Alejandrino vs.
Quezon [September 11, 1924]
Original Action in the Supreme Court
Facts:
 The Petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and injunction is Jose
Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the 12th
senatorial district.
 February 5, 1924 – A resolution was adopted by the Philippine Senate depriving
senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his
office for the period of one year from January1, 1924 having been declared
guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate
for having treacherously assaulted Senator de Vera on the occasion of certain
phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the
credential of Mr. Alejandrino.
Issues:
1. WON a Mandamus and injunction can be issued to the respondent to recognize
the rights of the petitioner to exercise his rights as a Senator
2. WON the Senate can suspend its members for a period of one year.
Ratio
1. No
 General Rule: the writ of mandamus will not lie from one branch of the
government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other.
 Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members or its
officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their
character which therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over
which they have exclusive control.
2. No
 Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General to appoint 2 senators and 9
representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Legislature.
These senators and representatives hold office until removed by the
Governor-General. They may not be removed by the legislature.
 The Senate and House of Representatives is granted the power to punish
its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of 2/3,
expel an elective member.
 The Constitution has purposely withheld from the Senate and House of
Representatives and the Governor-General the power to suspend an
appointive member.
 Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of
the House without depriving the constituency of representation.
 Expulsion when permissible vindicates the honor of the legislative body
while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew.
 Suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded any means by which to fill the vacancy. By
suspension, the seat remains filed but the occupant is silenced.
 Suspension for 1 year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal
Note: Writ of mandamus cannot be issued because the SC does not possess the
power of coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular action.
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan
CASCO Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. GIMENEZ (February 28, 1963)
FACTS:
• Petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for
refund of petitioner Casco.
• Pursuant to RA 2609 “Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law”, the Central Bank of
Phil. (CBP) issued on July 1, 1959 Circular No. 95 fixing a uniform margin fee of
25% on foreign exchange transactions.
• Many times between Nov & Dec 1959, Casco, (which is engaged in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber & veneer by
plywood & hardwood producers) – bought foreign exchange for the importation
of urea and formaldehyde & paid the margin fee of P33, 765.42.
• In May 1960, Casco made another purchase of foreign exchange & paid
P6,345.72 as margin fee.
• Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42,
relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board (MB) of said Bank
dated Nov. 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Petitioner made a similar request for
refund of the sum of P6,345.72.
• Although CBP issued the margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts,
the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers
upon the ground that the exemption granted by the MB for the separate
importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of
Sec. 2, par. XVIII of RA 2609.
• On appeal by petitioner, Auditor General affirmed said action of the Auditor of
the Bank. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON “urea” and “formaldehyde” are exempt by law from the payment of
the aforesaid margin fee.
HELD: NO, decision appealed from is affirmed.
RATIO:
• Sec. 2, RA 2609: “The margin established by the MB pursuant to the provision
of Sec.1 hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the
importation of the ff: ….XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood & hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.”
• PETITIONER: “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea” and
“formaldehyde”
• However, whereas, urea & formaldehyde are the principal raw materials in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the Commissioner of Nat’l Institute of
Science & Tech said: “Urea formaldehyde…is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde…”

• Hence, “urea formaldehyde” is a finished product, distinct and different from
“urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin “urea formaldehyde”
• THE IMPORTANT PART: Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, & that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” &
formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea
formaldehyde”, not the latter as a finished product, citing statements made on
the Senate floor during the consideration of the bill therein.
• SC: Said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the
Senate, much less do they indicate the intent of the House of Representatives.
• It is well settled that the enrolled bill – which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” instead of “urea” and “formaldehyde” – is conclusive upon the
courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress & approved by
the President.
• If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified
by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive – on which the Court
cannot speculate w/o jeopardizing separation of powers – the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee vs. JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant
[Aug. 12, 1916]
*Facts are not really important. Focus more on the issues especially issue #2. 
Facts:
• Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons & Jacinto Lasarte were charged w/ crime of illegal
importation of opium (Act No. 2381). Lasarte had not yet been arrested. Pons &
Lasarte were both found guilty by RTC.
• April 5 or 6, 1915
1. Spanish mail steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila fr. Spain. Among its
cargo were 25 barrels manifested as wine consigned to/for Lasarte.
2. Beliso, a wine merchant, delivered the shipper’s invoice & bill of landing for
the shipment to customs broker Gregorio Cansipit. These documents were
endorsed & signed by Lasarte ordering shipment’s delivery to Beliso.
3. Barrels were delivered to Beliso’s warehouse in 203 Calle San Anton,
Manila. Beliso signed paper acknowledging delivery.
• Customs officials became suspicious because they have noticed that “wine”
shipments have been consigned to persons who were not listed as merchants.
They doubted nature of merchandise too. So they investigated.
• April 10, 1915: they traced 25 barrels to Beliso’s warehouse. Their investigation
revealed that:
1. Delivery of barrels began on morning of April 9 at around 11 am loaded on
bull carts.
