Cornelia Matabuena v. Petronila Cervantes (1971)  Dec. 20, 1915 – J.C.
Graham Los Baños sold automobile to Henry
Appeal from a decision of CFI Sorsogon
FACTS:
 Feb 1956: Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos of
a parcel of land in favor of defendant, Petronila w/c the latter
accepted, during the time of their common-law relationship.
 March 1962: Donor and donee were married.
 Sept 1962: Felix Matabuena died intestate. Appellant Cornelia, being
the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased executed
an affidavit of self-adjudication and had the land declared in her name.
She also paid the estate & inheritance taxes from then. (in short,
feeling rightful owner na siya. She brings this case to court.
 Lower Court: Ruled in favor of widow noting that donation was made
at a time before defendant was married to donor.
ISSUE:
WON ban on donations between sps during marriage applies to common-
law relationships
HELD: Decision reversed. Donation declared void. Case remanded to lower
court for its appropriate disposition re rights of both as pro indiviso heirs.
RATIO: Policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the
dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a
common-law relationship even if Art 133 CC only expressly pertains to
donations between sps during marriage. The policy of the law is clear and
must be applied and that is “to prohibit donations in favor of the other
consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor.” This policy embodies a deeply-
rooted notion of what is just and what is right and will not be nullified by
such an irregular relationship. What is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of it as what is written.
Note: Pls see annotation on p.290 of case for added info re donations.
HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY [August
10, 1918)
Action to recover damages
Plaintiff: Mrs. Henry Harding & husband, residents of Manila
Defendant: Commercial Union Assurance Company, Great Britain company,
w/agent Smith, Bell & Co, a Philippine corporation
 1913 – Levy Hermanos, Studebaker automobile Manila agent, sold
automobile no. 1063 to John Carson for P3,200.00
 Oct. 14, 1914 – Carson sold car to Henry Harding for P1,500.00
 Nov. 19, 1914 – Mr. Harding sold car to J. Brannigan of Los Baños,
Laguna for P2,000.00
Harding for P2,800.00.
 Jan. 16, 1915 – Henry gave automobile to wife. Repaired & repainted
at the Luneta Garage amounting to P900.00.
 Luneta Garage – agent of Smith Bell & Co., solicited of Mrs. Harding,
insurance of said automobile. Garage manager Mr. Server, experienced
automobile mechanic testified that automobile costs about P3,000.00,
this was the price agreed upon by both parties. Mrs. Harding was
charged sum of P150.00 / 5% of P3,000.00 estimated value. Among
the terms of the insurance was that in cases of loss or damage of any
cause, the insurance company will indemnify insured up to agreed
amount of P3,000.00 or value of car.
 March 24, 1916 – automobile was totally destroyed by fire. Iron parts
were sold by Smith Bell however, no amount was tendered to Harding
until such time that court was opened for trial. Harding furnished
Smith Bell w/ proof of her loss & interest & she likewise performed all
conditions under said policy. However, Smith Bell did not pay. They
claim that Mrs. Harding falsified the value & ownership of the
automobile.
 Lower Court – decided in favor of Harding
ISSUE/S AND RATIO:
1. WON Mr. Diehl’s testimony should be excluded. – Not important.
It merely showed alleged actual value of the automobile. This evidence
is irrelevant.
2. WON donation/Mr. Harding’s act of giving the automobile to his
wife is void. – NO
a. defendant claims that gift is void under CC Art. 1334 w/c states
that “All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Moderate gifts w/c the spouses bestow on each other on festive
days of the family are not included in the rule. Thus, they claim
that she has no interest in the issuance of the policy.
b. In Cook vs. McMicking, the SC held that parties who have no
relation to the property owners at the time of transfer or those
who do not have any interest in the properties involved, cannot
challenge the validity of the transfer.
c. Burden of proof that the gift doesn’t fall under the exception
(moderate gifts) falls on defendant who raised this as a defense. A
car may be a moderate gift depending on the circumstances of the
parties. Such info is not disclosed by the records.
3. WON value of automobile was falsified. – NO.
a. There’s even proof that it cost more than the amount mentioned.
(purchase price of P2,800.00 + P900.00 for repairs & repainting is
more than stated amount of P3,000.00)
b. Unfair to hold it void simply because outlay represented was made
by Mr. Harding & not his wife, to whom he had given his old
vehicle.
 c. Value did not actually come from Mrs. Harding. In fact, she only
acted upon information given her by her husband and by Mr.
Server, the manager of Luneta Garage w/c is an agent of Smith
Bell. There was even an examiner who inspected the automobile
before policy was issued.
d. In Union Insurance Company vs. Wilkinson, the SC held that
it is normal for insurance agencies to rely on their agents to deal
with their clients that these clients often do not know anything
about the company or its officers. But despite this set-up the
company will still be responsible to the clients for acts of its agents
will be construed as acts of the principal/company itself. Same
ruling in Rowley vs. Empire Ins. Co. which held that Though risk
in policies technically proceeds from insured, it will still be
regarded as act of insurers.
e. Value = market price if offered for sale. In insurance policies,
assured can only estimate such value. It’s enough that the assured
carries out terms of the contract and observed good faith in doing
his duties/obligations.
f. Insurance law (Act No. 2427), Sec. 163 states that effect of
valuation in policy of fire insurance is similar to policy of marine
insurance (Sec. 149) w/c states that valuation is conclusive if
insured had an insurable interest & was not guilty of fraud
HOLDING: Commercial Union Assurance Company is bound by their
contract w/Mrs. Harding. She had an insurable interest and she did not use
employ fraud in procuring the insurance. Lower Court affirmed.
 Onas vs. Javillo [March 20, 1934]
Appeal from an order of the COFI of Capiz
Facts:
 Crispulo Javillo died intestate on May 18, 1927. His first marriage to
