Consti part 1: standing, ripeness & mootness
3. WON the 2nd impeachment complaint
STANDING
1. FRANCISCO V HOUSE OF REPS
(Nov. 10, 2003)
Ponente: J. Carpio-Morales
Facts:
• July 22, 2002: House adopted a Resolution
directing the Committee on Justice to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
• June 2, 2003: Erap filed an impeachment complaint
(1st impeachment complaint) against the Chief
Justice and 7 Associate Justices for culpable
violation of the Consti, betrayal of public trust and
other high crimes, which was sufficient in form but
dismissed for being insufficient in substance
• Oct 23: 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with
the Sec Gen of the House on the basis of the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry of the
abovementioned Resolution
• Petitioners’ main argument: 2nd impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional bec it violates Sec 5,
Art XI of the Consti, stating that “no impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year”
• Petitioners’ allegations of Legal Standing:
o Duty as members of the legal profession or of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or of the
Philippine Bar Association
o As citizens of the Philippines, with an obligation
to protect the SC, the Chief Justice, and the
integrity of the Judiciary
o As taxpayers, with a right to be protected
against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers’ money
o As a class suit, in behalf of all citizens, citing
Oposa v Factoran, which was filed in behalf of
succeeding generations of Filipinos
o As members of the House of Reps, with the duty
of ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated
o As professors of law, with an interest in the
subject matter as it pertains to a constitutional
issue “which they are trying to inculcate in the
minds of their students”
o Legal standing should be brushed aside for
consideration of issues of national and
transcendental importance and of public
interest
Issues/Held:
1. WON the power of judicial review extends to those
arising from impeachment proceedings – YES
2. WON the essential prerequisites for the exercise of
the power of judicial review have been fulfilled
• WON petitioners have legal standing – YES
• WON the issue is ripe for adjudication – YES
• WON the issue is justiciable – YES
• WON the issue is the lis mota of the case – YES
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is
unconstitutional – YES
Ratio:
1. The Consti itself has provided for the instrumentality
of the judiciary as the rational way to determine the
nature, scope and extent of the powers of government.
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert superiority over the
other departments; it only asserts its solemn and
sacred obligation to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Consti and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. In case of
conflict, only the judicial arm can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.
2. Locus standi: a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
act that is being challenged
SolGen: petitioners have standing bec procedural
matters are subordinate to the need to determine
WON the other branches of gov’t have not
exceeded the constitutional limits of their powers
Dean Pangalangan: rule exception that when the
real party in interest is unable to vindicate his
rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the
case of the CJ who, for ethical reasons, cannot
himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the
courts will grant petitioners’ standing
Difference bet rule on real-party-interest and
rule on standing: former is a concept of civil
procedure while the latter has constitutional
underpinnings. Standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role
of the judiciary in certain areas. The question re:
real party in interest is WON he is the party who
would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
When suing as a citizen: interest of the
petitioners must be direct and personal; he must
show that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of any gov’tal act; party should
appear to have been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
As a taxpayer: where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a waste of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,
a party is allowed to sue. He should prove that he
has sufficient interest and that he would sustain
direct injury as a result.
As a legislator: he is allowed to sue to question
the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.
Consti part 1: standing, ripeness & mootness
As an association: while an association has
legal personality to represent its members, the
mere invocation by the IBP or any member of the
legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule
of law
and nothing more, although true, does not
suffice to clothe it with legal standing bec its
interest is too general. However, the Court
chooses to relax the rules on standing bec of
advanced constitutional issues raised in the
petitions.
In the case of class suits: persons intervening
must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect
the interests of all concerned to enable the court
to deal properly with all interests involved in the
suit bec a judgment in a class suit , whether
favorable or not, is binding on all members of
the class WON they were before the court.
In the case of transcendental importance: J.
Feliciano’s instructive determinants:
a. The character of the funds or other assets
involved in the case
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality
of the gov’t
c. The lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised
Ripeness: for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, something should have been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture (Tan v Macapagal)
The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e.
