Garcia vs Manzano
has been granted.
Topic: Judicial separation of property for sufficient cause
FACTS
 Plaintiff filed by for the judicial declaration of the separation of their conjugal
partnership property before Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that  he and
defendant are husband and wife but they have been living separately from each other
since 1948, all attempts at reconciliation between them having failed; that plaintiff, a
duly licensed doctor of veterinary science, used to be employed in the slaughter-
house of the City of Manila, while defendant, with plaintiff’s knowledge and consent,
engaged in the business of slaughtering large cattle and selling the fresh meat in the
city; that as a result of their joint efforts, plaintiff and defendant acquired and
accumulated real and personal properties; that upon the separation of the spouses,
the defendant assumed the complete management and administration of the conjugal
partnership property, has been enjoying said property as well as its accessions and
fruits to the exclusion and prejudice of plaintiff, and has even fictitiously transferred or
alienated a majority of said property in favor of third persons; that since defendant
assumed the management and administration of the conjugal partnership property,
she has neglected to file any income tax returns; that defendant has failed and
refused to turn over and deliver to plaintiff his rightful share and participation in the
conjugal partnership property and its fruits.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action because “it does not allege any of the grounds recognized by
Article 191 of the new Civil Code for decreeing a judicial separation of properties”.
Plaintiff vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that he is entitled to some
relief, legal or equitable, under the allegations of his complaint, and that Article 191 of
the new Civil Code may also be availed of by the husband where the administration of
the conjugal partnership property has been forcibly taken from him by his wife and
she abuses the management thereof. The lower court held that plaintiff’s complaint is
not included under the provisions of Articles 190 and 191 of the new Civil Code
providing for judicial separation of the conjugal partnership property, and that the
husband being the legal administrator of the partnership and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this present appeal.
ISSUE
WON the complaint establishes a case for separation of property
RULING
NO, the complaint does not establish a case for separation of property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation and not in harmony
with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses,
the Civil Codes (both old and new) require that separation of property shall not prevail
unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or
by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage (Article 190, new Civil
Code; Article 1432, old Code); and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the
court for causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code:
ART. 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall
be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner; has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation
In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
property of the husband, or in case of abandonment by the husband, separation of
property may also be ordered by the court according to the provisions of articles 167
and 173, No. 3.
In the instant case plaintiff’s contention ignores the philosophy underlying the
provisions in question. The wife is granted a remedy against the mismanagement or
maladministration of the husband because by express provision of law, it is the
husband who has the administration of the conjugal partnership. (ART. 165, ART.
172)
In the system established by the Code the wife does not administer the
conjugal partnership unless with the consent of the husband, or by decree of court
and under its supervision (Arts. 168, 196) “with such limitations as they (the courts)
may deem advisable” (Art. 197 in relation to Article 196). Legally, therefore, the wife
cannot mismanage the conjugal partnership property or affairs, unless the husband or
the courts tolerate it. In the event of such maladministration by the wife the remedy of
the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power
granted to the wife and resume the administration of the community property and the
conduct of the affairs of the conjugal partnership.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
Partosa-Jo vs CA
Topic: Judicial separation of property for sufficient cause
FACTS:
Respondent Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered
fifteen children. The first of these women, the herein petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo,
claims to be his legal wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women
and their respective offspring are not parties of these case.
In 1980, the petitioner filed a complaint against Jo for judicial separation of conjugal
property, in addition to an earlier action for support, also against him and docketed, in
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35. The decision rendered a
definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of the complaint for judicial
separation of conjugal property.
Jo elevated the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial
court in the complaint for support. The complaint for judicial separation of conjugal
property was dismissed for lack of a cause of action and on the ground that
separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
Prima contested that the agreement between her and Jose was for her to temporarily
live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and
support her. They never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to
him, but the latter refused to accept her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo is entitled to judicial separation of
conjugal property on the ground of abandonment
HELD:
Yes, she is entitled to separation of property on the grounds of abandonment.
SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the necessary
modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For abandonment to exist, there
must be an absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention
of perpetual separation. The fact that Jose Jo did not accept Prima Partosa-Jo
demonstrates that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From
1968 until 1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent
to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for
the judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that the court
ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between them, share and
share alike. The division will be implemented after the determination of all the
properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership including those that may have
been illegally registered in the name of the persons.
