Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Anti-Community
Irving Goh
IRVING GOH
Introducing Anti-Community
community will only fleetingly reappear at the end of that text with the
announcement of a “shadow of a people to come.” Like the silence of a
shadow then, the question of community is a silent problematic in
Deleuze and Guattari, making it almost strange, if not estranging, to
think the possibility of a future thought of community, or the possibility
of a thought of the future of community, in relation to their philosophy.
That, however, does not mean that we should henceforth commit to
forgetfulness the concept of community in Deleuze and Guattari. What
this paper is committed to do therefore is to unfold that silent
problematic of community, singularly in Deleuze and Guattari, and also
to unfold what that silent problematic reserves for the (future) thought of
community. (Friendship, which undoubtedly supplements as another
problematic for the thinking of community in Deleuze and Guattari,
certainly calls for equal analysis. But I would like to reserve that task as
a second paper to this study of community in Deleuze and Guattari.)
Here, I would like to take up the question of community, or perhaps
the question of the apparent absence of community, in Deleuze and
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, the second book that follows Anti-
O e d i p u s . In A Thousand Plateaus, as in Anti-Oedipus, there is a
movement of what I will call “anti-community.” The word
“community” is hardly articulated in both texts. And when Deleuze
and Guattari do so, it hinges on the negative, as something that is anti-
thought, something that thought should not regress to (hence my use of
the term “anti-community”). For example, in A Thousand Plateaus,
where what is argued for is unrestricted or non-striated movement,
“community” is the form in which there is the danger of “run[ning] the
risk of reproducing . . . the rigid” (228). Yet what remains as the critical
concept in and to A Thousand Plateaus—the concept of nomadology—is
undeniably already communitarian, for nomads, from which
nomadology takes its image, are irreducibly tribal or of the pack, and
hence already manifesting itself as of a certain communitarian force.
And Deleuze and Guattari’s apparent reservation to give nomadology’s
communitarian expression its full force can never erase that
communitarian trace. How then does one approach the thought of
community in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of nomadology? In
other words, how does one think the idea of community in Deleuze and
Guattari when there is an apparent absence if not resistance of it in their
writing?
But let me interrupt those questions and speak first of the phrase
“anti-community,” situating it in a more general context before
attaching it to the question of community in Deleuze and Guattari.
Why anti-community? Why a phrase that suggests a violence against
something or some term that has at least put into place in this world
some form of harmonious living between humans? Perhaps one could
begin with less radicality by saying anti-“community” first, and from
218 Irving Goh Community in Deleuze and Guattari (I)
which one is able to subsequently discern why there should be a call for
the obviation of community today. In anti-“community,” the quotation
marks around the word community would signal linguistic markers,
indexing community as a mark of verbal speech. To be more precise,
they would mark community as an excess of speech, fallen from any act
of thought, rendering community and/or “community” as a
meretricious speech act. This is not simply a pessimism on paper. It is
very much a contemporaneous actuality. As Zygmunt Bauman has
observed, the word “community” as how we have been treating it has
been “so loud and vociferous” (11). We, Bauman continues, have
invoked “community” only to uncritically sing its praises, “telling the
others to admire them or shut up,” so much so that “community is no
more (or not yet, as the case may be)” (12). To every existing
community, there is to be no disagreement to the practices, codes, and
norms that are already in place. Communities and their practices
would be impervious to critique and to any suggestion of future
betterment via altogether different strategies. One may witness such a
philosophical let-down of thinking about community by turning to
contemporary affairs of the world. There can be no doubt that there is
so much talk about community today, particularly about an
“international community,” in global political discourse. But one is
often left thinking what or where such a community is, if not its
veracity. The term “international community” after all has been
invoked most oftentimes only as an alibi for the justification of the
violent decimation of a state-entity by another of global politico-
economic-military leverage when the former insists on a path contrary
to the political and economic interests of the latter. Otherwise, when the
“international community” has been called for so that the cosmopolitan
collectivity of sovereign states may be an effective force to end
humanitarian violence, poverty, tyranny, etc., in some place of the
world (one remembers, of late, the names Darfur and Sudan), the
response unfortunately has been less than desirable, which henceforth
seriously weakens the idea of the existence of any such “international
community.” And in almost the same vein as Bauman, Nancy in The
Inoperative Community has also suggested that community is like the
word “love,” which we say too much without finally saying it, without
touching the heart of the matter. Should we then not reserve a breath
for community and not articulate it for a moment, but take that moment
to think what remains for us to think about community today?
