PEOPLE VS.

DASIG
ENRILE vs SALAZAR
Facts:
 Rodrigo Dasig was convicted by the RTC with Murder with Direct
Assault.
 August 4, 1987 – Dasig together with his companions approached Pfc.
Manatad, who was manning the traffic, and shot him. Only Dasig and
Nunez were captured. Nunez died while the case was still with the trial
court.
 In an extra-judicial confession executed by Dasig and Nunez they
admitted killing Manataf. They also admitted that they were members
of the sparrow unit and their aliases were Armand and Mabi.
 Dasig contends that their confession was legally defective and contrary
to his Constitutional Rights. He also claims that assuming he
conspired in the killing he should be convicted at most with simple
rebellion and not murder with direct assault.

Issues:

WON the extra-judicial confession of Dasig is valid? YES PEOPLE vs HERNANDEZ

 There is no reason to doubt the factual findings and conclusions of the
trial court that the extra-judicial confession was voluntarily made.
 Jurisprudence: Confession is admissible until the accused successfully
proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise or reward of leniency.

WON Dasig is guilty of murder with direct assault? NO

 Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government
among other means.
 Dasig did not only confess voluntarily his membership with the sparrow
unit but also his participation and that of his group in the killing of
Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City. The sparrow unit
is the liquidation unit of the NPA with the objective of overthrowing the
government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of
Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the
subversive ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the
crime of rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in CARINO vs PEOPLE
authority.
 The act of killing a police office, knowing that the victim is a person in
authority is a mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done
in furtherance of rebellion.
 People vs. Managallan – where the accused admitted his membership
with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC informer, the crime
committed is not murder but rebellion punishable under article 134 and
135 of the RPC.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OSCAR OLIVA (Ka Ambot), Edgar there being no proof that the killing was in connection w/or in furtherance of
Manlapaz, Bocoy Seachon, Metchel Ibaya, Joel Cinco, Amy Inopia (Ka the rebellious acts.
Jinky/Ka Nelly), John and Peter Doe, Ka Yoli, Ka Gerson, Noli Salcedo (Ka ⇒ It was not indubitably proven that Oliva was indeed a member of the NPA.
Tony), Bogoy Manlapaz, Virgilio Panguilinan (Ka Ariel, Ka Riza, Ka Liza),
accused. OSCAR OLIVA and Noli Salcedo, accused-appellants [2001] 2. Circumstancial evidence prove that Ka Ambot & Oliva are one & the same
and that he took part in the commission of the crime.
⇒ May 26, 1986: Jacinto Magbojos, Jr. went out of their house early morning 3. Alibi can’t stand since it was not impossible for them to be at the scene of
to count the coconuts in his dad’s coconut land uphill. At around 8 a.m., the crime and they were positively identified by witnesses.
Cinco & Ibaya went to Magbojos’ house, however, they left after learning 4. No treachery, evident premeditation & use of superior strength since there’s
that he was not home. A few minutes after Magbojos got home, 4 persons no proof at all on how the killing was done.
entered their house, hogtied him and took him away walking towards the
western direction. Holding: RTC decision modified. Oliva & Salcedo guilty of homicide.
⇒ Arturo Inopia, a farmer, testified that Ka Ambot (Oliva) & company visited
him at about 8:30 or 9 a.m. They informed him that they were out to get
Magbojos. Before leaving his house, Oliva warned him not to report to the PEOPLE vs UMALI
police authorities otherwise Inopia will be killed.
⇒ Edgardo Labajata, a farmer, testified that he saw Magbojos (then hogtied)
in the company of 5 persons. Magbojos appeared weak & w/abrasions on
both sides of his face & can hardly talk. Oliva questioned Labajata & when
the former learned that the latter knew Magbojos, he was also hogtied but
was subsequently released on the condition that he will leave their brgy.
⇒ Magbojos’ brother, Renato, a policeman was informed by one Levelito
Tuberion that he knew where Magbojos was buried since he was the one
asked by Oliva’s group to accompany them to the burial site. Graveyard
was dug & they found human bones, a shirt, short pants, coralon rope, a
brief & black rubber band. Magbojos’ wife testified that these were personal
belongings of her husband.
⇒ Original charge: murder amended to kidnapping w/murder against Oliva,
Salcedo & Cinco. All of them pleaded not guilty.
⇒ Oliva’s defense: he was an NPA commanding officer in the Masbate area. PEOPLE vs TAHIL
Thus, he should be charged w/rebellion. Tuberion is in the list of shoot-to-
kill order while Inopia was a member of a group called Walang Patawad,
pretending to be an NPA member for business extortion.
⇒ Salcedo’s defense: at the date of the incident, he was staying w/his cousin
in another barangay w/c was about 5 km away from Magbojos’ brgy or it
would take approximately 5 hours to get there by walking.
⇒ Lower Court: Oliva & Salcedo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder
and not kidnapping w/murder. Cinco acquitted.

