JOHN O. IATRIDES (New Haven, Conn., U.S.A.

From Liberation to Civil War:

The United States and Greece, 1944-46*

The study of American policy toward Greece between 1944 and 1946 may at
first glance appear to be a rather frivolous undertaking, prompted only by the
idiosyncracies of narrow scholarly specialization. As any survey of postwar inter-
national politics makes clear, Greece did not become the object of a systematic
American policy until the delivery of the now famous British aide memoire of 21
February 1947, which, together with its companion message on Turkey, served as
the catalyst for the Truman Doctrine.1 Indeed, in the two-year period under re-
view, one is hard pressed to find an active policy: the official American position on
Greece remained one of deliberate non-involvement, coupled with considerable
disdain for Greek politics and Britain's handling of the affairs of that small, distant,
and troubled country. Thus one can write about an American policy largely in a
passive and nebulous way and might be tempted to dismiss the present topic alto-
gether by echoing the frequent lament of U.S. Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh that
his government showed a dangerous disregard for developments in Greece and in
the Balkans, even though such developments were bound to have serious conse-
quences for the future. After a particularly frustrating meeting with Roosevelt on
24 August 1944, MacVeagh wrote in his diary that the president had given Britain a
free hand in the Balkans and added: "The meaning of this, and of the short time he
was willing to give me on this visit would seem to be that Pilate is washing his
hands, or, to paraphrase Bacon, 'What are the Balkans?' asked jesting Roosevelt,
and would not stay for an answer."2
Nevertheless, the absence of positive action can be as instructive and revealing as
the most vigorous behavior. In the case at hand, official passivity concerning Greece
demonstrates important characteristics of official American perception and policy
during a period of difficult transition from wartime goals to postwar politics. In

*Paper prepared for delivery at the American Historical Association's Ninetieth Annual
Meeting, Atlanta, 28-30 Dec. 1975.
1. For the aide memoires of 21 Feb. 1947, see Department of State Records (unpublished
records of the U.S. Department of State, National Archives,Washington,D.C. [hereafter D5R],
868.00/2-2147). See also Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks(New York: Viking, 1955); John
L. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Colum-
bia Univ. Press, 1972); Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-AmericanConfrontation. Postwar Recon-
struction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1973); and
James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and WorldOrder (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1976).
2. Unpublished diaries of Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh,in author's possession [hereafter
MacVeaghDiary 1,24 Aug. 1944.
 33

particular, American attitudes toward Greece in 1944-46 suggest a failure to ap-

preciate fully the war's impact upon Eastern Europe and the manner in which
fundamental American interests would be affected by the radical transformation of
that region's national politics and balance of power.
The wartime assignment of Greece, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Balkans
to Britain's area of responsibility and the persistent refusal to seek solutions to
"political" problems until after the common enemy had been defeated reveal a
shortsighted perception of a number of key problems which were destined to
bedevil the United States in the very near future. Thus, at its highest levels the
American government failed to understand that if the internal crisis of Greece and
of other Balkan states were of no apparent concern to the United States, they
nevertheless represented the determining factor in the balance of power of a region
which constituted a pathway to Europe and the Middle East, areas of traditional
and vital interest to the United States. Similarly, there appeared to be no realization
that the wartime management of Greek affairs by Britain exacerbated political
passions and contributed to the further radicalization of Greek politics which were
already aggravated by the enemy occupation and the realities of the resistance
movement. Revolutionary politics, which seemed to be the order of the day in the
Balkans, threatened the stability and order which the United States would wish to
champion no less than Britain. To defuse the dangerous ideological confrontation in
Greece it would be necessary either to legitimize the powerful and armed coalition
of the Left (EAM/ELAS3), with unpredictable consequences for that country's
future orientation, or crush it swiftly with overwhelming military force. Britain was
obviously unprepared to pursue either of these courses, particularly as the United
States might be expected to condemn the second alternative. Finally, despite end-
less studies of anticipated problems in the postwar period, there was little attention
paid to the simple fact that after liberation and to avert total collapse, Greece as
well as other countries would require massive economic assistance which only the
United States could provide.
The record of events in 1944-46 suggests that American policy toward Greece in
the postwar period constituted a delayed response to factors and perceived dangers
which were unrelated to Greece itself. The transformation of American attitudes
toward the resistance groups from cautious sympathy during the war to unmiti-
gated hostility shortly after liberation dramatically illustrates this point. However

