
echelon battle and operate independently of the main forces.
OMGs usually use a separate axis of advance from the main
body.
Concentration of armd, Prior to launching an attack, troops may be moved to
inf and arty forces. assembly areas from which they can deploy.
Dispersal of tanks and Tanks generally accompany leading waves of assault
SP arty to units. mechanised units with SP arty closely following.
Movement forward of SAM control radars require time to be established.
Surface to Air Missile GENFORCE norms establish air defence cover before moving
(SAM) fire-control other forces forward.
systems.
Forward movement of Offensive operations also occur in depth. Forward movement
Surface to Surface of SSMs places FF airfields, supply areas and headquarters
Missiles (SSM). under threat.
Concentration of mass Single or double envelopment is normally attempted in the
towards either of both offensive. Armoured and mechanised units on either or both
flanks within 1st echelon flanks may indicate a single or double envelopment operation.
defensive area.
Establishment of forward Preceding an attack, an auxiliary CP is usually established.
command post (CP)
close to the EFLT.
Armoured anti-aircraft Armd AAA systems are deployed prior to an attack to protect
Artillery (AAA) systems assault forces and to facilitate forward movement.
located in forward areas.
Massing of Arty units The presence of arty groups at each level of command
indicates the main axis of advance.
Signals intelligence SIGINT and jamming assets will move well forward, possibly
(SIGINT) assets located to within 2-4 km of the FEBA, before an attack.
forward.
Radio silence on nets Attacker will attempt to deny the defender information, which
organic to the brigade or can be developed from intercepting radio traffic.
corps.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-2

 Deception operations to Attacker will attempt to deceive defenders as to the formers
cover unit moves. true location; e.g. false traffic on radio nets to disguise moves.
Psyops operations (Radio and TV) will also be conducted.
Demonstrations and Local small-scale attacks or demonstrations involving
feints. mechanised units, armour and arty frequently precede a
general attack.
Forward units positioned GENFORCE doctrine calls for a Motor Rifle Battalion (MR Bn)
on relatively narrow breakthrough zone of 2-4 km within an assigned attack
fronts and depths. frontage, which can vary from 3-8 km. MR Bn HQ is usually
located approx 4 km from the EFLT during normal attack
posture.
Extensive smoke Smoke operations mask the movement of units during the
operations. period immediately prior to an attack.
Clearing lanes through This is generally done to facilitate forward movement and
obstacles within own grouping, particularly at night.
positions.
Increase in agent activity Attackers will attempt to prevent or disrupt forward movement
in defenders’ rear area. of supplies and reinforcement of their enemy.
Fire Plan Indicator
Extensive spot and Extensive jamming will precede an attack to cause the
barrage jamming of maximum disruption of the defenders’ command and control
defenders’ front-line communications. However, jamming will generally cease
units’ communication when attacking forces reach the main defensive area to
nets and tactical air- prevent interference with their own communications.
control systems.
Systematic air Prior to launching an offensive, a systematic bombardment
bombardment. may occur of key positions along the main axis of advance.
Extensive artillery Offence is built around the striking power and shock of
preparation. massed artillery. Preparation of ½ to 1 hour may precede an
offensive.
Airborne, air-assault or Attackers will attempt to conduct offensive operations
Airmobile insertions into throughout the depth of the defence. Air Assault/Desant
defenders’ rear area. attacks are also made to facilitate difficult operations such as
river crossings.
Extensive attempts to GENFORCE doctrine calls for the elimination of defenders’
destroy nuclear storage nuclear weapons by any means and considered that
areas and delivery defenders are more likely to use nuclear weapons than
means by air, arty and attackers.
sabotage.
Movement Indicator
Traffic control units Traffic control points are employed throughout the march
marking routes to the routes to facilitate march formations. Allied border guards
EFLT. assist by controlling traffic through the barrier areas of the
border.
Location of maintenance The establishment of Maintenance parties on lateral routes
parties on lateral routes. facilitates march operations.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-3

 SECTION 2 - MEETING ENGAGEMENT/PURSUIT/ADVANCE
ACTIVITIES
Reconnaissance
Increased air and ground
reconnaissance over routes
and obstacles.
Increased counter-
reconnaissance activity.
Administrative preparation
Construction of forward
airfields.
Forward movement of
maintenance facilities. Forward
dumping of fuel, Engr stores.
Increase in traffic control
organisation.
Opening of reserve formation
HQ, change in command nets.
Tactical preparations
Forward movement of columns
dispersed laterally in 2 or more
mobility corridors.
Road junctions, bridges and
other key features occupied by
either air-delivered forces or
forward detachments.
Issue 1.0: Jun 01
REMARKS
Indicator
Accurate information concerning routes and obstacles
speeds-up the advance.
Counter-reconnaissance attempts to prevent the
defender from gaining information about the attackers’
dispositions and movements.
Indicator
Forward airfields increase the capability to mount
Fighter Ground Attack (FGA), Close Air Support (CAS)
missions and air assault operations.
Attackers will wish to maintain a high rate of advance.
Probable regrouping of forces.
Indicator
Attackers will generally prefer to use march formation
when moving to contact.
Attackers will wish to control high-speed avenues of
approach into defenders’ key areas.
C-5-4

ACTIVITIES
Reconnaissance
Presence of reconnaissance
screen.
Defensive preparation
Entrenching and erecting barbed
wire.
Presence of demolitions, obstacles
and minefields.
Preparation of battalion and
company defence areas consisting
of company and platoon strong
points.
Preparation of alternate artillery
positions.
Preparation of dummy artillery Ops
plus the presence of dummy posn.
Presence of dummy command
posts.
Administrative preparation
Restocking Ammunition, Engr
supplies and equipment.
Establishment of a security zone.
Decrease in radio intercepts.
Increased activity of SIGINT units, Increased activity is an attempt to gain information
but decreased activity of ECM
units.
Deployment
Forward units deploy on relatively GENFORCE norms call for the defence zone of a
wide fronts and depths compared
to offensive posture.
Deployment of mechanised units in Dominating terrain that has good fields of fire and is
good defensive positions.
Preparation of company
strongpoint on key terrain.
Issue 1.0: Jun 01
SECTION 3 - DEFENCE
REMARKS
Indicator
Reconnaissance screen (both patrols and static
Ops) will attempt to determine attackers’ axis of
advance.
Indicator
Indications of preparations to hold the position.
Obstacles are placed to cover avenues of approach
to defensive positions.
Defence is based upon holding prepared defensive
areas and counter-attacks by tank-heavy forces.
In normal defensive operations, 3 positions are
prepared for each firing battery.
Dummy artillery Ops preserve the effectiveness of
the actual positions by deceiving attackers as to
their location.
Deception to conceal the true CP locations.
Indicator
Restocking ammunition reduces the load on
logistics throughout the system once the battle
begins. Engr supplies and equipment may be used
to construct fortifications and erect obstacles.
A security zone is established to enable
fortifications to be constructed away from immediate
danger from both direct and indirect fire weapons.
In the defence, greater emphasis is placed on cable
communications to increase security.
about the attackers prior to an attack. ECM is an
active measure and would betray a unit’s location.
Indicator
MR Bn to have a frontage of 3-5 km depending
upon terrain and the combat availability of forces.
Depth varies also: 2.5-4 km.
relatively inaccessible to armour is usually selected
for a defensive position.
C-5-5
 Formation of anti-tank (AT) AT strongpoint are formed in depth along logical
strongpoint. avenues of approach for armour. Mines, ditches
and other obstacles may fortify these positions.
Additional AT units attached to 1st All defence tactics place great emphasis on
echelon manoeuvre units. destroying tanks early. If the tanks can be stopped
the attack will generally fail.
Presence of large AT reserves with Large AT reserves are established with MOD to
Mobile Obstacle Detachment provide a quick reaction AT capability.
(MOD).
Large tank-heavy units located in Tank units are held in assembly areas for
assembly areas to the rear. employment in counter-attacks.
Deployment of Artillery and SSM Depth fire is not as critical in the defence as in the
units towards the rear. offence. Also, in the rear, the assets are less likely
to be destroyed.
Air Defence (AD) systems located Destruction of logistics, command and artillery units
in rear areas. are high priority missions for attackers’ air strikes.
Employment of roving artillery. Roving guns and batteries are part of normal
defensive operations.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-6

 SECTION 4 - WITHDRAWAL
ACTIVITIES
Withdrawal from defensive positions
before becoming heavily engaged.
Successive local counter-attacks with
limited objectives.
Frontages up to 4 times that normally
assigned to units on the defensive.
Discovery of dummy minefields.
Forward concentration of IFVs/APCs.
Administrative preparation
Evacuation of logistical and medical
services and all non-essential
transport.
Establishment of small dumps of
explosives and landmines near
bridges and other demolition targets.
Movement of location of traffic control
units or parties to the rear along the
lines of communications that are to be
used by major units.
Preparation of future defensive lines
behind main defensive structure.
Route Denial
The systematic destruction of bridges,
communications facilities and other
assets.
Engr reconnaissance and MODs
detected along lines of
communications, tunnels, built up
areas, dams and dykes.
Tactical preparation
Presence of deception operations e.g.
dummy radio traffic.
Jamming or destruction of attackers’
air and ground battlefield surveillance
radar.
Rearward movement of long-range
artillery.
Issue 1.0: Jun 01
REMARKS
In delaying actions, units avoid becoming
decisively engaged.
Counter-attacks are employed to assist in
disengaging 1st echelon units rather than to gain
ground or restore positions.
Forces conducting a delaying action are
normally assigned frontages in excess of that
normal for units on the defensive.
Dummy minefields are easier and quicker to
prepare, but can cause the same delay to
advancing pursuers.
IFVs/APCs are concentrated forward to facilitate
a rapid withdrawal of the main body.
Indicator
Non-essential services are generally withdrawn
first to avoid being overrun or hindering the
evacuation of tactical units.
Withdrawing forces will attempt to delay pursuit
by destruction of transport infrastructure and the
creation of obstacles.
Marking withdrawal routes.
If the withdrawal is deliberate, withdrawing
forces will require new positions ready prior to
withdrawing.
Indicator
Deliberate demolitions and scorched earth
tactics may be employed in withdrawals.
Withdrawing forces will begin systematically to
destroy al crossings and construct obstacles as
they withdraw.
Indicator
Withdrawing forces will attempt to portray a
normal defence.
Battlefield surveillance radar are capable of
detecting a withdrawal at night or during poor
visibility conditions.
Long-range artillery will be moved back to new
positions before the withdrawal takes place – to
cover the operation.
C-5-7
 Movement of small reconnaissance
parties to the rear.
Presence of rear guard covering force. Rear guard covering force will cover movement
Rearward move of HQ.
Fire Plan
Increase in artillery bombardment
activity.
Predominance of automatic weapons
with the rear guard.
Smoke operations.
Issue 1.0: Jun 01
Withdrawing units need current reconnaissance
along withdrawal routes.
of withdrawal of main body. The rear guard
would fight a delaying action if required and
minimise losses; it permits the main body more
freedom of movement.
Indication of enemy force withdrawal.
Indicator
Artillery fire assists in covering the noise of a
withdrawal.
High rates of fire compensate for reduction in
number of troops and assists in masking the
absence of troops.
Assists in covering withdrawing forces from
view.
C-5-8
 SECTION 5 - NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ACTIVITIES
Heavily-guarded movement of
supplies, equipment and material
usually in small convoys including
closed vehicles.
Light aircraft circling over moving
convoy.
Movement of trailers with rockets or
missile bodies.
Identification of tall, slender objects
such as towers, chimneys or tall trees
not previously in area.
Large well-guarded complexes
including tanks, trucks, radars,
electronic equipment, generators and
maintenance tents located well to the
rear.
Evacuation or exclusion of civilians
from specific areas suitable for
nuclear storage or delivery means.
Preparation of heavy artillery
positions.
Issue 1.0: Jun 01
REMARKS
Movement of material of a nuclear nature
requires special security measures. Nuclear
warheads are moved under heavy security
usually in closed vans; escorting personnel are
equipped with a high percentage of automatic
weapons.
Nuclear warhead convoys often use aerial radio
relays to maintain communications.
Trailers are used to resupply missile and rocket
units.
Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged as
towers, chimneys or narrow trees such as
poplars.
SSM units require extensive ground handling
facilities.
Civilians may be evacuated from areas selected
for nuclear storage or delivery sites.
Primary and alternate positions for nuclear
delivery artillery are prepared prior to movement
of the units.
C-5-9
 SECTION 6 - DECEPTION

