Research Report

Cadre Personnel Management in China: The

Nomenklatura System, 1990–1998*
Hon S. Chan

ABSTRACT Nomenklatura, which establishes Party and governmental leadership in

China, is a key instrument of Communist Party control. Changes in the nomenklatura
reveal shifts and strains in Chinese governmental and personnel management. This
research report analyses the latest nomenklatura configuration, established in 1998,
and compares it to the 1990 one. It reveals that the major thrust in 1998 was to reform
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and argues that the Party faces a difficult trade-off
between maintaining political primacy and achieving economic flexibility. It shows
that the changes in the 1998 nomenklatura clearly encapsulate the contradictory
desires of the party-state – economic modernization through marketization combined
with continued political control. Central control for some strategic SOEs now exists
alongside much looser control of smaller enterprises.

Nomenklatura is the main instrument of Party control of leadership

selection and appointment in institutions in China. It reinforces a unified
management system that parcels out the authority and power, the auton-
omy, the status, the importance and the functions of the various compo-
nents of the polity in their relations to the central Party. Party committees
at different levels have their own list that describes the offices over which
they have authority. Through the nomenklatura system, the Communist
Party of China (CCP) manages and essentially controls the appointment,
promotion, transfer and removal of practically all but lowest ranking
officials.
Changes in the distribution of cadre management authority among
Communist Party committees occurred in 1984, 1990 and 1998.1 The
nomenklatura system in general and the its characteristics before 1998
have been described and analysed in previous articles.2 Through the
reformulation in 1998, the central Party sought to intensify party-build-
ing in various sectors, and to undertake economic reform in general and

* For comments on earlier versions of this research report, I am grateful to David

Rosenbloom, Chen Feng, Ting Gong, Gerald Chan, Ian Holliday, Ray Yep and Ngok
King-lun. I am also grateful to Edward Li, my graduate student, for his help in locating all
the information from Chinese websites and Chinese pinyin. I am particularly grateful to those
Party and government officials who kindly agreed to be interviewed. Any errors and
omissions, however, remain the author’s.
1. The 1984 and the 1990 nomenklatura were published on 14 July 1984 and 10 May
1990, respectively. The 1998 nomenklatura was internally promulgated on 13 August
1998.
2. For general discussion of the nomenklatura system, see Melanie Manion, “The cadre
management system, post-Mao: the appointment, promotion, transfer and removal of Party
and state leaders,” The China Quarterly, No. 102 (June 1985), pp. 203–233; John P. Burns,
“China’s nomenklatura system,” Journal of Problems of Communism, No. 36 (September–
October 1987), pp. 36–51; John P. Burns, “Contemporary China’s nomenklatura system,”
© The China Quarterly, 2004
704 The China Quarterly

enterprise reform in particular. The twin-edged measures presented the

CCP with a dilemma: political primacy or economic flexibility? To
transform China’s economic institutions requires a decision on the extent
and the way in which politics can make way for economic moderniza-
tion. The 1984 and 1990 lists were reformulated in a different context
and appeared to have addressed problems of a different nature. It is
worth examining the 1998 nomenklatura because its reformulation
reflects the extent in which the central Party has been able to deal with
the dilemma.
This report comprises a comparative study of the 1990 and 1998
nomenklatura. It shows that the changes in 1998 clearly encapsulate the
contradictory desires of the party-state – economic modernization
through marketization in combination with continued political control. A
linchpin of the communist system has been the domination by the
nomenklatura, which naturally calls for continued party-state control
over the bureaucracy. Yet, in the context of an increasingly open market
economy, the CCP needs to create initiatives to respond to economic
modernization. A good example that clearly reflects the major contradic-
tion in the 1998 nomenklatura is the official policy of “grasping the
large and releasing the small enterprises” adopted by the 15th Party
Congress in respect of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).3 It requires
the central Party to tidy up and consolidate the reporting line of “large”
SOEs (enterprises of fundamental and strategic importance to
China’s national security, national and economic livelihood) on the one
hand whilst allowing partial delegation of personnel and financial auth-
ority of “small” enterprises (enterprises of secondary importance) to
local Party committees on the other. Thus, central control for some
strategic SOEs now exists alongside much looser control of smaller
enterprises.
This research report draws on many sources. Some materials and
documents are published, whilst others are kept in Party and government
archives. It also relies on a number of interviews conducted mainly in
Beijing, Guangzhou and Hong Kong after April 2000 when the 1998
nomenklatura emerged.

footnote continued

Chinese Law and Government, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Winter 1987–88), pp. 3–134; John P. Burns,
“Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura,” The
China Quarterly, No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 458–491.
3. See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu guoyou qiye gaige he fazhan ruogan zhongda
wenti de jueding” (“The decision of the central Party on several major problems in reforming
and developing state-owned enterprises”) (22 September 1999) in Zhonggong zhongyang
wenxian yanjiushi (ed.), Shiwu da yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian (Selection of Important
Documents since the 15th National Party Congress) (Vol. 2) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe,
2000), pp. 1002–35.
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 705

The 1998 Job Title List of Centrally Managed Cadres

The 1998 nomenklatura, particularly the job title list (zhiwu
mingchengbiao), is more comprehensively developed than the one pro-
posed in 1990. Like its predecessors, the 1998 nomenklatura is divided
into two parts. The first is the “job title list of centrally managed cadres”
(Zhonggong zhongyang guanli ganbu zhiwu mingchengbiao) (hereafter
referred to as the job title list) (see Appendix 1), and the second is the
“list of cadre positions to be reported to the centre” (xiang zhongyang
bei’an de ganbu zhiwu mingdan) (hereafter referred to as the reported
list) (see Appendix 2). The nomenklatura system continuously operates a
one-level-down cadre management method.
The 1998 job title list is divided into ten sections (see Table 1). Section
one contains the entire principal leading positions in the CCP high
command, including the Politburo, the Central Committees, the Military
Commission and the Secretariat. Section two covers the leading positions
in the Party’s central bureaucracy. Since the 1998 nomenklatura was
forthright in its intention to “deepen the reform of the state-owned
enterprises,” the creation of two specialist committees, the Party Central
Financial Work Committee and the Party Central Large-scale Enterprise
Work Committee (renamed the Party Central Enterprise Work Committee
in December 1999), points to the most important development underpin-
ning the 1998 nomenklatura, and best characterizes the central Party’s
concerted efforts in responding to the need for economic transformation.4
Facing runaway economics, the central Party had to take concrete
measures to deal with the systemic failure of the reform of the SOEs and
to develop ways to handle the problems of both financial and non-
financial SOEs. The first step was to clarify the nature of the problems.
The central Party commissioned the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) to look into this and give advice in 1997. The first
UNDP report focuses on the problem of the multi-head management
structure of financial SOEs.5 It shows that units and agencies including
the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the People’s
Bank, and the State Economic and Trade Commission have all strived for
a stronger role in national comprehensive co-ordination and planning,
monetary and fiscal policies, banking and insurance management, and
their specific role in running financial as well as non-financial enterprises.
The decision to appoint a vice-premier to head each of the two commit-
tees is clearly designed to tidy up and consolidate (zhenghe) the reporting
line of SOEs and to enable them to tackle the problem of multi-head
management.

4. See “Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu xiuding Zhonggong zhongyang guanli

de ganbu mingchengbiao de tongzhi” (“The notification about amending the job title list of
centrally managed cadres by the Party Central Organization Department”) Zhongzufa, No. 11
(13 August 1998) (internal document).
5. See United State Development Programme (UNDP) and the Office of the Central
Establishment Commission (PCEC), an advisory report on “From comprehensive economic
departments to macro-regulatory department” (CPR/96/510) (Beijing: UNDP & PCEC,
17–19 December 1997).
 706

Table 1: The 1990 and 1998 Chinese Communist Party Central Nomenklatura Compared

1990 1998

Section No. Section No.

1. CCP high command (Politburo, Central 1. Party central (CCP high command)
The China Quarterly

Committee, Military Affairs Commission, etc.)

