THE SUMMUM BONUM, THE MORAL LAW,

AND THE EXISTENCE OF GOD*

by Mary-Barbara Zeldin, Hollins College/Virginia

In his Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason Lewis White Beck

finds fault with Kant's concept of the highest good and with his moral argument
for the existence of God. Kant, he notes, makes the following points:
1. The moral law commands the promotion of the summum bonum *.
2. Since reason commands the promotion of the summum bonum, if it were
not possible, the moral law would be null and void 2 . It is on these grounds that
Kant claims that the existence of the conditions of the possibility of the summum
bonum must be postulated 3.
3. Given the finite nature of man, the hope for the highest good is a necessary
incentive for his doing his duty 4 .
Beck objects that:
1. (a) The command to promote the summum bonum is not to be found in
any of the formulations of the categorical imperative 5. (b) If it is neverteheless
so contained, it is then an implication of the categorical imperative and thus can
contain no more than the concept of morality, i. e., it cannot also contain that
of happiness 6.
2. The fact that the moral law would be null and void if the object of its
command were not possible implies that the object of the command (the summum
* In this essay all references to the German text of Kant's works are to the edition
by Ernst Cassirer of Immanuel Kants Werke, 11 Bände, Berlin, 1912—1922. References
to the Kritik der reinen Vernunft, however, are to the pagin g of the first edition äs
well äs to that of the second edition, which is the one printed by Cassirer. They
are indicated äs "A" and "B" respectively. References to English translations of
Kant's works are to the following: Critique of Pure Reason: Norman Kemp Smith
translation, second impression with corrections of 1933; Fundamental Principles of the
Metaphysic of Ethlcs: Abbott translation, in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and
Other Works on the Theory of Etbics, sixth edition, reprint of 1948 (= Fundamental
Principles); Critique of Practical Reason: Abbott translation in the volume referred
to above; Critique of /udgment: Bernard translation in the '^iafner Library of
Classics" edition, second printing, 1961; Religion witbin the Limits of Reason Ahne:
Greene and Hudson translation in the "Harper Torchbook" edition of 1960 (=
Religion).
1
Beck, First Phoenix Edidon, Chicago, 1963, pp. 253, 261.
2
Ibid., pp. 244, 254, 274, and see 255n.l7.
3
Ibid., pp. 253—54.
« Ibid., p. 243.
5
Ibid., p. 244.
Ibid.

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bonum) is eithcr analytlcally related to the moral law — in which case the exi-
stcnce of God nccd not be postulated — or a priori necessarily synthetically re-
lated to it — in whidi case heteronomy is implied. Bede, however, rejects both
alternatives 7,
3. If hope for the summurn bonum is a necessary incentive for man's doing bis
duty, (a) the autonomy of the moral law is forfeited 8 and (b) the validity of
the postulates and of the belief'in the possibility of the summum bonum are
restricted to man and to his "all-too-human", reason 9; the claim that "moral
philosophy abstracts, even more than theoretical philosophy, from the peculiar
nature of human reason", cannot be made with respect to the postulates, and
the force of the moral argument is therefore correspondingly limited10.
4. Beck concludes by saying that the summum bonum is not a practical concept
at all n and its possibility is not directly necessary to morality 12.
Beck himself mitigates these objections 13, but the criticisms remain. The aim
of this paper is to elucidate Kant's arguments in these matters and to show that
Beck's objections can be, if not definitively refuted, at least circumvented so that
Kant's remarks are consistent with his general views.