2. Before merchandise arrived, Pons went to the warehouse & spoke w/Beliso.
Pons left & afterwards barrel arrived & unloaded in Beliso’s warehouse.
3. Cornelius Sese: ordered by Beliso to deliver 5 carefully selected barrels to
Pons at 144 Calle Gen. Solano. He did as ordered.
4. Customs agents arrived on Apr 10 before office was opened & they waited
for Beliso. They arrested Sese who was already there. They separated the
barrels from the last shipment from other merchandise in the warehouse.
They learned that only 20 of the 25 were there & they learned the
aforementioned facts from Sese.
5. Agents + Sese went to Pons’ place. They found 5 empty barrels. They
found empty tins, baskets of lime & 77 TINS OF OPIUM IN ONE OF THESE
BASKETS. No one was home then though they found clothing w/initials JP.
They later on learned that Mariano Limjap owned house, rented by F.C.
Garcia. Lease was signed FC Garcia by Pons.
6. They returned to Beliso’s house & selected 3 barrels & ordered their return
to customhouse. Upon opening, they found large tins in each barrel
containing 75 small tins of opium. Large tins were similar to those found n
Pons’ place.
7. Beliso was arrested & confessed participation in the smuggling of opium
however, he claimed that those found w/Pons represented the entire
importation.
8. Pons was likewise arrested. He showed officers how to open barrels &
pointed to marker at the end of barrel w/c indicated that such contained
opium. He further stated that he delivered 250 tins of opium from recent
shipment to a Chinaman on April 10 at 7:30 am. He admitted that he &
Beliso had been partners in several opium transactions. When asked re
ownership of the house in Gen. Solano, he claimed that he leased it, at
Beliso’s suggestion, to handle prohibited drug. When asked re FC Garcia,
Pons became a schizo: 1) Garcia was a tobacco merchant traveling bet.
Isabela & Cagayan. 2) Garcia’s a fictitious person. 3) Garcia is a wine
merchant residing in Spain who wrote him a letter asking him to rent a
house & to retain it until he arrived in RP. Letter arrived along w/recent
shipment w/c he destroyed for fear that it would compromise him. He
further claimed that the letter informed him that opium was coming in
barrels of wine sent to Beliso by Lasarte & that is the reason why he
wanted to get barrels of wine fr Beliso (ang coherent niya noh?).
• Pons’ counsel appealed RTC decision invoking Act No. 2381, claiming that under
which Pons must be punished if found guilty. He claims that such act is null &
void because it was passed after the allowable day of legislative session of Phil
Legislature of 1914. Supposed last day was Feb. 28 (mandated by Gov Gen’s
proclamation) & according to counsel, session was stopped at midnight & act
was passed after midnight or March 1, 1914. However, legislative journal
indicates that statute was passed before midnight.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON court can take judicial notice of the journals in this case wherein
there is a dispute re last day of Legislature’s special session w/c
determines WON Act No. 2381 became a law. - YES
• Act No. 1679: Sec. Of Commission (Phil Legislature later on) shall perform
duties required of the Recorder of the Commission.
• Rules 15 & 16, Legislative Procedure of Phil Commission (PC): duty of Sec. To
keep a correct journal of proceedings of PC. Record proceedings briefly &
accurately.
• P.793, Vol. 7, Commission Journal for 3rd Phil Legislature (PL) sessions: Journal
for Sat., Feb. 28, 1914 approved. Adjournment sine die (w/o assigning day for
further mtg or hearing) of Commission as a Chamber of PL at the hour of
midnight on motion of Commissioner Palma.
• Above-mentioned journal was published in accordance w/ Act of Congress
approved July 1, 1902, sec. 7 of w/c orders publication of journal.
• Sec. 275 of Code of Civ. Procedure: official acts of exec, legis, & judic of US &
PI shall be judicially recognized by the court w/o introduction of proof. Court
may receive evidence when it shall find necessary for its own information &
may resort for its aid to appropriate books, documents or evidence.
• Sec. 313, amended by Sec. 1 Act No. 2210, Code of Civ Procedure: official
documents may be proved as (2) proceedings of PC/any legis body or of
Congress by journals of those bodies or by published statutes/resolutions or by
copies certified by clerk/sec or printed by their order. Provided that copies
signed by presiding officers & sec of said bodies will be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Act & due enactment thereof.
• US case State ex rel Herron vs. Smith: journals may be noticed by courts in
determining the ques whether a particular bill became a law or not.
• 1914 journals are not ambiguous or contradictory. PL was adjourned on
midnight of Feb. 28, 1914, sine die.
2. WON courts can look beyond the journal to determine the actual date of
adjournment. - NO
• Evidence: that w/c proves/disproves any matter in ques or to influence the
belief respecting it.
• Conclusive evidence: establishes the fact as in the instance of conclusive
presumptions.
• In the case at bar, two opposing evidence are presented in order to prove the
enactment of Act No. 2381. Pons’ counsel relies on mere memory/recollection
of witnesses while on the other hand, legislative journals are presented, w/c are
act of the Gov’t or sovereign itself.
