RULE 3 Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the

PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS capacity to sue, to the same extent, a decedent does not
have the capacity to be sued and may not be named a
Section 1. Who may be parties party defendant in a court action.

Hence, there can be no doubt that a deceased person or

GAFFNEY v. BUTLER, G.R. No. 219408
his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil
Campaner, Faith Angeli M.
action as they lack legal personality.
FACTS:
Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and
 Donald Gaffney filed a complaint against Gina
he could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the
Butler for sum of money.
present ordinary civil suit for collection.
 Donald alleged that sometime in 2006-2007, Gina
and her husband, Anthony, invited Donald to
Failure to state a cause of action
invest in ActiveFun Corporation.
As such, the complaint against him should be dismissed
 Anthony died in December 2009.
on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states
 When the proposed investment did not
no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action
materialize, Donald demanded the return of his
pursuant to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
investments from Gina.
because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of
 Because no full relief can be had against the
action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
Estate/heirs of Anthony Richard Butler under the
original Complaint, Donald filed a Motion for
Lack of jurisdiction
Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the
The Regional Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction over
purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs of
the person or estate of Anthony. Summons is a writ by
the late Anthony Richard Butler [as additional
which the defendant is notified of the action brought
party-defendant] allegedly represented by Gina
against him and service thereof is the means by which the
as his surviving spouse.
court acquires jurisdiction over his person. In the present
 Gina opposed the motion primarily on the
case, no valid service of summons upon the deceased
ground that "only natural or juridical persons may
Anthony was or could have been made, precisely because
be parties in an ordinary civil action."
he was already dead even before the complaint against
him and his wife was filed in court. In several occasions,
ISSUE: The estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his
the Court has held that the trial court fails to acquire
surviving spouse Gina, could be named as additional
jurisdiction over a defendant who was already dead at the
defendant in the present case.
time the complaint was filed against him.
RULING: NO.
Conclusion
A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued
In sum, impleading the deceased Anthony or his estate in
and may not be made a defendant in a case.
the present petition was improper. The action against him
must be dismissed and the same may just be filed as a
Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
claim against his estate in a proper proceeding.
"Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by
law may be parties in a civil action."
Sections 2. Parties in interest
Applying this legal provision, the Court, in Ventura v.
Militante, declared that neither a deceased person nor his CONSUMIDO vs ROS, G.R. No. 166875
estate has capacity to be sued. Concepcion, Elaizza

Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party FACTS:

plaintiff in a court action. A deceased person does not
have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so
much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should
be denied by the court.
Spouses Saura filed a complaint for unlawful detainer
against Digna Consumido. In their complaint, they alleged
that, That sometime in 1995, they entered into two lease
contracts with Digna Consumido, wherein they leased to
Digna 2 units (Unit 982 and Unit 980); that Digna

Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 1

undertook to pay rentals per month (PhP 6,400
and PhP 6,000, respectively); and that Digna started
defaulting on the rental payments (last quarter of 1995,
and August 1997), and despite repeated demands,
Digna failed to pay the accrued rentals and to vacate the
premises.
To this, Digna Consumido answered: That she entered in
the said lease contracts not with the Spouses Saura but
with the late Ramon Saura, Sr., the father of Ramon Saura,
Jr. (husband); that Ramon Sr. organized Villa Governor
Forbes Corporation (VGFC), the administrator of the
leased premises.; and that until June 1999, she religiously
paid the rentals to the Spouses Saura, who (merely) had
assumed the administration of the leased premises after
the death of Ramon, Sr., not knowing that as early as April
18, 1995, Sandalwood Real Estate Development (SRED)
had already bought the leased premises from VGFC.
The MeTC rendered a decision DISMISSING the ejectment
suit, ruling that VGFC was the lessor and
Spouses Saura merely acted as administrators and/or
representatives of VGFC upon the execution of the leased
agreements; that the Spouses Saura are not the real
parties-in-interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not Spouses Saura are real parties-in-
interest and are consequently entitled to file the
complaint for unlawful detainer
RULING: One who has no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-
plaintiff in action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party in interest. A real party in interest is one
who has a legal right. Since a contract may be violated
only by the parties thereto as against each other, in an
action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest,
either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the
said contract.
In an action for unlawful detainer, the real parties-in-
interest are the landlord, the vendor, the vendee, and any
other person against whom the lawful possession of the
land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right
to hold possession by virtue of a contract. This case is for
unlawful detainer. There was however no written lease
agreement thus there is no need for the court to
determine who are the parties to the contract. And as was
rightly found by the trial court, it was Forbes Corp which
was the lessor or the landlord being the registered owner.
The records show that Digna Consumido did not enter
into the lease agreement with Spouses Saura. Other than
their bare allegations, the Spouses failed to present
sufficient evidence showing that they are the landlords of
the leased premises or its successors-in-interest or are
authorized to institute the ejectment suit in the name of
the real party in interest. That Spouses Saura were parties
to the lease agreement is not supported by the evidence
on record. The Spouses were able to establish only as far
as accepting the rental payments from Digna. However,
this fact alone cannot vest in them the right of a landlord
but of a mere administrator or representative of the late
Ramon Saura, Sr. and/or VGFC.
Thus, as pointed out by the MeTC, Spouses Saura cannot
institute the ejectment suit in their personal capacities.
They must present their authority to prosecute the
ejectment suit in the name of the real party in interest,
which is now Sandalwood Real Estate Corp, being the
present owner. This the Spouses failed to do.
Sections 5 and 6.
CENTRAL BANK vs BANCO FILIPINO, G.R. No.
173399
Macacua, Alvia Aisa B.
FACTS:
Central Bank ordered the closure of Banco Filipino. Three
cases were filed by Banco Filipino against the Monetary
Board of the Central Bank. These cases were consolidated.
Consequently, the Supreme Court nullified the order for
the closure of Banco Filipino.
During the pendency of the cases, RA 7653 otherwise
known as The New Central Bank Act of 1993 took effect.
Under the new law, the Central Bank was abolished and
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas was created.
After the lapse of more than 10 years, Banco Filipino filed
a second amended/supplemental complaint which
sought to include Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas as additional defendants.
However, Central Bank Board of Liquidators opposed
since it violates the rule on Joinder of parties. It alleged
that the second supplemental complaint raised new and
independent causes of action against a new party (BSP)
which was not an original party.
ISSUE: Whether the second supplemental complaint
violates the rule on joinder of parties
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 2
RULING: YES.
The second supplemental complaint violates the rule on
joinder of parties.
The joinder of causes of action is indeed allowed under
Section 5, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court; but if there
are multiple parties, the joinder is made subject to the
rules on joinder of parties under Section 6, Rule 3.
Specifically, before causes of action and parties can be
joined in a complaint involving multiple parties
(1) the right to relief must arise out of the same
transaction or series of transactions and
(2) there must be a question of law or fact common to all
the parties.
In the instant case, Banco Filipino is seeking to join the
BSP and its MB as parties to the complaint. However, they
have different legal personalities from those of the
defunct CB and its MB: firstly, because the CB was
abolished by R.A. 7653, and the BSP created in its stead;
and secondly, because the members of each MB are
natural persons.
These factors make the BSP and its MB different from the
CB and its MB. Furthermore, neither of the two
requirements for the joinder of causes of action and