But anti-“community” will not be about rejecting communities
absolutely. It will not be about dismantling or destroying absolutely the
idea or notion we call “community,” though it will indeed put forth a
certain necessary violence against that codified convention the world
presently calls “community.” To think a future (of) community, a
verbal anti-“community” is not enough. It will also be necessary to
s ym pl okē 219
undo if not strike out at the myths and false idealisms of community.
That is the necessary violence of anti-community—this time without
quotation marks around the word “community.” But it is a violence
that will only ultimately return “community” to an active process of
thought. This paper (despite its title) is therefore not anti-community
per se, in the sense that it is looking towards an absolutely nihilistic
horizon for community. And neither is Deleuze and Guattari’s
philosophy of nomadology. The “anti” of negation in anti-community
that this discussion is engaged with operates not so much on community
as idea or thought as on the linguistic articulation of that idea. To say it
again, it is really the verbal reiteration of “community”—articulated
endlessly without submitting it to critical thought, enunciated as if it
could ever if not already adequately give us that thing called
“community”—that has so far contaminated any future possibility of
thinking about community. We will have to begin to refrain from
uttering “community.” We will be anti-community just so to create a
clearing for a free space of thought for another thinking of community.
We will have to be anti-community not so that we will stop thinking
about community but to return community to a proper thinking, a
thinking that is always open to its futures, a thinking without horizon.
That is my hypothesis for a future thought for community, for a future
of community, or for a future community. That is also my hypothesis
with regard to the question of (the absence of) community in Deleuze
and Guattari. Anti-community for a future (of) community is what I
believe the apparent absence of community in Deleuze and Guattari
helps us to do. What I am arguing therefore is that there is a force of
anti-community at work in Deleuze and Guattari, which only returns
community to a whole new movement of thought, even though this
movement is undeniably one that will be of a “chaoid” (to use their
term from What is Philosophy?) trajectory. This is the reading that I will
give to Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, with particular focus
on that “plateau”—the “nomadology” plateau—in A Thousand Plateaus
that speaks precisely of a certain sense of community, which at the same
time is veiled by an ironic reservation of what we call “community.”
2 “We certainly would not say that discipline is what defines a war machine:
discipline is the characteristic required of armies after the State has appropriated
them. The war machine answers to other rules. We are not saying that they are
better, of course, only that they animate a fundamental indiscipline of the warrior, a
questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very
volatile sense of honor, all of which, once again, impedes the formation of the State”
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 358; my italics). Deleuze will return to this question of
the betrayal in Dialogues (1987). Deleuze, on speaking of nomads “who have neither
past nor future” will also reaffirm that in the trajectory of nomadic movement, “there
is always betrayal in a line of flight” (38, 40). This betrayal is “not trickery like that of
an orderly man ordering his future, but betrayal like that of a simple man who no
longer has any past or future” (40).
s ym pl okē 221
N-1 Community
Now, I have said, and Deleuze and Guattari themselves have also
said, that the nomadic war machine reads more as a solitary force than a
communitarian one. But that is not to say that it is not open to a space
in which the space is constituted by a situation of more-than-itself.
Smooth space is after all a space of more-than-itself. Smooth spaces “are
not without people” (1987, 506). But these people, these other
experimental people, are those who have left behind the striated spaces
of State-communities. They do not bind or delimit themselves with a
defined territorial organization. “They have a local construction
excluding the prior determination of a base domain . . . . They have
extrinsic and situational properties, or relations irreducible to intrinsic
properties of a structure,” as Deleuze and Guattari write (209). These
people are multiplicities as Deleuze and Guattari also call them, and
they affirm and exercise the freedom to come together or break away.
Multiplicities enjoy “a certain leeway, between the two extreme poles of
fusion and scission” (209).
