Digested Constitutional Law II Cases -Atty.

Joan Largo

U.S. vs GOMEZ, G.R. NO. L-9651, August 4, 1915 (31 Phil 218)

Facts:
In this case, defendant was found guilty by the trial court with the crime
of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of Section 8, Act 30 of
the Philippine Commission which provides: “The Board of Medical
Examiners may refuse to issue any of the following certificates provided
for therein to an individual convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction
of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such
refusal, the reason therefore shall be stated to the applicant in writing.
The Board may also revoke any such certificate for like cause, or for
unprofessional conduct, after due notice to the person holding the
certificate, and a hearing, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for
the Philippine Islands, the decision of which shall be final.” Defendant
contends that the court erred in declaring the aforementioned provision
are no in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in
which he relies on paragraph 1, section 5 thereof which states: “That no
law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws.”

Held:
Defendant’s contention is not meritorious because the Board of Medical
Examiners where given such a responsibility through the exercise of the
State’s police power. The state has general power to enact such laws, in
relation to persons, and property within its borders, as may promote
public health, public morals, public safety, and the general prosperity and
welfare of its inhabitants. This power of the state is generally
denominated in its police power. It has been held that the state cannot be
deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police power and the right
to exercise it constitute the very foundation, or at least one of the
cornerstones of the state. For the state to deprive itself or permit it to be
deprived of the right to enact laws to promote general prosperity and
welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public morals, and
public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the
state. No legislature can bargain away the public health, public safety, or
the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their
servants. Governments are organized with a view to preservation of these
things. They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for them.
(Stone vs. Mississippi) In order to enforce the police power of the state, it
may, under certain conditions become necessary to deprive its citizens of
property and of a right providing for the continuance of property, when
the property or the exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public
health, the public morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and
prosperity of its inhabitants. (Slaughter House Cases) Upon police power
of the state depends the security of social order, the life and health of the
citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the
enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. It
extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of

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all persons and the protection of all property within the state. Persons and
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

BINAY vs DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 92389, September 11, 1991 (201 SCRA 508)

Facts:
The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who
only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of
P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the
police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the
Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the
disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was
disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there
cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the
objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general
welfare, etc. of its inhabitants. Hence, this petition revolving around the
pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of
Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause.

Held:
Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police
power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a
governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was
born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic
utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to impair
others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is
the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general
welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest
and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

AGUSTIN vs EDU, G.R. NO. L-49112, February 2, 1979 (88 SCRA 195)

Facts:

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The letter of instruction providing for an early warning device for motor
vehicles is being assailed in the case at bar as being violative of the
constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner contends that they are
"infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable
to the motoring public;" 13 are "one‐sided, onerous and patently illegal
and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set
of the so‐called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per
set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of
a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on
the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set
of EWD's."

Held:
Petitioner’s contention is erroneous because the Letter of Instruction was
issued in the exercise of the police power which is “nothing more or less
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.” In the
leading case of Calalang v. Williams, Justice Laurel identified police power
with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and
property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order for the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ This
doctrine was later reiterated again in Primicias v. Fugoso which referred
police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the
people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in
a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies
of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions
and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of
Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be
interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What are
critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a
dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in
the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ, G.R. NO. L-7995, May 31, 1957 (101 Phil 1155)

Facts:

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This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far‐reaching
in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police
power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of
fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep,
militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect
citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field
of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national
aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in
the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and
tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the
competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may
be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts
and circumstances justify the enactment?

Held:
It has been said the police power is so far ‐ reaching in scope, that it has
become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence
from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co‐extensive with self‐
protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of
all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable.
Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the
demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all‐embracing and have transcended human foresight.
Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public
interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so
we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by
which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the
police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations
thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the
equal protection clause.
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free
citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment
clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which
and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and
future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the
law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a

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matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of
the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are
clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has
not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any
treaty or any other conventional agreement.

THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910
(15 Phil 85)

Facts:
Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 &
33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that
appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human
consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit
from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered.
Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal
but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for
agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in
a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails
the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only
carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.