Kant's moral argument is not a proof14: the proposition, äs Kant is at pains

to point out15, is undemonstrable and is therefore merely postulated16. On
the other hand, it is clear that Kant considered the argument a sound one,
since he used it again and again. In barest outline, it runs äs follows:
1. The moral law is a fact for all rational beings.
2. It commands categorically.
7 £.g., pp. 241, 252—55.
8
Ibid., p. 244.
8
Ibid., p. 254.
10
Ibid., p. 253n.46, referring to Fundamental Principles, p. 28 (Cassirer, IV, p. 269).
11
Beck, ibid., p. 245.
12
Ibid.
13
See especially ibid., pp. 254—55 with reference to the second of these four ob-
jections and 253n.46 with reference to the third.
14
In the Critique of Judgment (Section 57, Remark I) Kant distinguishes proofs
from demonstrations. The moral argument is, in these terms, obiously not a demonstra-
tion; it is a 'proof* insofar äs it is grounded in subjective principles of cognition
and one practical objective fact. It is in this sense qnly that Kant can cail the argu-
ment a 'proof in Sections 87 and 88 of this Critique. The argument is not, however, a
theoretical proof, i. e., not a proof in the usual sense of the term, nor does Kant ever
claim that it is [see also Critique of Judgment, p. 301n.l5 (Cassirer, V, p. 531n.l)].
15
E.g., A829/B857 (N. K. Smith, p. 650) and Critique of Practical Reason, p. 219
(Cassirer, V, p. 133).
16
A postulate is "a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable äs such, but whidi is
an inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical law" [Critique of Practical
Reason, p. 219 (Cassirer, V, p. 133.)].

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 3. It commands us (a) to promote the summum bonum, or (b) to achieve the
summum bonum.
4. We cannot logically be commanded what is logically or-really impossible17.
5. The promotion or adiievement of the summum bonum is logically and really
possible only if the summum bonum is logically and really possible.
6. The summum bonum is really possible, for the understanding of a finite
rational being, only if God exists.
7. Hence, if (a) we are to do our duty and thus promote the summum bonum
or (b) we are to do our duty and achieve the summum bonum, we must
postulate that God exists.
8. Since we are categorically commanded to do our duty, the postulate is
necessary: the belief in the existence of God is a necessary belief of a
finite rational being, i. e., it is a belief of bis practical reason or a necessary
moral belief.
These premises require support or, at least, explanation.
1. The moral law is a fact for all rational beings because the moral law is
pure reason in its practical employment18.
2. Unlike a phenomenal fact, it is not in any way contingent or conditional.
It holds absolutely äs a rational fact — a fact of reason's very nature — for any
rational being whose reason has a practical employment, and it would hold even
for a rational being who never acted at all, so long äs such a being was capable
of conceiving action 19.
3. Kant sometimes says20 that we are commanded to promote the summum
bonum and at other times 21 that we are commanded to achieve it. This point

17
Kant distinguishes two kinds of possibility, logical and real. Something is logi-
cally possible if it can be thought without contradiction; it is really possible if it
"agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with the conditions of intui-
tion and concepts" [A218/B265 (N. K. Smith, p. 239)].
18
Critique of Practtal Reason, p. 122, (Cassirer, V, p. 38): "The moral law expresses
nothing eise than the autonomy of the pure practical reason," that is, the expression
of the content of the moral law is the pure activity of reason, äs the faculty of laws, in
its practical employment. The two are.thus identicai in intension. That the moral law
is a fact is a basic thesis of Kant's [see, e.g., Critique of Practical Reason, p. 136 (Cassirer,
V, p. 53), and Beck, The Fact of Reason: An Essay on Jnstification in Ethics, in: Studie*
in The Philosophy of Kant, Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City, 1965, pp. 200—
214, first published in German in Kant-Studien, LII (1960), pp. 271—85].
19
A556/B584 (N. K. Smith, p. 478): "Reason is present in all the actions of men at
all times under all circumstances, and is always the same." In Kant's usage all action,
äs such, involves reason; any other mode of dränge is not action, but, at best, reaction
(see H. J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative, Chicago, 1948, pp. 82—83, for an excellent
brief discussion of this point).
" E.g., Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 210, 211, 215, 221, 222, 226, 227, 230,
242n. (Cassirer, V, pp. 124, 125, 129, 135, 136, 140, 141, 144, 155n.l); Critique of ]udg-
ment, p. 301 (Cassirer, V, p. 531) and Religion, p. 5n. (Cassirer, VI, p. 144, n.l).
21
£.g., Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 209, 218, 231, 232 (Cassirer, V, pp. 123,
132, 145, 147); Critique of Pure Reason, A813/B841 (N. K. Smith, p. 640).