the 2nd impeachment complaint had been filed
with the House of Reps and the 2001 Rules have
already been promulgated and enforced, the
prerequisite above has been complied with.
Dean’s persuasion that wasn’t taken: even if
the petitions are premature (since Articles of
Impeachment haven’t been transmitted to the
Senate), the CJ can still raise issue of
constitutional infirmity through a Motion to
Dismiss  withdrawal of signatories would not,
by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of
infirmity and it would not obliterate the 2nd
impeachment complaint
3. Sec 5, Art XI of the Consti – y’all know the
discussion here 
2. SANLAKAS vs. EXEC SEC
(02/03/2004)
Tinga, J.
Facts:
July 27, 2003-Oakwood mutiny
-Pres GMA issued Proclamation no 47 declaring a
"state of rebellion" & General Order No. 4
directing AFP & PNP to supress the rebellion.
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-by evening, soldiers agreed to return to barracks.
GMA, however, did not immediately lift the
declaration of a state of rebellion, only doing so on
August 1, 2003 thru Proc NO. 435.
Petitioners:
1. Sanlakas & PM; standing as "petitioners committed to
assert, defend, protect, uphold, and promote the rights,
interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor
and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine
society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert
human rights, including political and civil rights, of the
citizens freedom of speech and of expression under
Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to
publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands
and to mobilize public opinion to support the same;
assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does not require the
declaration of state of rebellion to call out AFP;assert
further that there exists no factual basis for the
declaration, mutiny having ceased.
2. SJS; standing as "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law profs
& bar reviewers"; assert that S18, Art7 of the Consti does
not require the declaration of the state of rebellion,
declaration a "constitutional anomaly" that misleads
because "overzealous public officers, acting pursuant to
such proclamation or general order, are liable to violate
the constitutional right of private citizens"; proclamation is
a circumvention of the report requirement under the same
S18, Art7, commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial
law; presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President
3. members of House; standing as citizens and as
Members of the House of Representatives whose rights,
powers and functions were allegedly affected by the
declaration of a state of rebellion; the declaration of a state
of rebellion is a "superfluity," and is actually an exercise of
emergency powers, such exercise, it is contended,
amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress granted
by S23 (2), Art6 of the Constitution
4. PImentel; standing as Senator; assails the subject
presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and
abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis
under the Constitution; petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests"
for the crime of rebellion
Respondents: SolGen; petitions have been rendered moot
by the lifitng of the proclamation; questions
standing of petitioners
Issues:
1. whether or not petitioners have standing
2. whether or not case has been rendered moot by
the lifting of the proclamation
3. whether or not the proclamation calling the
state of rebellion is proper
Held: 1. NOT EVERY PETITIONER. only members of the
House and Sen Pimentel have standing. Sanlakas & PM
Consti part 1: standing, ripeness & mootness
have no standing by analogy with LDP in Lacson v Perez
"… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself
which would justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is
a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot
claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it
alleged that its leaders, members, and supporters are
being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention
for the crime of rebellion." At best they seek for
declaratory relief, which is not in the original jurisdiction
of SC. Even assuming that Sanlakas & PM are "people's
organizations" in the language of Ss15-16, Art13 of the
Consti, they are still not endowed with standing for as in
Kilosbayan v Morato "These provisions have not changed
the traditional rule that only real parties in interest or
those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the
judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in
cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the
"case and controversy" requirement of S5,Art8. This
requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial
function." SJS, though alleging to be taxpayers, is not
endowed with standing since "A taxpayer may bring suit
where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.No
such illegal disbursement is alleged." Court has ruled
out the doctrine of "transcendental importance"
regarding constitutional questions in this particular
case. Only members of Congress, who's (?) powers as
provided in the Consti on giving the Pres emergency
powers are allegedly being impaired, can question the
legality of the proclamation of the state of rebellion.
2. YES. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases,
judicial power being limited to the determination of
"actual controversies." Nevertheless, courts will decide a
question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition
yet evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case,
since prior events (the May 1, 2001 incident when the
Pres also declared a state of rebellion) prove that it can
be repeated.
3. YES. S18, Art 7 grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]." From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling out