Held:
The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a
fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State
in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to
the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or
abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a
public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may
order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering
the lives of passers‐by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a
conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed
or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the
regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of
interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to
certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement
of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of
vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of obscene
publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling
houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this,
however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it,
and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the

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legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require,
but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To
justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference;
and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the
public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other
words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police
powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the
court.
From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the
provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for
human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work
or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private
ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such
animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by
greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal
food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may
be measurably and dangerously affected.
Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt.,
140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons
and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the
perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon
acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural
persons are concerned."

CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY, G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil
580)

Facts:
The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal
Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or
billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign,
signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs
allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power in this case?

Held:
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the
Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is
limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles
which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act

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of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of

the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary
enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But
where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for
the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the
courts.
"The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
"The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete
definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state
functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health,
protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do
not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law."
"It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and
economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively
with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest
number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed
limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic
and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand
correction."
"It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the
great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by
usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant
opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this
police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its
exercise."

TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 132922, April 21, 1998 (289 SCRA 337)

Facts:
TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the
validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have
taken properties without due process of law and without just
compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power
given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or
information during election period.

Held:
Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio
or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want
to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a
privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in

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accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or

right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by
the Congress when the common good so requires."

Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of

the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the
present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as
taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the
Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common
good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than
one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more
of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of
the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 11

Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement

that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there
are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on
broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of
views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free
expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give
free air time to candidates in an election.

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given

franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they
transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege,
the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

Diosdado Guzman vs National University

Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel
Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this
Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued
and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for
extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were
denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass
actions within the premises of the University.
The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’
failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due
to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their
constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic

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showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That
Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of
properties of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their
records, and are not of good scholastic standing.”

Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and
memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of
any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led
or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted
without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted
classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and
intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for
and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a
civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against
petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for
his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the
omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of
theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for
poor scholastic standing.
There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them,
with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear
and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO

ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

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The case was about the constitutionality of EO 626-A which prohibits

interprovincial movement of carabaos.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the
police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the
above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case,
the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could
no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as
raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed
validity.

Held:
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would
remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary because due
process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule"
laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all
persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very
elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to
every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing
times and circumstances may require.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which,
generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended
as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary
on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with
applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and
the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that
every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the
law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred
years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment
only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain
arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice
and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20
In the exceptional cases accepted, however there is a justification for the

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omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the

problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property
confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished.

EO 626-A was declared unconstitutional.

Tanada vs Tuvera

Facts:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not
been published as required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.

Issue: WON publication is needed for laws that were to become effective
immediately.

Held:
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication
may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that
a law is effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack
of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it
is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true
only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be
communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot
be said that such a law does not affect the public although it

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unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body
politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even
in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Halili vs Public Service Commission

Facts:

A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the revocation and
annulment of an order by respondent Public Service Commission dated
July 3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the bus service established
by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall,
Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates of public
convenience to operate auto-truck services between Balara and various
points in the City of Manila and its suburbs.
On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a petition with the respondent
Commission alleging that the route authorized in its City Hall(Manila)-
Balara line is entirely different from that supported by the evidence
presented in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended. On
the following day, July 3, and without previous notice to the petitioner or a
previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in
accordance with the petition.

Issue:
WON the order of the amendment of the route, without notice to the
petitioner and other interested parties, or hearing in which the latter may
be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly issued by the
Commission.
WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

Held:

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The order by the Commission of amending the route was not validly issued
and petitioner’s right to due process was violated.
In the first place, the power to issue provisional permits is expressly
authorized. In the second place, the change ordered is not provisional
merely, like that granted in a provisional permit, but final and permanent
in character. In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound by the
rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head to he constitutional
mandate that no person shall be deprived of a right without due process
of law. The "due process of law" clause of the Constitution binds not only
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each and
everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. (16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of
law, or, in the mean accord with the procedure outlines in the law, or, in
the absence of express procedure, under such safeguards for the
protection of individual rights as the settled maxims of law permit and
sanction for the particular class of cases to which the one in question
belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service Act does
not include the amendment made in the disputed order among those may
be ordered without notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the
Act. Is the amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the well
settled maxims of law? We declare it is not, because due process of law
guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons who would be
affected by the order or act contemplated.

