Methods 42 (2007) 68–76

www.elsevier.com/locate/ymeth

Creativity meets neuroscience: Experimental tasks for the

neuroscientiWc study of creative thinking
Andreas Fink ¤, Mathias Benedek, Roland H. Grabner, Beate Staudt, Aljoscha C. Neubauer
Institute of Psychology, University of Graz, Universitaetsplatz 2/III, A-8010 Graz, Austria

Accepted 2 December 2006

Abstract

The psychometric assessment of diVerent facets of creative abilities as well as the availability of experimental tasks for the neuroscien-
tiWc study of creative thinking has replaced the view of creativity as an unsearchable trait. In this article we provide a brief overview of
contemporary methodologies used for the operationalization of creative thinking in a neuroscientiWc context. Empirical studies are
reported which measured brain activity (by means of EEG, fMRI, NIRS or PET) during the performance of diVerent experimental tasks.
These tasks, along with creative idea generation tasks used in our laboratory, constitute useful tools in uncovering possible brain corre-
lates of creative thinking. Nevertheless, much more work is needed in order to establish reliable and valid measures of creative thinking, in
particular measures of novelty or originality of creative insights.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Human cognition; Creativity; Creative thinking; Divergent thinking; Neuroscience

1. Introduction such as ideational Xuency (i.e., number of ideas), the degree

Creativity is deWnitely a complex Weld of research. On
the one hand, it pervades almost all areas of our everyday
life: It is important in the pedagogical, cultural, and in the
scientiWc domain. Likewise, creativity is advantageous in
economy and in the job. On the other hand, no conclusive
deWnition of this mental ability construct has been achieved
yet. Most researchers agree that creativity is the ability to
produce work that is novel (original, unique), useful and
generative [1]. Accordingly, creativity is regarded as a per-
formance or ability trait, preferably manifested in original,
valuable, and socially accepted ideas, products, or works of
art. This view is also reXected in the presumption that the
creativity level of an individual can be assessed by means of
performance measures derived from creative thinking tasks
or psychometric tests. But what kind of measures are these?
As originally suggested by Guilford, creative talent or
creative ability can be assessed by a number of variables
*
Corresponding author. Fax: +43 316 380 9811.
E-mail address: andreas.Wnk@uni-graz.at (A. Fink).
of novelty (or uniqueness/originality) of ideas, or the Xexibil-
ity of the mind (i.e., the ability to produce diVerent types of
ideas, as opposed to rigidity) [2]. InXuenced by Guilford’s
suggestions many creativity measures have been developed,
among the most inXuential are the Torrance Tests of Crea-
tive Thinking (TTCT; [3]), Mednick’s Remote Associates
Test [4], or Guilford’s divergent production tests [5].
The availability of creativity measures as well as the
availability of experimental tasks for the study of creative
thinking has also motivated other scientiWc disciplines to
enter into this complex mental ability domain. Recent
research eVorts in the Weld of cognitive sciences and partic-
ularly in the Weld of neurosciences have expanded our
knowledge about creativity to a considerable extent. DiVer-
ent frameworks and theories about possible mechanisms
underlying creative thinking have been proposed [6,7]. Basi-
cally, theoretical and empirical advances in these disciplines
have—along with psychometric approaches—displaced the
viewpoint of creativity as an unsearchable phenomenon.
This is nicely illustrated in Ward et al.’s concept of creative
cognition which is considered as an extension of recent

1046-2023/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ymeth.2006.12.001
 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76
work in cognitive psychology or cognitive science to the
domain of creative thinking [8]. Concepts, theories, and
methods that have already been employed in many noncre-
ative research Welds of cognitive psychology are adapted for
the study of creative thought. Among the most prominent
examples of the creative cognition approach are, as out-
lined in Ward et al., the study of insightful problem solving,
creative imagery, extending concepts (or conceptual expan-
sion, respectively), or the study whether creative products
are the result of recently activated knowledge (e.g., previ-
ously seen examples). Likewise, Weisberg’s knowledge the-
ory of creativity has also contributed to a better
understanding of this complex mental ability domain [9].
He emphasizes the role of domain-speciWc knowledge as an
important prerequisite for creative functioning. Along the
same lines, other researchers pay attention to intellectual
ability as a key variable in creative thinking [10].