• Legislative journals are as impt as those of the judiciary. Inquiring into their
veracity even if they are clear & explicit would 1) violate the spirit & letter of
the organic laws w/c brought Phil gov’t into existence, 2) invade a coordinate &
independent dept of gov’t and 3) interfere w/legitimate powers & functions of
the legislature.
• If Pons’ counsel is correct, resultant evil might be slight compared to that of
altering the probative force & charac of legislative records & thereby making
proof of legislative action depend on uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by
death/absence & so imperfect on account of treachery of memory. Verity &
unimpeachability of legislative records have been established centuries ago in
consideration of pub policy. If we take that away for 1 purpose, it must be
taken away for all & evidence of laws of state must rest upon a foundation less
certain & durable than that afforded by law to many contracts bet priv
individuals concerning comparatively trifling matters (Capito vs. Topping).
• No case has shown that a court went beyond proceedings recorded in journals
to determine whether a law has been adopted. Imperative reasons of pub policy
require that the authenticity of laws should rest upon pub memorials of the
most permanent charac. Public – all are required to conform to them.
Permanent – rt acquired today upon faith of what has been declared to be law
shall not be destroyed tomorrow or at some remote period of time by facts
resting only in memory of individuals. (State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith)
• US jurisprudence are applicable, there being no RP jurisprudence on this matter
& Phil Consti is modeled after US Federal gov’t & various states. Thus, journal
records w/c provide that legislature adjourned at midnight on Feb. 28, 1914 is
respected.
(Main idea is that proof of legislative proceedings such as the enactment of laws
should be based on recorded materials w/c come from the legislative body itself,
duly signed/authenticated/certified by the officer in-charge of doing so. We cannot
rely on testimonies of other people based merely on memory. This is in accordance
w/public policy.)
Held: Act No. 2381 is valid. RTC decision affirmed.
Astorga vs. Villegas [April 30, 1974]
Original Action in the Supreme Court. Mandamus, injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary mandatory prohibitory injunction.
Facts:
 House Bull No. 9266 which was filed in the House of Representatives passed on
3rd reading without amendments
 It was sent to the Senate for concurrence and it was referred to the appropriate
Senate Committee, which recommended approval with a minor amendment
recommended by Senator Roxas. (instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-
Mayor in case of the latter’s incapacity to act as Mayor.)
 When the bill was discussed on the Senate Floor, substantial amendments to
Section 1 was introduced by Senator Tolentino, which amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate.
 May 21, 1954 – Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that the House Bill had been passed by the Senate by the
Senate with amendments. Attached was a certification of the amendment,
which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas, and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.
 House of Representatives signified their approval.
 The printed copies were then certified and attested to by the Secretaries of
Senate and House of representatives and the Senate President
 The bill with the Roxas amendments were signed by the president of the
Philippines and it was subsequently named RA 4065
 It was later made public by Senator Tolentino that the enrolled copy of HB 9266
signed into law by the President was a wrong version of the bill actually passed
by the Senate and approved on the Senate Floor.
 Senate President admitted the mistake in a letter to the President. As a result,
the president sent a message to the presiding officer of both houses that he
was officially withdrawing his signature from HB 9266
 Mayor of Manila issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions of RA
4605. He also issued an order recalling 5 members of the city police who had
been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under the authority of RA 4065.
 Vice Mayor Astorga filed this petition with the court.
 Respondents contends that RAA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body
and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
Issue:
1. WON the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of
a bill’s due enactment.
2. WON RA 4065 can be considered as valid in the absence of the attestation
required
Held
1. No
 Senate President declared that his signature on the bill to be invalid and
issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature
meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
 This declaration should be accorded greater respect than the attestation
that it invalidated
 Certification that was made by the presiding officer is merely a mode of
authentication
 The essential thing is the approval of congress and not the signature of the
presiding officers.
 Function of attestation is not approval because a bill is considered
approved after it has passed both houses.
 Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officer should sign
the bill before it is submitted to the president.
 Rationale of the enrolled bill theory – the signing by the speaker of the
House of Representatives and by the president of the Senate, in open
session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses,
through their presiding officers, to the president, that a bill, thus attested,
has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him.
(Field vs, Clark)
 Enrolled bill theory – based mainly on the respect due to coequal and
independent departments which requires the judicial department to accept
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticate in the manner stated.
2. No
 Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but he
argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting that it
to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation
at all but would not affect the validity of the statute.
 The argument of the petitioner would limit the court’s inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon
the validity of the statute
 Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to
determine within the bill had been duly enacted? In such case, the entry in
the journal should be consulted.
 The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the president and signed by him.
 Bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
Enrique Morales v. Abelardo Subido,
as Commissioner of Civil Service
Motion for Reconsideration of SC decision (1969)
FACTS:
Petitioner prays for judicial review in the act of amending of House Bill 6951.
