This question is based on confession.

Confession is defined under section 3 (1) (a) of Tanzania Evidence Act Cap. 6 R.E 2002
to mean a word or conduct or a combination of both words and conduct, from which,
whether taken alone or in conjunction with other facts proved, an inference may
reasonably be drawn that the person who said the words or did the act or acts constituting
the conduct has committed an offence.

An admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting
the inference that he committed that crime or is the statement which either admits in
terms of the offence or at any rate substantially all the facts which constitute the
offence………….

In the case of R v. Bampamiyki1 a statement should be regarded as confession only

when it contains ingredients of the crime with which the accused person is charged, so
that the accused person could be properly convicted or on his own plea.

Also in the case of Queen Empress V. Babu Lal 2 a confession as defined as admission
made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference
that he committed that crime.

Confession is covered under Chapter II, Part III of the Tanzania Evidence Act Cap.6 R.E
2002 particularly sections 27- 33.

With regard to the question posed in this scenario section 27 which is about admissibility
of confessions to police officers, section 29 which provides for confession caused by
inducement or threat, or promise when irrelevant in criminal proceeding, section 30
which provides to confession made after removal of impression caused by inducement,
threat or promise, section 31 which provides for relevancy of information received from
accused in police custody, and section 33 which provides for confession which may be
taken into consideration against co accused are the ones which will be the core of the
discussion when attempting the question given.

Any statement made to a police officer will be admissible provided the prosecution
proves that it was voluntarily made. This is proved under section 27 of the Tanzania
Evidence Act Cap. 6 R.E. 2002. A confession shall be held to have been voluntarily made
if it was not induced by threat, promise or other prejudice held out by the police officer to
whom it was made, or any member of the police force, or any other person in authority as
proved under section 29 of the Tanzania Evidence Act Cap. 6 R.E. 2002.

(a) - The statement made by Kilonzo is admissible because it relates to spiritual

exholtation which can not vitiate a confession and it was made voluntary. In the
case of R v. Wilde the accused charged with murder being few days short of

1
(1957) EA 473
2
[1884] 6 All 509, 539 FB
 fourteen days was told by a man who was present when he was taken up but not
a constable and was told “now kneel down I am going to ask you a very serious
question and I hope you will tell me the truth in the presence of Almighty” after
which the accused made a confession. The confession was held not to have been
made under a threat because it was made under spiritual exholtation.

-The statement made by Mapera is admissible subject to section 32 of the

Tanzania Evidence Act Cap.6 R.E 2002 which provides that “ if a confession
refers to section 29 is otherwise relevant, it does not become irrelevant merely
because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a
deception practiced on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or
when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he
need to have answered whatever may have been the form of those questions, or
because he was not warned that he was not bound such confession, and that
evidence of it might be given against him” . This section provides an exception
to the rule of practice that a caution has to be administered before a police
officer question the accused. As it can be seen in the scenario the fact that
Tambo did not gave Mapera any caution about the consequences of his
confession was not a bar for that confession to be admissible.

-The statement made by Simsim in relation to his respective case is not

admissible, this is because on obtaining of that particular confession from
Simsim, Tambo threaten to kill him by pointing his gun at Simsim this act
constituted threat that made Simsim to confess. Thus since this act is clearly
against section 29 of the Tanzania Evidence Act Cap.6 R.E 2002 which provide
that “ no confession which is tendered in evidence shall be rejected on the
ground that a promise or a threat as been held out to the person confessing
unless the court is of the opinion that the inducement was made in such
circumstances and was of such a nature as was likely to cause an untrue
admission of guilty to be made”. The section also displays important ingredients
to be checked so as to discover if the confession was made under threat. We are
told the test of this is whether the accused displaced in such a situation or
position that he would rather give untrue rather than true statement. The cases of
Njuguna S/o Kimani v. R 3 and Commissioner of Customs and Excise v. Harz 4
can be refered.
In the case of Njuguna S/o Kimani v. R, EACA stated that “where an accused
is promised pardon or an inducement for a confession of guilt, the effect of the
inducement is to make the freedom which will accompany the false confession
more attractive at the moment than to remain restrained if he were to speak the
truth”. And in the case of Commissioner of customs and Excise v. Harz , the
company officials made incriminating statements during the interrogation in the
course investigating the failure by the company to pay taxes made by customs
officers lasting for 3 hours. Under the statute which empowered the

3
(1954) 21EACA 3111
4
(1967) 1 ALL ER 177
 interrogation it was provided inter alia that failure to answer questions asked
could lead to prosecution. The Company officials maintained in the court that
they only answered the questions because of this provision. Harz was
subsequently charged with consipiracy to cheat and defraud customs, and
evidence of the admissions made at the interrogation was tendered. It was held
that the admission was inadmissible because it was made under the threat of
prosecution.

(b)