The viewpoint of creativity as performance or ability
oriented trait has been further underpinned by Dietrich
who provides a comprehensive review of contemporary
research in the Weld of cognitive science and neuroscience
[6]. Dietrich argues that creativity requires a variety of clas-
sic (frontal lobe demanding) cognitive abilities such as
working memory, sustained attention, or cognitive Xexibil-
ity. Creative thinking involves, among others, the ability to
break conventional rules of thinking or to develop new
strategies. Moreover, producing novel ideas by combining
already stored knowledge elements [6] presumably also
involves working memory, which is conceptualized as the
ability to temporarily maintain information in mind upon
which concurrent information processing takes place.
Recent advances in the development of brain imaging
techniques like the quantiWcation of task- or event-related
(de)synchronization of brain activity in the electroencepha-
logram (EEG), the measurement of regional cerebral blood
Xow (rCBF) via positron emission tomography (PET), or
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques
allow us to look at the brain when engaged in creative
thinking [see also 11]. However, presumably due to diYcul-
ties in operationalizing creative performance during EEG,
PET, or fMRI measurements, neuroscientiWc studies that
aim at identifying possible brain mechanisms related to cre-
ative thinking are comparatively rare at the present time. In
the following we provide a brief overview of existing meth-
odologies used for the operationalization of creative think-
ing in a neuroscientiWc context.
1.1. Operationalization of creativity in neuroscientiWc
research
Table 1 summarizes empirical studies which measured
brain activity during the performance of diVerent experi-
mental tasks. The employed tasks cover diVerent aspects of
creative thinking ranging from creative story generation,
over mental imagery, to mental composition of music. Pet-
sche, for instance, used verbal, visual, and musical tasks
[12]. Bhattacharya and Petsche asked their participants to
69
mentally compose a drawing [13]. In other studies partici-
pants were requested to solve match problems [14] or to
generate a story with given stimulus words [15,16]. Most of
the tasks presented in this table were adapted from, or at
least inXuenced by Torrance’, Mednick’s or Guilford’s tests
of creative thinking [3–5]. For example, Jung-Beeman et al.
[17; see also 18] studied neural activity during the perfor-
mance of compound remote associate problems which were
adapted from Mednick’s Remote Associates Test [4]. In this
task, Jung-Beeman et al. present three stimulus words (e.g.,
pine, crab, sauce) and instruct their participants to produce
a single solution word (apple) that represents a compound
with each of the three stimulus words (pineapple, crab apple,
applesauce). Carlsson et al., Folley and Park, and Mölle
et al. employed modiWed versions of the well-known
unusual uses task (see TTCT), which requires participants
to name as many alternative or unusual uses of a common
object as possible [19–21].
An issue directly related to the experimental tasks
reviewed here is the experimental design that should allow
conclusions on the neuronal bases of creative thinking.
Near infrared spectroscopy (NIRS), fMRI, and PET mea-
sure brain activity indirectly by hemodynamic (in PET also
metabolic) parameters. The observed changes in brain
activity (e.g., from a baseline condition to an activation
interval) occur rather slowly (e.g., the BOLD signal in
fMRI reaches its maximum at 4–6 s and needs about 15 s to
decline) which considerably limits the investigation of the
time-course of creative cognition. With respect to fMRI,
perhaps the most important question is how to design
diVerent task conditions that can be used to isolate the
brain areas involved in creative cognition by means of the
subtraction method [22,23]. The mere comparison of a crea-
tive thinking task with a resting period seems to be unsatis-
factory as it is not known which cognitive processes take
place in the resting condition. Binder et al., for instance,
found that language regions are active during a resting
period which was attributed to “mental soliloquizing” of
the participants [24]. A more appropriate approach is the
comparison of tasks or conditions requiring creative think-
ing to a diVerent extent. In this vein, Jung-Beeman et al.
contrasted brain activity during problem solving with vs.
without insight as indicated by the participants [17]. How-
ard-Jones et al., in contrast, varied the extent of creative
engagement via the instruction to generate either creative
or uncreative stories [15].
While fMRI enables insights into the neuroanatomical
bases of creative cognition with high spatial accuracy, the
primary advantage of EEG lies in its high temporal resolu-
tion (in the range of milliseconds) and the availability of
diVerent parameters. All EEG studies presented in Table 1
analyzed oscillatory EEG activity which is associated with
functional network formation and dynamic interactions
within and between brain structures during cognitive infor-
mation processing [25–27]. In light of the complexity of cre-
ative thinking, presumably requiring a highly coordinated
interplay of diVerent neural networks, the analysis of
70 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76

Table 1
Overview of studies employing neuroscientiWc methods to the study of creative thinking
NeuroscientiWc Task Description/example Scoring
measurement method
[13] EEG Creative imagery Mentally compose a drawing on one’s
own choice
[30–32,37,56] EEG Creative idea generation tasks Insight task, utopian situations, Ideational Xuency, originality
alternative uses, word ends of ideas
[28,34] EEG Closed vs. open problems Open problem task: Plan a day’s activities Solving eYciency (time,
by considering certain task constraints correctness of each solution
(e.g., time needed to accomplish all tasks) etc.)