3. EAM: b*v1Kdv A7re\eu6epcjTtKOf MÉTú.J1I"ov(National Liberation Front), and its mili-

tary arm, ELAS: b0v1Kd<Ammo? hxeXev0epwTiKdqE7-par6c (National Popular Liberation
Army). On the wartime resistance in Greece see Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanios Partisans
and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972); John O.
latrides, Revolt in Athens. The Greek Communist "Second Round," 1944-1945 (Princeton:
Princeton Univ. Press, 1972); Andri K6dros, La Résistance Grecque, 1940-1944 (Paris: Robert
Laffont, 1966); Komnenos Pyromaglou, 'H 'E6vcK?j'A.vnuTauLç(The National Resistance)
(Athens, 1947); and C. M. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, 1941-1949 (London: Hart-
DavisMacGibbon, 1976).
34

flattering for Greece the attention focused upon it by the Truman Doctrine, the
bold policy thereby proclaimed was hardly appropriate to the task at hand. It
barely concealed the fact that relatively modest but prompt and positive action
during 1944-46 would almost certainly have rendered unnecessary the feverish
activity of the Truman Administration after February, 1947. One is reminded of
George Kennan's often-quoted parable in which democracy is likened to a pre-
historic monster "with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he
lies there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environ-
ment ; he is slow to wrath-in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to
make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but once he grasps this, he
lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adver-
sary but largely wrecks his native habitat." American policy concerning Greece is a
prime example of this transformation from "undiscriminating indifference to a holy
wrath equally undiscriminating."4 Such a statement might be viewed as an unfair
indictment based on hindsight were it not for the persistent and prophetic messages
of MacVeagh to Roosevelt personally and to the Department of State throughout
this period, advocating a strong American policy in Greece and the Balkans in order
to avert chaos after liberation and to prevent an Anglo-Soviet contest for influence
which would inevitably draw the United States into the conflict.

** *

During the war a number of key factors encouraged the United States to remain
aloof from Greek affairs and to accept Britain's responsibility for that country.
London's traditionally powerful influence over the government in Athens had been
fortified by diplomatic and military activity there before the country had suc-
cumbed to the combined German-Italian invasion. Afterward, the Greek govern-
ment in exile, its armed forces reformed in the Middle East, and the Greek monarch
who divided his time between London and Cairo had all become dependent upon
the British authorities for their very existence. In occupied Greece British agents
sought to foster and manipulate a powerful resistance movement which would
remain sensitive to London's wishes, and showed no desire to share the field with
the few OSS men who eventually joined them. Moreover, all Greek issues appeared
to have strong ideological overtones and any attempt to deal with them might have
embroiled the United States in political controversies at a time when victory over
the common enemy was viewed as the only legitimate objective, and might have
taken on the appearance of interfering in the internal affairs of an allied nation.
Accordingly, until the liberation of Greece in October, 1944, and with few excep-
tions, the United States sought to avoid becoming entangled in Greek problems,
confining itself to whatever relief operations were found possible and to small-scale

4. George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor, 1952), pp.
66-67.
 35

intelligence and sabotage activities. Plans to establish direct American liaison with
the Greek Left through the Labor Desk of the OSS in Cairo were vetoed for fear of
antagonizing the British.5
This hands-off policy was hardly an indication that the American government
was satisfied with the unfolding situation. On the contrary, from the outset the
Department of State had accepted as well founded the view, propounded by vir-
tually all Greek factions but most loudly by the Left, that his complicity in the
dictatorship of General John Metaxas had rendered the Greek monarch, George II,
thoroughly unpopular among his subjects and that he should not be permitted to
return to his throne until a plebiscite had decided the matter in his favor. Moreover,
the king's influence was believed to be a hindrance to the Greek government and a
cause of unrest and factionalism among the Greek armed forces as well as the
resistance groups. Since Britain openly supported King George, the Department of
State wished to dissociate itself from that policy and repeatedly reproached the
British for their declared intention to "sell the King" to the Greeks. "If the King
can 'sell' himself to the Greek people" argued the Department in a message to the
British embassy, "despite having let them down several times before, well and good.
The selling job should not, however, be undertaken by a foreign power."6 And
elsewhere: "This Government believes that the principal Allied Governments should
carefully avoid any action which would create the impression that they intend to
impose the King on the Greek people under the protection of an Allied invading
force or that the Greek people can secure the rewards of the common victory only
at the price of accepting the return of the monarchy. This Government would
regard it as a great tragedy should any civil disturbances arise in Greece as a result
of internal opposition to the return of the King, in which it might be necessary for
Allied troops to intervene."7
In view of the above considerations the Department of State had taken the
position that both the king and his government in exile under Premier Emmanuel
Tsouderos should remain outside Greece "until there has been an opportunity for
the people to express their will freely under the auspices of an impartial Allied