power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In
the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an
actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety
requires the exercise of such power. However, as we
observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,
"[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the
calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it
becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed
forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion.'"Nevertheless, it is equally true that S18,
Art7 does not expressly prohibit the President from
declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution
vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief
powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers.
The ponencia then traced the evolution of executive
power in the US (Jackson and the South Carolina
situation, Lincoln and teh 'war powers', Cleveland in In
re: Eugene Debs) in an effort to show that "the
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is
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and become more so when taken together with the
provision on executive power and the presidential oath of
office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency
equips the occupant with the means to
address exigencies or threats which undermine the very
existence of government or the integrity of the State." This,
plus Marcos v Manglapus on residual powers, the Rev
Admin Code S4, Ch2, Bk3 on the executive power of the
Pres to declare a certain status, argue towards the validity
of the proclamation. However, the Court maintains that
the declaration is devoid of any legal significance for being
superflous. Also, the mere declaration of a state of
rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally
protected rights. if a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with
more reason that a simple declaration of a state of
rebellion could not bring about these conditions.
Apprehensions that the military and police authorities may
resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded.In
Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held that
"[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities
may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the circumstances so
warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is,
thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of
rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to
a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or
not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long
as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are
present.The argument that the declaration of a state of
rebellion amounts to a declaration of martial law and,
therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is
a leap of logic. There is no illustration that the President
has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law
powers. Finally, Nor by any stretch of the imagination can
the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of
emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant
of Congress pursuant to S23 (2), Art6 of the
Constitution.The petitions do not cite a specific instance
where the President has attempted to or has exercised
powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as
Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of
rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on the President by S1 & 18, Art7, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated
by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
RIPENESS
:
1. TAN vs. MACAPAGAL
Consti part 1: standing, ripeness & mootness
2. POE VS. ULLMAN
This case deals with the statute as in Griswold vs.
Connecticut where, in this case, two couples and their
physician sued the State and its Attorney-General,
Ullman, asking the Court to declare the Connecticut
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment..
Facts: Paul and Pauline Poe had three consecutive
pregnancies terminating in infants with multiple
congenital abnormalities resulting in their death shortly
after birth. Because of the great emotional and
psychological stress resulting from these deaths, it is Dr.
Buxton’s opinion that the best and safest medical
treatment is to prescribe contraceptives in order to
preserve the health of petitioner. On the other hand,
Mrs. Doe recently underwent a pregnancy which caused
her critical physical illness such that another pregnancy
would be exceedingly perilous to her life. Also, their
doctor, Dr. Buxton, also joined them in saying that the
statute deprived them of liberty and property without
due process.
Issue: W/N the allegations raised by petitioners
regarding the constitutionality of the Connecticut statute
raise a justiciable question before the Court.
Held: No. Petitioners do not allege that appellee, Ullman
threatens to prosecute them for their use of or for giving
advice regarding contraceptives. The allegations merely
state that in the course of his public duty he intends to
prosecute any violation of Connecticut law. There is thus
no imminent or impending threat of arrest on the
petitioners. The Court goes on to say that in the over 75
years of its existence, prosecutions for violation of the
statute seems never to have been initiated according to
counsel nor the researchers of the Court. Judicial notice
was also taken of the fact that contraceptives are readily
available in drug stores which invite more the attention
of enforcement officials. Given the fact that federal
judicial power is to be exercised to strike down
legislation, whether state or federal, only at the instance
of one who is himself immediately harmed or
immediately threatened with harm, by the challenged
action, the circumstances of the case do not justify the
exercise of judicial power as it lacks the requisites for
“case” and “controversy”.
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting.