Ramona Levis was blessed with 5 children. His second marriage with
Rosario Onas was blessed with 4 children.
 First marriage they acquired 11 parcels of land. Second Marriage
acquired 20 parcels of land.
 Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the second
marriage were products of the first marriage.
 Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was made by the
administrator of the estate of her husand. She alleges the following
errors:
o All the properties acquired during the second marriage were
acquired with the properties of the first marriage.
o The trial court erred in approving the partition dated September
9, 1931, notwithstanding that the same did not include all
properties of the deceased.
Issues:
WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased husband or wife. NO
 When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought about the
community ceases, for the principles of an ordinary partnership are not
applicable to this community, which is governed by special rules.
 Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any effect
for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it
conforms to unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and
wife, and serves as a recompense for the care of preserving and
increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death of one of
the partners.
 Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or
when during the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the
conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as the
spouses are united.
WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of
the properties of the first marriage. NO
 Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the
partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition
be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own
capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no
share.
WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid. NO
Was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second
marriage were produced by the properties of the first marriage.
Luis Lim, administrator, v. Isabel Garcia, widow of Hilario Lim
(1907)
Appeal from a judgment of CFI Zamboanga
FACTS:
 1903: Hilario Lim died intestate leaving a widow and 9 children.
 RTC: Inventory prepared by the administrator showed entire estate of
the deceased to be conjugal property except
1) H&Lot in Zamboanga
2) Sum of P10,000.00
3) P700 sum paid for a certain lot but was later sold
4) Not included in the inventory were 3 parcels of land presumed to be
part of widow’s paraphernal/ separate estate.
 Administrator and children contend that none of the said property
should be treated as conjugal because Hilario Lim brought to the
marriage property more than double the amount of the intestate estate
while defendant widow brought nothing at the time of the marriage or
thereafter. (ouch!)
ISSUE:
WON the above claim is tenable
HELD: Judgment affirmed.
RATIO: No, unless evidence will be provided to establish otherwise. Art
1407 CC holds:
All the estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal
partnership property (bienes gananciales – repeat after me...) unless
and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the H
or W.
Sps Virgilio & Michelle Castro v. Romeo Miat (2003)
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA
FACTS:
 Sps Moises & Concordia Miat bought 2 parcels of land during their
marriage in the ff locations:
1) Parañaque: 132 sq. m. – w/c Moises wanted to be his alone
2) Paco, Mla: 70 sq. m., bought on installment basis – w/c was for their 2
sons, Romeo & Alexander
 The agreement re the partition of the Paco property was manifested in
the ff events:
a) even before death of Concordia admitted that he knew Romeo was in possession of the title & Romeo
b) reiterated at her deathbed then insisted that he is the owner of the property.
c) after Moises’s return from Dubai, UAE, again reiterated in front of the A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property and pays a full and fair
Miat extended family members and attested to by formal document price for it at the time of the purchase or before any notice of some other
(Sinumpaang Salaysay) person’s claim or interest in it. He must be wary and should investigate
d) letters of Moises to sons the rights of those in possession of the real property. W/o such inquiry,
the buyer can hardly be regarded as buyer in good faith. (Republic v. De
 Dec 1984: Moises paid the balance of the Paco property in full from Guzman)
Fraval Realty, Inc. but secured the title in his name as a widower.
Romeo asserted his right and demanded for the owner’s duplicate of the
Paco property w/c was given to him.
 April 1988: After Romeo along w/ Alexander & his wife lived in the
property, the couple decided to leave the house and agreed to sell
Alexander’s share to Romeo. Romeo gave him partial payment of
P6,000.00.
 Feb 1988: Romeo learned from his godmother that the latter placed a
downpayment of P30K for the Paco property in favor of her son Virgilio.
 Dec 1988: Romeo & Virgilio Castro went to MTC to discuss status of the
Paco property. It was later sold to him by virtue of a Deed of Sale for
P95K.
 Romeo filed an action to nullify such sale and to compel Moises & ro
Alexander to execute a deed of conveyance or assignment of the Paco
property to him upon his payment of the balance of the agreed price.
 RTC declared sale of Moises-Virgilio as valid. CA ruled in favor of
Romeo and nullified deed of sale.

ISSUES:
1) WON Paco property is conjugal or capital
2) WON there was a valid oral partitions of that land
3) WON sps Castro were buyers in good faith

HELD: CA decision affirmed. Costs against petitioners.

RATIO:
1) Clearly conjugal. Paco property acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the common fund. Art 153 of the New CC:
The ff are conjugal partnership property:
a. Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, ….
2) YES! See manifestations cited above.
No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in
order to be valid Moreover, the partition of inherited property need not be
embodied in a public document. The requirement in Art 1358 CC is only for
convenience; non-compliance w/ which does not affect the validity or
enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves. (Pada-Kilario
v. CA)
3) No, as manifested in the fact that they brought Moises to the Judge in
MTC to find out if Romeo had a right over the property. Virgilio even