MACARIO PADILLA v.

AIRBORNE SECURITY SERVICES and/or

CATALINA SOLIS
G.R. No. 210080
November 22, 2017

Facts: Macario Padilla was hired by respondent Airborne as a security guard. Padilla
allegedly rendered continuous service until 15 June 2009, when he was relieved from his
post and was advised to wait for his reassignment order.

On 27 July 2009, he allegedly received a letter from respondent directing him to report
for assignment and deployment. He called Airborne’s office but he was told that he had
no assignment yet. On 9 Sept 2009, he received another letter from respondent asking
him to report to its office. He sent his reply letter on 22 Sept 2009 and personally
reported to the office to inquire on the status of his deployment with respondent’s
Director for Operations, wherein he was told that there are having a hard time finding
an assignment for him since he was already over 38 years old. Padilla added that he was
advised by respondent to resign but was refused.

In Dec 2009, when he reported to the office to collect his 13 th month pay, he was again
persuaded to hand in his resignation letter. Still not having been deployed, Padilla filed
his complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Padilla was constructively dismissed from

his employment with respondent Airborne, he having been placed on
floating status apparently on the basis of his age and not having been timely
assigned.

Ruling: Petitioner Padilla was constructively dismissed from employment owing to his
inordinately long floating status.

The Court held that the practice of placing security guards on floating status or
temporary off-detail is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Jurisprudence has
settled that the period of temporary off-detail must not exceed six (6) months. Beyond
this, security guard’s floating status shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal.

Also, contrary to the assertions of respondent that petitioner was offered new
assignment as evidenced by a series of letters requiring petitioner to report to
respondent’s head office. The Court held that these letters did not identify any specific
client to which petitioner was to be reassigned. The letters were, at best, nothing more
than general return-to-work orders. Wherein, jurisprudence is consistent in its
disapproval of general return-to-work orders as a justification for failure to timely
render assignment to security guards.

As a further defense, respondents add that it was petitioner abandoned his work. The
Court also disagreed with the respondent. It held that for an employee to be considered
to have abandoned his work, two (2) requisites must concur: First, the employee must
have failed to report for work or have been absent without a valid or justifiable reason.
Second, the employee must have had a clear intention to sever the ee-er relationship, the
second element must be manifested by some overt acts. Herein, the petitioner’s conduct
belies any intent to abandon his work. To the contrary, it demonstrates how he took
every effort to retain his employment.

Finally, as a consequence of the finding of illegal dismissal, petitioner would ordinarily

be entitled to reinstatement pursuant to Article 294 of the Labor Code1.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ABENIR BRUSOLA

G.R. No. 210615
July 26, 2017

Facts: Spouses Abenir and Delia together with their children (Joanne, Abegail and
Kristofer) were at home watching TV. Joanne was eating and would occasionaly glance
at her father (Abenir) and noticed that he seemed restless. Suddenly, Joanne saw Abenir
hit Delia on the head with a maso. A second blow hit the cement wall. Joanne yelled
“Tay!” and tried to pacify Abenir, asking why he did it. Abenir said he saw a man in the
bathroom with Delia. Joanne looked in the bathroom but saw no one. Delia was rushed
to the hospital and lost consciousness thereafter.

The defense averred that Abenir worked in Saudi Arabia as a mason, when his sister
informed him that Delia had a paramour. That, one night, while he was preparing
things, Delia went outside. She appeared to be waiting for somebody; that while he was
inside the house he heard people talking outside and looked out through a crack in the
plywood wall. He saw a man and a woman kiss and identified the woman as Delia, who
told the man “Hwag na muna ngayon, nandiyan pa sya.” The man embraced her, and
groped her breat and private parts. Abenir picked up the maso, went outside, and
approached them, who were surprised to see him. Abenir attacked the man who used
Delia as a shield.

The trial court found Abenir guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Abenir appealed the trial court decision to the CA. He argued that there was
inconsistency between the testimonies between Joanne and Abegail. Moreover, Joanne,
the prosecution’s lone eyewitness to the attack, purportedly had the ill motive against
him since he had opposed her plans of early marriage. Further, in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, the trial court did not consider the mitigating circumstances of
passion, obfuscation and voluntary surrender.

The CA found no merit in Abenir’s argument. Thus, Abenir filed a Notice of Appeal
before the Supreme Court.
1
Article 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. (As amended by Section 34, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Issue: (1) Whether or not the crime of parricide was sufficiently proved by
the prosecution; (2) Whether or not the testimony of Joane as lone witness
is credible and her testimonies are entitled respect; and (3) Whether the
trial court properly sentenced accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Ruling: (1) The Court agreed with the trial court that the evidence presented by the
parties, considered the credibility of their respective witnesses, and found that all
elements of the crime of parricide 2 were sufficiently proved by the prosecution. There
was no dispute as to the relationship between the accused Abenir and the victim.

(2) Joanne’s straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive
and credible evidence sufficient to convict the accused. Well-settled is the rule that it is
unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused’s own child, who is interested in
vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do
so is to let the guilty free. Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were
actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made
under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.

(3) The trial court properly sentenced accused Abenir to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua as there are mitigating circumstances in a parricide case; hence, the proper
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.

Further, the Court held that the crime of parricide is punishable by the indivisible
penalties of reclusion perpetua to death. With one mitigating circumstance, which is the
voluntary surrender, and no aggravating circumstances. The imposition of the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua and not the penalty of death on the accused was thus
proper.

MARILYN YANGSON v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

G.R. No. 200170
June 3, 2019

Facts: Marilyn Yangson was Principal III at the Surigao Norte Nat’l High School.
Yangson was personally served a Memorandum (Memo) issued by the Assistant Schools
Division Superintendent OIC Fidel Rosas. In the Memo , Yangson was reassigned from
Surigao Norte to Toledo High School, in the exigency of the service.

Yangson refused to accept the Memo without first consulting her counsel. Two days
prior to the effectivity of her assignment, Yangson filed before RTC a Petition for
Injunction with prayer of TRO against Rosas. She alleged that the Memo violated
2
Article 246. Parricide – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall
be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. (Revised Penal Code)
DEPED Circ. No. 02 S2015, because it failed to specify the duration of her reassignment
and it was issued without her prior consultation. She also claimed that there was no
vacancy in the position, and the reassignment would cause diminution in her rank.

Issue: (1) Whether Yangson’s appointment was station-specific; (2)

Whether Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Techers applies to
petitioner Yangson’s movement; (3) Whether Yangson’s reassignment
violated her security of tenure; (4) Whether Yangson’s reassignment was
for the exigency of service and in accordance with policy; (5) Whether
Yangson was demoted; and (6) Whether Yangson’s appointment may be
indeterminate.

Ruling: (1) The Court affirms Yangson’s appointment was not station-specific 3.
Yangson did not deny that she was appointed as “Principal III of Division of Surigao Del
Norte.” Evidently, Yangson’s appointment is not solely for Surigao National or for any
specific school. There is no particular office or station specifically indicated on the face
of her appointment paper. Neither does her position title specifically indicate her
station.

(2) Section 6 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers 4 does not apply here.
Yangson’s movement from Surigao National to Toledo Memorial was a reassignment,
not a transfer. This was simple reassignment the same provision does not apply.

(3) Yansong’s reassignment did not violate her security of tenure. Here, it was
established that petitioner’s appointment is not station-specific. While she is entitled to
her right to security of tenure, she cannot assert her right to stay at Surigao National.
Her appointment papers are not specific to the school, which means she may be
assignment to any station as may be necessary for public exigency. Because she holds no
vested right to remain as Principal III of Surigao National, her security of tenure was not
violated.

(4) Yangson’s reassignment was for the exigency of service. The Court cited a case where
it uphold the reassignment in order for her to share benefits of her expertise in her new
assignment plus the recognizable fact that a relatively long stay in one’s station tends
towards over-fraternization with associates which could be injurious to the service- has
substantial factual basis that meets the requirements of the exigencies of the service.

3
An appointment is station-specific if the employee’s appointment paper specifically indicates on its face
the particular office or station the position is located. Moreover, the station should already be specified in
the position title, even if the place of assignment is not indicated on the face of the appointment. (CSC
Resolution No. 1800692)
4
Section 6. Consent for Transfer - Except for cause and as otherwise provided, no teacher shall be
transferred without his consent from one station to another.
Since it cannot be gainsaid that the reassignment was attended by whim, fancy or spite,
as she would like this Court to believe. It is presumed that reassignments are regular
and made in the interest of public service.

(5) Petitioner’s reassignment cannot be considered a demotion 5 or constructive

dismissal. A reassignment may be deemed a constructive dismissal if the employee is
moved to a position with a more servile or menial job as compared to his previous
position.

Petitioner’s position at Toledo Memorial is still Principal III. She retains the same rank,
status, and salary, and is expected to exercise the same duties and responsibilities. There
is no movement from a higher position to a lower position. She was not given a servile
and menial job.

(6) Yangson’s reassignment may be indefinite and exceed one (1) year as in the
petitioner’s case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. KING REX AMBATANG

G.R. No. 205855
March 29, 2017

Facts: Jennifer was at kitchen of their house with her cousins when she heard a barrage
of stones hurdled at their house. She peeked out of the window and saw Ambatang
standing outside with a certain “Loui.” Melody immediately called barangay tanods,
who then went to Ambatang’s house, just across Ely Vidal’s house. While Ambatang’s
mother was speaking to a tanod, another tanod, saw Ambatang sharpening a knife in
their kitchen. Suddenly, Ambatang was nowhere to be found and appeared to have
sneaked past the tanods before running towards the Vidal’s house. Later, Ambatang was
on top of Vidal and was stabbing him repeatedly with a kitchen knife. Ambatang ran
away and was apprehended by the tanods. The victim Vidal was pronounced dead on
arrival

In his defense, Ambatang claimed that he was at AMA Computer Learning Center on
that day from 3:00 pm and did not get home until 9:30 pm. He stated that while he was
doing the laundry, barangay tanod went to their house looking for a person named
Loui. He then heard noise from a commotion outside his house. His mother and sister
went out and instructed him to stay in the sala with his girlfriend. Minutes later, he went
out to see his friend. His friend was not there, but he was able to speak to a certianRael
for a few seconds. He then left his friend’s house and was arrested by the barangay
tanod on his way home. Ambatang’s testimony that he was inside the house when the
stabbing occurred was supported by his mother and his girlfriend.

5
A demolition means that an employee is moved or appointed from a higher position to a lower position
with decreased duties and responsibilities, or with lesser status, rank, or salary. (In the case of Cruz v.
Court of Appeals)
Issue: (1) Whether the accused Ambatang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder; and (2) Whether the alleged ill motive and inconsistencies on
the part of witness Carmelita renders the testimony not worthy of respect;
and (3) Whether treachery is present.

Ruling: (1) The examination of records shows that there is nothing that would warrant
the reversal of the Decisions of RTC and of the CA. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are sufficient to convict Ambatang. The RTC and of the CA made definitive
findings that Jennifer and Acaba made positive, unequivocal and categorical
identifications of accused Ambatang as the person who stabbed the deceased Vidal.

As against the accused who offered denial and alibi as defenses, which jurisprudence has
long considered weak and unreliable.

Further, the Court held that the positive identification of the witnesses of the accused as
perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight that their denial and alibis. True,
accused Ambatang’s alibi was corroborated by his mother and girlfriend. However, an
alibi especially when corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused is held
by this Court with extreme suspicion for it is easy to fabricate and concoct.

Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he
was at some other place at the time the commission of the crime but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

(2) Accused Ambatang’s conviction was not based on the testimony of Carmelita, but on
the testimonies of eyewitnesses Jennifer and Acaba whose credibility was never assailed
by Ambatang.

The Court cited the case of People vs Bagaua which ruled that “few discrepancies and
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not
actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the
witnesses. Instead of weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to
strengthen their credibility because they discount the possibility of their being
rehearsed.”

(3) Treachery is present to qualify Vidal’s killing to murder. As pointed out by the RTC
“accused employed treachery when he attacked the victim. This is shown by the
suddenness of the attack against the unarmed victim, without the slightest provocation
on the latter’s part and opportunity to defend himself xx armed with sharp bladed
weapon, he attacked and repeatedly stabbed the victim who was that time sixty years old
and inferios in size and built compared to him”

INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK v. SPOUSES JEROME AND QUINNIE

BRIONES and JOHN DOE
G.R. No. 205657
 March 29, 2017

Facts: Spouses Briones took out a loan from iBank to purchase a BMW Z4 Roadster
with monthly amortization for two (2) years; they executed a promissory note with
chattel mortgage that required them to take out an insurance policy on the vehicle.

The promissory note also gave iBank, as the Spouses Briones’ attorney-in-fact,
irrevocable authority to file an insurance claim in case of loss or damage to the vehicle.
The insurance proceeds were to be made payable to iBank.

Thereafter, the mortgaged BMW Z4 Roadster was carnapped. Jerome Briones

immediately reported the incident to the PNP. Spouses Briones declared the loss to
iBank, which instructed the, to continue paying the next 3 monthly installments as a
sign of good faith, a directive they complied with.

After paying the 3 monthly installments, iBank sent them a letter demanding full
payment of the lost vehicle. Afterwards, the Spouses Briones submitted a notice of claim
with their insurance company which denied the claim due to the delayed reporting of
the los vehicle.

Petitioner iBank filed a complaint for replevin and/or sum of money against the Spouses
Briones and alleged that the spouses defaulted in paying the monthly amortizations of
the mortgaged vehicle.

Issue: (1) Whether an agency6 relationship existed between the parties; (2)
Whether the agency relationship was revoked or terminated; and (3)
Whether petitioner is entitled to the return of the mortgaged vehicle or, in
the alternative, payment of the outstanding balance of the loan taken out
for the mortgaged vehicle.

Ruling: (1) All the elements of agency 7 exist in this case. Under the promissory note
with chattel mortgage, Spouses Briones appointed iBank as their attorney-in-fact,
authorizing it to file a claim with the insurance company if the mortgaged vehicle was
lost or damaged. Petitioner iBank was also authorized to collect the insurance proceeds
as the beneficiary of the insurance policy.

(2) The Spouses Briones' claim for loss cannot be seen as an implied revocation of the
agency or their way of excluding petitioner. They did not disregard or bypass petitioner
iBank when they made an insurance claim; rather, they had no choice but to personally

6
In a contract of agency, "a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter." 
7
The creation an acceptance of the relationship of agency whereby one party, called the
principal (mandante), authorizes another, called the agent (mandatario),  to act for and in his behalf in
transactions with third persons. The essential elements of agency are: (1) there is consent, express or
implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in
relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; and (4) the agent acts
within the scope of his authority. (Citing the case of Rallos v. Felix Go Chan)
do it because of their agent's negligence. This is not the implied termination or
revocation of an agency provided for under Article 1924 of the Civil Code.
While a contract of agency is generally revocable at will as it is primarily based on trust
and confidence, Article 1927 of the Civil Code8 provides the instances when an agency
becomes irrevocable. A bilateral contract that depends upon the agency is considered an
agency coupled with an interest, making it an exception to the general rule of
revocability at will.