2. Central Party bureaucracy 2. Central Party bureaucracy
3. President, vice-president of PRC 3. State leaders, Central Military Commission
4. State advisory organs (NPC/CPPCC), 4. NPC
judiciary/procuratorate
5. State Council 5. CPPCC
6. Mass organizations 6. State Council, banks, corporation and diplomats
7. Local (provincial and, in some cases, 7. Judiciary, procuratorate
prefectural organizations)
8. Mass organizations
9. Local organizations (province- and deputy
province-level)
10. Institutes of higher learning
Note:
This compares only the structure of the 1990 and 1998 “Job title lists of cadres centrally managed by the Chinese Communist
Party.” John Burns estimated that there were about 5,000 positions listed in the 1990 job title list. This author has not made similar
estimation here in the 1998 list.
Sources:
John P. Burns, “Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection: the 1990 nomenklatura,” The China Quarterly,
No. 138 (June 1994), pp. 458–491 and Appendix 1.
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 707

An informed academic in Beijing said that dealing with the problems

of financial SOEs required Chinese leaders to develop a national strategy
in system building in respect of the entire national financial system.6 The
multi-head problem has been more serious in financial SOEs than in
non-financial ones. The management framework of the Party Central
Financial Work Committee therefore seeks to bring together heads of
financial institutions with national portfolios in the Chinese financial
system, including the People’s Bank of China, the China Securities
Regulatory Commission, the state-owned commercial banks, the strategic
and policy banks, the Bank of Communications, and the China Insurance
Regulatory Commission.7
A vertical management framework (chuizhi guanli tizhi) is adopted in
the administration of all financial institutions. Currently, the Party Central
Financial Work Committee controls 30 fundamentally important financial
institutions.8 It is proposed that all Party core groups of the subordinate
units and agencies be removed. A Party committee for each institution is
to be set up. Secretaries of lower-level Party committees will be members
of the immediately superior one. The Party committee is also to set up
organization and propaganda departments, and to create a system-wide
discipline inspection committee to assist the Party’s supervision work on
all financial institutions. This aims to ensure continuity of policies and to
maintain effective monitoring over the entire financial system. It clearly
allows this committee to play the role of “dragon head” to exercise
effective downward personnel as well as professional management auth-
ority over every level in the Party hierarchy. The management framework
of this committee appears to have created an impression that the central
Party has strengthened its grip over the national financial system.
The second report produced by the UNDP in 1997 examines the
problem of non-financial SOEs.9 It identifies direct administrative man-
agement of SOEs as the core of the problem and proposes to resolve it
by separating the administration of the government from the management
of enterprises. The underlying aim is to achieve marketization, that is,
what can be done by the market and society should be handed over as
much as possible to the market and society. It requires the government to
off-load its vertical mode of administering enterprises, allow enterprises
to spur initiatives to respond to the market in accordance with law and
competition, transform in most cases, reorganize, merge and scrap in
some other cases enterprises so as to push market-oriented and indepen-

6. Interviews in Beijing, a senior academic in a university in Beijing, June 2003.

7. See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu wanshan jinrong xitong dang de lingdao tizhi,
jiaqiang he gaijin jinrong xitong dang de gongzuo youguan wenti de tongzhi” (“The Central
Committee’s notice on improving the leadership structure of the financial system, and on the
several problems on strengthening and improving the Party work of the financial system”)
(19 May 1998) in The CCP Internal Regulations 1996–2000), pp. 118–121.
8. Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, Central Party Organization Department
(CPOD)/China Bank Industry Supervision and Administration Commission (CBSAC)
(formerly the Party Central Financial Work Committee), June 2002.
9. See UNDP and PCEC, an advisory report on “Government-enterprise relations in
China” (CPR/96/510) (Beijing: UNDP & PCEC, 17–19 December 1997).
708 The China Quarterly

dent operation of SOEs. Some of these measures clearly trigger off the
changes as indicated in section six of the title list and section three of the
reported list.
In November 1998, the central Party decided to implement delinking,
that is, to sever the functional, financial, staffing and the use of official
status and name between enterprises and Party and state departments and
offices.10 For non-financial SOEs, there were two decisions to implement
delinking. First, personnel decisions of leaders of SOEs of fundamental
importance to China’s national security or economic livelihood are to be
controlled by the Party Central Large-scale Enterprise Work Committee
and handled by its executive arm, the Ministry of Personnel. The central
Party now controls 44 non-financial SOEs whilst the Party Central
Large-scale Enterprise Work Committee directly manages 120.11 Sec-
ondly, personnel decisions of other non-financial SOEs of secondary
importance to China’s economy should be as far as possible handled by
local Party committees (shudi guanli). This has affected approximately
600 to 700 of such SOEs.12 The crux of the problem of non-financial
SOEs is to determine the extent to which personnel as well as financial
authority can be partially off-loaded. The management framework under
this committee seems to call for more economic flexibility in the form of
partial delegation of personnel and financial authority to lower-level Party
organizations.
It is important to note that the central Party did not adopt a uniform
reform of SOEs across sectors. The management framework of the two
committees clearly exhibits the major contradiction in nomenklatura
policy. When tidying up the reporting line of financial SOEs, the central
Party aims to create a system-wide framework to strengthen its grip on
them. But because it takes the separation of state and enterprises as the
defining objective in reforming non-financial SOEs, the ownership and
management jurisdiction of SOEs of secondary importance can be off-
loaded downwards. This option is clearly not available in reforming
financial SOEs.13
Nowhere has this contradiction been made more evident than the
policy of “grasping the large while releasing the small enterprises”
adopted by the 15th Party Congress. On the basis of the SOEs’ national
profile and importance to China’s economy, this policy makes a simple
distinction between large and small enterprises. Unlike the management
framework of the two committees, the distinction here does not rest on

10. See “Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting, guowuyuan bangongting guanyu

zhongyang dangzheng jiguan yu suoban jingji shiti he guanli de zhishu qiye tuogou youguan
wenti de tongzhi” (“The notice of the Party Central General Office and the General Office
of the State Council on the problem of delinking the enterprises and the economic entities
directly operated and managed under the Central Committee and the State Council”) (8
November 1998) in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Selection of Important
Documents since the 15th National Party Congress (Vol. 1), pp. 610–14.
11. Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, (CPOD)/(CBSAC), June 2003.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. and “The notice on the problem of delinking the enterprises and the economic
entities.”
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 709

the type of SOE. As such, the central Party will tightly control personnel
decisions of the “large” SOEs, whether financial or non-financial. The
arrangements for placing 44 non-financial SOEs under the direct manage-
ment of the Central Committee, 120 non-financial SOEs under the Party
Central Large-scale Enterprise Work Committee and 30 financial SOEs
under the Party Central Finance Work Committee provide evidence of
this practice.
In the context of an open market economy, the central Party has looked
for ways to spur the Party and state administration to respond to econ-
omic modernization. The policy objective of separation of state and
enterprises (here referred to non-financial SOEs) provides such an option.
The partial delegation of authority allows the central Party to spread the
loss caused by bad-performing “small” enterprises among the local Party
and state administration, as well as to share the cost in revamping the
under-performing “small” enterprises.
Partial delegation of personnel authority downward means that some
SOEs are removed. Yet this does not mean that the leading cadres of
these enterprises are beyond the control of nomenklatura. For example,
Jilin Chemical Industry Company, Shanghai Petrochemical Industry Fac-
tory and the Machine Building Science Research Institute, which were
listed in section four of the 1990 reported list, are now subsidiary
enterprises of the China National Petroleum Corporation, the China
Petrochemicals Corporation and the Party Central Enterprise Work Com-
mittee. These three corporations are absent from the 1998 nomenklatura.
Nevertheless, the leading cadres of the first two are now managed directly
under the Party Central Organization Department whilst the last one is
under the Party Central Enterprise Work Committee.14 As such, these
leading cadres are still either centrally managed or listed in positions to
be reported to the central Party. Some enterprises that appeared in the
1990 reported list have now been transferred to and are managed by local
Party committees. For example, the Kailuan Mine Service Bureau was
transferred to the Hebei local Party committee and has now become the
Kailuan (Group) Limited Company.15 The removal of the Kailuan Mine
Service Bureau from the 1990 reported list is indicative of the fact that
it had been successfully transformed into a non-financial enterprise, and
is now transferred to and managed by Hebei provincial Party committee.
Section three contains the state leaders (guojia lingdaoren) and the
leaders of the central military commission (CMC). It must be noted that
the latter are included in section one of the 1998 job title list as the chair
and members of the CCP CMC and in section three as the chair and
members of the CMC of the PRC. Their inclusion in section three is
recognition of their status as state leaders. It specifically gives the chair
of the CMC the same status as the president of the PRC. This gives CMC