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has bccn ably discussed by John R. Silber 22 . Kant is at least saying that it is
onr duty to promotc thc summum bonum.
4. A command that commands what (a) logically or (b) really cannot be is
itself logically impossible: (a) What logically cannot be, cannot be commanded,
since it cannot be an object of reason in any employment. (b) What really
cannot be or be achieved cannot be commanded because it cannot be an object
for, cannot be understood in the füll objective sense by, any finite rational being
with a sensuous Intuition of any kind 23, while nothing can be commanded to a
rational being with a non-sensuous Intuition since such a being "would have no
objects but those which are actual" 24. In other words, any being whose practical
reason can be impure and for whom, consequently, the moral law is a law of
duty 25 which commands, must understand, not merely logically through un-
schematized categories, but äs an object, the moral law äs a command, and must
therefore be able to sdiematize it by some Schema both äs to its meaning and äs
to its complete object26. So doing gives the law content in terms of, or
analogous to, the forms of experience possible for the rational being in question
and thus makes the object commanded really possible for that being 27. Thus no
rational being whose will is not holy can be commanded what cannot really be,
because he would then simply not be aware of the command and it would thus
not be a command for him. To be commanded the production of a something-
I-know-not-what is tantamount to being aware of something which means
nothing and is thus not a something 28.

22
Kant's Conception of the Highest Cood äs Immanent and Transcendent, in:
Philosophical Review, LXVIII (1959), pp. 469—92.
23
That is, any rational being whose Intuition is not intellectual.
24
Critique of Judgment, Section 76, especially pp. 250 and 252 (Cassirer, V, pp.
480 and 482).
25
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 175: "The moral law is in fact for the will
(Wille) of a perfect being a law of boliness, but for the will (Wille) of every finite
rational being a law of duty, of moral constraint..." (Cassirer, V, p. 90).
26
In other words, he must be capable of representing it to himself. With regard to
the meaning of the law, "without something which [the judgment] could use äs an exam-
ple in a case of experience, it could not give the law of a pure practical reason its
proper use in practice" [Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 161—62 (Cassirer, V, p. 78)];
the type of the law of nature provides the required sdiema in this regard [see: "Of
the Type of the Pure Practical Judgment," Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 159—63
(Cassirer, V, pp. 75—79)].
27
For the rational creature with a two-dimensional spatial Intuition a command to
produce or even to try to produce äs an experience for itself a three-dimensional object
is meaningless, just äs for man n-dimensional figures are logically but not empirically
possible objects.
28
This state of affairs does not imply that man or any finite rational being there-
fore has a need "to know the outcome of [his] moral actions" [Religion, p. 5n. (Cassirer,
VI, p. 144, n. 1)]. The moral law still commands "absolutely, be the consequence what it
will" (ibid.). But such a being must know what the command is, i.e., have an understanding
of what he is to promote: "The representation of the effect [of the determination of

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 5. The same argument holds for this next point. We logically cannot bc
commanded the absurd or the incomprehensible. Although we may understand
the notion of "promoting", the command is, even if we accept alternative (3a),
not just to promote, but to promote the summum bonum, and if the summum
bonum is really impossible, then the whole command is similarly irapossible, äs:
if A ^ B —B, then —A.
6. Although, äs the content of the categorical imperative, the summum bonum
(i. e., the complete object which is, or of which the promotion is commanded) is
derived from "the mere form of law" in conjunction with the form of the law
of nature äs a Schema, it is, for any finite rational being, synthetically related
to the law and to the duty of that being insofar äs its real possibility is concerned.
To derive the content from the moral law the schema of the law of nature was
used. To ensure the real possibility of this content, however, this schema cannot
again be used, for the summum bonum is not natural, is not given äs a fact of
experience or äs related to facts of experience by means of the law of natural
causality. The summum bonum only ought to be. Thus, although the object
commanded must be really possible, that this object is really possible is not esta-
blished and nothing in the world is adequate to it. Now, the summum bonum äs
the complete object of the moral law is an ultimate end of reason29. It thus
involves a total systematic unity in moral terms, i. e., a moral world in which
what is or will be is what ought to be 30. For a finite rational being who knows
only natural and practical causality, that is, only the laws of experience and the
laws of freedom, the real possibility of such a world rests on a cause adequate
to this total moral effect, i. e., an omnipotent and moral cause. This is what we
call God. Hence, the complete object of the moral law is possibly only if God
exists.
7. and 8. Thus although we do not know that God exists and that the summum
bonum is really possible, since we are finite rational beings and our conclusions
in these matters are not based on the only grounds of knowledge we can have, i.e.
on experience, we may and must believe that the object of the moral law is really
possible and hence postulate that God exists: (a) We must believe in the real
possibility of the summum bonum and postulate the existence of God if the moral
law is to command and not be a mere "law of thought." (b) We may and must