In the promissory note with chattel mortgage, the Spouses Briones authorized petitioner
to claim, collect, and apply· the insurance proceeds towards the full satisfaction of their
loan if the mortgaged vehicle were lost or damaged. Clearly, a bilateral contract existed
between the parties, making the agency irrevocable. Petitioner was also aware of the
bilateral contract; thus, it included the designation of an irrevocable agency in the
promissory note with chattel mortgage that it prepared for the Spouses Briones to sign.

(3) As the agent, petitioner was mandated to look after the interests of the Spouses
Briones. However, instead of going after the insurance proceeds, as expected of it as the
agent, petitioner opted to claim the full amount from the Spouses Briones, disregard the
established principal-agency relationship, and put its own interests before those of its
principal.

The facts show that the insurance policy was valid when the vehicle was lost, and that
the insurance claim was only denied because of the belated filing.1Having been
negligent in its duties as the duly constituted agent, petitioner must be held liable for the
damages suffered by the Spouses Briones because of non-performance of its obligation
as the agent, and because it prioritized its interests over that of its principal.

PEDRO C. PEREA v. ELBURG SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 206178
August 9, 2017

Facts: Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg under its principal
Augustea Atlantica. Perea was hired as a fitter; he was deployed to work aboard. One
day, Perea had difficulty breathing while repairing a pipe. The following day, he had
chest pains with palpitations, was seen by the doctor; and was advised to take
medication and to rest for 3 days. However, he did not feel any better even after resting
and taking medications; thus, he asked to be repatriated.

A few days later, Perea was welding when the machine exploded. He hit his left shoulder
and twisted his fingers. He took a pain reliever but 3 days later, he found that 2 of his
fingers had grown numb.
8
An agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an
obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed manager of a partnership in the contract of
partnership and his removal from the management is unjustifiable. (Art. 1927, Civil Code)
Thereafter, he was sent to medical facility in Turkey because of continued chest pain. He
was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma; he was then transferred to SEMA Hospital
where he was declared suffering from “Cubital Tunnel Syndrome.” He was soon
repatriated to the Philippines.

After conducting lab examinations and other medical procedures, company designated
physicians Dr. Lim and Dr. Hao-Quan gave an initial impression. In a letter to Elburg.
Dr. Hao-Quan stated that the cause of hypertension was not work-related and opined
that Perea’s estimated length of treatment would be approximately 3-4 months.

Perea filed a complaint for underpayment of his sick leave pay, permanent disability
benefits. Thereafter, Perea consulted Dr. Pascual who diagnosed him with
“Uncontrolled Hypertension and Coronary Artery Disease.” He also found that Perea
was medically unfit to work as a seafarer.

Further, after series of examinations, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim certified that Perea
was cleared of the injuries that caused his repatriation.

Issue: (1) Whether the issue of concealed pre-existing condition was rightly
ruled upon by the NLRC when it was not raised by any of the parties; (2)
Whether petitioner Perea is entitled to disability benefits; and (3) Whether
petitioner Perea is entitled to the balance of his disability allowance; and

Ruling: (1) Petitioner Perea was correct to assail the NLRC ruling on the concealment
of a pre-existing fracture or dislocated elbow because it appears that it was never raised
by the parties before the Labor Arbiter or even the NLRC. In fact, aside from petitioner
questioning this ruling, the alleged concealment of a pre-existing injury was also not
raised as an issue before this Court. 

(2) This Court sees no reason to distrust Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim's assessment of
Perea's condition considering that they were able to monitor Perea's condition over a
prolonged period. As the Court of Appeals discussed:

As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians who conducted an

extensive examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who saw petitioner on only one
(1) occasion and did not even order that medical tests be done to support his declaration
that petitioner is unfit to work as [a] seaman, the company-designated physicians'
findings that petitioner has been cleared for work should prevail.

(3) The claim for sickness allowance under the CBA is denied. The CBA  between
Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and Augustea
Shipmanagement was only from March 28, 2008 to December 31, 2008 but was
extended to December 31, 2009. Thus, when petitioner first experienced chest pains on
the CBA was no longer in effect.
 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. CARMELITA, REYME, ANGEL, all
surnamed SANTOS, NONENONG DIANCO et al.
G.R. No. 208293
December 10, 2014

Facts: Angel Santos who died on 21 March 1991, maintained an account with PNB. The
deposit amounted to P1.7M and time deposit of P1M. Respondents went to PNB to
withdraw their father’s deposit. The Branch Manager required them to submit
documents to them to withdraw the amount.

By 26 April 1998, respondents had already obtained the necessary documents. They
tried to withdraw the deposit. However, the Branch Manager informed them that the
deposit had already been released to a certain Bernardito Manimbo.

Respondents questioned the release of the deposit amount to Manimbo who had no
authority from them to withdraw their father’s deposit and who failed to present all the
requirements for such withdrawal.

Issue: (1) Whether PNB was negligent in releasing the deposit to Bernardo
Manimbo; and (2) Whether the Branch Manager is jointly and severally
liable with PNB.

Ruling: PNB and Aguilar were negligent in handling the deposit of Angel Santos. The
contractual relationship between banks and their depositors is governed by the Civil
Code provisions on simple loan. Once a person makes a deposit of his or her money to
the bank, he or she is considered to have lent the bank that money. The bank becomes
his or her debtor, and he or she becomes the creditor of the bank, which is obligated to
pay him or her on demand.

Banking is a business that is impressed with public interest. It affects economies and
plays a significant role in businesses and commerce. The public reposes its faith and
confidence upon banks, such that even the humble wage-earner has not hesitated to
entrust his life’s savings to the bank of his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its
custody and will even earn some interest for him. This is why we have recognized the
fiduciary nature of the bank’s functions, and attached a special standard of diligence for
the exercise of their functions.

The fiduciary nature of banking is affirmed in Republic Act No. 8791 9 or The General
Banking Law.

9
Section 2. Declaration of Policy – The State recognizes the vital role of baks in providing an environment
conducive to the sustained development of the national economy and the fiduciary nature of banking that
requires high standards of integrity and performance. In furtherance thereof, the State shall promote and
maintain a stable and efficient banking and financial system that is globally competitive, dynamic and
responsive to the demands of a developing economy. (1987 Philippine Constitution)
PNB and Branch Manager’s treatment of Angel Santos account is inconsistent with the
high standard of diligence required of banks. They accepted Manimbo’s representations
despite knowledge of the existence of circumstances that should have raised doubts on
such representations. As a result, Angel Santos’ deposit was given to a person stranger
to him.

PNB is a bank from which a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a
family is expected. PNB and its manager failed to meet even the standard of diligence of
a good father of a family. Their actions and inactions constitute gross negligence.

REPUBLIC v. MOLDEX REALTY, INC.

G.R. No. 171041
February 10, 2016

Facts: Luis, Rosa, Maria Clara, all surnamed Erce applied for registration of parcels of
land before RTC-Cavite. Eventually, applicants sold two lots to Moldex. Applications
were later substituted by Moldex in the application for registration. To prove its title,
Moldex presented the testimonies of Manaloto and Pia Atis. Manoloto, Moldex’s
Assistant Manager testified that Moldex purchased the properties from heirs of Erce.
According to Manaloto, the technical descriptions and the subdivision plan covering the
properties were approved by the Bureau of Lands. He further testified that he secured
certification that the properties were declared alienable and disposable land of public
domain.

Pio Atis, a farmer testified that he knew the owners of the properties before Moldex. He
had been residing in the area since birth. He was a tenant of the properties and was also
an owner of the adjoining lots. He testified that he had personal knowledge that the
Erces possessed the properties before war.

The RTC rendered a Decision granting the application. The OSG, representing the
Republic appealed the RTC Decision before the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that based on Republic v. Court of Appeals
(Naguit) an application for registration satisfies the requirement that the property is
classified as alienable and disposable if the land has been alienable and disposable at the
time of the application for registration.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, Moldex filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that
although it had already been issued a favorable decision by the RTC and the CA, it opted
to withdraw its application for registration of the properties in its name

Issue/s: (1) Whether Moldex withdrawal of its application for land

registration rendered this case moot and academic;

Ruling: (1) Respondent’s withdrawal of its application for registration has rendered
this case moot and academic.
This court’s power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies. There is
an actual case or controversy when the case presents conflicting or opposite legal rights
that may be resolved by the court in a judicial proceeding. Citing the case of David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court held that “An actual case or controversy involves a
conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is
“definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interest”; a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. A case becomes
moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting issue that may
be resolved by the court ceases to exist. There is no longer any justiciable controversy
that may be resolved by the court. This court refuses to render advisory opinions and
resolve issues that would provide no practical use or value. Thus, courts generally
“decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.”

Respondent’s Manifestation stating its withdrawal of its application for registration has
erased the conflicting interests that used to be present in this case. Respondent’s
Manifestation was an expression of its intent not to act on whatever claim or right it has
to the property involved.

Thus, the controversy ended when respondent filed that Manifestation. A ruling on the
issue of respondent’s right to registration would be nothing but an advisory opinion.

LIZA MAZA, SATURNINO OCAMPO, TEODORO CASINO AND RAFAEL

MARIANO v. HON. EVELYN TURLA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC of Palayan City, Nueva Ecija
G.R. No. 187094
February 15, 2017

Facts: Petitioners are former members of the House of Representatives. Inspector

Arnold Palomo name 19 individuals, including petitioners who were allegedly
responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta and Danilo Felipe. His
findings show that the named individuals conspired in the killing of the supporters of
AKBAYAN Partylist, a rival of Bayan Muna and Gabriela.

Inspector Palomo recommended that a preliminary investigation be conducted.

Investigating Prosecutor Antonio Lapus issued a subpoena requiring petitioner to testify
at the hearings. Petitioners filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Quash
Complaint/Subpoena, they argue that the Provincial Prosecutor had no jurisdiction to
conduct a preliminary investigation since no valid complaint was filed against them. The
panel of prosecutors denied the motion. Petitioners filed their respective counter-
affidavits. Then, the panel issued a Joint Resolution and found probable cause for the
murder in the killing of Bayudang, Peralta and Felipe.

Informations were filed in the RTC-Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. Petitioners filed a Motion
for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright.
Judge Evelyn Turla issued an Order, and held that “proper procedure in the conduct of
the preliminary investigation was not followed. Hence, she remanded the case to the
Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary investigation.

Issue/s: (1) Whether petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of

courts in bringing their petitioner directly before the Supreme Court; (2)
Whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion when she
remanded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of
preliminary investigation; (3) Whether admissibility of evidence can be
ruled in preliminary investigation.

Ruling: (1) This petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. The
presence of compelling circumstances warrants the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction.
At the time the petition was filed, petitioners were incumbent party-list representatives.
The possibility of their arrest and incarceration should the assailed Order be affirmed,
would affect their representation of their constituents in Congress.

(2) The remand of the criminal cases to the Provincial Prosecutor is improper. A plain
reading of the provision (Rule 112, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure) shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has the
following options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest or a commitment order if findings show
probable cause; (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence if there is doubt
on the existence of probable cause.

The trial court’s judge determination of probable cause is based on her or his personal
evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and its supporting evidence. The determination
of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial function, whereas the
determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function.

Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutor’s conduct of preliminary investigation
was “incomplete” and that their determination of probable cause “has not measured up
to the standard,” she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors. Instead
of determining probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary
investigation.

Regardless of Judge Turla’s assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation,

it was incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the
accused after a personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s report and the supporting
documents. She could even disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or
require the prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to
remand the case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation.
In doing so, she acted without any legal authority.

(3) To emphasize, “a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial; it is not a

trial on the merits. Since “it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in
court the prosecutor would have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a
conviction of the accused,” the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence cannot be
ruled upon in a preliminary investigation.

SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) v. UNIVERSAL

ROBINA CORP. and SONEDCO
G.R. No. 220383
July 5, 2017

Facts: In 2007, URC-SONEDCO offered a P16/day wage increase to their employees.

To receive benefits the employees had to sign a waiver that in the event that CBA os
negotiated between the Management and Union, the new CBA shall only be effective on
1 Jan 2008. Some members of SWOLFU refused to sign.

URC-SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008. It extended additional P16/day

wage increase to employees who would agree that any CBA negotiated for that year
would only be effective on 1 Jan 2009. Several members of SWOLFU refused to sign
their rights. Consequently, they did not receive the wage increase which already
amounted to a total of P32/day.

SWOLFU and its members who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the
requirement of a waiver prior to the release of the wage increase constituted
interference to the employees’ right to self-organization, collective bargaining, and
concerted action. They asked that they be granted a P16/day wage increase for 2007 and
an additional P16/day wage increase for 2008. They also demanded a continuing wage
increase of P32/day from 1 Jan 2009 onwards.

Both NLRC and the CA found URC-SONEDCO not guilty of unfair labor practice.
Nonetheless, they ordered the URC-SONEDCO to give petitioners the same benefits
their co-workers received in 2007 and 2008. However, SWOLFU claim for 2009 wage
increase was denied. Since a new CBA was already in effect by 2009, the CBA governed
the relationship between the management and the union.

Issue: Whether a P32/day wage increase beginning 1 Jan 2009 to present

should be awarded to petitioners.

Ruling: Generally, the CBA controls the relationship between the parties. Any benefit
not included in it is not demandable. However, in light of the peculiar circumstances in
this case, the requested wage increase should be granted.

The wage increase was integrated in the salary of those who signed the waivers. When
the affiants waived their rights, respondent rewarded them with P32/day wage increase
that continues to this day. The respondent company granted this benefit to its
employees to induce them to waive their collective bargaining rights. This Court has
declared this unfair labor practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the
petitioners the wage increase that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To
rule otherwise will perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All the
consequences of the unfair labor practice must be addressed.

The grant of the P32/day wage increase is not an additional benefit outside the CBA of
2009. By granting the increase to petitioners, this Court is eliminating the
discrimination against them, which was a result of respondent’s unfair labor practice.

RHODORA RACHO TANAKA v. SEIICHI TANAKA

G.R. No. 199515
June 25, 2018

Facts: Racho and Seiichi were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro
Manila. They lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama, Japan and did not have any
children.

Thereafter, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of the Japanese Consulate in the Philippines and
had it authenticated by an authentication officer of the DFA. She filed the Divorce
Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was
informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to
the Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case
for judicial recognition of divorce.

RTC finds that Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated
that while she was able to prove Tanaka’s national law, the Divorce Certificate was not
competent evidence since it was not the divorce degree itself.

Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC. The SC deferred action on
her Petition pending her submission of a duly authenticated acceptance certificate of the
notification divorce.

Racho argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes
effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by two (2) or
more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance
Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama,
Japan” is sufficient to prove that she and her husband have divorced by agreement and
have already effected notification of the divorce.

Issue: Whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce

is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Racho and
respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to
his national law.
Ruling: Under Article 2610 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a
Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained
according to the foreign spouse's national law.

The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation where a Filipino
spouse remains married to the foreign spouse even after a validly obtained divorce
abroad. The addition of the second paragraph gives the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have the marriage considered as dissolved, and ultimately, to grant him or her
the capacity to remarry.

Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to

determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce
decree is issued, the divorce becomes validly obtained and capacitates the foreign
spouse to marry. The same status should be given to the Filipino spouse.

The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or
participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino
woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from something that a foreign law
may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce
proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.

Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce maybe recognized in this
jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained, regardless of who among the spouses
initiated the divorce proceedings.

Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is
terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not
state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There
can be no other interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and
respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital tie.

Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant
both parties the legal capacity to remarry as provided under Article 40 11 of the Family
Code.
To insist that under our laws, petitioner s still married to respondent despite the latter’s
newfound companionship with another cannot be just. Justice is better served if she is
not discriminated against in her own country. As much as petitioner is free to seeks
10
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Civil Code)

11
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (Civil
Code)
fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her
commitments within the institution of marriage.

LUZ ANATOLIA E. CRISPINO, CARIDAD O. ECHAVES REESE and

ZENAIDA ECHAVES represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, REUBEN
CAPILI ECHAVES v. ANATOLIA TANSAY
G.R. No. 184466
December 5, 2016

Facts:

ATTY. HARRY ROQUE v. ARMED FORCES OF THE PHIL

G.R. No. 214986
February 15, 2017

Facts: Jennifer Laude was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by Marine
Private Pemberton. Since the killing, police had not been able to obtain Pemberton' s
latent fingerprints and oral swabs, because he was confined by his superiors on a ship
and placed under their custody. Thus, the question of custody over Pemberton was
subject of public discussions.

Pemberton was eventually transferred from his ship to a facility in the headquarters of
the AFP. However, Philippine authorities maintained that until a case was filed against
Pemberton, custody over him remained with the USA.

News broke out that Pemberton had been flown into Camp Aguinaldo, where a
detention facility had been constructed for him, in the premises of the Mutual Defense
Board-Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB)

Thus, petitioner, together with the family of the slain Jennifer Laude went to Camp
Aguinaldo to demand to see Pemberton. Respondents state that petitioner, with his
clients, forced their way inside the premises of the MDB-SEB and gained entry despite
having been instructed by Military Police personnel not to enter the compound, and
even though the gates were closed.

Respondents filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner, before the IBP. On the
same day, respondent called a conference at Camp Aguinaldo, and publicly announced
that a disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner.

Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted
from, by media; he asserts that respondents' acts are contumacious violations of Section
18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court; further, he claims that respondents' acts put to
question his professional and personal reputation.
Respondents argue that the press statements are not among the contumacious acts
prescribed under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; that, the subject of the
disbarment case pertains to a serious breach of security of a military zone; that, the
statements were official statements made in the performance of a public function to
address a public concern; that, the circumstances, which led to the filing of the
disbarment complaint and the acts alleged therein were witnessed by the public and
duly reported by the media; and that, the filing of the disbarment case was not meant to
malign petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the events that transpired at
Camp Aguinaldo

Issue/s: (1) Whether a violation of the confidentiality rule constitutes

contempt of court; (2) Whether respondents' public pronouncements
violate Section 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court; (3) Whether
respondents may raise public interest as a defense; (4) Whether non-
lawyers may be punished for contempt; and (5) Whether respondents shall
be punished by contempt.

Ruling: (1) Generally, court proceedings are often matters of public discussion, and the
mere fact of publicity does not, in and of itself, influence or interfere with them.

Publicity does not, in and of itself, impair court proceedings. Even in the highly
publicized case, where the parties, their sympathizers, and lawyers all participated in a
media blitz, this Court required proof that the fairness and impartiality of the
investigation was actually affected by the publicity.

(2) Proceedings against lawyers, however, are treated differently, for several reasons.
Disbarment proceedings are covered by what is known as the confidentiality rule. This is
laid down by Section 18, Rule 139-B12 of the Rules of Court.

Law is a profession and not a trade. Lawyers are held to high standards as officers of the
court, and subject to heightened regulation to ensure that the legal profession maintains
its integrity and esteem. As part of the legal profession, lawyers are generally prohibited
from advertising their talents, and are expected to rely on their good reputation to
maintain their practice.

Thus, a good reputation is among a lawyer's most valuable assets. The confidentiality
rule is intended, in part, to prevent the use of disbarment proceedings as a tool to
damage a lawyer's reputation in the public sphere.

Thus, the general rule is that publicly disclosing disbarment proceedings may be
punished with contempt.

(3) The confidentiality in disciplinary actions for lawyers is not absolute. It is not to be
applied under any circumstance, to all disclosures of any nature. As a general principle,
12
Section 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However,
the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. (Rules of Court)
speech on matters of public interest should not be restricted. This Court recognizes the
fundamental right to information, which is essential to allow the citizenry to form
intelligent opinions and hold people accountable for their actions. Accordingly, matters
of public interest should not be censured for the sake of an unreasonably strict
application of the confidentiality rule.

Indeed, to keep controversial proceedings shrouded in secrecy would present its own
dangers. In disbarment proceedings, a balance must be struck, due to the demands of
the legal profession.

The confidentiality rule requires only that "proceedings against attorneys" be kept
private and confidential. It is the proceedings against attorneys that must be kept
private and confidential. This would necessarily prohibit the distribution of actual
disbarment complaints to the press. However, the rule does not extend so far that it
covers the mere existence or pendency of disciplinary actions.

Some cases are more public than others, because of the subject matter, or the
personalities involved. Some are deliberately conducted in the public as a matter of
strategy. A lawyer who regularly seeks attention and readily welcomes, if not invites,
media coverage, cannot expect to be totally sheltered from public interest, himself.

(4) Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer from any publicity he may deem
undesirable. The power of contempt is exercised to ensure the proper administration of
justice and maintain order in court processes. The power to punish for contempt should
be invoked only to ensure or promote the proper administration of justice. Accordingly,
when determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged violations of the
confidentiality rule, we apply a restrictive interpretation.

Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a
subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against
petitioner. The statements were official statements made in the performance of
respondents' official functions to address a matter of public concern. It was the
publication of an institutional action in response to a serious breach of security.
Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for
responding publicly to such public actions.

(5) This Court will not freely infringe on the constitutional right to freedom of
expression. It may interfere, on occasion, for the proper administration of justice.
However, the power of contempt should be balanced with the right to freedom of
expression, especially when it may have the effect of stifling comment on public matters.
Freedom of expression must always be protected to the fullest extent possible.

The power to punish for contempt is not exercised without careful consideration of the
circumstances of the allegedly contumacious act, and the purpose of punishing the act.
Especially where freedom of speech and press is involved, this Court has given a
restrictive interpretation as to what constitutes contempt.

When a lawyer chooses to conduct his cases in as public a manner as in this case, it
would be an abuse of our contempt power to stifle the subject of his attention. A lawyer
who uses the public fora as his battleground cannot expect to be protected from public
scrutiny.

MARIO MAGAT v. TANTRADE CORPORATION and PABLO BORJA

G.R. No. 205483
August 23, 2017

Facts: Respondent Tantrade filed a Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money praying
that the original defendant, now deceased Juliana Magat be ordered to pay P266,481.50
Juliana denied making any such purchases for herself.

The MTC found Juliana liable to pay Tantrade. It ruled that purchase orders signed by
Juliana indicated that she bound herself to pay Tantrade for the purchased materials.

Juliana appealed before the Regional Trial Court but passed away while her appeal was
pending. Hence, she was substituted by her heirs, now petitioners in this case.

The RTC affirmed in toto the MTC decision. Petitioners' counsel received a copy of the
Regional Trial Court April 18, 2011 Order on May 9, 2011.

One (1) day before the lapse of the 15-day period to file a Petition for Review under Rule
42, petitioners filed their Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review under Rule 42 (First Motion for Extension). They asked for an additional 15 days
from May 24, 2011, or until June 8, 2011, to file their appeal. They justified their Motion
by citing financial constraints. They explained that they were still reeling from expenses
due to the long hospitalization and death of Juliana, and thus, could not immediately
finance their appeal.

Despite their declared financial difficulties, petitioners managed to pay the docket and
other fees and to make a deposit for costs, as required for a Petition for Review under
Rule 42. These were done alongside the filing of their First Motion for Extension.

On 31 May 2011, CA denied the First Motion for Extension. It faulted petitioners for
procrastination as they filed a motion for extension a day before the end of the
reglementary period.

Two (2) days before the expiration of the 15-day extension that petitioners originally
prayed for in the First Motion for Extension, petitioners filed their Second Urgent
Motion for Extension of Time (Second Motion for Extension). They had not yet received
a copy of the assailed Court of Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution by this time. They
sought another 15 day extension, or until June 23, 2011, to file their Petition for Review.

On 22 June 2011, a day before the end of the second 15-day extension they prayed for,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review under Rule 42.

It was only on June 29, 2011 that petitioners received a copy of the assailed Court of
Appeals May 31, 2011 Resolution. On July 11, 2011, they filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Not impressed with petitioners' reasons, the CA issued its assailed
January 15, 2013 Resolution, denying petitioners' MR.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in denying the extensions sought by petitioners and in dismissing their
appeal.

Ruling: Section 1 of Rule 4213 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals
taken to the Court of Appeals from decisions of Regional Trial Courts rendered in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction.

It is evident from the last two (2) sentences of Section 1 that motions for extension to file
Rule 42 petitions are permissible.

Rule 44 takes a particularly liberal stance with regard to the period for filing petitions. It
explicitly enables extensions, while other modes of appeal do not. In contrast with Rule
42, Rule 40, or the rules on appeals to the Regional Trial Courts from the Municipal
Trial Courts, and Rule 41, or the rules on appeals to the Court of Appeals of decisions of
the Regional Trial Courts rendered in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, make no
similar reference to any extension to file such appeals. They even proscribe motions for
extension to file motions for new trial or reconsideration.

Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An initial
extension may be given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion, docket and
lawful fees are paid, and a deposit for costs is made before the expiration of the
reglementary period. After this initial extension, Rule 42 permits a second extension of

13
Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. - A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the Regional
Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and
the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full
amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only
within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the
most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Rules of Court)
another 15 days. This second extension shall, however, only be "for the most compelling
reason."

Ultimately, this Court considers it to be in the better interest of justice had the Court of
Appeals been more perceptive of petitioners' plight and granted them the extension
sought, in order that they could have fully litigated their cause.

Their pleaded justifications were hardly frivolous. Petitioners stepped into the shoes of a
defendant who passed away. Certainly, substituting for a deceased party is not forced
upon heirs and petitioners' inclusion in litigation was due to their free volition. Still,
petitioners' predicament of grappling with the potentially stained name of a deceased
wife and mother, who could no longer defend herself against allegations of unpaid
debts, and whose estate faced possible diminution or dissipation likely made it pressing
for them to pursue her case. Doing so, however, meant shouldering costs that were not
initially theirs to bear. By the unfortunate fortuity of Juliana's passing, petitioners found
themselves defending a case that was not their own and bearing all the costs-financial or
otherwise-that it entailed.

By the time they had been compelled to litigate, Juliana's case was already in its
advanced stages. By then, pursuing an appeal literally entailed crossing the sea to
another island. The Court of Appeals should have considered that the required docket
fees and deposit for costs under Rule 42 were not all that petitioners had to shoulder.
There, too, was the need for proper legal representation in the advanced stages of
litigation and having to bear the adversity of having twice lost in lower courts.

Petitioners were simultaneously afflicted with the tragedy of death and constrained by
their means. These were compelling reasons warranting a solicitous stance towards
them. Justice is better served by extending consideration to them and enabling an
exhaustive resolution of the parties' claims. This is especially so as petitioners' utmost
good faith was demonstrated; they having seen to it that, even as they were imploring
the Court of Appeals' understanding, each of the technical requirements of Rule 42 was
satisfied.

CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC. v. OMELIO

G.R. No. 189102
June 7, 2017

Facts: Thousands of banana plantation workers from over 14 countries5 instituted class
suits for damages in the United States against 11 foreign corporations. The banana
plantation workers claimed to have been exposed to dibromochloropropane (DBCP) in
the 1970s up to the 1990s while working in plantations that utilized it. As a result, these
workers suffered serious and permanent injuries to their reproductive systems.

The United States courts dismissed the actions on the ground of forum non
conveniens14 and directed the claimants to file actions in their respective home
countries.

On 3 May 1996, 1,84316 Filipino claimants filed a complaint for damages against the
same foreign corporations before the RTC-Panabo City, Davao

PCSO v. MAXIMO DE LEON, Presiding Judge of Makati and PHILIPPINE

GAMING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 236577 and 236597
August 15, 2018

Facts: This case arose from the Equipment Lease Agreement (Lease Agreement) by the
PCSO and the Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation (PGMC). The Lease
Agreement provided that the PCSO, as lessee, will lease the lottery equipment and
accessories of the PGMC, as lessor, for the operation of its on line lottery in Luzon. The
term of the Lease Agreement was eight (8) years or until 2003.

In 1997, the PCSO and the PGMC amended the Lease Agreement to reduce the original
number of required terminals.

In 2004, the PCSO and the PGMC executed another lease agreement, amending the
Lease Agreement. One of the provisions in the amendment was on the extension of the
lease duration to another eight (8) years.

In 2011, the Lease Agreement was investigated by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
(SBRC). The investigation was conducted due to an alleged "lapse in financial judgment"
when the PCSO rented lottery machines instead of purchasing them. After investigation,
the SBRC recommended that the PCSO proceed with the renegotiation of the rental fee.
The SBRC also recommended that the renegotiations should be pursued not only with
the PGMC but also with the Pacific Online Systems Corporation (Pacific Online), the on-
line lottery operator for Visayas and Mindanao.

Pursuant to the SBRC’s recommendation, the PCSO sought the renegotiation of the
lease rental rate with the PGMC, and Pacific Online. Pacific Online conceded for the
reduction of the lease rental to 7.85% of the gross lotto sales. Since the PGMC declined
to reduce the rental rate of 10% of the gross lotto sales, the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office allowed Pacific Online to provide lottery equipment for the on-line
lottery operations in Luzon.

While the Amendments was still in effect, the Philippine Gaming and Management
Corporation filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the RTC-Makati City. The PGMC argued that the PCSO violated a
Court order confirming its exclusive right.

PCSO filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam, they contended that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the case and that the PGMC has no exclusive right as the sole
supplier of on-line lottery equipment in Luzon territory.

Judge Baybay issued a Reso1ution denying Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam filed by the
PCSO.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Presiding Judge Maximo M. De Leon

committed grave abuse of discretion when he granted respondent
Philippine Gaming and Management Corporation's application for
injunctive relief.

Ruling: This Court finds that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting respondent PGMC’s application for injunctive relief. A Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is issued "to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and
adjudicated.

The issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is governed by Rule 58, Section 3 14 of

the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

PGMC’s claim of exclusive rights, as stated in the Interim Settlement and which was
brought to arbitration, pertained to its rights under the Amendments to Equipment
Lease Agreement, which will expire on August 21, 2018. It failed to provide proof that
the Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement was extended beyond August 21, 2018.
It cannot claim that it has alleged exclusive rights to be protected and that it will suffer
irreparable injury if petitioner continued with the Nationwide On-line Lottery System
bidding process. This is precisely because the bidding was for the next supplier of the
Nationwide On-line Lottery System for a period of five (5) years after August 21, 2018 or
commencing on August 22, 2018.

