AIRCurrents

Loma Prieta’s Legacy,

Twenty Years On Editor’s note: This year marks the 20th anniversary of the October 17,
1989, Loma Prieta earthquake, the most destructive in northern California
since the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. Dr. Mehrdad Mahdyiar, AIR Director
of Earthquake Hazard, and Dr. Paolo Bazzurro, AIR Principal Engineer and

10.2009
Director of Engineering Analysis and Research, discuss some noteworthy
characteristics of the event and explore how the lessons learned in the
past twenty years have shaped our current approach to earthquake loss
estimation.

By Dr. Mehrdad Mahdyiar and Dr. Paolo Bazzurro

The World Series Earthquake

At 5:04 p.m. on October 17, 1989, minutes before the
scheduled start of the third game of the World Series, a
strong earthquake struck the Bay Area. Millions of television
viewers around the world watched as the earthquake and
its aftermath unfolded in real-time. Remarkably, no one was
injured at San Francisco’s Candlestick Park that evening, and
the mostly local fans of the two Bay Area contending teams,
who in customary California fashion pride themselves on
remaining unfazed by earthquakes, erupted into cheers and
applause. Unbeknownst to them, the situation was quite
different elsewhere.

Across the Bay in Oakland, the upper deck portion of a
stretch of Interstate 880 known as the Cypress Viaduct fell
onto the lower deck, crushing cars below. A 50-ft span of
the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge collapsed, closing for
a month a crucial transportation link between San Francisco
and the East Bay, which served over 300,000 commuters
every day. In San Francisco’s Marina District, about 50 miles
from the epicenter, seven wood-frame buildings collapsed
and more than 60 others were too damaged to reoccupy.
Figure 1. Collapsed portions of the Cypress Viaduct (left) and the San Francisco-
Oakland Bay Bridge (right). Source: USGS
Farther south, closer to the earthquake’s epicenter, damage
was more concentrated. In Santa Cruz, the historic city
center, including the Pacific Garden Mall, was devastated
and hundreds of businesses were affected. In towns
like Hollister, Watsonville, and Los Gatos, weak masonry
buildings suffered widespread damage ranging from cracked
walls and fallen facades to complete collapse, and many
homes were thrown off their foundations.

In total, the Loma Prieta earthquake was responsible for
63 deaths, 42 from the Cypress Viaduct collapse alone,
and over 3000 injuries. More than 1300 commercial
and residential buildings were destroyed, and another
20,000 damaged to some degree. More than 16,000
housing units were rendered uninhabitable in ten Bay
Area counties, leaving thousands of people homeless. In
addition, transportation links (bridges and freeways in
particular), communications systems, and utilities were
severely disrupted. Direct damage estimated by various
organizations ranged between $6 billion to $12 billion in
1989 dollars.
The Unusual Suspects: Surprising
Rupture Characteristics
The fault rupture, which extended along a 25 mile segment
of the northern San Andreas Fault, originated near the
Loma Prieta peak in the Santa Cruz Mountains, some
60 miles south of San Francisco. The quake registered a
moment magnitude of 6.9 and was felt from as far away as
Los Angeles, southern Oregon, and western Nevada.
In 1988 the Working Group on California Earthquake
Probabilities assigned that very fault segment a 30%
probability of producing a magnitude 6 to 7 earthquake
in the following 30 years—the highest probability among
those faults studied in the Bay Area. So while the vast
majority of Bay Area residents had never experienced
a strong earthquake (and indeed may have become
somewhat complacent), the location and magnitude of the
earthquake did not surprise seismologists. A few unusual
characteristics of the event, however, have given researchers
a lot to think about in the years since.
First was the relatively short duration of strong shaking
during the quake, which at 10 to 15 seconds was
approximately half as long as would be expected from an
earthquake of this magnitude. This was likely because the
start of the rupture was located in the middle of the fault
segment, instead of at the end. Consequently, the rupture
progressed simultaneously in both directions, cutting short
the travel time. This brought up concerns of whether
the damage caused by Loma Prieta should be considered
representative for Bay Area earthquakes, as a more typical
earthquake with a longer duration of strong shaking would
likely have been more destructive.
A second surprising feature was the depth of the
earthquake and the faulting mechanism. The depth at
the point of rupture (focal point) has been estimated at
AIRCurrents
10.09|Loma Prieta’s Legacy, Twenty Years On
By Dr. Mehrdad Mahdyiar and Dr. Paolo Bazzurro
more than 10 miles—unusually deep compared to typical
shallow crustal events on the San Andreas Fault. Also
contrary to conventional wisdom was the large reverse-slip
thrust component of the fault motion, which caused over
4 feet of vertical displacement, in addition to the expected
horizontal, right-lateral, strike-slip motion that generated
a maximum horizontal displacement of about 6 feet. The
fault rupture propagated upward for several miles, but—
probably as a result of its unusual depth—did not break the
ground surface. Instead of a continuous visible fault trace
on the ground, surface cracks appeared in a diffuse and
indistinct area along the fault zone, which caused damage
to houses, roads, and underground pipelines.
While the fault segment that ruptured in 1989 overlaps
the segment that ruptured during the 1906 San Francisco
earthquake, the unusual depth and rupture geometry
suggest that the two earthquakes may have occurred on
different fault planes. Seismologists have consequently
proposed that the Loma Prieta quake did not release strain
accumulated on the northern San Andreas Fault since the
1906 event, leaving the probability of a stronger shallow
quake essentially unchanged. As a point of comparison (and
keeping in mind that rupture length correlates well with
magnitude), the 1906 earthquake ruptured nearly 300 miles
of the San Andreas Fault, while the Loma Prieta earthquake
ruptured only 25. A larger quake closer to urban centers,
and one that will more rigorously test the Bay Area’s
building stock, seems all but inevitable (click here for the
latest rupture probability forecast).
Figure 2. Rupture lengths of the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake and the 1989
Loma Prieta Earthquake. Source: AIR
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10.09|Loma Prieta’s Legacy, Twenty Years On
By Dr. Mehrdad Mahdyiar and Dr. Paolo Bazzurro