Definition

1. Deception is defined in AAP-6 as:

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification

of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

Deception Operations

2. It is frequently argued in Western military circles, that given modern surveillance

means, surprise cannot be achieved; deception has become largely forgotten skill in the
west. GENFORCE does not subscribe to these views: surprise and deception were central
to GENFORCE operational philosophy. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that former
client states of GENFORCE place equal emphasis on deception.

3. Most nations are aware of which other nations pose a threat to them, the perceived
threat being based on capability and intentions; in most cases there will be operational
plans for both offensive and defensive action to be initiated in the event of a war. The
armed forces are also frequently aware of the combat indicators on which the enemy
intelligence services base their assessment. GENFORCE is certainly aware of its potential
adversary’s preconception and plan is deception to confirm them, each stage of the plan
being implemented when the enemy falls for the previous one. A potential adversary can
therefore be expected to devote time and effort to simulating combat indicators and other
behaviour consistent with normal practice. The degree of time and effort will vary with each
adversary; it would depend on their intelligence collection capabilities.

4. In his book Stratagem, Deception and Surprise in War, Barton Whaley analysed 68
historical cases of strategic deception between 1914—1968. He found that:

a. Surprise was achieved in 92% of cases; victory followed in 87%.

b. Out of 47 instances of operational and tactical deception in the same period,

surprise was achieved and victory followed in 91% of cases.

c. In 10 examples where detailed military plans were compromised before an

intended attack, half were carefully fabricated deception and half were genuine
breaches of security. All five deception plans were accepted as genuine and 4 out of
5 plans were rejected as deception.

Deception Planning

5. In a deception operation, the skilled planner will generally work through the following
process, whether consciously or not:
a. An initial appreciation of the situation will be carried out of both enemy and
own forces.

b. The deception mission must be clearly define and the following Identified:

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C - 5 - 10

 (1) The Target of the deception (usually the enemy commander).

(2) The reaction required of the target, including location and timings.

(3) The reaction of any subsidiary targets (e.g. the enemy commander’s
planning staff).

c. Identification of the perception required of the primary and subsidiary targets.

In addition, the times by which these perceptions are to be formed and the duration
for which they are to be held must also be established.

d. The deception story would be developed, consideration being given to the

scenario types detailed at Annex A. In addition, specific evidence conforming to the
deception story should be developed to encourage the required perceptions. A
check must be made to ensure that all other evidence reaching the target
corroborates (or at least does not compromise) the deception story.

e. The methods by which the evidence is to be disseminated must then be selected.

In many circumstances, direct dissemination will lack credibility; indirect methods
should be sufficiently diverse to ensure that some evidence reaches the target.

f. In executing the deception plan, the target (and any potential unintended
targets) should be constantly monitored, in order to assess the progress of the
deception mission and to make any necessary adjustments. The deceiver should
be in a position to detect any compromise of the plan at the earliest opportunity; if
the target becomes aware that he is being deceived, he may deliberately provide
feedback suggesting that the deception remains undetected; the initiative passes
from the deceiver to the target.

6. Deception cannot be taught as a drill or SOP since it often relies on originality and
the unexpected for success; a counter deception SOP also cannot be provided for similar
reasons, although there are a number of deception techniques which form the basis of all
deception plans. Deception plans also need to be tailored to the specific circumstances
prevailing at the time.

Counter-Deception

7. The deceiver who knows his target and who is sufficiently practised at his art is
invariably successful. In addition, because the deceiver has the additional weapons of
double bluff and uncertainty, the same trick can be played several times with equal
success. It would seem then that there can be little defence against deception, but this is
not necessarily the case: there are a number of measures that provide the basis for
counter-deception:

a. Awareness of the Threat. While avoiding the mistake of perceiving

deception where it does not exist, the commander and his intelligence staff should
constantly be aware that they are likely to be the targets of deception operations.

b. Study of the Enemy. A detailed knowledge of the enemy is as important in

countering deception as it is in achieving it. The intelligence staff must be aware of

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C - 5 - 11

 the enemy’s point of view, the enemy’s capabilities, limitations and relevant terrain
factors. A detailed intelligence estimate will assist in assessing the enemy’s aims
and courses (including the deception courses) and help to distinguish truth from
falsehood. It is equally important to resist the kind of self-delusion that comes from
overstatement of enemy capabilities.

c. Keeping an Open Mind. A study of deception in history shows that success

was usually achieved because the ruse largely conformed with a preconceived idea
in the mind of target and, since apparent events seem more or less what the target
was expecting, the components of the ruse appear feasible and logical. If the target
has no preconceived ideas and keeps an open mind, deception is more difficult.

d. Resistance to Deriving False Conclusions. There is constant pressure on

intelligence staff to reach conclusions and formulate predictions for their
commanders. There are usually deadlines to meet and, in fast moving battle,
intelligence is of little use unless it is timely. Shortage of time may preclude an
exhaustive collection of information; it is on such conditions that the deceiver thrives.
The intelligence staff must resist the temptation to disseminate unsubstantiated, or
unsubstantiatable, conclusions.

e. Scepticism. Intelligence staff should be reluctant to accept information at

face value and should be automatically suspicious of information which has not
received the protection of routine security precautions.

f. Aggressive Intelligence Collection. Considerable effort is required on the

part of the deceiver to implant a ruse which is confirmed by all or even most of the
enemy’s wide range of increasingly sophisticated sensors; still more effort is required
to sustain a ruse over a lengthy period of time. A deception may be uncovered
because the deceiver has neither the skill, resources or will to execute his plan with
sufficient thoroughness to fool a competent adversary. Defence against deception
thus requires active and sustained questioning of evidence, searching for
corroboration by all available sources and a review of previous deductions as fresh
evidence is produced. In particular it is helpful to look for small and obscure clues
which are missing and which would prove or disprove the authenticity of the
evidence to hand.

g. Adherence to Intelligence Procedures. The short-circuiting of intelligence

procedures greatly assists the deceiver. Strict adherence to the proper procedures
for processing information by collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and
interpretation is essential.

h. Attention to Anomalies. Deception plans are seldom flawless. Indications

of false activities can be clumsily presented and indications of genuine activity can
rarely be totally suppressed. Intelligence staff are frequently confronted by a
proportion of incongruous detail which should not be lightly dismissed as the result of
inaccurate or mistaken reporting. Anomalies, which might prove to be the flaw in an
otherwise convincing pattern, must be subjected to the same routine of double
clicking as other evidence.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C - 5 - 12

 i. Devil’s Advocate. Deception usually succeeds because of the extreme
difficulties encountered by a small intelligence staff analysing information from
different perspectives; an increased alertness is no guarantee of improving
judgement: there is a danger that greater alertness can lead to perceiving deception
where nod deception is intended. A possible solution to this problem is to have an
outsider to the intelligence staff question the intelligence assessment prior to
dissemination.

j. Mistrust of Automated Interpretation. Advances are currently being made

in the automatic processing of data; there are constant improvements in the speed
and accuracy with which information can be collected, collated and disseminated.
The powers of discrimination and interpretation which can be imparted to a machine
do not yet match those of the human brain and can never be foolproof. Automation
does not therefore offer a safe defence against deception.

8. The making of a deception plan is a torturous process fraught with difficulties, snares
and complications; the opportunities for error, inconsistency and omission are considerable.
Every deception operation inevitably leaves clues; the intelligence staff require the
expertise, training and understanding of the structure and process of deception in order to
detect these clues. The counter-deception analyst needs access to intelligence collection
sensors to uncover deception, and data processing equipment to sort the mass of
information acquired. On the premise “it takes a thief to catch a thief” the best detectors of
deception are deceivers themselves: the analyst who fully understands deception is best
placed to uncover the deceiver and his deception plan.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C - 5 - 13

 ANNEX A
TO SECTION 6
TO CHAPTER 5
TO PART C

SCENARIO TYPES

Obvious Solution

1. The target is encouraged to react to a previous obvious course of action. An

example of this scenario type was the Allies’ exploitation of Hitler’s conviction that, because
of the problems of air cover and the need for a major port, any Allied invasion of Europe
would have to be across the Pas de Calais.

Lure

2. The target is encouraged to exploit a seemingly advantageous opportunity, being

unaware that he is being lured into a trap. There are many examples of this in history.
William the Conqueror may have won the Battle of Hastings by the feigned retreat of his
cavalry unit, which lured Harold’s foot soldiers from their impregnable position on the
Seulac Ridge down into open ground, where the Norman Men-at-Arms could deal with
them more effectively.