Additionally, with the Regional Trial Court's confirmation of the arbitral tribunal's Final
Award, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is deemed lifted and petitioner may now
proceed with the bidding process of the Nationwide Online Lottery System for Luzon.

14
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:
(a)That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring performance of
an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b)That the commission, continuance or non-
performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant
respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. (Rules
of Court)
ATTY. JOSELITA MALIBAGO-SANTOS, Clerk of Court, Office of the Clerk of
Court, RTC, Antipolo City v. JUANITO FRANCISCO JR., Sheriff, Office of
the Clerk of Court, RTC, Antipolo City
A.M. No. P-16-3459
June 21, 2016

Facts: Atty. Santos, Clerk of Court of RTC-Antipolo City received a letter of Intent to
Redeem Subject Property from Overlook Resort in relation to extrajudicial foreclosure
case. Plantersbank was adjudged the highest bidder during the auction. Thus, Atty.
Santos wrote the Plantersbank to inform her of the mortgagors’ intent to redeem the
foreclosed property. In accordance with the rules, she requested the bank to submit a
statement of account of all the expenses it incurred relative to the foreclosure sale.

Atty. Santos received a letter from Plantersbank stating that the redemption price for
the foreclosed property. Attached to the letter were statements of accounts and receipts
in support of the amount including the receipt for P8,000.00 signed by Sheriff
Francisco, who was then Sheriff-In-Charge.

Atty. Santos required Sheriff Francsico to explain why he did not submit an estimate of
expenses and liquidation in relation to the P8,000.00 he received.

Sheriff Francisco admitted that he received a check for P8,000.00; that he received the
check when the auction had already been concluded as a token of appreciation. He
averred that Rule 141, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, which required the submission of
estimate expenses, only pertains to execution of writs and in his honest belief, this
provision does not apply to extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings.

Sheriff Francisco alleged that he did not solicit nor demand any fee, and even initially
declined the gratuity. However, Plantersbank insisted that it regularly gives this
standard amount as posting fee and sheriff’s expense.

Issue/s: Whether respondent Sheriff Francisco is guilty of gross misconduct

when he accepted the P8,000.00 check from Plantersbank.

Ruling: Sheriffs play a crucial role in our justice system as our frontline representatives
tasked with executing final judgments by the courts. Consequently, a sheriff must always
perform his or her duty with integrity for “once he [or she] loses the people’s trust, he
[or she] diminishes the people’s faith in the judiciary.”

Codes of ethics for public employees such as sheriffs prohibit them from accepting any
form of remuneration in relation to the performance of their official duties.

The Court has considered the solicitation and acceptance of monetary considerations by
sheriffs as conduct unbecoming of a court employee, grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Sheriff Francisco is found guilty of gross misconduct and is suspended for one (1) year.
 LUZ ANATOLIA CRISPINO, CARIDAD ECHAVES REESE and ZENAIDA
ECHAVES represented by Attorney-in-Fact REUBEN ECHAVES v.
ANATOLIA TASAY
G.R. No. 184466
December 5, 2016

Facts: Respondent Anatolia Tansay, now deceased, was twice widowed. In 1957
Anatolia met 20-year-old Zenaida Capili who was then single. Anatolia took in Zenaida
and treated her as her own child.

Thereafter, they moved to Cebu where Anatolia acquired a Tansay compound; she
subdivided the compound into three lots (Lot A, Lot B and Lot C). Zenaida eventually
married Ben Echaves and had several children, among whom are petitioners Luz and
Caridad. Zenaida and her family lived in Anatolia’s house.

Anatolia allegedly sold Lot A in favor of Zenaida and Lot C to Luz and Caridad. And in
1991, Zenaida returned abroad and discovered that the tittles of the lots were missing
from her room where she left them. Hence, she filed a petition before RTC for
reconstitution of the certificates of title.

Meanwhile, Anatolia filed Revocation of Trust, Declaration of Nullity of Transfer and

Cancellation of Title before RTC. RTC declared Anatolia to be the lawful and rightful
owner of the property. Petitioners appealed the Decision before the CA.

Thereafter, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Opening of Trial. They anchored
their motion on an alleged Affidavit (Confirmation of Previous Sale by Anatolia to
Petitioners) after RTC had rendered its Decision. The CA denied the Urgent Motion to
Remand Records. The CA treated the same as motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence and ruled that the Confirmation of Previous Sale was not the kind
of newly discovered evidence contemplated by the Rules that would warrant a new trial.

Issue/s: (1) Whether an interlocutory order may be assailed by an appeal of

the appellate court’s Decision; and (2) Whether the CA erred in treating
petitioners’ motion to remand as a motion for new trial.

Ruling: (1) In determining the correct procedural remedy, aggrieved parties must first
ascertain the nature of the decision, order or resolution they intend to challenge.

The remedy against an interlocutory order15 is not appeal but a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. The reason for prohibition is to prevent multiple
appeals in a single action that would unnecessary cause delay during the trial.

15
An Interlocutory Order is one that merely resolves incidental matters and does not finally dispose a
case. When an interlocutory order is issued, the court is still tasked with adjudicating on the merits of the
case
Faced with an interlocutory order, parties may instantly avail of the special civil action
of certiorari. This would entail compliance with the strict requirements under Rule 65 of
the Rules. Aggrieved parties would have to prove that the order was issued without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and that there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.

The CA’s resolution which denied petitioner’s motion to remand was an interlocutory
order. It did not finally dispose of the case because the appellate court still had to
determine whether the deeds of sale executed by Anatolia were valid. Rather, than
availing of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, petitioners opted to
wait for the CA to render its decision before challenging the Resolution.

Petitioners did not commit any procedural infirmity in assailing the interlocutory order
in an appeal of the CA’s decision.

(2 & 3) The CA correctly treated petitioner’s motion to remand as a motion for new trial
under Rule 53 of the Rules. The CA, pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Section
9 of B.P. 129, as amended is empowered to receive evidence to resolve factual issues
raised falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction.

As may be gleaned from the records, in actions falling with the original jurisdiction of
the CA, such as special civil for certiorari, the CA’s power to received evidence is
unqualified. This does not hold true with respect to appeals in civil cases, criminal cases,
as well as appeals involving claims for damages.

Hence, in appeals in civil cases, the CA may only receive evidence when it grants when it
grants a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

MARIA THERESA GUTIERREZ v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 200628
January 13, 2015

Facts: Gutierrez is a Cash Collecting Officer at NFA-NCR. One day she had collections
amounting to 10.8Million to which she placed pearless boxes in a wooden cabinet and
790K was placed in a safety vault

The following day, armed men in military uniforms entered NFA-NCR. The armed men
disarmed security guards and took Gutierrez’s undeposited collections. The CA issued a
demand letter to Gutierrez and was informed that she must immediately produce the
missing funds amounting to 10.1Million.

The CoA then issued a withholding order against the salaries and other emoluments so
these could be applied to the satisfaction of the shortage. Gutierrez requested relief from
money accountability for the loss of the collections.
State Auditor denied Gutierrez’s appeal; Gutierrez filed a notice of appeal of State
Auditor’s withholding order. CoA issued a decision denying the appeal and expressing
his agreement with the issuance of the withholding order.

Gutierrez filed an MR of the decision of CoA on the ground that he did not give her a
chance to file a memorandum of appeal before submission of the case for resolution.
The CoA denied the same.

Issue: Whether Gutierrez’s due process rights were violated when the CoA decided her
appeal without requiring her to file an appeal memorandum.

Ruling: (1) Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. The right of counsel under
Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution applies in criminal proceedings, but not in
administrative proceedings. It is a right given to persons accused of an offense during
criminal investigation. Any proceeding conducted by administrative body is not part of
the criminal investigation or prosecution.

Also, petitioner’s due process was not violated when the CoA had failed to require her to
submit an appeal memorandum before he decided her appeal of the State Auditor’s
issuance of a withholding order. There was also no violation of due process rights when
the CoA issued its decision denying her request for relief from accountability, without a
petition for review of the CoA’s decision. The right to appeal is not part of due process.
Neither is it a natural right.

Moreover, the Court ruled in Ang Tibay v. CIR, ruled that administrative due process
requires only the following:
1. The party should be allowed to present his or her own case and submit
supporting evidence;
2. The deciding tribunal must consider the party’s evidence;
3. There is evidence to support tribunal’s decision;
4. The evidence supporting the tribunal’s decision must be substantial or such
“relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion”;
5. The tribunal’s decision was based on the evidence presented or the records of the
case disclosed to the parties;
6. The tribunal’s decision must be based on the judges’ independent consideration
of the facts and law governing the case;
7. The tribunal’s decision must be rendered such that the issues of the case and the
reasons for the decisions are known to the parties.

In sum, due process in administrative proceedings does not necessarily require a trial
type of hearings. Neither does it require an exchange of pleadings between or among the
parties. Due process is satisfied if the party who is properly notified of allegations
against him or her is given an opportunity to defend himself or herself against those
allegations, and such defense was considered by the tribunal in arriving at its own
independent judgment.
Therefore, petitioner cannot say that her due process rights were violated for the lack of
order to file an appeal memorandum.

PEOPLE v. NADY MAGALLANO and FLOR ROMEO TAPAR

G.R. No. 220721
December 10, 2018

Facts: On 1 Oct 2005, Magallano and Tapar armed with hard object and bladed
weapon assault Ronnie Batongbakal and stab bladed weapon in different parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which caused his death.

Miguel testified that at around 1AM, he was at home sleeping beside his wife when loud
voices roused him from sleep. He then heard a woman shout “Romy, bakit mo sya
sinasaktan, inaano ba kayo?” He peeked into his window and saw two (2) men, whom
he later identified as Magallano and Tapar, ganging up on Ronnie Batongbakal, who was
by then lying on the ground. He testified that he saw Magallano repeatedly strike
Batongbakal with “dos por dos” while Tapar watched.

As Magallano was hitting Batongbakal, a woman suddenly bolted from the fray.
Magallano and Tapar then jumped inside a tricycle and chased the woman. By then,
still-conscious Batangbakal began to crawl slowly towards the gate.

They returned after few minutes carrying a several stones which they threw on
Batangbakal’s head and body, and prevented him from crawling away.

Miguel attested that he wanted to help Batangbakal but his wife stopped him out of fear.
Still, the accused heard him so they stopped attacking Batongbakal, loaded him into the
tricycle and sped off towards Poblacion.

Miguel testified that he knew Magallano and Tapar since they both worked at NFA; he
also stated that the streetlight outside their house where Batangbakal was mauled, was
well lit by a streetlight; he also explained that he did not immediately give his statement
to the police officers because the day after the incident, he was informed by a police
officer that a woman had already given her statement.

Defense presented the testimonies of Magallano and Tapar and their employers; both
accused denied their involvement in the incident; defense insinuated that the
prosecution failed to produce its principal witness, belatedly brought Pineda as a
witness and merely manufactured his testimony; he further posited that the prosecution
failed to prove the elements of murder, particularly treachery and conspiracy.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution proved accused-appellant’s guilt for
murder16 beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling: Trial courts have the advantage of personally scrutinizing the conduct and
attitude of witnesses when giving their testimonies. Thus, assignment of values to the
testimony of a witness is virtually left, almost entirely, to the trial court which has the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand. Due to their unique
position, the trial courts’ factual findings and appreciation of the witnesses’ testimonies
are given much respect, more so, when their conclusions are affirmed by the CA.

Here, the RTC and CA both found Miguel’s testimony to be a credible and reliable.

The Court also ruled that there is no standard of behavior when confronted by a
shocking incident. Miguel’s delay in reporting the incident or making a statement before
the police, when adequately explained, neither impairs his credibility as a witness nor
destroys the probative value of his testimony.

To sustain a conviction under Article 248 RPC, the prosecution must prove the following
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused-appellants
killed the victim; (3) that the killing was not parricide or infanticide; (4) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248.

A few hours after Pineda saw accused-appellants pound Batongbakal with rocks, then
cart his body away in their tricycle, the victim’s lifeless body was found floating on a
creek in Brgy. San Miguel, Bulacan. The prosecution likewise proved lacked of
relationship between the victim and accused which satisfies the first and third elements
of conviction.

However, the Court ruled that treachery17 is not attendant in this case. Miguel’s
testimony began when accused-appellants were in the middle of mauling the victim, and

16
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death, if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the
use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse. (Revised Penal Code)

17
Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances:
there was no testimony to prove that the victim did not provoke them or expect their
attack. The prosecution did not present evidence that would show that the accused
reflected on and decided on the form of their attack to secure an unfair advantage over
the victim. Even when the accused-appellants returned after chasing the screaming
woman and hit the crawling victim with rocks, treachery is still absent. This is because
the second attack was not a surprise, as shown by the victim's attempt to go back to the
safety of his own house.

Hence, the prosecution thus only proved that accused-appellants committed homicide,
not murder. Nonetheless, the conspiracy 18 between accused-appellants was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

SPS ROBERTO ABOITIZ and MA. CRISTINA CABARRUS v.

SPS PETER and VICTORIA PO
G.R. No. 208450
June 5, 2017

Facts: This case involves a parcel of land registered (Original Certificate of Title) under
the name of Roberto; the land was originally belonged to Mariano.

On July 1973, Mariano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of his son, Ciriaco
Seno. Ciriaco sold the lots to Victoria Po. Mariano died and was survived by his five
children: Esperanza, Ramon, Benita, Simeon and Ciriaco (“Mariano Heirs”)

Peter Po discovered that Ciriaco had executed a quitclaim renouncing his interest over
the lot in favour of Roberto. In the quitclaim, Ciriaco stated that he was the declared
owner.

The SpsPo confronted Ciriaco. By way of remedy, Ciriaco and Sps Po executed a MOA in
which CIriaco agreed to pay Peter Po the difference between the amount paid by the Sps
Po as consideration for the entire property and the value of the land the Sps Po were left
after quitclaim.

However, in 1990, the lot was sold to Roberto. The Mariano heirs executed a deed/s of
absolute sale in favour of Roberto. Thereafter, Roberto developed the lot as part of
North Town Homes.

In 1991, Sps Po declared the lot for taxation purposes and was issued a Tax Declaration.
In 1992, Roberto declared the lot for taxation purposes and was issued a Tax
That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). xxxxx There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make. (Revised Penal Code)

18
Article 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. - xxxx A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. (Revised
Penal Code)
Declaration annotated with “This tax declaration is also declared in the name of Mrs.
Victoria Po so that one may be considered a duplicate to another.”

In 1993, Roberto filed an application for original registration with the RTC Cebu.

Issue/s: (1) Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Sps Peter and
Victoria Po’s complaint; (2) Whether the action is barred by prescription;
(3) Whether the doctrines of estoppel and laches apply; (4) Whether the
land registration court’s finding that Ciriaco Seno only held the property in
trust for the Mariano Heirs is binding as res judicata in this case; (5)
Whether the Deed of Sale between Ciriaco Seno and the Sps Po should be
considered as evidence of their entitlement to property; (6) Whether the
Mariano Heirs, as sellers in a deed of conveyance of realty, are
indispensible parties; and (7) Whether the respondents Jose Aboitiz,
Ernesto Aboitiz and Isabel Aboitiz are innocent purchasers for value.

