PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA G.R. No. 135981.

September 29, 2000 (first

version)
Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, province of
Leyte, accused Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband,
with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several
wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide and sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had
suffered at the hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed
that under the surrounding circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense is
applicable in this case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the
final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable—not necessarily
immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former
against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the
existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

DIGEST: PEOPLE VS. GENOSA GR no. 135981 January 15, 2004 (second version)

FACTS:

Appellant was married to the victim Ben Genosa. In their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but soon
thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become violent. Ben, a habitual drinker, became cruel
to Marivic; he would provoke her, slap her, pin her down on the bed or beat her. These incidents happened several
times and Marivic would often run home to her parents. She had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile.

On the night of the killing, appellant, who was then eight months pregnant, and the victim quarreled. The latter beat
her, however, she was able to run to another room. Allegedly there was no provocation on her part when she got home
that night, and it was her husband who began the provocation. Frightened that her husband would hurt her and wanting
to make sure she would deliver her baby safely, appellant admitted having killed the victim, who was then sleeping at
the time, with the use of a gun. She was convicted of the crime of parricide. Experts opined that Marivic fits the profile
of a battered woman syndrome and at the time she killed her husband, her mental condition was that she was re-
experiencing the trauma, together with the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as constituting self-defense;

2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

RULING:

No, the Court ruled in the negative on both issues.

1.) The Court held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome, to wit: (a) each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner; (b) the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life; and (c) at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused, based on the
history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense.

Under the existing facts of the case, however, not all of these were duly established. Here, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. In fact, she had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. The attack had apparently ceased and the
reality or even imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. Ben was no longer in a position that presented
an actual threat on her life or safety.

2.) The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression
from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must
have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk
from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. Here, there is no showing that appellant intentionally
chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he
might make. It appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
decided to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately
employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court resolved the doubt
in her favor.

LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with
two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing
petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under
section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in
the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without
notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed
by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal case.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.

(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation was imperative.

HELD:

(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from
the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the
right to due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence,
slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the
commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case. Being purely
a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal
procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.

Hence, SC denied the petition.

Teofilo Evangelista v. The People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 163267

Del Castillo, J.:

Issue:

Whether Evangelista can be tried for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the jurisdiction of
the Philippine courts.

Facts:

Petitioner was a passenger of Philippine Airlines Flight No. 657 arriving from Dubai with him are some firearms and
ammunitions that he bought at Angola but were confiscated at the Dubai International Airport after being questioned
about its ownership. Upon arriving in NAIA Petitioner yielded no evidence or records to show that the firearms were
obtained legally. Petitioner was then charged with violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions). Petitioner then contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case as he claims that his alleged
possession of the firearms transpired while he was at the Dubai Airport

Decision:

Yes, The court held that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition was committed in the
Philippines. The accomplishment by the petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon arrival at the NAIA is very clear
evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge happened in
Dubai. Also, there were no records of any criminal case having filed against petitioner in Dubai regarding the discovered
firearms. The rule is that he who alleges must prove his allegation.

People vs. Monalyn Cervantes GR181494 March 17, 2009

Fajardo vs. CA GR 128508 February 1, 1999

Facts:
In 1981, Fajardo was charged with violation of BP 22. At the time he committed the offense, PD No. 968 allows an
accused who appeals his conviction to still apply for probation.
In 1988, the trial court convicted Fajardo of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer the penaltyPD No. 968,
became effective (in 1986), providing that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. Fajardo, however, still appealed his conviction.
When he lost the appeal, he filed motion for probation before the trial court contending that he was eligible for
probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused who had appealed his conviction was
still qualified to apply for probation and that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had
interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application and hence, not applicable to him. The trial court
denied Fajardo’s motion for probation and so did CA. 
Issue:
Whether P.D. 1990 is an ex post facto law.
Held:
It is not ex post facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted after its effectivity. An ex post
facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime which was innocent at the time of its commission. Presidential
Decree No. 1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in character. It may not be considered as an ex
post facto law.
At the time of the commission of the offense charged--violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22--in 1981, petitioner
could have appealed if convicted and still availed himself of probation. However, petitioner was convicted on May
26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner no longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if
unsuccessful in the appeal. Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he could no longer apply for
probation since he had appealed. Fajardo vs. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 128508. February 1, 1999

Sable vs. Pp GR 177961 April 7, 2009

Facts: The petitioner is the accused in a falsification case, after conviction she filed a notice of appeal in the RTC which
was denied; after which she applied for probation after 8 months from her conviction.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may still avail of the probation.