De la Cruz vs De la Cruz
Topic: Judicial separation of property for sufficient cause
FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and
begotten 6 children. During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and
were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed an action against her husband
for the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband aside from
abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand,
Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided
support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to
supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the
conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid
short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter
suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the
urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander
and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON
there has been an abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal
partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and
support of the family. To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal
home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual
separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the
husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This
negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. The plaintiff even
testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more than one visit. Likewise, as
testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a
monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the
witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the
business constitutes abuse of administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must
be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.
Lacson vs San Jose
Topic: Voluntary Separation of Property
Under Article 136 (Voluntary Separation of Property)
consolidated cases:
Alfonso Lacson v. Carmen San-Jose Lacson and the Court of Appeals (L-23482)
Carmen San-Jose Lacson v. Alfonso Lacson (L-23767)
Alfonso Lacson v. Carmen San Jose-Lacson
FACTS
Alfonso and Carmen were married on February 14, 1953. They had four
children. On January 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home in Bacolod and resided
in Manila. On March 12, 1963 she filed a complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them
and herself. However, through the assistance of their respective lawyers, the spouses
reached an amicable settlement as to custody of the kids, support, and separation of
property. On April 27, 1963, they filed a joint petition with the CFI of Negros
Occidental, submitting that they had mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership. The terms included a) separation of property, b) all earnings of
each spouse shall belong to that spouse exclusively, c) the custody of the two elder
children shall be awarded to Alfonso and the two younger children to Carmen, d)
Alfonso shall pay Carmen a monthly allowance of P200.00 for the support of the
children, and e) each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation and every
summer the former spouses shall swap [my word] kids. For that particular year,
however, Carmen was allowed custody of all four children until June of 1963, when
she was supposed to return the two older children to Alfonso’s custody.
 Finding the foregoing joint petition as conformable to the law, the CFI issued
an order approving their compromise agreement on the very same day. On May 7,
however, Carmen filed a motion with the JDRC alleging that the compromise
agreement was the only way she could get custody of all the children and praying that
she be relieved of the agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of the
children and that she now be awarded full custody [bitch]. Naturally, Alfonso opposed
the motion and the JDRC ruled in his favour. Carmen went to the Court of Appeals
and the CA certified the case to the Supreme Court. Carmen went to the CFI and filed
a motion for reconsideration, basically claiming the same thing. Alfonso opposed. The
CFI favored Alfonso and ordered Carmen to return the two older children by June, on
pain of contempt. It is from this decision that the instant case springs. Carmen
instituted certiorari proceedings with the CA against the CFI, saying the CFI
committed grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate execution of the compromise agreement. The CA declared void the portion
of the agreement pertaining to the custody of children.
ISSUE: Was the assailed compromise agreement—and the judgment of the CFI
grounded on said agreement—conformable to law?  declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses
HELD: YES—but only as far as the separation of property of spouses and the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, in accordance with Article 191 of the Civil
Code. The spouses did not appear to have any creditors who would have been
prejudiced by their arrangement. At the time of the decision the spouses had been
separated five years and so the propriety of severing their financial and proprietary
interests was manifest. (However, the Court maintained that approving the separation
of property and dissolution of conjugal partnership did not amount to recognition or
legalization of de facto separation.) As to the custody of the children, they were all
below 7 years of age at the time of the agreement and so the CA was correct in
awarding the custody to the mother. The Court was also “loath to uphold the couple’s
agreement regarding the custody of the children”, citing rights of the children to
proper care not anchored on the solely on the whims of his or her parents. Courts
must decide fitness of parents for custody.
Toda Jr. vs CA
Topic: Voluntary Separation of Property
FACTS:
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda were married on June 9,
1951 and were blessed with two children. Individual differences and the alleged
infidelity of Benigno, however, marred the conjugal union thereby prompting Rose
Marie to file on December 18, 1979 in the former Court of First Instance of Rizal, as
Civil Case No. 35566, a petition for termination of conjugal partnership for alleged
mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.
After hearings were held, the parties in order to avoid further “disagreeable
proceedings,” filed on April 1, 1981 a joint petition for judicial approval of dissolution
of conjugal partnership under Article 191 of the Civil Code, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 9478, which was consolidated with the aforesaid civil case. This
petition which was signed by the parties on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise
agreement allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal
partnership assets and dismissing with prejudice the said Civil Case No. 35566, CA-
G.R. No. 11123-SP of the Court of Appeals and G.R. No. 56121 of this Court. The
said petition and the compromise agreement therein were approved by the trial court
in its order of June 9, 1981.
Thereafter, several orders were issued by the lower court pertaining to the
interpretation and implementation of the compromise agreement.