Issues & Ratio:

1. WON Oliva should be charged w/rebellion. – NO.
⇒ Claim lacks factual & legal basis.
⇒ No rebellion in this case since the killing was not committed in furtherance
of rebellion but for personal reasons/other motives. Thus, killing must
punished separately even if committed simultaneously w/the rebellious acts
 PRIMICIAS vs. FUGOSO
FACTS:
Petitioner Cipriano Primicias is the campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties.
Respondent Valeraino Fugoso is the Mayor of Manila. Primicias would like to compel
Fugoso, by means of a mandamus, to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting in
Plaza Miranda, as respondent Fugoso has denied the request.
ISSUE: WON the denial of the permit for holding a public meeting is proper.
HELD: No it is not.
RATIO:
The court first states the importance of the right of freedom of speech and to peacefully
assemble, stating, however, that these rights have their limits in that they should not be
injurious to the rights of the community or society.
Then they discuss the other side, the right to regulate these rights. This brings a
discussion of police power, saying that the legislature delegated police power to the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila, giving it regulatory powers regarding the use of
public places. These powers, however, according to the court, are not absolute. If these
powers were absolute, then the Municipal or City government would have sole and
complete discretion as to what to allow and what not to allow. This would be wrong as it
would leave decisions open to the whims of those in power. While these rights should be
regulated, they should be regulated in a reasonable manner, and giving unbridled deciding
power to the government is not reasonable.
Also, looking at the ordinance Sec. 1119, the courts said there there were 2 ways to
interpret such an ordinance:
1) The mayor has unregulated discretion
2) Applications are subject to reasonable discretion to determine which areas to
use to avoid confusion and minimize disorder
The court took the 2nd interpretation.
To justify their stand, the court went through a series of U.S. cases that handled similar
circumstances. Many of these cases struck down ordinances and laws requiring citizens to
obtain permits for public meetings, events, parades, processions, and the like.
Lastly, the court states that there is no reasonable reason to deny this public meeting. As
such, the mandamus is granted.
Note: SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall
be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided
by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise
during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on
the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit
issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof,
where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That
the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless
a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion,
determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of
such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or
procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the
holding of such parade or procession.
HILADO DISSENT:
The dissent of J. Hilado is divided into 4 parts: a, b, c and d.
a) Right not absolute but subject to regulation. Mainly says that the right to
freedom of speech and assembly are not absolute rights. After citing U.S. cases,
J. Hilado moves to the case at bar and points out that the Mayor of Manila had
the “duty and power” to grant or deny permits. Moreover, he says that the
government has the right to regulate the use of public places. Pointing to the
case at bar, Plaza Miranda is a public place in that it is a high traffic area,
whether for vehicles or pedestrians. As such, holding the meeting there would
have caused an “inconvenience and interfere with the right of the people in
general”. He again states that the right is not absolute, but “subject to regulation
as regards the time, place and manner of its exercise”.
b) No constitutional right to use public places under government control, for the
right of assembly and petition, etc. Here, J. Hilado explains that the action that
the Mayor of Manila took was not one of denying the public meeting and
regulating the right to speech and assembly, but was merely one of denying the
use of a public place in the conducting of the meeting. In this interpretation,
there was no constitutional right infringed.
c) Here J. Hilado goes through his own list of U.S. cases to cite as authority. I don’t
think dean will make us enumerate them. Anyways the summaries in the case
are short.
d) Mandamus unavailable. Here, J. Hilado cites section 2728 of Municipal
Corporations, 2nd ed., a source of American municipal rules. In this rule, it is
stated that in the issuance of permits, if the power is discretionary, it cannot
ordinarily be compelled by mandamus. The refusal must be arbitrary or
capricious so as to warrant mandamus. He then points to certain allegations of
the Mayor of Manila pointing to the high possibility of trouble that would result
from the meeting taking place. His reason in denying the permit is that of peace
and order. As such, the refusal was not capricious or arbitrary and does not
warrant a mandamus.
PEOPLE vs. PEREZ
MALCOLM, J
FACTS:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato
Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, meet on the morning of April 1, 1922, in
the presidencia of Pilar, and became engaged in a discussion regarding the
administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a
number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off
the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has recommended a bad
administration in these Islands and has not made a good
recommendation; on the contrary, he has asassinated the independence
of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not obtained independence
and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256. of the Penal
Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court.
ISSUE:
1. WON article 256 of the Penal Code, the provision allegedly violated, is still
enforceable
2. WON the appellant committed libel
HOLDING:
1. Yes
2. No, however, he was guilty of a portion of treason and sedition. Trial court
decision affirmed with modification
RATIO:
Enforceability of Art. 256
The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is to the effect that article
256 of the Penal Code is no longer in force.
In the case of United States vs. Helbig, Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article
256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the court of origin for a
new trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that
article 256 is still in force.
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, that until otherwise decided by
higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate
to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under the Libel Law, exists
and must be enforced.
The Crime Committed
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article
256 of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this instance is
not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In other
words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused did not so
much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise
a disturbance in the community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily
against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the authority of
the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined
in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is sedition, which is
the raising of commotions or disturbances 'in the State. Though the ultimate
object of sedition is a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of
measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open
violence against the laws, or the subversion of the Constitution.
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be
interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
Criticism is permitted to penetriate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the
Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech,
unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and
effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the
Philippine Islands. His official position seems rather to invite abusive attacks.
But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest
bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws. The
Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the
Philippines and of the sovereign power. A seditious attack on the Governor-
General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American
sovereignty.
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act
No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet
such a situation. This section reads as follows:
"Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write,
publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States
or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write,
publish, utter or make any statement, or speech, or do any act which tends to
disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his
duty, or which tends to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful
purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the
peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United States currency
or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or. both, in the discretion of the
court."
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act
which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement
and done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities.
He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of PEOPLE vs RODIL
the community and the safety or order of the Government.