parties was met.
The only common factor in all these allegations is Banco
Filipino bank itself as the alleged aggrieved party. Since
the BSP and its MB cannot be joined as parties, then
neither can the causes of action against them be joined.
Section 7. Compulsory joinder of Indispensable
Parties
LAGUNILLA vs VELASCO, G.R. No. 169276
Picot, Praisah Marjorey F.
FACTS:
Fr. Patricio, Magdalena, Venancio, Macaria (all surnamed
Monis) and Andrea Monis Velasco are siblings. Venancio
had two children (herein petitioners): Dionisia Monis
Lagunilla and Rafael Monis. Fr. Patricio and Magdalena
acquired several properties in Quezon City. The Q.C.
property was co-owned by Patricio and Magdalena with
Spouses Andrea Monis-Velasco and Pedro Velasco. After
death of Patricio and Magdalena, Andrea and Macaria
executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement with Donation
and donated it to Andrea’s Son: Pedro Monis Velasco Jr.
Dionisia and Rafael instituted an action for Annulment of
Documents and Damages before RTC on the ground of
the alleged fraudulent act committed by Andrea and
Macaria. After the SIBLINGS rested their case, they moved
for the amendment of the complaint to implead
additional party and to conform to the evidence
presented. They averred that the resolution of the case
would affect the interest of PEDRO as donee; hence, he is
an indispensable party.
The Regional Trial Court denied the motion, as the
amendment of the complaint would result in the
introduction of a different cause of action prejudicial to
the TITAS. The court further held that the amendment of
the complaint would unduly delay the resolution of the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pedro (donee) is an indispensable
party
RULING: YES.
Joinder of indispensable parties
 Joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.
 A condition sine qua non to the exercise of
judicial power.
 The absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
 Without the presence of indispensable parties to
the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain
finality.
 One who is not a party to a case is not bound by
any decision of the court; otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to due process.
 The case is generally remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings.
 The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action.
 The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed
to be indispensable.
 Parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and/or at such times as
are just.
 If the plaintiff refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the
court, then the court may dismiss the complaint
for the plaintiffs failure to comply with a lawful
court order.
 In light of the foregoing, a remand of the case
to the trial court is imperative.
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 3
In the case at bar, at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the TITLE to the Quezon City property was
already REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF PEDRO. His
interest in the controversy and in the subject matter is
not separable from the interest of the other parties.
His legal presence as a party to the proceedings is,
therefore, an absolute necessity.
MIRANDA vs BESA, G.R. No. 146513
Malicay Jr., Victor O.
FACTS:
Macaria Capuno was the owner of a property and she
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Spouses
Miranda and Feliza Garcia over a portion of the property.
Capuno filed an application for the registration of the two
lots under her name, the spouses Miranda did not file any
opposition to the application.
The Court granted the application declaring the applicant
Capuno to be the absolute owner, Capuno then executed
a deed of absolute sale in favor of Atty. Tomas Besa.
Capuno then filed a complaint with the court against Sps.
Besa for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale,
however the complaint was dismissed, and was appealed
to the IAC.
Meanwhile, Atty Besa sold the lots in favor of Circle Drugs
Corporation. Besa then subdivided the property, she then
discovered that the house of Lucia Miranda the daughter
of the Spouses Miranda occupied the portion of said lot.
Besa, then filed a complaint of unlawful detainer against
Lucia Miranda, in which the court ruled in favor of Besa.
Whereby, Lucia Miranda, her agents, successors-in-
interest and members of her family or any person(s)
allowed by her access to the property are directed to turn
over possession of the property to respondent and to
remove any improvements thereof.
Lucia Miranda contended that the complaint was
defective as it failed to implead her husband and siblings,
who are allegedly indispensable parties, is untenable.
ISSUE: WON her husband is an indispensable party?
RULING: No.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, indispensable parties are parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of
an action.
A party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is distinct and divisible from
the interest of the other parties, and will not necessarily
be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice
to the parties. In this light, the ruling of the appellate court
is apropos:
Clearly, this case is one of ejectment and Besa is ejecting
Miranda from the portion of the property being unlawfully
withheld by her. Obviously, the failure to implead her
brother and sister did not bar the lower court from making
a final adjudication against her considering that her
brother and sister are also occupying another portion of
the disputed land.
MACAWADIB vs PNP DIRECTORATE, G.R. No.
186610
Sosoban, Sarah Melisse S.