False Routine

3. The target is conditioned to react to a perceived pattern of routine. An example is

the successful crossing of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians in the Yom Kippur war of 1st
October 1973. From autumn 1972 the training of Egyptian troops laid great emphasis on
crossing water obstacles; about forty major exercises were held involving crossing water.
These exercises involved moving large quantities of bridging equipment to the Canal and
cutting graded approaches to the water edge. At the end of each exercise, the bridging
equipment was seen to be taken away but unnoticed by the Israelis, a small proportion
remained – mostly in underground storage close to the Canal. By constant repetition, the
Egyptians succeeded in persuading the Israelis that these were harmless training
exercises. The Egyptian attack achieved complete surprise.

Mask

4. The target is encouraged to react to a belief that hostile deployments are friendly.
An example of this technique is the Wooden Horse of Troy. The Law of Armed Conflict
requires the discarding of disguises before a battle is joined.

Act of God

5. The credibility if disinformation is enhanced by encouraging the target to believe in

one of two lies:

a. That it has come into possession of the information as a result of a breach of

security, negligence or inefficiency on the part of the originator.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-A-1

 b. That the information arrived because of circumstances over which the
originator has no control (eg. the crash of an aircraft carrying sensitive courier items).
c.
The Double Bluff

6. The double bluff is a risky technique: it involves revealing the truth to the target, who
has come to expect deception, in the conviction that he will not believe it. This is not a
foolproof method of deception and stands probably only a 50% chance of success.
Nevertheless there is historical evidence to suggest the same deception can be used more
than once; the enemy may recognise the ruse but, because he does not believe the same
trick is being played on him again, he is deceived by it. There are, however, better
deception methods with less risk attached.

Substitution

7. The target is encouraged to identify objects or activities correctly (the objects or

activities may be real or false) and to plan his reaction accordingly; the false is substituted
for the real immediately prior to the operation. During the Second World War, before the
Visla Oder operation, the Russians deployed a false axis of over 1000 dummy tanks and
self-propelled guns, with scores of real tanks to create tracks to deceive the German
photographic interpreters. Actual communications of 1 and 2 Tank Army were used in the
area of the false concentration: the real concentration was successfully passed off as a bluff
one. A false grouping might also contain strong combat elements, which will attack and
thus prolong the disguise of the main axis; a GENFORCE view is that troops used in this
manner are not wasted because they are still killing enemy soldiers, even if not on the main
axis.

8. Annex B illustrates a deception plan in support of a deliberate infantry brigade attack.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-A-2

 ANNEX B
TO SECTION 6
TO CHAPTER 5
TO PART C

DECEPTION PLAN – ILLUSTRATION

1. The aim of the deception is to divert the enemy’s attention and forces, particularly
armour, away from the area of the genuine brigade attack, thus gaining surprise, freedom of
action and a more favourable balance of forces. The brigade is equipped with wheeled
APCs and the deception force consists of one infantry battalion group with one field troop of
engineers. The schedule of activity and timings might be as follows:

Timings Deception Force Remainder of Brigade

H-12 Covert reconnaissance of real objectives and
approaches.
H-8 1. Poorly concealed 1. Covert surveillance continues.
reconnaissance of 2. Obvious dummy bridge constructed on
diversionary objective and real approach route.
approaches.
2. Engr reconnaissance and
movement of plant to
improve mobility.
3. Armed helicopter
reconnaissance.
H-4 1. Deception force 1. Real assault forces move on foot to
establishes false bridge assembly areas under electronic silence.
concentration area using
the bulk of the brigade’s
APCs
2. Brigade step up HQ moves
into concentration area.
3. Premature move of
dressing station and main
repair group.
4. Distribution point
established close to false
concentration area.
H-3 1. Artillery adjustment on
diversionary objective.
2. Controlled breach of radio
security in concentration
area.
H-2 1/2 Active counter surveillance against enemy
to H-2 communications and stand-off sensors.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-B-1

 Timings Deception Force Remainder of Brigade
H-2 1. Radio silence except for
traffic control net.
2. Movement of APCs on
diversionary route.
3. Vehicles noise and dust
raising.
4. Establishment of waiting
areas.
5. Selective switch-on of air
defence and mortar
locating radar.

H-1 1. Movement of empty troop

lift helicopters close to
diversionary assembly areas.
H-30 1. Diversionary attack. 1. Real assault force in assembly areas.
mins 2. Air attack.
3. Active counter-surveillance.
H-Hour 1. Real attack.

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 C-5-B-2

 PART D

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
TANKS
T-54/55
T-64
T-72
T-80
T-90

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-1

 WHEELS
a. 5 large spoked roadwheels - NO Return Rollers T-54/55
b. Gap between 1st & 2nd Roadwheels

HULL
a. Straight Splash Plate
b. Driver on left

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 100mm MAIN Gun Range: 1500m (43 Rounds)
b. 1x 12.7mm AAMG Range: 1000m (AA), 2000m (ground)
c. 1 x 7.62mm coax MG Range: 1000m
d. Fume Extractor at end of barrel

TURRET
a. Dome shaped turret
b. Fnt climbing handles on Turret are straight
b. Rear climbing handles are curved
d. IR searchlight above and to the right of the main gun.

COMMENTS
a. T-55K command tank has double aerial fit
b. Retrofitted to fire ATGW through main armament
ROLE: MBT LENGTH: 6.45M
CREW: 4 WIDTH: 3.27M
SPEED: 48KPH HEIGHT: 2.4M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 36T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-2

 WHEELS
a. 6 small pressed roadwheels - 4 return rollers T-64
b. Tops of roadwheels still seen when side skirts fitted
HULL
a. V-shaped Splash Plate
b. Centrally mounted driver
ARMAMENT
a. 1x 125mm MAIN Gun Range: 2100m (40 Rounds)
b. 1x 12.7mm AAMG
c. 1 x 7.62mm coax MG mounted on RHS of turret
d. Fume Extractor 1/3 way down barrel
e. Four section removable thermal sleeve around barrel

TURRET
a. Low rounded turret centred on the hull.
b. Long schnorkel fitted to rear of turret with bent end
c. IR searchlight on left of barrel

COMMENTS
a. T-64K has no AAMG
b. T-64B can fire AT-8 (Songster - Range 4000m) from the halt

ROLE: MBT LENGTH: 6.35M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3.4M
SPEED: 70KPH HEIGHT: 2.27M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 35T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-3

 WHEELS
a. 6 evenly spaced large spoked roadwheels - 3 return rollers T-72
HULL
a. V-shaped Splash Plate
b. Exhaust mounted on rear left above 5th & 6th roadwheel
c. Centrally mounted driver
ARMAMENT
a. 1x 125mm MAIN Gun Range: 2100m (39 Rounds)
b. 1x 12.7mm AAMG (Normally points to rear)
c. 1 x 7.62mm coax MG
d. Fume Extractor 1/3 way down barrel
TURRET
a. Short schnorkel fitted to left rear of turret
b. IR searchlight normally to right of barrel
COMMENTS
a. T-72M has laser rangefinder
b. Retrofitted to fire ATGW through main armament

ROLE: MBT LENGTH: 6.9M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3.46M
SPEED: 45-60KPH HEIGHT: 2.19
FUEL: DIESEL/BENZINE WEIGHT: 45T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-4

 WHEELS
a. 6 large studded roadwheels in pairs - centre 2 are close together T-80
HULL
a. V-shaped Splash Plate
b. Large grilled exhaust at centre rear
c. External tanks (when fitted) at extreme corners of rear hull
ARMAMENT
a. 1x 125mm MAIN Gun Range: 2100m (40 Rounds)
b. 1x 12.7mm AAMG (with large windshield)
c. 1 x 7.62mm coax MG
d. Fume Extractor 1/3 way down barrel
TURRET
a. Very thick Schnorkel fitted to rear of turret
b. IR searchlight fitted to right of main armament
COMMENTS
a. Can fire AT-8 (SONGSTER - Range - 4000m)
b. T-80B & T-80U can fire AT-11 (Reffleks)

ROLE: MBT LENGTH: 6.7M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3.5M
SPEED: 60-70KPH HEIGHT: 2.3M
FUEL: GAS TURBINE WEIGHT: 42-46,000Kg

PICTURE SHOWS T-80U

PICTURE SHOWS T-80U

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-5

 WHEELS
a. 6 x spoked evenly spaced roadwheels T-90
HULL
a. Based on T-72

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 125mm 2A46M MAIN Gun
b. 1 x coaxial 7.62mm PKMG
c. 1 x 12.7mm NSVT (Normally points forward)

TURRET
a. Based on T-72

COMMENTS
a. Developed from T-72
b. Can fire AT-11 (Refleks) Laser Guided projectile(5,000m)

ROLE: MBT LENGTH: 6.86-9.53M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3.37M
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 2.23M
FUEL: DISEL WEIGHT: 46,500Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-6

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
APC’s/IFV’s
TRACKED IFVS
BMP-1
BMP-2
BMP-3
WHEELED APCS
BTR-60
BTR-70
BTR-80
BTR-90 (Info not available)
COMMAND & CONTROL VARIANTS
BMP-1KSH
R145BM
BTR-60 PU12
RECCE VARIANTS
BRM-1K
BRM-3K

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-7

 WHEELS
a. 6 small pressed roadwheels - 3 Return Rollers BMP-1
HULL
a. Trim Vane - Fnt top
b. Sloping front deck with ribbed area on top
c. Bulbous rear doors containing fuel tanks
d. 4 x vision blocks and firing ports on each side
e. Vertical line pattern on side skirts
f. 4 hatches on top of personnel compartment

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 73mm MAIN Gun (Range: 1300m)
b. 1x AT-3 (SAGGER) (Range: 500-3000m)
c. 1 x 7.62mm PKT

TURRET
a. Frying pan shaped turret (1 Man - 1 Hatch)

COMMENTS
a. BMP-1P has 1 x AT-4 (SPIGOT)
b. Manual reloading of ATGW
ROLE: IFV LENGTH: 6.74M
CREW: 3+8 WIDTH: 2.94M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 1.92M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 13600Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-8

 WHEELS
a. 6 small pressed roadwheels - 1st/2nd/6th have shock absorbers BMP-2
HULL
a. Trim Vane - Fnt top
b. Sloping front deck with ribbed area on top
c. Bulbous rear doors containing fuel tanks
d. 3 x vision blocks and firing ports on each side
e. Horizontal lines on side skirt
f. 2 hatches on personnel compartment

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 30mm Cannon (Effective Range: 1000m Sighted: 4000m)
b. 1x AT-4 (SPIGOT) or AT-5 (SPANDREL/KONKURS) mounted on turret
c. 1 x 7.62mm PKT