Ruling: (1)

(2) The Sps Po’s action has not prescribed. The Sps Aboitiz argue that the Sps Po's cause
of action has prescribed. They claim that prescription has set in because the original
complaint was filed only on November 12, 1996, after more than 10 years after the Deed
of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and Sps Po was executed on May 5, 1978.

An action for reconveyance prescribes in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property. The basis for this is Section 53, paragraph 3 19of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 in relation to Articles 145620 and 1144(2)21 of the Civil Code.

Under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), the owner of a
property may avail of legal remedies against a registration procured by fraud.

Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring a property through fraud
becomes an implied trustee of the property's true and lawful owner.

19
Section 53 (3). Presentation of Owner's Duplicate - Upon Entry of New Certificate. - xxx
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value
of a certificate of title. (Presidential Decree No. 1529)

20
Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a person acquiring a property through fraud becomes an
implied trustee of the property's true and lawful owner.

21
Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that the following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon an written consent;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment
An implied trust is based on equity and is either (i) a constructive trust, or (ii) a
resulting trust. A resulting trust is created by implication of law and is presumed as
intended by the parties. A constructive trust is created by force of law of such as when a
title is registered in favor of a person other than the true owner.

The implied trustee only acquires the right "to the beneficial enjoyment of [the]
property." The legal title remains with the true owner.

Thus, the law creates a trust in favor of the property's true owner. The prescriptive
period to enforce this trust is 10 years from the time the right of action accrues per
Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

In an action for reconveyance, the right of action accrues from time the property is
registered. Registration of the property is a constructive notice to the whole world. Thus,
in registering the property, the adverse party repudiates the implied trust. Necessarily,
the cause of action accrues upon registrati0n.

An action for reconveyance and annulment of title does not seek to question the contract
which allowed the adverse party to obtain the title to the property. What is put on issue
an acti0n for reconveyance and cancellation of title is the ownership of the property and
its registration. It does not question any fraudulent contract.

Thus, an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title prescribes in 10 years from the
time of the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
Considering that the Sps Po's complaint was filed on November 19, 1996, less than three
years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property on April 6, 1994, it is well
within the 10-year prescriptive period imposed on an action for reconveyance.

(3) Thus, it cannot be said that they are barred by laches.

The Sps Aboitiz insists that estoppel and laches have already set in. They claim that they
have been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, and adverse possession in the concept
of owners over the property for 46 years as of 1993," without the Sps Po acting on their
Deed of Absolute Sale.

There is laches22 when a party was negligent or has failed to assert a right within a
reasonable time, thus giving rise to the presumption that he or she has abandoned it.
Laches has set in when it is already inequitable or unfair to allow the party to assert the
right.

22
There is laches when: (1) the conduct of the defendant or one under whom he claims, gave rise to the
situation complained of; (2) there was delay in asserting a right after knowledge of the defendant's
conduct and after an opportunity to sue; (3) defendant had no knowledge or notice that the complainant
would assert his right; (4) there is injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant. (Citing Ignacio v. Bastillo)
Laches is different from prescription23. Prescription deals with delay itself and thus is an
issue of how much time has passed. The time period when prescription is deemed to
have set in is fixed by law. Laches, on the other hand, concerns itself with the effect of
delay and not the period of time that has lapsed.

The defense of laches is based on equity. It is not based on the title of the party invoking
it, but on the right holder's long inaction or inexcusable neglect to assert his claim.

This Court rules that the Sps Po is not barred by laches. There is no showing that they
abandoned their right to the property. The factual findings reveal that the Sps Po had
their rights over the property registered in the assessor's office; they testified that they
introduced improvements by cultivating fruit trees after they purchased the lots. And
when the Sps Po discovered that Ciriaco executed a quitclaim renouncing his interest
over the lot in favor of Roberto, the SpsPo executed a MOA with Ciriaco to protect their
interest in the lot. The Sps Po also had the property declared for taxation purposes in
their names.

Based on these circumstances, the elements of laches are clearly lacking in this case.
There was no delay in asserting their right over the property, and the Sps Aboitiz had
knowledge that the Sps Po would assert their right.

(4) The Sps Aboitiz insist that there is already a finding by the RTC in LRC that Ciriaco
merely held the property in trust for the Mariano Heirs. Thus, Ciriaco could not have
validly sold the property to the Sps Po. They claim that these findings are binding on the
whole world because land registration proceedings are actions in rem.

This Court rules that this cannot be binding in this action for reconveyance.

23
Appellee is correct in its contention that the defense of laches applies independently of prescription.
Laches is different from the statute of limitations. Prescription is concerned with the fact of delay.
Whereas laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally
a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some change in
the condition of the property or the relation of the parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on fixed time, laches is not.
(Citing Nielson Co. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining)
Res judicata embraces two (2) concepts: (i) bar by prior judgment and (ii)
conclusiveness of judgment, respectively covered under Rule 39, Section 47 24 of the
Rules of Court covered by paragraphs (b) and (c).

Res judicata in the concept of bar by prior judgment proscribes the filing of another
action based on the same claim, demand, or cause of action. It applies when the
following are present: (a) there is a final judgment or order; (b) it is a judgment or order
on the merits; (c) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties; and (d) there is identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action
between the first and second actions.

Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment applies when there is an

identity of issues in two (2) cases between the same parties involving different causes of
action. Its effect is to bar the relitigation of particular facts or issues which have already
been adjudicated in the other case.

In Racoma v. Fortichth25 it was held that res judicata could not be a defense in an action
for reconveyance based on fraud where the complainant had no knowledge of the
application for registration.

24
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. -The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties
and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

( c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
thereto. (Rules of Court)

25
The other ground upon which the lower court dismissed the complaint is res judicata. It is stated in the
order of dismissal that the plaintiff had admitted that the property in controversy was applied for by
defendant Maximina Fortich in a cadastral proceeding and under Act 496; that the proceedings were in
rem and, therefore, the whole world, including the plaintiff, were parties thereto and bound by the
judgment thereon ... [I]t is obvious that the lower court was referring to the legal effect of the
conclusiveness against all persons of the in rem decision in the cadastral case rather than the actual fact
that the plaintiff was a claimant who appeared in the said case, for he alleged in his complaint that he
"has no knowledge whatsoever of the application for registration filed by defendant Maximina Fortich and
the order of decree of registration issued in favor of the defendant Maximina Fortich by this Honorable
Court until on February 25, 1967 ... " (Record on Appeal, page 30). Such being the case, then an action
for reconveyance is available to the plaintiff, the decree of registration notwithstanding, for ...

it is now a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that the existence of a decree of registration in favor of
one party is no bar to an action to compel reconveyance of the property to the true owner, which is an
action in personam, even if such action be instituted after the year fixed by Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act as a limit to the review of the registration decree, provided it is shown that the registration
is wrongful and the property sought to be reconveyed has not passed to an innocent third party holder for
value.
The reason26 for this rule is to prevent the unjust deprivation of rights over real
property.

In this case, the Sps Po allege that the registration was done through fraud. They
contend that they were unaware and were thus unable to contest the registration and
prove their claim over the property. Aside from several tax receipts, the Sps Po formally
offered as evidence, among others, the Deed of Sale executed by Mariano in Ciriaco's
favor, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Ciriaco in their favor, and the Tax
Declaration under Victoria's name. Additionally, they also submitted their MOA with
Ciriaco and the Quitclaim executed by Ciriaco in favor of the SpsAboitiz. These
documents were not considered by the land registration court when it issued the title in
favor of the Sps Aboitiz. The Sps Po also offered the Application of Original Registration
of Title of the Sps Aboitiz to prove that the Sps Aboitiz only submitted to the land
registration court the cancelled tax declarations of Ciriaco, instead of the tax declaration
of the Sps Po.

Thus, the ruling of the land registration court cannot be so conclusive as to deny the Sps
Po the remedy afforded to them by law. The action for reconveyance allows them to
prove their ownership over the property. Hence, they are not precluded from presenting
evidence that is contrary to the findings in the land registration case.

(5) The Sps Aboitiz posit that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Sps Po
is fake and fraudulent.They argue that this is evidenced by certifications of the
document's non-existence in the notarial books and the Sps Po's failure to enforce their
rights over the property until 18 years later.They also claim that the Deed of Absolute
Sale is inadmissible as no documentary stamp was paid and affixed.
The Court notes that the Sps Aboitiz are raising questions of fact which are not within
the scope of a review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An appeal under
Rule 45 must raise only questions of law, unless the factual findings are not supported
by evidence or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. Absent these
exceptions, the factual findings of the lower courts are accorded respect and are beyond
the review of this Court.

The Sps Aboitiz failed to prove that these exceptions exist in the case at bar. The RTC
26
As discussed in People v. Cainglet, it is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a
cadastral proceeding -a proceeding in rem -is binding and conclusive upon the whole world. Reason is
that public policy and public order demand not only that litigations must terminate at some definite point
but also that titles over lands under the Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends
the stability of the country's economy. Interest republicae ut sit finis litium. However, this conclusiveness
of judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute. It admits of exception. Public policy also dictates
that those unjustly deprived of their rights over real property by reason of the operation of our registration
laws be afforded remedies. Thus, the aggrieved party may file a suit for reconveyance of property or a
personal action for recovery of damages against the party who registered his property through fraud, or in
case of insolvency of the party who procured the registration through fraud, an action against the
Treasurer of the Philippines for recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund. Through these remedial
proceedings, the law, while holding registered titles indefeasible, allows redress calculated to prevent one
from enriching himself at the expense of other. Necessarily, without setting aside the decree of title, the
issues raised in the previous registration case are relit1ated, for purposes of reconveyance of said title or
recovery of damages.
lent credence to documents presented by the Sps Po, Peter's testimony about Mariano's
sale of the property to Ciriaco, Ciriaco's sale of the property to the Sps Po, and the
issuance of a Tax Declaration in the name of Victoria.

In this case, the Court believes that defendant Roberto Aboitiz is aware of the
proprietary rights of the plaintiffs considering the land was already declared for taxation
purposes in plaintiffs' names after the tax declaration of said land, first in the name of
Mariano Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the name of [iriaco Seno when
the latter bought the said land from his father Mariano Seno, and after the said tax
declaration in the name of Ciriaco Seno was cancelled and another one issued in the
name of plaintiffs herein.

So, defendant Roberto Aboitiz purchased the subject land from the Heirs of Mariano
Seno who are no longer the owners thereof and the tax declaration of subject land was
no longer in the name of Mariano Seno nor in the name of Heirs of Mariano Seno.

The City Assessor of Mandaue City even issued a Certification (Exh. X) to the effect that
Tax Declaration No. 0634-A in the name of Mrs. Victoria Lee Po married to Peter Po
was issued prior to the issuance of T.D. No. 1100 in the name of Roberto Aboitiz married
to Maria Cristina Cabarruz.

Buyers of any untitled parcel of land for that matter, to protect their interest, will first
verify from the Assessor's Office that status of said land whether it has clean title or not.

With the exception of its ruling regarding respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel being
purchasers in good faith, these factual findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Thus, there is no showing that the factual findings are not supported by evidence or that
the judgment seems to be based on a misapprehension of facts. Therefore, the factual
findings of the lower courts are binding.

Furthermore, this Court finds that the Sps Aboitiz failed to prove their claim of fraud.
The Sps Aboitiz attempted to prove that the Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and
the Sps Po was fake and fraudulent by presenting certifications of its non-existence in
the notarial books of the notary public who notarized the document.

However, a review of the certifications does not even state that the document does not
exist in the notarial books.

In any case, the Notary Public's failure to submit his or her notarial report does not
affect the act of notarization as per Ruled 132, Section 30 of the Rules of Court.

Thus, parties who appear before a Notary Public should not be prejudiced by the failure
of the Notary Public to follow rules imposed by the Notarial Law. They are not obliged to
ensure that the Notary Public submits his or her notarial reports.
The Sps Aboitiz failed to present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption. The notarized Deed of Absolute Sale between Ciriaco and the Spouses Po
is, thus, presumed regular and authentic.

Consequently, this Court can affirm the finding that the property was sold to Ciriaco in
1973, and that Ciriaco, as the owner of the property, had the right to sell it to the
Spouses Po. Hence, the lot did not form part of the estate of Mariano, and the Mariano
Heirs did not have the capacity to sell the property to the Sps Aboitiz later on.

(6) The Spouses Aboitiz argue that the Mariano Heirs are indispensable parties who
should have been impleaded in this case. The Mariano Heirs are not indispensable 27
parties.

The property owners against whom the action for reconveyance is filed are
indispensable parties. No relief can be had, and the court cannot render a valid
judgment, without them. The property has been sold to respondents Jose, Ernesto, and
Isabel. Thus, they are indispensable parties.

However, the seller of the property is not an indispensable party.

The Mariano Heirs, as the alleged sellers of the property, are not indispensable parties.
They are at best necessary parties28.

It is clear that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable parties. They have already sold
all their interests in the property to the Sps Aboitiz. They will no longer be affected,
benefited, or injured by any ruling of this Court on the matter, whether it grants or
denies the complaint for reconveyance. The ruling of this Court as to whether the Sps Po
are entitled to reconveyance will not affect their rights. Their interest has, thus, become
separable from that of Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel.

Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Mariano Heirs are not indispensable
27
Section 7. Compulsory Joinder of Indispensable Parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

An indispensable party is the party whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that "the
action cannot be finally determined" without him or her because his or her interests in the matter and in
the relief "are so bound up with that of the other parties.(Rule 3, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court)

28
Section 8. Necessary Party. - A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be
joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.

Necessary parties may be joined in the case "to adjudicate the whole controversy," but the case may go
on without them because a judgment may be rendered without any effect on their rights and interests.
(Rule 3 - Rules of Court)
parties.

(7) Despite these findings, the Spouses Po cannot recover the property. Respondents
Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are innocent purchasers for value 29.

The Spouses Po argue that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel are not innocent
purchasers for value because the tax declaration over the property has annotation.

However, if a property is registered, the buyer of a parcel of land is not obliged to look
beyond the transfer certificate of title to be considered a purchaser in good faith for
value.

Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 218 states: “Every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith,
shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted in said
certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:

First. Liens, claims or rights arising or existing under the laws and Constitution of the
Philippines which are not by law required to appear of record in the Registry of Deeds in
order to be valid against subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers of record.

Second. Unpaid real estate taxes levied and assessed within two years immediately
preceding the acquisition of any right over the land by an innocent purchaser for value,
without prejudice to the right of the government to collect taxes payable before that
period from the delinquent taxpayer alone.

Third. Any public highway or private way established or recognized by law, or any
government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, if the certificate of title does not state that
the boundaries of such highway or irrigation canal or lateral thereof have been
determined.

Fourth. Any disposition of the property or limitation on the use thereof by virtue of, or
pursuant to, Presidential Decree No. 27 or any other law or regulations on agrarian
reform.