FACTS:
Dimapinto Macawadib was police officer with the rank of
Police Senior Superintendent. Subsequently, pursuant to
the provisions of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 6975, the
Chief of Directorial Staff of the PNP issued General Order
No. 1168, enumerating the names of commission officers
who were subject to compulsory retirement by virtue of
their attainment of the compulsory retirement age of 56.
Among the names included in the said Order was that of
Macawadib, as the files of the PNP Records Management
Division indicate that he was born on January 11, 1946.
Macawadib then filed an application for late registration
of birth with the Municipal Civil Registrar’s Office. In the
said application, Macawadib swore under oath that he
was born on January 11, 1956. The application was
subsequently approved.
Macawadib now filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Marawi City, Branch 8, a Petition for Correction of Entry
in the Public Service Records Regarding the Birth Date.
The Regional Trial Court of Marawi City then rendered a
Decision in favor of Macawadib. It issued an Entry of Final
Judgment indicating therein that its Decision has become
final and executory.
The PNP Directorate now filed a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 4
with the Court of Appeals, seeking to nullify the above-
mentioned Decision of the RTC on the ground that the
trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the PNP, “an
unimpleaded indispensable party”.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the PNP Directorate is an
indispensable party, without whom no final determination
of the case can be had
RULING: YES.
The Supreme Court first defined what an indispensable
party is, “An indispensable part is one who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
injuring or affecting that interest.”
Applying the definition in the case at bar, there is a
necessity to implead the PNP, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC)
because they stand to be adversely affected by
Macawadib’s petition which involves substantial and
controversial alterations in Macawadib’s service record.
Moreover, it is the integrity and correctness of the public
records in the custody of the PNP, NAPOLCOM, and CSC
which are involved and which would be affected by any
decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by
Macawadib. Furthermore, if Macawadib’s service is
extended by ten years, the government, through the PNP,
shall be burdened by the additional salary and benefits
that would have to be given to Macawadib during such
extension.
Having established that the PNP Directorate is an
indispensable party to the case, it necessarily follows that
it should have been impleaded pursuant to Section 7, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court which provides for the compulsory
joinder of indispensable parties.
“Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable
Parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as
plaintiffs or defendants.”
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the Decision of the trial court is
void because of the failure to implead the PNP Directorate
RULING: YES.
The Supreme Court explained that it is precisely when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action
should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent action of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even to those present. The purpose of the rule
for the compulsory joinder of parties is a complete
determination of all issues not only between the parties
themselves, but also as regards other persons who may
be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face
cannot attain real finality where there is want of
indispensable parties.
Citing the case of Go vs Distinction Properties
Development and Construction, Inc., the Supreme Court
further said that, the general rule with reference to the
making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of
all indispensable parties under any and all conditions,
their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of
judicial power. For this reason, our Supreme Court has
held that when it appears of record that there are other
persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation,
who are not made parties to the action, it is the duty of
the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made
either plaintiffs or defendants. Where the petition failed
to join as party defendant the persons interested in
sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should
be dismissed. When an indispensable party is not before
the court, the action should be dismissed.
Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties
CABUTIHAN vs LANDCENTER, G.R. NO. 146594
Suelto, Paolo F.
FACTS:
On December 3, 1996, Landcenter engaged with the
services of Cabutihan and her group as a Facilitator in
recovering a property.
To pay or compensate the following persons, Cabutihan,
Forro, Radan Sr., and Anave shall receive 20%, 10%, 4%.
And 2.5% of the proceeds or gross area respectively.
Landcenter failed and refused of to act on the
compensation for the services of Cabutihan and her
companions. An action for specific performance with
damages was filed by Cabutihan against Landcenter.
Landcenter contended that Cabutihan, Forro, Radan Sr.,
and Anave were not named as plaintiffs, and only
Cabutihan was named as plaintiff. While Cabutihan avers
that omission of the name of her companions did not
prevent the RTC from proceeding with the action, and that
the Trial Court may add or drop a party or parties at any
stage of the action.
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 5