Held: No, Probation and appeal are alternatively exclusive of each other; to remove the element of speculation from the
accused. In addition, the time of applying for probation was during the perfection of appeal or 15 days from the receipt
of judgement.

Valeroso vs Pp GR 164815 February 22, 2008

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: A petition for review on certiorari involving the decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals which
affirmed that of the RTC of Quezon City in finding the petitioner-accused Jerry Valeroso liable of illegal possession of
firearm.

FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was
found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City.

On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case
of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was
about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in
his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was
confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

The defense on the other hand contended that Valeroso was arrested and searched in the boarding house of his children
in New Era Quezon City. He was aroused from his slumber when four heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the
room. The pointed their guns on him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and
ransacked the room. Moments later an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside.
Adrian Yuson, an occupant to the adjacent room testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that the firearm with
live ammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.

The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the RTC. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Hence this
petition. Petitioner raised the issue of legalilty of the search and the admissibility and validity of the evidence obtained
as the same was the “fruit of the poisonous tree”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition valid.

RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008 Resolution are
RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.

RATIONALE/REASON: From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served
the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling
him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to
Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no
way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him.

The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in
front of him, for any concealed weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances obtaining,
there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk drawers and cabinets or the other closed or
concealed areas in that room itself.

It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest) is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what
is needed to serve its purpose. In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to
have been within Valeroso’s immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of what may be considered as an
incident to a lawful arrest.

Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view doctrine."

The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.

Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s children, because they were supposed to serve a
warrant of arrest issued against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for the intrusion.
Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case,
the police officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition; they actually searched for
evidence against Valeroso.

Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Consequently, the evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.
G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HERMIE M. JACINTO,

Facts:

Appellant Hermie Jacinto was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the rape of the then 5-year-old victim. The
crime was committed when appellant was only 17; Judgment was rendered when appellant was already 25.

Issue:

Whether or not, appellant may benefit from the provisions of RA9344 regarding criminal liability of an accused who was
a minor during the commission of the crime and the suspension of sentence of one who is no longer a minor during the
pronouncement of verdict.

Held:

The Court sustained the conviction of the appellant in view of the straightforward testimony of the victim and the
inconsistencies of the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

The Court did not exempt accused of his criminal liability although he was only 17 during the commission of the crime
since, in view of the circumstances to which accused committed the felony, it was proved that he acted with
discernment. (Sec 6, RA 9344). There was showing that the accused understood the consequences of his action.

Applying, the provision of RA 9346, the accused was meted with reclusion perpetua instead of the death penalty.

As to the civil liability of accused, his minority also had no bearing to the decision of the Court, ordering accused to pay
the victim for damages.

However, the Court afforded the accused the benefit of the suspension of his sentence provided in Section38 of RA
9344, which made no distinction to an accused found guilty of a capital offense. The Court stated that what was
important was the intent of the Act to uphold the welfare of a child in conflict with the law. What was to be considered
was the fact that accused committed the crime at a tender age.

The Court held that accused may be confined in an agricultural camp or any training facility in accordance with Sec 51 of
RA 9344. The case was remanded to the court of origin to take appropriate action in accordance to the said provision.