Public clinics dispensing birth-control information has
been closed down by the State as well as others following
the Nelson case which the ponente cited as the test case
for the statute. The Court failed to take notice of the fact
that several prosecutions for violations of this statute
had been initiated in the minor courts. In failing to
answer the question of the constitutionality of the
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statute, in effect the court is asking the people to violate
the law and hope that it is not enforced, that they don’t get
caught which is not a proper choice under the present
constitutional system. He then goes on to repeat the
arguments in Griswold regarding the application of the
statute reaching into the intimacies of the marriage
relationship forcing search warrants for private bedrooms
for its enforcement since what it prohibits is not the sale
or manufacture but the use of contraceptives.
3. U.S vs. RICHARDSON
BURGER, C. J., +4 concurring, 4 dissented
FACTS:
Respondent attempted to obtain from the Gov’t
information concerning detailed expenditures of the CIA.
He wrote to the Government Printing Office and requested
that he be provided with the documents published by the
Government in compliance with Art I, sec 9, cl (7) of the
US Constitution:
"No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law; and a regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public
Money shall be published from time to time."
insofar as that clause requires a regular statement
and account of public funds.
The Fiscal Service of the Bureau of Accounts of the
Department of the Treasury replied, explaining that it
published the document known as the Combined
Statement of Receipts, Expenditures, and Balances of the
US Gov’t. Several copies of the monthly and daily reports
of the office were sent with the letter. Respondent also
inquired as to how he could receive further information on
the expenditures of the CIA. The Bureau of Accounts
replied stating that it had no other available information.
Respondent asked the federal court to declare
unconstitutional a provision of the CIA Act which permits
the CIA to account for its expenditures "solely on the
certificate of the Director ". The only injury alleged by
respondent was that he cannot obtain a document that
sets out the expenditures and receipts of the CIA but on
the contrary was asked to accept a fraudulent document.
District Court dismissed the case for lack of standing.
The CA en banc with three judges dissenting, reversed,
holding that the respondent had standing. The majority
relied on Flast v. Cohen, and its two-tier test.
While noting that the respondent did not directly attack an
appropriations act, as did the plaintiff in Flast, the CA
concluded that the CIA statute challenged by the
respondent was "integrally related," to his ability to
challenge the appropriations since he could not question
an appropriation about which he had no knowledge. The
CA seemed to rest its holding on an assumption that this
case was a prelude to a later case challenging, on the basis
of information obtained in this suit, some particular
appropriation for or expenditure of the CIA; respondent
stated no such an intention in his complaint.
Consti part 1: standing, ripeness & mootness
ISSUES: WON respondent is a proper and appropriate
party to invoke federal judicial power with respect to the
issues raised.
HELD: NO, he has no standing. (case is not ripe for
adjudication)
RATIO:
Standing Issue:
Precedents:
Flast v. Cohen is a starting point in an
examination of respondent's claim to prosecute this suit
as a taxpayer, that case must be read with reference to
its principal predecessor, Frothingham v. Mellon.
Frothingham: Denied standing on the "comparatively
minute, remote, fluctuating and uncertain" impact on
the taxpayer, and the failure to allege the kind of direct
injury required for standing.
Flast: held that a "taxpayer will have standing consistent
with Art III to invoke judicial power when he alleges that
congressional action under the taxing and spending
clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions
which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and
spending power."
Court made clear it in Flast that it was reaffirming the
principle of Frothingham precluding a taxpayer's use of
"a federal court as a forum in which to air his
generalized grievances about the conduct of government
or the allocation of power in the Federal System."
Application of Doctrines:
It is held in Flast that a "fundamental aspect of
standing" is that it focuses primarily on the party
seeking to get his complaint before the federal court
rather than "on the issues he wishes to have
adjudicated," it made equally clear that in ruling on
taxpayer standing, it is necessary to look to the
substantive issues to determine if there is a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought
to be adjudicated.
Status Asserted -(nexus)- Claim Sought:
The recital of the respondent's claims and an
examination of the statute under attack demonstrate
how far he falls short of the standing criteria of Flast and
how neatly he falls within the Frothingham. Although
the status he rests on is that he is a taxpayer, his
challenge is not addressed to the taxing or spending
power, but to the statutes regulating the CIA. That
section provides different accounting and reporting
requirements and procedures for the CIA, as is also done
with respect to other governmental agencies dealing in
confidential areas.
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Respondent makes no claim that funds are being spent in
violation of a specific constitutional limitation upon the
taxing and spending power. Rather, he asks the courts to
compel the Government to give him information on
precisely how the CIA spends its funds. Thus there is no
"logical nexus" between the asserted status of taxpayer