Ground Motion, Soil Failure, and a Few

More Surprises

Soil Amplification
In 1989, the Bay Area was well instrumented by the
California Strong Motion Instrumentation Program and
the United States Geological Survey, which provided more
than one hundred strong motion records at locations with
different underlying geology, including sites on rock, soft
soil and landfill. Maximum recorded peak accelerations
exceeded 0.6g at rock sites near the epicenter and soil
sites displayed significant ground motion amplification—by
as much as 200% to 300%—compared to adjacent rock
sites. Figure 3 shows comparisons of recorded acceleration
at locations with various site conditions versus adjacent Figure 4. Comparison of ground motions recorded at Treasure Island and Yerba
bedrock sites in the Bay Area. While scientists had observed Buena Island. Source: Housner, 1990

these site effects in previous quakes—most notably during

the 1985 Mexico City quake just a few years prior—no
general attenuation function had yet been developed to
account for soft soils.
Figure 3. Average acceleration amplification at Bay Area sites compared to
adjacent bedrock sites. Source: Adapted from National Research Council, 1994
One particularly interesting case study involved two
adjoining islands in the San Francisco Bay, Treasure Island
and Yerba Buena Island, both located at a distance of about
50 miles from the epicenter. Treasure Island was created in
the 1920s by hydraulically filling sand over underwater bay
mud deposits, while Yerba Buena Island is a natural rock
outcrop. Recordings obtained during the main shock of
the Loma Prieta earthquake as well as during subsequent
aftershocks showed significant amplification at the soft soil
Treasure Island site, where recorded peak accelerations were
more than two times higher than those at Yerba Buena
Island.
The Moho
While shaking was undoubtedly stronger on soft
sediment sites, this alone could not sufficiently explain the
anomalously strong observations recorded at considerable
distance from the epicenter–even at rock sites. Several
studies1 have suggested that seismic waves from the Loma
Prieta earthquake hit a boundary called the Mohorovičić
discontinuity (or Moho), located between the earth’s crust
and mantle. Because of the difference in density between
these two layers, waves that strike at a sufficiently shallow
angle bounce back to the surface with increased strength,
instead of decreasing monotonically with distance from the
epicenter—a phenomenon called critical reflection. These
reflections, collectively referred to as the Moho bounce,
are believed to have increased ground motions by a factor
of two or three in the San Francisco and Oakland areas.
Recognizing that past attenuations relationships may
underpredict ground motion at certain distances from the
epicenter, seismologists have incorporated flat portions
into modern equations to account for this phenomenon.
(For a thorough discussion of the latest research on ground
motion attenuation in California, see the AIR Current
Ground Motion Prediction—The Next Generation.)
Liquefaction
In addition to stressing the importance of geological
conditions in determining seismic hazard, the Loma Prieta
earthquake also confirmed concerns regarding the Bay
Area’s vulnerability to liquefaction—the phenomenon that
causes loose water-saturated soil to behave as a liquid when