5. I am grateful to Costa G. Couvaras of Glendale, California, for detailed information and

records concerning OSS's "Pericles Mission," which he headed. For a brief summary of the
Mission'sactivities, see OSS, Labor Desk Report 32308, 25 Aug. - 1944. Records of the Office of
Strategic Services,National Archives,Washington,D.C.
6. Department of State Publication 7665, Foreign Relations of the United States [here-
after FLUS], 1943, IV: The Near East and Africa (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1964), pp. 126-27. For details see John O. Iatrides, "United States Attitudes
Toward Greece During World War n," in Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas (Thessaloniki:
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1975), pp. 599-625. On Britain's wartime policy toward Greece,
see Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, British Policy Toward Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia
and Greece (London: Macmillan, 1975); Elizabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe
in the Second World War (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976); and Llewellyn Woodward,
History of the Second World War 3 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970-71),
and in particular III, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War383-439.
7. FRUS, 1943, IV, 133-34.
36

occupation."8 This last element, which represented the substance of the American
policy on Greece, was abruptly abandoned by the president on 22 August 1943, at
the First Quebec Conference, when he endorsed Churchill's demand that the Greek
monarch be permitted to return to his throne "as soon as possible." Although the
statement also referred to a plebiscite, there was no mention of its timing or of an
international supervision.9 Disregarding the strongly held views of his diplomatic
advisers, Roosevelt had simply decided not to frustrate Churchill's wishes in the
matter.
That the president had given the Greek constitutional issue little thought became
clear several months later when, meeting MacVeagh in Cairo on 3 December, he
argued once more that King George, whom he had found "nice but stupid," should
be treated fairly and be permitted to return freely and at the head of the Greek
troops. Roosevelt also thought, however, that the king should be merely a figure-
head, confining himself to ceremonial roles and remaining strictly outside politics.
When MacVeagh explained that, in view of the highly political record of the Greek
monarchy and the prevailing passions, such a neutral role was not possible, Roose-
velt laughingly suggested that the best solution for the problems of the Greeks-and
of the Yugoslavs-might be "to put walls around them and let those inside fight it
out, and report when all was over who was top dog!"l0
Ironically, at this juncture the president's support for the king's early return was
in conflict with the position of the Foreign Office. Mindful of the mounting opposi-
tion to the Greek monarchy and since the United States had already vetoed British
plans for an Allied invasion of the Balkans-which would have provided the means
for imposing political stability in the liberated lands-Foreign Minister Anthony
Eden now proposed that King George await the results of a national plebiscite
before returning to Greece. Both MacVeagh in Cairo and the Department of State
were aware of this Zew British position and naturally concurred with it. Once again,
however, Roosevelt disregarded the advice of his diplomats, this time succumbing
to an impulsive sympathy for the hapless monarch. After seeing King George in
Cairo on 6 December, the president denounced Eden's plan as a "pistol put to the
head" of the king and directed MacVeagh to take no part in "any effort to force
the King's decision against his will."11 Believing to have gained American endorse-
ment of his stand, George refused to alter his declared intention to return at the
moment of liberation.
The controversy surrounding the monarch's future and the composition of his
government soon led to several mutinies among the Greek troops in the Middle East
and to more militant anti-monarchist proclamations in the Greek mountains.
MacVeagh, whose informants were in direct contact with the mutineers, advised his