While our own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain
the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of
insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible
individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers the general public
peace.

VILLAMOR, J., with whom concurs AVANCEÑA, J., concurring and

dissenting:
I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer two months and one
day of arresto mayor with costs, as imposed by the court a quo, under the
provisions of article 256 of the Penal Code, but not under section 8 of Act No.
292. The accused should not be convicted of the crime of sedition because
there is no allegation in the complaint nor proof in the record, showing that when
the accused uttered the words that gave rise to these proceedings, he had the
intention of inciting others to gather for an illicit purpose, or to incite any
conspiracy or rebellion, or to disturb the peace of the community or the safety
and order of the Government

TEXAS vs JOHNSON
 PEOPLE v. BALBAR
Facts
 Tiburcio Balbar in Aug. 20, 1960( in the information it’s Aug 29) went
inside the classroom where teacher, Ester Gonzales was in during
school classes.
 Without warning after Ester finished writing on the board, Balbar placed
his arms around her and kissed her on the eye. Ester pushed him
away and tried to flee. Balbar then brought out his “daga”,(knife) and
pursued Ester and embraced her while holding the daga. They fell on
the floor and Ester suffered slight physical injuries.
 Two informations were taken from the same incident.:
One for Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority: Aug 29, Balbar
willfully unlawfully and feloniously assaulted Ester, a public school teacher
in the school bldg of Lian, duly qualified and appointed as such and while in
the performance of her official duties. By then and there pulling his dagger
and embracing and kissing her, committed with the aggravating
circumstance of committing it inside the school building during school
hours.
One for Acts of Lasciviousness: Aug 29 Balbar with deliberate
intent to satisfy his lust, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of
lasciviousness on the person of Ester, a public school teacher, by placing
himself close to her, embracing and kissing her against her will and by
means of force. And as a result, the Ester fell to the floor, causing her injury,
resulting to pain and tenderness on the right side of the trunk on the
posterior surface of the right arm which may require 3-4 days to heal.
Committed with the aggravating circumstance of perpetrated inside the
public school bldg during class hours.
 The accused filed a motion to quash arguing that the Direct Assault
charge had no sufficient cause of action and that it charges two
offenses in a single complaint. And secondly, that the charge of acts of
Lasciviousness would place the accused in Double Jeopardy.
 So even if the Prov. Fiscal disagrees, the lower court quashed the two
informations saying that the Lasciviousness is absorbed in the physical
injuries or unjust vexation (it can’t be direct assault because the
element of direct assault is absent in the info). Since the physical
injuries or unjust vexation within the original jurisdiction of the justice of
Peace then the information is quashed(along with the absorbed).
 Then the Government appealed that the main element of direct assault
is missing in the info, which is the knowledge of the accused that the
person is in authority. 1
Issue
1
Art 148, RPC, direct assault is committed by any person who without public uprising xxxx shall attack, employ, force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties. And Art 152 says that teachers, professors and persons who are charged to supervise public or private schools
are person in authority.
WON the Lower court made an error in quashing the information for the
said reasons above.YES
 Direct assault is committed by any person/s who w/o a public uprising
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person
in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties or on occasion of such performance (RPC Art. 148).
Teachers, professors & persons charged w/the supervision of public or
duly recognized private schools, colleges, and universities shall be
deemed persons in authority.
 There is no need for the allegation in the info of the knowledge of the
accused of the authority of the teacher.
 She is a teacher inside her classroom during school hours in the
performance of her duty makes the fact known to the accused.
 It doesn’t matter if it wasn’t alleged. Complainant’s status is a matter of
law and not of fact, ignorance of this is no excuse. (art.3 cc)
WON the dismissal of the information for lack of lasciviousness is
correct. YES
 The SC agrees with this conclusion, that although some acts lead to
more than one offense, upon examination of the events, it seems that
the acts of lasciviousness does not appear to have been committed.
 “It is somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing
what conduct makes one amendable to Art 3366, which constitutes
lewd or lascivious conduct. It is varied from case to case, the
demarcation line is difficult to pinpoint between lascivious acts and acts
of an amorous lover.”US v Gomez
 The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of
the acts and circumstances.