TURRET
a. 2 man turret
b. 3 x smoke dischargers either side of turret

COMMENTS
a. Resembles BMP-1
b. ATGW manually reloaded
ROLE: IFV LENGTH: 6.73M
CREW: 3+7 WIDTH: 3.14M
SPEED: 65KPH (7kph in water) HEIGHT: 2.49M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 14500Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D-9

 WHEELS
a. 6 small studded road wheels - 3 return rollers BMP-3
b. Prominent gaps between 2nd/3rd & 5th/6th road wheels
c. 2 shock absorbers above 1st & 2nd road wheels
d. Rounded front to track guards

HULL
a. Rectangular body with double angle to bow front
b. 2 outward opening rear doors
c. Hydrojet covers bottom of rear doors

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 100mm MAIN Gun (4000m)
b. 1 x 30mm Cannon (Slaved) (2000m)
c. 7.62mm coax MG
d. 2 x 7.62mm bow MG
e. Can fire AT-10 (STABBER/BASNYA - Range 4Km) through barrel
f. Laser range Finder above main armament

TURRET
a. 2 man turret
b. 3 smoke grenade launchers either side of turret

COMMENTS ROLE: IFV LENGTH: 7.20m

a. High elevation of slaved CREW: 3+7 WIDTH: 3.23m
cannon increases range to SPEED: 70KPH (10kph in water) HEIGHT: 2.65m
4,000m against heli tgts FUEL: Disel WEIGHT: 18,700Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 10

 WHEELS
a. 8 evenly spaced roadwheels BTR-60
b. Steps between wheels

HULL
a. Boat shaped hull
b. Exhaust pipes mounted at 45 degrees
c. Straight climbing handles on sides of hull
d. Large centrally mounted split hydrojet cover at rear

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 14.5mm MG
b. 1 x 7.62mm PKT

TURRET
a. Small turret at front of hull

COMMENTS
a. Basic APC refered to as BTR-60PB

ROLE: WHEELED APC LENGTH: 7.6M

CREW: 2+16 Normally 12 WIDTH: 2.82M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 2.31M
FUEL: PETROL WEIGHT: 10300Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 11

 WHEELS
a. 8 (4 x 4) roadwheels BTR-70
b. Gap and a door between centre wheels
c. Steps between remaining wheels

HULL
a. Boat shaped hull includes trim vane
b. Exhaust pipes mounted at 30 degrees
c. No rails on side
d. Raised engine cooling louvres at rear
e. Angled hydrojet cover at rear

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 14.5mm MG
b. 1 x 7.62mm coax MG

TURRET
a. Small turret at front of hull

COMMENTS
a. Similar to BTR-60

ROLE: WHEELED APC LENGTH: 7.53M

CREW: 2+8 WIDTH: 2.8M
SPEED: 90KPH HEIGHT: 2.235M
FUEL: PETROL WEIGHT: 13.600Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 12

 WHEELS
a. 8 (4 x 4) roadwheels BTR-80
b. Gap and a door between centre wheels - split top and bottom
c. Steps between remaining wheels

HULL
a. Boat shaped hull includes splash plate - Slab sided rear
b. Exhaust pipes mounted horizontally
c. One piece, centrally mounted, angled hydrojet cover with circular indent at rear

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 14.5mm MG
b. 1 x 7.62mm PKT

TURRET
a. Small turret at front of hull

COMMENTS
a. Similar to BTR-70
b. BTR-80A equipped with 30mm cannon vice 14.5mm MG

ROLE: WHEELED APC LENGTH:

CREW: 3+7 WIDTH:
SPEED: 90KPH HEIGHT:
FUEL: PETROL WEIGHT: 14,550Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 13

 WHEELS
a. BTR-80 chassis
BTR-90
HULL
a. Boat shaped hull includes splash plate - Slab sided rear
b. Exhaust pipes mounted horizontally

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 30mm cannon
b. 1 x 7.62mm PKT MG
c. 1 x AT-5 (SPANDREL)

TURRET
a. Complete turret of BMP-2

COMMENTS
a. Has more steel armour than BTR-80

ROLE: WHEELED APC LENGTH: 7.64m

CREW: 3+7 WIDTH: 3.20m
SPEED: 90KPH HEIGHT: 2.975m
FUEL: PETROL WEIGHT: 17,000Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 14

 WHEELS
a. 6 roadwheels - 3 Return Rollers BMP-1KSH
HULL
a. Trim Vane - Fnt top
b. Sloping front deck with ribbed area on top
c. Bulbous rear doors containing fuel tanks
d. Dismountable generator box in centre of extreme rear
e. NO firing ports

ARMAMENT
a. Replaced by telescopic mast

TURRET
a. Non-rotating Frying pan shaped turret
b. Cylindrical antenna sheath along right rear side of turret

COMMENTS
a. Command & Control variant BMP

ROLE: IFV LENGTH: 6.74M

CREW: 3+8 WIDTH: 2.94M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 1.92M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 13600Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 15

 WHEELS
a. 8 evenly spaced roadwheels R-145BM
b. Steps between all wheels

HULL
a. Boat shaped hull
b. Exhaust pipes mounted at 45 degrees
c. Straight climbing handles on sides of hull
d. 3 sided tubular antenna (CLOTHES RAIL) mounted on roof
e. Telescopic HAWK EYE antenna (Front Right)
f. Dismountable generator box in centre of roof
g. Large centrally mounted split hydrojet cover at rear

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 7.62 MG

TURRET
a. REMOVED

COMMENTS

a. Formally referred to as BTR-60PA Command

ROLE: WHEELED APC LENGTH: 7.6M
CREW: 2+9 WIDTH: 2.82M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 2.31M
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: 10300Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 16

 WHEELS
a. 8 evenly spaced roadwheels BTR-60 PU-12
b. Steps between wheels

HULL
a. Boat shaped hull
b. Exhaust pipes mounted at 45 degrees
c. Straight climbing handles on sides of hull
d. Large centrally mounted split hydrojet cover at rear
e. Dismountable rectangular generator box in centre of roof
f. Telescopic HAWK EYE mast on front right

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 7.62mm PKT

TURRET
a. REMOVED

COMMENTS
a. Air Defence Command & Control vehicle

ROLE: WHEELED APC LENGTH: 7.6M

CREW: 2+9 WIDTH: 2.82M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 2.31M
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: 10300Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 17

 WHEELS
a. 6 roadwheels - 3 Return Rollers BRM-1K
HULL
a. Trim Vane - Fnt top
b. Sloping front deck with ribbed area on top
c. Bulbous rear doors containing fuel tanks
d. De-ditching log carried on left side of vehicle
e. Telescopic mast extends horizontally across rear of vehicle

ARMAMENT
a. 1x 73mm MAIN Gun
b. 1 x 7.62mm PKT

TURRET
a. Enlarged 2 man frying pan shaped turret
b. Hatch at rear of turret housing TALL MIKE (Battlefield Surveillance radar)
c. 3 smoke grenade launchers on either side of turret

COMMENTS
a. Similar to BMP-1

ROLE: Recce LENGTH: 6.74M

CREW: 6 WIDTH: 2.94M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 1.92M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 13600Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 18

 WHEELS
a. As BMP-3 BRM-3K
HULL
a. As BMP-3

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 30mm 2A72 Cannon (2000m)
b. 1 x 7.62mm MG (1500m)

TURRET
a. BMP-3 turret with Main (100mm) Armament removed
b. Battlefield surveillance equipment mounted in rear of turret (TALL MIKE)

COMMENTS
a. Similar to BMP-3
b. BRM-3k also known as RYS

ROLE: RECCE LENGTH: 6.74M

CREW: 6 WIDTH: 2.94M
SPEED: 70KPH (10KPH in water) HEIGHT: 1.92M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 18700Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 19

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
ARTY/MRL/SSM

Self Propelled Arty Towed Guns

2S1 D-20
2S3 D-30
2S5 2A36
2S7 2A61
2S19 2A65

Mortars MRL

2S23 BM-21
2S31 PRIMA
2B9 9P140
2B11/2S12
2B14 SSM
2B16
9A52-2
SS-21/TOCHKA
SCUD-B

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 20

 WHEELS
a. 7 x evenly spaced, pressed roadwheels - NO return rollers 2S1
b. NO Track Guards

HULL
a. Barrel does not extend over front of hull
b. Single door in rear of hull
c. Vehicle is amphibious (5KPH in water)

ARMAMENT
a. 122mm HOWITZER Range 15.3-21.9(RAP)Km (40 Rounds)
b. Can fire CW/HE//Flechette/LGP/smk/illum/HEAT
c. Multi-Baffle Muzzle Brake
d. Fume extractor - 1/3 way down barrel

TURRET
a. Turret set to rear of hull

COMMENTS
a. Rate of fire (7-8rounds per min - not sustainable)
b. Previously designated 122mm Fd Gun M1974
d. Also known as 2S1M GVOZDIKA
ROLE: Arty LENGTH: 7.62M
CREW: 4 WIDTH: 2.85M
SPEED: 70KPH HEIGHT: 2.73M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 15.7T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 21

 WHEELS
a. 6 x spoked roadwheels - 4 x return rollers 2S3
b. NO Track Guards
c. Gap between 1st/2nd & 2nd/3rd roadwheels

HULL
a. Barrel extends over front of hull
b. Double doors at rear of hull
c. Straight Splash Plate - Fords 1m

ARMAMENT
a. 152mm GUN/HOWITZER Range 17.3-24Km (40 Rounds)
b. Can fire CW/HE Frag/Flechette/RDM/LGP/smk/illum/HEAT/Jammer
c. Double-Baffle Muzzle Brake
d. Fume extractor - 1/3 way down barrel
e. 2 x prominent recoil tubes above barrel
f. 1 x 7.62MG

TURRET
a. Large turret set to rear of hull
b. Commanders cupola bulges out on left of turret

COMMENTS
a. Rate of fire (5 rounds per min - not sustainable) ROLE: Arty LENGTH: 7.78M
b. Vehicle is not amphibious CREW: 4+2 WIDTH: 3.2M
c. Previously designated 152mm Fd Gun M1973 SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 2.72M
d. Also known as 2S3-M1 AKATSIYA FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 27,500Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 22

 WHEELS
a. 6 x spoked roadwheels - 3 x return rollers 2S5
b. NO Track Guards
c. Rear 3 wheels grouped to rear

HULL
a. Mounted on 2S3 chassis
b. Slab-sided cupola front left
c. Horizontally ribbed spade at rear
d. Fords 1m