ISSUE:
When does the compromise agreement became effective? RULING:
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of Appeals that the
compromise agreement became effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was
approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981 when it was signed by the
parties. Under Article 190 of the Civil Code, 14 “in the absence of an express
during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.” Hence, the
separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or
agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
therefore, becomes effective on y upon judicial approval, without which it is void. 15
Furthermore, Article 192 of said Code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership
is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree of separation of property.
Juaniza vs Jose
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
Article 144 of Civil Code: When a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the
property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
Facts:
Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger
jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine
National Railways that took place on November 23, 1969 which resulted in the death
to seven (7) and physical injuries to five (5) of its passengers. At the time of the
accident, Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been
cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Rosalia Arroyo, for sixteen (16) years in a
relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
In the resulting cages for damages filed in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, decision was rendered ordering defendants Jose and Arroyo jointly and
severally to pay plaintiff Victor Juaniza the sum of P1,600.00 plus legal interest from
date of complaint until fully paid and costs of suit the respective heirs of the deceased
in the sum of P12,000.00 for the life of each of said deceased, with legal interest from
date of complaint, and costs of suit.
 Motion for reconsideration was filed by Arroyo praying that the decision be
reconsidered insofar as it condemns her to pay damages jointly and severally with her
co-defendant, but was denied. The lower court based her liability on the provision of
Article 144 of the Civil Code
Issue:
Is Rosalia Arroyo jointly and severally liable under Article 144 of the Civil
Code?
Held:
No, Arroyo is not liable under Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an
impediment for him to contract marriage with Arroyo. Under the 144 of the CC, Arroyo
cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of
Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the
passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision.
Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither
be liable for damages caused by its operation. It is settled in our jurisprudence that
only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that
may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the
passengers therein. She is declared free from any liability for damages and the
appealed decision is hereby modified accordingly.
Vda. De Consuegra vs GSIS
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
FACTS:
● This is an appeal on the decision of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del
Norte, dated March 7, 1967, in its Special Proceeding No. 1720.
● Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was employed as a shop foreman of
the office of the District Engineer in the province of Surigao del Norte
● In his lifetime, Consuegra contracted two marriages, the first with herein
respondent Rosario Diaz, solemnized in the parish church of San Nicolas de
Tolentino, Surigao, Surigao, on July 15, 1937, out of which marriage were born
two children, namely, Jose Consuegra, Jr. and Pedro Consuegra, but both
predeceased their father; and the second, which was contracted in good faith
while the first marriage was subsisting, with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin, on
May 1, 1957 in the same parish and municipality, out of which marriage were
born seven children, namely, Juliana, Pacita, Maria Lourdes, Jose, Rodrigo,
Lenida and Luz, all surnamed Consuegra.
● Being a member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS, for short)
when Consuegra died on September 26, 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance
under policy No. 601801 were paid by the GSIS to petitioner Basilia Berdin and
her children who were the beneficiaries named in the policy.
● Consuegra was entitled to retirement insurance benefits in the sum of P6,304.47
pursuant to Section 12(c) of Commonwealth Act 186 as amended by Republic
Acts 1616 and 3836.
● Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary who would receive the
retirement insurance benefits due to him.
● Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed a claim with the
GSIS asking that the retirement insurance benefits be paid to her as the only
legal heir of Consuegra, considering that the deceased did not designate any
beneficiary with respect to his retirement insurance benefits.
● Petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children, likewise, filed a similar claim with the
GSIS, asserting that being the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of
Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the retirement insurance
benefits due the deceased Consuegra.
● GSIS ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were Rosario Diaz,
his widow by his first marriage who is entitled to one-half, or 8/16, of the
retirement insurance benefits, on the one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by
the second marriage and their seven children, on the other hand, who are
entitled to the remaining one-half, or 8/16, each of them to receive an equal
share of 1/16.
● Unhappy with the ruling of GSIS, Basilia Berdin and her children1 filed on
October 10, 1966 a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction in the
Court of First Instance of Surigao, naming as respondents the GSIS, the
Commissioner of Public Highways, the Highway District Engineer of Surigao del
Norte, the Commissioner of Civil Service, and Rosario Diaz, praying that they
(petitioners therein) be declared the legal heirs and exclusive beneficiaries of the
retirement insurance of the late Jose Consuegra, and that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining the implementation of the adjudication made by
the GSIS.