And there is always a relation between multiplicities and smooth
space. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “a heterogeneous smooth
space . . . is wedded to a very particular multiplicity: non-metric,
acentered, rhizomatic multiplicities which occupy space without
‘counting’ it and can ‘only be explored by legwork’” (371). The bodies
of multiplicity may be “non-metric,” but as multiplicity, there is
inevitably the notion of number, if not of the numerous, though there is
nothing numerically definitive about it. (Here, one may even say, in
the conventional understanding of what makes a community, that there
is already a sense of community with multiplicities, since community
always already involves some gathering of some numerous.) Except
the number here is no longer that which is of a quantitative measure:
“The number is no longer a means of counting or measuring, but of
moving” (387). It constitutes a geography, a mapping out of a
gathering, a gathering whose cartography is constantly changing as the
experiment goes along. This number, or this “numbering number” as
Deleuze and Guattari call it, does not function as an index of formal or
224 Irving Goh Community in Deleuze and Guattari (I)
makes it necessary also “to take into account arithmetic relations that are
external” (391). What the smooth space of the nomadological war
machine articulates is therefore difference or alterity, and exteriority. In
Deleuze and Guattari’s words, the nomadological war machine
“produces its effect of immensity by its fine articulation, in other words
by its distribution of heterogeneity in free space” (391). The rhythmics
of the nomadological war machine is therefore also, to wit, “not
harmonic” (390), contra the myth of harmonious relations within
conventional communities. With the nomadic war machine, there is
always the possibility or the freedom of a dissonant line irrupting the
stability of a melodious line of conventional communities, or else to
break away with its own other trajectory. Attaching itself to at times
threateningly and possibly fragmenting elements of heterogeneity or
alterity, the architecture of smooth space of multiplicity created by the
nomadic war machine is not a bunker architecture. Instead, it is more a
bridge architecture, an architecture of moving bridges, or “movable
bridges” in Deleuze and Guattari’s words in What is Philosophy? It is a
question of bridges that are always constructing towards a future
community. If there is any architecture of community that the
nomadological war machine projects, it will only be an undefined
architecture. It will not be a finished, enclosed architecture, but an
architecture-to-come, an architecture-in-progress, an architecture-on-the-
way. As Deleuze and Guattari themselves say, “It is not a question of
this or that place on earth . . . . It is a question of a model that is
perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is
perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again” (20).
With the nomadological war machine, the architecture of community is
always a question of “relaying” these architectures-on-the-way: “only
relays, intermezzos, resurgences” (377).
It is with such an architecture that Deleuze and Guattari’s
nomadological war machine is always maintaining a thought of
community, maintaining the free space of thought of community,
maintaining the freedom of another thought of community, the thought
of another future community to come. At the end, it is more of
community rather than anti-community in the nihilistic sense. After all,
the nomadic war machine clears a smooth space only for a “movement
of people in that space” and in which “it is a very special kind of
distribution, one without division into shares, in a space without borders
or enclosure” (422, 380). In other words, it smashes present
communities from within only to seek another future communitarian
arrangement such that within that space, thought is free, that there is a
freedom of movement of coming and leaving, that there is no politics or
economics of counting, and the possibilities of and to the outside are
always open. After all too, the nomadological war machine conducts
war against striated spaces like the State and overcodified communities
226 Irving Goh Community in Deleuze and Guattari (I)
only “on the condition that [it] simultaneously create[s] something else,
if only new nonorganic social relations” (423). This other social relation,
this new communitarian assemblage, may be “nonorganic” perhaps
because it will be an inhuman community, inhuman because freed from
the anxieties of subjectivity, representational drive, and consciousness of
the metaphysical human Being—Being that thinks limitedly and
inclusively only in the image of itself, and Being that only looks
towards a One of totality of community or a community of a
quantitatively accumulative One. Once again, the nomadological war
machine reads fascinatingly as an “absolute solitude.” But Deleuze and
Guattari will also always reaffirm that “it is an extremely populous
solitude, like the desert itself, a solitude already interlaced with a
people to come, one that invokes and awaits that people, existing only
through it, though it is not yet here” (377). The nomadic war machine
is always already singularly plural, to use Nancy’s term. And it is
therefore always already a question of a community-to-come, a
community-to-come that renders any signifying articulation of it as
finally a “community” a belatedness, a community-to-come that renders
any representation of it as a cutting-off of itself from the flow or passage
of the community-to-come. It is “an ambulant people of relayers” that
the nomadological war machine awaits and clears a path for, “rather
than a model society” (377), rather than a model (of) community.