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 152mm 2A37 GUN Range 28.5-40(RAP)Km (40 Rounds)
b. Can fire Nuc/CW/HE Frag/RDM/conv EMP/ICM/smk/illum
c. Multi-Baffle Muzzle Brake
d. 1 x 7.62mm MG

TURRET
a. NO Turret -open breach area

COMMENTS
a. Rate of fire: 1.5-2 rnds/min (not sustainable)
b. Formerly known as M1981
c. Can deliver low yield ROLE: ARTY LENGTH: 8.3M
nuclear munition CREW: 5-7 WIDTH: 3.2M
d. Also known as GIATSINT SPEED: 63KPH HEIGHT: 2.76M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 28.2Tonnes

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 23

 WHEELS
a. 7 x evenly spaced roadwheels - 6 x return rollers 2S7
b. NO Track Guards

HULL
a. Large hydraulic spade at rear of vehicle
b. Non amphibious/Non deep wade

ARMAMENT
a. 203mm GUN Range 37.5- 47(RAP)Km
b. NO Muzzle Brake
c. Recoil system & Recuperator above and below barrel
d. Can fire Nuc/CW/HE Frag/Concrete Piercing/conv EMP/ICM/RDM

TURRET
a. NO Turret

COMMENTS
a. Rate of fire: 2.5 rnds/min (not sustainable)
b. Can deliver nuclear munitions
c. Previously designated M1975
d. Also known as 2S7M/PION
ROLE: ARTY LENGTH: 13.1M(incl
Gun)
CREW: 3+4 WIDTH: 3.5M
SPEED: 50KPH HEIGHT: 2.8M
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 46T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 24

 WHEELS
a. 6 x solid roadwheels - 5 x return rollers 2S19
b. Track Guards fitted
c. 3 rear wheels close together

HULL
a. Modified T-80 chassis
b. Fords 1m/Deep Wades 5m

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 152mm GUN Range 24.7-28.9(Base Bleed)Km
b. Can fire CW/HE Frag/Flechette/RDM/ICM/LGP/Jammer/smk/illum/HEAT
c. Multi-Baffle Muzzle Brake
d. Fume extractor - 1/2 way down barrel
e. 2 x prominent recoil tubes above barrel
f. 1 x 12.7mm AAMG

TURRET
a. Large angular turret set to rear of hull
b. Commanders cupola with remote control MG and searchlight on
front right of turret
c. Reload arm (Scorpions Tail) at rear of turret

COMMENTS ROLE: ARTY LENGTH: 11.92M

a. 152mm 2A65 Gun on T-80 chassis CREW: 5 WIDTH: 3.38M
b. Also known as MSTA-S SPEED: 60kph HEIGHT: 2.985M
FUEL: Multifuel WEIGHT: 42T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 25

 WHEELS
a. 8 wheels - 4 axles 2S23
HULL
a. Based on BTR-80 chassis
b. Vehicle is amphibious

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 2A60 120mm rifled semi-automatic GUN Range: Direct 500m
b. Can fire HE/LGP/smk/illum/HEAT Indirect 8.8-12.8(RAP)Km
c. 1 x AAMG Mortar: 7.5km
d. 1 x 7.62mm MG

TURRET
a. High centrally mounted turret

COMMENTS
a. Rate of fire: 8-10 rounds/min
b. Also known as NONA-SVK

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: 7.5M

CREW: 4 WIDTH: 2.9M
SPEED: As BTR-80 HEIGHT: 2.75M
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 14500Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 26

 WHEELS
a. 2S31 turret can be mounted on BMD-3 or BMP-3 chassis 2S31
HULL
a. 2S31 turret can be mounted on BMD-3 or BMP-3 chassis

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 120mm long barrel rifled automatic artillery gun Range 2-18(HEFP)Km
b. Can fire CW/HE Frag/Flechette/LGP/smk/illum/HEAT
c. Fume Extractor 1/3 way down barrel
d. 1 x 7.62MG

TURRET
a. 2 x 6 electronically operated smoke dischargers either side of turret

COMMENTS
a. Automatic survey and orientation system/Day/Night Capability/Autonomous system
b. Vehicle is amphibious (5KPH in water)
c. Also known as VENA

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH:

CREW: 4 WIDTH:
SPEED: 70KPH HEIGHT:
FUEL: WEIGHT: 16.9/19T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 27

 WHEELS
a. Conventional Artillery Carriage and Split Trails 2B9
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 82mm breech loaded automatic mortar (Range: 100-5000m)
b. Clips (4 rounds) of Ammunition (HE/Smk/Illum/Incend/HEAT)

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Normally towed by GAZ-66 (4 x 4)
b. Also known as VASILEK

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: ?

CREW: ? WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 632Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 28

 WHEELS
a. Mounted on single axle trailer 2B11
HULL
a. Top of circular base plate is smooth, underside has 8 pointed star pattern
b. Guard fitted on end of muzzle to stop 2 rounds being loaded

ARMAMENT
a. 120mm Mortar Range: 460-7100M
b. Muzzle is at the height of an average mans head
c. Can fire HE/Illum/Smk/LGP/Incend

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. 2B11 is ‘stand alone’ mortar
b. 2S12 is towed or GAZ-66 mounted version. Also known as SANI
c. Max Rate of Fire: 10-15 rnds/min
d. Previously designated M-120

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: ?

CREW: 5 WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 210kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 29

 WHEELS
a. 2B14
HULL
a. N/A

ARMAMENT
a. 82mm Mortar Range: 80-4270m
b. Can fire HE/Smk/Illum/Incend

TURRET
a. N/A

COMMENTS
a. Also known as PODNOS
b. Can be man-packed or vehicle mounted

ROLE: LENGTH:
CREW: WIDTH:
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT:
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 42Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 30

 WHEELS
a. 2 Wheels 2B16
HULL
a. N/A

ARMAMENT
a. 120mm breach loaded mortar Range: Mortar: 7.1Km
Howitzer: 8.7-13(RAP)Km
b. Can fire Mortar: HE Frag/Cargo/RAP/LGP
How: HE Frag/Smk/Incend/Illum

TURRET
a. N/A

COMMENTS
a. Combination GUN-MORTASR System
b. Also known as NONA-K
c. Normally towed by GAZ-66 (4 x 4)

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: 5.9m

CREW: 4 WIDTH: 1.79m
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT:
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 390Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 31

 WHEELS
a. Single axle carriage with single wheels D-20
b. Gun trails have castor wheels
HULL
a. Short, split trail carriage
b. 2 cylinder recoil mechanism above barrel
c. Scalloped, winged shield

ARMAMENT
a. 152mm GUN/HOWITZER Range 17.4- 24(RAP)Km
b. Double baffle muzzle brake
c. Can fire CW/HE Frag/RDM/LGP/Smk/Illum/HEAT/Jammer

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Formerly designated M1955(Gun-How)
b. Normally towed by URAL375D/KRAZ-260

ROLE: Arty LENGTH: 8.69M

CREW: 10 WIDTH: 2.32M
SPEED: NA HEIGHT: 1.925M
FUEL: NA WEIGHT: 5700Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 32

 WHEELS
a. Single axle carriage with single wheels- raised when firing D-30
HULL
a. Straight top to 2 piece shield
b. Prominent wedge shaped recoil housing above barrel & between shields
c. 3 x Box Trails

ARMAMENT
a. 122mm HOWITZER Range 15.4-21.9Km
b. Multi-Baffle Muzzle Brake (D-30A - Double baffle muzzle brake)
c. Prominent Towing-Eye at end of barrel

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Only eastern European Gun that is towed by the barrel
b. Also known as 2A18
c. Rate of Fire: 8 Rounds/Min (Not sustainable)
d. Formerly designated M1963(How)

ROLE: Arty LENGTH: 5.4M

CREW: 7 WIDTH: 1.95M
SPEED: NA HEIGHT: 1.66M
FUEL: NA WEIGHT: 3210Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 33

 WHEELS
a. Double axle carriage with single wheels on each axle 2A36
b. Large box trails

HULL
a. Recoil mechanism above the barrel extends through shields and is covered by a
triangular protective plate
b. Swept back ‘winged’ shields

ARMAMENT
a. 152mm Field Gun Range: 27-40(RAP)Km
b. Multi-slotted muzzle brake
c. Can fire NUC/CW/HE Frag/Flechette/RDM/LGP/Jammer/Smk/HEAT/Illum/Conv EMP

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Max Rate of Fire: 5-6 rnds.min
b. Formerly designated 152mm Fd Gun M1976
c. Normally towed by KRAZ-260 (6 x 6)

ROLE: Arty LENGTH: 13M

CREW: 8 WIDTH: 2.79M
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: 2.76M
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 9760Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 34

 WHEELS
a. Based on modified D-30a chassis 2A61
HULL
a. N/A

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 152mm light towed howitzer Range 4-19(Base Bleed)Km
b. Can fire CW/HE Frag/Flechette/Illum/HEAT/ICM/RDM/LGP/Jammer/Smk

TURRET
a. N/A

COMMENTS
a. Normally towed by ZIL-131 or MTLB (BY THE BARREL)

ROLE: Arty LENGTH: 6.36M

CREW: WIDTH: 2.2M
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: 1.97M
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 4300Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 35

 WHEELS
a. Single axle with single wheels 2A65
b. 2 x Box trails have small dolly wheels

HULL
a. Straight top to shield
b. Circular firing platform positioned (in transit) under the barrel
c. Twin recuperators over the barrel forward of the shield

ARMAMENT
a. 152mm GUN-HOWITZER Range: 24.7-29(Base Bleed)Km
b. Very long barrel with triple baffle muzzle brakes
c. Can fire CW/HE Frag/Flechette/ICM/RDM/LGP/Jammer/Smk/Illum/HEAT

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Also known as MSTA-B
b. Normally towed by KRAZ-260 (6 x 6)

ROLE: Arty LENGTH: ?

