List 0£ Doctri.

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C 375. ·rh

ne person and irrju rv to

190 Chapter 7 ■ Ust of Doctrines
Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded a huge amount as a compensation a~
The State Roadways for the said accident, following which the State Road11
impos~d a penalty o~ reduction of p~y upon the driver. Subsequently
bus driver was convtcte~ under Section 304- A of. Lhe_ Code f~llowing 11~
the:
the penalty upon the driver was enhanced to terrmnanon of his service~
State Roadways by the Department. It was held that there is no qu~
of applicability of principle of double jeopardy under Article 20(2) of the
Constitution in such a case. [State of Haryana v. Balwant Singh, AIR 2003SC
1253: (2003) 3 SCC 362, 364-65, paras 4 to 6, relying on Union of lndiav.P.n
Yadav, (2002) I SCC 405, 425, para 25) (Constitution of India, An. 20(2); lit
(45 of 1860), S. 304A)
Doctrine of eclipse. This doctrine, flowing from the prospective nature of An,
13( l) of the Constitution of India, was evolved by the Supreme Court in Bhikaji\
tare of M.P, AIR 1955 SC 781, meaning thereby that a valid pre-consritutiolll!
law violating a fundamental right becomes inoperative treating it as ha,~ngbc!ii
eclipsed by the relevant fundamental right. If this fundamental is amenck,j
and the shadow is removed, the law will revive and operate. However, the la.
subsists for pre-constitutional rights and liabilities. An existing law inconsis1cm
with a fundamental right though becomes inoperative from the date of tht
commencement of the Constitution is not dead altogether.
Doctrine of election. The same principle is stated in White and Tudor's Leaciini
ases in Equity, Vol. (sic) 18th Edn. at p. 444 as follows: 'Election is the obligatioo
imposed upon a party by Courts of equity to choose between two inconsistent Cl!
alternative rights or claims in cases where there is clear intention of the person
from whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both ... That he who accep
a benefit under a deed or Will must adopt the whole contents of the instrument
(As referred in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan, AIR 2006 SC 577: (2000)
2 sec 641,649, P· 25)
Doctrine of eminent domain. Art. 300-A embodies the 'doctrine of eminent
domain' which comprises two pans, (i) acquisition of property in public imerests
and (ii) payment of reasonable compensation therefor. [State of Bihar v. Project
chcha Vidya Si.kshak Sangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545, 573, p. 65) [Consdnuion of
India, Art. 300-A)
Doctrine of equal pay for equal work. For the purpose of invoking the
'doctrine of equal pay for equal work', the nature of work and responsibility
attached to the post are some of the factors which arc bound to be taken imo
onsideration. [Mahcndra L. Jain v. Indore Development Authority, AIR 200j
.:iC 1252:JT (2004,) IO SC I)
Doctrine of equality. A person not qualified for appointment cannot claim
uch right on the basis of his fundamental rights and by invoking the 'docrrinr
of equality' under Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. (State of Punjab v.1'at1
ingh Shahi, ( 1996) 8 SCC 44·8] The 'doctrine of equality' cannot be invoked~
an employee of a corporation with that of other corporation as each public srnor
undertaking is an independent cnriry and free to have its own service condi1i~lll
as per law. On the basis of this docu-ine, Board of Directors of the CorporaiKm
who themselves forms a different class cannot be equated with other employtti
in regard Lo conditions of service applicable to them. [Suresh Chandra Singh•
Fertilizer Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) I SCC 592, 594, para 7]
Chapter 7 ■ List of Doctri nes 191
c,etrine of estoppel. To invoke the doctrine of estoppel embodied in Section
p 115 three conditions must be satisfied: (1) representtation by a person to
oilier; (2) the other shall have acted upon the said representation; and (3) such
a:;'tion shall have been detrimental to the interests of the person to whom the
:epresentation has be~n made. Wh_ere the first tw". conditions are satisfi~d ~ut
the third is not, there 1s no scope to invoke the doctnne of estoppel. Gyarsi Bai v.
Dhansukh Lal, MLJ: QD (1961-1965) Vol Ill C564: (1965) 2 SCJ 783: AIR 1965
SC 1055 [Evidence Act ( I of 1872), S. 115)
poctrine of fairness or the duty to act f"airly and reasonably. "- ....
Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and reasonably is a doctrine developed
in the administrative law field to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of
justice where the action is administrative in nature. Just as principles of natural
justice ensure fair decision where the function is quasi judicial, the doctrine of
fairness is certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary the express terms of
the contract between the parties. This is so, even if the contract is governed b
statutory provisions, i.e.. where it is a statutory contract-or rather more so. It is
one thing to say that a contract- every contract-must be construed reasonabl
having regard to its language. But this is not what the licensees say. They seek to
create an obligation on the other party to the contract,just because it happens to
be the State. They are not prepared to apply the very same rule in converse case,
i.e, where the State has abundant supplies and wants the licensees to lift all the
stocks. The licensees will undertake no obligation to lift all those stocks even if the
Staie sutlers loss. This one sided obligation in modification of express terms of the
contract, in the name of duty to act fairly, is what we are unable to appreciate ... "
Assistant Excise Commissioner v. Issac Peter, 1994 AIR SCW 2616, 2636, as
referred to in Oil and National Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Streamline shipping Co.
Pvt. Ltd, AIR 2002 Born 420, 422.
Doctrine of feeding the estoppel. The doctrine of feeding the estoppel
envisages that where granter has purported to grant an interest in land which
he did not at the time possess, but subsequently acquires, the benefit of his
ubsequent acquisition, goes automatically to the earlier grantee, or as is usuall
expressed feeds the estoppel. [Hardev Singh v. Gurmail Singh, AIR 2007 SC
1058, !060, para 14]
Doctrine of B.exibility. While interpreting the constitution, the constitutional
Courts arc not only required to take into consideration their own experience over
the time, the international treaties and covenants but also keeping the doctrine of
Rcxibilily in mind. [Union of India v. Naveenjindal, AIR 2004 SC 1559: (2004)
2 sec 51 o, 539, para 40]
Doctrine of harmonious construction. A law should be so interpreted as
to give: effect to all its pans and the presumption should be that no conflict or
rcpugnan<'y was intended between the various provisions of the statute.
Doctrine of issue estoppel. The statement of law made by the Suprern
Court in State of U.l~ v. Nawab Hussain, AIR I 977 SC I 680, is to the following
effect (Paras 3 and '~): Doctrine of issue cstoppcl "The principle of estoppel per
rei_n judicatum is a rule of evidence. It may be said to be "the broader rule of
cviclcnce which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action." This doctrine is
based on two theories; (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for
the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a
192 Cha.l!,ter 7 ■ List of Doctrines

protected from multiplication of Litigation." as cited in P.N. Govindan v. A

Kari Subaida Becvi, AIR 1998 Ker 50, 57.
Doctrine of legitunate expectation. The 'doctrine of legitimate expectaiion•
-----
matter of public policy, and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should~ -- Cha~r 7 ■ List of Doctri nes

oetrine of nierger. _'D~trine o~ merger' is _a c~mmo? law doctrine founded on

P tlie principle of propriety m the hierarchy of JUSOce delivery system. The_ purpose
f the doctrine is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative order
193

~vcrning the same subj~ct- matter at a ~ven !='.°in~ of time. It ~ th_e decree or or~er
is only an aspect of Article 14 of the constitution dealing with the citizens in of the superior Court, ~bunal or authonty which IS the final, binding and operauve
non-arbitrary manner and thus, by itself, does not give rise to an enforceableri~ decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court below.
but in testing the action taken by the Government authority whether arbitraryr_i [Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587: (2000) 245 ITR 360 (Sq]
otherwise, it would be relevant. [State of WB. v. Niranjan Singha, (2001) 2SC(; poctrlne of ~atural j~ti':e. The concept of 'natural ~~stice' cannot be put
326, 329, para 4] A person may have a 'legitimate expectation' of being treate1 into a straitjacket. It IS futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of
in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal rigl natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of
in private law to receive such treatment. This doctrine has an important platt any given case. The only essential point has to be kept in mind in all cases that
in developing law of judicial review. It can provide a sufficient interest to cnablt ihe person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his
one who cannot point to existence of a substantive right to obtain leave of Coun case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially
to apply for judicial review. Doctrine of legitimate expectation is to be confined and reasonably. [Keshav Mill Co. Ltd. V. Union of India, (1973) 1 sec para 8.