my will] must be capable of being accepted, not, indeed, äs the basis for the deter-
mination of my will [Willkür] and äs an end antecedently almed at, but yet äs an end
conceived of äs the result ensuing from the wiirs [Willkür] determination through the
law ... Without an end of this sort a will [Willkür], envisaging to itself no definite
goal [Gegenstand] for a contemplated act, either objective or subjective (whidi it has
in view), is indeed informed äs to how it ought to act, but not wbither" [Religion,
p. 4 (Cassirer, VI, pp. 142—43)].
29
A840/B868 (N. K- Smith, pp. 658—59), Critique of Judgment, p. 294 (Cassirer, V, p.
524), and passim.
30
A808/B836 (N. IC Smith, pp. 637—38), A814/B842 (N.K.Smith, p.641), Fundamen-
tal Principlcs, p. 55 (Cassirer, IV, p. 295), and passim.

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postulatc thc cxistcncc of God bccause, in accordance with Kant's views äs
cxprcsscd in thc scction on "Opining, Knowing and Believing" of the Critique
o} Pure Reason, it is a necessary moral belief: the (promotion of the) summum
bonum is the object and end of an absolute, factually given command and is
thus absolutely necessary; it can only be such an end for a finite rational being
if it is really possible; the only subjective possibility of the real possibility of
the summum bonumy i. e., the only possible means of its real possibility knowable
to any finite rational being, is belief in the existence of God.
The existence of God is neither more nor less than a necessary moral belief:
It is no more, for there is no knowledge, in the Kantian sense of a relation to the
possibility of experience; it is no less, for the subjective judgment is based on
more than mere opinion — it is not a hypothesis grounded in and developed to
explain an empirical fact. It is "a theoretical proposition, not demonstrable
äs such, but which is the inseparable result of an unconditional a priori practical
law" 31, i. e., a postulate. Thus, "the postulate of the possibility of the higbest
derived good ... is likeweise the postulate of the reality of a higbest original
good" a*.
In this generalized version of the moral argument we reach the conclusion that
the belief in the existence of God is rationally necessary for finite beings, but that
there is no objective certainty of God's existence and that the sphere of theore-
tical knowledge has not been enlarged in any way.
Kant is by no means disturbed by the meagerness of these results of his efforts.
If we could go further and establish the existence of God with certainty, "God
and eternity with their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our
eyes"33; man would act from maxims of prudence; he would, in fact, "be
changed into a mere mechanism, in which, äs in a puppet-show, everything would
gesticulate well,.but there would be no life in the figures"34. What is more,
nature, which at first seemed stepmotherly in the means she has provided to us to
achieve our end , has in fact acted with wisdom and justice, for
in matters whidi concern all men without distinction nature is not guilty of any
partial distribution of her gifts, and ... the highest philosophy cannot advance further
than is possible unter the guidance whidi nature has bestowed upon the most ordinary
understanding 3e.

31
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 219 (Cassirer, V, p. 133), and see p. 53 f.
32
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 222 (Cassirer, V, p. 136).
33
Ibid., p. 245 (Cassirer, V, p. 159).
34
Ibid. See also Critique of Judgment, p. 334—35 (Cassirer, V, p. 564).
35
Ibid., p. 245 (Cassirer, V, p. 158).
36
A831/B859 (N. K. Smith, p. 652).

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 II

I shall now try to reply to Beck's criticisms.