To recapitulate, the anti-community force of the nomadological war
machine projects both a “disarticulation” of “community” and a violent
combative projectile against it. The latter is a necessary combat,
necessary only because communities have become target communities
for the formation and maintenance of the State, or else its own striating
totalitarian micropolitics. But the nomadological war machine is anti-
community only because it maintains the future of community,
maintains the possibility of a future, radical, and other community to
come. It is never nihilistic with regard to community. Instead, what it
does, for community, is to allow the chance of the future event of a
community-to-come to take place. With Deleuze and Guattari then, and
at least in A Thousand Plateaus and particularly with the image of
nomadology of A Thousand Plateaus as I have tried to show, philosophy
is always a question of community. For Deleuze and Guattari, we are
always arriving at or moving towards a community with philosophy,
but a community that is as indefinite as its linguistic article not because
it is not able to decide itself (as community), and not because it is not
sure of itself, but because it is always open to something new, always
forms itself anew, which as such guarantees its future, and even
promises a radical future unrestricted to its present form. It is a
community that is decisively (an) undecidability, an indecision that is
properly in-decision, as Nancy would put it. It decides on its openness
s ym pl okē 227
Conclusion:
Deterritorializing (from) the Real / Becoming-Animal
At this point, one may ask what is this communitarian nomadic war
machine in real terms, and where and how could one locate it in the real
world today, if not, for tomorrow? What and where can there be an
empirical trace of such a “mass” or “people” that is communitarian
precisely because of its anti-community force? One could be tempted to
think of the subterranean or rather hyperreal community of digital
hackers. This community after all has been described in no less
Deleuzian terms by McKenzie Wark in his A Hacker Manifesto as such:
“Whether we come to represent ourselves as researchers or authors,
artists or biologists, chemists or musicians, philosophers or
programmers, each of these subjectivities [of the hacker community] is
but a fragment of a class still becoming, bit by bit, aware of itself as
such” (002). It is a community of a “collective hack that realizes a class
interest based on an alignment of differences rather than a coercive
unity” (006), a community that is always reinventing technics that will
go round, if not smash from within, legal limits of the State that try to
restrain the sharing of digital information via peer-to-peer technology.
One could indeed pursue such a thread and give a nomadological
contour to such a community. But I would like to resist doing so. That
would, perhaps, be too easy. And that would also somewhat amount to
ignoring some of the dangers in (thinking of) locating the nomadic war
machine in the real. “We lack resistance to the present” (Deleuze and
Guattari 1994, 108).
To locate the nomadic war machine in the real is firstly to
presuppose that it already presently exists. And if it is already visible in
some way or other, it surely would already be subject to the State’s
monitoring of its deviation from a State-managed and State-controlled
community. The State would not allow any minimal deviation of its
people to extend beyond a certain duration. In no time, the policing
forces of striation would have swarmed in on this deviation. And in
any case, even before the declension of the striating forces falls on the
deviating elements, the latter collective would have lost its constitution
as a nomadological war machine, for to be perceptible as part of the
existing community implies that it is in some ways part of the existing
status quo of life. But the nomadological war machine is always that
which departs from the normalized conditions of living. It does not want
any part of it. It does not want to be part of it. And because it departs,
228 Irving Goh Community in Deleuze and Guattari (I)
it would belong not to the order of the perceptible but the order of the
disappeared or disappearing. And in that sense, there can be no way of
locating this nomadological war machine in the real such that one could
hypostasize it as a subject of analysis. There is no doubt that the
nomadic war machine is real and exists within the horizons of the real,
but it dislocates itself in the perceptible way of things. It has departed
only by its disappearance, its rendering itself in-visible. It occupies space
but only by making a desert of that space, a space of a desert so empty and
so minimal in contrast to the excess of the global metropolis that
surrounds contemporary communities, such that no one else sees it. It is
dis-location par excellence. And it is the nomadic war machine as dis-
location that renders it difficult to be located in the real.
Deleuze and Guattari themselves are also careful not to identify any
empirical social group, contemporaneous to the context of the writing of
A Thousand Plateaus, as possible communitarian nomadological war
machines. They understand the limits and dangers of the visible real.