mostly to right of a fair hearing before a decision which results in negati\~ng a ce also Kumaon Manda! Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and Ors.
promise or withdrawing an undertaking. It does not give scope to claim a relier (2001) I SCC (LCS) 189, para IJ
traightaway from administrative authorities. (Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Doctrine of necessity. 'Doctrine of necessity'
omrnercial Tax Officer, (2004) 9 SCALE 604] was held to be not applicable where Council of
(Doctrine of) lifting the veil. The doctrine of lifting the veil has been applied Ministers refused to grant sanction for prosecution
in the words of Palmer, in five categories of cases: where companies are in and the Governor on his discretion sanctioned
relationship of holding and subsidiary (or sub-subsidiary) companies; where a for the prosecution of Ministers contrary to the
hare-holder has lost the privilege of limited liability and has become directly advice of the Council of Ministers. [M.P. Special
liable to certain creditors of the company on the ground that, with his knowledge, Police Establishment v. State of M.P., (2004) 8
the company continued to carry on business six months after the number of its sec 788, 806, para 33]
members was reduced below the legal minimum; in certain matters pertaining to Doctrine of noscitur a socii. The principle
the law of taxes, death duty and stamps, particularly where the question of the underlying noscitur a socii is that two or more
'controlling interest' is in issue; in the law relating to exchange control, and in the words which are susceptible of analogous meaning
law relating to trading with the enemy where the test of control is adopted. O~C. when are coupled together are to be understood as
garwala v. Payment of Wages Inspector, (2005) 8 SCC I 04, 121, para 22] [Sec used in their cognate sense, taking, as it were their
also PLAMER'S Company Law, 20th Edn., p. 136, now p. 215, 24th Edn.1987] colour from each other, that is, the more general is to be restricted to a sense
Doctrine of lis pendens. The principle of lis pendens enforced in England both analogous to the less general. (Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Bharat
by Courts of law and equity is embodied in S 52. The section docs not declare Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (2002) 4 SCC 219, 225-26, para 7]
that all the transfers made penderue lite are null and void but what is provided for Doctrine of occupied field. Pre-empted field.
is that such transfers will be subject to the decree or order passed or made in the Doctrine of parens patriae. The expression parens patriae appears in Volume
suit. In other words the transfer will be subservient to the decree or order. (1946) 2 31 page 99 of the Words and Phrases in American Constitution Law by Laurance
MLJ 35: AIR 1947 Mad 18: (1937) 2 MLJ 286: AIR 1937 PC 251 and AIR 19·13 B. Tribe ( 1978) Edition at paragraph 324. It is stated that in its capacity
Cal. 5 77, Relied on. If the decree or order does not create a right in any party proprietor a State may satisfy the requirement of injury to its own interest by an
in respect of any specific property transferred no question or lis pcndcns can assertion of harm to the State as such. It was further stated that the State ma
possibly arise. Where the property covered by the transfer was not alfcctcd b)' the sue for wrongs suffered by it and also for public institutions. In its quasi sovereign
partition decree passed in a suit pending at the time of the transfer and no part of capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the title of the
the property allotted to the plaintifT was from and out of the properties covered b citizens in all the earth and air within its domain. It was emphasised that as parens
the transfer, and no charge for mesne profits was created in the partition decree, patriae on behalf of the citizens where State's capacity as parcns parriae is not
the decree for mesne profits, is nothing more than a simple decree for moue located by the Federal Structure, the protection of the General Health comfort
and is not enforceable against the judgrncntdcbrors personally and ai:,rainst thci and welfare of State inhabitants have been held to give the State itself a sufficient
other properties. It is not specifically enforceable against properties covered by 1h interest. The doctrine was upheld in Charan Lal Sahu v. U.O.1., AIR 1990
transfer, and there is no question or the decree prevailing over the transfer. Ahm 1480, para 63 while upholding the validity of the Bhopal Gas (Disaster Processing
Ali Khan v. Banguluru Veeralla, MlJ QD (1956- 1960) Vol. IV C2582: (1958 or Claims) Act, 1985.