8. Ibid., p. 127.
9. Ibid. p. 148.
10. MacVeaghDiary, 3 Dec. 1943.
11. Ibid, 6 Dec. 1943.
 37

superiors fully on the nature of the crisis. Once again, however, without consulting
the Department of State, Roosevelt jumped into the affair. In a public statement
addressed to Prime Minister Churchill, he expressed his displeasure over the in-
cidents and proclaimed his hope that "everywhere Greeks will retain their sense of
proportion and will set aside pettiness." The president urged all Greeks to "show a
personal unselfishness which is so necessary now and think of their glorious
past."12 To most Greeks, concerned less with their glorious past than with their
country's uncertain political future, the president's words appeared to offer moral
support to the royal cause.
By the summer of 1944 the president had once again lost interest in Greek
squabbles and was prepared to let Britain regain full control of the smoldering
crisis. After first heeding Secretary Hull's determined opposition to any move
toward "spheres of influence," Roosevelt gave in to Churchill's persistent pleas to
permit an Anglo-Soviet understanding concerning their respective responsibilities in
the Balkans. Despite the many disclaimers and the professed limitations placed on
the American assent, Roosevelt had in effect recognized Britain's predominant
interest in that troublesome region.13 As in earlier instances, the Department of
State had to content itself with copies of the president's all-important messages to
Churchill.
If it can be argued that Secretary Hull's position regarding the Balkans had been
essentially negative, the same cannot be said of MacVeagh's. Maintaining that
"British moves are very different from what we conceive as agreed-upon programs
for the postwar world," and that Britain was too weak and far too partisan to be
successful in any contest with the Soviet Union, MacVeagh advocated a strong
American initiative. "To keep Britain and Russia from eventually conflicting in this
region," he wrote Roosevelt on 17 February 1944, "the Balkan states may be
reconstituted as genuinely free and friendly to both sides. Only the United States
can undertake this task. Are we to fight a war and sacrifice for victory the aims we
seek to win? So let it be known that the United States is running the job." Other-
wise, "the preponderance of power in Europe will certainly drag them [the
Balkans] to Russia's side if we sell them down the river to the British."14 Several
months later he wrote Roosevelt that the presence of Soviet troops in Eastern
Europe was raising fears there which "will doubtless be intensified when Russia is
no longer simply one of the great powers but the only great power remaining on the
European continent." This could only lead to a contest between Russia and Britain.

12. Department of State Publication 7859, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, V:
The Near East, South Asia, Africa, the Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1965), p. 99.
13. FRUS, 1944, V, 112-33. See also Stephen G. Xydis, "The Secret Anglo-SovietAgree-
ment on the Balkans of October 9, 1944," Journal of Central European Affairs, 15 (Oct. 1955),
248-71.
14. MacVeaghletter to Roosevelt, 17 Feb. 1944, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park,
New York [hereafter Roosevelt Library].
38

"Can this be prevented from becoming more than a game? If it leads to war, I
suppose we shall again be involved."1 A few weeks later MacVeagh warned the
president that the British were keeping Moscow in the dark on economic and relief
operations being planned for the Balkans and that this practice could well appear to
the Soviet government "as masking an attempt at establishing a postwar zone of
influence." To remedy the situation he urged that the Russians "be brought more
closely into all our long-term planning" for the liberated areas.16 And on 15
October 1944 he reported that "subversive social forces are continuing to operate
powerfully in Greece today, and are receiving the open sympathy of Moscow, if not
its active support. I therefore still feel that, however the Russian Government may
formally keep its hands off, the Greece of the future is going to be very different
from the Greece we have known in the past." Nor was Greece the only nation that
required careful watching, for "eventually what goes on in the Balkans and the Near
East generally will have to be recognized as of prime importance to us." 1 7
MacVeagh was never encouraged to spell out his recommendations. However, it
is clear that he advocated a strong American role in the liberated countries of
Eastern Europe, coupling economic assistance with a military and diplomatic
presence of the kind which would contain Anglo-Soviet rivalry and foster political
stability while encouraging sufficient but controlled social change so as to win
popular support away from those bent on armed revolution. He believed that the
United States was uniquely qualified and equipped to serve as the region's "honest
broker" and that such a role would serve vital American interests and would be
welcomed by the people of the nations involved. In short, he felt that in Eastern
Europe America's powerful wartime role should be continued after military opera-
tions had ceased.
Whatever the details of his thinking, during the period under review his ideas
met with "undiscriminating indifference," occasionally broken by a reminder from
the Department of State that neither the president nor the military authorities
favored such an American commitment in the liberated areas. By the time official
Washington had "discovered" the Greek crisis in late 1946, Eastern Europe was the
battleground of the Cold War and a "holy wrath equally undiscriminating" was
about to be unleashed in the form of a new American doctrine.
MacVeagh's information concerning developments in occupied Greece was based
in part upon the reports of the approximately fifty OSS teams operating in that
country. As in neighboring states, the OSS was compelled to serve under the com-
mand of British SOE missions, while reporting directly to American superiors in
Cairo and Washington. The OSS's only independent mission in Greece, and indeed
in all of the Balkans, was attached to ELAS headquarters in Eastern Macedonia,