and the claimed failure of the Congress to require the
Executive to supply a more detailed report.
Ripeness Issue:
Respondent's claim: without detailed information on CIA
expenditures, he cannot intelligently follow the actions of
Congress or the Executive, nor can he properly fulfill his
obligations as a member of the electorate in voting for
candidates seeking national office.
SC says: This is surely the kind of a generalized grievance
described in both Frothingham and Flast since the impact
on him is plainly undifferentiated and common to all
members of the public. He has not alleged that, as a
taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular
concrete injury as a result of the operation of this statute.
Sierra Club v. Morton: "A mere `interest in a problem,' no
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how
qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem, is
not sufficient by itself to render the organization `adversely
affected' or `aggrieved' within the meaning of the APA.”
In the absence of any particular individual or class to
litigate these claims gives support to the argument that the
subject matter is committed to the surveillance of
Congress, and ultimately to the political process.
The Constitution created a representative Government, not
an Athenian Democracy, with the representatives directly
responsible to their constituents during election periods.
MOOTNESS
S
1. DEFUNIS vs. ODEGAARD
FACTS:
Marco Defunis applied for admission at University of
Washington Law School of w/c Charles Odegaard is
president. DeFunis was denied admission. He then
commenced with this suit contending that the procedures
and criteria will be employed by the admissions committee
discriminated against him because of race in violation of
the Equal Protection clause. He brought the suit on behalf
of himself alone and not as a representative of any class.
He asked and the trial court gave a mandatory injunction
commanding the Univ to allow to enroll him. He began
studies in 1971. On appeal, the Washington SC reversed
the trial courts decision. He was in his 2nd year. DeFunis
then petitioned the United States SC for a writ of
certiorari. The WSC's decision was stayed until final
dispostion by the USSC. In the 1st term of his final year,
the USSC considered his petition and requested both
parties to make a brief on the question of mootness.
Consti part 1: standing, ripeness & mootness
Respondent claimed that the petitioner had another term
for him to enroll therefore the question was not moot.
USSC granted petition. The case was finally heard
during DeFunis' final term. Counsel for Respondent
made it clear that the petitioners registration will not be
abrogated regardless of USSC determination.
Issue: Is the case moot?
Ratio:
"Federal courts are w/o power to decide questions that
cannot affect the right of litigants before them" (this
doctrine stems from Consti that judicial power can only
be exercised when there exists an actual case or
controversy) All parties agree that DeFunis will be
allowed to complete his term and graduate.
Therefore, the case is moot.
Rationale:
A USSC deision would no longer be necessary to compel
the result nor prevent it. The controvrsy between the
parties is no longer "definite and concrete" and "no
longer touches the legal relations of parties having
adverse interests".
Defunis suit is not a class action; his only remedy was
that he be admitted. He already had that remedy and is
in his final term. It does not matter that there admission
policy issues involved. DeFunis will no longer be
affected.
petitioner will be allowed to complete this term.
respondent did not demonstrate that there was not even a
mere possibility that the petitioner would once again be
subject to the challenged admissions policy. respondent
free to return to their old ways (the challenged policy).
Requirements for ripeness present because of case's
history (procedural facts). Reqirements are "questions are
framed with necessary specificity, issues will be contested
with necessary adverseness, litigation will be pursued with
necessary vigor, to assure that the constitutional
challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be
capable of judicial resolution.
Mooting the case disserve public interest. Many people are
affected and are involved with 26 amicus curiae briefs.
This issue will be raised again and again until SC decides.
Avoidance of repetitious litigation serves public interest,
and this case's inevitability counsels that SC should
decide
on it now.

Doctrine of "mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal

conduct does not moot case" is irrelevant because
mootness arose from the fact that Defunis is in his final
term, not the unilateral change in admissions procedure.

Doctrine of "capable of repetition, yet evading review"

also irrelevant because Defunis will never again be
required to enter admission processes. The issue will
never be raised again in review. If admissions procedures
are left unchanged, there is no reason to suppose that a
subsequent case will not come to court. This is not
exception to doctrine in Southern Pacific Terminal Co v
ICC; actual controversy must exist at stages of appelate
or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action
is initiated.

DISPOSITION: WSC decision vacated, case remanded for

such poceedings necessary

DISSENTS:
Douglas: does not address issue of mootness directly.
Discusses admissions policy. Argues for remanding of
case to determine if LSAT exam should be eliminated for
racial minorities because of it's inherent discriminatory
white man viewpoint

Brennan: case is not moot bec something might happen

to cause Defunis to miss final term, thus he will have to
enter admission processes again. "Voluntary cessation"
doctrine relevant bec university implied no concession
that admission policy is unlawful. university allowed
only that

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