1 Somerville and Yoshimura (1990); Catchings and Kohler (1996).

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subjected to strong shaking. Under the right conditions,
artificial landfill and loosely compacted natural deposits can
lose their ability to resist compacting, spreading, or sliding,
as well as their ability to support structures, roads, and
underground utilities. Liquefaction was observed at many
locations during the earthquake, including Santa Cruz,
Watsonville, Moss Landing, and Oakland, but particularly
hard hit were parts of San Francisco, where the pattern of
liquefaction damage eerily echoed that during the 1906
quake. In the Marina District, which was created after the
1906 earthquake using manmade landfill, liquefaction
contributed to the collapse of several buildings (see Figure
5).
Figure 5. Liquefaction contributed to the collapse of this four-story wood frame
building in the Marina District. Source: USGS
In general, existing liquefaction susceptibility maps at the
time accurately identified areas prone to damage, although
some inconsistencies stressed the need for more detailed
mapping of subsurface conditions. Additionally, the
earthquake provided one of the first opportunities to test
ground compaction and other soil stabilization methods
meant to mitigate damage in liquefaction-prone areas.
Encouragingly, no ground failure occurred on any improved
sites and thus no building damage occurred to structures
built on such sites. Buildings on adjacent unimproved sites,
on the other hand, displayed settlement and resultant
cracking.
Building Performance and Seismic
Design
The Usual Suspects
Given the remote location of the epicenter and fairly
limited ground motions, buildings generally performed
AIRCurrents
10.09|Loma Prieta’s Legacy, Twenty Years On
By Dr. Mehrdad Mahdyiar and Dr. Paolo Bazzurro
reasonably well during the Loma Prieta earthquake and
engineers reported no significant surprises. Buildings
that were designed and constructed well withstood the
earthquake well; the types of structures that failed—some
catastrophically—were previously known to be vulnerable.
For example, when the Cypress Viaduct and the Bay Bridge
were constructed (in the 1950s and 1930s, respectively),
seismic design standards for bridges did not include any
provisions for ductility. But after 1971 San Fernando
earthquake, during which several brittle concrete structures
collapsed, the need for these structures to be reinforced
with steel to enhance ductility was widely recognized and
put into practice for new structures in the 1976 Uniform
Building Code.
Likewise, a consistent pattern of failure of unreinforced
masonry (URM) buildings—first identified during the
1868 San Francisco earthquake—repeated itself (quite
disastrously) in 1906 and in subsequent California
earthquakes in 1925, 1933, 1952, 1971, 1983, and 1987.
Not surprisingly, then, the pattern was repeated during the
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. According to the Association
of Bay Area Governments, 12% of the units rendered
uninhabitable by the Loma Prieta earthquake were located
in URM buildings, even though they accounted for only 1%
of Bay Area housing stock. While the Field Act passed after
the 1933 Long Beach prohibited new URM construction,
many older masonry buildings remain standing today
and, unless adequately retrofitted, will inevitably fail in
disproportionate numbers in the next big quake.
The most significant source of property damage during the
Loma Prieta earthquake was to wood frame construction,
which is to be expected given that this construction type
dominates residential exposure in California. The light
weight of these buildings minimizes inertial forces and,
therefore, the strain imparted on the building’s structural
elements. While most such wood frame buildings
performed well, older single family homes in the epicentral
region that were not properly secured to their foundations
or that had weak cripple walls below the first floor did not.
Severe damage was also observed to multifamily wood-
frame structures with open spaces on the ground floor used
for parking or retail purposes. These so-called “soft stories”
lack the ability to resist significant lateral forces and are
prone to collapse, especially when built on soft soils, as in
the Marina District.
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What Will Happen Next Time?
While engineers had foreseen the severity of damage
that an earthquake like Loma Prieta would incur, this is
not to say that the event had no far reaching impact on
our understanding of building vulnerability or on seismic
analysis. In particular, the interesting geotechnical aspects
of the event provided a clear basis for strengthening seismic
codes for structures built on soft soils. Additionally, the
wealth of observational data resulting from the earthquake
provided engineers with guidance in selecting ground
motion records appropriate for seismic design.
There remains considerable uncertainty regarding future
building performance in the face of larger magnitude Bay
Area earthquakes. For example, the Loma Prieta quake
demonstrated once again that soft soils not only increased
ground shaking, but also altered the frequency content of
the ground motion, in particular by amplifying the long-
period components by as much as eight to ten times. In
addition, larger magnitude earthquakes are expected to
be significantly richer in long-period components of the
ground motions. This has significant implications for tall
buildings built in the 1970s and 80s on reclaimed land
in downtown San Francisco, whose response in the next
great quake will certainly exceed design specifications. Also
untested are the retrofit efforts from the last two decades
that aim to mitigate some of the types of damage observed
during Loma Prieta, especially for URM and wood-frame
buildings.
Conclusion
For now, the 1906 M7.8 earthquake remains the defining
event for illustrating Northern California earthquake
potential. Were it to recur today, AIR estimates ground-
up losses (monetary damage to all properties, before the
application of insurance terms) of $308 billion, compared to
$37 billion for a recurrence of the Loma Prieta earthquake.
Nevertheless, the 1989 event, as the first truly significant
AIRCurrents
10.09|Loma Prieta’s Legacy, Twenty Years On
By Dr. Mehrdad Mahdyiar and Dr. Paolo Bazzurro
Bay Area quake since 1906, left a far-reaching legacy in
seismological, geotechnical, and engineering inquiry and
served as a crucial wake-up call to the public to prepare for
the next “Big One.” Fortunately for residents and business
owners, the Bay Area has some of the strictest seismic
codes in the world, which have improved significantly as a
result of lessons learned from past earthquakes. However,
these codes do not apply retroactively and the explosive
growth of exposures in the Bay Area after 1906 remains
largely untested by strong ground motions.
The Loma Prieta earthquake stressed some important
geotechnical lessons—especially regarding soft soil
amplification and liquefaction—that resulted in significant
improvements in subsequent design codes. The earthquake
also provided a wealth of data that has led researchers to
develop superior analytical methods for quantifying these
geotechnical effects.
While the engineering community reported no real
surprises, there was a large gap between the state of
scientific knowledge and societal expectations regarding
acceptable building performance. Structures were largely
designed to avoid collapse and ensure life safety, and the
general public was shocked by the larger economic impact
resulting from post-earthquake business interruption and
loss-of-use. Current practice is gradually leaning toward
bridging this divide by implementing performance-based,
rather than prescriptive, design and analysis (see the AIR
Current Nonlinear Dynamic Analysis—a Step Advance
in Assessing the Vulnerability of Buildings to Earthquake
Ground Motion for more information on performance-
based earthquake engineering). Earthquakes of course
are characterized by considerable uncertainty, and the
unknowns with respect to the next big Bay Area event may
seem daunting. While many challenges remain, the last
twenty years since the Loma Prieta earthquake have seen
tremendous progress in our understanding of the natural
phenomenon and our ability to prepare for the inevitable.
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10.09|Loma Prieta’s Legacy, Twenty Years On
By Dr. Mehrdad Mahdyiar and Dr. Paolo Bazzurro