The substitute bill of Sec 10 of House Bill 6951 reads:
“No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he
holds a bachelor’s degree and has served either in the AFP or NBI or
police dept of any city and has held the rank of capt or its equivalent
for at least 3 yrs OR any high school graduate who has served the
police dept of a city for at least 8 yrs w/ the rank of capt or higher.”
At the order of Sen Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase “has served as officer in the
Armed Forces” was inserted for clarity so the last part of the provision was read as:
“…OR any high school graduate who has served the police dept of a city
or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 yrs w/ the
rank of capt or higher.”
Petitioner insists that this version was the intended amendment that was approved
by the Senate on the 3rd hearing and when the bill emerged from the conference
committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase
“or has served as chief of police w/ exemplary record.” To support his contention,
petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the diff drafts of House Bill 6951.
Acdg to the page proofs of the bill, the ff provision appears:
“No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless
he holds a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either the AFP or has served as chief of
police w/ exemplary record or the NBI or the police dept of any
city and has held the rank of capt or its equivalent for at least 3
yrs OR any high school graduate who has served the police dept
of a city or has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least
8 yrs w/ the rank of capt or higher.”
However, he contends that this was changed only at the insistence of the House Bill
division1 and substitute bill of Sec 10 of Police Act of 1966 in its final form now
reads:
Sec 10. Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency.
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds
a bachelor’s degree from a recognized institution of learning and has
served either the AFP or has served as chief of police w/ exemplary record
or the NBI or the police dept of any city and has held the rank of capt or
its equivalent for at least 3 yrs OR any high school graduate who has
served as officer of the Armed Forces for at least 8 yrs w/ the rank of capt
or higher.”
It appears that the line “has served the police dept of a city” has been deleted or
omitted, whether deliberately or unintentionally, in the qualifications of high school
graduates. Petitioner aims to show that such change was made not at any stage of
the legislative proceedings but only in the course of the engrossment of the bill, i.e.
in the proofreading stage. He further contends that such change was made not by
Congress but only by an employee thereof and that a rewriting was made only to
suit some stylistic preference and it in result, altered the meaning of the provision.
It is for this reason that the petition seeks the judiciary to search into the matter.
ISSUE: WON judiciary may/should look into the petition
HELD: No. MFR denied.
1
Petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a memoramdum w/c acdg to him was signed by an employee in the Senate bill
division.
As per the enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the Phil Pres, it
shows that Sec 10 is exactly as it is in the statue as officially published in slip form
by the Bureau of Printing. The judiciary, as it is not part of its function, cannot go
behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened.
The respect due to the other branches of the govt demands that judiciary acts upon
the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official
acts of their respective depts. Otherwise, it would cast in the unenviable and
unwanted role of a sleuth (detective) trying to determine what actually did happen
in the labyrinth of law-making, w/ consequent impairment of the integrity of the
legislative process. This is a matter worthy of the attention not of an Oliver Wendell
Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes.
The investigation w/c the petitioner would like SC to make can be better done in
Congress. The remedy in case of mistake in printing of bills is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Moreover, in all cases, the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. The Constitution
expressly requires what matters must be entered on the journal of each house.
However, with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the
journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.
NOTES: US SC held that the signing by the Speaker of the House and by the Sen
Pres of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the 2 houses that such bill has
passed Congress. And when the bill is thus signed by the Pres and deposited in the
archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. (Marshall Field & Co v. Clark)
ABBAS v. SET
166 SCRA 651 (1988)
Facts:
 Oct. 9, 1987 – petitioners filed before the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal
an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators elect on May 11, 1987
 Composition of respondent Tribunal:
o 3 Justices of the SC: Yap, Narvasa and Guitierrez, Jr.
o 6 senators: Estrada, Gonzales, Guingona, Lina, Tamano, and Ziga
 Senator Saguisag, respondent in election contest case, filed a Petition and
supplemental Petition to Recuse Senators-members of the tribunal on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
respondents.
 Nov. 17, 1987 – petitioners, except Estrada who affiliated with the Liberal
Party and thus replaced by Enrile, filed with SET a motion for disqualification or
inhibition of the Senators-members of the SET from the hearing and resolution
of the election contest
 Senator Paterno, another respondent, filed his comment on both petition to
recuse and motion for disqualification or inhibition.
 Memoranda on the subject were filed and oral arguments were heard by SET
and SET issued a Resolution (now complained of) denying both motions to
recuse and to disqualify.
 The petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair
play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought
and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation of
the questioned resolution does not rule out the solution they are proposing,
which is basically to amend Sec. 24 of SET’s rules of procedure which required
the concurrence of 5 members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever
nature.
 The proposed amendment shall stipulate that where more than 4 members are
disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less
than 3, including 1 justice, and may adopt resolutions by majority vote with
no abstentations.
 In the case at bar, such amendment would leave the resolution of the contest
to the only 3 members who would remain, all Justices of the Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
Issue: WON proposed amendment by petitioners may be allowed
Held: NO. Petition for certiorari dismissed.