CREW: 8 WIDTH: ?
SPEED: ? HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: 7000kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 36

 WHEELS
a. Normally mounted on URAL 375D 6x6 Truck BM-21
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 40 x 122mm Rocket tubes Range 11.5 Km (Short) - 20.5Km (Long)
b. Firing pack has distinctive boxed shape even when tarped
c. Can fire HE Frag/RDM/Incend

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Complete salvo fired in 20 sec
b. Reload Time: 10 min
c. Uses Short & Long range rockets
d. Also known as GRAD
e. BM-21Vis 12 x 122mm GAZ-66(4 x 4) mounted version

ROLE: MRL LENGTH: 7.35M

CREW: 6 WIDTH: 2.69M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 2.85M
FUEL: PETROL WEIGHT: 13,700Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 37

 WHEELS
a. Based on a URAL 4320 (6 x 6) Chassis PRIMA 9A51
HULL
a. Based on a URAL 4320 (6 x 6) Chassis

ARMAMENT
a. 50 x 122mm Rocket tubes Range: 5- 20.5Km
b. Can fire HE Frag/RDM/TGSM//CW/Incend

TURRET
a. N/A

COMMENTS
a. Time Into/Out of Action: 5/2mins
b. Reload Time: 10-20 min
c. Also known as PRIMA
d. Estimated range of new Prima rocket = 36Km

ROLE: MBRL LENGTH:

CREW: 3 WIDTH:
SPEED: 85KPH HEIGHT:
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 13,900Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 38

 WHEELS
a. Normally mounted on ZIL-135 (8 x 8) Chassis 9P140
b. 4 axles with 2nd & 3rd under common oval wheel arch
c. 2 x stabilising jacks at rear

HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 16 x 220mm Rocket tubes Range: 10-35Km
b. Can fire HE Frag/ICM/RDM/CW/TGSM/FAE/Incend
c. Rocket tube pack gives a chamfered appearance when tarped

TURRET
a. 3 piece windscreen over a flat fronted cab
b. Rectangular engine compartment behind cab

COMMENTS
a. Also known as URAGAN
b. Previously referred to as BM-27 & BM-22
c. Reload time approx 15-20mins
d. SetUp time= 3 min
e. Firing Time = 8.8s
ROLE: MRL LENGTH: 9.27M
CREW: 4 WIDTH: 2.8M
SPEED: 65KPH HEIGHT: 3.225M
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 23000Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 39

 WHEELS
a. 8 wheels - 4 axles 9A52-2
HULL
a. Based on MAZ-543M

ARMAMENT
a. 12 x 300mm Multi Barrel Rocket Launch system Range: 20-70Km
b. Can fire HE Frag/ICM/RDM/ARM/TGSM/FAE/CW/Incend

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Original version was 9A52 (14 x 300mm tubes)
b. Also known as SMERCH

ROLE: MRL LENGTH: 12.1M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3.05M
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 3.05M
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 43,700Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 40

 WHEELS
a. 6 wheels - 3 axles SS-21
b. Based on BAZ-5921 (6 x 6) chassis
HULL
a. Based on SA-? Chassis

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x HE/NUCLEAR/CHEMICAL/ICM/CLUSTER/FAE Warhead
b. Range 20-120Km (Accuracy 32-76M CEP)

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Solid fuel inertially guided terminally homing (with MMW radar) ballistic missile
b. Vehicle is amphibious
c. Time into action: under 20mins
d. Also known as TOCHKA

ROLE: SSM LENGTH: 9.5M

CREW: ? WIDTH: 2.78M
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 2.5M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 30.8T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 41

 WHEELS
a. 8 wheels - 4 axles SCUD
HULL
a. Based on MAZ-543 chassis

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x HE/NUCLEAR/CHEMICAL/ICM/CLUSTER Warhead
b. Rocket has liquid propellant

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Designated SS-1C
b. Scud A = SS-1B (Tracked Variant)
c. Latest version = R-17 (SCUD-D) Range 300Km with CEP 50m
inertially guided with digital scene matching

ROLE: SSM LENGTH: 12M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3M
SPEED: 70KPH HEIGHT: 2.6M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: ?

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 42

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
ARTY COMMAND
& CONTROL

Arty C2

1V13
1V14/15
1V16
1V18/19

Arty Recce

PRP-3
PRP-4

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 43

 WHEELS
a. 7 small spoked roadwheels 1V13
HULL
a. Based on the MTLBu chassis
b. Inset rectangular box on right of hull in line with turret
c. Large rectangular hatch to the left of square door at rear of vehicle

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 12.7mm MG

TURRET
a. Shallow trucated conical turret
b. Prominent pimple at top front of turret

COMMENTS
a. Part of 1V12 Series
b. Also known as ACRV M1974(1) - Role: Bty FDC
c. Variant 1V13M as above + Generator box on rear of vehicle
d. On RHS. NO Box on Turret - Box on Hull

ROLE: ARTY COMD & CTL LENGTH: As MTLB

CREW: 6 WIDTH: As MTLB
SPEED: As MTLB HEIGHT: As MTLB
FUEL: As MTLB WEIGHT: As MTLB

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 44

 WHEELS
a. 7 small evenly spaced road wheels 1V14/15
HULL
a. Based on MTLBu chassis
b. Telescopic mast along left side of hull (1V15 ONLY)
c. Inset rectangular box on right side of hull

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x MG

TURRET
a. Shallow truncated conical turret
b. Prominent rectangular block on top front left of turret

COMMENTS
a. Part of 1V12 Series
b. 1V14 also known as ACRV M1974(2A) - Role: Bty COP
c. 1V15 also known as ACRV M1974(2B) - Role: Bn COP
d. Variant 1V14/15M as above + Generator box on rear of vehicle
e. On RHS. Box on Turret - Box on Hull

ROLE: ARTY COMD & CTL LENGTH: As MTLB

CREW: 7 WIDTH: As MTLB
SPEED: As MTLB HEIGHT: As MTLB
FUEL: As MTLB WEIGHT: As MTLB

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 45

 WHEELS
a. 7 small evenly spaced road wheels 1V16
HULL
a. Based on MTLBu chassis
b. Telescopic mast along left side

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 12.7mm MG

TURRET
a. ‘Clean’ turret

COMMENTS
a. Part of 1V12 Series
b. Also known as ACRV M1974(3) - Role: Bn FDC
c. Variant 1V16M as above + Generator box on rear of vehicle + NO turret
d. On RHS. NO Box on Turret - NO Box on Hull

ROLE: ARTY COMD & CTL LENGTH: As MTLB

CREW: 6 WIDTH: As MTLB
SPEED: As MTLB HEIGHT: As MTLB
FUEL: As MTLB WEIGHT: As MTLB

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 46

 WHEELS
a. 8 wheels - 4 axles 1V18/19
HULL
a. Based on BTR-60 chassis
b. Additional horizontal exhaust silencer on left of hull (above 3rd wheel)

ARMAMENT
a. NO ARMAMENT

TURRET
a. Rotatable, truncated, conical turret
b. Turret has a box inset into the front (protruding ears when viewed fron the rear
c. Distinct gap between base of turret and hull

COMMENTS
a. Part of 1V17 Series
b. 1V18 also known as ACRV M1979(1)
c. 1V19 also known as ACRV M1979(2B)

ROLE: ARTY COMD & CTL LENGTH: as BTR-60

CREW: 6 WIDTH: as BTR-60
SPEED: as BTR-60 HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: as BTR-60 WEIGHT: as BTR-60

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 47

 WHEELS
a. 6 roadwheels - 3 return rollers PRP-3
HULL
a. Based on BMP-1 chassis

ARMAMENT
a. NO Main Armament - NO ATGW
b. 1 x 7.62mm PKT MG

TURRET
a. Enlarged 2 man turret
b. SMALL FRED surveillance radar located over rear of turret. Locates targets upto 10km
c. Reflector is rectangular and hinged at rear

COMMENTS

ROLE: Arty OP/Surveillance LENGTH: 6.7M

CREW: 6 WIDTH: 3.0M
SPEED: 65 KPH HEIGHT: 2.94M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: NA

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 48

 WHEELS
a. 6 roadwheels - 3 return rollers PRP-4
HULL
a. Based on BMP-1 chassis
b. Boxes fitted at rear each side on top of track guards

ARMAMENT
a. NO Main Armament - NO ATGW
b. 1 x 7.62mm MG (1,500M)

TURRET
a. Enlarged 2 man turret - extended at rear with slight concave appearance
b. TALL MIKE surveillance radar located over rear of turret
c. Large angular vision devices on left & right of turret

COMMENTS

ROLE: Arty OP/Surveillance LENGTH: 6.7M

CREW: 5 WIDTH: 3.0M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 2.94M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 13,200Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 49

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
ENGINEER
Combat Engr Equip Ferries

IMR-2 PMM-2
BAT-2 (Info not available) PTS
BAT-M (Info not available)
PJM-2 (Info not available) Engr Recce
MDK-3 (Info not available)
IRM
Mine-Layers IPR

UMZ
GMZ

Bridges

MTU-20
MTU-72
PMP
TMM-3

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 50

 WHEELS
a. 6 large spoked road wheels with return rollers IMR-2
HULL
a. Modified T-72 chassis

ARMAMENT
a. Enlarged variable geometry dozer blade
b. 12.7 MG

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. IMR based on T-55
b. IMR-2 previously called IMR M1986
c. IMR-2 has NBC protection for crew

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 9.55M

CREW: 2 WIDTH: 3.74-4.35M
SPEED: 59KPH HEIGHT: 3.68M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 44,300Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 51

 WHEELS MDK-3
a. MT-T carrier chassis
b. 7 small pressed road wheels 4 return rollers similar to the T-64

HULL
a. Indescribable

ARMAMENT
a. Enlarged variable geometry dozer blade

TURRET
a. 2 Seater cabin

COMMENTS
a. Trench digging speed 200m/h

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 12M

CREW: 2 WIDTH: 3.5M
SPEED: 50KPH HEIGHT: 4M
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 40,000K

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 52

 WHEELS
a. Based on ZIL-131 (6 x 6) Chassis UMZ
HULL
a. Based on ZIL-131 (6 x 6) Chassis

ARMAMENT
a. 6 x Launchers (30 x tubes each) Range: 30-100m

TURRET
a. N/A

COMMENTS
a. Reload time (upto) 20 mins

ROLE: Engr Mining System LENGTH: 7.21m

CREW: 2 WIDTH: 3.45m
SPEED: 40KPH(Dispensing) HEIGHT: 3.3m
FUEL: WEIGHT:

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 53

 WHEELS
a. 7 spoked road wheels - 4 return rollers GMZ
HULL
a. Modified GANEF (SA-4) chassis
b. Straight splash plate
c. Prominent hooded headlights
d. Mine chute and plough at rear. Raised when taroed - guiving ‘Rhino-Horn’
appearancae
e. Slab-Sided

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 7.62mm MG

TURRET
a. Commanders cupola front left with mine layers cupola rear right

COMMENTS
a. GMZ-2 variant has additional optics
b. GMZ-3 variant has front mounted dozer blade and smoke grenade launchers
c. Mine Laying Speed: 8 Mines/Min (Surface) - 4 Mines/Min (Buried)
d. Reload time 15-20min
ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 8.62M
CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3.25M
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 2.7M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 28,500Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 54

 WHEELS
a. 5 roadwheels -NO return rollers MTU-20
HULL
a. Based on a modified T-55 chassis

ARMAMENT
a. NOT APPLICABLE

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Launch Time: 3 Mins
b. Bridge Length - 20M (Span gap of 18M) Capacity - 60,000Kg
c. Takes 5min to lay bridge in posn and 7min to recover.