[16,35] EEG Creative story generation, Fantasy speech task: “A man meets a External ratings of creative
drawing woman and asks her out on a date. Make quality [35]
up a story about who the people are, how
they met and what will happen. Use your
imagination.”
[33] EEG Remote Associates Test; Name a fourth word that is related to a
Alternate Uses Test given stimulus triplet; Alternate uses for a
brick, a shoe and a newspaper
[21] EEG Convergent vs. divergent Consequences: “Imagine you are able to Productivity (number of
thinking Xy”; Alternate uses, similarities and diVerent responses)
meanings in pictures
[12] EEG Verbal, visual and musical Creative story generation; Mentally
tasks create a picture; Mentally compose a
short piece of music
[36,57] EEG Convergent vs. divergent “There were hundreds of poisonous snakes Productivity (Xuency)
thinking (hypothesis in the zoo. How will it be possible to
generation) measure the lengths of each snake?”
[17] EEG, fMRI Remote associates problems Form a compound word/phrase to, e.g., Subjective ratings (experience
pine, crab, sauce of AHA!)
[14] fMRI Match problems An arrangement of matches must be Reaction time and accuracy
reorganized to make other patterns by
removing matches
[15] fMRI Creative story generation Generate a story using three presented External ratings: creative
words quality
[20] NIRS Divergent thinking tasks Generate uses for real objects Number of singular and
combinatory uses (i.e., use for
at least two objects within the
stimulus set), response time
[19] rCBF via 133xenon Verbal Xuency task; uses of Verbal Xuency task: Generate as many Fluency, number of
inhalation method bricks words as possible beginning with a categories
speciWed letter; Brick uses: Name as many
diVerent uses of bricks
[58] rCBF via PET Verbal creativity tasks Creative story generation using words
from diVerent semantic areas

oscillatory activity seems to be the choice method in EEG
research on creative cognition. In this context, at least two
types of EEG parameters with diVerential functional sig-
niWcance have to be distinguished: (a) analyses of (task-
related changes in) the amplitude of EEG background
activity in diVerent frequency bands [17,28] and (b) analyses
of functional couplings (in amplitude and/or phase)
between diVerent electrode sites [12,13]. In studies from our
research group, we primarily focused on task-related EEG
power changes in the alpha frequency band as this measure
has proved to be a useful and appropriate technique to
measure the level and also the topographical distribution of
cortical activity during cognitive task performance [29].
The studies presented in Table 1 are organized by the
neuroscientiWc measurement method. As can be seen in this
table, most of these studies measured brain activity by
means of EEG, some of them used PET or fMRI, and in
one study NIRS was employed. In this context it is impor-
tant to note that the applied measurement method places
several limitations on the experimental tasks and designs
that can be realized. Most of the creative thinking tasks
reported in literature are paper-and-pencil tasks and
require the participant to write down or even to draw ideas
to a given stimulus. This response mode is very diYcult to
realize in neurophysiological settings, as (a) time segments
of writing or drawing may cause artifacts (e.g., muscle arti-
facts in EEG or activation artifacts due to a task-related
motor activity in fMRI) and consequently reduce the num-
ber of reliable (artifact-free) time segments that can be ana-
lyzed, and (b) the test environment does not, or only to a
certain extent, allow free-hand writing or drawing (e.g., with
the participants lying supine inside the fMRI scanner). This
important restriction may also be a reason why most of the
studies employed verbal tasks. However, one way to
 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76
circumvent this limitation is to isolate the time interval of
creative thinking from the response interval. Bhattacharya
and Petsche, for example, asked the participants to men-
tally compose a drawing while looking at a white wall [13].
After EEG recording, they had to sketch the visualized pic-
ture on paper. A similar procedure was administered in the
fMRI study by Howard-Jones et al. who required partici-
pants to (silently) generate creative vs. uncreative stories
from sets of three words visually presented inside the scan-
ner [15]. Immediately after leaving the scanner the partici-
pants had to identify the word sets from a list and to recall
their stories from a selection of word sets. In verbal creative
thinking tasks, an alternative approach is to require oral
responses which can be recorded by the experimenter. This
procedure which has been repeatedly employed in the EEG
studies from our research group shall be introduced later in
this article [30–32].