● On March 7, 1967, the court rendered judgment affirming the decision of GSIS
to divide the retirement benefit of Jose Consuegra equally between Rosario Diaz
and Basilia Berdin and her heirs; said judgment gave rise to this present appeal
ISSUE/S:
● To whom should the retirement insurance benefit be paid, in case the insured
has failed to designate its beneficiary?
● Whether or not the beneficiaries of the life insurance of a government employee
under GSIS are automatically the beneficiaries of the retirement insurance of
said employee under GSIS?
HELD:
● The appeal is DENIED. Bb
● Designation of beneficiaries for the GSIS life insurance does not automatically
designate the same beneficiaries for the GSIS retirement insurance. These 2
insurance benefits are separate and distinct from each other.
● The provisions on life insurance were originally stipulated under Commonwealth
Act 186
● The provisions on retirement insurance under the GSIS came about only when
Commonwealth Act 186 was amended by Rep. Act 660 on June 16, 1951.
● Further, in Republic Act 660, there is a chapter on life insurance and another
chapter on retirement insurance. 3 Under the chapter on life insurance are
sections 8, 9 and 10 of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended; and under the
chapter on retirement insurance are sections 11, 12, 13 and 13-A.
● There is need for the employee to file an application for retirement insurance
benefits when he becomes a member of the GSIS, and he should state in his
application the beneficiary of his retirement insurance. Hence, the beneficiary
named in the life insurance does not automatically become the beneficiary in the
retirement insurance unless the same beneficiary in the life insurance is so
designated in the application for retirement insurance.
● GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems of benefits to its members — one
is the life insurance and the other is the retirement insurance. These two distinct
systems of benefits are paid out from two distinct and separate funds that are
maintained by the GSIS.
● Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee — to
provide for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the government
for a required number of years. If the employee reaches the age of retirement,
he gets the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries named in his application for retirement insurance. The beneficiary
of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the retirement
insurance if the employee dies before retirement. If the employee failed or
overlooked to state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the retirement
benefits will accrue to his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in
accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named
in the insurance policy.
Maxey vs CA
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
FACTS: Since 1903, Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived
together as husband and wife and out of said union were born 6 children, herein
plaintiffs. During the period of their cohabitation, sometime in 1911 and 1912,
Melbourne Maxey acquired parcels of land, this was before their 1919 church
marriage. Except for the youngest son, all the children were born before the disputed
properties were acquired. The father, Melbourne Maxey, was a member of the 1899
American occupation forces who afterwards held high positions in the provincial
government and in the Philippine public schools system while Regina Morales is an
illiterate with no job.
Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding. The
husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a
power of attorney, sold the said properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs.
Beato C. Macayra. Since the sale, the defendants-spouses have taken immediate
possession thereof continuously up to the present.
Plaintiffs prayed for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the parcels of
land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-
spouses, alleging that the realties were common properties of their parents, having
been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that
the sales of the lands in favor of the defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death of
their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey,
without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to know of the above
mentioned sales only in 1961.
The trial court applied Article 144 of the Civil Code which provides:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The court stated that when a man and a woman lived together as husband and wife,
justice demands that the woman should be entitled to the share of the property. The
Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of land to be exclusive properties of the
late Melbourne Maxey. It set aside the decision of the trial court and ruled that the
appellants are the absolute owners of the properties in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not a woman has rights over properties acquired principally
through the efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not
yet legally married.
RULING: Yes, a woman has rights over properties acquired principally through the
efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally
married.
Considerations of justice dictate the retroactive application of Article 144 of the
Civil Code to the case at bar. Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on
August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and
wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties
acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized
through decisions of this Court.
With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established
through judicial precedents but with the modification that the property governed by
the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of them  through their
work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during
the man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.
This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if
a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the
requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect
her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in
business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. This article is particularly
relevant in this case where the “common-law” relationship was legitimated through a
valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold.
The “real contribution” to the acquisition of property must include not only the
earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her
contribution to the family’s material and spiritual goods through caring for the children,
administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from
household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife.
Valdes vs RTC
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
FACTS
1. Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971 and later
had 5 kids.
2. On June 22, 1992, Antonio sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage
pursuant to Art. 36 of the FC.