The RTC ruled that there was no allegation anywhere in
the records that Cabutihan is authorized to represent
Forro, Radan and Anave, who were real parties-in-interest
with respect to their respective shares of the 36.5 percent
claim. Such being the case, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of their claims.
ISSUE:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A NON JOINDER?
YES.
2. WHETHER OR NOT A MISJOINDER OR NON
JOINDER OF PARTIES IS A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF ACTION? NO.
RULING: Since there was non-joinder of the necessary
parties. The Regional Trial Court should have ordered the
joinder Forro, Radan Sr., Ravan.
Section 11, Rule 3, ROC. Misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties
is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or on its own initiative at any stage the action and
on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined
party may be severed and proceeded with separately.
(11a)
After the order of joinder, Noncompliance with the said
order would have been ground for dismissal of the action.
Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the
whole 36.5 percent claim without impleading the
companions of CABUTIHAN as party-litigants, the RTC
could have separately proceeded with the case as far as
her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned,
independent of the other 16.5 percent. This fact means
that Forro, Radan Sr., Ravan are not indispensable parties.
At best, they are mere necessary parties who ought to be
impleaded for a complete determination or settlement of
the claim subject of the action.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent
the court from proceeding with the action, and the
judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to
the rights of such party.
Therefore, nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties is not a
ground for dismissal of action.
SALUDO, JR. vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, G.R.
No. 193138
Ampatuan, Sarip Aila A.
FACTS:
On June 11, 1998, SAFA Law Office entered into a Contract
of Lease with Philippine National Bank (PNB), whereby the
latter agreed to lease 632 square meters of the second
floor of the PNB Financial Center Building in Quezon City
for a period of three years and for a monthly rental fee of
P189,600.00.
On August 1, 2001, the Contract of Lease expired.
According to PNB, SAFA Law Office continued to occupy
the leased premises until February 2005, but discontinued
paying its monthly rental obligations after December
2002.
On September 1, 2006, Saludo, in his capacity as
managing partner of SAFA Law Office, filed an amended
complaint for accounting and/or recomputation of
unpaid rentals and damages against PNB in relation to the
Contract of Lease.
On October 4, 2006, PNB filed a motion to include an
indispensable party as plaintiff, praying that Saludo be
ordered to amend anew his complaint to include SAFA
Law Office as principal plaintiff. PNB argued that the
lessee in the Contract of Lease is not Saludo but SAFA Law
Office, and that Saludo merely signed the Contract of
Lease as the managing partner of the law firm.
Thus, SAFA Law Office must be joined as a plaintiff in the
complaint because it is considered an indispensable party
under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
On October 23, 2006, Saludo filed his motion to dismiss
counterclaims, mainly arguing that SAFA Law Office is
neither a legal entity nor party litigant. As it is only a
relationship or association of lawyers in the practice of law
and a single proprietorship which may only be sued
through its owner or proprietor, no valid counterclaims
may be asserted against it.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not SAFA Law Office is a real party
in interest. [YES]
RULING: SAFA Law Office is the real party-in-interest in
the case filed by Saludo against PNB.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines a real
party-in-interest.
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 6