DiVerent methodologies and experimental designs have
been realized in the reviewed literature depending on the
respective research question. Brain activation patterns were
compared between (a) low vs. high creative individuals
[19,33], (b) between tasks involving low vs. high creativity
[21], and (c) between low vs. high original ideas within one
task [17,30]. Particularly in the latter approach measures of
the creative quality of the produced ideas are needed. This
point is not satisfactorily addressed in the literature inas-
much as most researchers merely focus on quantitative
measures such as ideational Xuency (i.e., number of ideas).
Some studies focused on parameters of “solving eYciency”
such as reaction time and accuracy measures [14,34]. Quali-
tative measures such as measures of novelty, uniqueness, or
originality are almost completely lacking (cf. right column
in Table 1). Only few studies used qualitative measures of
creative task performance. Howard-Jones et al., for
instance, applied an external rating procedure in order to
obtain a measure of creative quality of the generated stories
[15; see also 35]. In the study by Jung-Beeman et al. self-rat-
ings of the given responses were obtained [17]. In the
remaining studies summarized in Table 1 no qualitative
measures of creative task performance are reported.
What do the studies summarized in Table 1 tell us about
possible brain correlates of creative thinking? How can
these studies contribute to a better understanding of this
complex mental ability domain? On the whole, they appear
to indicate that diVerent modes of thinking are accompa-
nied by diVerent activity patterns of the brain. For example,
when participants’ task is to name as many unusual uses of
a common, everyday object or to think of as many conse-
quences as possible of a given hypothetical situation, they
display a diVerent pattern of electrophysiological brain
activity than during the performance of intelligence related
tasks (e.g., mental arithmetic, or continuation of a row of
letters; cf. [21]). Mölle et al. reported higher EEG complex-
ity during the performance of more “free-associative” types
of tasks which could be the result of a larger number of
independently oscillating neural assemblies during this type
of thinking [21]. Similarly, Jausovec and Jausovec as well as
71
Razoumnikova reported Wndings which also indicate that
these diVerent modes of thinking are accompanied by
diVerent activity patterns in the EEG [34,36]. Hence, brain
activation patterns during free-associative thinking appear
to stand in contrast to activation patterns that are usually
observed during the performance of conventional cognitive
tasks, e.g., intelligence test tasks. The studies summarized in
Table 1 also suggest that during creative thinking, the brain
activation patterns of highly creative individuals are signiW-
cantly diVerent from those observed in lower creative indi-
viduals [13,33]. Finally, neuroscientiWc studies also reveal
that brain states that come along with highly original ideas
diVer from those observed during the production of less
original, conventional ideas [17,30,32].
2. Combining novel tasks of creative thinking with EEG
Our on-going research deals with the exploration of
diVerent aspects of creative thinking. In pursuing a neuro-
scientiWc approach, we measured brain activity (by means
of EEG) while participants were engaged in the perfor-
mance of creative idea generation tasks [30–32,37]. In the
following we provide a detailed description of our method-
ologies with special focus on combining novel tasks of crea-
tive thinking with EEG. In this context it is important to
note that the choice and modiWcation of tasks was guided
by the goal to realize them appropriately within an EEG
recording session. Some limiting factors that have an eVect
on the realization of experimental tasks in neuroscientiWc
studies have already been outlined in previous sections of
this article and we will refer to these when we discuss the
rationale of our task procedures in more detail.
Perhaps the most important restriction in the choice and
modiWcation of experimental tasks was that the task con-
straints should be low to enable the participant to produce
a broad range of ideas (i.e., many, diVerent, and original
ideas). This was not only done to achieve a large number of
trials (i.e., allowing reliable EEG measurements) but also
motivated by our research aim to contrast brain states that
come along with qualitatively diVerent responses or ideas
(e.g., more vs. less original). In order to select the most suit-
able tasks out of literature, several pilot studies were run
prior to the EEG sessions in which several creative thinking
tasks adapted from the Torrance Tests of Creative Think-
ing [3] and from well-established German creativity tests,
viz., the “Verbaler Kreativitäts-Test” [39] and the “Berliner
Intelligenzstruktur-Test” [40] were analyzed [38].