In a General sense it means the right to be heard before some tribunal

having jurisdiction to determine the question in dispute.

By "due process of law" is meant orderly proceeding adopted to the nature

of the case, before a tribunal having jurisdiction, which proceeds upon
notice, with an opportunity to bee heard, with full power to grant relief.

Some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be

concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself.

A course of proceeding according to these rules and principles which have

been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and
enforcement of private rights.

Serrano vs National Labor Relations Commission

Facts:

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A petition was filed seeking a review of a resolution made by the National

Labor relations commission which reversed the decision rendered by
theLaborArbiter and dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal
and denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store.

Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, said respondent decided to
phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an
independent security agency. A memorandum was subsequently wrote to
petitioner informing him of his termination immediately (date of
effectivity of termination was exactly the same as the date the
memorandum was made).

Issue:
WON there was a violation of petitioner's right to due process when
respondent-employer failed to give the required 1 month notice provided
in the Labor Code.

Held:

"It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a
just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right
to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice
and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the
employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements
of, or for failure to observe, due process."
There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer
of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process
resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff.
The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation
on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private
power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. This
is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . .
." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life,
liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process
Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what
are considered civilized methods.
The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due
Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear
upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of
employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an
aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day

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written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an

opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The
purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his
job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes
do exist justifying the termination of his employment.
The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be
considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer
cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own
cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause
under Art. 282.
We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the
employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement does not
constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a
procedure for the termination of employment which makes the
termination of employment merely ineffectual. Indeed, under the Labor
Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment
can make the dismissal of an employee illegal.

Lao Gi v Court of Appeals

Facts:

Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a judgment was

rendered cancelling his citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment) on
the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation.
Petitioners were required to register as aliens but refused. They filed a
motion for reconsideration of the of the order directing them to register
as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest but was denied by
Acting Commissioner Nituda. Petitioners filed for certiorari in the CFI of
Manila which was dismissed fo lack of legal basis. Petition for certiorari
was also dismissed on appeal in the CA and a motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:
WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are
aliens.

Held:

The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under

the authority of the sovereign power. 1 It is a police measure against

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undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious

to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a

criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person,
the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be
denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation
proceedings.

Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended,

it is provided:

c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific

grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of
procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.
Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions
complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to
enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is
intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper
judgment.

Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the respondent

commission on immigration and deportation is hereby set aside.

Villegas vs Ho

Facts:

A petition for certiorari is filed to review the decision rendered by the CFI
of Manila wherein Ordinance 6537, which prohibits aliens from being
employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or
business without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of
Manila and paying the permit fee of fifty pesos xxx, was declared null and
void for it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to
aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property
and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Issue:

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WON respondent judge committed a serious and patent error of law in

ruling that ordinance 6537 violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.

Held:

No, respondent judge did not commit the errors assigned. The ordinance
in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.
Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the
City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not
obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he
cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens
and citizens.

International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing

Facts:

Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are

receiving less than their counterparts hired abroad and now cry
discrimination. The school contends that a foreign-hire would necessarily
uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and
take the risk of devaiting from a promising career path - all for the
purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a
foreign land and such person does not enjoy security of tenure as well so
the compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to
remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting
competent pruofessionals in the field of international education. The
school's classification between foreign-hires and local-hires was in the
point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being classified as local-hires.
Petitioner claims that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and
that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination. On the other hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor upheld
the point-of hire classification for the distinction in salary rates. He also
stated that The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to
justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by

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legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A

classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and
apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial
distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only
a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and
have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to
join the teaching faculty of the School.

Hence the present petition.

Issue:
WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the reasonableness of the
classification made by respondent-school.

Held:

Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond

contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these
evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of
employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides
that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these
provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and
discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection." 26 The State,
therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor
and capital.27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such
contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will
not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-

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hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable

distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires.
The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy
of this Court.

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