15. MacVeaghletter to Roosevelt, 15 May 1945, Roosevelt Library.

16. MacVeaghletter to Roosevelt, 23 June 1944, Roosevelt Library.
17. MacVeaghletter to Roosevelt, 15 Oct. 1944, Roosevelt Library.
 39

with which it soon developed an effective and cordial working relationship.18

Actually, the majority of OSS teams in Greece, while under orders to avoid involve-
ment in political issues, served in ELAS-dominated areas and communicated in their
reports a growing respect and even admiration for the leftist guerrillas. In words
reminiscent of intelligence messages of the same period from China, they com-
mented on the dynamism and political effectiveness of the leftist forces grouped in
EAM, and on the unpopularity of the country's traditional powerholders. More-
over, while there was no mistaking the dominant role of the Communist Party in
EAM, in the words of one OSS agent, "the old fears of the people toward the
Communists have disappeared. The fact that the Communists have changed a great
deal themselves has helped to alleviate that fear." In particular, the Communists no
longer attacked the institutions of private property, family, or religion, and strongly
denied any intention of seizing power by armed force. Their claim to political
influence after the war was to be based upon their impressive record in the re-
sistance and in the widespread support they enjoyed among the masses. 99
Influenced by his own political values and by a more sophisticated under-
standing of world trends, MacVeagh regarded communism as a serious threat to the
Greek state and his letters to Roosevelt quoted above reflect this fear. Nevertheless,
he saw the powerful leftist movement as the direct product of political, social, and
economic conditions in Greece, and of the debilitation of Greek society and tradit-
ional values under the devastating impact of the Metaxas dictatorship and of the
war. Britain's handling of Greek affairs served to further polarize and inflame
political passions, with EAM/ELAS the beneficiary of a growing mass movement.
Moreover, while the Soviet Union might be viewing this trend with satisfaction,
there was no evidence of active Soviet support for, or involvement in, the activities
of the Greek Communist Party. MacVeagh repeated with approval a remark of his
Soviet colleague accredited to the Greek Government in Cairo: "They are terribly
afraid of me here lest I engage in subversive activity. But I intend doing nothing of
the sort. I don't have to. Conditions in the country itself will do all that is neces-

* * *

The liberation of Greece in October, 1944, saw no immediate change in the

American policy of non-involvement. Despite his intimate knowledge of personal-
ities and issues in Athens, and his growing fear that the country was headed for
violent upheaval, MacVeagh kept himself aloof from the Papandreou government of
"National Unity" and its British patrons. He was convinced that efforts to provide
economic relief and political stability were inadequate and inept but there appeared

18. James G. Kellis, "The Development of U.S. Intelligence, 1941-1961," (Ph.D. diss.,
Georgetown University, 1962), pp. 92-98.
19. Reports of OSS "Pericles Mission," in author's possession.
20.' MacVeaghletter to Roosevelt, 15 Oct. 1944, Roosevelt Library.
40

to be nothing he could do to avert chaos and disaster. His attempts to elicit from
his superiors instructions and a positive policy on Greece continued to be fruitless
and he was compelled to deduce his government's position from his talks with the
president and Department of State officials the previous summer. In addition, there
was Secretary of State Stettinius' public comment-made on 3 December 1944,
following the outbreak of violence in Athens-that "the United States policy has
always been to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of other
nations." This pronouncement, which was clearly intended as a condemnation of
British handling of Greek problems, stressed Washington's continued determination
not to become involved in the crisis as well as its vague support for the Greek leftist
forces. "The American people," Stettinius noted, "have naturally viewed with
sympathy the aspirations of the resistance movement and the anti-fascist elements
in liberated countries.."21 1
In what appeared to be a practical application of this position, the Chief of U.S.
Naval Operations directed that no American ships be used for the logistic support
of the British in Greece.22 The president himself was reported angered by Britain's
involvement in efforts to disarm ELAS and in the ensuing fighting in Athens.23
Rejecting Churchill's appeals for American support of British policy in Greece,
Roosevelt now appeared to share leftist suspicions of the monarchy. He endorsed
the idea that the king should declare that he would remain away from Greece
"unless called for by popular plebiscite" and that in the meantime a regency
should be established to provide leadership above political passions.24 In Athens
MacVeagh was already giving discreet support to the growing movement to name
Archbishop Damascinos regent. Nevertheless, despite the obvious discrepancy
between British policy and American wishes in the matter, Roosevelt continued to
acknowledge London's responsibility in Greece as well as the need to maintain at
least the facade of allied harmony. The stormy conference in Athens on 26 Decem-
ber, in which Churchill sternly lectured the leaders of the Left on their misdeeds,
was attended by MacVeagh (as well as by the senior Soviet officer in the Greek
capital), who remained silent throughout, giving credence to Churchill's claim that
he spoke for all three Allied powers.
The December-January fighting in Athens did little to change the American
assessment of the deeper roots of the continuing crisis. MacVeagh and his superiors
in the Department of State thought that both the Left and the British-backed Right
were to blame. In order to prevent the resumption of civil war, MacVeagh expressed
the hope that once order had been restored, Britain would agree to the creation of
an American-British-Soviet commission to "oversee the holding of a plebiscite on
the regime and guarantee impartial settlement of other critical problems likely to