References
Association of Bay Area Governments (2003), “Loma Prieta and Northridge Were a Wake-Up Call,”
http://www.abag.ca.gov/bayarea/eqmaps/nightmare/problem2003.pdf

Hess, R.L. (2008), “Impacts of a M7.8 Southern San Andreas Earthquake on Unreinforced Masonry
(URM) Buildings,” U.S. Geological Survey Open File Report 2008-1150

Catchings, R.D., Kohler, W.M. (1996), “Reflected seismic waves and their effect on strong shaking
during the 1989 Loma Prieta, California, earthquake,” Bulletin of the Seismological Society of
America; October 1996; v. 86; no. 5; p. 1401-1416

Holzer, T.L. (1998), “The Loma Prieta, California, Earthquake of October 17, 1989—Liquefaction,” U.S.
Geological Survey Professional Paper 1551-B

Housner, G.W. et. al. (1990), “Competing Against Time,” Report to Governor George Deukmejian from
the Governor’s Board of Inquiry on the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake

Kircher, C.A., Seligson, H.A., et. al. (2006), “When the Big One Strikes Again – Estimated Losses due to a
Repeat of the 1906 San Francisco Earthquake,” Earthquake Spectra Volume 22, Issue S2

National Research Council, Geotechnical Board (1994), “Practical Lessons from the Loma Prieta
Earthquake,” National Academy of Sciences

Segall, P., Lisowski, M. (1990), “Surface Displacements in the 1906 San Francisco and 1989 Loma Prieta
Earthquakes,” Science, 30 November 1990: Vol. 250. no. 4985, pp. 1241 - 1244

Somerville, P., Yoshimura, J. (1990), “The influence of critical Moho Reflections on strong ground
motions recorded in San Francisco and Oakland during the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake,”
Geophysical Research Letters, 17(8), 1203–1206.

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