14. See their websites: http://jmw.jl.gov.cn/qiye/jh.htm (Jilin Chemical Industry Corpor-

ation); http://www.sinopec.com.cn (China Petrochemicals Corporation); http://chinapark-
ing.org/kexueyuan.htm (The Machine Building Science Research Institute).
15. See the website: http://www.kailuan.com.cn/kljt/syg.html (Kailuan (Group) Limited
Company).
710 The China Quarterly

chairs such as Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin legitimacy and formal
power even after they withdraw from other posts.
The separation of the post of the president of the PRC and the chair of
the CMC explicitly renders the option of having different leaders in each
post legitimate. The most important thing is that the separation allows the
chair of the CMC to stay on where circumstances permit. If the same
person is in both posts, he is required to step down if he serves more than
two consecutive terms as president of the PRC.16 Nevertheless, it is now
clear that an ordinary CCP member can become the chair of the CMC if
he is a representative of the National People’s Congress (NPC). As in the
case of Jiang Zemin, one need not be a member of the CCP Central
Committee in order to be nominated and elected the chair of the CCP
CMC.
Sections four and five have slightly expanded the coverage of the NPC
and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) by
adding to them the Party core group of organs,17 which was created in
1978.18 The expanded political environment immediately after the 4 June
Incident intensified Party building. From 1990s onwards, a system to
promote Party cause (dang de shiye) had evolved. Designated personnel
for Party affairs (zhuanzhi dangwu renyuan) were instituted. For exam-
ple, there were at least 182 designated positions (zhuanzhi zhishu) created
for Party building, Party affairs and discipline inspection in the 1993
administrative reorganization.19 The appearance of the Party core groups
of organs under the NPC and the CPPCC in the 1998 job title list simply
gives recognition to the work and the status of Party building, Party
affairs and discipline inspection.
Section six modestly extends the coverage of the State Council, various
banks and corporations directly under the State Council, as well as
China’s overseas representatives and officials for various purposes.
The people’s armed police and the China National Supply and Market-
ing Co-operatives are absent from the 1998 Job Title List because of a
change in the line of authority.20 The China Aviation Industry Corpor-

16. See Article 79 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China adopted at the
fifth session of the Fifth National People’s Congress and promulgated for implementation by
the proclamation of the National People’s Congress on 4 December 1982. See
http:news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002–02/20/content_283404.htm.
17. Apart from this common change, section four of the 1998 job title list lists an additional
organ, the Research Office Director of the General Office of the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress. See Appendix 1.
18. See Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, Zhonggong zhongyang dangshi yanjiushi,
zhongyang dang’anguan, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao (The Materials on
Organization History of the Communist Party of China) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi
chubanshe, 2000), Vol. 7 (hereafter The Organization History Materials), pp. 275 and 375.
19. The data were drawn from Guowuyuan bangongting mishuju, zhongyang bianwei
bangongshi zonghesi (ed.), Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou (The Organizational Structure of
the Central Government 1993) (Beijing: Zhongguo fazhan chubanshe, 1994) (hereafter The
1993 Structure).
20. The people’s armed police was removed from the nomenklatura because it was made
part of the armed forces in March 1995. Originally, the Ministry of Public Security directly
managed the people’s armed police. Now, it is under the direct management of the Central
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 711

ation and the China Aerospace Industry Corporation were both estab-
lished in the 1993 administrative reorganization of the central govern-
ment and were made organs directly under the State Council, hence their
inclusion here.21 A merger of the several power industries and manage-
ment bureaus listed in the 1990 reported list created the State Power
Corporation. This is now listed together with the China National Nuclear
Corporation, the China Ordnance Industry Corporation and the China
State Shipbuilding Corporation (these three corporations were in section
five of the 1990 job title list) in this section because of its strategic
importance in China’s economy. Established in 1958, the China Academy
of Engineering Physics was formally listed under the State Council in the
1998 job title list.22 The need to realign the State Council’s management
jurisdiction and authority had inevitably called for these changes.
Amendments made in this section clearly mark the importance of the
tasks undertaken at the time when the 1998 job title list was issued. These
included the handover of Hong Kong and Macau, China’s entrance into
the WTO, the Pacific Economic Co-operation Organization (PECO) and
the Three Gorges Construction Project. To these ends, units and organs
responsible for these portfolios were included in this section.23
As expected, the 1998 administrative reorganization of the State Coun-
cil led to the reformulation of the 1998 job title list. Some 15 departments
and offices were closed down, four new ones were set up, three renamed,
and 20 departments, offices, banks and bureaus retained. Also established
were 19 state bureaus under the management of the departments and
offices of the State Council.24
However inclusion of more units or organs in the job title list does not
necessarily increase the number of centrally managed cadres. Similarly,
streamlining staff members in the State Council does not unilaterally
reduce the number of centrally managed cadres. One example is the 1998
administrative reorganization which sought to cut the staff size of the
State Council in half. Zhu Rongji argued that the General Office of the
State Council had played a pivotal role in cutting down the number of
vice-premiers from six to four, state councillors from eight to five, and

footnote continued

Military Commission. See The Organization History Materials, pp. 425–431. The China
National Supply and Marketing Co-operative was re-categorized as a mass organization,
hence removed from this section.
21. See The 1993 Structure, pp. 422–431.
22. It was placed in section four of the 1990 reported list. The deputies of the leading cadres
of the Academy are now placed in section three of the 1998 reported list. See Appendix 2
and http://www.caep.ac.cn/.
23. See Appendix 1.
24. See “Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang’an” (“The programme of the administrative reform
of the State Council”) and “Guowuyuan guanyu buwei guanli de guojiaju shezhi de tongzhi”
(“The notice of the State Council on the establishment of the State Bureaus under the
management of the departments and offices of the State Council”) (The State Council [1998]:
No. 6) in Guowuyuan bangongting mishuju he zhongyang jigou bianzhi weiyuanhui
bangongshi zonghesi (ed.), Zhongyang zhengfu zuzhi jigou (The Organizational Structure of
the Central Government 1998) (Beijing: Gaige chubanshe, 1998) (hereafter The 1998
Structure), pp. 18–22 and 27–28.
712 The China Quarterly

vice-secretaries-general from ten to five.25 Other similar examples

abound. The reduction in the numbers of these leading officials could
hardly make a significant change to the nomenklatura in general and the
number of centrally managed cadres in particular because they were more
than likely to have taken up other important positions listed in the
nomenklatura. All the interviewees agreed that the number of province/
ministry-level leadership positions contained in the job title list had been
kept fairly stable and at times marginally increased.26 The official statis-
tics at the time suggested that the number of province/ministry-level
cadres serving in the Party and state organs of the State Council in 1997
and 1998 were 828 and 888 respectively.27 As far as the 1998 job title list
and the number of centrally managed cadres serving in the State Council
were concerned, the 1998 administrative reorganization did not appear to
have made any significant change at all.28
Section seven covers the judiciary and the procuratorate. The central
Party extends its hold over these by setting up the discipline inspection
committees (groups) together with the political departments within them.
Despite the fact that the political departments were created after the 4
June Incident, these positions do not figure in the 1990 job title list.29 The
Central Committee expanded its control over the judiciary and the
procuratorate after 1991.30 To that effect, designated positions for Party
building, Party affairs and cadre management were established. For
example, under the Political Department of the Supreme People’s Procu-
ratorate, there are now four bureaus responsible for cadre work. They
include the Cadre Bureau, the Propaganda Bureau, the Cadre Education
and Training Bureau and the General Office of the Political Department.31
The Party Central Organization Department can exercise direct personnel
control over units and organs of the judiciary and the procuratorate
through the political departments within them.

25. See Zhu Rongji, “Zai shengbuji ganbu tuijin zhengfu jigou gaige zhuanti yanjiuban
xueyuan zuotanhui shang de jianghua (jiexuan)” (“The speech given in a meeting with the
province/ministry-level cadres on how to promote the government administrative reform
(excerpt)”) (10 April 1998), in The 1998 Structure, pp. 32–37.
26. Even when we consider the number of province/ministry-level cadres from 1997 to
1998 nationally, there was a modest increase of 156, from 2,406 to 2,562. The increase was
less than 1%. Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, Ministry of Personnel
(MOP)/(CPOD), April 2000–June 2002. The figures are drawn from Zhonggong zhongyang
zuzhibu, Dangzheng lingdao ganbu tongji ziliao huibian (1954–1998) (Selection of
Documents on the Statistical Information of Party-State Leading Cadres, 1954–1998)
(Beijing: Dangjian duwu chubanshe, 1999) (hereafter The Statistical Information), p.3.
27. See ibid. p.3.
28. The 1998 administrative reorganization of the State Council had definitely made some
changes to the reported list. For example, the number of bureau-level cadres serving in the
Party and state organs of the State Council between 1997 and 1998 had decreased from 7,687
to 6,508, representing a 15% reduction. See ibid.
29. Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, (MOP)/(CPOD), March and June 2002.
30. See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de jianshe tongzhi” (“The Central
Committee notice on strengthening Party building”), Zhongfa, No. 9 (28 August 1989) in
Renshibu zhengce faguisi (ed.), Renshi gongzuo wenjian xuanbian (Selection of Personnel
Work Documents) (Beijing: Renshi chubanshe, 1993) (hereafter RGWX), Vol. 12 (1989), pp.
12–23
31. See http://www.spp.gov.cn/jgzz/jgzz2.htm.
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 713