 The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and
intent of the Constitution which created a SET and ordains its composition and
defines its jurisdiction and powers (Art. VI, Sec, 17)
 By providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices and members of the
senate, the Constitution intended that both “judicial” and “legislative”
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualification of Senators.
 It is more clearly signaled by the fact that the proportion of the senators to
justices in the prescribed membership is 2-1.
 The proposed amendment precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in
the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the
same objections to the substitute’s competence, the proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no other
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if the entire
membership of the Senators shall not participate.
 The framers of the Consti could NOT have been unaware of the possibility of an
election contest that would involve all 24 Senators-elect six of whom inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon, especially in 1992 when once more, but for
the last time, all 24 seats in the senate are at stake.
 YET! The Constitution provides no scheme for settling such situation or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may
be sought. Litigants in such situation must simply place their trust and hope of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the members of the Tribunal.
 However, every member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of the case where he sincerely feels that his
personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective judgment
The Court is merely saying that, in light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such, absent its entire membership of senators and that no
amendment of it rules can confer to the three justices members alone the power of
valid adjudication of a senatorial election content.
Bondoc vs. Pineda
September 26, 1991
Introduction (of ponente Grino-Aquino, J)
-Over a century ago, the SC of the US hesitated to embark upon a legal
investigation of the acts of the other branches of the government finding it
“peculiarly irksome as well as delicate” (Marbury v. Madison).
-In the past, the SC, head of the third and weakest branch of government was too
willing to void political confrontations by succumbing to the political question
doctrine (defined in Aguino v. Ponce Enrile, p. 795).
-Duty of the Courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action especially involving private rights was recognized. Responsibility of
courts ascertain the two coordinate branches adhered to the mandate of the
fundamental law under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This does not
mean however that the courts are superior to the President and the legislature.
Facts:
-On May 11, 1987, during the local and congressional elections, Marciano Pineda of
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of the
Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival candidates for Representative of the Fourth
District of the Province of Pampanga. Canvass of votes by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Pampanga that Pineda (31,700) had a margin of 3,300 votes over
Bondoc (28,400).
-On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET Case. No. 25)
which is composed of nine members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme
Court and the remaining six are members of the HR chose on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987
Constitution). The members of the HRET can be seen in p. 797.
-On October 1990, a decision was reached where Bondoc won over Pineda by a
margin of 23 votes. LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on an appreciation and
recount of the ballots cast in some precincts which delayed the finalization of the
decision for 4 months. However, in the re-examination and re-appreciation,
Bondoc’s lead over Pineda increased to 107.
-On March 4, 1991, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. because of candor and
honesty, revealed to Congresman Jose Conjuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, the
final tally in the Bondoc case and that he voted for Bondoc, member of the NP,
“consistent with truth and justice and self-respect” and to honor a “gentlemen’s
agreement” among the members of the HRET that they would “abide by the result
of the appreciation of the contested ballot.”
-On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision in HRET
Case No. 25.
-On March 13, 1991, before the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Cojuangco
informed Camasura by letter that the LDP Davao del Sur Chapter expelled him and
Congressman Benjamin Bautista for helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
“Danding” Cojuangco and for “a complete betrayal of the cause and objectives, and
loyalty to LDP.” Cong. Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon Mitra about the ouster of
the two congressmen from the LDP.
-On March 4, 1991 the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Ameurfina M.
Herrera was informed through a letter from the Office of the Sec. Gen. of the HR
that the HR during its plenary session on March 13, 1991 decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Camasura to the HRET on the basis of the
letter from the LDP (p. 799).
-Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano informed the Chief Justice and Associate
Justices of the SC of the “distressing development” and asked that they be relieved
from their assignment in the HRET. They wrote in the letter (pp. 800-801) that the
decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote in HRET Case. No. 25 may be
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by Pineda which would have been
defeated. Justices agree with the “conscience vote” of Camasura. They find it
difficult to continue their membership in the Tribunal when it is clear the unseating
of Pineda is being prevented at all cost thereby compromising the constitutional
function of the Tribunal. Justices suggested a return to the composition of the
Tribunal in the 1935 Constitution or the switch of jurisdiction between the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal – each
Tribunal sitting as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of the members of the other body.
-On March 13, 1991, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. Tribunal reasoned that without
Camasura’s vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as required by
Sec. 24 of the Rules of the Tribunal to be valid. The three justices and
congressmen members of the tribunal also manifested their intention to resign in
the Resolution (p. 802).
-On March 19, 1991, the Court resolved to direct the Justices to return to their
duties. Court noted that the term of office of every member of the Tribunal should
be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not be
legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or
removal for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
-On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by
Bondoc against Representatives Pineda, Palacol, Camasura or any other appointed
vice representative of Camasura praying, among others, to annul the decision of the
HR to withdraw the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Camasura to the
HRET (p. 803).