Andh LT 938: (1959) I An WR 72: AlR 1959 AP 2B0. [Transfer or Property /\l Doctrine of pari delicto. The "doctrine of pari delicto" is not designed to
(4 or 1882), s. 52] reward the 'wrong-doer' or to penalize the 'wronged', by denying to the victim
194 Chapter 7 ■ Llst of Doctrines
of explo_ita~on a~ce~s to justice. The. do~trine is attracted ~nly when none or
the parnes 1s a vicum of such exploitation and both parties have volunta . ,
and by their free will joined hands to flout the law for their mutual gain. Mo~
alimuddin v. Misri Lal, AIR 1986 SC 1019.
Doctrine of pith and substance. It means examining the true nature ¾I
character of the law in order to know whether it comes within the purview of the
nion List or the State List e.g. the State law will be invalid even if it incidenta!J)'
touches the Union List unless it goes into that List so far that its substance falli
within that List.
Doctrine of pleasure. Under the Indian Constitution a public servant though
works at the pleasure of the President or the Governor as the case may be, doci
not work, at his mercy.
Doctrine of presumption of innocence. In view of the prevalent criminal
jurisprudential system in the country, the doctrine of 'presumption of innocence'
in favour of the accused makes the justice itself a victim which ultimately weakens
the criminal justice dispensation system. Be that as it may, an onerous duty is cast
upon the criminal Courts in the country to ensure that no innocent person ii
onvicted and deprived of his personal liberties. [Bijoy Singh v. State of Bihar,
AIR 2002 SC 1949)
Doctrine of promissory estoppel. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has
been evolved by equity to avoid injustice. Its object is to interpose equity share of
its form to mitigate the rigour of strict Jaw. Purpose of this doctrine is to avoid or
prevent a detriment to party asserting the estoppel by compelling opposite party
to adhere to assumption upon which the former acted or abstained from acting
(Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (2004) 9 Scale 604]
he 'doctrine of promissory estoppel' is not based on the principle of estoppel.
It is a doctrine evolved by equity in order to prevent injustice. Where a party
by his words or conduct makes a promise to another person in unequivocal and
clear terms intending to create legal relations knowing or intending that it would
be acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding by the other
party to whom the promise is made and it is so acted upon on the party making
it. [Banglore Development Authority and ors. v. R. Hanumaiah and ors., (2005)
12 sec 508, 525, para 28)
Doctrine of proportionality. The doctrine of proportionality originated as far
back as in the 19th century in Russia and was later adopted by Germany, France
and other European Countries. Since 1952, this principle has been applied
vigorously to legislative and administrative action in India. The administrative
action in our country has to be tested on the principle of proportionality, just
as it is done in the case of main legislation. [Teri Oat Estates (P.) Ltd. v. U.T.
hancligarh and ors., (2004) 2 SCC I 30, 145, 146, para 45, 49. See also Om
Kumar v. Union of India, (200 I) 2 SCC 386] The principle of 'proportionality'
means that the question whether while regulating exercise of fundamental
rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made b)·
the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of legislations or
the purpose of administrative order as the case may be. Under this principle the
Court will see that the legislature and administrative authority maintain a proper
balance between the adverse effects which the legislation or the adminisrratiw
order may have on the rights, liberties or interests of persons keeping i11 miud
Chapter 7 ■ List of Doctrines 195
the purpose which they were intended to serve. [Teri Oat Estates (P.) Ltd. v. U.T
Chandigarh and ors., (2004) 2 SCC 130, 145, para 46]
D 0ctrine of proprietary estoppel. "The overwhelming weight of authority
hows that detriment is required. But the authorities also show that it is not a
narrow or technical concept. The detriment need not consist of the expenditure
of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something
substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as
to whether repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the
circumstances." [Gillett v. Holt, (2000) 2 All ER 289, 308: (2000) 3 WLR 815
(CA); See alsoJai Narain Parasrampuria and ors. v. Pushpa Devi Saraf and ors.
(2006) 1 sec 756, 111- 78, p. 38]
Doctrine of prospective overruling. The sum and substance of the doctrine
of prospective overruling is that when the Court finds or lays down the correct
law in the process of which the prevalent understanding of the law undergoes
a change, the Court, on consideration of justice and fair deal, restricts the
operation of the new-found law to the future so that its impact does not fall
on the past transaction. [Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643.