3. The RTC of Quezon City rendered judgment and declared the marriage null and
void under Art. 36 of the FC on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to
comply with their essential marital obligations and ordered the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Art. 147 of the FC and to comply with the provisions
of Art. 50, 51 and 52 of the FC
4. Consuelo sought a clarification of the order of the court and asserted that the FC
did not have provisions for the liquidation of common property in “unions without
marriage”
5. The court explained in an order dated May 5, 1995 that the property including the
family home acquired during their union are presumed to have been obtained through
joined efforts and the property would be owned by them in equal shares and the
liquidation and partition of property would be governed by the regime of co-ownership
6. The court also explained that Art 102 does not apply since it refers to the
procedure for liquidation of conjugal partnership property. Art 129 also does not apply
because it refers to procedures for liquidation of the absolute
community of property
7. Antonio moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied.
(Shorter version)
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children.  Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null
and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity.  Stella and Joaquin
are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to
choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure
for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”.  During the
hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with
their father.
ISSUES
WON Art 147 is the correct law governing the disposition of property in the case at
bar
WON Art 147 applies to marriages declared null and void pursuant to Art. 36
RULING
1. In void marriages, the property relations of the parties during the cohabitation
period is governed by the provisions of Art. 147 or Art. 148
2. In the case at bar, Art. 147 applies because there was no legal impediment to their
marriage and they were capacitated wherein the word capacitated refers to legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-
ownership.  Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts.  A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
*prima facie- based on the first impression; accepted as correct until proved otherwise
Notes: Potential conflict between Art. 129 and Art. 147
 Trial court’s decision:
-The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes
is hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
-The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with.
-"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother,
herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes.
-"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are
in the custody of the other.
-The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of
their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply
with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days
from notice of this decision.
Alleged Errors:
-"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychological incapacitated.
-"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern
the disposition of the
family dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses.
-"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read
consistently with Article 129.
-"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to
stay.
Nicdao Carino vs Carino
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
FACTS:
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages,
the first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second was on November
10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee, with whom he had no children in their almost
ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes
complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992,
under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both
petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”
Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner
Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least
one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively
denominated as “death benefits”.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during
the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had
no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife
of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum of money, respondent
contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because
the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner
which bears no marriage license number;  and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila which states that they have
no record of marriage license of the spouses Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Susan Yee can claim half the amount acquired by Nicdao.
HELD:
No, Susan Yee cannot claim half the amount acquired by Susan Nicdao.
SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or polygamous
marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.
The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid
marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for
the same has been solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected
marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter,
the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be
limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void.
Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be
governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property
Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage
to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired
with the deceased through their actual joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned
by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common
by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of
the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not
one of them.

San Luis vs San Luis
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
Facts:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo. The second was Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146.
Thereater, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. But the trial court issued an
order denying the two motions to dismiss. On September 12, 1995, the trial court
dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati
City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for
letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration
Held:
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s
capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations
between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co- ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.
Morover, the Supreme Court founnd that respondent’s legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co- owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148
of the Family Code.
The order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
affirmed. It was also REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
Atienza vs De Castro
Topic: Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
FACTS 
Lupo, a married man cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their
coverture, they allegedly acquired a real property and registered it under the name of
Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they parted. He filed an action for
partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of limited co-
ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she acquired it thru
her own savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared the property subject of co-
ownership, but the CA reversed it as he failed to prove material contribution in the
acquisition of the same. On appeal, he contended that he was not burdened to prove
that he contributed in the acquisition of the property because with or without
contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484, NCC, for as
long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property
would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-
ownership. Is the contention correct? Explain.
ISSUE
WON the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda 
HELD
Yes It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other
because Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with Yolanda. Their property regime, therefore, is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married
man. Under this regime, …only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. (Cariño v. Cariño, 351
SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual contribution is required. (Agapay v. Palang, 342
Phil. 302).
RATIO: 
Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, FC 148
applies. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their
contributions. Absent of proof of contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal. He did
not show any evidence that he contributed in the parcel of land while the accountant
showed bank accounts which apparently shows that she was capacitated to buy the
said land. 
Evidence of De Castro: job as accountant and businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending, and jewelry retail, promissory notes of dealings with
clients, bank account statements, and business transactions = had financial capacity
on the other hand Atienza merely provided evidence that Yolanda had no such
sufficient funds and didn‘t provide for evidence regarding his own capacity to pay for
such property.
Docena vs Lapesura
Topic: The Family and its Members
FACTS:
 On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the
recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and
Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on occupation
since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the
judgment of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have
leased from Casiano. The Complaint in Intervention of Abuda was dismissed. 
A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the
Court of Appeals, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge
in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in issuing the Writ of Demolition.  “earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made between the parties but the
ISSUE:  denied the same.
WON the signing of one of the spouses in a certificate of non-forum
shopping is sufficient compliance with the requirements for Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition.
RULING:  Hence, this present case.
