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Theory Masterfile

Defense – T
Nebel T
C/I – Affirmative debaters may specify states.
The plan is topical – it’s a subset of the resolution and proves the resolution true.
Overing ’14 Bob Overing, 12-11-2014, "Topicality and Plans in LD: A Reply to Nebel by Bob Overing," Premier Debate America,
https://www.premierdebate.com/articles/topicality-and-plans-in-ld-a-reply-to-nebel-by-bob-overing/

As Nebel has pointed out, it’s hard to come up with many plans that affirm LD topics on his view of
topicality that “whether a plan is topical is whether its being a good idea entails the resolution” (“T in Policy,” para. 10). However, we
have good reasons to reject that view of topicality as too stringent. Nebel finds this definition from
Lichtman, Rohrer, and Corsi (1979) and leans on it heavily: [T1] affirmative teams are required to
formulate proposals whose affirmation logically entails affirmation of the resolution (p. 375) The fact
that Nebel bolds this definition does not grant it authority. It is not , in fact, the “only uniform test” (“T in
Policy,” para. 10). It’s also unclear that Lichtman et al. have a strong intent to define, given that their article is not about topicality
whatsoever. They do not discuss various alternative definitions. Why should we hold their idea of T above any of the
following definitions? [T2] The plan and case ought to justify the conclusion the resolution asks to be drawn (Allen & Burrell, 1985, p.
857) [T3] The plan and case must provide evidence in favor of the resolution [T4] The plan and case must be an example or instance of the
resolution [T5] The plan and case must fall within the bounds of the resolution [T6] All plan provisions must bear a rational relationship to a
topical scheme of action (Unger, 1979 cited in Hingstman, 1985, p. 850) Nebel omits the plethora of alternative views on topicality he is no
doubt aware of. In particular, definitions like T4 and T5 that stress the “bounds” of the topic are common in debate theory (Dolley, 1984;
Hingstman, 1985; Parson, 1987; Bauschard, 2009). On these views, the
plan must only be an example or a subset of the
topic, a smaller burden than defending the resolution as a whole . Without defending any particular
definition of topicality, we can say that Nebel’s T1 is mistaken. It seems to be extremely difficult to meet
with any plan, even on policy topics. For instance, consider the 1993-94 NDT topic, “Resolved: That the Commander-in-Chief
power of the President of the United States should be substantially curtailed.” A specific plan to substantially curtail the Commander-in-Chief
power in a very specific way may not entail the truth of this proposition generally. For instance, it may be that the power to deploy armed
forces should be curtailed, but every other Commander-in-Chief should be augmented! One might bite the bullet on examples such as these,
but that would render many plans consistently deemed topical in NDT and NDT-CEDA debate non-topical, narrowing the potential breadth of
these topics and stifling creativity. Many such plans, especially on resolutions that are not disjunctions, are and should be allowed. Reasons A)
through E) above are additional justifications for this loosening of topicality from T1 to T2-T6 to allow more policy debate on quasi-policy topics.
Additionally, on my view, the
aff could use specific examples while avoiding the induction/generalizability
problem. As Allen and Burrell (1985) explain, on definitions like T1 and T2, the aff can only win on a plan if its
proposal generalizes to the resolution as a whole (p. 857-59). Importantly, this means that even on Nebel’s
view, the aff gets to read a plan. However, this produces bad debates by requiring a generalizability contention in the aff case.
Debaters either a) race to find the most representative example for their side of the topic and debate out the comparative “generalizability” of
these examples, or b) eschew example-finding altogether in favor of a whose-large-metastudy-is-better debate, neither of which seem
particularly productive. Simon (1984) also points out that these debates may be difficult to judge due to a lack of standard for clear example
comparison (p. 50-51). In-depth plan debates seem less repetitive, more informative, and more lenient on the aff. Modifiers in the topic such as
a plural actor or words like “substantial” or “prioritize” as well as stock issues constrain potential plans avoid minute, unpredictable plans.
Goodnight, Balthrop and Parson (1974) defend something similar, recognizing that many plans may not “ontologically encompass the resolution
for all times” but may be overwhelmingly valuable for competitive debate (cited in Dolley, 1984).
Violation: They say I can’t.
Standards:
a. Real world education – policy makers aren’t going to say that every country should
do the aff– specifying makes it more realistic and better for education
b. Reciprocity – the NEG can read a PIC if I don’t specify – they are comparatively
worse bc the aff isn’t reactionary like the neg, so they can’t switch their position like
the neg.
c. Depth > breadth – specifying means more in-depth research about different
scenarios
Yes RVIs: Discourages frivolous theory – They can read as many T-shells as they want;
RVI punishes them for making these blippy arguments, and I spent a greater fraction
of my AR (1/4 of the AR vs 1/7 of the NC) and I should be rewarded.
Drop the argument: Shouldn’t drop me in this round even if they win that there is
minor abuse because it doesn’t skew the NEG to where they can’t possibly win
Top level – the interp is nonunique bc judges vote on spec plans all the time
Cannot Specify State
C/I: affs can specify states
**“states” is existential and pragmatics outweigh
Cohen PhD et al 02 Ariel Cohen [Ph.D., Computational Linguistics, Carnegie Mellon University] Nomi
Erteschik-Shir [PhD, Ben Gurion University of the Negev] “Topic, Focus, and the Interpretation of Bare
Plurals” Natural Language Semantics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 125-165 RE