And so in A Thousand Plateaus, they do not look to the present or rather
to what is present to seek out the potential nomadic war machine. The
only reserve that is left in A Thousand Plateaus for thinking the nomadic
war machine in the real is that problematic real of which they will call
becoming-animal. Becoming-animal, which is not the anthropomorphic
mimesis of animals, is about the adjacent space between the human and
the animal. It is a “phenomenon of bordering” (Deleuze and Guattari
1987, 345) between the human and the animal, in which a molecular
anti-anthropomorphism at the edges of the human departs and
communicates with the molecular particles of the animal that have
likewise left the frays of its form. This is the communitarian
“transversal communications between heterogeneous populations” of
becoming-animal by “unnatural participation” (345). On the
communitarian horizon of becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari will
also say, “A becoming-animal always involves a pack, a band, a
population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity” (239). Like the “people
to come” that the nomadic war machine looks forward to, the pack, the
band, or the multiplicity involved with a becoming-animal is nothing
structured. There is no conscious investment to build up such a
community. Its future is not determined by any methodical calculation
or rationality. And like the unquantifiable n-1 future community of the
nomadic war machine, the elements within this multiplicity are
uncounted, uncountable. “A multiplicity is defined not by its elements,
nor by a center of unification or comprehension” (249).
And again like the nomadic war machine, the communitarian event
of becoming-animal proceeds with anti-community gestures. It begins
with what Deleuze and Guattari call the “anomic.” This “anomic” is an
“exceptional individual” (243), but it is not exceptional in the sense that
it is absolutely outside the law of the group or existing community.
s ym pl okē 229
Instead, it traverses the border between being with the law and being
outside the law. It is like a shadow at this border, and one can never be
sure if this shadow is going to incline towards the outside or back within
acceptable boundaries. And yet this is enough to render it a figure of
uncertainty or potential chaos in the eyes of power. It does not violate
the law but its being at the border just disturbs the stability or
equilibrium of the law (and is therefore something of an anti-community
potentiality). And it is through an intuitive affinity with this (anti-
community) “anomic” that a becoming-animal is put into effect. As
Deleuze and Guattari say, “you will . . . find an exceptional individual,
and it is with that individual that an alliance must be made in order to
become-animal” (243). It is with the “anomic” that an event of
becoming-animal “arrives and passes at the edge” (245) of the human.
And from then on, like the anti-community/communitarian nomadic
war machine, becoming-animal is a potential violence against any force
that structures for all within its grasp a rigidity of belonging, for
example, conventionally codified communities. Becoming-animal “is
accompanied, at its origin as in its undertaking, by a rupture with the
central institutions that have established themselves or seek to become
established” (247), and “we should not confuse these dark assemblages
. . . with organizations such as the institutions of the family and the
State apparatus” (242).
The affinity between becoming-animal and the nomadic war
machine is undeniable. Deleuze and Guattari will even say that there
are “becomings-animal in the war machine” (247). One then is not
surprised to find the echo of the betrayal function of the nomadic war
machine in becoming-animal too. The advance of a becoming-animal
will also see to the undoing of the alliance with the “anomic.” This is its
other anti-community gesture. Becoming-animal will betray the
“anomic”: “I have to strike him to get at the pack as a whole, to reach
the pack as a whole and pass beyond it” (245). In a becoming-animal,
one will strike at the “exceptional individual” who is not only critical for
the constituting of a friendship that will lead one to become-animal, but
who will also lead one to the pack, the band, a peopling, the
communitarian multiplicity. And one will certainly not rest with the
communitarian outcome (“to reach the pack”) of the betrayal. In fact,
one will trace a further anti-community trajectory and “pass beyond”
the pack, the band, the multiplicity, but surely for other “new
nonorganic social relations.”
Now, why becoming-animal is a problematic real, or why it is
difficult if not impossible to locate in the real, is because it is a “zone of
indiscernibility” (280). It proceeds by being “something more secret,
more subterranean” (237) than what the real would like to spectacularly
demonstrate to visibility. Becoming-animal puts forth “an objective
zone of indetermination or uncertainty” (237), and presents at best a
230 Irving Goh Community in Deleuze and Guattari (I)
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
s ym pl okē 231
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