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 11.64M

CREW: 2 WIDTH: 3.3M
SPEED: 54KPH HEIGHT: 3.4M
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 37,000Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 55

 WHEELS MTU-72
a. Based on T-72 Chassis

HULL
a. Based on T-72 Chassis

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 7.62mm MG

TURRET
a. N/A

COMMENTS
a. Launch Time: 3 Mins Retrieval Time: 8 Mins
b. BridgeLength: 20M (Span Gap of 18M) Capcity: 50,000Kg

ROLE: Engr Bridging Equip LENGTH: 11.64M

CREW: 2 WIDTH: 3.46M
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 3.38M
FUEL: Multi-Fuel Diesel WEIGHT: 40,000Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 56

 WHEELS
a. 6 x Wheels- 3 Axles PMP
HULL
a. Carried on KRAZ 214/255B/260
b. Carries 1 x section of Heavy Folding Pontoon Bridge (shaped like Nissen Hut)
CENTRE
c. Shaped like W in travel position (RAMP)

ARMAMENT
a. NOT APPLICABLE

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. 1 x complete pontoon consists of 32 centre sections + 4 ramp sections+ 12 BMK/T
b. Average construction time - 7m/min

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 6.75M

CREW: 2 WIDTH: 7.1(3.21)M
SPEED: ? HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: 18,600Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 57

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE TMM-3
HULL
a. Carried on KRAZ-225B (6 x 6) truck
b. Carries Treadway Bridge
c. Spare wheel on roof
d. Frame from front bumper over cab

ARMAMENT
a. NOT APPLICABLE

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. TMM-4 variant is modified bridge on KRAZ-260
b. 4 Spans in a set
c. BridgeLength: 10.5M (Set = 42M) Capcity: 60,000Kg
d. Assembly time for 40m 45-60Mins (Day) 60-80Mins (Night)

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 10.5M

CREW: 1+2 WIDTH: 3.2
SPEED: 55KPH HEIGHT: 3.15M
FUEL: Diesel WEIGHT: 19,500Kg

PICTURE SHOWN TMM-2

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 58

 WHEELS
a. 7 small pressed road wheels with return rollers PMM-2
b. T-64 running gear

HULL
a. 2 x propellers in stern tunnels
b. 2 x unfoldable pontoons are carried one on top of the other (RH on top)
c. Enclosed cabin

ARMAMENT
a. NOT APPLICABLE

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Used as a one-piece floating pontoon (NB. Can unfold on land)
b. NB. Replaced GSP
c. Can carry up to 50T

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 13.35M

CREW: ? WIDTH: 3.36M
SPEED: 55KPH (10KPH in water) HEIGHT: 3.65M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: ?

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 59

 WHEELS
a. 6 small evenly spaced road wheels - NO return rollers PTS
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. NOT APPLICABLE

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Tracked Amphibious Ferry
b. PTS-2 is mounted on Kharkov chassis

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: 11.5M

CREW: 1+1 (70 Troops in rear) WIDTH: 3.3M
SPEED: 42 KPH HEIGHT: 2.65M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 17,700Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 60

 WHEELS
a. 7 pressed road wheels - 5 return rollers IRM
HULL
a. 2 x large encased propellers on top rear
b. 2 x barrel oxygen tanks either side of hull
c. 2 x folding arms on front of hull
d. Can operate submerged to a depth of 10M

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 7.62mm MG

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. IRM is a modified IPR without schnorkel and with improved mine probes
b. Onboard equipment includes: MINE DETECTOR
MECHANICAL PENETROMETER
SONAR

ROLE: ENGR RECCE LENGTH: 8.22m

CREW: Up to 6 WIDTH: 3.15m
SPEED: 52KMH HEIGHT: 2.4m
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 17,200Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 61

 WHEELS
a. 7 pressed road wheels - 5 return rollers IPR
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. NOT APPLICABLE

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. As IRM but with schnorkel

ROLE: ENGR LENGTH: ?

CREW: 4? WIDTH: ?
SPEED: ? HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: ?

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 62

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
ANTI-TANK

ATGM
AT-3 SAGGER
AT-4 SPIGOT FAKTORIYA 75-2,500M
AT-5 SPANDREL KONKURS 75-4,000M
*AT-6a SPIRAL ATAKA 400-5,000M
*AT-6b 9P149 SHTURM-S 600-6,000M
AT-7 SAXHORN
*AT-8 SONGSTER KOBRA 100-4,000M
*AT-10 STABBER BASTION/BASNYA 100-4/5,000M
*AT-11 SNIPER REFLEKS 100-5,000M
*AT-13 METIS 40-1,500M
AT-14 KORNET 100-5,500M
*AT-15 KHRISANTEMA 250-6,000M
*AT-16 VIKHR 500-7,000M
RPG-29
SPG-9
MT-12/MT-12M
2A45M
9P148 BRDM-2 +AT-5
9P149 MTLB + AT-6
*9P150 GROZA BMP-3
*9P151/9P157 BMP-3 + AT-15
*SU-125

* info not presently included

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 63

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE AT-3
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x wire guided MCLOS Anti Tank missile Range: 3000M+

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Covername - SAGGER
b. Can be man-pack or vehicle mounted

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: ?

CREW: ? WIDTH: ?
SPEED: ? HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: ?

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 64

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE AT-4
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x wire guided SACLOS Anti-Tank missile Range: 3500M

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Covername - SPIGOT
b. Can be man-pack or vehicle mounted
c. Also known as FAKTORIYA

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: ?

CREW: 3 WIDTH: ?
SPEED: ? HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: ?

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 65

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE AT-5
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x wire guided SACLOS Anti-Tank missile Range: 4000M+

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Covername - SPANDREL
b. Normally seen mounted on 9P148
c. Also known as KONKURS

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 1263mm

CREW: ? WIDTH: ?
SPEED: ? HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: 26.5Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 66

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE AT-7
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. Tube launched SACLOS ATGM system Range - 1000M
b. HEAT Whd

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Covername - SAXHORN
b. Man-Portable

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: ?

CREW: 2 WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: Firing Post - 10Kg
Msl - 6.3 or 13.8Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 67

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE SPG-9
HULL
a. Tripod mounted, recoilless AT Gun

ARMAMENT
a. 73mm Recoilless Rifle Range - 1300M (Self Destruct Element)
b. Fires rocket assisted HE & HEAT shells

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 2.11M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 0.99M
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: 0.88M
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 47.5KG

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 68

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE
AT14
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 152mm Heat warhead Range: Max 5500m
b. Laser guided

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Penetrates armor upto 1.2m
b. Basic system has only day sight
c. Night sight system is being developed and is effective upto 3500m
d. Also known as KORNET

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 1.2M

CREW: 2 WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 27KG

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 69

 WHEELS RPG-29
a. NOT APPLICABLE

HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 105mm Tandum shaped charge warheads Range - 450M

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Can penetrate 1.5m of reinforced concrete
b. Folds into two half's for carrying
c. Ground mounting increases range upto 800m

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 1m

CREW: 2 WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: ?

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 70

 WHEELS
a. Single axle carriage with single wheels MT-12
HULL
a. 2 x Box Trails
b. Wavy top shield slopes back at sides
c. NO recoil mechanism in front of shield
d. 2 recuperator cylinders above breach block
e. 1 large recuperator behind shield on right side

ARMAMENT
a. 100mm 2A29 ANTI-TANK GUN Range Direct -1330m Indirect - 8500m
b. Pepper-Pot muzzle brake

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Normally towed by MTLB
b. Rate of fire - 14 rounds/min (NOT sustainable) Normal - 6 rounds/min
c. MT-12M is capable of firing AT-10 (BASTION)

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 9.64M

CREW: 6 WIDTH: 2.31M
SPEED: NA HEIGHT:
FUEL: NA WEIGHT: 3100Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 71

 WHEELS
a. 2 Wheels - 1 Axle 2A45M
HULL
a. Based on D-30

ARMAMENT
a. 125mm Semi-Automatic Anti-Tank Gun (Range 12.km max. missile propelled 15.4km max)

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Auxilliary propelled towed anti-tank gun
b. Previously known as SPRUT-B
c. Can fire 125mm laser guided projectiles
d. Can fire AT-11 (REFLEKS)
e. Normally towed by URAL-4320/mtlb
f. Replaced the MT-12

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 7.12M

CREW: 7 WIDTH: 2.66M
SPEED: Towing 80km HEIGHT: 2.09M
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: 6500Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 72

 WHEELS
a. Based on a BRDM-2 with No Turret & No vision blocks 9P148
HULL
a. As BRDM-2
b. Hinged, humped missile cover behind pedastal
c. ‘TV’ sight housing top front right of vehicle

ARMAMENT
a. 5 x AT-5 (SPANDREL) ATGM Range - See AT-5
b. Resupply held internally

TURRET
a. Replaced by a rotating launch pedastal

COMMENTS
a. Also known as BRDM-2 AT-5
b. Referred to as BRDM-3
c. When travelling missiles are hinged to the rear and retract into hull.