2.1. Description of experimental tasks
In Fig. 1 an overview of the selected tasks is given. Four
tasks with two diVerent items each were used. In the insight
task (IS) participants are confronted with unusual, hypo-
thetical situations that are in need of explanation. They are
required to think of as many and diVerent causes or circum-
stances as possible. Similarly, in the utopian situation task
(US) participants are instructed to put themselves in the
72 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76

Fig. 1. Overview of creative idea generation tasks and schematic time-course of experimental procedure. Brain activity during creative idea generation was
quantiWed by means of task- or event-related power changes in the EEG alpha band. A 10 s time interval during the presentation of the Wxation cross (pre-
stimulus reference interval R) as well as a 1 s time interval 250 ms before pressing the IDEA-button (activation interval A) were used for EEG analyses.
For quantifying task-related power changes (TRP) in the alpha band [59] the (log-transformed) power during the reference interval was subtracted from
the (log-transformed) power during the activation interval for each electrode i according to the formula: TRPi D log [Powi activation] ¡ log [Powi refer-
ence]. Decreases in alpha band power from the reference to the activation interval are reXected in negative TRP values, whereas task-related increases are
expressed in positive values [59]. As indicated in the lower part of this Wgure, somewhat higher TRP values (i.e., increases in alpha activity from the pre-
stimulus reference to the activation interval; as symbolized by blue colors in the brain maps) were found in the AU, IS and US tasks as compared to the
WE task, most prominent in posterior regions of the cortex (cortical areas: AF, anteriofrontal; F, frontal; FC, frontocentral; CT, centrotemporal; CP,
centroparietal; PT, parietotemporal; PO, parietooccipital). (For interpretation of the references to color in this Wgure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this paper.)
 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76
given utopian situations that will actually never happen
and to produce as many and original ideas as possible. In
the alternative uses test (AU) participants’ task is to name
as many and unusual/original uses of a conventional, every-
day object. And Wnally, in the word ends task (WE), Ger-
man suYxes are presented that have to be completed
originally by the participants.
Prior to the presentation of the experimental tasks, par-
ticipants were familiarized with the response mode by pre-
senting them a simple association task. To this end, they
were instructed to produce associations to the concept
“holiday” and to press an IDEA-button whenever an asso-
ciation or idea related to this stimulus word came into their
mind. Immediately after pressing the IDEA-button a mes-
sage appeared on screen asking the participants to vocalize
the idea (which was recorded by the experimenter) and
Wnally to conWrm it by pressing this button again where-
upon the stimulus reappeared on screen. Subsequently, the
experimental session started. All tasks began with the pre-
sentation of a warming up trial (e.g., IS: “Person A wears
only designer clothes”; or US: “What would happen, if sud-
denly an ice-age would break in”). Possible solutions/ideas to
the warming up items were given in order to clarify the
range of thinkable responses (IS: “is rich”, “attaches impor-
tance to good quality”, “is sponsored by the designer”; US:
“stronger hairiness in animals and men”, “increasing heating
costs”, “insolvency of open air baths”). The item presenta-
tion time (or the response interval, respectively) was 3 min
for each test item (see Fig. 1). The choice of item presenta-
tion time (or the response interval, respectively) was guided
by the following considerations: Relevant literature sug-
gests that the idea rate usually decreases over time, espe-
cially within the Wrst 6 min [41]. On the other hand, there is
a general increase in idea originality over time [42–44], with
more common ideas being more likely produced at the
beginning of the task, followed by more remote ones. A
task presentation time (or a response interval, respectively)
of 3 min has proven to be long enough to cover more than
initial common ideas and short enough to keep mean idea
rate up to about four ideas per minute.
2.2. Scoring of task performance
In addition to the assessment of ideational Xuency (i.e.,
counting the number of given responses) we also measured
the originality of ideas. This was realized twofold: First, in
order to obtain a subjective measure of originality, we
prompted our participants to judge the originality of their
own ideas given during the performance of the experimen-
tal tasks. To this end, the given responses were presented to
the participants subsequent to the EEG recording session
and participants were required to rate each single idea on a
Wve-point rating scale ranging from 1 (highly original) to 5
(not original at al ). Second, the originality of ideas was also
assessed by means of an external rating procedure similar
to the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT) proposed
by Amabile [45]; see also [46,47]. The CAT technique is
73
based on a consensual deWnition of creativity. Accordingly,
“ƒcreativity can be regarded as the quality of products or
responses judged to be creative by appropriate observers
ƒ” [45], p. 1001. In our studies, the ideas of each partici-
pant were rated by three female and three male raters
(advanced diploma psychology students) with regard to
their uniqueness or originality. SpeciWcally, the raters were
instructed to evaluate the ideas separately for each task (i.e.,
separately for the IS, US, AU, and WE task, respectively)
and each participant. They were prompted to read all
responses a participant gave in one task to gain a Wrst over-
all impression of its originality range and—based on this—
to rate the originality of the given responses on a Wve-point
rating scale ranging from 1 (highly original) to 5 (not origi-
nal at all). The raters were asked to utilize the complete
scale range as far as possible. In order to obtain a measure
of internal consistency of the ratings we computed Cron-
bach alpha coeYcients, separately for each of the four
experimental tasks (in considering the six available ratings
as “items”). We found satisfactory internal consistency
between the ratings (Cronbach alphas of .93, .92, .91 and .87
for the IS, US, AU, and WE task, respectively). Subse-
quently, the ratings were averaged over all six raters (for
each of the four tasks separately) so that one originality
measure was available for each task and participant.