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to land and to put
a stop to any question of legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in
the certificate of title at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto.
Every registered owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the
title to the property free from all encumbrances except those noted in the certificate.
Hence, a purchaser is not required to explore further what the Torrens title on its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat
29
An innocent purchaser for value refers to the buyer of the property who pays for its full and fair price
without or before notice of another person's right or interest in it. He or she buys the property believing
that the seller is the owner and could transfer the title to the property.
his right thereto.

Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of title thus
issued, acquire rights over the property the court cannot disregard such rights and order
the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of such an outright cancellation would
be to impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with
property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance
whether the title has been regularly or irregularly issued. This is contrary to the evident
purpose of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him
to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Even if a decree
in a registration proceeding is infected with nullity, still an innocent purchaser for value
relying on a Torrens title issued in pursuance thereof is protected.

The rationale for this rule is the public's interest in sustaining "the indefeasibility of a
certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful ownership of the land or of any
encumbrance" on it.

The Torrens system was adopted to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public
the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with
the necessity of inquiring further.

One need not inquire beyond the four comers of the certificate of title when dealing with
registered property.

The protection of innocent purchasers in good faith for value grounds on the social
interest embedded in the legal concept granting indefeasibility of titles. Between the
third party and the owner, the latter would be more familiar with the history and status
of the titled property. Consequently, an owner would incur less costs to discover alleged
invalidities relating to the property compared to a third party. Such costs are, thus,
better borne by the owner to mitigate costs for the economy, lessen delays in
transactions, and achieve a less optimal welfare level for the entire society.

Thus, respondents were not obliged to look beyond the title before they purchased the
property. They may rely solely on the face of the title.

The only exception to the rule is when the purchaser has actual knowledge of any defect
or other circumstance that would cause "a reasonably cautious man" to inquire into the
title of the seller If there is anything which arouses suspicion, the vendee is obliged to
investigate beyond the face of the title. Otherwise, the vendee cannot be deemed a
purchaser in good faith entitled to protection under the law. 226

In this case, there is no showing that respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel had any
knowledge of the defect in the title. Considering that the annotation that the Spouses Po
are invoking is found in the tax declaration and not in the title of the property,
respondents Jose, Ernesto, and Isabel cannot be deemed purchasers in bad faith.
 PEOPLE v. ROLANDO TERNIDA
G.R. No. 212626
June 3, 2019

Facts: The police officer of San Fernando, La Union formed a buy-bust team composed
of PO2 Annague, as the poseur-buyer, PO3 Quesada, PO3 Dapula and PO3 Batnag, as
back-up on a tip that an illegal drug transaction would take place.

The team carried out the operation. The officers spotted Ternida. PO2 Annague
approached him, while P03 Batnag stayed at a distance where he could observe the
transaction.

Ternida asked how much PO2 Annague would buy, to which PO2 Annague said
Pl,000.00 worth. Ternida then gave P02 Annague one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of
crystalline substance in exchange for Pl,000.00 bill. After securing the sachet, P02
Annague gave the pre-arranged signal to PO3 Batnag, who immediately approached and
arrested Ternida.

A Certificate of Inventory was subsequently prepared. And the seized plastic sachet
tested positive for shabu.

On defense, Ternidad alleged that after frisking him, the officers took his cell phone and
coin purse, then, brought him under a tree, where they took photos of him beside the
plastic sachet. Afterwards, they brought him to the police station, where he was
detained.

Ternida denied that there had been a buy-bust operation. He claimed that he was about
to cross Quezon Avenue on his way to a restaurant when three (3) men, whom he later
identified as Inspector Quesada, P03 Batnag, and P02 Annague, arrested him.

Temida also argued that the prosecution failed to preserve the identity and integrity of
the corpus delicti. He pointed out that the seized item was not marked with the date of
seizure. Moreover, he claimed that the drugs allegedly seized were not photographed.
He asserted that the prosecution did not give justifiable grounds for the apprehending
officers' failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements under the law.

Ternida also pointed out that the witnesses who had signed the Certificate of Inventory
were not presented in court. Moreover, he claimed that the arresting officers
contradicted each other as to the witnesses' presence during the buy-bust.

Moreover, Ternida asserted that no Certificate of Coordination with the PDEA was
presented, and that the police officers themselves admitted that they did not coordinate
with the PDEA during the surveillance and monitoring operations before Temida's
arrest. He also claimed that PO2 Annague's and PO3 Batnag's testimonies on their
coordination with the PDEA were not only inconsistent with each other, but also
inconsistent with the Pre-Operation Report and Coordination Sheet presented by the
prosecution.

Issue: Whether or not accused Ternida is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling: Accused Ternida should be acquitted.

To convict an accused of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must not
only prove that the sale took place, but also present the corpus delicti in evidence. In
doing so, the prosecution must establish the chain of custody of the seized items to
prove with moral certainty the identity of the dangerous drugs seized.

Article II, Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts provides the
procedures that the apprehending team must observe to comply with the chain of
custody requirements in handling seized drugs. The first step upon seized mandates:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof [.]

That the photographing and physical inventory of the seized drugs must be done
immediately where the seizure had taken place minimizes the possibility that evidence
may be planted. Non-compliance with this legally mandated procedure, upon seizure,
raises doubt that what was submitted for laboratory examination and as evidence in
court was seized from an accused.

Here, the prosecution failed to provide any evidence that the allegedly seized drugs were
photographed upon seizure, in the presence of the accused. That no photograph of the
seized drugs was offered in evidence raises questions as to whether the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was seized form Ternida in the buy-bust
operation.

The arresting officer’s failure to photograph the seized drugs, to explain this failure, and
to establish that the integrity of the seized drugs was preserved despite the failure, are
sufficient to reverse accused Ternida’s conviction based on reasonable doubt.

MICHAEL GUY v. RAFFY TULFO et al.

G.R. No. 213023
April 10, 2019

Facts: An article entitled “Malinis ba talaga o naglilinis-linisan (Sino si Finance Sec.

Juanita Amatong)” was published in Abante Tonite, a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines.
Written by Raffy Tulfo (Tulfo), the article reported that a certain Michael Guy, who was
then being investigated by the Revenue Integrity Protection Service (RIPS) of the
Department of Finance for tax fraud, went to former DoF Sec. Juanita Amatong’s house
to ask for help. Sec. Amatong then purportedly called the head of the RIPS and directed
that all documents that the RIPS had obtained on Guy’s case be surrendered to her.

Claiming that the article had tainted his reputation, Guy filed a Complaint before Office
of the City Prosecutor; and eventually, an Information charging Tulfo et al. with the
crime of libel.

RTC convicted Tulfo et al. of the crime of libel. It also ordered respondents to pay Guy
500K as actual damages, 5M as moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not there is sufficient basis for an award of actual
damages; (2) Whether or not petitioner Guy is entitled to moral damages;
and (3) Whether or not he is entitled to exemplary damages.

Ruling: (1) Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured
party in the position where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or
losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Actual damages
constitute compensation for sustained pecuniary loss. Nevertheless, a party may only be
awarded actual damages when the pecuniary loss he or she had suffered was duly
proven.

Petitioner Guy failed to substantiate the loss he had allegedly sustained. Save for his
testimony in court, he presented no evidence to support his claim. His allegation of
possibly earning P50,000,000.00 in 10 years is a mere assumption without any
foundation. This bare allegation is insufficient to prove that he has indeed lost
P5,000,000.00 as earnings. As this Court has previously held, the award of unrealized
profits cannot be based on the sole testimony of the party claiming it.

Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence on the amount of actual damages suffered,
a party may be awarded temperate damages should the court find that he or she has
suffered some pecuniary loss even if its amount cannot be determined with exact
certainty.

Unfortunately, petitioner failed to prove that he has suffered any pecuniary loss. While
he testified that he lost clients as a result of libelous article, records reveal that he lost
only 1 client. On cross-examination, such client testified “that he was not immediately
convinced by the article.”

(2) Moral damages are compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish from a wrong. They are awarded to the injured party to enable him to
obtain means that will ease the suffering he sustained from respondent’s reprehensible
act. Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are instead a type of award designed
to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered.
Unlike actual and temperate damages, moral damages may be awarded even if the
injured party failed to prove that he has suffered pecuniary loss. As long as it was
established that complainant’s injury was the result of the offending party’s action, the
complainant may recover moral damages.

Article 2218 of the Civil Code specifically states that moral damages may be recovered in
cases of libel, slander or defamation. The amount of moral damages that courts may
award depends upon the set of circumstances for each case. There is no fixed standard
to determine the amount of moral damages to be given. Courts are given the discretion
to fix the amount to be awarded in favor of the injured party, so long as there is
sufficient basis for awarding such amount.

Here, other than his bare allegations of besmirched reputation and loss of clientele,
petitioner failed to present evidence supporting his assertions. He submitted no
evidence substantiating his claimed loss. He also failed to adduce proof to support his
claim that his reputation was tainted due to the business associates who allegedly lost
faith in him.

Nonetheless, moral damages should still be awarded. As he had testified during trial,
members of his family were displeased with him for being accused of committing illegal
and corrupt acts. He was berated by his mother for having humiliated his family. His
children were questioned at school. As such, award of P500K as moral damages is an
adequate recompense to the mental anguish and wounded feelings that petitioner had
endured.

(3) Exemplary damages may be awarded where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. Exemplary or corrective
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. It is imposed
as a punishment for highly reprehensible conduct and serves as a notice to prevent the
public from the repetition of socially deleterious actions. Such damages are required by
public policy for wanton acts must be suppressed. They are an antidote so that the
poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic.

Here, respondents published the libelous article without verifying the truth of the
allegations against petitioner. As the CA found, the RIPS only investigates officials of the
DoF and its attached agencies who are accused of corruption. Petitioner, on the other
hand, is not government official and, therefore, beyond the RIPS’ jurisdiction. It only
goes to shows that respondents did not verify the information on which the article was
based.

Thus, to ensure that such conduct will no longer be repeated, and considering their
profession, respondents are directed to pay petitioner exemplary damages in the
amount of P1M.

Respondents, then, should have been more circumspect in what they published. They
are not media practitioners with a lack of social following: their words reverberate. This
Court can only hope that respondents appreciate the privilege their fame has brought
them and, in the future, become more circumspect in the exercise of their profession.

SIMEON LAPI v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 210731
February 13, 2019

Facts: Operatives of Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Operation conducted a stake-out

operation in Bacolod City. During the operation, PO2 Villeran heard noises from one (1)
of the houses. He peeped through his window and saw Lapi, Sacare, and Lim having a
pot session.

PO2 Villeran tried to enter the house through the main door, but the
s

ARIEL LOPEZ v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 212186
June 29, 2016

Facts: Perez purchased a female carabao from a certain Enrique Villanueva. The
purchase was evidenced by a Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle. Perez narrated that
he tied his carabao to a coconut tree located inside the property of Genosas. At around
5:00 am on 17 July 2002, Perez discovered that the carabao was missing. Perez claimed
that he searched for his carabao for over a month. After, he went to the Barangay
Captain to ask for assistance.

Felix Alderete testified that he worked as an errand boy for Lopez. Around 3:45 am of
the next day, Alderete and Lopez went to Genosas’ property. Lopez untied the carabao
and allegedly told Alderete that he would bring the carabao to his boss.

Alderete, not knowing whether the carabao was owned by Lopez, delivered the carabao
to Lopez’s boss in Davao City loaded on a vehicle. The next day, Alderete learned that
there was a commotion regarding Perez’s lost carabao. Afraid of being accused for the
loss of the carabao, Alderete sought help from the barangay police.

Teresita testified that Barangay Police informed her and Perez, her husband. That
Lopez stole their carabao. Subsequently, a confrontation took place at the barangay
police station. During the confrontation, Lopez admitted the taking of the carabao and
promised to pay indemnification.

PO3 Lozarito corroborated Teresita’s testimony and stated that a request for Lopez’s
appearance was issued, but no custodial investigation was conducted. He claimed that
he simply allowed Lopez and Teresita to confront each other. He also stated that Lopez
wanted to settle by paying for the carabao, but the parties were unable to agree on the
price.

Lopez argued that the prosecution was unable to prove that the carabao allegedly stolen
was the same carabao owned by Mario and Teresita Perez. He argued that the request
for appearance issued by PO3 Lozarito was in violation of his custodial rights.

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not all the elements of the crime of cattle-rustling
were proven; and (2) Whether Lopez’s uncounselled admission during the
confrontation at the barangay police office is admissible in evidence.

Ruling: (1) The prosecution failed to prove one of the elements of cattle-rustling.
Specifically, that the lost carabao of Mario and Teresita Perez is the same carabao
allegedly stolen by Lopez.

Presidential Decree No. 533 defines cattle-rustling as the taking away by any means,
method, scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the above
mentioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, whether committed with or
without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things. It includes
the killing of large cattle, or taking the meat or hide without the consent of the
owner/raiser.

The elements of cattle-rustling are:

1. Large cattle is taken;
2. It belongs to another;
3. The taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser;
4. The taking is done by any means, method or scheme;
5. The taking is done with or without intent to gain; and
6. The taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.

Not all the elements of cattle-rustling were proven by the prosecution. The carabao
transported by Lopez and Alderete was not sufficiently proven to be the same carabao
owned by Perez. Alderete’s description of the carabao is too generic. He did not mention
any distinguishing mark on the carabao that Lopez allegedly stole. In cases involving
cattle-rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle must be proven with certainty because of
distinguishing marks of the cattle.

(2) Lopez’s uncounselled admission during the confrontation at the police station is
inadmissible in evidence. The records shows that Lopez’s appearance before the police
station was far from being voluntary. In this case, the so-called “request for appearance’
is no different from the “invitation” issued by police officers for custodial investigation 30.
The circumstances surrounding Lopez’s appearance before the police station falls within
the definition of custodial investigation. Lopez was identified as a suspect in the theft of
30
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect
in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the
suspect’s participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. (In Perez v. Guting)
large cattle. Thus, when the request for appearance was issued, he was already singled
out as the probable culprit.

Also, the confrontation between Teresita and petitioner can be considered as having
been done in a custodial setting because (1) petitioner was requested to appear by the
police; (2) the confrontation was done in a police station; (3) PO3 Lozarito was inside
the station during the confrontation. Thus, when Lopez appeared before Teresita at the
police station, the “pressures of a custodial setting” were present.

Therefore, PO3 Lozarito’s statements are inadmissible for being hearsay 31 as he has no
personal knowledge of what the parties had discussed.

Verily, for the prosecution’s failure to prove all the elements of cattle-rustling, and for
violation of Lopez’s rights during custodial investigation, we hold that there is
reasonable doubt that Lopez is guilty of cattle-rustling. Thus, he must be acquitted.

ANTONIETA LUCIDO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 217764
August 7, 2017

Facts: Victim AAA, an eight (8) year old at that time, was placed by her parents in the
custody of their neighbor Lucido. The arrangement was made upon the request of
Lucido that AAA stay with her since she was living alone.

During AAA’s stay with Lucido, the child suffered repeated physical abuse in the latter’s
hands, which included strangulation, beating, pinching and touching of her sex organ by
Lucido. AAA was also threatened by Lucido that she would be stabbed if she tells anyone
about what was being done to her.