Section eight of the 1998 job title list includes four additional mass
organizations and covers leading cadres who are centrally managed. The
China National Supply and Marketing Co-operative was included here
after re-categorization. The other three new organizations were the State
Natural Science Foundation Management Committee, the All-China Fed-
eration of Industry and Commerce, and the National Work Committee for
the Elderly.
Section nine identifies the various positions in the province-level as
well as deputy province-level Party and state organizations, including
their judiciaries and procuratorates, which are under the central Party’s
control. In this section, Chongqing is included because it was upgraded
as the fourth centrally administered city. The section covers 15 deputy
province-level cities and excludes the chairs and deputy chairs of the
Party advisory committees (small groups) of provinces, autonomous
regions and centrally administered cities. On balance, the number of
centrally managed cadres in this section might have increased.
Section ten is a new addition. A list of higher learning institutes is a
throwback to the 1984 job title list, which included ten universities. The
inclusion of these higher learning institutes shows the central Party’s
intention to strengthen its grip over them. As clearly indicated in Zhongfa
(issued by the CCP Central Committee), document No. 9 (28 August
1989) and the notice accompanying the promulgation of the 1990 job title
list, the leadership treated the higher education portion of the propaganda
system more cautiously.32 The Party Central Organization Department
and the Party Core Group of the State Education Commission jointly
issued Jiaodang (the Party Core Group of the State Education Com-
mittee) document No. 56 (17 May 1991) and began to institute greater
regularization regarding Party building and leadership corps building.33
From May 1991, prior formal approval – rather than informal consul-
tation – from the Party Central Organization Department was required
regarding leadership appointments to higher learning institutes.
Under the leadership of the CCP Leading Small Group on Party
Building, the Party Central Organization Department, the Party Central
Propaganda Department and the Party Core Group of the Central State
Education Commission launched the First National Conference of Party
Building in Higher Learning Institutes in 1990. It is now an annual
event.34 Against this backdrop, the tightening of control over the higher

32. See “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de jianshe tongzhi”; Zhongzufa, No.
2 (10 May 1990), RGWX, Vol. 13 (1990), pp. 45–53. For a detailed discussion, see Burns,
“Strengthening central CCP control of leadership selection,” pp. 466–67.
33. The most notable measure was to require that at least one half of the leadership corps
in these higher learning institutes must be responsible for Party affairs and its administration.
See “Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu, zhongyang guojia jiaowei dangzu guanyu jinyibu
jiaqiang gaodeng xuexiao lingdao banzi jianshe de tongzhi” (“The Party Central Organization
Department and the Party Core Group of the Central State Education Commission’s notice
on further strengthening leadership corps building of higher education institutes”), Jiaodang
No. 56 (17 May 1991), RGWX, Vol. 14 (1992), pp. 8–17.
34. Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, Ministry of Education (MOE), June 2002.
714 The China Quarterly

learning institutes, especially the key point universities, is expected. Two

reasons might account for it.
First, after the 4 June Incident, the Party centre was highly alert to
student movements nation-wide, especially in key point universities such
as Beijing University and Beijing Normal University.35 The strengthening
of leadership corps building in higher learning institutes, the institution of
Party building and Party affairs work over university teachers’ as well as
university students’ unions, and the turning from the university president
leadership management system adopted in 1985 to the Party secretary
leadership management system implemented after 1990 are effective
ways to prevent an outbreak of student riots.
Secondly, one of the main purposes behind the launching of Party
building in higher learning institutes is to recruit high quality cadres to
join the Party. Gathered information indicates a certain measure of
success in this respect. The percentage of college students who joined the
Party was raised from 0.8 per cent in 1990 to 4 per cent in 1997, that of
graduate students from 23 to 26 per cent, and that of university teachers
from 42 to 45 per cent.36 By 1997, almost all higher learning institutes
had established primary Party organizations, and there were about
678,000 Party members in higher learning institutes.37
Leading cadres of 17 top universities are now listed in this section. Ten
of them were included in the 1990 reported list. In terms of institutional
affiliations, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing
Institute of Technology, the North-west Engineering University and the
Harbin Institute of Technology are now under the control of the Com-
mission of Science, Technology and National Defence Industry. The
University of Science and Technology of China is under the Academy of
Science. The remainder are under the Ministry of Education. Sichuan
Union University is now called Sichuan University after its acquisition of
a few local colleges. Beijing University of Medical Science is now the
Medical School of Beijing University, having officially merged with
Beijing University in April 2001.38
When the leading cadres of these universities were placed in the 1990
reported list, they were given a bureau-level grade. From 1999, they were
given a province/ministry-level administrative grade after being placed in
the 1998 job title list. Up until May 2002, five more universities – Nankai
University, Tianjin University, Wuhan University, Zhongshan University
and the North-west University of Agriculture, Forest, Science and Tech-
nology – were added to the list of higher learning institutes, leading

35. After the Tiananmen Incident, Li Peng and Song Ping made their first university visit
to Beijing University, followed by the second one to Beijing Normal University as a gesture
to pacify university students’ discontent on 9 September 1989. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, (MOE)/(CPOD), March 2002.
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 715

cadres of which were centrally managed. The Ministry of Education

continues to manage these five.39

The List of Positions to Be Reported to the Centre

The 1990 reported list has four and the 1998 reported list has three
sections. In terms of coverage, the latter is short. It mainly covers and
extends the central nomenklatura’s control over a range of lower admin-
istrative level organizations including Party, state, legislative, judicial,
procuratorate and mass organizations; local organizations; higher learning
institutes; and radio and television stations, enterprises, research, cultural
and health institutes.
Section one is revised in order to reflect the changes made. These
include the new lines of authority and responsibility of the Party and state
bureaucracy. It marks the importance of the tasks undertaken and ratio-
nalizes the new administrative structure after the 1998 reorganization of
the State Council. These changes are made parallel to the 1998 job title
list.
Section two basically makes a few changes in relation to its scope. It
includes mainly deputy positions of local Party, state, newspaper, ju-
dicial, procuratorate and mass organizations. It removes from the 1998
reported list the local units and offices of the People’s Bank of China, the
various specialized banks and the People’s Insurance Corporation of
China. The removal of these organs was made in line with the reconstitu-
tion of the entire financial system in general and the province-level
branch offices of the People’s Bank in particular. On 17 October 1998,
the State Council approved the programme submitted by the People’s
Bank to set up nine branch offices across provinces, autonomous regions
and centrally administered cities.40 Each branch office extends its jurisdic-
tion to more than one locality, hence removing them from section two of
the 1998 reported list, which basically covers locality-based organs. The
turning from 13 cities under central planning (not including Chongqing)
and other capital cities under province (shenghuishi), that is Jinan and
Hangzhou, into 15 deputy province-level cities should not really make
any significant change.41 The number of leading officials to be included
in section two of the reported list should remain largely the same,
possibly with a few reductions.
Section three in the main covers the 17 higher learning institutes, radio
and television stations, enterprises, and research, cultural and health
institutes. However, unlike section three of the 1990 reported list, it
does not cover ordinary higher learning institutes. The removal of these
might mean that their leading cadres could be placed in the local

39. Interviews in Beijing and Hong Kong, middle-level officials, (MOE)/(CPOD) and an
executive vice-president of a university in Beijing, March and June 2002.
40. Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, People’s Bank, June 2002.
41. This is so because many, if not all, leading cadres of the 13 cities previously under
central planning and cities under province were listed in the 1990 reported list. Interviews in
Beijing, middle-level officials, (CPOD), June 2002.
716 The China Quarterly

nomenklatura. A month before the promulgation of the 1998 nomenklat-

ura, the Ministry of Education, the State Economic and Trade Com-
mission, the State Development and Planning Commission and the
Ministry of Finance had jointly issued a notice announcing ways to adjust
the management structure and jurisdiction of educational institutions
subordinate to the departments, offices and corporations of the State
Council. Some 93 ordinary higher learning institutes were implicated to
be in need of reform. Two of them had reportedly remained under the
direct management of the State Coal Industry Bureau, whilst the others
were put under the joint administration of the State Council and local
governments, which here refer to local Party committees.42 From the
beginning of 1999, the State Economic and Trade Commission began to
transfer the management jurisdiction and authority of higher learning
institutes subordinate to the State Bureau, which previously belonged to
it, to the Ministry of Education and local governments. There were
altogether 160 schools implicated in this exercise.43 The adjustments
made to the management jurisdiction and authority of these schools
inevitably led to the reformulation of section three of the 1998 reported
list.
In terms of coverage of research institutes, enterprises, hospitals,
cultural and health units, section three reflects the major differences
between the 1990 and the 1998 reported list. Section four of the 1990
reported list includes approximately 153 research institutes, enterprises,
hospitals, cultural and health units.44 Section three of the 1998 reported
list files only 19 units, six of which are new entries.45 The new entries are
research institutes and corporations subordinate to the China National
Nuclear Corporation, the China Aerospace Industry Corporation and the
China State Shipbuilding Corporation.46 Leading positions of cadres at
different hierarchical levels of these three corporations are now placed in