2.3. Rationale of task procedure
As already mentioned above, the choice as well as some
modiWcations of the tasks (e.g., task timing, IDEA button
procedure) was guided by the goal to realize them appro-
priately within an EEG recording session. In the following,
the rationale of the task procedure is outlined more thor-
oughly.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, each task started with the presen-
tation of a Wxation cross for a time period of 15 s, which
served for the assessment of baseline EEG activity. Brain
activity during creative idea generation was measured by
means of an event- or task-related approach. Concretely,
EEG activity during the performance of the experimental
tasks (i.e., the generation of ideas, cf. abbreviation “A” in
Fig. 1) was contrasted with EEG activity during the pre-
stimulus reference period (abbreviation “R” in the Figure).
The term “event-“ or “task-related” refers to the principle
that brain activity during the performance of a given cogni-
tive task is related to a pre-stimulus reference interval dur-
ing which no task is performed [29]. Provided that diVerent
experimental groups or tasks do not diVer in pre-stimulus
reference brain activity, any diVerences in event- or task-
related brain activity are due to group or task diVerences in
the process of task performance (in this context creative
idea generation) and not to diVerences in baseline brain
activity. In this regard it should be noted that the basic
principle and rationale of this baseline interval is not
directly comparable to a resting period in fMRI studies.
While the latter should reXect a task-related control condi-
tion used to “subtract” all cognitive processes from the
74 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76
experimental condition that are of no interest for the
research question, the function of the reference interval in
this EEG approach is to adapt for individual EEG power
diVerences in diVerent frequency bands and to quantify
changes in the oscillatory dynamics that are induced by an
event or task [25]. These changes can then be interpreted
with respect to the functional signiWcance of the respective
frequency band (see below).
As already outlined above, we requested the participants
to press a so-called IDEA-button whenever a creative idea
comes into mind. In applying this procedure, the experi-
menter can obtain information about an individual’s brain
activity at any point of time, for instance, immediately prior
to the production of creative ideas. In this particular con-
text, the EEG method provides a special advantage over
other brain imaging techniques (such as fMRI) as it enables
the analysis of brain activity with a comparatively high
temporal resolution. Given that the peak of the BOLD sig-
nal (in response to a stimulus) is time-delayed and the gen-
eral sluggishness of this hemodynamic response, fMRI
studies do not allow for such a Wne-grained temporal analy-
sis of brain activity. After pressing the IDEA-button, par-
ticipants were requested to vocalize the idea and to Wnally
conWrm it with a button-press. With this procedure we were
not only able to analyze brain activity immediately prior to
the production of creative ideas but also to precisely local-
ize (and exclude) EEG segments that were contaminated
with the production of speech, body movements, eye blinks,
etc. This experimental design would also be very diYcult to
realize in an fMRI study. If the participant’s responses
(ideas) occur at a comparably high rate with short intervals
in between, the long-lasting BOLD signal does not allow
diVerentiating brain activity related to creative thinking
(before the response) and the oral response itself. As a con-
sequence, any activation of language-related brain areas
might not solely be due to the semantic processing of the
presented verbal stimulus (e.g., in a coarse semantic net-
work presumably required for the production of remote or
more original ideas, respectively; [48]) but also to the speech
production itself.
The task procedure used in our previous studies also
enables—provided that a suYcient number of ideas is
given—the analysis of brain activity that is associated with
the production of highly original ideas, as compared to
brain responses that come along with the production of
conventional, customary ideas. This is very similar to the
approach adopted by Jung-Beeman et al. who analyzed
brain activity during the subjective experience of “AHA!”
[17]. In that study, participants were asked to indicate
whether they had solved the problem with or without
insight, herewith providing trials that were either solved
with or without the unique experience of “AHA!”. Like-
wise, the responses a participant gave in the experimental
tasks described above can also quite easily be classiWed into
lower original and higher original ones (e.g., by means of a
median split of the ratings within each person). This classiW-
cation can be based on both, external and subjective ratings
of the given responses which can elucidate the neurophysio-
logical bases of creative cognition from diVerent perspec-
tives [30,32].