 In this case, taking the manner, place and time, the acts as lewd
designs can’t be attributed to the accused. The factual setting of the
schoolroom within the presence of the students and hearing
distance of co-teachers rules out the purpose of lewd or lustful
designs.
• It may be the he hugged and kissed the girl, but it doesn’t make it
punishable within Art. 336.
The case is remanded but the quashing of the Direct Assault charge is set
aside. But the quashing of the charge of Act of Lasciviousness is affirmed.
PEOPLE vs RECTO
US vs GARCIA
 ALBERTO VS. DELA CRUZ
Facts:
 Eligio Orbita is a provincial guard who is being prosecuted for the crime
of Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoner as punished by art. 224 of the
RPC. Orbita is charged with the duty of keeping
 One of the evidences presented during the trial was a note purportedly
written by Governor Cledera. Cledera was asking Esmeralda to send
five men to wordk in the construction of a fence at his house at
Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur. Esmeralda declared the he could
not remember who handed him the note and that he was not sure as to
the genuineness of the signature.
 The defense, believing that the escape of Denaque was made possible
by the note of Cledera to Esmeralda, filed a motion in court seeking the
amendment of the information so as to include Cledera and Esmeralda.
 The Fiscal manifested in court that after conducting a reinvestigation of
the case and a thorough and intelligent analysis of thee facts and law
involved, no prima facie case against Cledera and Esmeralda exist,
hence they cannot be charged.
 Orbita field an MFR and the Court issued an order to amend the
information so as to include Cledera and Esmeralda.
 Fiscal filed an MFR but it was denied.
Issue: WON Cledera and Esmeralda should be included in the information? NO
 Rule: Fiscal is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to support
the allegations thereof Although this power and prerogative of the
Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is sufficient to
form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not
absolute and subject to judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the
prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a case when he is in
no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the
necessary evidence to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of
the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to appeal the
Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special
prosecutor.
 The fiscal was not capricious or whimsical when he refused to
prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda. A reinvestigation was conducted
but no additional fact was elicited. There is also no sufficient evidence
in record to show a prima facie case against the two.
 Art. 156 of the RPC:
Delivering prisoners from jails. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
unposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail or penal
establishment any person confined therein or shall help the escape of
such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery. If other
means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed.
It the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of sad
establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same penalties
shall be imposed in their minimum period."
 Offense in art. 156 can be committed in 2 ways:
o By removing a person in any jail or penal establishment.
o Helping such a person to escape
 Offense under art. 156 is s usually committed by an outsider who
removes from jail any person therein confined or helps him escape. If
the offender is a public officer who has custody or charge of the
prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and
penalized under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov.
Cledera, as governor, is the jailer of the province, and Jose Esmeralda
is the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the
escape of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal
Code.
 There is no sufficient evidence to warrant their prosecution under
article 223.
 ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion.-Any public officer
who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his custody or charge,
shall be punished:
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
temporary disqualification in its maximum period to perpetual special
disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been sentenced by final judgment
to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and temporary special
disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have been finally convicted but
only held as a detention prisoner for any crime or violation of law or
municipal ordinance
 Under article 223 it is necessary that the public officer had consented
to, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or
charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the
person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the
crime of faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer
charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the
fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime.
 No evidence to prosecute the two under article 224. article 224
punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner has
escaped by reason of his negligence.
PEOPLE vs DIOSO