42. See “Guanyu tiaozheng chebing bumen suoshu xuexiao guanli tizhi de shishi yijian”
(“The implementation opinion about adjusting, scrapping and merging schools subordinate
to the organs of the State Council”), in The 1998 Structure, pp. 88–98.
43. See “Yuanhe chexiao jiu ge weiguan guojiaju (xinwen fenxi)” (“Why are the nine State
Bureaus to be scrapped? [News Analysis]”), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 20 February
2001. Note that there might well be some overlaps of schools involved in the 1998 and 1999
reshuffling exercises.
44. This calculation is based on section four of the 1990 reported list and the report made
by Ming pao (Hong Kong) on 3 February 1999. There were 21 foreign trade corporations and
subsidiary units under the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation.
45. They are the China Research Institute of Atomic Energy Science (CRIAEC), the China
Warships Research Institute (CWRI), the China Research Institute of Launching Technology
(CRILT), the China Research Institute of Space Technology (CRIST), the China Changfeng
Science and Technology Industry Corporation (CCSTIC) and the China Haiying Science and
Technology Industry Corporation (CHSTIC).
46. In June 1999, the China Aerospace Industry Corporation was split into two organs, the
China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and the China Aerospace Machinery
and Electronics Corporation. The latter was renamed the China Aerospace Science and
Industry Corporation on 6 September 2001. The CRILT and the CRIST are now subsidiary
organs of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Group. The CCSTIC and the CHSTIC
are directly under the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. The CRIAEC is
subordinate to the China National Nuclear Corporation. The CWRI is directly under the China
State Shipbuilding Corporation. For further details, see their websites.
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 717

section six of the 1998 job title list and section one of the 1998 reported
list, respectively.
The reduction of the number of enterprises and research institutes was
a result of enterprise reform introduced since 1997. Zheng Silin, the
deputy director of the State and Economic Commission, reportedly said
that the State Council would take three years to reform, restructure,
transform and strengthen the management of those large and medium-
sized enterprises that were not making a profit.47 The Ministry of Finance
began the delinking exercise by withdrawing financial capital from its
enterprises in July 1998.48 In the second half of 1998, the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation implemented a full-scale
programme to consolidate and reform the 30-odd enterprises directly
under it. Some 21 of them were moved so as to come under the
supervision of the Party Central Large-scale Enterprise Work Committee.
The rest were to be handled by a small group headed by Sheng Huaren
of the State Economic and Trade Commission.49 It was reported in
December 1998 that the central Party had set up the CCP Leading Small
Group for Delinking Non-financial Enterprises from the Party and State
Organs to oversee this delinking.50 In early 1999, the Ministry of Com-
munications started to delink several enterprises, including some listed in
the 1990 reported list.51
The State Economic and Trade Commission took the most important
significant step that removed most of research institutes and institutes of
other kinds such as museums, libraries and travel agencies from the 1990
reported list. In preparation for abolishing the nine State Bureaus under
it, the Commission turned most of their 242 research institutes into
science and technology type enterprises. The Commission merged the rest
of them with enterprise groups. The Party Central Large-scale Enterprise
Work Committee itself, its subordinate committees or local Party com-
mittees would manage these revamped enterprises. Other institutes of the
State Bureaus, either under the State Economic and Trade Commission or
other departments and offices of the State Council, also adopted the
principle of localized management. Accordingly, local Party committees

47. “Jingmaowei huibao jinnian guoqi gaige jinzhan” (“The State Economic and Trade
Commission reports the progress of state-owned enterprise reform of this year”), The
Economic Journal (Hong Kong), 15 December 1998.
48. See “Caizhengbu chedi zhengqi fenjia” (“The Ministry of Finance thoroughly delinks
from itself enterprises”), The Eastern Oriental Daily (Hong Kong), 21 July 1998.
49. See “Zhongyang dangzheng jiguan niandi yu jingban qiye tuogou, jingwai sheli qiye
zanbu lieru tuogou fanwei” (“The Central Committee and the State Council will delink their
self-run enterprises: enterprises set up outside the mainland will not be in the interim included
into the scope of delinking”), The Economic Journal (Hong Kong), 15 December 1998.
50. See ibid.
51. This included the Changjiang Transportation Company, the China Overseas
Transportation Company, the Hong Kong China Merchants Group Company, and the China
Road, Harbour and Bridge Construction Company. The latter was set up after merging the
China Harbour Construction Company and the Highway Construction Company (these two
companies also appeared in section four of the 1990 reported list) with other companies.
Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, (MOP)/(CPOD), April 2001.
718 The China Quarterly

would control these institutes.52 Analysing changes made in this section

illustrates again how the CCP put into practice the policy of grasping the
large and releasing the small enterprises. The enterprise reform had
clearly set out to remove enterprises, research institutes and institutes of
other kinds from section three of the 1998 reported list.

Conclusion
Following such reforms, Chinese officials have not stopped flaunting
their dissatisfaction with the deteriorating financial performance and the
loss-making phenomenon of financial and non-financial SOEs.53 With
markets on a rise and being continually opened up, irregularities in the
Chinese financial system will undoubtedly damage the growing potential
of China’s economy, erode the state property and cause failure in China’s
attempt to upgrade industry as a whole.54 Facing runaway economics, Zhu
Rongji resorted to a tactic of managed marketization, leading a closed
market in the direction of an open market.55 From this, the framework in
itself did not diminish but instead emphasized the role of the party-state.
By adopting a series of tools of economic intervention and guidance, it
evolved as well as dismantled institutions, allowing private enterprises to
grow alongside SOEs instead of replacing them. The nomenklatura
certainly reflected the evolving character of the party-state in making a
transition towards a socialist market economy.
In China’s transitional economy, the course of transforming economic
institutions is not simply a matter of economic theory. It is about the
combined use of command- and market-tools to clear up rent-seeking
bureaucracies. In this regard, the nomenklatura framework is indicative of
the contradictory desire of the party-state: economic modernization in
combination with continued political control. The differential framework
with regard to SOEs’ personnel management across sectors shows that
the central Party only opens up the economic front of small, mainly
non-financial SOEs, and allows them to respond to marketization. For
SOEs of fundamental and strategic importance to China’s economy, it
maintains tight and continued control.
In tackling China’s runaway economics, the first problem was not of
economics but of politics. The focus of current mainstream literature on
the study of nomenklatura is confined to the scope of Party control and

52. See “Yuanhe chexiao jiu ge weiguan guojiaju (xinwen fenxi),” Renmin ribao, 20
February 2001. These enterprises are listed in the nomenklatura at the corresponding levels.
Interviews in Beijing, middle-level officials, (CPOD), April 2001.
53. “Central Committee bodies to oversee commercial ties in bid to ally corruption worries,
Party strengthens grip on enterprises,” in South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 1
December 1998, p. 8; Ming pao (Hong Kong), 14 December 1998, A11; Ta kung pao (Hong
Kong), 5 and 10 January 2001, p. C8 and C9.
54. For discussion of the irregularities in the Chinese financial system, see X.L. Ding,
“Systemic irregularities and spontaneous property transformation in the Chinese financial
system.” The China Quarterly, No. 163 (September 2000), pp. 655–676.
55. For discussion, see Edward S. Steinfeld, Forging Reform in China, The Fate of
State-Owned Industry, pp. 129–158.
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 719

the extent to which state authority is negotiated and refined. The 1998
nomenklatura is no exception: the Party’s unitary political leadership is
called upon once again to lead China into making a transition towards a
socialist market economy.
Last but not least, the 1998 nomenklatura indicates the continuing
importance that the CCP places on control of personnel management to
maintain its position in the political system. Nevertheless, this authoritat-
ive list was not published in the Ministry of Personnel annual series of
volumes on personnel work, as were the 1990 list and the 1984 notice.56
This indicates the heightened secrecy surrounding the system and pro-
vides evidence that the Party perceives its behind-the-scenes control to be
more sensitive now than before. The increased secrecy surrounding the
nomenklatura runs counter to pressures for increasing transparency that
come from China’s accession to the WTO. Increasing secrecy also runs
counter to the Party’s own professed interest in increased transparency
and open administration (zhengwu gongkai).