-Pineda, contending for the dismissal of the petition, claims that Congress is the
sole authority that nominates and elects from its
members; those who sit in the HRET upon the recommendation of the political
parties has the sole power to remove any of them; that the Tribunal member’s term
of office in not co-extensive with his legislative term; the expulsion of Camasura is a
“purely a party affair” of the LDP”; that the membership in the HRET is a purely
political question beyond the reach of judicial review.
Issues:
(1) WON the HR is empowered by the Constitution to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the HRET by reorganizing the
representation in the tribunal of the majority party.
-NO. Under Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, the composition of
specifies the power of the Electoral Tribunal that is the “sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.” But
to be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be
independent. Its jurisdiction must not be shared with the Legislature nor with the
Courts. Section 17 is taken from Section 11, Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution
except that the allocation of the representatives in the latter follows equal
representation from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the
Legislature while former uses proportional representation from all the political
parties. Both sections of the Constitutions uses the word “SOLE” which scores
exclusive jurisdiction of the HET. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. The
purpose of the tribunal is to provide an independent and impartial tribunal devoid of
partisan consideration. Angara v. Electoral Tribunal stated that the Electoral Tribunal
is a body separate from and independent of the legislature and though not a power
in the tripartite scheme of government. Exchanges between Commissioners
Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission attests to the
preservation of the independence of the electoral tribunal referring to the cases of
Vera v. Avelino, Angara v. Electoral Commission and Sanidad v. Vera (pp. 808-810).
Under the 1935 Constitution, it was impossible for any political party to
control the voting in the tribunal. The 1973 Constitution did not provide an
electoral tribunal in the BP.
Action of the HR is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate in Sec.
17, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which created the tribunal as the sole judge
of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. The resolution of March 13,
1991 of the HR withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Camasura
as member of the HRET is null and void. Bondoc is entitled for the relief he prays for
in this case.
Reasoning of the Court:
1. Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of
the HRET.
-The independence of the HET so zealously guarded by the framers of the
Constitution would only be a myth or a farce if the HR or the majority party therein
may shuffle and manipulate the political (distinguished from the judicial) component
of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
-The Resolution of the HR removing Camasura from the HET for disloyalty to the
LDP is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HET to be the sole
judge of the elections contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
-Sanctioning the interference would make the tribunal a mere tool of the party in
party (LDP) where the three justices and the lone NP member would be powerless
to stop.
2. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in
the HRET.
-As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence – even
independence from the political party to which they belong. “Disloyalty to party” and
“breach of party discipline” are not valid grounds for expulsion of a member of the
Tribunal. HR committed grave abuse of discretion in expelling Camasura for having
case a “conscience vote.”
3. Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right of tenure.
-Members of the HRET are entitled just as members of the judiciary to security of
tenure under Sec. 2, Art. VIII of the Constitution. Termination may only occur
for a just cause such as the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office,
his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in
the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause.
-Two justices in the Tribunal were changed before the congressional term but these
changes had no political implications and for valid reasons (Chief Justice Fernan was
elevated to the office of CJ and Justice Feliciano took a leave of absence to deliver a
lecture in Yale University).
-Judicial power was invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights the strong
arm of the majority party in the HR. This is a duty of the Court “even when the
violator be the highest official of the land of the Government itself” (Concurring
opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino v. Ponce-Enrile).
Holding: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus prayed for by Bondoc is
granted. The resolution of March 13, 1991 of the HR withdrawing the nomination
and rescinding the election of Camasura as member of the HET is declared null and
void. Camasura is ordered reinstated to his position as member of the HRET. HRET
Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case.
No. 25 (Bondoc v. Pineda) is also set aside. Considering the conscious delay of the
promulgation, the said decision is declared duly promulgated effective upon service
of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the tribunal.
DAZA vs. SINGSON (December 21, 1989
FACTS:
• After May 11, 1987 congressional elections, the HR proportionally apportioned
its 12 seats in the COA among the several political parties represented in that
chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, PDP-Laban, NP-Unido, Liberal Party
(LP), & KBL, in accordance with Art. VI, Sec. 18, of CONSTI.
• Petitioner Raul Daza was listed as representative of LP.
• Sept 16, 1988: Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized,
resulting in a political realignment in the HR.
• 24 LP members resigned & joined LDP, swelling its number to 159 and reducing
LP’s membership to 17.
• On the basis of this development, the HR revised its representation in the COA
by withdrawing the seat occupied by petitioner & giving this to the newly-
formed LDP.
• Dec 5, 1988: HR elected a new set of representatives consisting of original
members except the petitioner & including respondent Luis Singson as the
additional member from LDP.
• Present action by petitioner: to challenge his removal from COA & the
assumption of his seat by respondent.
• ART VI, Sec. 18, CONSTI: There shall be a COA consisting of the Pres of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, 12 Senators & 12 Members of HR, elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
& parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein…
ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER:
1. THAT he cannot be removed from COA because his election thereto is
permanent as laid down in Cunanan v. Tan.
2. THAT the reorganization of the House representation in COA is not based on a
permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered
political party & has not yet attained political stability.