See also Kailash Chand Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 6 SCC 562, 589]
For the first time the Apex Court in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab accepted
the doctrine of 'prospective overruling' and laid down following propositions: (1)
The doctrine of prospective overruling can be invoked only in matters arising
under our Constitution; (2) it can be applied only by the highest Court of th
country i.e. the Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare
law binding on all the Courts in India; (3) the scope of the retrospective operation
of the law declared by the Supreme Court superseding its 'earlier decisions' is
left to its discretion to be moulded in accordance with the justice of the cause or
matter before it. [AIR 1967 SC 1643, 1669. See also San-van Kumar and ors. v.
Madan Lal Aggarwal, (2003) 4 SCC 147, 157, para 15]
Doctrine of public trust. The 'doctrine of public trust' though in existence
from Roman times, is enunciated in its modern form by US Supreme Court in
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People of the State of Illinois, where the Court
held: 'The bed or soil of navigable waters is held by the people of the State in
their character as sovereign in trust for public use for which they are adapted ...
The State holds title to the bed of navigable waters upon a public trust and no
alienation or disposition of such property by the State which does not recognise
and not in execution of this trust, is permissible.' [146 US 387: 36 L Ed 1018
(1892). As relied in Intellectuals Forums, Tirupathi v. State of A.P., (2006) 3
549,574, para 74]
Doctrine of repugnancy. Repugnancy arises when two enactment's, both within
the competence of the two legislatures collide and when the Constitution express!
or by necessary implication provides that the enactment of one legislature has supe-
riority over the other then to the extent of the repugnancy the one supersedes
the other; The test of two legislations containing contradictory provisions is not,
however the only criterion of repugnancy, for if a competent legislature with a
uperior efficacy or expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation an intention to
cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature whether passed before
or al1er would be over borne on the ground of the 'doctrine repugnancy'. (State of
Orissa ,: M.A. Tulloch & Co., AIR 1964 SC 1284: ( 1964) 4 SCR 461, 4 77.
196 Chap_ter 7 ■ List of Doctrines
Doctrine of res gestae. The essence of the doctrine of res gestae in evidence.
that the facts which though are not in issue arc so connected with the fact in issul!
as to form part of the same transaction and thereby become relevant like fact/
- Chapter 7
issue. Babula! Choukhani v. Western India Theatres, Ltd., MLJ: QD (1956-19~
ol. 11 C2490: (S) Al R 195 7 Cal 709: ( 1958) 28 Com Cas 565. [Evidence Ac;
(I of 1872), S. 6)
Doctrine of res ipsa liquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only means that
an accident by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negUgencc for
which the defendant is responsible than by other causes, and in such a case the mcrr
fact of the accident would be prima facie evidence of such negligence. [MPSRT
orpn v. Sudhakar, AIR 1968 l'vlP 4 7 (Cole v. De Trafford, 1918 2 KB 523)]
Doctrine of res judicata. Where substitution application filed by the legal heirs
of the deceased-appellant was rejected as not maintainable on the ground that
eparate applications were not filed for substitution, setting aside abatement of
appeal and condonation of delay and thereafter separate applications were filed,
it was held that the subsequent application for substitution would not be hit b)•
doctrine of 'res judicata.' [Ganeshprasad Badrinarayan Lahoti v. Sanjeevprasad
Jamna Prasad Chourasiya, (2004) 7 SCC 482, 486, para I OJ
Doctrine of restitution. The principle of the 'doctrine of restitution' is that on
the reversal of the decree' the law imposes an obligation on the party to the suit
who received the benefit of the erroneous decree to make restitution to the other
party for what he has lost. This obligation arises automatically on the restitution
n the reversal or modification of the decree and necessarily carries with i1 1h
right to restitution of all that has been done under the erroneous decree, and the
Court is bound in making the restitution to the same position they were in of
the Lime of passing an erroneous decree. [Padanathil Rugrnini Arnrna v. P.K.