21. FRUS, 1944, V, 148. See also latrides, pp. 132-99.

22. latrides, Revolt in Athens, p. 213.
23. Elliot Roosevelt, As,He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), pp. 222-24.
24. FRUS, 1944,V, 150-51.
 41

cause trouble." In this manner, "confidence in British intentions which is so sadly if

unjustly lacking throughout the Greek world" might be restored.25
With the Department of State cool to the idea, MacVeagh's recommendation for
a tripartite commission was not immediately taken up. It was, however, destined to
be revived once more, by Roosevelt himself. On 21 March 1945, he proposed to
Churchill that a special allied commission be sent to Greece to assist in that
country's reconstruction by "concerted, non-political action," which could have a
"highly constructive effect on world opinion at this time." When Churchill quickly
rejected the notion of a Soviet role in Greece and counter-proposed an Anglo-
American commission, the president considered the British move as dangerous to
postwar relations with Moscow and dismissed it as a "mistake."26
In the summer of 1945, with Roosevelt dead, the war in Europe ended, and
serious difficulties with the Soviet Union already threatening the postwar order,
there were signs that the United States was revising its perception of the Greek
crisis. This changing attitude reflected the tendency of American officials to view
Greek issues not merely in the light of East-West tensions elsewhere, but as the
direct result of Soviet policy. While the causes of turbulence in Greece remained
essentially the same as they had been throughout the war, they now assumed a new
and ominous significance. Accordingly, criticism of British action was now replaced
by cautious endorsement of London's efforts to organize the Greek security forces,
form a stable coalition of the major anti-Communist factions, and hold elections
before, not after, the expected plebiscite as the Varkiza agreement27 had pre-
scribed and as the Left, smarting from the defeat and demoralization of its forces in
the December revolt, continued to demand. Earlier American disapproval of the
Greek monarchy and unconcealed sympathy for the republican side were gradually
reversed: King George was soon viewed by the Truman Administration as the .
much-needed stabilizing factor against internal and foreign enemies, while the re-
'
publican Left was blamed for the December tragedy and for the country's con-
tinuing ills. Indeed, the palace would soon emerge as a major ally of American
policy in Greece. At the same time, the Left was no longer regarded as a powerful
coalition of various factions united in their legitimate opposition to the monarchy's
return and as the natural outgrowth of recent Greek history but as the dangerously
misguided following of a subversive Communist Party acting as the agent of
Moscow. Despite a critical press the American government made only half-hearted

25. Ibid., p. 145. "I feel certain," MacVeaghwrote, "that the present drastic foreign sup-
port being given to one side of a local Greek quarrel in which so much genuine patriotic fervor
and even fanaticism is enlisted in the other contains little if any hope of furnishing a durable
solution unless it can be followed by some such clear proof of genuine impartial interest in the
Greek people as a whole."
26. Iatrides, Revolt in Athens, p. 255.
27. The Varkiza agreement of 12 Feb. 1945, concluded between the Greek Government and
the Greek Left, officially ended the civil war of December-January and provided the basis for
the resolution of the country's political problems. Text of the agreement in ibid., pp. 320-24.
320-24.
42