1. (a) The command to promote the summum bonum is not to be found in
any of the formulations of the categorical imperative 37.
The third formulation of the categorical imperative in the Fundamental
Principles is "the idea of the will of every rational being äs a universally
legislative will" 88; this is "the systematic union of rational beings by common
objective laws, i. e., a kingdom which may be called a kingdom of ends" 89. This
formula, "that all maxims ought by their own legislation to harmonize with a
possible kingdom of ends"40 is, Kant says, one of "three modes of presenting
the principle of morality" 41; it is only one of "so many formulae of the very
same law" 42.
This kingdom of ends is, however, identical with the idea of a moral world äs
described in the Crltlque of Pure Reason 43 and the latter, in turn, is the summum
bonum 44. Thus, the command to promote the summum bonum, äs the kingdom
of ends, is found in the third formulation of the categorical imperative.
1. (b) If the command to promote the summum bonum is contained in a for-
mulation of the categorical imperative, it is implied by the categorical imperative
and thus can contain no more than the concept of morality, i. e., it cannot contain
that of happiness 45.
The concept of the summum bonum does contain more than that of the concept
of morality äs such, although it is derived from the latter. It does so in two ways:
(1) The kingdom of ends to be promoted or achieved is, Kant says in the
Fundamental Principles, the "complete characterization of all maxims by means"
of the moral law46, äs it is brought "nearer to intuition"47. In the Critique
of Practical Reason, on the other hand, Kant teils us that the summum bonum is
"the whole [complete, ganze] object [Gegenstand] of a pure practical reason, i. e.,
[of] a pure will [Wille]" 48 and is its ideal 4Ö . We have seen that the kingdom
37
See p. 43.
38
Fundamental Principles, p. 49 (Cassirer, IV, p. 289).
*» Ibid., p. 52 (Cassirer, IV, p. 292). v
40
Ibid., p. 55 (Cassirer, IV, p. 295).
41
Ibid., p. 54 (Cassirer, IV, p. 294).
42
Ibid.
« A807—15/B835—43 (N. K. Smith, pp. 636—42).
44
A810—11/B838—39 (N. K. Smith, p. 639): It is ... only in the ideal of the supreme
original good that pure reason can find the ground of this connection ... between the two
elements of the supreme derivative good [höchsten abgeleiteten Guts] — the ground, name-
ly, of an intelligible, that is, moral world."
45
See p. 43.
40
Fundamental Principles, p. 55 (Cassirer, IV, p. 295).
47
Ibid., p. 54 (Cassirer, IV, p. 295).
4B
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 204; I have inserted "of" to indicate the German
genitive (Cassirer, V, p. 119). Kant distinguishes "object" äs Gegenstand from "object"
äs Objekt. A Gegenstand of pure practical reason is the form of an action [sce