*for reference the sentence it is referring is “Boys are present.”*

Sentence (46b) contains the predicate present, which is S-level. This predicate introduces a
spatiotemporal variable, which may be a stage topic. In this case the subject may be a topic
as before, but does not have to be . When the subject is a topic, it is interpreted generically; when it
is in focus, it is interpreted existentially (we will return to existential interpretations in section 7 below).
Hence, the sentence is ambiguous and both generic and existential readings are available
(cf. Jäger 1999). In fact, it is hard to get the generic reading, and the existential reading is much
preferred. The reason is that generics cannot express predication of a temporary property
(Cohen 1999). If the property present is perceived to be such a temporary property, with a boy
being present at some times and absent at others, the generic will be unacceptable . If, on the
other hand, being present is perceived to be a property that is expected to hold well into the future, a
generic reading is possible, as in (4)

Specific instances prove generics which also means I meet


Cimpian et al, PhDs, 10 (Andrei, Amanda C. Brandone, Susan A. Gelman, Generic statements require
little evidence for acceptance but have powerful implications, Cogn Sci. 2010 Nov 1; 34(8): 1452–1482)

Generic statements (e.g., “Birds lay eggs”) express generalizations about categories. In this paper, we
hypothesized that there is a paradoxical asymmetry at the core of generic meaning, such that these
sentences have extremely strong implications but require little evidence to be judged true . Four
experiments confirmed the hypothesized asymmetry: Participants interpreted novel generics such
as “Lorches have purple feathers” as referring to nearly all lorches, but they judged the same novel
generics to be true given a wide range of prevalence levels (e.g., even when only 10% or 30% of
lorches had purple feathers). A second hypothesis, also confirmed by the results, was that novel
generic sentences about dangerous or distinctive properties would be more acceptable than generic
sentences that were similar but did not have these connotations. In addition to clarifying important
aspects of generics’ meaning, these findings are applicable to a range of real-world processes such as
stereotyping and political discourse. Keywords: generic language, concepts, truth conditions, prevalence
implications, quantifiers, semantics Go to: 1. Introduction A statement is generic if it expresses a
generalization about the members of a kind, as in “Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” or
“Birds lay eggs” (e.g., Carlson, 1977; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Such generalizations are
commonplace in everyday conversation and child-directed speech (Gelman, Coley, Rosengren, Hartman,
& Pappas, 1998; Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008), and are
likely to foster the growth of children’s conceptual knowledge (Cimpian & Markman, 2009; Gelman,
2004, 2009). Here, however, we explore the semantics of generic sentences—and, in particular, the
relationship between generic meaning and the statistical prevalence of the relevant properties (e.g.,
what proportion of birds lay eggs). Consider, first, generics’ truth conditions: Generic sentences are
often judged true despite weak statistical evidence. Few people would dispute the truth of
“Mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus”, yet only about 1% of mosquitoes are actually
carriers (Cox, 2004). Similarly, only a minority of birds lays eggs (the healthy, mature females), but
“Birds lay eggs” is uncontroversial . This loose, almost negligible relationship between the
prevalence of a property within a category and the acceptance of the corresponding generic sentence
has long puzzled linguists and philosophers, and has led to many attempts to describe the truth
conditions of generic statements (for reviews, see Carlson, 1995; Leslie, 2008). Though generics’ truth
conditions may be unrelated to property prevalence (cf. Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), the same cannot
be said about the implications of generic statements. When provided with a novel generic sentence, one
often has the impression that the property talked about is widespread. For example, if we were
unfamiliar with the West Nile virus and were told (generically) that mosquitoes carry it, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that all, or at least a majority of, mosquitoes are carriers (Gelman, Star, &
Flukes, 2002). It is this paradoxical combination of flexible, almost prevalence-independent truth
conditions, on the one hand, and widespread prevalence implications, on the other, that is the main
focus of this article. We will attempt to demonstrate empirically that the prevalence level that is
sufficient to judge a generic sentence as true is indeed significantly lower than the
prevalence level implied by that very same sentence. If told that, say, “Lorches have purple
feathers,” people might expect almost all lorches to have these feathers (illustrating generics’ high
implied prevalence), but they may still agree that the sentence is true even if the actual prevalence of
purple feathers among lorches turned out to be much lower (illustrating generics’ flexible truth
conditions). Additionally, we propose that this asymmetry is peculiar to generic statements and does not
extend to sentences with quantified noun phrases as subjects. That is, the prevalence implied by a
sentence such as “Most lorches have purple feathers” may be more closely aligned with the prevalence