Section 2. Parties in Interest. — A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
SAFA Law Office is the party that would be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit before the RTC.
Particularly:
 It is the party interested in the accounting and/or
recomputation of unpaid rentals and damages in
relation to the contract of lease.
 It is also the party that would be liable for payment to
PNB of overdue rentals, if that claim would be proven.
This is because it is the one that entered into the contract
of lease with PNB. As an entity possessed of a juridical
personality, it has concomitant rights and obligations with
respect to the transactions it enters into.
Section 2. Parties in Interest. — A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
In this case: As the one primarily affected by the outcome
of the suit, SAFA Law Office should have filed the
complaint with the RTC and should be made to respond
to any counterclaims that may be brought in the course
of the proceeding.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the SAFA Law Office may be
included as an indispensable party in the case. [YES]
RULING:
The complaint filed by Saludo should be amended to include
SAFA Law Office as plaintiff.
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of
parties. — Neither misjoinder or non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court
on motion of any party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be
severed and proceeded with separately.
The Court has also held in several cases that the court has full
powers, apart from that power and authority which are
inherent, to amend processes, pleadings, proceedings, and
decisions by substituting as party-plaintiff the real party-in-
interest.
In this case: SAFA Law Office will then replace Saludo as the
real party-in-interest.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not there is a valid class suit. [NO]
RULING:
Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 12. Class suit. — When the subject
matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons so numerous
that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a
number of them which the court finds to be
sufficiently numerous and representative as to
fully protect the interests of all concerned may
sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in
interest shall have the right to intervene to
protect his individual interest.
Conditions for a valid class suit
1. The subject matter of the controversy is one of common
or general interest to many persons;
2. The parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to
join all as parties.
In this case: While it can be said that the suit being filed is
one of common or general interest to the partners of SAFA
Law Firm, it’s lacks the second condition. While there were
numerous partners in the firm, they can still all be joined.
Sections 12. Class Suit
BORLASA vs POLISTICO, G.R. No. L-22909
Chew, Mary Grace E.
FACTS:
In this case, a group of people decided to form an
association called “Turuhan Polistico”. We have here
Vicente Polistico who is the President-Treasurer of the
association and who would then collect weekly
contributions from its members. These contributions
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 7
would be used to conduct their lottery weekly. It was
alleged that the sums of money were being paid with few
irregularities. Thus, this prompted Victoriano Borlasa and
other members to file an action for the purpose of
securing the dissolution of a voluntary association and to
compel Vicente Polistico and others to account for and
surrender the money and property of the association in
order that its affairs may be liquidated and its assets
applied according to law. However, Vicente Polistico and
other raised the question of lack of parties and set out a
list of some hundreds of persons whom they alleged
should be brought in as parties.
ISSUE: Is the suit filed by some members in behalf of
some other members proper?
RULING: YES.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties
in a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties
wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, the presence of those
latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial
power.
Exception: CLASS SUIT also known as “Doctrine of
Virtual Representation”
Section 12, Rule 3. Class suit. — When the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general interest
to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to
join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds
to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully
protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend
for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the
right to intervene to protect his individual interest.
In class suit, it is the relaxed application of the general rule
which permits the suit to proceed, when the class is
sufficient represented to enable the court to deal properly
and justly with that interest and with all other interest
involved in the suit.
Here, there are two conditions of a valid suit:
1. The subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons;
In this case: secure the dissolution of a
voluntary association and compel the Vicente
Polistico and other members to account for and
surrender the money and property of the
association.
2. The parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties.
In this case: It would be impossible to require all
of the members of the association to be joined
as parties as it would be tantamount to a denial
of justice.
In class suit, then, representation of a class interest which
will be affected by the judgment is indispensable; but it is
not indispensable to make each member of the class an
actual party.
MIAA vs RIVERA VILLAGE, G.R. No. 143870
Chew, Mary Grace E.
FACTS:
This a petition filed by the Rivera Village Homeowner’s
Association (RIVERA) to refrain the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) from implementing the
Conceptual Development Plan. The subject property of
the plan was previously leased by RIVERA. This plan seeks
to pursue an undertaking in furtherance of the airport-
related activities. If this plan will be implemented, the
interest of RIVERA over the subject property will be
affected. RIVERA also wants to compel MIAA to sell the
property in favor of the homeowners association. The
MIAA denied the request, claiming that the subject
property will still be included in its Conceptual
Development Plan intended for airport-related activities.
MIAA aleged that the petition should be dismissed for
lack of personality to sue of the homeowners association.
IST ISSUE: Whether or not Rivera Village is a real party in
interest
RULING: YES.
Section 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
In this case, the petition filed with the trial court
sufficiently avers that the homeowners association,
through its President, is suing in a representative
capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution
attached to the petition. Although the names of the
individual members of the homeowners association who
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 8
are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit
were not indicated in the title of the petition, this defect
can be cured by the simple expedient of requiring the
association to disclose the names of the principals and to
amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly.
Essentially, the purpose of the rule that actions should be
brought or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest is to protect against undue and unnecessary
litigation and to ensure that the court will have the benefit
of having before it the real adverse parties in the
consideration of a case. This rule, however, is not to be
narrowly and restrictively construed, and its application
should be neither dogmatic nor rigid at all times but
viewed in consonance with extant realities and
practicalities. As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals,
the dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality
to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the filing
of multiple suits by the individual members of the
association.
Hence, Rivera Village is a real party in interest.
2ND ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is a class suit.
RULING: NO, the petition cannot be considered a class
suit under Sec. 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
requisites therefor not being present in the case, notably
because the petition does not allege the existence and
prove the requisites of a class suit
Requisites
1. the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons and
2. The parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court,
and because it was brought only by one party.
In the case at bar, the homeowners association did not
have a common interest. The metes and bound of the
subject property is different from each other. The absence
of one of the requisites renders the case not class suit.
In Board of Optometry v. Colet, we held that courts must
exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which
is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all
indispensable parties. For while no difficulty may arise if
the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs, a
quandary would result if the decision were otherwise as
those who were deemed impleaded by their self-
appointed representatives would certainly claim denial of
due process.
Sections 16. Death of party; duty of counsel
HINOG vs MELICOR, GR NO. 140954
Bahalla, Carlo L.
FACTS:
1. The Balane owned a parcel of land. Sometime in
March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo Hinog to use
a portion of the said property for 10 years and to
construct a small house of light materials at a
nominal annual rent by virtue of the close
relationship.
2. After the expiration of the 10-year period, they
demanded the return of the property and
removal of the house but Bertuldo refused and
instead claimed ownership over the entire
property.
3. This prompted the Balane to file a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership and Possession,
Removal of Construction and Damages against
Bertuldo.
4. During the trial, Bertuldo died. Also, the OLD
counsel of Bertuldo withdrew and was replaced
by Atty. Petalcorin as the new counsel.
5. Thereafter, Atty. Petalcorin filed a Motion to
Expunge the Complaint from the record and
nullify all court proceedings.
6. This was opposed by the Balane. One of their
grounds is that Atty. Petalcorin has no legal
personality to represent a litigant since there was
no substitution of parties pursuant to Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
7. This was noted by the trial court which
subsequently directed Atty. Petalcorin to comply
with the said provisions.
8. And Atty. Petalcorin complied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Petalcorin has legal
personality to appear as counsel in this case
RULING: NO.
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that
“whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty
of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30)
days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give
the name and address of his legal representative or
representatives…”
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 9

The purpose behind the rule on substitution is the
protection of the right of every party to due process. It is
to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-
compliance thereof would render the proceedings and
judgment of the trial court infirm because the court
acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal
representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the
judgment would be binding.
Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons
and to remove any future claim by any heir that he
was not apprised of the litigation against Bertuldo or
that he did not authorize Atty. Petalcorin to represent
him.
With regards to the legal personality of a counsel,
substitution is necessary before a lawyer of the deceased
party can have legal personality to represent a litigant.
In this case, the list of names and addresses of the heirs
was submitted 16 months after the death of Bertuldo and
only when the trial court directed Atty. Petalcorin to
comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court. Strictly speaking therefore, before said
compliance, Atty. Petalcorin had no standing in the
trial court when he filed his pleadings such as the
Motion to Expunge.
However, the court ruled here that the matter has been
duly corrected by the Order of the trial court.
NERY vs LEYSON, G.R. No. 139306
Baruis, Mariel Q.
FACTS:
The Nerys are the heirs of Mercedes del Rio. Mercedes co-
owned a parcel of land in Cebu with her co-heirs from del
Corro. When the Nerys filed for the partition of the share
of Mercedes, they discovered that there was a notice of lis
pendens on the title of the land. The Nerys discovered
that the Leysons had filed a case for the annulment and
cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title (Case A). In
Case A, the Leysons impleaded Mercedes. At this time,
Mercedes was already dead. Case A was later on decided
in favor of the Leysons. Thus, a new Certificate of Title is
issued in the name of the Leysons.
The Nerys contend that they were never made parties to
the case. As such, the decision in Case A does not bind
them and it was null and void. The Nerys filed a case with
the trial court to annul the title in the name of the Leysons
and the annulment of the judgment in Case A.
The Leysons allege that the trial court had already
acquired jurisdiction over the Nerys when they failed to
notify the trial court of the death of Mercedes during the
trial of the case. In fact, they alleged that it is the duty of
the counsel to notify the court of the death of a party.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Nerys should have been
impleaded in Case A? Yes.
2. Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction
over the Nerys? No.
RULING:
1. The Nerys should have been impleaded in Case A.
As the heirs of Mercedes, they were indispensable
parties.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (ROC) provides that
indispensable parties are the parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
However, under Section 11, Rule 3, ROC, the non-joinder
of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action.
2. The court never acquired jurisdiction over the
Nerys.
At the time Mercedes was impleaded in Case A, she was
already dead. The requirement under Section 16, Rule 3
of the ROC provides that when a party to a pending action
dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within 30 days
after such death of the fact thereof.
Section 16, Rule 3 only applies to a pending case. A
pending case necessarily implies that the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of the party
who died or became incapacitated or incompetent. The
Trial Court cannot impose such requirement on the
counsel of the defendants. Section 16, Rule 3 finds NO
application to this case.
Thus, for failure to implead the Nerys in Case A, the court
never acquired jurisdiction over them.
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 10
In this case however, the court did not grant the petition
of the Nerys to annul the judgment of Case A because it
is contrary to the Doctrine of Adhesion. A trial court
cannot annul the judgment of a co-equal court.
Hence, even if the Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the nerys in Case A, the trial court in Civil Case B
cannot annul this judgment as the Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is vested in a higher court, the court of
appeals.
DELA CRUZ vs JOAQUIN, GR No. 165770
Bentayao, Gerard Wendyll
FACTS:
Pedro Joaquin alleged that he had obtained a loan from
Sps Dela Cruz, to secure payment for an obligation, Pedro
Joaquin supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
Sps Dela Cruz, for a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija. The
parties also executed a Kasunduan which Pedro Joaquin
claimed showed the deed of sale to be actually an
equitable mortgage. Sps Dela Cruz contend that the
document was merely an accommodation to allow Pedro
Joaquin to repurchase the land, which the latter failed to
exercise.
The RTC declared that the parties had entered into a sale
with right to repurchase. It further held that Pedro Joaquin
had made a valid tender of payment on two separate
occasions to exercise his right of repurchase. Hence, Sps
Dela Cruz were required to reconvey the property upon
his payment.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Regional Trial Court
decision and ordered a substitution by legal
representatives, in view of Sps Dela Cruz’s death.
Spouses Dela Cruz now assert that the RTC’s Decision was
invalid for lack of jurisdiction when Pedro Joaquin died
during the pendency of the case and there being no
substitution by the heirs, the trial court allegedly lacked
jurisdiction over the litigation.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case upon Respondent’s death
RULING: No.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not
extinguished, the Rules under Sec.16, Rule 3 require a
substitution of the deceased.
Section 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. —
Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and
the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be
the duty of his counsel to inform the court within
thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his
legal representative or representatives. Failure of
counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground
for disciplinary action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator
and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal
representative or representatives to appear and
be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days
from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel
for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the
court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time to procure the appointment of an
executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if
defrayed by the opposing party, may be
recovered as costs.
The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to
protect every party’s right to due process. The estate of
the deceased party will continue to be properly
represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made
against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental
right to a day in court is denied.
A formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when
they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case,
and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These
actions negate any claim that the right to due process was
violated.
Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is
not a matter of jurisdiction, but of due process. Thus,
when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected,
Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 11
noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the
Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
Mere failure to substitute for a deceased Pedro Joaquin is
not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s
decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an
undeniable violation of due process.
While discretionary on the court, it should have allowed
De Vera to join in the action and participate in the trial,
considering that the other defendants were already
declared in default. Otherwise, it would violate his right to
procedural due process. He is deemed joined from the
moment the transfer of interest is perfected.