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of ends and the summum bonum are identical. Thus, the summum bonum is
both the complete characterization of all maxims by means of pure practical rea-
son and its object [Gegenstand] in that the pure moral will [pure Willkür] is a
will dctermined by pure practical reason [Wille], It is, however, pure practical
reason brought "nearcr to Intuition", that is, it is the moral law äs "schematized"
by the type of the law of nature and thus characterized objectively äs universally
binding and subjectively äs involving the concept of a rational being äs an end in
himself 50 . To this extent, the concept of the summum bonum, although it is
derived from the categorical imperative of the moral law, contains more — just
äs the schematized categories contain more than the "empty" pure categories. In
other words, the formulations of the categorical imperative are synthetically
related to the imperative.
(2) The concept of the summum bonum also contains more than the pure moral
law and its expression äs a categorical imperative in that, in order to be considered
a goal [Objekt, Zweck] of moral action äs well äs its determined form [Gegen-
stand], it requires the distinction between empirical fact and moral ideal, is and
ought, and the viewing of the summum bonum äs this distinct ideal. As soon
äs the ideal is distinct, however, its relation to the moral law is synthetic.
Heteronomy is not, however, involved — nor does B eck think it is — since the
summum bonum äs the goal is not the determining factor51. Moreover, even if
the summum bonum were the determining factor, since the summum bonum is
in fact no more than the moral law brought "nearer to Intuition," it would, äs
the kingdom of ends and the goal of a pure but finite practical reason, involve a
heteronomous element only insofar äs is required for such a reason to have a
moral end at all.
2.. The fact that the moral law would be null and void if the object of its
command were not possible implies ... that the object of the command (the
summum bonum) is analytically related to the moral law — in which case the
existence of God need not be postulated — or a priori necessarily synthetically
related to it — in which case heteronomy is implied 52.
That the summum bonum is not analytically related to the moral law has been
made clear in my reply to objection 1. (b) above53. That heteronomy is not
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 148 (Cassirer, V, pp. 64—65)]. The two Objekte of
practical reason are good and evil (ibid.). A Gegenstand of practical reason thus re-
fers to the disposition of the will [Willkür], and Objekt to the effect of this disposition
(ibid.; see also Beck, pp. 134—36). The summum bonum ist the complete Gegenstand
äs the wholly moral disposition and the complete Objekt äs the total good effect of
such a disposition. Both Abbott's translation and Beck's commentary refer to both Ger-
man terms äs "object", thus obscuring the distinction.
49
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 203 (Cassirer, V, pp. 117—18) and Fundamental
Principles, p. 52 (Cassirer, IV, p. 292.)
50
Fundamental Principles, p. 49 (Cassirer, IV, p. 289).
51
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 205 (Cassirer, V, pp. 119—20); Beck, p. 243n.l2.
52
See p. 44.
53
Pp. 53 f.

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involved has also been made clear there. Nevertheless, the point deserves further
elucidation: regardless of what Kant's main thesis may be, if the impossibility
of the summum bonum renders the moral law null and void, the relation of the
two concepts appears analytic.
In this connection Bede refers to three passages in the first two Critiques:
a. [A wise Author and] Ruler, together with life in [an intelligible] world, which we
must regard äs a future world, reason finds itself constrained to assume; otherwise it
would have to regard the moral laws äs empty figments of the brain [leere Hirnge-
spinste], since without this postulate the necessary consequence which it itself connects
with these laws could not follow 54.
b. I inevitably believe in the existence of God and in a future life, and I am certain
that nothing can shake this belief, since my moral principles would thereby be them-
selves overthrown 55.
c. If the supreme good is not possible by practical rules, then the moral law also
which commands us to promote it is directed to vain and imaginary ends [phantastisch
und auf leere eingebildete Zwecke gestellt], and must consequently be false 56.

According to the first passage, the moral law would be an empty fabrication
if the summum bonum were not possible and therefore if we do not believe in the
existence of God and in a future life. According to the second, we would give up
adherence to the moral law if we did not believe in the existence of God and in
a future life. According to the third, the summum bonum would be an empty
concep-t and therefore the moral law would be false, if the summum bonum were
not possible by practical rules. These passages can be made consistent among
themselves and with Kant's view that the moral law is autonomous and "the sole
determining principle of the will" 57, if we accept the argument presented on pp.
46 above. The moral law would then indeed be a mere law of thought,
purely formal and empty, if the possibility of the summum bonum was not
established, and it would be an empty fabrication so far äs its being moral is
concerned; it would therefore be false äs a moral law, that is, it would have no
practical force. It would thus be "null and void," äs Beck says, in a practical
sense for finite rational beings, but it would not be null and void in a logical
sense, äs Beck implies, that is, it would not contradict itself.
3. If hope for the summum bonum is a necessary incentive for man's doing
his duty, (a) the autonomy of the moral law is forfeited and (b) the validity of
the postulates and of the belief in the possibility of the summum bonum are
restricted to man, etc.58.
That the autonomy of the law is in no danger has been established in my reply
to 1. (b) 69 ; that the validity of the postulates is not limited to man but only to
54
A811/B839 (N. K. Smith, p. 639), referred to by Beck, p. 245n.l7.
M
A828/B856 (N. K. Smith, p. 650), referred to by Beck, p. 254.
w
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 210 (Cassirer, V, p. 124), referred to by Beck,
p. 244, and, indirectly, p. 274.
57
Critique o f Practical Reason, p. 204 (Cassirer, V, p. 119).
58
See p. 44.
59
See pp. 53 f.