Appendix 1: Job Title List of Cadres Centrally Managed by the

Chinese Communist Party, 1998

1. PARTY CENTRAL
Position Unit
Secretary General CCP Central Committee
Members Standing Committee of the CCP
Politburo
Members, alternate members CCP Politburo
Secretaries CCP Secretariat
Members, alternate members CCP Central Committee
Chairman, vice-chairmen, members CCP Central Military Commission
Secretary, deputy secretaries, CCP Central Discipline Inspection
Standing Committee members, Commission
members, Secretary General

2. CENTRAL PARTY BUREAUCRACY

Position
Heads, deputy heads, members
Heads, deputy heads, members
Secretary General, deputy secretaries
general, director, deputy
directors of the general office
Secretary, deputy secretaries,
members, Secretary General,
deputy secretaries general
Director, deputy directors
Unit
CCP Leading Small Groups
CCP Central Commissions
(committees)
Central Financial and Economic
Affairs Small Leading Group
Central Political Science and Law
Commission
Party Central General Office

56. See Zhongzufa, No. 6 (14 July 1984) RGWX, Vol. 7 (1984), pp. 39–41; Zhongzufa, No.
2 (10 May 1990) RGWX, Vol. 13 (1990), pp. 45–53.
720 The China Quarterly
Head, deputy heads
President, vice-presidents,
School Committee members
Director, deputy directors
Director, deputy directors,
Office Affairs Committee members
Director, deputy directors,
Office Affairs Committee members
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members,
secretary of the Disciplinary
Committee
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members,
secretary of the Disciplinary
Committee
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members,
secretary of the Disciplinary
Committee
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members,
secretary of the Disciplinary
Committee
Director, deputy directors, assistant
directors
Director, deputy directors
Director, deputy directors
Director, deputy directors
Director, deputy directors
Director
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members,
head of the Discipline Group
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members,
head of the Discipline Group
Director, deputy directors
Head, deputy heads
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Curator (guanzhang), deputy curators
Director (shezhang),
deputy directors, editor-in-chief,
deputy editors-in-chief,
editorial committee members,
head of the Discipline Group
Editor-in-chief
Party Central Committee departments
Central Party School
Party Central Policy Research Office
Party Central Literature Research Office
Party Central Party History Research
Office
Party Work Committee for Organs
Directly under the Central Committee
Party Work Committee for Central State
Organs
Party Central Financial Work Committee
Party Central Large-scale Enterprise
Committee
Party Central Taiwan Affairs Office
Party Central Office for Overseas
Propaganda
General Office for Party Central Spiritual
Civilization Construction Commission
General Office of Central Foreign
Affairs Small Leading Group
General Office of Central Establishment
Committee
General Office of Central Committee for
Comprehensive Management of Public
Security
CCP Hong Kong Work Committee
CCP Macau Work Committee
Party Central Bureau for Translating the
Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and
Stalin
China Foreign Publication Distribution
Affairs Bureau
Party Core Group of the China Foreign
Publication Distribution Affairs Bureau
Central Institute of Archives
Renmin ribao (People’s Daily)
Renmin ribao (Overseas Edition)
 Cadre Personnel Management in China
Editor-in-chief,
deputy editors-in-chief,
editorial committee members
Editor-in-chief,
deputy editors-in-chief,
editorial committee members
Editor-in-chief,
deputy editors-in-chief,
editorial committee members
Editor-in-Chief,
deputy editors-in-chief,
editorial committee members
Director
3. STATE LEADERS, CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION
Position
President, vice-president
Chairman, vice-chairmen, members
4. NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS (NPC)
Position
Chairman, vice-chairmen, members
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Secretary General, deputy secretaries
general
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Chairmen, vice-chairmen
Chairman, vice-chairmen
Research Office director
(bangongting yanjiushi zhuren)
5. CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE (CPPCC)
Position
Chairman, vice-chairmen,
standing committee members
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Secretary General, deputy secretaries
general
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
6. STATE COUNCIL, BANKS, CORPORATIONS, DIPLOMATS
Position
Premier, vice-premiers, councillors
721
Jingji ribao (Economic Daily)
Qiushi (Seeking Truth) magazine
Guangming ribao (Bright Daily)
China Daily
Keji ribao (Science and Technology
Daily)
Unit
People’s Republic of China
Central Military Commission of the PRC
Unit
Standing Committee of the NPC
Party Core Group (dangzu) of the
Standing Committee of the NPC
Standing Committee of the NPC
Party Core Group of Organs (jiguan
dangzu) under the Standing Committee
of the NPC
Specialized committees of the NPC
Legislative Affairs Commission of the
Standing Committee of the NPC
General Office of the Standing
Committee of the NPC
Unit
National Committee of the CPPCC
Party Core Group of the National
Committee of CPPCC
CPPCC
Party Core Group of Organs under the
CPPCC
Unit
State Council
722 The China Quarterly
Secretary General, deputy secretaries
general
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Ministers (directors), deputy ministers Ministries and Commissions of the State
(deputy directors)
Governor (hangzhang)
Auditor general, deputy auditors
general
Heads, chairmen, presidents
(zhuren, juzhang, yuanzhang,
shezhang, zhuxi), deputy heads,
vice-chairmen, vice-presidents
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members Party core groups or Party committees in
Heads
Directors
Assistant ministries (buzhang zhuli)
assistant governors (hangzhang zhuli))
Director, deputy directors, assistant
directors
Director, deputy directors
Head, deputy heads
Director, deputy directors, assistant
directors
Director, deputy directors
Governors, deputy governors, chairmen, State-owned commercial banks (guoyou
vice-chairmen, presidents, vice-
presidents, general managers, deputy
general managers
Chairmen
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members Party committees in the above
Secretaries
Assistant governors
General managers, deputy general
managers
State Council
Party Core Group of Organs under the
State Council
Council
People’s Bank of China
Auditing administration of the State
Council
Bureaus under the State Council (zhishu
jigou), administrative bodies under the
State Council (banshi jigou), institutes
under the State Council (zhishu shiye
danwei), various state bureaus
managed by ministries and
commissions of the State Council
(buwei guanli de guojiaju)
the above organizations
Discipline inspection committees
(groups) in the above organizations,
where established
Political departments in the above
organizations, where established
[where approved and established]
in the above organizations
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State
Council
Information Office of the State Council
State Bureau of Archives
New China News Agency (NCNA)
(Hong Kong Branch)
NCNA (Macau Branch)
duzi shangye yinhang), strategic banks
(zhengcexing yinhang), Bank of
Communications, People’s Insurance
(Group) Corporation of China
Monitoring committees (jianshihui) in
the above organizations
organizations
Discipline inspection committees in the
above organizations
State Development Bank
State Power Corporation, China National
Nuclear Corporation, China Aviation
Industry Corporation, China Ordnance
Industry Corporation, China State
Shipbuilding Corporation, China
Aerospace Industry Corporation, China
Three Gorges Project Corporation,
State Development Investment
Corporation
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 723

Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members Party core groups in the above

organizations
Heads Discipline inspection groups in the above
organizations
Assistant general managers [where approved and established] in the
above organizations
Directors, deputy director The General Office of Three Gorges
Project Construction Committee of the
State Council
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members Party Core Group of the General Office
of the Three Gorges Project
Construction Committee of the State
Council
Head The Supervision Bureau (jianchaju) of
the General Office of the Three
Gorges Project Construction
Committee of the State Council
Head, deputy heads Immigration Development Bureau of the
Three Gorges Project Construction
Committee of the State Council
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members Party Core Group of the Immigration
Development Bureau of the Three
Gorges Project Construction
Committee of the State Council
Head Discipline Inspection Group of the
Immigration Development Bureau of
the Three Gorges Project Construction
Committee of the State Council
Directors Changjiang River Water Conservation
Commission, Huanghe River Water
Conservation Commission
Secretaries Party core groups in the above
commissions
Head Central People’s Broadcasting Station
Head China International Broadcasting Station
Head China Television Station
Governor of Studies (zongduxue) Ministry of Education
Director State Language and Linguistic Work
Committee
Head State Aerospace Bureau
Director State Nuclear Energy Office
Chief representative for trade talks Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Co-operation
Secretary Party Committee of the China Academy
of Engineering Physics
President China Academy of Engineering Physics
Ambassadors (dashi) China’s embassies abroad
Representative, deputy representatives China’s permanent mission to the United
Nations (UN)
Representatives UN (international) agencies
Senior officials (gaoguan) Pacific Economic Co-operation
Organization
724 The China Quarterly

Executive director (zhixing dongshi) China’s permanent mission to Asian

Development Bank
Chief representative China’s side on the Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group
Chief representative China’s side on the Sino-Portuguese
Joint Liaison Group
Commissioner Office of the Commissioner of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the
HKSAR Government

7. JUDICIARY, PROCURATORATE
Position Unit
President, vice-presidents Supreme People’s Court
Members Judicial Committee of the Supreme
People’s Court
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members Party Core Group of the Supreme
People’s Court
Head Discipline Inspection Group of the
Supreme People’s Court
Director Political Department of the Supreme
People’s Court
Procurator General, Supreme People’s Procuratorate
deputy procurators general
Members Procuratorial Committee of the Supreme
People Procuratorate
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members Party Core Group of the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate
Head Discipline Inspection Group of the
Supreme People’s Procuratorate
Director Political Department of the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate

8. MASS ORGANIZATIONS
Position Unit
Presidents, vice-presidents All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), All-China Federation of
Women (ACFW), China Association
for Science and Technology (CAST)
First secretaries, secretaries, Secretariats of ACFTU, ACFW, CAST
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members Party core groups of ACFTU, ACFW,
CAST
First secretary, secretaries Secretariat of the Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Youth League
Chairmen, vice-chairmen China Federation of Literary and Art
Circles, Chinese Writers’ Association,
All-China Journalists’ Association
Secretaries Secretariats in the above organizations
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members Party core groups in the above
organizations
 Cadre Personnel Management in China
Chairman, vice-chairmen
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Presidents, vice-presidents
Secretaries, deputy secretaries, members
Chairman, vice-chairmen of the board
of directors
Head, deputy heads
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Head
Chairman, vice-chairmen
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Chairman, vice-chairmen
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Chairman of the Presidium, vice-
chairman, chairman, vice-chairmen of
the Executive Committee
Secretary, deputy secretaries, members
Secretary, deputy secretaries
Chairman
9. LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS (PROVINCE-LEVEL AND DEPUTY
PROVINCE-LEVEL)
Position
Secretaries, deputy secretaries,
standing committee members
Secretaries, deputy secretaries
Governors, deputy governors
Chairmen, vice-chairmen
Mayors, deputy mayors
Chairmen, vice-chairmen
725
All-China Federation of Returned
Overseas Chinese (ACFROC)
Party Core Group of the ACFROC
Chinese People’s Association for
Friendship with Foreign Countries,
Chinese Council for the Promotion of
International Trade
Party core groups in the above
organizations
China National Supply and Marketing
Co-operative (CNSMC)
Monitoring Committee of the CNSMC
Party Core Group of the CNSMC
Discipline Inspection Group of the
CNSMC
State Natural Science Foundation
Management Committee (SNSFMC)
Party Core Group of the SNSFMC
Song Chingling Foundation
Party Core Group of the Song Chingling
Foundation
Chinese Federation for the Disabled
Party Core Group of the Chinese
Federation for the Disabled
Party Core Group of the All-China
Federation of Industry and Commerce
National Work Committee for the
Elderly
Unit
Party committees of provinces,
autonomous regions, and centrally
administered cities (Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai, Chongqing)
Party discipline inspection committees of
the provinces, autonomous regions,
and centrally administered cities
Provincial people’s governments
People’s governments of autonomous
regions
People’s governments of centrally
administered cities
Standing committee of people’s
congresses of provinces, autonomous
regions, and centrally administered
cities
726 The China Quarterly
Chairmen, vice-chairmen
Presidents
Chief procurators
Secretaries (deputy province-level)
(fushengji)
Chairmen (fushengji)
Mayors (fushengji)
Chairmen (fushengji)
Commander (chairman, president),
deputy commanders (vice-chairmen,
deputy presidents), first political
commissars, political commissars,
deputy political commissars
10. INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
Positions
Secretaries
Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conferences of provinces, autonomous
regions, and centrally administered
cities
Higher people’s courts of provinces,
autonomous regions, and centrally
administered cities
People’s Procuratorates of provinces,
autonomous regions, and centrally
administered cities
Party committees of deputy
province-level cities [Guangzhou,
Wuhan, Harbin, Shenyang, Chengdu,
Nanjing, Xi’an, Changchun, Jinan,
Hangzhou, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen,
Xiamen, Ningbo]
Chairpersons of the standing committees
of people’s congresses in deputy
province-level cities [see above list of
cities]
People’s governments of deputy
province-level cities [see above list of
cities]
CPPCC of deputy province-level cities
[see above list of cities]
Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corporation (China Xinjiang
Corporation)
Unit
Party committees of Beijing University,
Qinghua University, Renmin
University of China, Beijing Normal
University, Fudan University,
Shanghai Jiaotong University, Xi’an
Jiaotong University, University of
Science and Technology of China,
Beijing University of Medical Science,
China Agricultural University, Beijing
Institute of Technology, Beijing
University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Northwest Engineering
University, Harbin Institute of
Technology, Zhejiang University,
Nanjing University, Sichuan Union
University
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 727

Presidents Beijing University, Qinghua University,

Renmin University of China, Beijing
Normal University, Fudan University,
Shanghai Jiaotong University, Xi’an
Jiaotong University, University of
Science and Technology of China,
Beijing University of Medical Science,
China Agricultural University, Beijing
Institute of Technology, Beijing
University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Northwest Engineering
University, Harbin Institute of
Technology, Zhejiang University,
Nanjing University, Sichuan Union
University

Source:
Zhongzufa [1998] Document No. 11, Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu
xiuding Zhonggong zhongyang guanli de ganbu zhiwu mingchengbiao de tongzhi
(The Notification About Amending the Job Title List of Cadres Centrally Managed by
the CCP Issued by the CCP Central Organization Department), 13 August 1998,
(Internal Document).

Appendix 2: List of Cadre Positions to be Reported to the Chinese Commu-

nist Party Centre, 1998

1. PARTY CENTRAL, LEGISLATURE, JUDICIARY, STATE COUNCIL,

CORPORATIONS, DIPLOMATS, MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Position
Directors, deputy directors
Directors, deputy directors
General secretaries, deputy general
secretaries
General secretaries, deputy secretaries
Bureau-level heads (juzhang, zhuren,
buzhang), deputy bureau-level
heads
Bureau-level heads,
deputy bureau-level heads
Unit
Offices under CCP leading small groups
Offices under CCP central commissions
(committees)
CCP leading small groups, where
approved and established
CCP central commissions (committees),
where approved and established
Various bureaus (offices) of central and
state organs, subordinate organs of the
State Council, offices of the State
Council, institutes directly under the
State Council, and state bureaus
managed by various ministries and
commissions
Various bureaus (offices) of
ministry-level people’s mass
organizations, institutes, and
newspapers whose leading cadres are
listed under and managed by the
Central Committee
728 The China Quarterly
Secretaries, deputy secretaries
Secretaries, deputy secretaries
Secretary General, deputy secretaries
general
Chief engineers, chief economists,
chief accountants, registrars
Deputy secretaries
Deputy directors, and heads and
deputy heads of subordinate
departments
Heads
Bureau-level heads,
deputy bureau-level heads
Heads, deputy heads
Heads, deputy heads
Chief judges, deputy chief judges
Deputy directors, and heads and
deputy heads of subordinate
departments
Heads (yuanzhang), deputy heads
Party committees of organs in the
bureau-level offices of central and
state organs, subordinate organs of the
State Council, offices of the State
Council, institutes directly under the
the State Council, and state bureaus
managed by various ministries and
commissions
Party committees of organs of the
bureau-level offices in the
ministry-level people’s mass
organizations, institutes, and
newspapers, whose leading cadres are
listed under and managed by the
Central Committee
[where approved and established] in the
bureau-level offices of Party Central
and state organs, subordinate organs of
the State Council, offices of the State
Council, institutes directly under the
State Council, state bureaus managed
by various ministries and
commissions, the bureau-level
offices of ministry-level people’s mass
organizations, institutes, and
newspapers, whose leading cadres are
listed under and managed by the
Central Committee
[where approved and established] in the
above agencies
Disciplinary work committees (groups)
in the above agencies, where
established
Political departments in the above
agencies, where approved and
established
Bureau-level offices of deputy
ministry-level organs in the above
agencies
Personnel bureaus of deputy
ministry-level organs in the above
agencies
Various bureaus (offices) of organs of
the Standing Committee of the NPC
Various bureaus (offices) of organs of
the CPPCC
Divisions of the Supreme People’s Court
Political departments of divisions of the
Supreme People’s Court
Specialized courts (zhuanmen fayuan)
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 729