In contrast to most creative thinking tasks which are
commonly used as paper-and-pencil tasks, participants
were requested to respond orally to the stimuli presented on
the screen. The choice of the oral response mode was
guided by the following reasons: First, the production of
creative ideas—in particular ideational Xuency (i.e., the
number of ideas)—is not contaminated by writing or typing
speed, respectively. In addition, oral responding to the stim-
uli is far less time consuming than typing into the com-
puter, particularly in those participants who are not
capable of typewriting or are not familiar with computers.
Also, given that the participants are requested to respond
orally, they can exclusively focus on the production of
novel and original ideas, being less likely distracted from
“technical surroundings”. The application of EEG (but
also NIRS and PET) is also advantageous over fMRI with
respect to this response mode. In fact, the loud noise of the
MR scanner due to switching of the gradient coils makes it
very diYcult to record oral responses with the standard
microphones installed in the scanner. Therefore, either spe-
cial microphones have to be used or the image acquisition
has to be suspended for a pre-deWned response period.
2.4. Analyses of experimental tasks
There were several behavioral and neurophysiological
analyses run in order to assess the psychometric quality
(i.e., reliability and validity) of the presented creative idea
generation tasks. The main results of these analyses should
be brieXy discussed, particularly with respect to aspects of
convergent vs. discriminant validity of the tasks. Generally,
the behavioral analyses reveal that the tasks may draw on
diVerent cognitive functions, ranging from more intelli-
gence-related (e.g., the WE Taskß as evident by a signiWcant
correlation with verbal IQ) to more free-associative tasks
(i.e., IS, US, AU), which are not correlated with verbal intel-
lectual ability at all [31,38]. These latter tasks are, unlike the
WE task, considerably associated with creativity-related
personality variables such as “openness to new experi-
ences” which is frequently found to be related to creativity
[49]. It appears to be noteworthy that task diVerences were
apparent on the neurophysiological level as well. As illus-
trated in Fig. 1, the IS, US, and AU task elicited stronger
increases in EEG alpha activity (i.e., synchronization of
alpha activity; symbolized by blue colors in the maps) than
the more intelligence-related WE task which displayed the
lowest increase in alpha activity (symbolized by yellow col-
ors in the maps). In addition to this, stronger increases in
EEG alpha activity (relative to rest) were also found in
more original ideas as compared to less original ones
[30,32].
But what is the functional meaning of synchronization of
EEG alpha activity? What does this tell us about possible
brain correlates of creative thinking? The traditional view-
 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76
point considers task- or event-related alpha synchronization
as a cortical idling phenomenon, presumably reXecting a
reduced state of active information processing in the underly-
ing neuronal networks [50]. Hence, synchronization of alpha
activity during creative idea generation could indicate that a
reduced or a lower activity level of the brain is needed to pro-
duce novel, original ideas (cf. Martindale’s low arousal the-
ory [51]). However, besides the view of alpha synchronization
as a cortical “idling” phenomenon, there is also recent evi-
dence suggesting that synchronization of alpha activity could
reXect an active cognitive process, viz., an active inhibition of
task-irrelevant brain regions [26,52,53]. Thus, alpha synchro-
nization observed during creative thinking may also reXect
an inhibitory mechanism that prevents internal information
processing to be disturbed by external input or conXicting
operations [54]. However, further studies which combine
diVerent neuroscientiWc measurement methods (such as
fMRI and EEG) within one and the same experimental
design are needed to clarify the functional meaning of EEG
alpha synchronization during creative thinking.
3. Concluding remarks
In this article we have focused on contemporary method-
ologies used for the operationalization of creative thinking in
neurophysiological research settings. One important factor
that should be kept in mind in evaluating neuroscientiWc cre-
ativity literature is that well-designed, widely acknowledged
experimental tasks that have been successfully employed in
behavioral studies of creative thinking can often not be
adopted one-to-one to neuroscientiWc studies. In many cases,
comparatively “simple” experimental tasks were used during
the performance of neurophysiological measurements (such
as EEG, NIRS, PET, or fMRI). Nevertheless, these studies
have yielded useful information about possible brain corre-
lates of creative thinking, herewith extending our knowledge
about this complex mental ability domain.