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any finitc rational being has been made clcar in my observations on the 4th
prcmise of my generalized vcrsion of the moral argument60. However, if we do
not further clarify the nature of the summum bonum and its relation to morality,
the suspicion of heteronomy and restriction will remain: Kant, in the first
Critique, teils us that the summum bonum is a System of self-rewarding mora-
lity βι, that is, one "in which happiness is bound up with and proportioned
to morality" °2. Happiness is there defined s "the satisfaction of all our desires,
extensivdy, in respect of their manifoldness, intensively, in respect of their degree,
and protensively, in respect of their duration" e3. Kant further adds that moral
laws do and must carry with them promises and threats e4. The Suggestion of
heteronomy is obvious.
If, however, we turn to the Critique of Practical Reason, we find "happiness"
redefined s "the condition of a rational being in the world with whom
everytbing goes according to bis wish and will [Wille]; it rests, therefore, on the
harmony of Physical nature with his whole end [Zweck], and likewise with the
essential determining principle of his will [Wille]" βδ. Happiness here is clearly
limited to rational beings. It is also by implication limited to finite (sensuously
intuiting) rational beings, since for a being with an intellectual intuiton all
objects are actual ββ and, therefore, such a being has no wishes and needs not
will insofar s willing is distinct from thinking. Happiness thus is nothing but
the state of a finite rational being in a world where his will, or practical reason,
is efficacious. For a pure practical reason this, however, is the moral law itself,
practical reason or the Wille s the Objekt of the law realized in a real world,
that is, the ideal end actually realized for a rational being with a sensuous Intuition.
Thus happiness is the moral autonomy of each in a world System. There is no
more heteronomy here than was found at the end of the discussion of objection
1. (b). Even the definition of happiness of the first Critique now no longer
necessarily implies heteronomy, and the promises and threats are no more than
implications of the possibility of adiieving the Objekt of the law, i. e., the
Statement that, if we do not act morally (for the sake of the law), if we do not

60
See p. 46.
61
A810/B838 (N. K. Smith, p. 638).
62
A809/B837 (N. K. Smith, p. 638).
63
A806/B834 (N. K. Smith, p. 636).
M
A811/B839 (N. K. Smith, p. 639).
65
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 211 (Cassirer, V, p. 315). Here Kant des happi-
ness directly to the third formulation of the categorical imperative in the Fundamen-
tal Principles: "the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate con-
dition of its harmony with universal practical reason," [Fundamental Principles, p.
49 (Cassirer, IV, p. 289)] that "all our maxims ought by their own legislation to har-
monize with a possible kingdom of ends s with a kingdom of nature" [Fundamental
Principles, p. 55 (Cassirer, IV, p. 295)].
66
Critique of Judgment, pp. 250 and 252 (Cassirer, V, pp. 480 and 482) and see p. 46.

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have the law äs our Gegenstand, we cannot achieve morality (the summum bonum
äs the Objekt of the law) 67.
4. The summtim bonum is not a practical concept at all and its possibility is
not directly necessary to morality68,
It is clear by now that the summum bonum is a practical concept and is ne-
cessary to morality not directly äs analytically connected with it, but directly
äs synthetically a priori connected with it. Bede, however, goes on to say:
[The concept of the summum bonum is] a dialectical Ideal of reason. It is not impor-
tant in Kant's philosophy for any practical consequences it might have ... It is important
for the ardiitectonic purposes of reason in uniting under one Idea the two legislations
of reason, the theoretical and the practical, in a practical-dogmatic metaphysics wholly
distinct from the metaphysics of morals. Reason cannot tolerate a diaos of ends; it
demands the a priori synthesis of them into a System ... If, therefore, we are to
conceive of a System of ends, äs reason requires for its own satisfaction (and not for
obedience to a law whidi speaks with commanding authority long before its creden-
tials are presented), then we must suppose that the highes t good is possible69.
The summum bonum is certainly an ideal of reason70, important for the
ardiitectonic purpose of reason in uniting its two legislations71. However, äs
an ideal, it serves theoretical reason well but only äs the Schema of a regulative
principle72, and äs thus only regulative for the theoretical employment of rea-
son it cannot lead to a dogmatic metaphysics. On the other hand, the summum
bonum is not a mere dialectical ideal of reason. As Kant points out73, the
ideal of the summum bonum has practical consequences while the belief in its
real possibility is a necessary consequence of accepting the moral law 74 . Thus
the two employments of reason serve eadb other 75. The summum bonum is the
complete Gegenstand and Objekt of the moral law of pure practical reason and,
äs an intelligible moral world, the theoretical ideal of pure theoretical reason.
The two legislations of reason are united not in a practical-dogmatic metaphysics
but in a moral-metaphysical ideal which is no more foreign to the metaphysics
of morals than this latter is to metaphysics äs such76. Reason does indeed