Directors (tingzhang), deputy directors Offices of the Supreme People’s

Procuratorate
Deputy directors, and heads and Political departments of offices of the
deputy heads of subordinate Supreme People’s Procuratorate
departments
Procurators General, deputy procurators Specialized Procuratorial Offices
general (zhuanmen jianchayuan)
Secretary General, deputy secretaries CCP Hong Kong Work Committee
general
Deputy heads Discipline Inspection Group of the CCP
Hong Kong Work Committee
Heads, deputy heads Various bureaus (offices) of the CCP
Hong Kong Work Committee
Secretary General CCP Macau Work Committee
Heads Various bureaus (offices) of the CCP
Macau Work Committee
Secretary Party Committee of the Graduate School
of the China Academy of Social
Sciences
President Graduate School of the China Academy
of Social Sciences
Secretaries Party committee of the research institutes
of the China Academy of Social
Sciences institutes
Heads Research institutes of the China
Academy of Social Sciences
Secretary Party Committee of the
Macro-Economics Research
Institute of the State Development
Planning Commission
President The Macro-Economics Research Institute
of the State Development Planning
Commission
Deputy editors-in-chief Renmin ribao (overseas edition)
Directors, deputy directors, editors-in- Renmin ribao (Huadong branches),
chief, deputy editors-in-chief, (Huanan branches)
general managers, deputy general
managers
Deputy directors, editor-in-chief, Keji ribao (Science and Technology
deputy editors-in-chief, editorial Daily)
committee members
Directors, deputy directors New China News Agency (NCNA)
(various overseas headquarters)
Directors NCNA branches of provinces,
autonomous regions, and centrally
administered cities
Secretary General, deputy secretaries NCNA, Hong Kong Branch
general, heads, deputy heads of
subordinate departments
Secretary General, heads NCNA, Macau Branch
of subordinate departments
Heads, deputy heads Party committees of People’s Bank of
730 The China Quarterly

of subordinate departments China, China Securities Regulatory

Commission, State Development Bank
Deputy secretaries Discipline inspection committees of
People’s Bank of China, China
Securities Regulatory Commission,
State Development Bank
Heads, deputy heads Branch offices of the State Development
Bank
Heads, deputy heads of subordinate State-owned commercial banks, strategic
departments, deputy heads of banks, Bank of Communications,
personnel departments People’s Insurance (Group)
Corporation
Heads of subordinate departments Party committees in the above agencies
Deputy secretaries Discipline inspection committees in the
above agencies
Assistant director (assistant general [where approved and established] in the
managers) above agencies
Director Bank of China (Hong Kong and Macau
Management Office)
Director China Investment Bank
Secretary Party committee of the China Investment
Bank
Chairman, general manager China Pacific Insurance Corporation
Secretary Party Committee of the China Pacific
Insurance Corporation
Heads, deputy heads State Power Corporation, China National
of subordinate departments Nuclear Corporation, China Aviation
Industry Corporation, China Ordnance
Industry Corporation, China State
Shipbuilding Corporation, China
Aerospace Industry Corporation
Heads of subordinate departments, and China Three Gorges Project
deputy heads of personnel Development Corporation, State
departments Development Investment
Corporation
Deputy directors Changjiang River Water Conservation
Commission, Huanghe River Water
Conservation Commission
Deputy secretaries, members Party core groups in the above agencies
Heads (zongzhanzhang), political Frontier inspection stations of the
commissars Ministry of Public Security
Director General Administration of Customs,
Guangdong Branch
Secretary Party Core Group of the General
Administration of Customs,
Guangdong Branch
Heads (guanzhang) Subordinate offices (stations) directly
under the General Administration of
Customs
Secretaries Party core groups of subordinate offices
(stations) directly under the General
Administration of Customs

Head
Secretary
Director-general
Secretary
Secretaries, deputy secretaries
Envoys (gongshi), counsellors (canzan), China’s embassies abroad
Consul generals (zonglingshi)
(with ambassador title)
Deputy representatives
Deputy executive directors
Deputy commissioners
Presidents, vice-presidents
Secretaries, deputy secretaries
Chairmen, vice-chairmen
Heads
Secretaries
Heads, deputy heads
Heads, deputy heads
2. LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS
Position
Secretaries General, deputy secretaries
general, department heads, deputy
department heads, bureau (office)
heads, deputy bureau (office) heads
Presidents, vice-presidents
Cadre Personnel Management in China 731
Maritime Bureau of the People’s
Republic of China
Party Committee of the Maritime Bureau
of the People’s Republic of China
China Posts and Telecommunications
Bureau
Party Committee of China Post and
Telecommunications Bureau
Party committees in China’s embassies
(group, division), abroad
China’s consulates general abroad
UN (international) agencies
China’s permanent mission to Asian
Development Bank
Office of the Commissioner of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the
HKSAR Government
Trade Union Movements College
(gongyun xueyuan), Youth Political
College (qingnian zhengzhi xueyuan),
China Women College (Zhongguo
nüzi xueyuan), State Accounting
College (guojia kuaiji xueyuan)
Party committees in the above
organizations
Trade unions of various industries of the
ACFTU
Various Chinese literary and arts circles
associations
Party core groups of various Chinese
literary and arts circles associations
Corresponding (duikou) associations of
the Chinese People’s Association of
Friendship with Foreign Countries
All-China Federation of Taiwan
Compatriots, Chinese People’s Institute
of Foreign Affairs, China Association
for International Understanding,
Chinese People’s Association for
Peace and Disarmament.
Unit
Party committees of provinces,
autonomous regions, and centrally
administered cities
Party schools of provinces, autonomous
regions, and centrally administered
cities
732 The China Quarterly

Editors-in-chief, Newspapers of Party organs of

provinces, autonomous regions, and
centrally administered cities
Secretaries General, deputy secretaries People’s governments of provinces,
general, commission heads, bureau autonomous regions, and centrally
(ting, ju) heads administered cities
Vice-presidents Higher People’s Courts of provinces,
autonomous regions, and administered
cities
Deputy chief procurators People’s Procuratorates of provinces,
autonomous regions, and administered
cities
Chairmen Provincial branches of the ACFTU
Secretaries Provincial branches of the Communist
Youth League
Chairmen Provincial branches of the Women’s
Federation
Deputy secretaries, standing committee, Party committees of deputy province-
members level cities [Guangzhou, Wuhan,
Harbin, Shenyang, Chengdu,
Nanjing, Xi’an, Changchun, Jinan,
Hangzhou, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen,
Xiamen, Ningbo]
Heads Organization Departments of deputy
province-level cities [see above list of
cities]
Secretaries Discipline committees of deputy
province-level cities [see above list of
cities]
Vice-chairmen Standing committee of the NPC of
deputy province-level cities [see above
list of cities]
Deputy mayors People’s governments of deputy
province-level cities [see above list of
cities]
Vice-chairmen CPPCC of deputy province-level cities
[see above list of cities]
Presidents Higher People’s Courts of deputy
province-level cities [see above list of
cities]
Chief procurators People’s Procuratorates of deputy
province-level cities [see above list of
cities]
Secretaries Party committees of prefectures (di),
cities (shi), districts (zhou) and
banners (meng)
Commissioners (zhuanyuan) People’s governments of prefectures
Heads People’s governments of districts
Mayors People’s governments of cities
Chiefs (mengzhang) People’s government of banners
Secretaries Party committees of districts directly
 Cadre Personnel Management in China 733

administered by Beijing, Tianjin,

Shanghai, Chongqing
Heads People’s governments of districts directly
administered by Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai, Chongqing

3. HIGHER LEARNING INSTITUTIONS, RADIO AND TELEVSION

STATIONS, ENTERPRISES, RESEACH, CULTURAL AND HEALTH
INSTITUTES
Position Unit
Deputy secretaries Party committees of Beijing University,
Qinghua University, Renmin
University of China, Beijing Normal
University, Fudan University,
Shanghai Jiaotong University, Xi’an
Jiaotong University, University of
Science and Technology of China,
Beijing University of Medical Science,
China Agricultural University, Beijing
Institute of Technology, Beijing
University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Northwest Engineering
University, Harbin Institute of
Technology, Zhejiang University,
Nanjing University, Sichuan Union
University
Vice-presidents Beijing University, Qinghua University,
Renmin University of China, Beijing
Normal University, Fudan University,
Shanghai Jiaotong University, Xi’an
Jiaotong University, University of
Science and Technology of China,
Beijing University of Medical Science,
China Agricultural University,
Beijing Institute of Technology,
Beijing University of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Northwest Engineering
University, Harbin Institute of
Technology, Zhejiang University,
Nanjing University, Sichuan Union
University
Deputy heads Central People’s Broadcasting Station
Deputy heads China International Broadcasting Station
Deputy heads China Television Station
Deputy secretaries Party Committee of the China Academy
of Engineering Physics (CAEP)
Vice-presidents CAEP
Chief engineers CAEP
Chairman Science and Technology Committee of
the CAEP
734 The China Quarterly

Party committee secretaries and heads [presidents, institute heads, chairmen,

directors]
For all the following units

Research Institutes
Coal Science Research Industry
Beijing Institute of Non-ferrous Metals Research
China Agricultural Science Institute
China Forestry Science Research Institute
Steel Research Institute
Geological Sciences Research Institute
Railroad Scientific Research Institute
China Research Institute of Atomic Energy Science
China Warships Research Institute
China Research Institute of Launching Technology
China Research Institute of Space Technology
Chinese Academy of Medicine

Corporations
China Changfeng Science and Technology Industry Corporation
China Haiying Science and Technology Industry Corporation

Culture Institutes
Imperial Palace Museum
Museum of Chinese History
Museum of Chinese Revolution
Beijing National Library

Health Institute
Beijing Hospital

Source:
Zhongzufa [1998] Document No. 11, Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu xiuding
Zhonggong zhongyang guanli de ganbu zhiwu mingchengbiao de tongzhi (The Notification
About Amending the Job Title List of Cadres Centrally Managed by the CCP Issued by the
CCP Central Organization Department), 13 August 1998 (Internal Document).