One of Lucido’s neighbors noticed the abrasions on AAA’s neck and observed that she
was limping as she walked. The child then related that she was chocked and beaten on
her leg by Lucido. AAA’s parents learned of her plight, prompting FFF, the father of AAA
to go to Lucido’s residence and take AAA back.

Lucido denied that she pinched, beat and hit AAA and that she inserted her finger into
AAA’s vagina. She claimed that she usually cleaned AAA’s vagina and bathed her with
hot water.

31
Hearsay evidence is defined as: “It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts
that he knows of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A
witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or heard.
Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has heard from
others; it is not only limited to oral testimony or statements but likewise applies to written statements, such
as affidavits.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the court a quo erred in sustaining her conviction
despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; (2) Whether or not the court a quo erred in not finding
that the crime committed was only slight physical injuries and not a
violation of Republic Act No. 7610; and (3) Whether or not Lucido’s alleged
acts were prejudicial to AAA’s development.

Ruling: (1) The prosecution’s evidence that the abuse suffered by AAA had prejudiced
her normal development is fundamentally factual. This Court is not a trier of facts. As a
rule, “only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45.”

It is not the function of this Court to review and weigh anew the evidence already passed
upon by the RTC and the CA absent any showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or
palpable error. Lucido did not present any substantive or compelling reason for this
Court to apply the exception in this case.

Even this Court disregards the infirmity, the petition still fails to impress. This Court
finds reversible error in the CA’s Decision affirming Lucido’s conviction for child abuse.

(2) It is a fact that when the incident happened, the victim was a child entitled to the
protection extended by Republic Act No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. Thus
Lucido was properly charged and found guilty of violation Article VI, Section 10(a) 32 of
Republic Act No. 7610.

As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical abuse of the child, whether it is
habitual or not. Petitioner’s act falls squarely within this definition. AAA testified on the
physical abuse she suffered in the hands of Lucido.

Here, AAA was maltreated by Lucido through repeated acts of strangulation, pinching
and beating. These are clearly extreme measures of punishment not commensurate with
the discipline of an eight (8)-year old child. Discipline is a loving response that seeks the
positive welfare of a child. Lucido’s actions are diametrically opposite. They are abusive,
causing not only physical injuries as evidenced by the physical marks on different parts
of AAA’s body and weakness of her left knew upon walking, but also emotional trauma
on her.

(3) Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e. (a)
child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the child development.

32
Sec. 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. - (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (Republic Act No.
7610)
The element that the acts must be prejudicial to the child’s development pertains only to
the fourth offense. Strangulating, severely pinching, and beating an eight (8)-year old
child to cause her limp are intrinsically cruel and excessive. These acts of abuse impair
child’s dignity and worth as a human being and infringe upon her right to grow up in a
safe, wholesome, and harmonious place. It is not difficult to perceive that this
experience of repeated physical abuse from Lucido would prejudice the child’s social,
moral and emotional development.

It must be stressed that the crime under Republic Act No. 7610 is malum prohibitum.
Hence, intent to debase, degrade, or demean the minor is not the defining mark. Any act
of punishment that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child constitutes offense.

NORBERTO VITANGCOL v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 207406
January 13, 2016

Facts: Norberto married Alice at the Manila Cathedral. Born into their union were
three (3) children. After some time, Alice began hearing rumors that her husband was
previously married to another woman. She eventually discovered that Norberto was
previously married to a certain Gina as evidenced by a marriage contract. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Norberto.

Norberto presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar which states that
the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issues in his favor and his first
wife, Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of
marriage – the marriage license – the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his
first marriage.

Issue: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it
has no record of the marriage license issued to Norberto and his first wife
Gina proves the nullity of Norberto’s first marriage and exculpates him
from the bigamy charge.

Ruling: The Certification, assuming that it is true, does not categorically prove that there
was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriage is not dissolves through mere
certifications by the civil registrar. It does not prove that Norberto’s first marriage was
solemnized without marriage license. It does not categorically state the Marriage
License issued to Norberto and Gina does not exist.

The Court ruled that it is not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a
marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such
license existed or was issued.

Further, assuming without conceding that Norberto’s first marriage was solemnized
without a Marriage License, still, Norberto remains liable for bigamy. Bigamy is
punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. For an accused to be convicted of
this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.

Norberto’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his first wife Gina
judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. As held in Landicho v.
Relova:

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity
of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime
of bigamy, Article 349 of the RPC becomes useless. As that all the adventurous bigamist has to
do is to contract a subsequent marriage and escape bigamy charge by subsequent marriage that
the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first.

Here, all the elements of bigamy are present. Norberto was still legally married to Gina
when he married Alice.

RENANTE REMOTICADO v. TYPICAL CONSTRUCTION TRADING

G.R. No. 206529
April 23, 2018

Facts: Remoticado’s services were engaged by Typical as a helper in its construction

projects. Typical’s Field HR Officer and two (2) of Remoticado’s co-workers recalled that
on 6 Dec 2010 to 20 Dec 2010, Remoticado was absent without an official leave. And
upon showing up, he informed the HR Officer that he was resigning due to “personal
reasons considering that he got sick.” The Field HR Officer advised Remoticado to
return the following day as he still had to report Remoticado’s resignation to Typical’s
main office, and as hisfinal pay had yet to be computed.

Remoticado returned the following day and was handed P5,082.53 as his final pay. He
protested, saying that he was entitled to separation pay. In response, Typical explained
that Remoticado could not be entitled to the same considering that he voluntarily
resigned. Typical added that if Remoticado was not satisfied with the amount, he was
free to continue working for Typical. However, Remoticado was resolute and proceeded
to sign and affix his thumb marks on a Waiver and Quitclaim.
Remoticado filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against typical. He claimed that on
23 Dec 2010, he was told to stop reporting for work due to a debt at the canteen and was
prevented from entering Typical’s premises.

Issue: Whether Remoticado voluntarily resigned or his employment was

illegally terminated in the manner, on the date, and for the reason he
averred in his complaint.

Ruling: It is true that in illegal termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to
prove that termination of employment was for a just cause. Logic dictates, however, that
the complaining employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
termination by the employer. If there is no proof of termination by the employer, there
is no point in even considering the cause for it. There can be no illegal termination when
there was no termination.

Here, Remoticado only made a general statement that he was illegally dismissed. He did
not state how he was terminated from work. Also, Remoticado has never disavowed the
waiver and quitclaim.

Jurisprudence frowns upon waivers and quitclaims forced upon employees. Waivers and
quitclaims are, however, not invalid in themselves. When shown to be freely executed,
they validly discharge an employer from liability to an employee. A legitimate waiver
representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer’s claims should be respected by the
courts as the law between the parties.

Remoticado would have this Court rule in favor when he does absolutely nothing more
than entreat the doctrine on an employer’s burden to prove just causes for terminating
employment. It is as though this invocation was a magic spell that would win the day for
him regardless of whether or not he is able to discharge his primordial burden of
proving the occurrence of termination. Hence, it is the petitioner who is in error.

The Court ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and Remoticado voluntarily resigned
from his employment.

MONIR JAAFAR v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 219829
January 18, 2017

Facts: Chief Larubis formed a team to schedule a buy-bust operation. PO1 Look was
designated as the poseur-buyer. The team left the police station at 1:45 am and went to
accused Jaafar’s house.

Jaafar met PO1 Look at the door of his house and asked them if they were buying shabu.
PO1 Look answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked P500 bill. Jaafar called
his his friend Gani inside the house. Gani came out and handled Jaafar a sachet
containing shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to PO1 Look, who immediately lit a cigar – the
prearranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust team.

The police officers rushed to arrest Jaafar. After arrest, PO1 Look marked the
confiscated sachet of shabu with is initials. He then turned over the sachet to their team
leader. The team brought Jaafar and Gani to the police station for investigation.

In his defense, Jaafar testified that he was at the internet café at 12:00 mn watching
video games. After which, he went home. And upon entering the alley, Jaafar saw six (6)
persons headed towards him. And thereafter, was brought to the Prosecutor’s Office.

Gani was acquitted for want of sufficient evidence. Jaafar was found guilty both in RTC
and Court of Appeals. Hence, his appeal.

Issue: Whether the guilt of accused Jaafar was proven beyond reasonable
doubt despite non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling: The Court grants the appeal and acquits Jaafar. The sachet of shabu was not
formally offered in evidence during the trial; the same was fatal to the case. The Court
held that in all prosecutions for violations of R.A. 9165, the corpus delicti is the
dangerous drugs itself. Hence, the identity of the dangerous drugs must be clearly
established.

Narcotics substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and
nature, they must undergo scientific testing and analysis. Narcotics substances are
highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or contamination. It is imperative, therefore,
that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same objects tested in the
laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of
authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs
are removed.

PEOPLE v. OLIVER BUCLAO

G.R. No. 208173
June 11, 2014

Facts: Victim AAA, a 15 year-old daughter of accused Oliver Buclao, testified that he
was cleaning their backyard when he was called by the accused to go inside their house.
When AAA was inside, Buclao closed the door and pushed her onto the bed. Buclao
pulled her pants and panties down to her knees the he removed his pants and briefs.
Next, AAA’s father moved on top of her, inserted his erect penis into her vagina, and
started pumping in an up and down motion. AAA felt pain during the act, but she could
not fight back so she just cried while she was being sexually assaulted. Buclao
threatened her that he would kill her if she told anyone about what happened.
On the second incident, AAA was raped for the second time. AAA testified that while she
was sleeping, she was awakened when she felt somebody lying on top of her. AAA was
shocked to see Buclao. He pulled down her pants and panties until they were around her
knees. Buclao removed his pants and briefs. Buclao inserted his penis into her vagina
and started doing the pumping motion. She cried out pain, but she could not fight off.
Buclao threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident.

It was after two (2) years when AAA told her maternal grandmother about the rape.
They reported the incident to the police.

Issue: Whether or not Buclao is guilty of two counts of rape beyond

reasonable doubt.

Ruling: The Court affirms accused Buclao’s conviction. Article 266-4A, par (1) of the
RPC provides the elements of the crime of rape:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Rape is qualified when “the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim 33.

In this case, AAA’s recollection of the heinous acts of Buclao was vivid and
straightforward. She was able to positively identify Buclao as her sexual assailant. Her
testimony was given in a categorical straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner.

Also, the absence of hymenal lacerations does not admit the possibility of there was no
sexual abuse. Citing the case of People v. Araojo:

The absence of external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body does not
necessarily negate the commission of rape, hymenal laceration not being, to repeat, an
element of the crime of rape. A healed or fresh laceration would of course be a
compelling proof of defloration. However, the foremost consideration in the prosecution
of rape is the victim’s testimony and not the findings of the medico-legal officer.

Further, the delay in reporting the alleged rape incidents does not persuade the Court.
Citing People v. Delos Reyes:

33
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353
 The failure to immediately report the dastardly acts to her family or to the authorities at
the soonest possible time xxxx is not enough reason to cast reasonable doubt on the guilt
of the accused. This Court has repeatedly held that delay in reporting rape incidents, in
the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim. Further, it has
been written that rape victim’s actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by the fear rather
than by reason. It is this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes
to build a climate of extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his
victim into silence and submissiveness.

The Court continued that there can be no greater source of fear or intimidation than your own
father – one who, generally, has exercised authority over your person since birth. Delay brought
by fear for one’s life cannot be deemed unreasonable. This Court has recognized the moral
ascendancy and influence the father has over his child. In cases of qualified rape, moral
ascendancy or influence supplants the elements of violence or intimidation. It is not only an
element of the crime, but it is also a factor in evaluating whether the delay in reporting the
incident was unreasonable.

With all the elements of qualified rape duly alleged and proven, the proper penalty to be
imposed is death. However, with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 34 the imposition of
death was prohibited, and the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the eligibility of parole
should be imposed.

PEOPLE v. PEDRITO ORDONA

G.R. No. 227863
September 20, 2017

Facts: Samuel and his wife, Marissa were talking at the doorway of their house. They
saw accused Ordona loitering by the corner of their house. Ordona appeared to be
waiting for someone. After some time, he left but returned five (5) minutes later.

Meanwhile, victim Hubay emerged from the house, holding some food. Ordona
approached Hubay with a stainless knife, called his attention by saying “Pare,” and
suddenly stabbed him in the left shoulder. Samuel and Marissa stood two (2) feet away
from them.

Hubay managed to ran away from Ordona gave chase and eventually caught up with
him/ Despite Hubay’s pleas for mercy, Ordona stabbed him in the left torso. Hubay’s
stab wounds proved to be fatal as he died immediately when he was brought to the
hospital.

In his defense, Ordona testified that on the day of the incident, he went to the house of
his mother-in-law to fetch his wife. On his way there, he met Cornelio de Leon who was
running amok. This prevented him from reaching his destination. After five (5) days,
Ordona was arrested by the authorities. However, they failed to recover any bladed
weapon from him. Ordona denied knowledge of Hubay’s identity.

34
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines
Issue: (1) Whether or not accused Ordona is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder; (2) Whether act was attended with the qualifying circumstance
of evident premeditation; and (3) Whether act was attended with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Ruling: (1) The Court affirms accused Ordona’s conviction. The crime of murder is
committed when a person is killed under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:

Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246
shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men,
or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity;
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of
motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin;
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an
earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public
calamity;
5. With evident premeditation;
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or
outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.

Accused Ordona is liable for murder. The killing was attended with the qualifying
circumstances of treachery.

(2) For evident premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder,
the following must be established by the prosecution “with equal certainty as the
criminal act itself”:

a. The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;

b. An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and
c. A sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of
the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Also, it is indispensible for the prosecution to establish “how and when the plan to kill
was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out.”

In this regard, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as a qualifying

circumstance in the present case. The prosecution failed to establish the time when
Ordona resolved to kill Hubay. There is no evidence on record to show the moment that
Ordona hatched his plan. Ordona’s act of lurking outside the house can hardly be
considered as an overt act indicting his resolution to kill Hubay.
(3) Since the killing was attended with the qualifying circumstances of treachery.

The essence of is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the
slightest provocation on his part. Two (2) requisites must be established by the
prosecution, namely:

a. That at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
b. That the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form or
attack employed by him.

Both elements are present in this case. Hubay, who was unarmed, was casually outside
of his residence when Ordona suddeny stabbed him. There was no opportunity for
Hubay to retaliate or to parry Ordona’s attack. And although the attack was frontal, it
was done suddenly and unexpectedly. A frontal attack, when made suddenly, leaving the
victim without any means of defense, is treacherous. The second stabbing also indicates
treachery. At the time, Hubay was already wounded and was unprepared to put up a
defense.

Hence, acussed Ordona’s conviction for the crime of murder is affirmed.

ANGELITO CRISTOBAL v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES

G.R. No. 201622
October 4, 2017

Facts: Cristobal became a pilot for Philippine Airlines (PAL). In line with downsizing
program of PAL, Cristobal applied for leave without pay from PAL to enter into a four
(4)-year contract with EVA Air. PAL approved the applied and advised him that he
would continue to accrue seniority during his leave and that he could opt to retire from
PAL during this period. In a letter, Cristobal advised PAL of his intent to retire. In
response, PAL advised him that he was deemed to have lost his employment status.
Thus, Cristobal filed a complaint with the NLRC.