Case records show that the heirs of Pedro Joaquin

voluntarily appeared and participated in the case after the
Court of Appeals had ordered for legal representatives to
appear and substitute for him. As such, the Motion for
Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and
the heirs, to have substituted for the deceased
respondent. As there was no violation of due process, the
issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to
nullify the trial court’s Decision.

Sections 19. Transfer of Interest

MEDRANO vs DE VERA, GR No. 165770

Delgado, Michael H.

FACTS:
Flaviana owns a parcel of land. She died intestate and her
sisters Hilaria and Helena inherited the land. The sisters
waived all their hereditary rights over the property in favor
of Francisca. A few heirs of the sisters assailed Francisca’s
right over the property, which prompted the latter to file
an action to quiet title. Some heirs executed a Deed of
Renunciation of Rights over the property in favor of De
Vera. Thus, De Vera wanted to intervene in the case,
considering that the other heirs were already declared in
default.

ISSUE: Should De Vera be allowed by the RTC to

participate in the case? Yes!

RULING: The RTC should have joined him as a party-

defendant. De Vera does not have an independent
interest over the property. He is considered as a
transferee pendente lite and is bound by the judgment
of his transferors on the rule of res judicata.

Rule 3, Section 19 – Transfer of Interest

In case of any transfer of interest, the action may:
1. Be continued by or against the original party,
2. Unless the court upon motion directs the person
to whom the interest is transferred to be
substituted in the action or
3. Joined with the original party.

Civil Procedure Case Digests (2 Sanchez Roman) 12