e7
The nature of the summum bonum becomes obvious if we think it äs complete
Objekt (whole end) and äs complete Gegenstand (essential determining principle of
the will) in the definition of happiness just cited.
«8 See p. 44.
«' Beck, p. 245.
70
A810/B838 (N. K. Smith, p. 639) and Fundamental Principles, p. 52 (Cassirer,
IV, p. 292).
71
E.g., A815—16/B843—44 (N. K. Smith, p. 642).
72
A674/B702 (N. K. Smith, p. 552) and A682/B710 (N. K. Smith, p. 557).
73
A808/B836 (N. K. Smith, p. 637).
74
Critique of Practical Reason, p. 221 (Cassirer, V, p. 135) and passim, and see p. 46.
75 A815—16/B843—44 (N. K. Smith, p. 642), Critique of Practical Reason, pp.
231—34 (Cassirer, V, pp. 145—48).
7 A841—42/B869—70 (N. K. Smith, pp. 659—60)

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rcquirc a System of cnds for its satisfaction, but reason is one and requires a
singlc cnd and a samc satisfaction in all its roles 77. It is not only theoretical
reason, but reason itself, which is "by nature architectonic" 78, which is "impelled
by a tendency of its own nature ... not to be satisfied save through the com-
pletion of its course in a self-subsistent systematic whole" 79, and whose law,
"which requires us to seek unity, is a necessary law, since without it we should
have no reason at all" 80. Reason seeks rationality in all its employments, logical
and practical äs well äs theoretical: "Pure reason .is in fact occupied only with
itself" 81.
Thus the concept of the summum bonum is the ideal of reason in all its
endeavors. This is made clearest and the concept is given its most determinate
form in the Critique of Judgment, where Kant teils us that it is a requirement
of reason which the ideal of rational beings under moral laws alone can satisfy 82.
It is thus, in the conception of a kingdom of ends, that reason achieves complete
systematic unity: man 83 äs a moral rational being is the final purpose of crea-
tion M.
The kingdom of ends, however, is a kingdom of Grace85. It has only prac-
tical reality and even this reality is possible only on the further, practically
legitimate and necessary postulate of the existence of a moral author of the world.
This is the basis of the moral argument.

77
See, e.g., A815/B843 (N. K. Smith, p. 642), Critique of Practical Reason, p. 217
(Cassirer, V, pp. 131—32).
78
A474/B502 (N. K. Smith, p. 429).
79
A797/B825 (N. K. Smith, p. 630). I am following Professor John R. Silber in
omitting Norman Kemp Smith's insertion of "the apprehension of" before the phrase
"a self-subsistent whole" (The Metaphysical Importance of the Highest Good us
the Canon of Pure Reason in Kant's Pbilosopby, in: Texas Studies in Literature and
Language, I, Summer, 1959, p. 233n.).
80
A651/B679 (N. K. Smith, p. 538).
81
A680/B708 (N. K. Smith, p. 556).
82
Critique of Judgment, pp. 286, 294, 296, 299n.l4 (Cassirer, V, pp. 516, 524,
526, 529n.l), etc.
83
Kant enlarges this to all finite rational beings in his "Moral Proof," Critique of
Judgment, p. 301 (Cassirer, V, p. 531).
84
See note 82, above.
85
A812/B840 (N. K. Smith, p. 640) and A815—16/B843—44 (N. K. Smith, p. 642).

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