bdulla, (1996) 7 SCC 668, 673, p. 12), relying on Binayak Swain v. Ramesh
handra Panigraahi, AlR 1966 SC 948]
· e of separation of powers. The doctrine advocating the three
compartments of governmenl namely the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary to be coordinate (equally important) and independent in their respective
functions. The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of
separation of powers in its absolute rigidity, but the functions of the different
parts of branches of the Government (Legislature, Executive andjudiciary) have
been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that
Indian Constitution docs not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of
the state of functions that essentially belong to another. The executive indeed can
exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate legislation when such powers
arc delegated to it by the legislature. Ramjawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR
1955 SC 549, 556.
Doctrine of severability. It means that, if a law is violative of fundamental
rights of the Constitution, il will be inoperative only to the extent of inconsistcuo
The law minus the inoperative portion will stand, If the inoperative part is not
severable, the whole law will be inoperative. It is the intention of the legislawrr
which is decisive in determining whether the operative portion of llw statute~
everable from the inoperative portion or not. The doctrine of sevcrnbility b
applicable only if it is possible 10 separate the legal from the uncm1sti1111io11<1i
portion of the provision. If it is not possible to do so, the entire provision has to II<'
I 15: AIR 200..J. SC 1340)
■ List of Doctrines
iruck down as unconstitutional. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Banajirao Shinde,
AIR 1968 SC I 053, I 056. A rule of interpretation; it means that where some
particular provision of statue offends against a constitutional limita?on, but_ ~at
197
provision is severable from the rest of the statue, only that offending prOV1S1on
will be declared void by the Court and not the entire statute. The main tests to
determine severability are (i) whether the part pronounced valid can stand alone
and be enforceable; (ii) whether the effect is to substitute for the law intended
by the Legislature one they may never have been willing. (Constitutional and
Parliamentary Term)
Doctrine of stare decisis. Under the 'stare decisis' rule, a principle of law
which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the
Courts and should be followed in similar cases. This rule is based on expediency
and public policy, and although generally it should be strictly adhered to by the
Courts, it is not universally applicable. [Corpus Juris Secundum, as referred in
Maktul v. Manbhari, AIR 1958 SC 918. See also Saurashtra Cement & Chemical
Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (2001) I SCC 91, 116, para 32)
Doctrine of strict Ii.ability. There are seven exceptions formulated by case-laws
to the doctrine of strict liability. One of such exceptions is 'act of stranger' i.e.
if the escape was caused by the unforseeable act of a stranger, the rule of strict
liability docs not apply. (\"'1NFIELD on Tort, 15th Edn., page 535 as referred in
M.P.E.B v. Shail Kurnari, (2002) 2 SCC 162, 165, para IO)
Doctrine of subrogation. Doctrine of 'subrogation' confers upon the insurer
the right to receive the benefit of such rights and remedies as the assured has
against third parties in regard to the loss to the extent that the insurer has
indemnified the loss and made it good. [Oberai Forwarding Agency v. New India
surance Co. Lrd., AIR 2000 SC 855: (2000) 2 SCC 407, para 17]
Doctrine of suppression of mischief rule. 'Parliament intends that an
enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is therefore presumed
that Parliament intends that the Court, when considering, in relation to the
facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment
corresponds to its legal meaning, should find a construction which applies the
remedy provided by it in such a way as to suppress that mischief The doctrin
originates in Heydon's case. [( 1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] where Barons of
the Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general four things are to be discerned and considered: I. What was the common
law before the making of the Act; 2. What was the mischief and defect for which
the common law did not provide; 3. ½1hat remedy Parliament has resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the common wealth; and 4. the reason of the
remedy, and I hen the office of all the judges is always to make such construction a
hall: [txt](a) suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and [txt)(b) suppre
ubtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro privato
rnmmodo (for private benefit); and [txt](c) add force and life to the cure and
remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro publico (for the
public good). [HALSBURY'S Laws of England, Vol. 44{1), 4th Edn. as referred
in National Insurance Co. Ltd. ,~ Baljit Kaur and ors., (2004) 2 SCC I, 6, par
Doctrine of ultra vi.-es. The order may be a nullity or void but these terms have
no absolute sense: their meaning is relative. If this principle of illegal relativity
198 Chapter 7 • Li st o f D o ct rin e s

Iavv can b

Doct:ri.n.e