Galo Monge vs People of the Philippines

GR no. 170308, March 7, 2008

Facts:
On 20 July 1994, Monge(petitioner) and Potencio were found by the barangay tanods in
possession of and transporting 3 pieces of mahogany lumber in Iriga City. Monge and Potencio were
not able to show any documents or the requisite permit from DENR. The trial court found Monge
guilty of violation of Section 68 of PD No 705, as amended by E.O. no. 277 while Potencio was
discharged because he was used as a state witness.
Agrrieved, petitioner elevated the case to CA where he challenged the discharge of Potencio as
a state witness on the ground that there is no absolute necessity for his testimony. Monge contested
that it was Potencio who owned the lumbers and not him, that he was only hired by Potencio to
transport the lumbers to a sawmill. The appellate court dismissed his petition, hence, he filed a review
on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Monge was guilty of the offense charged?

Held:
 Yes.
The contention of Monge is unavailing.
Under Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended by E.O No. 277, criminalizes two distinct and
separate offenses namely;
a. Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing of timber from alienable or disposable
public land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land
without any authority; and
b. The possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required
under the existing laws and regulations.
In the first offense, the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber
or other forest products may be proven by the authorization duly issued by the DENR. The second
offense, however, it is immaterial whether or not the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of
forest products are legal precisely because mere possession of forest products without the requisite
documents consummates the crime.
Petitioner cannot take refuge in his denial of ownership over the pieces of lumber fund in his
possession nor his claim that he was merely hired by Potencio to provide the latter with assistance in
transporting the said lumber. PD No. 705 is a penal statute that punishes acts essentially malum
prohibitum. In other words, mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper
legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent is illegal.