The tasks employed in our laboratory may also be useful
in the neuroscientiWc study of creative thinking. Partici-
pants are presented verbal problems (e.g., they have to
think of original causes or consequences, or to think of as
many, as diVerent, and as original uses of conventional
everyday objects) for a certain period of time. Whenever
they have an idea, they are requested to press the IDEA
button and to vocalize it. Thereby, the time-point of idea
production is self-directed by the participants, each single
idea can be recorded, and the IDEA button responses pro-
vide triggers for analyzing critical EEG time intervals (e.g.,
immediately before the production of creative or uncreative
ideas). In this experimental design, the high temporal reso-
lution of the EEG is deWnitely advantageous over other
neurophysiological measurement methods such as fMRI.
The presented tasks also allow for the generation of a suY-
cient number of ideas (more than 10 ideas within 3 min)
which, in turn, results in an adequate number of trials nec-
essary to obtain reliable neurophysiological measures of
creative thinking.
75
There are, nevertheless, also some important shortcom-
ings of the presented methodologies that need to be
addressed in future studies. First, the creative idea genera-
tion tasks presented in this article are exclusively verbal
tasks (i.e., employing verbal stimulus material). In this par-
ticular context it is also important to note that the pre-
sented tasks appear to draw on diVerent verbal demands.
While in the IS or US task participants were required to
respond to verbally presented scenarios or hypothetical sit-
uations, in the WE task presented suYxes had to com-
pleted. Obviously, the tasks considerably diVer with respect
to the involvement of language or speech [38]. This was also
reXected in the Wnding that performance in the WE task
was more strongly related to verbal intelligence than per-
formance in the remaining tasks. Future research should
also invest into the construction of experimental tasks suit-
able for the neuroscientiWc study of non-verbal creativity
such as creative imagery or visual art [13].
Moreover, comprehensive measures of creative task per-
formance are needed. When brain activity patterns during
creative thinking are analyzed we need not only to examine
whether or to which extent the participants are actually
engaged in creative thinking, we also need to know how
successfully they are in the production of novel, original
ideas. This holds particularly true when brain states during
the production of highly creative ideas are contrasted to
those observed during the production of customary, con-
ventional ideas. As evident in Table 1, qualitative measures
of creative task performance are rare. Due to diYculties in
deWning and measuring the uniqueness, novelty, or origi-
nality of ideas, creative task performance has mostly been
assessed by means of the Xuency of ideas. Operationalizing
novelty or originality solely in terms of statistical infre-
quency may be not satisfying given that crazy, useless, or
silly answers are normally also statistically infrequent.
Besides subjective ratings of the given responses [17,32] an
external rating procedure with trained raters [cf. also 45]
could be a possible alternative. Along this way, it is not
only possible to obtain a quality measure of creativity
reXecting novelty and uncommonness but, depending on
the respective rating instruction, also a measure that takes
usefulness and appropriateness into account.
Another unresolved issue is the question as to how the
Wndings obtained with creative idea generation tasks relate
to real-life creativity? Can brain activity patterns that have
been observed during the performance of these relatively
basic tasks tell us anything about creativity? We think so.
In the presented idea generation tasks participants are
explicitly instructed to produce ideas that cover a broad
range of diVerent ideas (i.e., diVerent types of ideas) and to
produce unusual, original ideas no one else would think of.
Hence, the presented tasks appear to represent more than
merely verbal Xuency tasks, they can be viewed as a useful
estimate of the potential for creative thought [55]. Also, at a
neurophysiological level, brain activity patterns consider-
ably diVer depending on whether an individual is creatively
responding to hypothetical situations (i.e., performing the
76 A. Fink et al. / Methods 42 (2007) 68–76
IS task) or engaged in the completion of suYxes (i.e., per-
formance of the WE task). This is in line with neuroscien-
tiWc research suggesting that diVerent modes of thinking are
associated with functionally diVerent activity patterns of the
brain (cf. Table 1). In applying diVerent measurement meth-
ods (such as fMRI and EEG) on well-established experi-
mental tasks of creative thinking we will get along in the
understanding of possible brain mechanisms related to cre-
ative thinking.
The work presented in this article should motivate
researchers from diVerent disciplines to enter into this men-
tal ability domain. Creativity is often viewed as a diYcult
Weld of research. However, recent advances in cognitive,
psychometric and neuroscientiWc research have qualiWed
this viewpoint to a considerable extent. We hope that we
could demonstrate that valuable approaches to the neuro-
scientiWc study of creative thinking are available now.
Acknowledgements
The research presented in this article was supported by a
grant from the Austrian Science Foundation (P16393). The
authors wish to thank Silvana Weiss and Anna Kanape for
their help in the work presented in article.
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