Yes. It has been the previous ruling that the certificate of non-forum
shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the
signing by only one of them is insufficient.   In the case at bar, however, we hold that
the subject Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping signed by the petitioner Antonio
Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with the
rules. Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal property belongs to
the husband and the wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance
where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or administration
does not require that the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may
validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of the
court in proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code.
Hontiveros vs RTC
Topic: The Family and its Members
Article 151 of the Family Code: No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Facts:
Petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City. The former alleged that they are the owners of a
parcel of land and also alleged that they were deprived of income from the said lands
consisting of rentals from tenants of the land and that private respondents withheld
possession of the land in bad faith.
The private respondent Hontiveros denied the allegations and invoked that
he and respondent Ayson were not married. On the contrary, they alleged that the
possession of the subject property had already been transferred to petitioners since
1985 by virtue of writ of possession.
Moreover, considering the foregoing facts, respondents assert petitioners
were receiving rentals from the lands, hence, the complaint has no cause of action
since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made,
considering that petitioner Augusto and respondent Gregorio are brothers.
The petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert the allegation that
same were unsuccessful”. Respondents answered the Amended Complaint and
The Regional Trial Court denied the petitioner’s motion and at the same time
dismissed the case on the ground of unverified complaint pursuant to Article 151 of
the Family Code and therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made
to arrive at a compromise. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but was denied.
Issue:
WON the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it does
not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made prior to
the filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code
Held:
Yes, the Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that verified
complaint of earnest efforts to a compromise only because the trial court could not
believe the veracity of the allegation.
 The Court emphasized that the absence of the verification required in Article
151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the
complaint. Such verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure
assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct.
Petitioner’s contention that Article 151 of the FC does not apply to the case
is correct since the suit is not exclusively among the family members. Under the
subject provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and
wife; parents and children; ascendants and descendants; and brothers and sisters.
Respondent Ayson and Petitioner Hontiveros (Maria) are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Art. 151, therefore, they are not
members of the family. In several jurisprudences, the Court already decided that
“whenever a stranger is a party in the case involving the family members, the
requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory”
Manalo vs CA
Topic: The Family and its Members
FACTS:
● This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De
Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2
affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which
denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
● Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his
wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo,
Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando
Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.
● At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and
style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma,
Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila.
● On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving
children of the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina,
Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.
● On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition
for hearing on February 11, 1993
● On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court
issued an order 'declaring the whole world in default, except the government,"
and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993.
● Herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio,
Isabelita and Orlando were granted then (10) days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.
● Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, culminating in
the filling of an Omnibus Motion on July 23, 1993
● On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order resolving said petitions
● Petitioners were unhappy with the trial court’s ruling, and, thus, filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals
● Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari in its Resolution promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6,
1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was likewise
dismissed.
ISSUE/S:
● Whether or not the petition filed by respondents for judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their
brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof, is covered by Article 151 of
the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code which require that earnest
efforts towards a compromise involving members of the same family should
have been made, and that the same has failed, prior to the filing of a suit or
petition.
HELD:
● The petition for review on certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.
● Article 151 of the FC applies only to ordinary civil action, and not on special
proceedings.Clearly, SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding
(Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate). The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of
death of Troadio Manalo, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his death. The also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are
sought to be settled in the probate proceedings.
● Further, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as
regard the intention of the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to
seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father. It is not their
intention to sue anyone. Thus, the term “suit” as contemplated in Article 151 of
the FC and Article 222 of the Civil Code, is inapplicable.
Modequillo vs Breva
Topic: The Family Home
FACTS: A judgment by the Court of Appeals rendered the defendants-appellees Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants,
pertaining to damages arising from a vehicular accident that took place on March 16,
1976 and which became final in 1988.
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued
to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose
Modequillo and Benito Malubay. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur and a parcel of agricultural land located
at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur both registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose
Modequillo alleging that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of
the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the
judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one
of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land,
although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still part of the
public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who
was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government
agency.
The trial court denied the motion, holding that the said house and lot became a family
home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and that the
Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior
to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by
way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
RULING: Yes, a final judgment in an action for damages may be satisfied by way of
execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or
by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and
so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value
allowed by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the
same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family
actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by
law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest
before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men
and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The exemption provided is effective from the time of the constitution of the family
home as such, and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as
a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code.
It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on
August 4, 1987.
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it
was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162
of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean
that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Since the vehicular accident was on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
rendered by the appellate court was on January 29, 1988, both preceded the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the
exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.