ARGUMENT OF RESPONDENT:
1. THAT the question raised by petitioner is a political question.
2. THAT he (respondent) has been improperly impleaded, the real party
respondent being the HR which changed its representation in COA & removed
petitioner.
3. THAT nowhere in the CONSTI is it required that the political party be registered
to be entitled to proportional representation in COA.
ISSUES:
1. WON issue is a political question.
2. WON respondent has been improperly impleaded
3. WON the reorganization of the House representation in COA is based on a
permanent political realignment because LDP is not a duly registered political
party & has not yet attained political stability. (*If based on a permanent
political realignment, reorganization of HR representation in COA can be done
at any time)
HELD:
1. NO, it is a justiciable controversy.
• What is involved is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of HR in
removing petitioner from the COA.
• Tanada v. Cuenco: Court was asked by petitioners to annul the election of
2 members of the SET, on the ground that they had not been validly
nominated. Court held that what was involved was not the wisdom of the
Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice in light of
the Constitutional requirement on the membership of the SET.
• Cunanan v. Tan: what is involved is the manner or legality of the
organization of the CO, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the
choice of its representatives.
• Even assuming it is a political question, Court is not precluded from
resolving it under its expanded jurisdiction.
2. NO/IRRELEVANT 
• While true that it is not respondent who caused the petitioner’s removal,
his objection is not an insuperable obstacle in resolving the controversy.
• Court may treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as petitioner
is questioning the respondent’s right to sit as a member of COA.
• Finally, as the Court held in the Emergency Powers cases, where serious
constitutional questions are involved, “the transcendental importance to
the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and
indefinitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.”
3. YES. Reorganization of the House representation in COA is based on a
permanent political realignment. LDP is considered to have attained
political stability.
• NOTE: Both parties invoked Cunanan v. Tan to support their claims. Thus,
the case was discussed at length.
• Cunanan v. Tan: FACTS: In 1961 election for HR…
Seats Representation in
won COA
Nacionalista 72 8 SC: We resolve the issue in favor of the authority of the HR to change its
Party
LP 29 4 in the political alignments of its membership. Such changes MUST BE
independent 1 PERMANENT & do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions
Subsequently, 25 NPs professed discontent with House leadership & made
common cause with LP & formed the “Allied Majority” to install a new speaker
and reorganize the chamber. House representation was reorganized where 3 NP
congressmen were displaced by 3 of their party colleagues who joined the Allied
Majority. Petitioner Cunanan’s ad interim appointment as Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestation Admin was rejected by COA &j respondent
Jorge Tan was designated in his place. Cunanan contends that the rejection of
his appointment was null & void because the COA was invalidly constituted.
HELD: Court agreed with petitioner. The Allied Majority was a merely temporary
combination as the NP defectors had not disaffiliated from their party &
permanently joined the new political group. They were still official members of
NP. The reorganization of the COA was invalid because it was not based on the
proportional representation of the political parties in the HR as required by the
CONSTI. A shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the
“Allied Majority” does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the
membership of the COA for HR. Otherwise, the COA may have to be
reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House.
Consti framers could not have intended to place a constitutional organ, like
COA at the mercy of each House of Congress.
• RESPONDENT: Cunanan case expressly allows reorganization at any time to
reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, PROVIDED, that
such changes are permanent. The creation of LDP constituting bulk of
former PDP-Laban & to which no less than 24 LPs had transferred was a
permanent change, justifying his designation to COA. Cunanan v. Tan: “If
by reason of…their expulsion from the political party to which they
belonged &/or their affiliation w/ another party, the ratio in the
representation of the parties in the House is materially changed, the House
is clothed with authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats
in COA held by members of said House belonging to the political party
adversely affected by the change & then fill said vacancies in conformity
with CONSTI.”
• IMPT. SUPERVENING EVENT: Nov 23, 2989: COMELEC granted the petition
of LDP for registration as a political party. Recall that petitioner heavily
relied on the non-registration of LDP, which he claims has not provided the
permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization.
• Petitioner’s contention that even if registered, the party must still pass the
test of time to prove its permanence is untenable. LDP has been in
existence for more than a year now. It has 157 members in HR & 6 in
Senate. Its titular head is the RP President, & its President is Sen. Neptali
Gonzales. Despite internal agreements w/n the party, IT SURELY CANNOT
BE CONSIDERED STILL TEMPORARY.
• As for the other condition suggested by petitioner, that the party must
survive in a general congressional election, LDP has doubtless also passed
the test. It now commands the biggest following in the HR. Besides, test
was not laid down in Cunanan.
representation in COA to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire
not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation &
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
 Coseteng v Mitra Jr. House of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered
Facts: under the party-list system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission
Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from diverse shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments
political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only candidate elected submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
under the banner of KAIBA. commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987
Constitution.)