The Labor Arbiter found Cristobal’s dismissal illegal, found him entitled to retirement
benefits pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code and ordered PAL to pay moral
damages and exemplary damages amounting to P500,000.00 each.

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter but reduced award of moral and exemplary
damages to P100,000.00 each. On Cristobal’s retirement pay, it noted PAL’s argument
that any retirement benefits should be pursuant to the terms of the CBA.

On 12 Nov 2010, Cristobal filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. PAL also filed a
Motion for Reconsideration. The NLRC resolved both motions on 31 May 2011. It
deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages and reducing the amount of
Cristobal’s retirement benefits.
On 24 June 2011, Cristobal filed his Motion for Reconsideration, seeking
reconsideration of the reduction of retirement benefits. In a Resolution, the NLRC
denied Cristobal’s motion, deeming it a second motion for reconsideration.

On 14 Nov 2011, Cristobal filed his Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which was
dismissed. The CA deems the motion as a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, it
did not toll petitioner’s period to file a Petition for Certiorari. Consequently, the petition
was filed out of time. The CA also held that the petition did not contain copies of
pertinent supporting documents.

Issue: (1) Whether or not the 24 June 2011 Motion for Reconsideration filed
by petitioner Cristobal assailing the NLRC 31 May 2011 Decision was a
prohibited second motion for reconsideration; and (2) Whether or not CA
committed reversible error when it dismissed the petition as it did not
contain the pertinent supporting documents

Ruling: (1) The Court grants the petition.

Rule VII, Section 15 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:

Section 15. Motions for Reconsideration. - Motion for reconsideration of any decision,
resolution or order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on
palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is filed within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with proof of service that a copy of the same
has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party; and provided
further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained

The NLRC Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from questioning a decision, resolution, or
order, twice. In other words, this ruled prohibits the same party from assailing the same
judgment. However, a decision substantially reversing a determination in a prior decision is a
discrete decision from the earlier one.

Here, the NLRC 31 May 2011 Decision substantially modified its 30 Sept 2010 Decision. Thus,
Cristobal was not precluded from seeking reconsideration of the new decision of the NLRC, and
it was clearly an error for the CA to find that Cristobal’s petition for certiorari was filed out of
time.

Further, as for the purported failure to attach the records necessary to resolve the petition. This
Court deems that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition outright,
considering that in Wack Wack Gold & Country Club v. NLRC, this Court held:

In Novelty Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,  the Court recognized the authority of
the general manager to sue on behalf of the corporation and to sign the requisite
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The general manager is also one
person who is in the best position to know the state of affairs of the corporation. It was
also error for the CA not to admit the requisite proof of authority when in the Novelty
case, the Court ruled that the subsequent submission of the requisite documents
constituted substantial compliance with procedural rules. There is ample jurisprudence
holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the
 relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice. While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and while
the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it nevertheless must not be
met at the expense of substantial justice. It was, therefore, reversible error for the CA to
have dismissed the petition for certiorari before it. The ordinary recourse for us to take is
to remand the case to the CA for proper disposition on the merits; however, considering
that the records are now before us, we deem it necessary to resolve the instant case in
order to ensure harmony in the rulings and expediency.

YOLANDA BRAVO v. URIOS COLLEGE

G.R. No. 198066
June 7, 2017

Facts: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher by Urios College. In addition, Bravo
was designated as the school’s comptroller. She was directed to arrange a salary
adjustment schedule for the new ranking system. She allegedly changed her rank from
office head to middle management. This was reflected on the payroll.

Urios College discovered that ranking system caused salary distortions among several
employees. It was also found out that the Comptroller’s Office solely prepared and
implemented the salary adjustment schedule without prior approval from the H.R.
Department and had misclassified several positions and miscomputed her salary.

Bravo received a show cause memo requiring her to explain in writing within three (3)
days from receipt on why his services should not be terminated for her alleged acts of
serious misconduct. Thereafter, a committee was organized to investigate the matter.
Hearings were conducted on three (3) separate dates, after which the parties submitted
their position papers.

Bravo was found guilty of serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the
sum of P179, 319.16. Urios College notified Bravo to terminate her services for serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of termination letter Bravo
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.

Issue/s: (1) Whether or not Bravo’s employment was terminated for a just
cause; (2) Whether or not Bravo was deprived of procedural due process;
and (3) Whether or not Bravo is entitled to the payment of separation pay,
backwages and attorney’s fees.

Ruling: (1) To warrant termination of the employment under Article 297 (a) of the
Labor Code, the misconduct must be serious or of such grave and aggravated character.
Trivial and unimportant acts are not contemplated under Article 297 (a) of the Labor
Code. In addition, the misconduct must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties unfit to continue working for the employer.
Recently, the Court has emphasized that the rank-and-file employee’s act must have
been performed with wrongful intent to warrant dismissal based on serious misconduct
Dismissal is deemed too harsh a penalty to be imposed on employees who are not
induced by any perverse or wrongful motive despite having committed some form of
misconduct.

This Court holds that Bravo was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence.
Bravo was not an ordinary rank and file employee. Her position of responsibility on
delicate financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from Urios College. The
entire payroll account depended on the accuracy of the classifications made by the
Comptroller. It was reasonable for employer to trust that he had basis for his
computations especially with respect to her own compensation.

Bravo’s act in assigning to herself a higher salary rate without proper approval is a clear
brach of the trust and confidence reposed in him.

(2) In termination based on just causes, the employer must comply with procedural due
process by furnishing the employee a written notice containing the specific grounds or
causes for dismissal. The notice must also direct the employee to submit his or her
written explanation within a reasonable period from the receipt of the notice.
Afterwards, the employer must give the employee ample opportunity to be heard and
defend himself. A hearing, however, is not a condition sine qua non. A formal hearing
only becomes mandatory in termination cases when so required under company rules or
when the employee requests for it.

Thus, any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence and address the
charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of ample opportunity to be heard.

Finally, the employer must serve a notice informing the employee of his/her dismissal
from employment.

In this case, Urios College complied with all the requirement of procedural due process
in termination Bravo’s employment

(3) Under Article 29435 of the Labor Code, the reliefs of an illegally dismissed employee
are reinstatement and full backwages. Backwages is a form of relief that restores the
income that was lost by reason of the employee’s dismissal from employment. It is
computed from the time that the employee’s compensation was withheld until his/her
actual reinstatement. However, when reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay
is awarded.

35
Article 297. [279] Security of Tenure. – In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits of
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement.
Considering that there was a just cause for terminating Bravo from employment, there is
no basis to award him separation pay and backwages. There are also no factual and legal
bases to award attorney’s fees to petitioner.

PABLO PADILLA and MARIA LUISA PADILLA v. LEOPOLDO MALICSI, LITO

CASINO and AGRIFINO GUANES
G.R. No. 201354
September 21, 2016

Facts: In 1998, Spouses Padilla discovered that Leopold, Lito and Agrifino (Malicsi, et al.)
constructed houses on their lot. Spouses Padilla made repeated verbal and written demands for
Malicsi, et al. to vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental, but Malicsi, et al. refused to heed
Spouses Padilla’s demands.

Spouses Padilla fileda complaint for recovery of possession against Malicsi, et al. In their
Answer, Malicsi, et al. alleged that they believed in all honesty and good faith that the lot
belonged De Mossessgeld. They claimed that they possessed the land and built their houses on
the lot only after receiving De Mossessgeld’s permission. Malicsi, et al. also claimed that they
and De Mossessgeld agreed that she would sell them the areas occupied by their houses.

During trial, Spouses Padilla exercising their option to sell the land to Malicsi, et al. filed a
Motion with Offer to Sell. In their Comment, Malicsi, et al. stated that by filing the Motion,
Spouses Padilla had, in effect, recognized Malicsi, et al.’s standing as builders in good faith. They
did not accept the offer to sell.

Issue: Whether or not Malicsi, et al. are builders in good faith.

Ruling: A builder in good faith is a builder who was not aware of a defect or flaw in his or her
title when he/she introduced on a lot that turns out to be owned by another. The essence of good
faith is an honest belief of strength and validity of one’s right while being ignorant of another’s
superior’s claim at the same time.
The Article 44836, Article 54637 and Article 54838 of the Civil Code provides for remedies
available to a landowner and builder in good faith.
Article 48 of the Civil Code gives a builder in good faith the right to compel the landowner to
choose between two (2) options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity
required by law; or (2) to sell the land to the builder.

The case of Ignacio v. Hilario summarized the respective rights of the landowner and builder in
good faith as follows:

The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to
retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article
[546]. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article [448],
either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he
cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land
and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is
entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same.

In Rosales v. Castelltort has emphasized that the choice belongs to the landowner, but the
landowner must choose from the two (2) available options:

The choice belongs to the owner of the land, a rule that accords with the principle of
accession, i.e., that the accessory follows the principal and not the other way around.
Even as the option lies with the landowner, the grant to him, nevertheless, is preclusive.
The landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of
the building to remove it from the land.

In here, Malicsi, et al. failed to present any evidence to bolster their claim that they are
builders in good faith nor they failed to adduce evidence that they entered into an
agreement to sell with De Mossessgel. Further, Malicsi, et al. neither produced De
Mossessegeld herself nor submitted proof on which she might have based her purported
36
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay
reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper
indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof. (Civil Code)

37
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the
person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (Civil
Code)

38
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good
faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it suffers no
injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the amount expended.
(Civil Code)
ownership of the lot. Malicsi, et al. likewise failed to prove that they exercised the
necessary diligence required by their situation. They did not examine the tax
declarations or the title to the property before they built on it.

Failing to substantiate their claim, Malicsi, et al. cannot be considered as builder in

good faith. Therefore, the benefits and rights provided under Article 448 of the Civil
Code do not apply.

As builders in bad faith, respondents have no right to recover their expenses over the
improvements they have introduced to Spouses Padilla’s lot under Article 449 of the
Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is
built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.

Under Article 452 of the Civil Code, a builder in bad faith is entitled to recoup the
necessary expenses incurred for the preservation of the land. However, respondents
neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that they introduced improvements for
the preservation of the land.

Therefore, Spouses Padilla’s as landowners became the owners of the improvements on

the lot, including the residential building constructed by Malicsi, et al. if they chose to
appropriate the accessions. However, they could instead choose the demolition of the
improvements at Malicsi, et al.’s expense or compel them to pay the price of the land
under Article 45039 of the Civil Code.

Whether Spouses Padilla chose to appropriate the improvements, compel their

demolition or compel Malicsi, et al. to pay the price of the land, they are entitled to
damages under Article 45140 of the Civil Code.

UNITED DOCTOR’S MEDICAL CENTER v. CESARIO BERNADAS,

represented by LEONILA BERNADAS
G.R. No. 209468
December 13, 2017

Facts: Cesario started working as an orderly in United Doctor’s hpusekkeping

department. He was eventually promoted as a utility man. United Doctor’s and its rank-
and-file employees had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) under which rank-and-
file employees were entitled to optional retirement benefits.

39
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things
in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent. (Civil Code)

40
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the
builder, planter or sower. (Civil Code)
Under the optional retirement policy, an employee who has rendered at least 20 years of
service is entitled to optionally retire. The optional retirement pay is equal to a retiree’s
salary for 11 days per year of service.

In addition, employees are also provided insurance. The employees’ family member
would be the beneficiaries of the insurance.

On 20 Oct 2009, Cesario dided form a freak accident while working in a doctor’s
residence. He was 53 years old. Leonila, representing her deceased husband, Cesario,
filed a Complaint for payment of retirement benefits with the NLRC Leonila and her son
also claimed and were able to receive insurance proceeds of P180,000 under the CBA.

United Doctor’s alleged that respondent Cesario’s beneficiaries do not have legal
capacity to apply for Cesario’s optional retirement benefits since Cesario never applied
for it in his lifetime. It likewise argues that to grant Cesario’s beneficiaries optional
retirement benefits on top of the life insurance benefits that they have already received
would be equal to double compensation and unjust enrichment.

Issue: (1) Whether or not Cesario is entitled to receive his optional

retirement benefits despite the fact that his beneficiaries already claimed
insurance proceeds;
and (2) Whether or not Leonila as her husband’s representative, may claim
his optional retirement benefits.

Ruling: (1) Retirement benefits must be differentiated from insurance proceeds. One is
in the concept of an indemnity while the other is conditioned on age and length of
service. A contract of insurance is an agreement whereby one undertakes for a
consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an
unknown or contingent event. On the other hand, retirement plans, while initially
humanitarian in nature – now concomitantly serve to secure loyalty and efficiency on
the part of employees and to increase continuity of service and decrease the labor
turnover, by giving to the employees some assurance of security as they approach and
reach the age at which earning ability and earnings are materially impaired or at an end.

Thus, the grand of insurance proceeds will not necessarily bar the grant of retirement
benefits. These are two (2) separate and distinct benefits that an employer may provide
to its employees.

(2) Retirement plans may be compulsory or voluntary. The latter has two (2) types, it
may be an agreement between the employer and the employee, usually embodied in the
CBA between them or one that is voluntarily given by the employer, expressly as in
announced company policy or impliedly as in a failure to contest the employee’s claim
for retirement benefits.
The rules regarding voluntary retirement plans are embodied in Article 302 41 [287] of
the Labor Code. However, these type of retirement plans are not meant to be a
replacement to the compulsory retirement scheme under social security laws but must
be understood as a retirement plan in addition to that provided by law. Article 302 [287]
of the Labor Code allows employers and employees to mutually establish an early
retirement age option.

The issue in this case concerns a voluntary retirement plan that was provided under the
employer and employee’s CBA. The terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law
between the parties. However, this CBA does not provide for the terms and conditions of
the present policy on optional retirement. It is settled that doubts must be resolved in
favor of the labor. Moreover, retirement laws should be liberally construed and
administered in favour of the persons intended to be benefited and all doubts as to the
intent of the law should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian
purposes.

Also, United Doctors admits that Cesario was already qualified o receive his retirement
benefits, having been employed for almost 23 years. And while the choice to retire
before compulsory age of retirement was within Cesario’s control, his death foreclosed
the possibility of him making that choice.

In any case, the CBA does not mandate that an application must first be filed by the
employee before the right to the optional retirement benefits may vest. Thus, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the retiree.

Retirement benefits are the property interest of the retiree and his/her beneficiaries.
The CBA does not prohibit the employee’s beneficiaries from claiming retirement
benefits if the retiree dies before the proceeds could be released. Even compulsory
retirement plans provide mechanisms for a retiree’s beneficiaries to claim any pension
due to the retiree. Thus, Leonila, being the surviving spouse of Cesario, is entitled to
claim the optional retirement benefits on its behalf.

41
Article 302. Retirement. – Any employee may be .retired upon reaching the retirement age established
in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have
earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided,
however, that an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements
shall not be less than those provided herein.

In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five
(65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years
in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months-being considered as one
(1) whole year.
 PEOPLE v. JUANITO ENTRAMPAS
G.R. No. 212161
March 29, 2017

Facts:
1.
2.
3. c
11dd
4.