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 5.7M

CREW: 4 WIDTH: 2.35M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: N/A
FUEL: NA WEIGHT: 7,000Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 73

 WHEELS
a. 6 x evenly spaced pressed roadwheels - NO return rollers 9P149
HULL
a. Based on MTLB chassis

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x AT-6 (SPIRAL) Radio guided AT missile Range - 400-5000M

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Also known as SHTURM-S (AT-6a) + ATAKA (AT-6b)
b. Can carry 12 x Radio Guided Missiles

ROLE: Anti-Tank LENGTH: 6.5m

CREW: 2 WIDTH: 2.85m
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 1.87m
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 12300Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 74

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
AIR DEFENCE

SA-4 GANEF
*SA-10 GRUMBLE S-300 PMU-1
SA-11 GADFLY BUK-M1
*SA-12a GLADIATOR S-300 V1
*SA-12b GIANT S-300 V2
SA-13 GOPHER STRELA-10
*SA-14 GREMLIN
SA-15 GAUNTLET TOR M1
SA-16 GIMLET IGLA
*SA-17 GRIZZLY BUK-M2
*SA-18 GROUSE IGLA-N
2S6 TUNGUSKA

* info not presently included

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 75

 WHEELS
a. 7 evenly spaced roadwheels SA-4
HULL
a. Not Applicable

ARMAMENT
a. 2 x Medium/High RangeSurface-Air Missiles with 170Kg HE Whd
b. Range - 80-100Km Altitude - 100-25000M

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Missile Length = 8.8M
b. Also known as GANEF
c. System includes PAT HAND - Tgt Aq & Fire Ctl Radar
THIN SKIN - Ht Finding Radar
LONG TRACK - Tgt Aq Radar

ROLE: Air Defence LENGTH: 9.46M

CREW: 3-4 WIDTH: 3.2M
SPEED: 50KPH HEIGHT: 4.47M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 25T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 76

 WHEELS
a. 6 x evenly spaced roadwheels - 4 return rollers SA-11
HULL
a. Not Applicable

ARMAMENT
a. 4 x Lower-Medium Range Surface-Air Missiles
b. Range - 30Km Altitude - 15-22,000M

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Missile Length = 8.8M
b. Also known as GADFLY
c. Also known as BUK M-1
d. Associated Radars: SNOW DRIFT (Surv, Tracking, Tgt Aq), FIRE DOME
(Tracking, Engagement)

ROLE: Air Defence LENGTH: 7.8M

CREW: ? WIDTH: 3.34M
SPEED: 65 KPH HEIGHT: 8.785m
FUEL: ? WEIGHT: 29,870KG

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 77

 WHEELS
a. Based on MTLB chassis SA-13
HULL
a. Based on MTLB chassis with no turret
b. Operators window is at base of pedastal

ARMAMENT
a. SA-13 (GOPHER) low altitude SAM system (4 missiles per launcher) (Range : 800-5000m)
b. 2 x 2 Missile Canisters mounted on rotatable pedastal with parabolic radar dish in centre
c. IFF Box mounted above right pair of missiles

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Vehicle is amphibious
b. Altitude - 6-7 Km
c. Can carry 8 reload missiles
d. Also known as STRELA-10

ROLE: Air Defence LENGTH: 6.6M

CREW: 3 WIDTH: 2.9M
SPEED: 55KPH HEIGHT: 2.3-3.8M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 13T

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 78

 WHEELS
a. 6 x spoked roadwheels - 3 return rollers SA-15
HULL
a. Elongated exhaust slit on left rear
b. Prominent half-heart shaped hatch on rear right

ARMAMENT
a. SA-15 (GAUNTLET) SAM system

TURRET
a. Large centrally mounted chamfered turret
b. Target Acquisition radar to rear of turret - folds down in transit
c. Square Target Tracking radar at front of turret

COMMENTS
a. Altitude - 10-6,000m Range - 1.5-12 Km
b. Cold launched (vertically) system
c. Fully Automatic
d. Also known as TOR M-1
e. Associated Radars: SNOW DRIFT (Surv, Tgt Aq), SCRUM HALF
(Tracking, Engagement)
ROLE: Air Defence LENGTH: 7.5M
CREW: 3 WIDTH: 3.3M
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 5.1M
FUEL: NA WEIGHT: ?

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 79

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE SA-16
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x Surface-Air missile with 2Kg HE warhead Range: 500-5000M
Altitude: 3500M

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Also known as - SA-14 GREMLIN
- SA-16 GIMLET & IGLA

ROLE: Air Defence LENGTH: 1.4M

CREW: Man Portable WIDTH: 0.07
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: N/A
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 15KG

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 80

 WHEELS
a. 6 x evenly spaced spoked roadwheels - 3 return rollers 2S6
HULL
a. Elongated exhaust slit on left rear
b. Prominent half-heart shaped hatch on rear right
c. Based on GM325M

ARMAMENT
a. 2 x 4 SA-19 (GRENDLE/GRISON) SAM launchers Range - 7-10Km
b. 2 x TWIN 30mm Cannon (Water-Cooled) Range - 4-5000m

TURRET
a. Circular target tracking radar (HOTSHOT) on front of turret
b. Rectangular, concave target acquisition (DOG EAR) radar mounted on top rear of turret

COMMENTS
a. Rate of fire: 4-5000 rds/min
b. Guns can fire on the move. Missiles can only be fired from stationary position
c. Also known as TUNGUSKA
d. Carries 8 x SA19
e. Replacement for ZSU-23-4
ROLE: Air Defence LENGTH: 7.93m
CREW: 4 WIDTH: 3.236m
SPEED: 65KPH HEIGHT: 4.021m
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 34000Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 81

 GENFORCE
(MOBILE FORCES)
MISC

BRDM-2
BRDM-2RKH
RKHM
TMS-65
MTLB/BLADE
PKM
RPK
AGS-17

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 82

 WHEELS
a. 4 Wheeeled - 2 Axles BRDM-2
b. 4 additional retractable belly wheels

HULL
a. 2 D-shaped hatches forward of turret
b. Hydrojet cover at rear
c. 2 D-shaped foot holds either side close to wheels.

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 14.5mm HMG
b. 1 x 7.62mm coax MG

TURRET
a. Centrally mounted frying pan shape turret

COMMENTS
a. Vehicle is amphibious
b. Previously designated as BTR-40PB
c. BRDM-3 equipped with 1 x 30mm Cannon + 1 x 7.62mm MG

ROLE: Recce LENGTH: 5.7M

CREW: 1+4 WIDTH: 2.35M
SPEED: 80KPH HEIGHT: 2.31M
FUEL: PETROL

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 83

 WHEELS
a. As BRDM BRDM-2RKH
HULL
a. As BRDM
b. Warning flag dispensers at rear (usually 1 either side)

ARMAMENT
a. NO Main Armament
b. 1 x 7.62mm MG

TURRET
a. As BRDM

COMMENTS
a. RKH = Chemical Recce Variant
b. Used for emplacing warning flags around contaminated areas

ROLE: Chem Recce LENGTH: As BRDM-2

CREW: 4 WIDTH: As BRDM-2
SPEED: As BRDM-2 HEIGHT: As BRDM-2
FUEL: As BRDM-2 WEIGHT: As BRDM-2

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 84

 WHEELS
a. Based on 2S1 chassis RKHM
HULL
a. Raised box-like structure
b. Flag dispenser RHS rear deck

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 14.5mm MG (2,000M)
b. 1 x 7.62mm MG (1,500M)

TURRET
a. Small turret RHS mounted on raised crew compartment

COMMENTS

ROLE: Chemical Recce LENGTH:

CREW: 3 WIDTH:
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT:
FUEL: WEIGHT: 13,000Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 85

 WHEELS
a. 6 Wheels - 3 Axles TMS-65
HULL
a. Based on URAL0375E truck chassis
b. Rear Mounted VK-1 Aircraft turbojet engine
c. Centre mounted 3,000L decontamination solution tank

ARMAMENT
a. NO Armament

TURRET
a. Not Applicable

COMMENTS
a. Can decontaminate 1 vehicle in 2-4 mins

ROLE: Chemical Defence LENGTH:

CREW: WIDTH:
SPEED: HEIGHT:
FUEL: WEIGHT:

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 86

 WHEELS
a. 6 x evenly spaced roadwheels MTLB
HULL
a. 2 x firing ports on each side

ARMAMENT
a. 1 x 7.62mm MG (1,000M)

TURRET
a. Small turret on right front

COMMENTS
a. Vehicle is amphibious
b. Multi-purpose vehicle - Prime mover/APC/Command Vehicle
c. Previously designated M1970

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: 6.45M

CREW: 2 + 10 WIDTH: 2.85M
SPEED: 60KPH HEIGHT: 1.87M
FUEL: DIESEL WEIGHT: 11.9Tonnes

PICTURE SHOWN MTLB-BLADE

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 87

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE PKM
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 7.62mm MG Max Range - 3.8-4Km (Effective Range - 1Km)

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Gas operated, belt fed, sustained fire wpn
b. Fired from bipod or fits in vehicle firing ports

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: 1.225m

CREW: N/A WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: Not Applicable WEIGHT: 8.4-10.66Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 88

 WHEELS
RPK
a. NOT APPLICABLE

HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. 5.45mm Max Range - 460m

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Can be fired on single shot or auto

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: 1.06m

CREW: N/A WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: Not Applicable WEIGHT: 4.6kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 89

 WHEELS
a. NOT APPLICABLE AGS-17
HULL
a. NOT APPLICABLE

ARMAMENT
a. Blowback operated 30mm Automatic Grenade Launcher (Range: 1700m Max)

TURRET
a. NOT APPLICABLE

COMMENTS
a. Drum Magazine holds 29 belted grenade rounds
b. Provides Infantry with an area-type suppresive-fire capability
c. Can fire at 100 or 400 rnds/min

ROLE: Infantry Support LENGTH: 840mm

CREW: 1+2 WIDTH: ?
SPEED: N/A HEIGHT: ?
FUEL: N/A WEIGHT: 31Kg

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 D - 90

 PART E

Issue 1.0: Jun 01

 CHAPTER 7

SUITABLE GENFORCE ORBATS

1. These ORBATS are generic in nature and cover the main range of enemy
oppositions that are likely to be encountered on exercise training.

2. The ORBATs are designed to be used in schools of instruction and training

establishments in the Armed Forces and thus individuals can become familiar with standard
groupings and equipments used by GENFORCE or OPFOR forces. They comprise:

a. Combined Arms Army Corps Page E-2

b. 11 Tank Bde Page E-3

c. 21 Tank Bde Page E-4

d. 56 Motor Rifle Bde Page E-5

e. 71 Motor Rifle Bde Page E-6

f. 9 Light Motor Rifle Bde Page E-7

g. 91 Reservist Motor Rifle Bde Page E-8

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-1

 COMBINED ARMS ARMY CORPS
XXXX

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-2

 11 TANK BDE

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-3

 21 TANK BDE

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-4

 56 MOTOR RIFLE BDE

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-5

 71 MOTOR RIFLE BDE

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-6

 9 LIGHT MOTOR RIFLE BDE

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-7

 91 RESERVIST MOTOR RIFLE BDE

Issue 1.0: Jun 01 E-8

To: Intelligence Wing
Defence Intelligence and Security School
Chicksands
Shefford
Bedfordshire
SG17 5PR

SUGGESTED AMENDMENT/CHANGE TO THE LAND COMPONENT

HANDBOOK (ENEMY FORCES)

1. It is proposed that the following be included in AC 71750:

2. The justification for inclusion is as follows (if considered necessary):

Signature:
Rank and Name:
Organisation