A year later, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" or LDP was organized as a
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was
affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in based on proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are
the Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then 160 members of the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty percent (80%) of 12
she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which
Electoral Tribunal. may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats
were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House majority in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal
membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the
alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of
however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing proportional representation of the political parties therein.''
the House minority.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the
On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Commission on Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their
Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null and void the election of respective political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by
respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the Commission on their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of
Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the Coalesced
respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.
Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation
Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales
Issue:
1. WON the question raised is political. PETITIONERS: Teofisto Guingona and Lakas-NUCD
2. WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were RESPONDENTS: Neptali Gonzales, Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein
as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. NATURE: Petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents:
1. Romulo and Tañada from sitting and assuming membership of the Commission
Holding/ Ratio: on Appointments (C.A.); and
1. No, it is not. 2. Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the C.A., from recognizing and allowing the
respondent senators to sit as members
The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, where this Court
ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission Campos, Jr., J.
on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the
question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review FACTS:
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the • Senate membership after May 11, 1992 elections:
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any Party Membership Proportional Tolentino’s
branch or instrumentality of the government." Representation Temporary
Compromise
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. LDP 15 Senators 7.5 members 8 members
NPC 5 Senators 2.5 members 2 members
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads: LAKAS-NUCD 3 Senators 1.5 members 1 member
"Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President LP-PDP-LABAN 1 Senator .5 members 1 member
of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the

• Based on proportional representation, each party has a claim to an extra half
seat
• Romulo, as Senate Majority Floor Leader nominated 8 LDP members for
membership in the Commission on Appointments
• Guingona and John Osmeña objected to the nomination of the 8th senator
(Romulo) on the grounds that LDP’s representation should not exceed 7.5
members
• Arturo Tolentino proposed a temporary compromise to allow the 8 nominations
with the understanding that if the Supreme Court finds a party to be
overrepresented and another underrepresented, respective parties will
necessarily adjust its representation:
• Guingona filed the petition to prohibit the nomination of Romulo as the 8th LDP
nominee and Tañada as the lone nominee from the LP-PDP-LABAN
• Petitioner’s contention:
1. Tolentino compromise violates Section 18 of Article 6 of the Constitution
2. The 8th nomination of LDP and the 1 nomination from LP-PDP-LABAN unduly
increased the representation of said parties at the expense of NPC and LAKAS-
NUCD
3. According to Section 18 of Article 6 of the Constitution, it is the right of the
minority parties to combine their fractional representation to complete one seat
and to decide who, among their ranks, shall be nominated
ISSUES:
I. WON the nomination of Romulo and Tañada are in violation of the
Constitution
HELD: Yes
RATIO DECIDENDI: To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the C.A. by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach
of the rule on proportional representation.
LEGAL BASIS: Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution:
There shall be a C.A. consisting of… 12 senators… elected… on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties or
organizations registered under the party list system.
REASONING:
• It will give the LDP an added member by utilizing the fractional membership of
the minority political party, who is deprived of representation.
• Provision of Section 18, Article 6 is mandatory in character and not subject to
the discretion of the majority party; otherwise, the majority party can, by sheer
force if numbers, impose its will on the hapless minority
• In other words, it will defeat the purpose of the rule of proportional
representation, which is: (1) to provide a check on the majority party; and (2)
to maintain a balance of power
II. In the case of Senator Tañada in particular
RATIO DECIDENDI: A political party must have at least two senators in the Senate
to have a representative in the Commission on Appointments; any number less
than 2 will not entitle such a party a membership in the C.A.
LEGAL BASIS: Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr.
GUIDELINES:
1. In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly
elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.
2. Where there are more than two political parties represented in the
Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate
cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission.
REASONING:
• Since the two houses do not vote separately but jointly, and usually along party
lines, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still be represented by Congressman Ponce
Enrile, who has become a member of the LP.
• Also, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition
with another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from
this decision.
III. WON it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments
HELD: No
RATIO DECIDENDI: The CA may perform its functions and transact its business
even if only 10 senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum exists.
LEGAL BASES:
a. Section 18, Article 6, The Constitution: The CA shall rule by majority vote of all
the members
b. Section 19, Article 6, the Constititution: The CA shall meet only while Congress
is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members “to
discharge such powers and functions herein conferred upon it.”
c. Section 10, Chapter 3 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments:
…The presence of at least 13 members is necessary to constitute a quorum.
Provided, however, that at least 4 of the members constituting the quorum
should come from either house.
REASONING:
• Constitution does not require the election and presence of 12 senators and 12
members of the House of Rep. in order that the CA may function.
• Other instance may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which
perform their functions even if not fully constituted and even if their
composition is expressly specified by the Constitution (e.g. Supreme Court,
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Election, Commission on Audit)
IV. WON the Senate committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the two
nominations
HELD: Yes.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with
the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength,
knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of
authority granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to
exist.
DECISION:
 Election of Romulo and Tañada are declared null and void for violating Section
18, Article 6 of the Constitution
 They are ordered to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the
functions of members of the CA.
 Gonzales is ordered to desist from recognizing the membership of the
respondent Senators and from allowing them to sit and participate as members
of said Commission.