that would be needed to judge it as true. Before describing our studies, we provide a brief overview of
previous research on the truth conditions and the prevalence implications of generic statements. 1.1.
Generics’ truth conditions Some of the first experimental evidence for the idea that the truth of a
generic statement does not depend on the underlying statistics was provided by Gilson and Abelson
(1965; Abelson & Kanouse, 1966) in their studies of “the psychology of audience reaction” to
“persuasive communication” in the form of generic assertions (Abelson & Kanouse, 1966, p. 171).
Participants were presented with novel items such as the following: Altogether there are three kinds
of tribes—Southern, Northern, Central. Southern tribes have sports magazines. Northern
tribes do not have sports magazines. Central tribes do not have sports magazines. Do tribes have
sports magazines? All items had the same critical feature: only one third of the target category
possessed the relevant property. Despite the low prevalence, participants answered “yes”
approximately 70% of the time to “Do tribes have sports magazines?” and other generic questions
similar to it. Thus, people’s acceptance of the generics did not seem contingent on strong
statistical evidence, leaving the door open for persuasion, and perhaps manipulation, by ill-
intentioned communicators. A similar conclusion about the relationship between statistical prevalence
and generics’ truth conditions emerged from the linguistics literature on this topic (e.g., Carlson, 1977;
Carlson & Pelletier, 1995; Dahl, 1975; Declerck, 1986, 1991; Lawler, 1973). For example, Carlson (1977)
writes that “there are many cases where […] less than half of the individuals under
consideration have some certain property, yet we still can truly predicate that property of the
appropriate bare plural” (p. 67), as is the case with “Birds lay eggs” and “Mosquitoes carry the
West Nile virus” but also with “Lions have manes” (only males do), “Cardinals are red” (only males
are), and others. He points out, moreover, that there are many properties that, although present in a
majority of a kind, nevertheless cannot be predicated truthfully of that kind (e.g., more than 50% of
books are paperbacks but “Books are paperbacks” is false). Thus, acceptance of a generic sentence is
doubly dissociated from the prevalence of the property it refers to—not only can true generics refer to
low-prevalence properties, but high-prevalence properties are also not guaranteed to be true in generic
form.
Offense – Theory
Realistic K alt
Interpretation: K alts must be realistic policy options.
Violation: The K alt can’t be implemented in the real world
Standards:
[1] DA ground: I lose all ground to implementation indicts and DAs because they never
give a tangible implementation method. This ground is key to answering K’s, and
fairness because if I can’t garner offense off of the alt, then I can never win.
[2] Real World: In real world decision making, advocacies actually have to be
implemented. To deny this would destroy fairness because I am forced to implement
my plan but the K doesn’t have to implement the alt. Real world decision making is
key to education
The scope of negative fiat and the logic of decision making.
Strait and Wallace 07 L. Paul Strait (George Mason University) and Brett Wallace (George
Washington University). “The Scope of Negative Fiat and the Logic of Decision Making.” WFU Debater’s
Research Guide. 2007. [http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/2007/The%20Scope%20of
%20Negative%20Fiat%20and%20the%20Logic%20of%20Decision%20Making.pdf]
The ability to make decisions deriving from discussions, argumentation or debate, is the key skill. It is the
one thing every single one of us will do every day besides breathing. Decision making transcends
boundaries between categories of learning like “policy education” and “kritik education,” it makes irrelevant
considerations of whether we will eventually be policymakers and it transcends questions of what
substantive content a debate round should contain . The implication for this analysis is that the critical thinking and
argumentative skills offered by real-world decision-making are comparatively greater than any educational
disadvantage weighed against them. It is the skills we learn, not the content of our arguments, that can
best improve all of our lives. While policy comparison skills are going to be learned through debate in one way or another, those
skills are useless if they are not grounded in the kind of logic actually used to make decisions .
[3] Fiat abuse: Lack of a functional K alt is unfair because it is a form of object fiat in
that instead of indirectly advocating a plan to attempt to solve the problem, the
negative is essentially wishing away the problems.
Fairness is a voter – debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation,
you can’t do it if one side is structurally skewed
Education is a voter: Education is the primary skill set evaluated by debate because
the nature of argumentation is such that superior arguments are evaluated. This
requires intellect and research, which are educational skills at their most basic level
Competing interps—leads to the race to the top to find the best possible norms
DTD to set a norm – if you lose you'll not run abusive ROB from now on
No rvis: chilling effect—debaters would be scared to read theory for fear of losing to a
prepped-out counterinterp, proliferating abuse
Illogical you shouldn’t win for meeting your burden of being fair and educational logic
is meta constrain on all your args because it definitionally determines if you arg is
valid.
Condo Bad