attempts to discourage the rightist oppression and excesses which began to sweep
the country in 1945,28 and to keep the more offensive representatives of the Right
out of the government.29 American observers participated in the supervision of the
elections of 31 March 1946, finally boycotted by the Left, which were won by the
Populists (Right), and of the plebiscite which returned the King the following
September. Alarmed by the problems he was encountering with the Soviet Union in
the Council of Foreign Ministers, Secretary of State Byrnes now lectured Prime
Minister C. Tsaldaris on the proper role of the monarchy30 and assured the British
Government that the United States would subsidize British efforts to protect and
stabilize Greece. The policy of non-involvement was already a thing of the past;
replacing Britain as Greece's protector was a short step ahead.
It would be inaccurate to suggest that already in 1946 the United States had
assumed the burden of responsibility in Greece. There still remained strong reluc-
tance to finance economic reconstruction and to oversee political stabilization,31
while there was also growing impatience with the apparent inability of Britain and
the various governments in Athens to pursue those twin objectives with any
measure of success. Greek territorial and reparation claims received scant support
from Washington and Greece was warned that its demands were causing further
tension in the Balkans. But as the civil war began to flare up again in the fall of
1946, there was every indication that the American government was conditioning
itself for the complete abandonment of its policy of non-involvement.32 Although
Soviet responsibility for the Greek crisis could not be verified (indeed, the Greek
government knew that no such responsibility existed), the occasional assistance
which the guerrillas received from the Communist regimes in the Balkans was
accepted as proof that Greece was the target of Moscow-directed international
Communist aggression. In Athens MacVeagh began serving as the most influential
advisor of the Greek monarch and of political leaders, replacing his British colleague
in that role.33 Soon American pressures would compel Tsaldaris to surrender his
high post to a more "liberal" personality. In the United Nations Soviet-bloc charges
against the Greek government were the object of a carefully prepared American
plan for a diplomatic counterattack. United Nations action in the matter revealed
that the East-West split was now hardening. Before the end of 1946 an American
mission to Greece would launch a massive study of the country's economic prob-

28.' On the persecution of the republican Left after 1945, see Constantine Tsoucalas, Tote
Greek Tragedy (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), pp. 85-102. On the immediate origins of the civil
war of 1946-49, see Woodhouse, pp. 169-203.
29. Department of State Publication 8490, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946,
VII: The Near East and Africa (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p.
237.
30. DSR, FW 868.00/10-846, 1 Oct. 1946.
31. FRUS, 1946, VII, 171-72.
32. Ibid., p. 209.
33. Ibid, p. 233.
 43

lems and of the manner in which systematic American assistance could be effec-
tively utilized.34 Once this process had begun, there was no doubt in American
government circles that the success of the contemplated program would require
direct American control of Greek affairs.35
The Greek crisis had now been fully submerged into a contest of global propor-
tions. Navy Secretary James Forrestal was expressing the view that the "central
problem" in the Greek situation was "Which of the two systems currently offered
the world is to survive."36 Senator Arthur Vandenberg reflected that events in
Greece were "probably symbolic of the world-wide ideological clash between
Eastern Communism and Western Democracy: and it may easily be the thing which
requires us to make some very fateful and far-reaching decisions."37 For Under
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the issue was similarly clear and compelling:
"Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the [Communist] corruption of
Greece would infect Iran and all to the east. It would carry infection to Africa
through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy and France...." The
result would be global disaster: "a highly possible Soviet breakthrough might open
three continents to Soviet penetration."38

* * *

By the end of 1946, reacting to growing frustrations and conflict with the Soviet
Union, the United States had transformed its policy on Greece from one of "un-
discriminating indifference" to that of "holy wrath equally undiscriminating."
Alarmed by issues which appeared to be worldwide in character, the United States
now perceived Greece more as the place where the policy of containment of Soviet
power could be safely implemented (as contrasted with China, where it could not)
and less as a nation deeply troubled by internal cleavages whose solution would
require patient, sweeping, and long-range reform, economic support, and above all
else, compromise and peaceful accommodation. The realities of the Greek crisis,
which only twenty months earlier had been quite obvious to Washington, were now
swept aside, distorted by the perception of a global confrontation soon to be
labelled the "Cold War."

Southern Corcnecticut State College

34. Ibid., p. 278. '

35. Department of State Publication 8592, Foreign Relations of the United Statess, i 947,
V: The Near East and Africa (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p.
379.
36. Walter Mills,ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Cassell,1952), pp. 245-46.
37. Arthur H. Vandenberg, ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (New York:
Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 340.
38. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 219.