ELENITA C. FAJARDO v. PEOPLE, GR No. 190889, 2011-01-10

Facts:
hat on or about the 28th day of August, 2002, in the morning, in Barangay Andagao, Municipality of
Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring,... confederating and mutually helping one another, without
authority of law, permit or license, did then and there, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in their possession, custody and control two (2) receivers of caliber .45 pistol, [M]odel [No.] M1911A1
US... with SN 763025 and Model [No.] M1911A1 US with defaced serial number, two (2) pieces short
magazine of M16 Armalite rifle, thirty-five (35) pieces live M16 ammunition 5.56 caliber and fourteen (14)
pieces live caliber .45 ammunition, which items were confiscated and... recovered from their possession
during a search conducted by members of the Provincial Intelligence Special Operation Group, Aklan
Police Provincial Office, Kalibo, Aklan, by virtue of Search Warrant No. 01 (9) 03 issued by OIC Executive
Judge Dean Telan of the Regional Trial
Court of Aklan.[3]
Petitioner was seen tucking a .45 caliber handgun between her waist and the waistband of her shorts,
after which, she entered the house and locked the main door.
At around 2:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. of August 28, 2002, Senior Police Officer 2 Clemencio Nava (SPO2
Nava), who was posted at the back portion of the house, saw Valerio emerge twice on top of the house
and throw something. The discarded objects landed near the wall of petitioner's... house and inside the
compound of a neighboring residence. SPO2 Nava, together with SPO1 Teodoro Neron and Jerome T.
Vega (Vega), radio announcer/reporter of RMN DYKR, as witness, recovered the discarded objects, which
turned out to be two (2) receivers of .45 caliber pistol,... model no. M1911A1 US, with serial number (SN)
763025, and model no. M1911A1 US, with a defaced serial number. The recovered items were then
surrendered to SPO1 Nathaniel A. Tan (SPO1 Tan), Group Investigator, who utilized them in applying for
and obtaining a search... warrant.
petitioner and Valerio failed to present any documents showing their authority to possess the confiscated
firearms and the two recovered receivers, a criminal information for violation of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, was filed against... them.
Petitioner disowned the confiscated items. She refused to sign the inventory/receipt prepared by the
raiding team, because the items allegedly belonged to her brother, Benito Fajardo, a staff sergeant of the
Philippine Army.
Resultantly, all firearms and explosives seized inside petitioner's residence were declared inadmissible in
evidence. However, the 2 receivers recovered by the policemen outside the house of petitioner before the
warrant was served were admitted as evidence, pursuant to the... plain view doctrine.
Accordingly, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of a part of a firearm, punishable
under paragraph 1, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. They were sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days to... five (5) years, four (4) months,
and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution dated
December 3, 2009.[12] Hence, the present recourse.
The CA correctly convicted Valerio with illegal possession of part of a firearm.
Issues:
In finding the accused liable for illegal possession of firearms, the RTC explained:
Ruling:
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC rejected the defenses advanced by accused, holding that the same were already denied in the
Orders dated December 31, 2002 and April 20, 2005, respectively denying the Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and Demurrer to Evidence. The said Orders were not... appealed and have thus attained finality.
The RTC also ruled that petitioner and Valerio were estopped from assailing the legality of their arrest
since they participated in the trial by presenting evidence for their defense. Likewise, by applying for bail,
they have effectively... waived such irregularities and defects.
Zaldy Valerio, the bodyguard of Elenita Fajardo, is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine
Army prior to his separation from his service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). With his military
background, it is safe to conclude that Zaldy Valerio is... familiar with and knowledgeable about different
types of firearms and ammunitions. As a former soldier, undoubtedly, he can assemble and disassemble
firearms.
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one's control... and management. This has to be
so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security,
which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish the object of... this law[,] the proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatsoever.
I]n order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal... intent.
o convict an accused for illegal possession of firearms and explosive under P.D. 1866, as amended, two
(2) essential elements must be indubitably established, viz.: (a) the existence of the subject firearm
ammunition or explosive which may be proved by the presentation... of the subject firearm or explosive or
by the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that
the accused has no license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition or explosive which fact
may be established by the... testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive
Consequently, petitioner and Valerio were convicted of illegal possession of firearms and explosives,
punishable under paragraph 2, Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294
Ruling of the CA
The CA concurred with the factual findings of the RTC, but disagreed with its conclusions of law, and held
that the search warrant was void
Hence, as correctly declared by the CA, the two receivers were admissible as evidence. The liability for
their possession, however, should fall only on Valerio and not on petitioner.
In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While
mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a
firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi... or an intent to possess on the part of
the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent
which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here refers to the
intention of the accused to commit... an offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not
important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that one may be
found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess... a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in
good faith and without criminal intent.
Certainly, illegal possession of firearms, or, in this case, part of a firearm, is committed when the holder
thereof:
(1) possesses a firearm or a part thereof
(2) lacks the authority or license to possess the firearm.[24]
We find that petitioner was neither in physical nor constructive possession of the subject receivers. The
testimony of SPO2 Nava clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house when the receivers
were thrown. None of the witnesses saw petitioner holding the receivers,... before or during their disposal.
At the very least, petitioner's possession of the receivers was merely incidental because Valerio, the one
in actual physical possession, was seen at the rooftop of petitioner's house. Absent any evidence pointing
to petitioner's participation, knowledge or consent in Valerio's... actions, she cannot be held liable for
illegal possession of the receivers.
Petitioner's apparent liability for illegal possession of part of a firearm can only proceed from the
assumption that one of the thrown receivers matches the gun seen tucked in the waistband of her shorts
earlier that night. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to convert such... assumption into concrete
evidence.
it was ascertained that Valerio is not a duly licensed/registered firearm holder of any type, kind, or caliber
of firearms.[29] To substantiate his statement, he submitted a... certification[30] to that effect and identified
the same in court.[31] The testimony of SPO1 Tan, or the certification, would suffice to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element.[32]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 10, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED with respect to petitioner Elenita Fajardo y Castro, who is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground
that her guilt was not proved beyond reasonable... doubt.
Principles:
The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
What the law requires is merely possession which includes not only actual physical possession but also
constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to... one's control and management. This has to be
so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security,
which the law penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its owner or a
borrower. To accomplish... the object of this law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no
bearing whatsoever.
But is the mere fact of physical or constructive possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful
possession of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a violation of the law? This
query assumes significance since the offense of illegal possession of... firearms is a malum prohibitum
punished by a special law, in which case good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.
When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be... distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very
nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in
the second (intent to... perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously.