FROM INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR BIODIVERSITY

CONSERVATION: NETWORKS OF RESERVES OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN

COLOMBIA

By

MARIA CONSTANZA RIOS MARIN

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2016
© 2016 Maria Constanza Rios Marin

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To the design-dreamers and feeling-thinkers

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 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First I would like to thank Dr. Eglee Zent, Dr. Standford Zent and Dr. Jon Paul

Rodriguez for encouraging me to pursue a Ph.D. Without their support and inspiration, I

would not have embarked on this journey. I am deeply grateful to my committee

members - Dr. Karen Kainer, Dr. Christine Overdevest, Dr. Christopher McCarthy, Dr.

Granville Barnes - for their rigorous and kind support and for stimulating me to go

deeper in the understanding of theories and methods to formulate a solid research

proposal and successfully secure research funding. I give special thanks to my advisor

Dr. Karen Kainer for her patience and her thoughtful and critical comments, which

challenge me to improve the quality in all aspects of this research. Dr. McCarty provided

invaluable support in the final phase of the writing process and helped me to improve

the structure and organization of this document. Support and input from other

professors were also extremely important during different phases of my Ph.D. Dr.

Mickey Swisher encouraged me to get a deeper understanding of on the application of

diverse theories and research methods in the social sciences, Dr. Marianne Schmink,

Dr. Susan Paulson, and Dr. Maria Stoilkova provided critical feedback and

encouragement that were extremely useful for the interpretation of the results, data

analysis, and writing. I am very thankful with all of them for generously sharing their time

and knowledge.

I want to acknowledge Dr. Steve Humphrey, Dr. Tom Frazer, Karen Bray and

Cathy Ritchie from the School of Natural Resources and Environment, as well as Dr.

Bette Loiselle and Patricia Sampaio from the Tropical conservation and Development

Program. Their support, patience and kindness help me to navigate smoothly through

the many administrative procedures during my Ph.D. This research would not have

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been possible without several sources of funding and support. The University of

Florida’s Tropical Conservation and Development Program (TCD) and School of Natural

Resources and Environment (SNRE) provided funding for the first four years of my

Ph.D. studies. The National Science Foundation Decision Risk and Management

program and Inter-American Foundation provided funding for field research through the

Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant and the Grassroots Development Fellowship

respectively. World Wildlife Foundation through Russell Train Fellowship and Prince

Bernard Scholarship and the University of Florida Graduate Assistants United provided

funding during the final phase of data analysis and dissertation writing.

I am deeply grateful to Charles Eisenstein, Dr. Arturo Escobar, and Dr. Clarissa

Pínkola Estes, for their support, their kind advice, and the inspiration during a critical

period of the writing process. They helped me to appreciate and recognize alternative

ways of looking at this research and the role of academia, activism, and alternative

education in the support of grassroots movements. I am thankful for the inspiration and

for reigniting my hope on the possibilities of other worlds.

I am very grateful to my fellow graduate students and peers from the Tropical

Conservation and Development program who besides being wonderful classmates and

labmates, were incredible friends and cooks. Learning and sharing with them was one

of the most valuable experiences during these past years. I am especially thankful to

Antonio Sierra, Timoteo Mesh, Claudia Monzón, Sergio Padilla, Thaisa Sobreiro,

Sebastián Palmas, Natalie Cooper, Percy Peralta, Todd Bertwell, Cristina Núñez,

Mauricio Núñez-Regueiro, Maggie Clifford, Marcela Márquez, Germain Mavah, Ricardo

Mello, and Martha Rosero.

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 Many friends provided much need emotional support and made life in Gainesville

positive and joyful for Ana María and me. Paloma Carton, Yanciuk Galvan and their

beautiful girls, Williams Castro and Margaret Francis, Iwan, Muriel and Isabella Molgo,

María Fernanda Checa y Daniel Zurita, Norma Flor, Maritsa Cruz, Angélica García,

Ivelisse Ruíz, Filipa Botello, Kathe de la Torre, Johanna Troufflard, Miriam Sá Leitäo,

Andrés Susaeta, Galaxia Cortés, Mónica Velez, Corey Souza, Becca Burton, Mindy

Miller, Sunshine Moss. I am thankful for their friendship and support.

I wish to acknowledge Mónica Arroyave, Edimer Zapata, Cristian Caez, Ivan

Villota, Christian Cardona, Galo Velazquez, Miguel Barriga and Nancy López for the

help provided during the fieldwork. I am especially thankful to the staff from Tierrandina,

Corpoversalles, Acerg, Ecofuturo, and Resnatur and to all of the reserve owners and

their families for sharing their time and experiences in conservation. I deeply appreciate

their generosity and hospitality. I owe deep gratitude to Margarita Rosa Tirado, Jorge

Iván Orozco, Marcela Santamaría, Vicky Plitt, Heidi Pohl, Roberto Sáenz, Javier

Pacheco, Alvaro Cogollo, Jorge Hernán López, Ramiro Giraldo, Martha Morales,

Claudia Angel, Patricia Jaramillo, Johanna Drews, Adriana Abadía, Alonso Velez, José

Vidal, Guillermo Ruíz, Lina Velez, Jorge Rozo, Trinidad López, Nilson Grajales,

Gerardo Pineda, Valentina Prieto, Hugo Ortega, Nancy López, Miguel Viles, Marcela

Benavídez, Sandra Acosta, Sandra Giraldo, Sandra Madrid, María Elfi Chavez, César

Marulanda and César Franco; reserve owners, disoñadores and senti-pensantes who

generously shared their knowledge and wonderful life experiences. What I learned from

them is by far more valuable than all the academic knowledge I gained during these

years. They are an example and source of inspiration and transformation in my life.

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 Finally, I want to thank Víctor Prato and my dad, Nestor Ríos for his support and

encouragement. To my mom, Aura, who is no longer with us, for caring about my

education and providing me with the tools to grow and develop as a human being and a

professional. I thank my beautiful daughter Ana María for these past 15 years of non-

stop cheerfulness, fun, warmth, tenderness, hugs, kisses, cuteness; but especially for

her curious and inquisitive mind full of critical and heartfelt questions which keep

challenging me to be a better mom and woman. I am thankful for your beautiful heart

and your love.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................. 4

LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... 13

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ 14

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... 16

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................... 17

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 19

2 CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN CONSERVATION: RESERVES OF THE

CIVIL SOCIETY NETWORKS AND THE COLOMBIAN CONTEXT ....................... 26

Conservation and Development Challenges in Colombia ....................................... 26

Biodiversity Conservation Challenges .............................................................. 26
Development Challenges: Increasing Urbanization and Rural Poverty ............ 28
Conservation by Civil Society in Colombia: ............................................................. 31
Origins of Civil Society Reserve Networks ....................................................... 31
Reserves of the Civil Society: Legal Definition and Recognition ...................... 34
Reserves of the Civil Society and IUCN Categories in Colombia ..................... 36

3 CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE THEORY

AND LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................. 42

General Problem, Mainstream Approaches and Contradictions ............................. 42

Grassroots Conservation Initiatives ........................................................................ 46
Conceptual and Methodological Approaches Used on this Dissertation to
Understand Grassroots Conservation Initiatives in Colombia .............................. 49
Private Conservation ........................................................................................ 49
Increasing importance of private conservation ........................................... 49
Assessing conservation effectiveness ....................................................... 51
Social Network Analysis ................................................................................... 53
Social networks as tools to understand social interactions ........................ 53
Personal networks: social support at the individual level ........................... 55
Whole networks, the influence of social dynamics at the group level. ........ 56
Social networks and natural resource management .................................. 57

4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS .......................................................... 63

Research Questions ............................................................................................... 63

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 Research Design .................................................................................................... 64
Bridge Organizations Examined ............................................................................. 65
Tierrandina ....................................................................................................... 65
Norte del Valle .................................................................................................. 66
Resnatur ........................................................................................................... 67
Chapter 5: Proportion of Property Allocated to Conservation ................................. 68
Data Collection ................................................................................................. 68
Property size and land use allocation ........................................................ 68
Reserve and household socioeconomic variables ..................................... 71
Data Analysis ................................................................................................... 71
Three key factors that influence proportion of land allocated to
conservation ........................................................................................... 71
Predictive model of proportion of property allocated to conservation ......... 72
Other economic factors .............................................................................. 73
Chapter 6. Conservation Effectiveness ................................................................... 73
Data Collection ................................................................................................. 73
Conservation effectiveness index .............................................................. 73
Reserve and household variables .............................................................. 75
Data Analysis ................................................................................................... 76
Reliability of the conservation effectiveness index. .................................... 76
Three key factors that influence conservation effectiveness ...................... 77
Predictive model of proportion of property allocated to conservation ......... 77
Chapter 7: Personal Networks ................................................................................ 78
Data Collection ................................................................................................. 78
Data Analysis ................................................................................................... 79
Chapter 8: Whole Networks .................................................................................... 80
Overlapping Personal Networks ....................................................................... 80
Whole Networks Approach Limited to Members ............................................... 81

5 VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION FROM THE GRASSROOTS : FACTORS

THAT INFLUENCE FOREST CONSERVATION BY CAMPESINOS AND
PRIVATE LANDOWNERS IN COLOMBIA ............................................................. 83

Results .................................................................................................................... 88
Land Use Allocation on the Reserves. ............................................................. 88
Three Key Factors that Influence Proportion of Land Allocated to
Conservation ................................................................................................. 88
Property size .............................................................................................. 88
Level of reliance on reserve for income (LR). ............................................ 89
Bridge organization .................................................................................... 90
Combined effects of bridge organization and level of reliance on
reserve for income .................................................................................. 91
Predictive Model for Proportion of Property Allocated to Conservation ............ 91
Reserve’s economic self-sustainability. ..................................................... 93
Gender of head of household..................................................................... 93
Influence of Other Economic Factors ............................................................... 93
Economic incentives and taxes .................................................................. 93

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 Opportunity costs ....................................................................................... 94
Discussion .............................................................................................................. 95
Land Use Allocation and Property Size ............................................................ 95
Big properties: the legacies of colonization and agrarian reforms .............. 95
Small properties: integrating livelihoods and conservation ........................ 98
Reserve owners’ perceived benefits from forest conservation ................. 101
Predictive Model for Proportion of Property Allocated to Conservation .......... 104
Gender of head of household................................................................... 105
Reserve’s economic self-sustainability and level of reliance on reserve
income .................................................................................................. 105
Influence of Other Economic Factors ............................................................. 110
Economic incentives and taxes ................................................................ 110
Opportunity costs ..................................................................................... 113

6 ASSESSING CONSERVATION EFECTIVENESS OF VOLUNTARY

CONSERVATION INITIATIVES IN COLOMBIA ................................................... 129

Conservation Effectiveness in Private Conservation Initiatives ............................. 129

Results .................................................................................................................. 130
Three Key Factors that Influence Conservation Effectiveness ....................... 131
Influence of property size ......................................................................... 131
Level of reliance on income ..................................................................... 132
Influence of bridge organization ............................................................... 132
Combined effects of bridge organization and level of reliance on
reserve for income. ............................................................................... 132
Predictive Model for Conservation Effectiveness ........................................... 133
Discussion ............................................................................................................ 133
Conservation Effectiveness Criteria ............................................................... 134
Ecological attributes ................................................................................. 134
Long-term viability of the ecosystem ........................................................ 137
Management capacity .............................................................................. 139
Diverse Factors that Influence Conservation Effectiveness............................ 142
Small reserves: tradeoffs between efficient management and property
size ....................................................................................................... 142
Bigger reserves: the influence of external threats and local contexts ...... 143
Diversified livelihoods promote bigger conservation areas ...................... 144
The importance of long-term institutional and personal commitment ....... 144
Tensions between bridge organizations and formal institutions ............... 147
Reserves of the Civil Society’s contribution to conservation........................... 148

7 PERSONAL NETWORKS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SUPPORT IN

VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION INITIATIVES ..................................................... 153

Results .................................................................................................................. 153

Characterizing Personal Networks by Size, Age and Gender ........................ 153
Personal Networks Composition .................................................................... 154
Homophily by gender ............................................................................... 154

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 Type of relationship .................................................................................. 155
Place of residency .................................................................................... 155
Institutional affiliation ................................................................................ 156
Personal Networks Structural Variables ......................................................... 156
Central Actors in the Networks ....................................................................... 157
Interactions Between Compositional and Structural Variables ....................... 157
Proportion of property allocated to conservation ...................................... 158
Conservation effectiveness ...................................................................... 158
Discussion ............................................................................................................ 159
Personal Network Composition ...................................................................... 160
Homophily ................................................................................................ 160
Type of relationship and place of residence ............................................. 161
Institutional affiliation ................................................................................ 163
Personal Network Structure............................................................................ 170
Personal Networks and Conservation Outcomes ........................................... 172
Proportion of property allocated to conservation ...................................... 172
Conservation effectiveness ...................................................................... 174
Other Sources of Support and Limitations of the Personal Networks
Methodology................................................................................................ 175

8 WHOLE NETWORKS. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF

GRASSROOTS CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS ........................................ 190

Results .................................................................................................................. 192

Overlapping Personal Networks ..................................................................... 192
Comparing network composition .............................................................. 192
Comparing network structure. .................................................................. 194
Member’s Information Exchange Network ...................................................... 195
Discussion ............................................................................................................ 196
Social Support Networks. Who are the Key Actors? ...................................... 196
Members Information Exchange Network....................................................... 201
Social Structure of Grassroots Organizations for Voluntary Conservation ..... 204
Challenges and Proposals to Strengthen Grassroots Initiatives for Voluntary
Conservation ............................................................................................... 207

9 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 219

Conservation Outcomes ....................................................................................... 220

Social Support ...................................................................................................... 222
Broader Implications and Recommendations ....................................................... 223

APPENDIX

A CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PROPERTY AND LANDOWNER

VARIABLES .......................................................................................................... 229

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B CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMPOSITIONAL AND STRUCTURAL
VARIABLES OF PERSONAL NETWORKS AND CONSERVATION
OUTCOMES ......................................................................................................... 230

C MOTIVATIONS TO PRESERVE FOREST, DIRECT QUOTES FROM

RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS. .............................................................................. 231

D MOTIVATIONS TO JOIN THE BRIDGE ORGANIZATIONS, DIRECT QUOTES

FROM RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS. .................................................................. 233

E IRB AUTHORIZATIONS ....................................................................................... 235

F QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT: RESERVE INFORMATION (SPANISH

VERSION). ........................................................................................................... 237

G QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT SOCIAL NETWORKS (SPANISH

VERSION). ........................................................................................................... 241

LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 245

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................... 277

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 LIST OF TABLES

Table page

2-1 IUCN classification of Privately Owned Protected Areas .................................... 38

5-1 List of dependent variables included in this study. ............................................ 118

5-2 Descriptive statistics of household variables .................................................... 120

5-3 Descriptive Statistics of reserve variables ........................................................ 121

5-4 Number of responses of households affiliated with the three different bridge
organizations .................................................................................................... 122

5-5 Opportunity costs analysis ................................................................................ 123

7-1 Comparative analysis of ego and alter compositional attributes between the
three Bridge Organizations. .............................................................................. 181

7-2 Descriptive statistics for structural variables of personal networks. .................. 182

7-3 Comparative analysis of structural measures of personal networks of reserve

owners from the three Bridge Organizations .................................................... 183

7-4 Regression coefficients for personal networks compositional and structural

variables and conservation outcomes .............................................................. 184

8-1 Composition and Structure of whole networks for the three Bridge
Organizations ................................................................................................... 212

8-2 Non parametric Anova (Kruskall-Wallis) and Dunn’s pairwise comparison test
for Centralization variables between support networks of three Bride
Organizations. .................................................................................................. 213

8-3 Structural measures for communication networks of the three bridge

organizations .................................................................................................... 214

8-4 Non parametric Anova (Kruskall-Wallis) and Dunn’s pairwise comparison test
for Centralization variables between networks of members of three Bridge
Organizations. .................................................................................................. 214

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 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

2-1 Map of the 13 Colombia ecoregions, including Chocó-Darién and Andean

Ecoregions.......................................................................................................... 40

2-2 Percent of each biome's protected by different networks of protected areas in

Colombia. ........................................................................................................... 41

4-1 Location of the reserves that participated in the study. ....................................... 82

5-1 Land uses reported on the reserves ................................................................. 124

5-2 Property size for the three bridge organizations ............................................... 125

5-3 Percentage of land allocated to conservation according to size categories ...... 125

5-4 Percentage of reserves on each bridge organization according to different

categories of income reliance ........................................................................... 126

5-5 Proportion of property allocated to conservation according to Level of

reliance on reserve for income ......................................................................... 126

5-6 Percentage of property allocated to conservation............................................. 127

5-7 Proportion of property allocated to conservation according to Economic

sustainability ..................................................................................................... 127

5-8 Proportion of land allocated to conservation according to gender of head of

household ......................................................................................................... 128

6-1 Conservation effectiveness scores for the three different categories of

income reliance ................................................................................................ 151

6-2 Conservation effectiveness variables for the three different categories of

income reliance ................................................................................................ 151

6-3 Conservation effectiveness scores for the three different Bridge organizations 152

6-4 Conservation effectiveness variables according to bridge organizations .......... 152

7-1 Gender composition of reserve owners (egos) interviewed by each Bridge

Organization ..................................................................................................... 185

7-2 Gender composition of alters. Average percentage of male and female alters
reported during personal networks interviews .................................................. 186

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7-3 Average homophily for men and women in each of the three bridge
organization ...................................................................................................... 186

7-4 Comparative analysis of personal networks composition for reserve owners

of three bridge organizations ............................................................................ 187

7-5 Comparative analysis of normalized centrality measures of personal

networks of reserve owners from the three bridge organizations ..................... 188

7-6 Frequency of different types of alters with the 20 highest centrality measures
in the ego-networks for the three bridge organizations ..................................... 189

8-1 Support networks for the three different bridge organizations .......................... 215

8-2 Gender composition in networks of the three bridge organizations when

considering only members and the whole network ........................................... 216

8-3 Whole Network composition in terms of bridge organization membership and

different categories of institutional affiliation ..................................................... 217

8-4 Whole networks for the three different bridge organizations. ............................ 218

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BO Bridge Organization.

CBNRM Community based natural resource management.

ICCAs Local community conserved territories and areas

IUCN International Union for the Conservation of Nature.

NGO Non-governmental organization.

OECM Other effective conservation measures

RESNATUR National Association of Reserves of the Civil Society (Colombia)

RNSC Natural Reserve of the Civil Society (Colombia)

RPPNs Natural Heritage Private Reserve (Brazil)

SESs Socio Ecological Systems

SINA National environmental system (Colombia)

SINAP Colombian National System of Protected Areas.

SNA Social Network Analysis

ZRC Campesino Reserve Zones (Colombia)

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 Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

FROM INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS TO COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR BIODIVERSITY

CONSERVATION: NETWORKS OF RESERVES OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY IN
COLOMBIA

By

María Constanza Ríos Marín

December 2016

Chair: Karen Kainer

Major: Interdisciplinary Ecology

Twenty-five years ago Networks of Natural Reserves emerged in the Southern

Colombian Andes as grassroots initiatives promoted by farmers and diverse actors of

the civil society. Today one national network, and more than 20 local networks (also

known as bridge organizations) and 400 associated reserves play an important role in

protecting biodiversity and ecosystem services and are officially recognized as part of

Colombia’s National System of Protected Areas. In this dissertation I examine the

contribution of reserves associated to two local bridge organizations (Tierrandina and

Valle) and the national organization of reserves of the civil society (Resnatur), in terms

of two conservation outcomes: area allocated to forest conservation and overall

conservation effectiveness.

While important differences were found between organizations, findings indicate

that around 80% of the reserve owners allocated at least 20% of their properties to

forest conservation. Lower levels of reliance on the reserves for subsistence and lower

levels of economic sustainability were associated with higher proportions of the

properties allocated to forest conservation. Ninety-five percent of the reserve owners

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reported positive conservation effectiveness, which was influenced by the affiliation and

years of participation in the bridge organization.

Using social networks analysis, I also examined the influence of social support at

the personal level and social structure at the organizations' level on conservation

outcomes. While results showed strong differences in the structure of the personal

networks of reserve owners from the different organizations, overall, actors that did not

have any institutional affiliation were dominant. Reserve owners that reported higher

percentages of women and lower percentages of institutional actors in their personal

networks allocated higher proportions of their reserve to forest conservation. Higher

conservation effectiveness was associated with lower values of network centrality and

higher proportions of actors that were part of the family and were not affiliated with any

institution. Research findings indicated that cultural, emotional and even spiritual

motivations are also strong motivators for grassroots voluntary conservation initiatives in

Colombia, and emphasize the need to include other approaches that go beyond

conventional institutional economics to promote effective participation of civil society in

conservation and environmental governance.

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 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Colombia is the country with the second highest biological diversity in the world.

In a relatively small area, 14 million Colombians share their rural livelihoods with this

rich and threatened biodiversity. In this country, as in many countries of Latin America

that experienced agrarian reforms during the XX century, campesino1 families that have

secured property rights and can be considered private landowners, account for a big

portion of the rural population. Most of them rely on their small subsistence farms, in

which usual agricultural livelihoods are intertwined with forests of different ages and

successional histories and different degrees of use and intervention. Conservation and

sustainable management of these conservation / production landscape matrixes are

critical issues, not only because of their high biodiversity value, but also for their

important contribution to the livelihoods of rural communities and for the millions of

urban residents that benefit from the critical ecosystem services and agricultural

products provided by these mountainous landscapes.

Despite the negative impacts of the violent conflict and economic development

policies during the past decades, voluntary forest conservation initiatives emerged more

than 25 years ago among small farmers and other rural landowners in different regions

1
The most literal translation to Spanish word “campesino” is “peasant;” however the question of how to
define “peasant or peasantry “ has a long, complicated and contentious history with deep policy
implications (Edelman 2013). This term is considered problematic, as it may be associated with past and
pre-modernity, and can connote legal, political, economic and even social inferiority. A critical analysis of
the use of this term can be found in (Van der Ploeg 2008). The limitations of the term are reflected in the
complex definition currently used by the international movement La Via Campesina who describe
themselves as “a movement that coordinates peasants organizations, small and medium-sized
producers, landless, rural women, indigenous people, rural youth and agricultural workers”. (FoodFirst
2005, Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010). Other suggested translations are “small- farmer” and “family
farmer” however those terms miss the word’s richness in Spanish, which recognizes the diversity of roles,
occupations, and ethnic backgrounds of the rural population in Latin America. In this dissertation the
terms campesino and small farmer will be used interchangeably.

19
of Colombia. In these initiatives, landowners voluntarily decided to allocate portions or

all of their properties to forest conservation through self-declared Natural Reserves of

the Civil Society (RNSC- acronym in Spanish), and most of them are considered to fall

within the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) category VI of

protected areas2 (protected area with sustainable use of natural resources). This notion

of reserve differs from conventional western notions of conservation that consider the

natural world and social aspects of life as separate categories (Porto-Gonçalves 2006,

Leff 2012). For reserve owners and in the context of this dissertation, a reserve includes

not only areas allocated to forest protection, but also areas where productive activities

are established. The following quotes provide some examples of what a reserve means

for diverse reserve owners (Resnatur 2015)

it is a space, or area of private property of any size, owned by and

individual, a family, an NGO or community organization which has natural
ecosystems (jungles, wetlands, savannas, among others) that are
managed for their recovery, conservation and / or sustainable use where
sustainable production practices that promote biodiversity are developed,
or where collections of our genetic resources including wild, cultivated or
domestic species of plants and animals are preserved.

it is a way of life, an option in which people and families that are linked to
the process, generate spaces and times to “Bienvivir”; facilitating the
satisfaction of the basic needs in terms of subsistence, protection of
nature, participation, leisure, understanding, identity, creativity, affection,
transcendence, freedom.

it is a source of knowledge, a refuge, a home. It is a space to exchange

knowledge and capacity for action, with other people who are interested in
the same. It is also a place to exchange our opinions on issues of our
concern and to reflect on how we can get to have an influence on them.

2
https://www.iucn.org/theme/protected-areas/about/protected-area-categories/category-vi-protected-
area-sustainable-use

20
 RNSC are organized through local NGOs or community organizations (bridge

organizations3), which provide a platform to coordinate and support economic

development, watershed and forest conservation and in many cases, cultural and

educational activities. They promote traditional agricultural practices, innovations for

sustainable agriculture, and provide training and support to farmers and rural

landowners with the goal of integrating their livelihoods with forest conservation. The

following quote explains the perceptions of the relationship between the reserves and

the bridge organizations by one of the reserve owners (Resnatur 2015).

my reserve is a little part of the network, it is a thread, it is a star of the

constellation, it is the base for organizing our own autonomous
processes. ... Is part of a territorial, cultural, and biophysical group,
separated but connected to others who also organize their life from a
vision of protection, proper management of biodiversity, cooperation and
solidarity.

Conservationists and practitioners in Colombia widely recognize the contributions

of these grassroots initiatives to rural well-being, forest protection, conservation of

endangered species, watershed and ecosystem restoration, and implementation of

traditional agricultural practices as strategies for climate change mitigation and

adaptation. Nonetheless, lack of resources and the paucity of academic studies on the

economic, ecological and social aspects of these initiatives are striking. This lack of

information to support policy design, along with previous policy gaps and poor inter-

sectorial coordination hinders the design of policies to adequately support those

initiatives, the implementation of much needed incentives, and the participation of these

organizations in decision making for natural resource management.

3
A detailed explanation of the term bridge organization is provided in chapter 4

21
 The objective of this research is to make visible this invisible majority –as they

are often referred to by Latin American scholars4- as a key strategy to provide leverage

to these underrepresented groups. By assessing their contributions, analyzing the social

structures that sustain these organizations, and their current economic and governance

challenges and motivations, I expect to support them in their efforts to deliver positive

outcomes in terms of biodiversity conservation, ecosystem protection and restoration

and rural economic development. Fair and more effective participation of rural

populations in territorial governance is crucial for long-term socio-ecological resilience of

their territories and to uphold the hopes of millions of Colombians for social equity and

peace. It is my hope that this research will provide a long overdue baseline of the main

factors that influence the long-term sustainability of those grassroots initiatives and will

help to identify knowledge and policy gaps.

This dissertation is organized in nine chapters. Following this general

introduction, the second chapter presents a more specific introduction to the

conservation and development challenges in the Colombian context, a background on

civil society initiatives for conservation in the country and in particular to the Networks of

Reserves of the Civil Society. The third chapter is a background review of traditional

governance and conservation approaches and introduces the theoretical frameworks

that will be used in this dissertation to address the research questions and analyze the

results. The fourth chapter describes the research questions, the rationale behind the

research design, research methods and study sites.

4
“Declaramos invisible lo que no queremos ver” (De Sousa Santos 2010), Una violencia invisible, la
colonialidad del saber (Palermo 2010), Los Nadie (Galeano 2000)

22
 Chapters 5 through 8 present the results of my research, with Chapters 5 and 6

jointly providing an analysis of the contribution of the reserves in terms of conservation

outcomes and the factors that influence them. Chapter 5 specifically aims to understand

the actual contribution of these reserves in terms of protection of forest cover. Through

a quantitative analysis of forest cover estimates and socio-economic variables, I

analyzed how different livelihood strategies (level of reliance on reserve for subsistence)

and affiliation to different grassroots organizations influence reserve owners’ ability to

protect forest on their properties. It also explores the factors that influence landowner

perceptions of the economic sustainability of their reserves and the economic factors

that may foster or hinder their ability to continue protecting forest in the long-term.

One of the main critiques in different conservation interventions is the paucity of

reliable evidence of the impact of the conservation strategies or interventions

implemented. This is considered to be a pervasive weakness of traditional interventions

such as protected areas or community management strategies, but is even more acute

in the case of voluntary conservation initiatives and private reserves such as the ones

studied in this dissertation. In most cases those initiatives do not fall into the category of

intervention, as it is usually difficult to establish a clear-cut baseline or determine a

before and after. Furthermore, the design and implementation of management

strategies is an organic process that rarely follows the traditional protocols for design

and evaluation and very rarely uses traditional conservation management tools.

Nevertheless, grassroots groups and conservation NGOs have been working together

to develop appropriate methodologies adapted to the atypical characteristics of those

initiatives. In Chapter 6 I use one of those methodologies as a guideline to calculate a

23
Conservation Effectiveness (CE) index for each reserve, using indicators of ecological

attributes, long term viability of the ecosystem, and management capacity of the reserve

owners. This chapter also explores how diverse socio economic factors, the particular

characteristics of the bridge organizations they are affiliated to, and the economic

sustainability of the reserves influence their conservation effectiveness.

Chapters 7 and 8 analyze the social structures that sustain and support those

initiatives at the micro (individual level) and the meso (organization) level. Using a

personal networks analysis approach, Chapter 7 aims to identify characteristics of the

individuals who are the main sources of support for reserve owners. A better

understanding of the relative importance of the support provided by different individuals

(with diverse types of relationships, and institutional affiliations) in the personal networks

of reserve owners can provide insights into the social characteristics present in

communities in which grassroots initiatives for voluntary conservation are thriving.

Grassroots initiatives for voluntary conservation are based on informal personal

interactions, and personal network analyses can also identify social interventions that

would favor occurrence of identified social characteristics. Chapter 8 uses a whole

network analysis approach to understand the structure of those informal forms of

organization, the roles of members and non-members of the bridge organizations in

shaping organization activities, values and goals. A better understanding of how these

initiatives are organized is crucial to facilitate articulation with other actors (formal

institutions) and to promote effective participation of these underrepresented groups in

environmental governance of their territories.

24
 Chapter 9 synthesizes the main findings of this dissertation and their relevance

for the current environmental governance challenges in Colombia. It also lays out the

limitations and recommendations for further research to promote a more effective

participation of civil society in conservation.

25
 CHAPTER 2
CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN CONSERVATION: RESERVES OF THE CIVIL
SOCIETY NETWORKS AND THE COLOMBIAN CONTEXT

Conservation and Development Challenges in Colombia

Biodiversity Conservation Challenges

Despite its relatively small size, Colombia is the second most biologically diverse

country on Earth, home to about 10% of the world's species. This biodiversity results

from Colombia's varied ecosystems and biomes—from rich tropical montane and

lowland rainforests to open savannas (2-1) (Sánchez-Cuervo et al. 2012). About 18% of

vertebrate species and 30% of plant species are endemic to the country, with most

endemics occurring in two of the most important biodiversity hotspots: the Tropical

Andes and Choco Ecoregions (Myers et al. 2000). While on paper nearly 10% of

Colombia is under some form of protection, its rich biodiversity is increasingly

threatened. A total of 140,356 ha of forest cover was lost in Colombia during 2014,

which represents an increase of 16% when compared with the 120,934 ha lost in 2013;

45% of deforestation happened in the Amazon and 24% in the Andes region (IDEAM

2015). The vast majority of this loss is unprotected primary forest, which covers more

than 80% of the country.

The tropical Andes are estimated to host over 40,000 plant species (Gentry

1993) and over 1500 bird species (Franco et al. 2007) contributing significantly to

Colombian and global biological diversity. However, despite their great value in terms of

biodiversity and environmental services such as hydrologic regulation and soil

conservation, Andean ecosystems in Colombia are experiencing accelerated rates of

destruction (Etter and Villa 2000). Depending on the altitude belt, only 18–25% of the

original Colombian Andean forest ecosystems remain, and are highly threatened by

26
colonization and conversion of forested areas to agriculture, planting of illegal crops

(Etter and Villa 2000) illegal mining, illegal logging and forest fires (IDEAM 2015). In

these mountains, 25 protected areas cover cf. 3.5 million hectares (Franco et al. 2007).

Less than 10% of the Andes ecoregion is protected by National Parks and between 10-

25 % is under protection if other conservation categories such as regional protected

areas are included (Figure 2-2) (Forero-Medina and Joppa 2010). Nevertheless, in this

region, significant protection gaps remain particularly for threatened species many of

which are located in areas with very low overall protection by the national protected

areas system (SINA) (Forero-Medina and Joppa 2010). In addition, most of these

protected areas are small and may not be sufficient for sustaining viable populations of

many species, especially big mammals (Jorgenson and Sandoval 2005). Currently in

this ecoregion, 186 amphibians, 62 birds, 23 mammals, 7 reptiles and 8 plant species

are reported as endangered by the IUCN Redlist (www.redlist.org), with two bird

species and one tree species reported as extinct in the second half of the twentieth

century.

The Chocó ecoregion corresponds to one of the largest active centers of

speciation and endemism in the world. Choco forests host more than 10,000 plant

species with nearly 20% strictly endemic (Gentry 1982), at least 127 species of

amphibians (Roa and Ruiz 1993), 97 species of reptiles, 577 bird species and 285

mammals 11 of them being endemics and highly endangered. According to the

evaluation of Dinerstein et al. (1995), this ecoregion had lost between 10% and 20% of

the original habitat. However logging activities have increased in the past 20 yrs.

(approximately 70 percent of the Colombian domestic timber comes directly from this

27
region), and industrial production of African palm oil, uncontrolled gold mining and illegal

growing of coca add to the list of causes of deforestation (Budowski 1990). Recent

estimates are that only 24% of the Choco rainforest is remaining, and protected areas

cover less than 10% of the total original habitat (Forero-Medina and Joppa 2010).

Successful conservation strategies for these highly threatened and fragmented

landscapes should incorporate the active collaboration of local stakeholders, not only

within protected areas but also in a wider context. Weak community organizations, low

participation, poor levels of solidarity, and poor understanding of the need to integrating

conservation and production processes have been identified as the main challenges for

conservation in this region (Etter and Villa 2000).

Development Challenges: Increasing Urbanization and Rural Poverty

According to latest available estimates, Colombian population is around 47

million people (DANE 2013). While Colombia is considered one of the most urbanized

countries in Latin America, the urban population is highly concentrated in the Andes

region. Even though the proportion of the rural population has decreased from almost

70 to 30% from the 1930s to 2000 (Pérez and Pérez 2002), the absolute numbers for

rural areas continue to increase. Furthermore, the high demand for water resources and

agricultural land continues to be a strong driver of natural resource degradation in these

fragile mountain ecosystems.

During the twentieth century Colombia implemented diverse policies intended to

facilitate development of small and medium producers and promote rural development,

among them programs that that planned to achieve equitable distribution of land

ownership (Heshusius 2004). Since 1917 the Colombian Government has attempted to

implement land reforms at least 14 times in an effort to address inequality (Flores 2013).

28
  Land titling (1926): The main goal was to clarify property rights, granting titles to
households that were making use of the land but had no formal document to
prove legal possession of the property (Sharpless 1978).

 Agrarian reforms (1934-1938, 1958-1962, 1966-1970): These were the main

form of intervention in the land market. This structural policy sought a more
equitable distribution of land ownership that promoted greater efficiency in the
patterns of land use and changed the structure of distribution of land with
potential for agricultural use. These reforms achieved relatively poor success in
terms of the equitable distribution of land, reform achievements in terms of new
opportunities and sustainable rural development are still highly questioned
(Borras 2003).

 Peasant Reserve Zones 1: In the face of deteriorating social and economic

conditions, affected rural minorities migrated and expanded the agricultural
frontier, often in new areas that were environmentally fragile or with high
likelihood of natural disasters. Peasant reserves zones were proposed by the
state to promote and stabilize the rural economy in these newly settled areas and
to ensure greater socioeconomic participation by rural communities (Fajardo
2002).

 Land restitution: This program is part of the Law 1448, also known as Law of
Victims (June 10, 2011). The law establishes the rights to land restitution for
peasants who were dispossessed of their land in the last two decades as part of
the ongoing armed conflict that has affected Colombia for the last 50 years
(Rodríguez 2016).

These efforts however, had very superficial impacts, their attempts for

meaningfully redistribute land have been largely unsuccessful and have left intact the

structural problems faced by the rural population. Despite all the different strategies

adopted during the historical evolution of land reform in Colombia including the recent

devolution of property to small farmer victims of forced displacement, the Gini Index for

land concentration is at the highest (meaning least equitable) values in the country’s

history, and has increased from 0.85 in 2011(Franco-Cañas and De los Rios-

Carmenado 2011) to 0.89 in 2015 (Gillin 2015). Among the main reasons are the ability

1
Zonas de Reserva Campesina (ZRC) Campesino reserve zones, were created through Law 160 of
1994, with the purpose of regulating and ordering the occupation of non-productive and non-titled lands
and consolidating the peasant economies in the country (Fajardo 2002).

29
of big landowners to halt the reforms through violent coercion and exert influence in

local governments (Flores 2013), and the poor attention to the creation and use of tools

for integrated rural development (Pulecio 2006).

In Colombia, urban and rural sectors have grown as two polar opposites, rather

than as an articulated duo that could enhance development without conflict. In general

rural development policies have been implemented within a productivist approach,

meaning without a strategy to transform the political and social structures in the field, let

alone a proposal for a coordinated and equitable balance between rural and urban

areas (Pulecio 2006). In most cases those programs have delivered high-cost land to

farmers with high illiteracy rates, no organized social networks, limited capital, and

assisted by government organizations with high doses of inefficiency and corruption,

which severely undermined the possibilities of transforming the rural sector in Colombia.

Many analysts agree that the big mismatch between rapid urbanization and a weakened

rural sector created the conditions conducive to non-competitive agriculture and social

conflict (Messaoudi 2011) that currently affects most of the country.

This clearly indicates that over the last 100 years, land formalization, agrarian

reforms, and/or devolution programs have failed to counteract all the factors that cause

land ownership concentration, and that intervention on those factors is sorely needed

(Franco-Cañas and De los Rios-Carmenado 2011). In general, Colombia’s experience

shows that, given the complexity of structural social and economic factors in which

small farmers are immersed, providing access to land through property formalization

and secure land ownership without also giving beneficiaries the means to make it

30
productive, does not translate into efficient agricultural land use and poverty alleviation

(Pulecio 2006).

A study based on household surveys (Balcázar Vanegas et al. 2001) found that

in terms of per capita family income and quality of life indicators, farmers who were

beneficiaries of government aid and agrarian reform plans were in worse condition than

non-beneficiaries. This negative impact is attributed in part to the inefficiency and

ineffectiveness of the entities responsible for land and aid redistribution. In contrast,

Balcázar et al. (2001) emphasized the importance of promoting not only farmers’

abilities to improve their own welfare, but also the institutional environment that favors

their opportunities and access to productive resources, such as land.

Despite these issues, if only agricultural land is considered (excluding

unproductive land and cattle ranching), small and medium size farms represent around

60% of the rural property area allocated to agriculture in Colombia (Pérez and Pérez

2002). Those farmers play a key role in food provision, not only in terms of quantity, but

in terms of the diversity of products they offer. They provide a wide variety of almost

year-round fresh crops delivered to local and regional markets, thereby reducing

processing and storage requirements. The amount of nationally-consumed food coming

from small farmers ranges between 35% to 65%, depending on the product and the

season (Pérez and Pérez 2002). This highlights the important role of small farmers for

food security in Colombia.

Conservation by Civil Society in Colombia:

Origins of Civil Society Reserve Networks

Twenty years ago small farmers in the Southern Colombian Andes took the

initiative to create a Network of Private Natural Reserves (Natural Reserves of Civil

31
Society - RESNATUR). This network emerged as a grassroots initiative of collective

action against the risk of displacement or relocation and loss of access to land and

natural resources due to the growing pressure of infrastructure and development

projects (dams). These projects represented a threat not only to their traditional

livelihoods but also to fragile and irreplaceable mountain ecosystems, endemic species

and ecosystem services. Resistance to development in the context of increasing neo-

liberalization and violence in a country like Colombia could have easily developed into

social conflict and stigmatization of the farmers as insurgent or revolutionaries.

Nevertheless, through strategic partnerships, and with support from international

conservation NGOs, and by using the conservation discourse as an umbrella, this

initiative grew and was replicated in other regions of the country. These farmers

successfully managed to maintain not only their land and livelihoods, but to create the

basis of a new model of rural development that seeks to integrate traditional livelihoods

and biodiversity conservation (Rodriguez 2010). Resnatur currently comprises more

than 150 associated reserves. It protects 101,766 ha of forest, mostly located in the

Chocó and Tropical Andes biodiversity “hot-spots” of high-priority conservation (Myers

et al. 2000). Resnatur associated reserves represent small farmers and rural

landowners from different regions of the country, who coordinate and share their

conservation activities through the network.

Resnatur is the oldest and largest network of private reserves in Latin America.

The initial support from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), particularly from the director of

the Colombian program, was key to developing the administrative capacity of this

organization and to providing the technical capacity to carry out their conservation

32
activities. Funding and logistical support was mainly focused on environmental

education workshops for the new reserve owners, but also included trips, tours and

trainings that were designed and facilitated by Resnatur members. These workshops

and trainings were focused on exchanging practical experiences and included

participatory research methods and explicitly drew their inspiration from the farmer led

sustainable agriculture movement Campesino a campesino (Farmer to farmer) (Rosset

et al. 2011) and Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodologies (Fals-Borda 1979,

1987).

Over the years, the geographical expansion of Resnatur brought logistical

challenges due to communication and participation of members in remote regions or in

regions with very few members - an issue that the organization tried to solve with the

creation of regional nodes (or Resnatur regional chapters). Some of these chapters

were successful at organizing and attracting new members, and slowly developed into

solid nodes. While these nodes continued to be recognized as part of Resnatur, many

groups started to establish their own local NGOs, a strategy that was necessary to

secure funding and interact effectively with local environmental institutions. This slow

process of decentralization of Resnatur eventually led to the creation of the concepts of

local networks and bridge organizations (BO), which recognized the important role of

the diverse types of organizations that were promoting Natural Reserves of the Civil

Society (RNSC) around the country. While Resnatur continues to be the only bridge

organization with national scope, over the years, in many other regions of the country

and inspired by the Resnatur experience, many other bridge organizations emerged not

only from the efforts of Resnatur members to establish local nodes, but from other civil

33
society actors that started to adopt the initiative with or without the support of external

organizations.

Today these local initiatives for conservation are organized through at least 20

local networks of reserves of the civil society. These local networks are usually

coordinated by local NGOs or community organizations (local bridge organizations) and

continue to focus their efforts in supporting small subsistence farmers from neighboring

municipalities. Due to the informal and dynamic nature of these organizations,

estimating the actual contributions of these initiatives and the total number of reserves

is a challenge, even for environmental authorities, but it is known that some of them

may have hundreds of associated reserves. Despite the differences in geographical

scope and organizational goals (which are adapted to local contexts), these

organizations and their members continue to share the common motivation of

integrating sustainable rural livelihoods and conservation.

Reserves of the Civil Society: Legal Definition and Recognition

Since 2007, the Colombian Ministry of Environment has officially recognized

RESNATUR and other bridge organizations as part of the National Protected Area

System (SINAP). Specifically, the legal basis for voluntary conservation processes in

private land lies within Articles 109 and 110 of Act 99 of 1993 of the Colombian

Constitution (through which is established the National Environmental System - SINA

and Ministry of Environment - today Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial

Development), and decree 1996 of 1999 (regulatory law 99 of 1993) that defines

Natural Civil Society Reserves as:

 Part or all of an area of property that holds a sample natural ecosystem and is
managed under the principles of sustainability in the use of natural resources,
whose activities and uses are adopted pursuant to regulation.

34
  Nature reserves of the civil society will pursue an integrated management, based
on sustainability criteria to ensure the conservation, preservation, regeneration or
restoration of natural ecosystems contained therein and to permit production of
goods and services.

The decree also establishes the potential activities that can be developed in the

reserves, their zoning, the procedure for registration with the National Parks Unit, the

participation of registered reserve owner’s in the planning process of programs to be

executed in its area of influence, the duties of the owners, and the procedure for

implementing state investments affecting registered reserves and that require

environmental license.

Private reserves in Colombia are also defined by the following specific

conservation goals (Escobar and Solano 2009):

 Preserve the productive capacity of natural and semi-natural ecosystems and

maintain population viability of native terrestrial or aquatic (marine and
continental) species so as to ensure long term provision of these resources.

 Maintain the natural and semi-natural vegetation cover and environmental

conditions necessary to regulate the water supply, prevent and control erosion
and sedimentation, and ensure air quality.

 Preserve areas containing natural elements of fauna, flora, water, which are
unique, represent a special scenic attraction or have scientific, cultural or
symbolic significance, or involve special traditional significance for the cultures of
the country.

 Provide natural or semi-natural spaces for pleasure, recreation, education and

improvement of environmental quality.

In general, associated reserves are very variable in size (ranging from a few to

thousands of hectares); however, what is really unique about this network is that most

of the reserves have emerged from within peasant communities (small farmers with <

10 ha) who rely on their land for subsistence activities. The diversity in of landowner's

types is also reflected in the different conservation goals. Farmers and landowners

35
voluntarily allocate a portion of their property to forest protection, and most of them

place a strong emphasis on integrating their livelihoods with biodiversity conservation,

protection of ecosystem services, environmental education and community

development.

The positive impact of this network on the design of environmental policies at the

national level, on the well-being of local communities, and biodiversity conservation has

been widely recognized (Rodriguez 2010), but scarcely evaluated. Originally supported

by international NGOs, the recent global economic crisis led to a decrease in funding

and ultimately to the total loss of external financial support. Many predicted the collapse

of this organization; however, members organized themselves and are currently

contributing with money or products from their own reserves to sustain the network.

Reserves of the Civil Society and IUCN Categories in Colombia

The International Union or Conservation of Nature has proposed a classification

system for privately owned protected areas, according to their management objectives

(Langholz and Lassoie 2001a)(Table 2-1). According to this classification, the most

common types of privately owned reserves in Colombia are: Ecotourism reserve (Type

III), Biological station (Type IV), Hybrid reserve (Type V), Farmer-owned forest patch

(Type VI), Personal retreat reserve (Type VII) and Non-governmental organization

reserve (Type VIII). In the particular case of Colombia, privately owned reserves such

as the ones in this study, encompass three different types of landowners: (1)

Campesinos or subsistence farmers, (2) non-indigenous rural landowners, and (3)

NGOs such as local community associations, regional and national NGOs and non-

profit research institutions (Botanical garden, arboretums, national and international

conservation NGOs such as Natura Foundation and Birdlife International). All of these

36
initiatives are known as civil society conservation initiatives - a name that has been

purposefully chosen to avoid the association with for-profit private initiatives (such as

hunting or corporate reserves which are not present in Colombia). In sum, despite their

private nature, these reserves encompass diverse types of landowners and diverse

management objectives. Within IUCN categories, they are considered as other effective

conservation measures (OECM), and Indigenous peoples’ and local community

conserved territories and areas (ICCAs) (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2013).

Those are not protected areas categories; instead, they include the territories of

local communities around the world (which can be private or community owned and

managed). OECMs and ICCAs include territories that are embedded in the cultures of

these communities, are the basis of their survival and livelihoods, and help sustain

ecosystems, species, and ecosystem functions. While their motivations and objectives

may be ethical, economic, political, cultural, material, and/or spiritual, often they are

simply a peoples’ or community’s way of life (Kothari 2015). While these territories have

been recognized as important conservation strategies by the IUCN and the Commission

for Biological Diversity (CBD), they face multiple threats such as lack of tenure security,

extractive industries, imposition of inappropriate land uses, erosion of traditional cultural

values, and incursion of external markets. These problems are often exacerbated, or

occur, because of a lack of recognition and support, especially at national and sub-

national levels (Jonas et al. 2014, Kothari 2015).

37
Table 2-1. IUCN classification of Privately Owned Protected Areas
CATEGORY MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVE
(TYPE)
Formal park Protect nature. A formally recognized
(Type I) unit in a national protected area
system. Must be legally gazetted.
Includes monitoring and evaluation by
government.
Program Participant in a formal, voluntary
participant incentive program designed to
(Type II) promote biodiversity conservation on
private lands. Programs include
restrictions on land use and are not
as formal as Type l. Include
easements and payments for
environmental services.
Ecotourism Combine nature conservation with
reserve tourism. Tourism is a principal
(Type III) revenue generator and takes place on
part or all of the landholdings
Biological Combine nature conservation with
station scientific research. Reserve serves as
(Type IV) outdoor laboratory. May incorporate
scientific and other forms of tourism,
as well as education. Differ from NGO
reserves (Type VIII) in that their
primary mission is research.
Hybrid Protect nature as one component of a
reserve diverse land use strategy. Usually
(Type V) large ranches that combine
agriculture, forestry, or cattle
production, with reserve providing
watershed protection and other
amenities.
38
EXAMPLE
More than two dozen "private wildlife
refuges" have qualified to be legally
recognized units in Costa Rica's
protected area system.
The Natural Heritage Program in the
Republic of South Africa has
registered more than 150 sites,
protecting 216,332 hectares. Most of
these natural areas owned by private
individuals.
Tambopata Jungle Lodge (Peru)
within the 6,000-square kilometer
Tambopata Candalno Reserve Zone
and has capacity to host 6,000
tourists per year.
Jatun Sacha Biological Station
protects 2000 hectares of Napo
forest in Ecuador, while conducting
rain forest research, hosting
university field courses and offering
natural history tours.
The 80,000-hectare Hato Pinero is a
family-based operation in Venezuela
that combines biodiversity
conservation, nature tourism, and
cattle ranching.
Table 2-1. Continued.
CATEGORY MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVE
(TYPE)
Farmer- Safeguard water sources and other
owned forest locally accruing environmental
patch (Type services, at the individual or family
VI) level. Usually informal, small (<20
hectares), and not involved in
tourism industry. Represent the least
formal type of private conservation
area.
Personal Maintain a natural area as a personal
retreat haven, the individual or family level.
reserve (Type Frequently owned by urbanites who
VII) purchase or inherit land in a rural
area and who are not reliant on the
reserve for income generation.
Non- Protect nature under the auspices of
governmental a local, national, or international
organization Non-profit conservation organization.
reserve Base of support is broader than that
(Type VIII) of most other reserve types. Includes
land trusts, conservancies,
foundations, and associations.
Hunting Maintain natural area for purpose of
reserve sustainable wildlife utilization.
(Type IX) Animals are collected for trophies
and/or meat production. Include
game ranches and lands owned by
hunting clubs. Especially common in
Africa.
Corporate Protect nature as a tool for creating
reserve favorable publicity, as result of court
(Type X) order, or from a conservation ethic.
Owned by private for-profit
corporations (such as golf courses,
paper companies, educational
institutions).
Adapted from Langholz and Lassoie (2001a)
39
EXAMPLE
Largest category of reserves in terms
of amount of land protected and
number of owners. Also the category
about which the least is known,
making it a crucial area for future
research. Thousands, perhaps
millions, of these patches exist
worldwide.
Sixty percent of the Adirondack State
Park in New York consists of private
property, much of it owned by
urbanites that use the area for
second homes and summer retreats.
Schoolchildren around the world
raised money to create The
Children's Rainforest to protect
threatened habitat in Costa Rica.
With 22,000 hectares, is larger than
18 of Costa Rica's 22 national parks,
and continues to grow.
The Republic of South Africa
currently has more than 9,000 game
ranches protecting 8 million
hectares. Habitat required for
economically important umbrella
species also supports nongame
biodiversity.
Developing country examples usually
owned by large multinational
corporations, including the forestry
industry. Examples include Danum
Valley (43,800 hectares) and Maliau
Basin (39,000 hectares) in Sabah,
East Malaysia.
Figure 2-1. Map of the 13 Colombia ecoregions, including Chocó-Darién and Andean
Ecoregions. Insert shows the distribution of the six biomes, and the five
regions Map by (Sánchez-Cuervo et al. 2012).Creative Commons License CC
BY.

40
Figure 2-2. Percent of each biome's protected by different networks of protected areas
in Colombia. A) National Network (IUCN I-VI) and B) National and Regional
Networks together. (Forero-Medina and Joppa 2010). Creative Commons
License CC BY.

41
 CHAPTER 3
CONSERVATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE THEORY AND
LITERATURE REVIEW

General Problem, Mainstream Approaches and Contradictions

While state managed protected areas have been the dominant conservation

paradigm since the XIX century, Community Based Natural Resource Management

(CBNRM) gained strength as a new approach to conservation in the 1970s. Amid the

growing critiques of the social impacts of exclusionary conservation, CBNRM emerged

to try to reconcile the need to protect invaluable natural areas while at the same time

consider the welfare of local and surrounding communities (Wilshusen 2000, Blaikie and

Jeanrenaud 2013). The publication of the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN 1990)

and Our Common Future (Brundtland et al. 1987), stressed a new message that

conservation was a socio-economic as well as a biological issue. Although this novel

conservation discourse established deep roots experiences around the world have

proven that the reconciliation of those aspects is a great challenge.

During the 1990s and 2000s the conservation debate of state vs. community

conservation was at its peak (Schwartzman et al. 2000a, Schwartzman et al. 2000b).

On one side of the discussion some scholars argued that people-centered approaches

were failing to achieve their goal of biodiversity protection and that conservation should

focus on strict protection of forest areas (Terborgh 1999, 2000); on the other side

scholars highlighted that advances had been made, and that the shortcomings of those

approaches were rooted on our limited understanding of the complex, socio-economic

and political processes that shape the implementation of conservation interventions

(Wilshusen 2000, Brechin et al. 2002, Wilshusen et al. 2002, Brechin et al. 2003). Some

of the main critiques were poor design and implementation that prevented adequate

42
monitoring and evaluation, and the pervasive lack of real rather than nominal

participation.

As a result, scholars have tried to advance our understanding of the conditions

that foster positive social and environmental outcomes and have proposed key

suggestions for the improvement of CBRM strategies. Some of them are: avoiding blue-

print solutions and incorporate the complexities of different contexts (Ostrom 2007).

They also advocate for increasing the collaboration with diverse groups of stakeholders,

including plural perspectives and diverse knowledge systems to foster meaningful

participation on project design and implementation (Berkes 2007). Finally, it is also

important to create strategies for long term monitoring and evaluation of project

effectiveness, not only in terms of maintenance or improvement of forest conditions but

also in terms of fair distribution of benefits among participants.

Despite those improvements, the debate between strict protection and people-

centered conservation continues, and it could be argued that it has been intensified and

polarized (Kopnina 2016). An example of this is the land sparing vs. land-sharing

debate (Phalan et al. 2011). Some scholars argue that technological advances in

agriculture such as GMOs, chemical fertilization and pest control as well as technified

agriculture and irrigation systems, will be the only solution to increase agricultural yields

to the extent that is needed to feed the growing global population without increasing

deforestation. This increased efficiency and agricultural intensification will allow for less

productive land to be spared for forest conservation. On the other side, scholars that

support the land sharing approach argue that biodiversity conservation and agricultural

production can coexist if the agricultural matrix provides suitable habitats for biodiversity

43
as in the case of diverse agroforestry systems (Kremen 2015). Besides providing

connectivity and creating buffer zones to protected areas, agro ecosystems can provide

higher yields than technified agriculture with similar area while protecting valuable

ecosystem services and providing food security (Perfecto and Vandermeer 2012).

More recently the rapid expansion of large scale land based investments for

commodity crops, biofuels, large scale tree and palm oil plantations, (Lambin and

Meyfroidt 2011) as well as the boom of extractive industries that exacerbate social

conflicts and environmental degradation, have increased the intensity of the debate

(Burchardt and Dietz 2014). The arguments have moved from ecological, technological

and economical evidence for the appropriateness of land sparing vs. land sharing to

issues of global political economy, climate change and human rights. Some advocate

for radical solutions, such as the recent proposal by E.O Wilson - a renowned Biologist-

to allocate half of the earth to strict forest conservation (Wilson 2016). His proposal,

along with the recent Ecomodernist manifesto launched last year by a group of

prominent scholars (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015), advocates that technological

improvements such as clean energy will allow us to decouple our economy from

dependence on natural resources, address climate change and engage in large-scale

restoration of natural ecosystems. On the other side of the discussion, scholars and

practitioners are skeptical of these solutions and stress that systemic changes are the

only way to avoid the looming future of increased destruction of natural resources and

social and economic inequality brought by agricultural intensification and extractive

industries (Büscher et al. 2014).

44
 In the midst of those debates answers focused on economic-based solutions

could be considered a third paradigm of conservation, which emerged in the early

1990s (Pearce et al 1992, Pearce 1991 and 1993). The rationale behind this new

paradigm was the internalization of externalities. Degradation of natural resources

occurs due to the undervaluation of resources that are in general open access. Under

this approach, economic tools have been seen as a complement to strict command and

control protection approaches and an attempt to fix the problem of undervaluation of

open access resources. It was proposed that establishment of incentives, regulations

and safeguards will lead to better management and proper allocation of resources for

environmental maintenance and conservation (Barrett et al. 2013, Burns and Giessen

2016). Payments for environmental services, taxes and subsidies, tradable rights of

carbon offsets and certification schemes, are some of the tools that have been

implemented since then under the logic of this approach (Pirard and Broughton 2011).

However detractors claim that besides raising a number of ethical and practical

concerns, such as the commodification of nature, and privatization of environmental

services, those approaches can bring serious negative social impacts and increase

inequalities among marginalized groups (Igoe and Brockington 2007, Brockington and

Ponte 2015). In sum, critical scholars and practitioners argue that the current use of the

development discourse, economic tools and market based approaches that seek to

improve the material conditions of the poor while promoting forest conservation are

basically a distraction to avoid and divert our attention from the long overdue discussion

on the systemic causes of unequal rights of rich and poor and nature degradation.

45
(Arsel and Büscher 2012, Büscher and Arsel 2012) and pervasive inequality (Stiglitz

2012).

Extensive analysis of the limitations of these three conservation paradigms have

been carried out by scholars and practitioners since the early 1990s (Biot 1995, Blaikie

and Jeanrenaud 2013), and most of those critiques continue to be valid today

(Brockington and Duffy 2010). Despite their inherent shortcomings and contradictions,

those are the tools available in the conservation toolbox, and policy makers and

practitioners continue using different combinations of them and increasingly working to

improve the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of a variety of

conservation interventions that make use of those tools. One may argue that the guiding

principles and values of those three paradigms that emphasize biological (protected

areas), social (CBRM) and economic aspects (market based and incentives) are largely

valid. The biological perspective emphasizes the intrinsic value of nature, the social

perspective places high value on the agency of local communities and their important

role in conservation, and the economic perspectives try to fix the problem of the lack of

valuation of irreplaceable resources in a society that strives for profit maximization.

Each of them individually and in combination creates institutional arrangements that

define, shape and regulate our relationship with the environment. However, some

questions arise: are there other possibilities for shaping this relationship? Do any other

examples exist?

Grassroots Conservation Initiatives

Today, there is a wide consensus that conservation strategies would benefit from

a deeper understanding of human–nature interactions and the incorporation of rural

communities’ perspectives and grassroots approaches to environmental governance

46
(Ostrom and Nagendra 2006, Berkes 2007). Notwithstanding, the design and

implementation of these inclusive approaches has proven to be a challenge and

questions remain about their long term maintenance and impact (Brooks et al. 2012).

While in the conservation and development scholarship the terms 'grassroots' and

'community' are many times used interchangeably, those terms represent different

epistemological political and practical approaches that are better understood through

examination of the origins of the term grassroots on the development literature. In

general, grassroots development has not received much attention and has not played a

substantial role in the mainstream development discourse. Sometimes is referred as

“empowerment”, but more specifically, it can be defined as the collective action initiated

by the poor to address their problems for themselves, frequently assisted by local

nongovernmental organizations (Bray 2009). It has been defined by Kleymeyer (1994)

as:

… a process in which disadvantaged people organize themselves to

overcome the obstacles to their social and economic well-being. The
strategies they employ include conducting self-help development projects,
pressuring public and private institutions for resources, and representing
the group common interest before governmental agencies and political
bodies. Ideally, members of those groups participate fully in identifying
problems, setting priorities, designing strategies and programs and
carrying them out. These activities normally involve small-scale, practical
efforts to achieve change, and are carried out by organizations such as
village or neighborhood associations, production or service cooperatives,
cultural groups, workers' associations, ethnic coalitions, or federations of
such organizations. The breadth and intensity of participation typically
generated by this approach is one of its major strengths relative to other
styles of development. p. 4-5.

Therefore, the main characteristic of grassroots development initiatives is that

they are designed and run by indigenous peoples or campesinos that may or may not

have received assistance from outsiders. In this sense, many projects aiming to benefit

47
local communities that have been designed, implemented or managed according to the

policies of external organizations (regional, national or international organizations) can

fall into the community conservation category, but should not be identified as

“grassroots” initiatives.

Despite the poor representation of rural communities’ initiatives for conservation

in scholarly literature, diverse examples highlight their long-term commitment in

conservation. Amazon scholars consider that these initiatives have been leading a

“quiet revolution,” challenging dominant conservation paradigms (Hall 1997) and that

increased support to those groups has facilitated the participation of diverse actors

involved in conservation and sustainable management, widening the diversity of the

management practices and conservation strategies implemented (from traditional timber

to non-timber products, agroforestry systems linked with organic agricultural production,

community-based ecotourism, handicrafts, cultural preservation, biodiversity

conservation, and carbon storage) (Kainer et al. 2003). Furthermore, there are many

examples from other regions in Latin America, which do not resemble conventional top-

down conservation strategies and have achieved very positive outcomes with scarce

external support. Some examples include watershed restoration groups in Ecuador

(Becker 2003), water committees in Honduras (Tucker 2014), grassroots initiatives for

capacity building and environmental education in Costa Rica (Burlingame 2000, Blum

2009) and the varied biodiversity conservation grassroots movements in Belize that

succeeded where many mainstream, large-scale conservation efforts have failed —

“held back by rigid management and funding structures and a lack of meaningful

community participation" (Horwich et al. 2011). These initiatives as well as hundreds of

48
other examples from grassroots organizations that are very poorly represented in the

academic literature share common principles of self-determination and a long-term

commitment to the improving the socio-economic conditions of surrounding

communities, in which conservation is not a separate goal, but is part of their overall

well-being.

Conceptual and Methodological Approaches Used on this Dissertation to

Understand Grassroots Conservation Initiatives in Colombia

Private Conservation

Increasing importance of private conservation

Approximately 20% of forests worldwide are privately owned (FAO 2010). This is

the most common tenure regime in North America (31%), Central America (46%) and

Oceania (37%), and is also significant in South America (21%) and East Asia (33%)

(FAO 2010). During the last few decades, private protected areas have been emerging

worldwide as increasingly important tools to promote voluntary conservation at a

landscape level (Miller et al. 2012). They encompass a wide variety of owners, such as

individuals, cooperatives, community organizations, NGOs and corporations (Mitchel

2007), and represent numerous land tenure structures and management objectives

(Table 2-1).

Despite their growing importance, official reports from the United Nations’ World

Database of Protected Areas indicate that private protected areas, (legally recognized

protected areas on private lands), represent 5% and less than 3% of all protected areas

in the world and Latin America respectively (Deguignet et al. 2014). However, while this

database is the most comprehensive available, the use of global datasets for

conservation planning presents various limitations (Joppa et al. 2016). These include

49
issues of accuracy and resolution (Chape et al. 2005), and the misrepresentation of

initiatives that do not fit with mainstream and top-down approaches to conservation.

Some authors consider that databases set a framework to see the world, that mask the

critical importance of diverse forms of informal individual and collective initiatives that

regardless of land ownership are working to promote conservation and natural resource

management (West et al. 2006), overlooking the same solutions that conservationists

are trying to promote (Brosius 1999, Pathak et al. 2004). An example that illustrates the

pervasive lack of representation of these initiatives in this global database is provided in

a recent analysis by Levin et al. (2016), who found that most of the private natural

heritage reserves (RPPNs) that play a key role in the conservation of Brazil’s pantanal

hotspot are not represented.

During the last 3 decades, private protected areas have spread very quickly in

Latin America (Langholz and Lassoie 2001a, Crouzeilles et al. 2013, De Vasconcellos

and Castley 2014, Arellano Gosdenovich 2015, De Vasconcellos and Castley 2016,

Miranda et al. 2016, Serenari et al. 2016), with an estimate of more than 2.5 million

hectares protected through approximately 4,200 private natural reserves in 14

countries, most of them organized through private reserve networks (Keller 2010).

Private natural reserves reduce opportunity costs of conservation, allow a balance

between conservation and production, and present opportunities for engaging and

educating civil society (Downsborough et al. 2011). Those areas are also becoming an

important factor to foster rural development, with many landowners proving to be good

land stewards and interested in developing effective partnerships with governments and

non-governmental organizations (Chacon 2005).

50
 By enhancing connectivity and acting as buffer zones, they can significantly

boost conservation outcomes (Fitzsimons and Wescott 2008), and when actively

managed as complementary strategies to government protected areas, the number of

species protected can be greatly increased (Molnar et al. 2004, Murphy and Noon 2007,

Gallo et al. 2009, Ocampo-Peñuela and Pimm 2014). Private reserves have

successfully aided to recover critically endangered species (Rambaldi et al. 2005) (De

Vasconcellos and Castley 2016), support climate change mitigation efforts (De Santo

2012), and contributed to enhancing the resilience of rural communities to natural

disasters (Keller 2010). Nonetheless, empirical evidence on the contribution of privately

owned reserves to conservation is still very limited. Resources for research to

understand land owner motivations, incentive programs that could work best, under

what conditions and in what settings private protected areas are most likely to develop

are sorely needed (Langholz and Lassoie 2001b, Gallo et al. 2009, Milam et al. 2016).

Assessing conservation effectiveness

The suitability of different indicators to natural resource management outcomes

has been a highly debated issue during the past decade (Sutherland et al. 2004, Izuieta

et al. 2011) and scholars are increasingly calling their attention to the chronic paucity of

studies that provide empirical causal evidence of the effectiveness of common

conservation instruments (Miteva et al. 2012). As a result, important efforts have

emerged through collaborative research in the field of conservation and natural

resource management to address this gap (Kapos et al. 2008, 2009). An increasing

number of studies have started to use counterfactual comparisons and diverse methods

such as remote sensing, in situ biodiversity inventories, species distributions and expert

assessments in an attempt to obtain more reliable measures of the impact of protected

51
area management on conservation outcomes (Geldmann et al. 2013, Venter et al.

2014), and in general, to obtain solid evidence of the impact of conservation policies

and interventions (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006, Fisher et al. 2014).

Despite this careful attention to scientific rigor, findings from some of these

studies are far from conclusive and several of them have even reported no correlation

between conservation management and conservation outcomes (Nolte and Agrawal

2013, Nolte et al. 2013, Carranza et al. 2014). This lack of correlation could suggest that

sometimes good management is not enough to ensure effective conservation (Carranza

et al. 2014); however, it could also reflect methodological limitations (i.e. small sample

size) and the perceptual nature of the management evaluation methodologies that may

be biased towards overly positive self-assessments (Cook and Hockings 2011, Carbutt

and Goodman 2013), or be prone to error associated to variable interpretation and

language (Carey and Burgman 2008).

While many of the concerns about the rigor and independence of self-

assessment methods and their efficacy as tools for impact evaluation are valid, those

approaches can also bring real benefits (Cook and Hockings 2011). In the absence of

quantitative data, expert opinion may be the best information available and it is common

for impact evaluation of protected area management to rely on a managers' personal

experience (Fazey et al. 2006) Even when quantitative information is available, impact

evaluations normally use expert opinion to fill knowledge gaps (Hockings et al. 2009).

Expert opinions are commonly used in ecology when information is scarce. This may

reveal information that purely quantitative methods cannot, and can also increase the

precision of models and facilitate decision making in a cost-effective way (Kuhnert et al.

52
2010, Cook et al. 2014). Expert opinion can also help synthesize and interpret existing

quantitative data (Fazey et al. 2006), increase our understanding of the interactions

between the different aspects of natural resource management and biological and social

outcomes (Patton 2008), and promote the use of those findings to improve

management (Coad et al. 2015).

Beyond controversies regarding the nature of the methods, another important

discussion involves the inclusion of contextual factors while evaluating conservation

interventions. In general, traditional conservation monitoring and evaluation approaches

are focused on inputs and outputs associated with particular conservation interventions

(Mascia et al. 2014); however, recent IUCN guidelines stress that it is also important to

identify the extent to which observed outcomes are due to management interventions or

other factors beyond the manager’s control (Hockings 2006). Failure to recognize the

context in which conservation interventions are embedded may limit our capacity to

understand the causes of failure or success and any attempt at improvement may be

ineffective (Coad et al. 2015).

Social Network Analysis

Social networks as tools to understand social interactions

In the early 20th century, sociologist George Simmel identified social relations as

key factor to understand how and why people behave and think as they do (Krackhardt

1999). Today, whether the pattern of relations in which people are embedded -the social

structure- has an impact on what people think and do, continues to be one of the most

profound questions in social science (Bernard 2012). A social network is a theoretical

construct useful to study relationships between individuals, groups, organizations, or

even entire societies. The term is used to describe the social structure determined by

53
such interactions (Wasserman and Faust 1994), social patterns at different scales and

the role of influential members in the dynamics of those interactions. Social Network

Analysis (SNA) can be considered an inherently interdisciplinary academic field which

encompasses social psychology, sociology, anthropology, statistics, quantum physics,

information sciences and graph theory among others (Borgatti et al. 2009, Burt et al.

2013).

To a great extent, the theoretical basis of research on social networks is

psychological, as it is the perceptions in the minds of social network participants that

constitute the relevant phenomena (Krackhardt 1987). SNA draws from traditions of

research and theory in psychology, sociology, and other areas to describe how patterns

of interpersonal relations are associated with diverse behavioral, cognitive, and

emotional outcomes. Currently, there is a deeper interest in understanding the

psychological foundations of why some people more than others engage and benefit

from the network of contacts within which they are embedded (Burt et al. 2013). People

with strong network closure and “weak” structural holes (as with the “strength of weak

ties”) tend to categorize themselves and others in terms of group memberships. They

also tend to be more extraverted and less individualistic. Network structure has also

been correlated with the origins of basic motivations such as safety and efficacy

(Kadushin 2002), and emotional attributes associated with leadership, emotional

intelligence and personality scales (Emery 2012).

Social networks are analyzed at the scale relevant to the researcher's theoretical

question. Although levels of analysis are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there are

54
three main general levels: micro (individual actor-ego level), meso (organizations), and

macro (large scale networks) (Borgatti et al. 2009).

Personal networks: social support at the individual level

Personal networks are focused on individual’s social interactions. Structural and

compositional characteristics of those networks can be analyzed through the

connections between the individual or ‘ego’ and other relevant persons known as ‘alters’

(Wasserman and Faust 1994, Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Egocentric, or personal

SNA is focused on how much of the outcome variables of interest is influenced not only

by the characteristics of the environment in which the actors live, but also by who the

actors know and how they relate with other actors (Bernard 2012).

One of the most important concepts in network analysis is the idea that structural

position-where a node is in a network- limits or enhances access to information and

other resources. There are several ways to describe the structural position of egos in a

network such as density, centrality (including degree centrality, closeness centrality, and

betweenness centrality), structural holes, and strong and weak ties (Borgatti et al.

2009). Density is the number of ties in a network divided by the number of possible ties,

with very dense personal networks indicating greater reliance on strong ties rather than

on weak ties (Bernard 2012). Degree centrality is the number of direct connections (ties,

links, relations) any node has to all the other nodes in a network. The concept of

betweenness centrality involves counting the number of times any node is on the

shortest path between all pairs of nodes in a network (Bernard 2012). The existence of

structural holes can be seen as the lack of redundant ties within a network, which

provides an actor with diverse information and enables him/her to act as an information

broker by combining information from different actors within the network (Burt 2001).

55
Another key measure of network structure is tie strength (Granovetter 1973). While

weak ties are important for information flow, strong ties represent social interactions that

better provide social support.

Compositional variables summarize the attributes of the interactions within the

personal network and include frequency and diversity of the interactions (McCarty et al.

2007). This is related to the concept of homophily, or the formation of social ties among

people who are similar in some way, for example in terms of age, gender, skin color

ethnicity, wealth, religion, occupation, or education. These patterns are known to limit

people’s social worlds in a way that has powerful implications for the information they

receive, the attitudes they form, and the interactions they experience (McPherson et al.

2001).

Other attributes of personal networks are the type of relationships, how close

alters live from the ego (which can in turn influence frequency and intensity of their

interaction) and whether or not ego and alters share their affiliation or support to diverse

formal or informal groups. These data permit understanding topics such as the

characteristics of social support networks and their influence on egos' decisions and

behavior (McCarty 2002)

Whole networks, the influence of social dynamics at the group level.

Whole (socio-centric) networks are used when the focus is to understand the

pattern of relationships among individuals that are part of a socially defined group. By

collecting data on social ties between these individuals, it is possible to calculate

network structure and function, analyze the patterns of those interactions and to

understand how these patterns explain observed behaviors or outcomes (or vice versa),

information that can be particularly valuable to optimize the use of limited resources

56
when planning diverse types of interventions (Perkins et al. 2015). Sociocentric network

studies have been used to understand social patterns that influence public health issues

(Christakis 2004, Smith and Christakis 2008), emotional states (Hill et al. 2010),

happiness and well-being (Fowler and Christakis 2008), domestic violence (Sukhera et

al. 2012), diffusion of innovations (Valente and Davis 1999), poverty (Cattell 2001) and

concentration of power and inequality (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004).

Sociocentric networks analysis can also be useful to identify subgroups within

apparently homogeneous groups that would otherwise be difficult to identify

ethnographically. Due to this they also are considered valuable tools to understand the

relationship between informal groups and formal institutions in natural resource

management (Cleaver 2002, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007).

Social networks and natural resource management

Numerous studies show that the existence of informal social networks of

participation and collaboration among and between various stakeholders and groups is

very important for environmental decision-making and for the success of community

based natural resource management initiatives (Bodin et al. 2006, Bodin and Crona

2008, Prell et al. 2009). In this context, social network analysis has been proposed as a

useful approach that seeks to understand how relations among stakeholders, and the

structuring of these relations, affect natural resource governance outcomes (Lauber et

al. 2008, Crona and Hubacek 2010, Lauber et al. 2011).

Some aspects that have been identified as critical for successful management of

socio-ecological systems are internal and external institutions and governance (Agrawal

and Gibson 1999, Kellert et al. 2000, Berkes 2004, 2007). However, most of the

conditions traditionally studied when assessing the effectiveness of management

57
institutions -following the design principles proposed by Gardner and Ostrom (1990)-

are mere characteristics of the community or institution such as scale, village size,

homogeneity or the ability to exclude outsiders. Furthermore, while these factors

undoubtedly contribute to their functionality, growing evidence shows that more

relational social mechanisms, such as transparency, trust and legitimacy are the real

glue that keeps an institution alive over time (Cox 2010).

Most environmental problems are too complex to fit into the formal problem-

solving structures of government and formal institutions, and overwhelming evidence

suggests that top-down centralized systems are poorly suited for sustainable

governance of natural resources. The concepts of co-management and governance

move beyond the logic of political-administrative hierarchy. In contrast to state rules and

competitive market regulation, they consider the importance of informal-voluntary

networks that involve a large number of interdependent actors from all scales (e.g.,

local, national, global) and sectors (e.g., business, government, civil society), with self-

organizing and self-enforcing capabilities interacting to produce public goods in

polycentric forms of social coordination (Folke et al. 2005, Ostrom 2010b, a) Scholars

consider that when governance problems attain a certain level of complexity, those

polycentric networks -that are usually politically independent and operate where formal

processes and regulations fail- are freer to develop alternative policies, allow learning

from each other and think creatively about the solution of resource problems. Network

members can share capacities, exchange differing worldviews, information,

relationships, unique structural positions, leadership, communication and facilitation

skills, power, trust, and different forms of knowledge. Those networks are seen as

58
incubators of new approaches for governing social-ecological systems (Huppé et al.

2012).

All these factors influence a network’s capacity to evolve over time; however, not

only the structure, but also the content of what is transferred through the ties, can

change over time. A relational tie that, initially, is used only for the exchange of some

specific kind of information (e.g. sustainable farming practices) can evolve into deeper

social relationships which in turn can facilitate the development of common norms and

values(Bodin and Crona 2009). Network structure is assumed to affect institutional

arrangements and the characteristics of the policy process; however, the attempts to

incorporate social network analysis as a policy tool and in particular, as a framework to

study socio ecological systems, is still in the early stages of development (Carlsson and

Sandström 2007), and empirical work searching for the kind of structural network

features that characterize sustainable governance systems remains rare (Sandström

and Rova 2009).

Many questions remain regarding the relationship between network structure and

institutional performance for natural resource governance, questions that are potentially

very relevant for policymaking and improvement Socio Ecological Systems (SESs)

governance (Kenward et al. 2011, Gonzalès and Parrott 2012). Understanding the

effects of social networks on resource use, management, and governance can be

improved by placing resource users and their behaviors within the context of social

networks and their interactions with formal and informal organizations. Such

understanding is important not only to advance of theory, but also has practical

relevance. Many informal networks and related social interactions of resource-

59
dependent communities are now often supplemented with new organizations created by

governments as they decentralize resource-use policies (Agrawal et al. 2013).

The importance of social networks on development and natural resource

governance has been broadly recognized. In this contexts social networks are defined

as groups of actors linked by repeated interactions allowing information and resource

sharing, competition, and cooperation over time (Granovetter 1973). Research efforts in

this area have shown that consolidation of social networks can build social as well as

ecosystem resilience in the face of environmental change (Adger et al. 2009), and that a

combination of strong local ties and weak long-range ties are necessary to both exploit

and explore ideas and innovations associated with resource use (Newman and Dale

2005). They have also shown that different network measures can provisionally be

associated with a number of desired social outcomes related to the adaptive

governance of renewable natural resources (Bodin et al. 2006, Agrawal et al. 2013).

Network structures related with successful cases of resource management are

very context specific and diverse, and it is likely that no single network structure is

optimum for all circumstances (Bodin et al. 2006, Bodin and Crona 2009). However,

network structural characteristics that are hypothesized to contribute to sustainable

natural resources management include: densely connected groups of people that share

specific knowledge and work together productively (Bodin et al. 2006, Bodin and Crona

2009, Sandström and Rova 2009); a heterogeneous set of groups within the network as

a whole, contributing expertise in a variety of knowledge areas (Bodin et al. 2006,

Ernstson et al. 2008, Bodin and Crona 2009, Sandström and Rova 2009); bridging

relationships between groups that facilitate the sharing of expert knowledge in response

60
to emerging challenges (Crona and Bodin 2006, Bodin and Crona 2009, Sandström and

Rova 2009); and ties to a periphery of diverse actors that provide specialized

knowledge, skills, and other resources over time as changing circumstances require

(Crona and Bodin 2006, Ernstson et al. 2008).

Evidence on the relation between social network structure and exchange of

information shows that some network structural characteristics such as density and

centralization can produce different learning outcomes and potentially affect

performance of network governance (Newig et al. 2010). Tie strength has been also

identified as relevant for social capital, as strong ties support trust building and capture

long term socio-ecological information (Barthel et al. 2010), while weak ties are

important in spreading information, diffusion of innovations, coordination of network

activities (Granovetter 1973) and possibly breaking up closed group thinking (Labianca

2004, Scheffer and Westley 2007).

There are some good examples of the importance of informal social interactions

and cooperation on sustainable resource management governance arrangements. One

of them is the creation of landowner associations and cooperatives and the adoption of

best management practices in the private forestry sector in US (Rickenbach 2009,

Knoot and Rickenbach 2011) and Sweden (Korhonen et al. 2012) Peer advice network

structures have been also proved to be instrumental in the adoption of sustainable

farming practices and establishment of on-farm experiments in cocoa agroforestry

systems in Ghana, West Africa, providing a strong foundation for community-based

adaptive management (Isaac et al. 2007). Recently, similar examples have been

61
documented in the adoption of agricultural innovations in Ecuador (Gamboa et al. 2010)

and India (Jana et al. 2013).

Only few studies to date have used network analysis in the context of private

conservation initiatives, but growing evidence, reveals that management practices of

civil society groups can play a crucial but neglected role in upholding ecosystem

services (Ernstson et al. 2010). To my knowledge, this social network approach has not

been yet applied to the study of natural resource management and governance by

grassroots conservation initiatives in Latin America. The Colombian Network of

Reserves of the Civil Society represents an example of a bottom-up initiative that offers

a unique opportunity to study how social networks affect natural resource management

outcomes and to understand the role, opportunities and challenges for active

participation of civil society in conservation.

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 CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS

Research Questions

Through a comparative approach of three bridge organizations from different

regions of the country, inserted in different cultural and socioeconomic contexts, this

research aims to understand the contributions of grassroots conservation initiatives in

terms of conservation outcomes. It also aims to understand the influence of different

socio-economic factors on reserve owners’ decisions to allocate part of their land to

conservation and the perceived effectiveness of their conservation activities. These

latter issues will be addressed through Chapters 5 (a-c) and 6 (d-e) with the following

specific research questions:

a) What is the influence on the proportion of property allocated to conservation of 3

key factors: i) Property size ii) Level of reliance on their property for subsistence
and iii) Institutional support through different types of bridge organizations?

b) Which of the measured household socio economic characteristics and reserve

(property) characteristics predict the proportion of property allocated to
conservation by these reserve owners?

c) What is the influence of other economic factors such as economic incentives,

taxes and opportunity costs on the proportion of property allocated to
conservation?

d) What is the influence on conservation effectiveness of 3 key factors: i) Property

size ii) Level of reliance on their property for subsistence and iii) Institutional
support through different types of bridge organizations?

e) Which of the measured household socio economic characteristics and reserve

(property) characteristics predict the conservation effectiveness of these
reserves?

Given the voluntary and non-official nature of these grassroots conservation

initiatives, and the diverse contexts in which they are embedded, this research will also

analyze the social structures that have promoted their creation. It will also look at how

63
the social support received by reserve owners influences conservation outcomes,

shapes the values, composition and organizational structure of these grassroots groups

and the way they interact with formal institutions. For this purpose, the following

research questions will be evaluated on Chapters 7 (a-b) and 8 (c-d).

a) How do support networks of reserve owners associated with the three different
bridge organizations differ in terms of: i) Network composition (Including gender
homophily, type of relationships and institutional affiliation of their alters); and ii)
Network structure (components, isolates, density and measures of network
centrality)?

b) Which compositional and structural variables of the personal networks are

significant predictors of positive conservation outcomes measured as the
proportion of property allocated to forest conservation and conservation
effectiveness?

c) How do the networks of social support from the three grassroots organizations
compare in terms of: i) Member's participation, ii) Gender, and iii) Institutional
affiliation (network composition); and iv) network structural variables at the node
level and v) network structural variables at the whole network level?

c) How do the networks of member’s information exchange from the three

grassroots organizations compare in terms of: i) Gender participation, ii)
Member’s participation, iii) Density fragmentation and iv) Centralization?

Research Design

Fieldwork was conducted in Colombia during a 3-month period in 2012 and again

from July 2013 until December 2014. A total of 234 reserve owners were interviewed.

Participants of this study live in rural areas where there is no postal or computer

services, and many of them had limited writing skills. Commonly used methods such as

surveys or auto completion of questionnaires would have probably yielded low response

rates and biased samples (Bernard 2006, Bryman 2008). Due to this, I chose to use

face-to-face questionnaires and interviews, which are significantly more costly

(especially in the context of rural areas with difficult access), but are the only reliable

64
method to sample this population, which is often underrepresented in these kinds of

studies.

Interviews included a questionnaire with close-ended questions to gather

household demographics and socioeconomic data, information to determine

conservation outcomes (measured as Proportion of property allocated to Conservation

(PC) and Conservation Effectiveness (CE), and a social networks interview. The

interview also included open-ended questions in which participants were queried about

their motivations to implement conservation on their properties and for engaging as

members of the bridge organizations. Additionally, data collection included participant

observation at formal and informal meetings and a review of archival information.

Reserves examined were chosen from three types of bridge organizations. Two of them

were local and one had a national scope, they were located in different regions, used

different organizational strategies and provided different types of support to reserve

owners. All reserves studied originated from the grassroots initiatives discussed in the

following section (Figure 4-1).

Bridge Organizations Examined

Tierrandina

Tierrandina is a local bridge organization that has been supporting small farmers

on the outskirts of a protected area (Santuario de Flora y Fauna Galeras – Galeras

Flora and Fauna Sanctuary) in the municipalities of Yacuanquer, Consaca and

Bombona in the southern Colombian Andes (Nariño department). In 2000, protected

area managers initiated activities of environmental education, capacity building and

livelihood improvement with local communities, as strategies to reduce the impact of

their extractive activities on the protected area and to improve ecosystem quality in the

65
Sanctuary buffer zone. This training provided a fertile ground for community

organization, leading to the creation of the local NGO Tierrandina, which now works in

partnership with the protected area to promote conservation and sustainable livelihoods.

Of the 900 families associated with Tierrandina, 101 have declared their properties as

reserves. Through this declaration they commit to protect forest and watersheds,

participate in projects for watershed restoration and to implement agroecological

practices in the productive portion of their property. These reserves represent a case in

which protected area managers have purposefully promoted the improvement of

landowner’s economic needs and strong community involvement as part of their

conservation strategy. The Sanctuary is one of only three protected areas in South

America and 24 in the world that were recognized in 2014 by the IUCN Green list of

well-managed protected areas. This designation was earned for meeting the criteria of

fair and transparent sharing of the costs and benefits of conservation, effective

management, and long-lasting conservation outcomes (IUCN 2014). Tierrandina is the

bridge organization through which the Sanctuary implements their community

conservation strategies. This bridge organization was chosen as it represents a case in

which grassroots initiatives (bottom-up) have been fully supported and integrated into

the agenda by environmental authorities. All 101 reserves associated with Tierrandina

were included in this study.

Norte del Valle

Norte del Valle is an unofficial group of four community organizations located in

the Western Colombian Andes (Valle del Cauca department) in the Municipalities of el

Cairo (Serraniagua), Versalles (Corpoversalles), El Dovio (Acerg), Roldanillo and

Bolivar (Ecofuturo). Some of these organizations have been working for more than 20

66
years with their associated reserves to improve farmer livelihoods, support community

development, promote forest and biodiversity conservation, and protect ecosystem

services (water, soil). As in the case of Tierrandina, some families associated with these

organizations have declared their farms as reserves; however, creation of and current

initiatives on these reserves are not the result of collaboration with government

agencies or protected area authorities. These four local organizations gather their own

financial resources or apply independently to diverse funding sources (regional

government, agriculture ministry, national or international NGOs) to cover administrative

expenses and to provide capacity building, economic and technical support to their

associated families. In recent years, they have been working together to design regional

conservation strategies and to promote the creation of a protected area in the “Serranía

de los Paraguas”, a mountain range of high conservation priority in the Choco-Andes

biodiversity hotspot that is not currently under legal protection. Because of logistical

constraints (remote areas or scheduling difficulties), only 71 of 76 (93%) reserve owners

were interviewed. This group of reserves represents a grassroots initiative (bottom-up)

in which local communities have self-organized and have independently applied for

external funding to promote their conservation and community development activities

without direct support or oversight of government authorities.

Resnatur

The National Association of Reserves of the Civil Society (Resnatur) is an

organization of farmers and rural landowners from different regions of the country, many

of whom had no previous affiliation among them and who voluntarily committed to

allocate a portion or all of their land to conservation. In contrast to the other two bridge

organizations, Resnatur does not provide direct economic or technical support to its

67
associates. While WWF provided economic support for administrative and capacity

building activities during the initial phase of NGO creation, for almost a decade they

have been totally self-funded, and Resnatur members pay an annual fee to cover

administrative expenses. Resnatur is headquartered in Bogota, and through regular

communications and meetings in different regions of the country, provides a platform for

group interactions, to learn and share information about conservation practices,

sustainable management, and environmental issues, and in some cases, to participate

in formulation of regional and national environmental policies. Via email, we contacted

all 154 active members (as per February 2014 roster) to participate in the study. After

several contact attempts by email and phone, face-to-face interviews and reserve visits

were scheduled with 52 reserve owners. In cases of logistic constrains due to difficult

access or conflicting schedules interviews were conducted through Skype. This was the

case for 12 reserve owners. All 64-reserve owners (42% of Resnatur members) who

responded to the invitation were included in the study. This group of reserves

represents a grassroots conservation initiative (bottom-up) in which a diverse,

geographically dispersed group of farmers and rural landowners have created a

community of practice to share knowledge and articulate their autonomous efforts to

integrate conservation and sustainable livelihoods without any direct intervention or

support of government authorities.

Chapter 5: Proportion of Property Allocated to Conservation

Data Collection

Property size and land use allocation

Data on property size and detailed information on land use allocation were self-

reported by participants during interviews Total property area, area under different types

68
of land use, including different types of forest cover and productive systems were

corroborated during the onsite visit and later verified with documents such as land titles

and management plans. Of the total of the reserves included in the sample, 74% (174)

had a management plan. Those documents are typically prepared with the economic

and logistic support of the bridge organizations, and are considered as a partial

requirement for reserve recognition and as a tool to prioritize future conservation

interventions on the property. Land use areas were classified as either conservation or

production, and those values were used to determine the proportion of property

allocated to conservation (PC) on each reserve as follows:

Conservation areas. (1) Native forest / ecosystems: Forest that had never been

cleared based on respondent recollection; however, these areas may have been

historically subjected to selective logging. These forests represented the vast majority of

all conservation areas, but we also included other natural ecosystems such as moors,

native grasslands, wetlands (lakes, rivers, creeks, springs) and surrounding forests

(elfin forests, mountain forests, riparian forests and swamp forests). Given the difficulty

of obtaining accurate measures and defining clear boundaries between these different

types of ecosystems, and their relative small representation in the whole sample when

compared to forest, all of them were included into the native forest/ ecosystem category.

(2) Secondary forest: Forest areas that were once totally cleared and converted to other

land uses (pastures or crops), and are now under forest cover due to natural

regeneration. The year of crop/pasture abandonment was registered. (3) Reforestation:

Areas where trees had been actively planted with native species with the purpose of

forest conservation. Landowners were queried about species planted and time since

69
reforestation. Small areas of forestry plantations were found on 2 reserves and were

included within the category of productive systems. All three conservation land uses

were used to calculate the total conservation area of each property (CA) and along with

property size (PS) used to estimate the proportion of property in conservation for each

reserve (PC).

Production areas. (1) Pastures: Areas dedicated solely to animal grazing and/or

areas in which reserve owners had implemented silvopastoral systems. (2) Coffee:

Which included four different types of productive systems (a) Intensive rustic coffee

agroforests where coffee was planted under an existing forest canopy; (b) Traditional

polycultures where coffee was planted along with a high diversity of tree species (used

as sources of timber, fuel or fruits) and understory subsistence crops; (c) less diverse

shade coffee dominated by fast growth tree canopy species (such Inga spp. and Cordia

alliodora); (d) Monoculture coffee with no overstory shade. (3) Subsistence crops:

Family gardens and other productive areas, which provide food for the household and

were not intended for commercial use. This category also included residential areas and

small scale facilities to raise domestic animals (chickens, quails, pigs, rabbits and

guinea pigs) usually small-sized and integrated into the family garden area. (4) Other

crops: Areas in which diverse crops had been planted usually for commercial purposes.

Many reserve owners reported agroforestry systems with high levels of tree

cover density (shade coffee or silvopastoral systems), which may have high

conservation value due to the of high levels of habitat heterogeneity and tree density.

However, due to the difficultly to obtain accurate estimations of canopy area of those

70
systems and the fact that the official definition of forest1, does not include agricultural

lands, these agroforestry systems were not considered conservation areas in this study.

Reserve and household socioeconomic variables

Two groups of socioeconomic variables were gathered through a questionnaire

and were used to evaluate the influence of reserve and household characteristics on the

proportion of property allocated to conservation (see Table 5-1 for details):

(1) Reserve variables: property size (PS), years of property ownership (YO),

years in the bridge organization (YB), bridge organization (BO).

(2) Household variables: Size of household (SH), age of head of household (AH),

gender of head of household person who manages the property (GH), head of

household education (HE), maximum education of the household (ME), reliance on

property for subsistence (RS), availability of off-reserve income (OI), level of reliance on

reserve-generated income for subsistence (LR), reserve is economically self-sustaining

(ES), investment of off-reserve income in the reserve or cash investment (CI), and

opportunity costs (OC) referring to foregone benefits from alternative land uses.

Data Analysis

Three key factors that influence proportion of land allocated to conservation

To explore the influence of property size on the proportion of land allocated to

conservation, reserves were divided into two class sizes (Small and Medium/Big)

according to official values of Family Agricultural Units (UAF), which originated from a

1 According to FAO Forest Resources Assessment (FRA) Forest is an area larger than 0.5 ha with more
than 10% tree canopy cover and tree is a plant capable of growing over five meters tall. Bamboos and
palm but not bananas are considered trees. Closed-canopy forest has more than 40% canopy cover and
open forest has 10-40% (FAO 2010)

71
policy instrument created by the Colombian Institute for Rural Development (INCODER)

and used to define the minimum property size required by a rural household to sustain

their livelihoods and improve their economic conditions (Gutiérrez et al. 2014). As UAFs

are determined by soil and environmental conditions, official UAF values vary across

municipalities. For this study, I used 12.5 hectares, which is the average UAF for the

municipalities in which the reserves were located. Correlation analysis between property

size and the proportion of property allocated to conservation were performed for the

whole sample and for each size category. In the case of the categorical variables:

bridge organization (BO) and level of reliance on reserve income (LR), its effect on the

proportion of property allocated to conservation was assessed through Kruskall-Wallis

non-parametric ANOVA, pairwise multiple comparison procedures (Dunn's Method) and

Mann-Whitney U test.

Predictive model of proportion of property allocated to conservation

For the second research question, correlation coefficients were calculated for all

the variables to determine collinearity. When coefficients between two variables were >

0.5, the variable with the highest correlation coefficient to proportion of property in

conservation was included in the model. In the case of categorical variables, these were

replaced by dummy variables for inclusion in the regression model. A multiple linear

Regression was used to analyze the influence of the two types of variables on the

proportion of property allocated to conservation. A combination of Akaike’s Information

Criteria (AIC) and Stepwise regression was used to select the regression model and

regression residuals were tested for normality. All test were performed using Stat Plus

5.9.92 and SPSS 20.0.

72
Other economic factors

Finally, in addition to the questionnaire further explanation by research

participants was used to understand the economic factors that influence reserve

owners’ ability to allocate land for conservation. The following group of variables, which

had already been included into the quantitative analysis, were also included in the

qualitative analysis: reserve is economically self-sustaining (ES), cash investment in the

reserve (CI) and opportunity cost (OC). Additional semi-structured questions referring to

the presence of economic incentives or tax breaks were also included on this qualitative

analysis.

Chapter 6. Conservation Effectiveness

Data Collection

Conservation effectiveness index

The dependent variable conservation effectiveness was evaluated following three

criteria (ecological attributes, long term viability of the ecosystem, and management

capacity) developed by experts on private conservation strategies in collaboration with

reserve owners in Latin America (Delgado et al. 2008, Mayorquín et al. 2010). Variables

and indicators from these studies were adapted for the particular context of this study

using information collected during workshops and interviews with bridge organization

members and staff and experts in the field during my preliminary research in 2012.

Specific wording and language structure of questionnaire items were adjusted based

their feedback. Contexts and consensus based methods are recommended to reduce

error associated with variable interpretation and language and to improve content

reliability of questions (Carey and Burgman 2008). Following perception-based methods

(Agrawal and Chhatre 2006, Wertime et al. 2007), reserve owners were requested to

73
score indicators for each category according to their perception of improvement or

decline since the time their property was declared a reserve. Scores of -2 represented

very poor/strong decline in the condition of the variable, -1 denoted poor or moderate

decline of variable condition, 0 denoted maintenance or no change in the condition, +1

denoted good/moderate improvement in the condition of the variable, and +2 very good

or great improvement in the condition of the variable.

The questionnaire also included questions on socio-economic variables, land use

allocation, forest cover, conservation and management practices implemented, time

since implementation and productive systems. This allowed for the qualitative questions

to be linked to quantifiable indicators, providing a concrete context and enhancing

consistency between the quantitative results and the conservation effectiveness

perceptions reported in the final part of the interview. This type of cross validation is one

of the strategies recommended by Lund et al. (2010) to improve the validity of the

results for perception based assessments that usually consider abstract indicators or

conditions. Results from the interviews were later triangulated and verified during field

visits and revision of reserve documents such as land titles and management plans. A

total of 14 categories were used to evaluate conservation effectiveness for the three

criteria as follows:

1. Ecological attributes included five categories: a) area in sustainable

management, b) area in conservation, c) forest condition, d) local populations of
flora and fauna, and e) water conditions (quality and quantity).

2. Long term viability of the ecosystem included four categories of impacts and
threats: a) unsustainable agricultural practices (impacts of agriculture, impacts of
cattle ranching, fire, and soil erosion), b) resource extraction (poaching, logging,
and firewood), c) pollution (inadequate management of solid waste and domestic
sewage), and d) extreme climate variability (flooding and landslides and extreme
climatic events).

74
 3. Management capacity included five categories: a) Perceived support (formal
institutions and community), b) influence of economic factors (surrounding
economic conditions and perceived availability of economic resources), c)
perceived management competence, d) participation in community initiatives for
conservation, and e) use of conservation tools (management plan and species
inventories).

Average scores for the indicators were used to obtain scores for each variable,

and criteria. A final score of conservation effectiveness (CE) was calculated as the

average score of the three criteria. This choice was made under the assumption that the

three criteria (ecological attributes, long term viability of the ecosystem and

management capacity) are equally important for the long-term viability of the reserve. In

addition to the survey questions and rated scales, participants were asked about other

impacts, threats, or other factors of relevance that were not included on the original list.

Besides the scores, participants were also queried about their concerns and

perceptions regarding the variables and indicators evaluated.

Reserve and household variables

Two groups of socioeconomic variables were used to evaluate the influence of

reserve and household characteristics on conservation effectiveness (see Table 5-1 for

details):

(1) Reserve variables: property size (PS), years of property ownership (YO),

years as a reserve (YR), bridge organization (BO);

(2) Household variables: Size of household (SH), age of head of household (AH),

gender of head of household (G), head of household education (HE), maximum

education of the household (ME), years in the bridge organization (YB), reliance on

property for subsistence (RS), off-reserve income (OI), level of reliance on reserve-

generated income (LR), reserve is economically self-sustaining (ES), investment of off-

75
reserve income in the reserve or cash investment (CI) and opportunity costs (OC)

referring to foregone alternative land uses.

Data Analysis

Reliability of the conservation effectiveness index.

The items included in the Conservation Effectiveness scale were adapted from

suggested guidelines to measure conservation management effectiveness in private

reserves in Latin America; however, these items have not been previously evaluated in

terms of internal consistency or reliability. Usually, scales with Cronbach alpha values

for internal consistency of 0.7 or more are considered to be reliable (Cozby 2004,

Bryman 2008). For this study, Cronbach alpha was calculated for the items included in

the Conservation Effectiveness Index and the value obtained was 0.67, which lies just

below that number. Further removal of items did not improve Cronbach Alpha value,

which indicates that all the items included appropriately described the variation in the

scale but in order to increase reliability extra items should be incorporated. All

calculations were performed using the software SPSS 20.0. Considering comments

from participants and observations during the interview process, the following

suggestions could be applied in further studies to improve the reliability of the index:

 Include items that will allow for an explicit distinction between the external or
internal causes of impacts and threats in the reserves. For example, in some
cases reserve owners may have reduced or eliminated harvest of firewood for
household consumption, however occasional illegal firewood harvest from
outsiders may still be present. The same applies to other impacts and threats
such as illegal hunting, harvest of non-timber forest products, water pollution,
solid waste, fire, erosion, etc.

 A more explicit distinction for the variables related with perceived support.
Reserve owners frequently reported different and conflicting perceptions
regarding the support they receive from different types of institutions such as
environmental authorities, government institutions, and NGOs at the local,
regional, national or even international level. The current scale provided a

76
 general measure of perceived support from different types of organizations but
did not include different governance scales.

 A more explicit distinction between individual’s and household economic

conditions and the general economic context in the area; as perceptions of these
aspects were frequently conflicting.

 More specific items in relation with climate change perceptions. For example,
separate drought and flooding events, and isolate the impacts of climate change
on crops and productive systems and natural habitats. Depending on the type of
habitat and topography the perception of the impact of these events perception
can be different. For example reduced rain can have strong negative impact on
crops but negligible impact on mountain forests that receive water from horizontal
precipitation (Still et al. 1999). Intense rainy seasons and out of season rains can
have very negative impacts in crops but positive or negligible impact on cloud
forests, moors and wetlands.

Three key factors that influence conservation effectiveness

Following the same procedures described previously for Chapter 5, reserves

were divided in two class sizes (Small and Medium/Big) according to official values of

Family Agricultural Units (UAF) (Gutiérrez et al. 2014). Correlation analysis between

property size and conservation effectiveness were performed for the whole sample and

for each size category. In the case of the categorical variables: bridge organization (BO)

and level of reliance on reserve income (LR), its effect on the proportion of property

allocated to conservation was assessed through Kruskall-Wallis non-parametric

ANOVA, pairwise multiple comparison procedures (Dunn's Method) and Mann-Whitney

U test.

Predictive model of proportion of property allocated to conservation

For the second research question, correlation coefficients were calculated for all

the variables to determine co-linearity, when coefficients between two variables were >

0.5 the one with the highest correlation coefficient to the dependent variable was

included in the model. Categorical variables were replaced by Dummy variables in order

77
to be included in the regression model. A multiple linear regression was used to analyze

the influence of the two types of variables on the proportion of property allocated to

conservation. A combination of Akaike’s Information Criteria (AICC) and Stepwise

forward regression was used to select the regression model and regression residuals

were tested for normality. All tests were performed using Stat Plus 5.9.92 and SPSS

24.0. Finally, besides the questionnaire categorical answers, further explanation by

research participants was used to understand the economic factors that influence

reserve owners’ ability to allocate land for conservation.

Chapter 7: Personal Networks

Data Collection

A total of 213 personal networks interviews were carried out among reserve

owners associated to three bridge organizations: 100 with Tierrandina, 62 with Valle

and 51 with Resnatur. Interviews consisted of several parts: First, basic socio economic

information such as gender, age and years of education was recorded for each reserve

owner. The subsequent section of the interview consisted of a combination of resource

(Van Der Gaag and Snijders 2005) and name generator questions (Marin and Hampton

2007, Bidart and Charbonneau 2011), which were used to obtain a list of alters

(individuals) who were perceived by the reserve owner (ego) as important sources of

different types of support. In the first step different aspects of social support relevant for

reserve owners’ daily activities in the reserve were mentioned to the reserve owners. In

the second step reserve owners were asked to identify the individuals that were

perceived as sources of support in these areas. Specifically reserve owners were asked

to mention people they considered as:

 A source of moral support (discussed important matters of their life).

78
  Sources of information. Received or discussed information of issues of relevant
for their reserve such as agricultural and conservation practices.

 Sources of social support. Provided help, did favors, borrowed tools or animals,
exchanged labor, agricultural inputs or seeds.

 Sources of Economic support. Provided economic support (lending money, sell

food or other products on credit)

 Have a commercial relationship that is important for the reserve

 Have a professional relationship that is important for the reserve

During the third part of the interview, participants were also asked attributes of

their alters:

 Type of interaction, which included: partner, parents, kids, extended family,

friend, neighbor and acquaintance.

 Institutional affiliation, which included the following options: no institutional

affiliation, local NGO, government agency, environmental agency, extension
agency, education and research, financial institution.

 Place of residency which included the following options: in the reserve, same
village, same municipality, other municipality, other state, and overseas.

During the final part of the personal networks interview, participants were asked

about the extent to which alters they named communicated with one another. The

options included: very often (at least once a week), occasionally (less than once a week

but at least once every two months), rarely, (once a year or less). This information was

used to create personal networks interview studies on Egonet® software (McCarty

2014).

Data Analysis

Summary statistics from compositional and structural personal network variables

were obtained from Egonet®. After variables were tested for normality (Shapiro-Wilk);

ANOVA and all pairwise multiple comparison procedures (Holm-Sidak method) were

79
used to identify the differences. This test is more powerful than Tukey and Bonferroni

and is recommended as the first line procedure for multiple comparison testing. For the

case of non-normal variables, Non-parametric ANOVA (Kruskall-Wallis) was performed

and Dunn's Method for pairwise multiple comparison was used as a post-hoc test. All

the analyses were performed in Sigma Plot 12.5 and SPSS24. To provide a basis for

visual comparison, network graphs were created using UCINET feature NetDraw

version 2.114 (Borgatti et al. 2002) for each one of the three Bridge Organizations.

Correlations were calculated to assess the influence of between personal networks

compositional and structural variables on conservation outcomes. Finally, regression

models including socio-demographic variables and network variables were calculated to

determine the combined effect of compositional and structural variables on conservation

outcomes. Given that all structural variables were correlated, only Degree centrality,

which was variable with the highest correlation coefficient, was included. Compositional

variables were all included and reported as covariates when applicable during model

building using Stepwise forward regression and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) for

variable selection (Akaike 1992).

Chapter 8: Whole Networks

Overlapping Personal Networks

Whole networks for each of the three bridge organizations were calculated using

the personal network data obtained during interviews with the reserve owners. The

whole network function of Egonet was used to overlap personal networks for each

bridge organization using “2” as the inclusion criteria. This means that alters should

have been mentioned by at least two reserve owners to be included in the analysis. This

inclusion criterion was used to omit alters who were related to particular reserve

80
owners, but whose interactions were not within the sphere of influence of the bridge

organizations. The adjacency matrix and attribute lists obtained were used to

characterize the interactions between all reserve owners and their alters within each

bridge organization. This information was exported to UCINET software (Borgatti et al.

2002) and used to calculate structural characteristics and compositional characteristics

of the whole network for each bridge organization. A total of 212 personal networks

interviews were used to calculate whole networks for the three bridge organizations.

Whole Networks Approach Limited to Members

While the previous analysis was focused on reserve owners’ sources of support,

another interview instrument was used to understand their interactions with other

members of the organization and the internal social dynamics of the bridge

organizations. Participants from each bridge organization were requested to mention

the ten members with whom they communicated and exchanged relevant information

for the management of their reserve. This information was used to create a one-mode

matrix. Graphical representations of the networks obtained for each bridge organization

were created with the NetDraw feature of UCINET and network data were analyzed

using the networks menu on UCINET. Visual and quantitative analysis of measures of

degree and betweenness centrality were performed in and used to analyze the social

dynamics of each bridge organization.

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Figure 4-1. Location of the reserves that participated in the study. Yellow stars
represent the municipalities in which the reserves were located. Orange
circles represent reserves associated to Valle (in the middle) and Tierrandina
(in the lower part of the map). All other represent Resnatur.

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 CHAPTER 5
VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION FROM THE GRASSROOTS: FACTORS THAT
INFLUENCE FOREST CONSERVATION BY CAMPESINOS AND PRIVATE
LANDOWNERS IN COLOMBIA

Although communities and communally owned lands are increasingly recognized

as key elements in conservation strategies, around the world diverse groups of civil

society (including small farmers and private rural landowners) are also actively engaged

in forest conservation (Norton 2000, Langholz and Lassoie 2001a, Langholz and

Lassoie 2001b, Chacon 2005, Kitamura and Clapp 2013, Kamal et al. 2015).

However, despite their active role, the conservation community still knows little

about these civil society initiatives. Long held biased perceptions of rural small holders -

and more particularly those from developing countries- as solely dependent on

agriculture and livestock for their income still persist (Wunder et al. 2014). These

perceptions are at the root not only of current scholarly and policy debates such as

land-sparing and land sharing (Perfecto and Vandermeer 2012, Kremen 2015), but also

have influenced the design and implementation of a wide range of policy instruments

and interventions for forest conservation that have emerged during the last decades

(Lemos and Agrawal 2006).

Most of these interventions use mainstream assumptions of classic economic

theories that seek to offset the opportunity costs of conversion of forest to agricultural

land under the premise that improvement of socio economic conditions will prevent

deforestation, will reduce pressure over forest resources and incentivize forest

conservation (Molnar et al. 2004). Nevertheless, there is a growing body of evidence

indicating that forest clearing is not based only on economic needs, and sometimes

83
livelihood improvement interventions may have negligible or worsening results in the

improvement of conservation outcomes (Wunder et al. 2014).

Despite growing critiques regarding the limited evidence of success and poor

design and implementation which prevents adequate monitoring and evaluation (Ferraro

and Pattanayak 2006); market and incentive based interventions (such as payments for

ecosystem services, certification schemes) continue to be the dominant and largely

uncontested paradigm to prevent deforestation and ecosystems degradation in rural

areas in developing countries (Roth and Dressler 2012).

As a complement to those strategies, during the last decades scholars have

made repeated calls to implement people-centered and participatory approaches

(Brown 2003, Lele et al. 2010, Shackleton et al. 2010, Kothari et al. 2013), with the

intent of improving collaboration with local stakeholders on project design and

implementation and to create strategies to monitor and evaluate project effectiveness,

not only in terms of maintenance or improvement of forest conditions but also in terms

of fair distribution of benefits among participants (Davies et al. 2014). While the focus on

participation and the contribution of local communities and traditional lands to

conservation is valuable and commendable, increased participation is not a blueprint

solution especially when interventions are designed from the outside and the absence

of real -rather than nominal- participation (Mannigel 2008) and the exclusion of other

perspectives persists (Cooke and Kothari 2001, Kothari and Cooke 2001).

During the past few decades practitioners, policy makers and scholars from

different disciplines around the world have been contributing to a growing body of

literature that challenges the double standards that are embedded in most of these top-

84
down interventions (Easterly 2006, Büscher et al. 2012, Easterly 2013). On the one

hand these approaches insist on problematizing the poor and are rooted in the

inadequately backed assumption that there is no alternative -TINA1- to market based

and external interventions. On the other hand, they are oblivious to the power

imbalances embedded in a market-based logic (Bakker 2010, Arsel and Büscher 2012,

Büscher and Arsel 2012), and to the fact that they may even exacerbate social and

economic inequality (McDermott et al. 2013, Pascual et al. 2014) and that the ideology

behind these approaches is at the root of the current social and environmental justice

issues that are emerging all around the world (Martínez-Alier et al. 2014, Martinez-Alier

et al. 2016).

Ironically with our excessive focus on understanding the root causes of

deforestation and forest degradation and designing increasingly technical and complex

solutions, we may have become blind to the solutions that are emerging from the

grassroots (Esteva 2010, Escobar 2015). The silence around these other alternatives,

and the “invisibilization” of social process that are not allowed to formally exist, is a

concern that Latin American scholars have been extensively discussing since the early

90s and is referred to as the “Sociology of the absences and emergences.” (Santos

2002). This omission has become so evident that more recently “the forgotten majority”

was a phrase used by CIFOR when referring to the unrecognized role of small farmers

in forest conservation (Bennett-Curry 2015). As far as economic and agro industrial

models have shaped rural development policies, campesinos in Latin America have

1
T.I.N.A. : there is no alternative, a phrase coined by Margaret Thatcher while defending the
implementation of economic reforms, and is seen as the main motto of neoliberalism (von Werlhof 2008).

85
been treated as a residual political category (Hecht 2014). It is about time we started

looking to the dynamic social process that are taking place in the “invisible forests’ that

are actively managed by millions of citizens who are shaping the new ruralities (Hecht

2014), and are emerging as vital actors and claiming their rights to participate in

environmental governance (Martinez-Alier et al. 2016).

Despite the negative impact of the violent conflict and economic development

policies during the past decades, Networks of Reserves of the Civil Society emerged in

different rural regions in Colombia as grassroots conservation initiatives in which

campesinos and rural landowners voluntarily decided to allocate portions or all of their

properties to forest conservation through self-declared reserves. Their goal is to

improve rural livelihoods, promote sustainable and traditional agricultural practices,

implement biodiversity conservation, and ecosystem restoration strategies and support

community development. Unfortunately, there is a pervasive paucity of research

focused on these grassroots initiatives which hinders the design of policies to better

support them, and their active participation in decision making processes that directly

impact the long term socio-ecological resilience of their territories.

For those rural landowners, the whole property, including areas under productive

activities, is considered a reserve. While all of these reserves are privately owned, they

are very diverse in size (from less than 1 ha to sometimes thousands of hectares) and

type of productive systems (agriculture, pastures, ecotourism). However, one of the

most striking features is the diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds of the

landowners, varying from subsistence farmers to wealthier landowners who do not rely

on these properties for subsistence. These diverse groups are organized through bridge

86
organizations, which are NGOs that provide support for the implementation of

sustainable management, agro ecological and conservation practices; and coordinate

landowner’s efforts with the goal of achieving positive conservation outcomes at the

landscape level. These bridge organizations may operate at different geographical

scales (national, regional, local), vary in the level of direct participation of reserve

owners in NGO management, and in amount and type of logistic and material support

they provide. This research included landowners from diverse socioeconomic

backgrounds associated with three different types of bridge organizations: 1) A local

bottom-up organization actively supported by formal institutions, 2) A local bottom-up

organization with minimum or no external institutional support, and 3) A national bottom-

up organization with minimum or no support from external institutions.

This research aims to understand the diverse factors that influence the proportion

of the property voluntarily allocated to forest conservation (PC) by these reserve

owners, through the following research questions:

1. What is the influence of three key factors on the proportion of property allocated
to conservation: a) Property size b) Level of reliance on their property for
subsistence and c) Institutional support through different types of bridge
organizations?

2. Which of the measured household socio economic characteristics and reserve

(property) characteristics predict the proportion of property allocated to
conservation by these reserve owners?

3. What is the influence of other economic factors such as economic incentives,

taxes and opportunity costs on the proportion of property allocated to
conservation?

87
 Results

Land Use Allocation on the Reserves.

Conservation was the dominant land use category, corresponding to 11,026

hectares (68% of total area) from the 234 reserves. Fifty-five percent of these lands

were allocated to conservation of forest or other natural ecosystems (7,529 hectares on

188 reserves), 12% (1,349 hectares on 155 reserves) to natural regeneration and 1%

(134 hectares on 72 reserves) to reforestation. When considering the different types of

forest found in the conservation area, 80% included natural forest, 18% forest regrowth

through natural regeneration and 2% included planted forest and reforested areas

(Figure 5-1). In general, 79% of the reserves allocated at least 20% of their property to

conservation.

Only 2 reserves reported reforestation areas with non-native tree species

(Eucalyptus grandis and Pinus patula). Productive systems comprised 32% of total land

area, with 26% under pastures (2,873 hectares reported on 147 reserves), 3% under

coffee production 3% (357 hectares on 107 reserves), and 2% dedicated to subsistence

and other crops (Figure 5-1).

Three Key Factors that Influence Proportion of Land Allocated to Conservation

Property size

High variation was found in property size, with reserves ranging from 0.25

hectares to 3,000 hectares (Table 5-2, Table 5-3). A weak but significant correlation

(r=0.22, p=0.00, Appendix A) was found between property size and the proportion of

land allocated to conservation (PC), with significant differences found among Bridge

Organizations (Kruskall Wallis, H = 121.85, p ≤ 0.001). Average property size for

Tierrandina reserves was 3.26 ± 3.20 hectares (n=101) and significantly smaller than for

88
Norte del Valle Reserves (20.32 ± 30 hectares, n=71, Q= 7.94, p<0.05) and Resnatur

reserves (142.90 ± 240 hectares, n=61, Q=10.14 p<0.05). No significant differences in

property size were found between Resnatur reserves and Norte del Valle Reserves

(Q=2.38, p>0.05) (Figure 5-2).

Due to the high variability of property sizes among the Bridge organizations (BO)

and to further explore the influence of property size, reserves were divided on two size

categories (Small size and Medium/ Big size) according to average values of Family

Agricultural Units (UAF = 12.5 hectares) as legally defined by Colombian authorities for

the municipalities included on this study (Figure 5-3). For medium to big properties (≥

12.5 ha), a weak and significant correlation among property size and the percentage of

the property allocated to forest conservation was found (r= 0.28, p=0.01). For the case

of smaller reserves (≤ 12.5 ha, which represented 68% of the whole sample), no

significant correlation was found (r=-0.09, p=0.2).

Level of reliance on reserve for income

Of the 234 reserve owners, 48% (n=112) reported that their reserve was the only

source of income, and therefore were classified as totally reliant. Seventy of them were

reserves from Tierrandina, 37 from Valle and only five from Resnatur. Twenty-one

percent (n=49) reported having off-reserve sources of income that complemented their

livelihoods and were classified as partially reliant. Thirty of them were from Tierrandina,

16 of them from Norte del Valle and only three of them from Resnatur. Finally, 31%

(n=71) reported other sources of income and do not rely on reserve income for their

subsistence and were classified as non-reliant, most of them were Resnatur reserves

(n=53), followed by Norte del Valle (n=18) and Tierrandina (n=1) (Figure 5-4).

89
 Kruskall-Wallis Analysis revealed significant differences in the proportion of

property allocated to conservation (PC) between the three categories of level of reliance

on reserve for income (LR), with level of reliance having a significant negative effect on

this conservation outcome (H = 60.45, p≤ 0.001, Figure 5-5). In sum, the more reliant

the reserve owners were on their property for income the less proportion of the property

was allocated to conservation. Nevertheless, even total reliant reserve owners allocated

on average 31.18% of their property to conservation (SD=25.45, n=112), partially reliant

properties allocated 49.02% (SD=29.01, n=49) and non-reliant properties allocated an

average of 67% of the property (SD = 25.9, n=71). This result shows that despite being

an important factor in determining the proportion of property allocated to conservation,

even reserve owners that totally rely on their property can allocate a significant portion

of it to conservation and are able to integrate conservation and livelihoods within their

properties.

Bridge organization

On average reserves from Resnatur allocated 71.41% of property to forest

conservation (SD= 23.21), Reserves on Norte del Valle allocated 34.00 ± 26.48 %) and

Tierrandina reserves allocated 39.63 ± 28.43%). These differences were significant

when comparing the three types of reserve organizations (H=57.53 p=0.001, Figure 5-

6), with Resnatur reserves allocated significantly higher percentages of property to

conservation when compared to Tierrandina (Q= 7.05 p<0.05) and Valle (Q= 6.35

p<0.05).

90
Combined effects of bridge organization and level of reliance on reserve for
income

In general, previous results indicate that both factors: Bridge organization (BO)

and Level of reliance (LR) have a significant effect on the percentage of property

landowners are allocating to conservation (PC), with reserves on Resnatur and non-

reliant reserves allocating significantly higher proportions of their properties. However,

as evidenced by the correlation analysis these variables are highly correlated. To

analyze the combined influence of both factors a Dummy variable that included each

combination of the two categorical variables was created (3x3). As expected, a

significant effect due to the interaction between Bridge organization (BO) and level of

reliance (LR) on the percentage of land allocated to conservation was found (Kruskall

Wallis H=80.89 p<0.001, with residuals complying normality assumptions). The higher

difference was found between non-reliant reserves from Resnatur and total reliant

reserves from Tierrandina (Q=7.79, p<0.01) and Norte del Valle (Q= 7.56, p<0.01).

Predictive Model for Proportion of Property Allocated to Conservation

From the wider set of variables included on the second analytical approach

Property size (PS), Bridge Organization (BO), Education (HH and ME), Off-reserve

income (OI) and Cash investment (MI); revealed positive significant correlation

coefficients with the proportion of property allocated to conservation (PC) (Appendix A).

In the case of Reliance on reserve for subsistence (RS), Level of reliance on reserve

(LR) and whether or not reserve is economically self-sustaining (ES), the coefficients

were significantly negative. The variables that did not present significant correlations

were Household Size (HS), Age of head of Household (AH), Years of property

ownership (YO), Years associated with Bridge organization (YB) and opportunity costs

91
(OC). Three groups of variables showed significant correlation coefficients among them:

Bridge organization (BO), Education variables (HE, ME), all variables associated with

income reliance (RS, OI, LR) and if the reserve is economically self-sustaining (ES)

(Appendix A), so the effect of those variables on the proportion of property allocated to

conservation is not independent.

A multiple linear stepwise regression and AICC as guide for model building was

used to understand the combined influence of all the property and household

socioeconomic variables (Table 5-4) on the proportion of property allocated to

conservation (PC). The following model was obtained:

PC = 0.686 + 0.091 * GH - 0.135 * LR - 0.069 * ES (5-1)

This model explains 26% of the variation on the proportion of the property

allocated to conservation (R= 0.515, R2 = 0.265, F=26.92, p <0.01,). Level of reliance

on property for income (LR) was the variable with higher coefficient in the model (R=-

0.135, t=-5.99, p <0.01) followed by and gender of head of household (GH) (R=0.091,

t=2.61, p=0.01) and economic sustainability of the reserve (R=-0.068, t=-2.92, p <0.01).

Additional analysis of these categorical variables revealed the following results.

Non-parametric analysis of variance (Kruskall-Wallis) and pairwise comparisons

(Dunn’s method) were used to further understand the effects and were included in the

regression model. To further explore the trends found in the regression model, the

following section provides a comparative analysis of the variables that presented

significant coefficients in the regression model and were not analyzed among the three

factors considered in research question #1: Reserve’s economic self-sustainability (ES),

and Gender of head of household (GH).

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Reserve’s economic self-sustainability.

From the total of 234 reserves, 43 (18%) were reported as non-economically

sustainable, 25 (10%) as partially sustainable and 156 (66%) as sustainable. Seventy-

four reserve owners (32%) reported investment of off-reserve income to sustain the

reserve (Table 5-4). Kruskall-Wallis analysis revealed significant differences on the

proportion of property allocated to conservation between the 3 different categories of

Economic Sustainability (H=29.42, p<0.01). The proportion of property area allocated to

conservation for partially sustainable reserves was not significantly different from non-

sustainable reserves (Q= 1.68, p>0.05) or sustainable reserves (Q=2.04, p>0.05);

however, significant differences were found between sustainable and non-sustainable

reserves (Q=5.13, p<0.05). The proportion of property allocated to conservation was

significantly higher for non-sustainable reserves (Median = 0.66 ha) vs. sustainable

reserves (Median = 0.33 ha, Figure 5-7), results that coincide with the negative

regression coefficient found in the model for this variable.

Gender of head of household.

Significant differences on the proportion of land allocated to conservation

between genders (Mann-Whitney U Statistic= 5,375.000, p=0.033); with women

allocating a significantly higher percentage of their property to conservation than men

(Figure 5-8).

Influence of Other Economic Factors

Economic incentives and taxes

Of the 234 reserves, only six reported having a substantial tax break for

allocating a portion of their property in conservation, and four of them reported property

tax discounts up to 30%; thus 95% (225) of reserve owners in this sample were levied

93
and regularly paid property taxes that included forest areas. From the whole sample, 93

reserve owners (40%) reported the amounts paid in taxes for year. From this group,

67% (63 reserve owners) reported having to pay annual taxes up to COP 100.0002

(U$ 50), 15% (14 reserve owners) reported annual taxes between COP 100.000 and

COP 1’232.000 (two monthly minimum wages3 or USD 616); and16 (17%) of them

reported annual property taxes higher than two monthly minimum wages. From this third

group several reserve owners reported having several years of property taxes overdue,

some of them owed amounts higher than 10 monthly minimum wages (COP 6’160.000

or USD 3.000) and up to 25 monthly minimum wages (COP 16’000.000 or USD 8.000).

Only one reserve owner from Resnatur reported participation on a pilot program for

Payments for Environmental Services for the implementation of silvopastoral systems.

Opportunity costs

From the whole sample, 89.3% of the reserve owners (209) reported that their

conserved areas were suitable for other productive activities. Alternative activities that

were foregone included: Agriculture –mainly coffee and subsistence crops- (48%),

Pastures (16%), agriculture or pastures (27%); other commodity crops –such as Oil

palm, rice- (5%), Urbanization (2%) and Mining (2%). Alternative land uses reported by

reserve owners varied depending on location, topography and the type of land use, and

further analysis revealed that reserve owners forewent at least COP 80,000 (U$ 40)

/ha/month in the case of pastures in remote and hilly regions, and as much as COP

1’200.000 (U$ 600) ha/month in the case of more lucrative crops such as greenhouse

grown flowers in mountain regions close to capital cities such as Medellin and Bogota;

2
COP 2.000 =1 USD approximately in 2014
3
Official minimum wage for 2014 was COP 616.000 (USD 308)

94
or oil palm plantations in tropical rain forests and Inter-Andean Valleys (Table 5-5). Only

10.3% of the reserve owners (25) reported high slopes or rocky soils as the reason for

not allocating those areas to production.

Discussion

Land Use Allocation and Property Size

One of the main findings of this research is that the percentage of property

allocated to forest conservation varies according to farm size, with notable differences

between small and medium to large reserves (Figure 5-2). Even though the effect was

weak, property size (PS) and the proportion of property allocated to conservation (PC)

were positively correlated (Figure 5.2). This effect persisted for medium to big reserves

but not for small reserves. One explanation of the positive effect on medium to big

reserves, may be the general trend in which bigger properties that remained under the

same family ownership for more years have more area in conservation, as indicated by

the positive significant correlation between years of property ownership (YO) and both,

property size (PS, r=0.16) and conservation area (CA, r=0.23). Around 60% of all

reserves reported areas with forest that were at least 25 years old and in many cases, >

100 years old, and in the particular case of medium and big size reserves, on average

properties had been own by the families of research participants for 29.1 ± 40.7 years

before joining the Bridge Organization (Calculated as Years of ownership – Years as on

the bridge).

Big properties: the legacies of colonization and agrarian reforms

Very often studies that try to understand the factors that influence land use

decisions are criticized for looking at the influence of current household socioeconomic

conditions with poor attention to other historical and contextual processes. Even though

95
a detailed analysis of the historical context of the reserves was beyond the scope of this

research, results show that these historical processes seem to have a long-term impact

on the current pattern of land use and the conservation conditions of these ecosystems.

For some of the reserves on this study, the presence of bigger areas of old growth

forest, rather than the product of landowner’s participation on conservation initiatives

during the past decades; may reflect the long term conservation vocation of the

property. Those patterns of forest cover may be the result of the historical political and

socio-economic nuances in the colonization of forest frontiers and the impacts of land

reforms and agricultural development policies that were implemented during the past

century on each region.

Land grabbing, pervasive violence and displacement were at the center of the

colonization processes in most rural Colombia in the late XIX and early XX centuries 4,

to such extent that are part of Colombian folk stories, and were depicted in detail in the

Nobel Prize winning novel “A hundred years of solitude” (Garcia-Márquez 1971). As a

response to farmer’s struggles to secure access to agricultural land and to address the

pervasive land concentration, two major agrarian reforms were implemented in the XX -

Law 200 of 1936 and Law 135 of 1961- (Balcázar Vanegas et al. 2001). Nevertheless,

implementation of these reforms never really occurred in several regions of the country,

and many analysts consider that these failed or incomplete agrarian reforms created the

conditions for the origin of armed resistances which in turn led to more than five

decades of armed conflict in the country (Pulecio 2006, Palou 2008). Nevertheless, in

4
A detailed account of the historical evolution of the concept of agrarian reform in Colombia from 1200
until 2010 can be found in (Franco-Cañas and De los Rios-Carmenado 2011).

96
some regions the transition from latifundia to minifundia took place in a relatively

smoother way and the reforms were followed by the necessary economic and political

support to promote an equitable rural development. This was the particular case of

many coffee regions (as those in this sample); where production on big coffee farms

was already managed through leasing of small plots to campesino families, and the

crisis in the coffee sector facilitated the implementation of the agrarian reforms. As a

result, areas that had been long cleared for agriculture were passed onto small farmers,

and landholdings that included big-forested areas –particularly on the high mountains-

continued to be owned by large landowners (Machado 2013). While data from this

research reflect the extreme high concentrations of landownership that is common in

the country (Faguet et al. 2016), with many small reserves and few medium to big

properties; it also provides indirect evidence of the long-term positive results in terms of

livelihoods and conservation that can be attained when small holders are granted tenure

security. Deforestation processes in Colombia are highly heterogeneous; current

deforestation trends continue to vary according to the historical and geographical

context (Armenteras et al. 2013, Rodríguez Eraso et al. 2013), with important regional

differences in past land use that mainly reflect past clearing events that may span

hundreds of years (Etter and van Wyngaarden 2000, Etter et al. 2006, Etter et al. 2008).

Further research on this topic could provide insights on the impacts of the historical

legacies and socio-economic impacts of agricultural policies and will be a valuable input

for policy design that is tailored to specific historical contexts in different regions of the

country.

97
Small properties: integrating livelihoods and conservation

Following an economic maximization rationale focused on profit and that equals

productivity to the yield of the main commercial crop; a common assumption is that the

smaller the farms and the more reliant reserve owners are on their property for income,

the smaller the areas that could be allocated to conservation. Under this model,

agriculture is seen as an enemy of conservation, and this basic assumption has been

the basis of the land sharing vs. land sparing model (Phalan et al. 2011), the forest

transition model (Mather 1992, Mather and Needle 1998) and the optimistic

assumptions that rural-urban migration of inefficient small scale farmers will

automatically result in higher agricultural yields in less area and higher rates of forest

recovery (Wright and Muller‐Landau 2006, Grau and Aide 2007).

While those assumptions may apply to large spatial scales and industrial

agriculture; the lack of correlation between property size and proportion of the property

allocated to conservation found on properties < 12.5 ha from this study (Figure 5-2),

indicates that reserve owners are managing to allocate substantial portions of their land

to conservation and to reconcile conservation and production at a small scale. To

understand these results it is necessary to consider the important role that agro

ecology, sustainable management and conservation practices have had as core tenets

in these grassroots initiatives. Diverse management practices (traditional and new)

promoted by the Bridge Organizations (BO) have been implemented in the reserves,

with the explicit objective of intensifying the production in such a way that reserve

98
owners can increase yields and economic gains and at the same time spare as much

area as possible to forest conservation5.

Even though this research was not focused on the productive areas of the farm,

these results provide indirect evidence that challenge conventional assumptions and

add up to the increasing body of evidence on the inverse relationship that exists

between farm size and productivity (Barrett et al. 2010, Carletto et al. 2013) 6, the

conservation value of smallholder’s agro forests (Perfecto and Vandermeer 2010,

Dawson et al. 2013) and highlight the importance of the sustainable management and

agro ecological practices that are implemented on the reserves.

Bridge organizations and other supporting NGOs (such as CIPAV and

Sunahisca) usually provide technical, logistical and often times economic support in

form of basic inputs, and fill the gaps left by the weak presence of local agricultural

extension agencies in those rural areas7. For decades, these organizations actively

incorporated Participatory action research (PAR) methodologies (Fals-Borda 1987,

1997), in which farmers played a central role as researchers (Espinel 1997). In some

cases they have been experimenting, testing and adapting those practices for many

5
Sustainable agricultural practices, conservation strategies, time of implementation, sources of support,
and challenges for their implementations were documented during the interviews and reserve visits.
However detailed analysis of those strategies are beyond the reach of this chapter.
6
The farm size productivity debate is one of the oldest debates in the agricultural policy field (Sen 1962,
Carter 1984, Cornia 1985) and continues to be one of the more controversial and ideologically charged
due to its implications for the design of development policies in third world countries, (Adamopoulos and
Restuccia 2014) and its impacts in forests conservation (Tscharntke et al. 2012a). Labor and market
failures, and low soil quality have been some of the main causal factors that have been explored for this
inverse relationship.
7
This role of local and community NGOs acting as service providers coordinators and facilitators of co-
management processes, acting as bridges between local producers and external markets and in sum
replacing the role of government in places with weak presence of formal institutions is widely recognized
by development scholars (Carroll 1992, Bebbington et al. 1993, Bebbington et al. 2008) Role of NGOs in
education and capacity building.

99
years and are now very active in the diffusion of these practices and the implementation

of sustainable productive systems among reserve members and other members of the

community (Corrales and Torres 2002), a method that resembles the “campesino a

campesino” initiatives common in other countries in Latin America (Holt-Giménez et al.

2012).

Some of the practices include live fences and planting of native trees species of

particular importance for household use (as sources of timber or firewood) or which are

known to be good for water retention or as sources forage for animals. These tree

species are usually incorporated into their agroforestry or silvopastoral systems in such

a way that allows farmers to increase canopy cover, plant biomass and diversity and

protect and restore degraded soils while increasing farm productivity per hectare (Calle

et al. 2013a, Calle et al. 2013b). Another common practice is planting of banana,

plantains, diverse fruit trees or transitory crops such cassava, beans, maize on forest or

forest margins. Instead of using fertilizers and irrigation systems, farmers use their

previous ecological knowledge to identify the microhabitats that may match the specific

ecological needs of particular crops. Improved soil conditions and water retention in

forest margins and small forest patches within the property provide these types of

habitats. This practice not only creates buffer zones for the remaining forest but it is also

an important part of their subsistence livelihoods, and along with multi-cropping

strategies that take advantage of microclimatic and soil differences, produce complex

agro ecosystems that promote high biodiversity (Perfecto and Vandermeer 2015) and

can increase livelihoods resilience to climate change (Altieri et al. 2015). Paradoxically

the recent enthusiasm with precision farming systems and the use of remote sensing

100
and high technology solutions to promote agricultural intensification (McBratney et al.

2005), recognize the importance of micro habitat heterogeneity on soil quality and water

availability and is seen by some authors as an attempt to reproduce these traditional

practices of crop specialization according to farm microhabitats (Perfecto and

Vandermeer 2010).

Reserve owners’ perceived benefits from forest conservation

Agro forests and small scale habitat features are widely recognized by their

conservation value and their role in the local provision ecosystem services such as soil

protection, water flow regulation and pollination (Zomer et al. 2009, Tscharntke et al.

2011, Kremen and Miles 2012, Perfecto and Vandermeer 2015) and conservation

scientist increasingly argue that these semi-natural habitats of biodiversity friendly

landscapes should be included as part of conservation strategies (Chazdon et al. 2009,

Tscharntke et al. 2012a, Brancalion et al. 2013, Dawson et al. 2013, Troupin and

Carmel 2014). Furthermore, they are also recognized as important strategies for climate

change mitigation and adaptation (Murgueitio et al. 2014) and for their role in improving

the resilience of rural communities (Altieri and Toledo 2011). However, do rural

landowners owners recognize these values? Rather than a detailed analysis of the

ecosystem services provided by forest in the reserves, this section explores reserve

owner’s perceptions of the benefits of forest conservation and how those may influence

their decisions to allocate some areas of their properties to conservation.

Water provision and regulation. Access to direct sources of water is seen as

one of the most valuable characteristics of a farm for reserve owners; and may have a

strong impact on property value, particularly in these mountainous regions where

irrigation systems are out of question due to their high costs. During the reserve visits

101
and conversations with household members, it was possible to corroborate that the role

of forest cover for water provision and regulation is engrained in the campesino culture

in Colombian Andes8, probably reflecting decades of extension work made by Bridge

Organizations and other environmental NGOs and agricultural extension agencies to

promote forest restoration and water conservation in the region The high value ascribed

to water availability was evident during reserve visits. Reserve owners frequently

mentioned concerns about water conservation and the need to increase forest cover to

secure water provision, and many of the reserve owners even reported that new springs

emerged after 2-5 years in areas that were left for forest regrowth.

Due to topography and rain seasonality, water availability on these mountain

areas is highly patchy and heterogeneous with strong seasonal variations at very small

spatial scales. Inside the same farm, plots that are less than a hundred meters apart

can have very different water restrictions, which ultimately determine land use and crop

choice on the property. With low capital and logistic restrictions to implement irrigation

systems they rely on forest patches for water provision on different areas of their farms;

and according to their general perception, during the dry season even small patches of

8
Since its establishment in 1927 Colombian Coffee grower’s federation (La Federacion de Cafeteros de
Colombia) has promoted economic and social well-being of Colombian Coffee growers. During the early
1970s the federation started to use different communication strategies such as radio programs and
periodic bulletins to support their extension activities in remote rural areas. The TV show “Las aventuras
del Profesor Yarumo” which was first aired in 1985 is considered its most successful extension
communication strategy and its main objective was to foster a positive cultural identity around the coffee
among farmers and to promote conservation of natural resources with a focus on disseminating
sustainable management practices and the importance of reforestation and water conservation (Bentley
and Baker 2000, FNC 2014). This program received several national and international awards and
several studies have analyzed the positive impact of this communication strategy as a tool for
environmental education, rural extension (Castro Chávez 2010, Argoty Muñoz et al. 2016) and for the
social construction of identity and campesino and coffee grower stereotypes in Colombia (Ocampo 2012).
Even though it still exists, unfortunately the program ceased to be aired on national television and no
longer reach farther rural areas.

102
forest can make the difference between having enough water to irrigate their crops or

losing the entire yield and for family consumption. For instance, smaller properties are

less likely to have direct access to watercourses such as streams creeks and rivers. In

those cases, small forest patches can increase rain interception, water retention, reduce

surface runoff and provide microclimatic regulation. Following this rationale, water

access and terrain heterogeneity may be important factors at play for the lack of

correlation and the negative slope between property size and proportion of property

allocated to conservation found on small reserves in this study (Figure 5-2).

Soil conservation. Along with water availability, reserve owners consider soil

quality as an important asset. Besides securing water provision, prevention and control

of soil erosion and landslides can be very important reasons to preserve forest and

incorporate certain trees and plant species, to plant live fences and to reforest

watersheds and slopes9 (Chará and Giraldo 2011). Trees are also integrated into

agroforestry and silvopastoral systems as to improve and maintain soil fertility (Chará et

al. 2015).

Pollination. Agroforestry landscapes and within farm local vegetation

management practices are considered particularly important for the conservation of bee

communities (Jha and Vandermeer 2010, Carvalheiro et al. 2011, Garibaldi et al. 2011).

In the case of many reserves particularly those associated with bridge organizations

9
Traditionally farmers use to plant guadua (Bambusa guadua), nacedero (Trichantera gigantean),
yarumo (Cecropia spp.) sietecueros (Miconia spp.), among other species known to be effective to
stabilize soils and to provide protection from landslides the protection of watersheds. Saman (Samanea
saman), Leucaena (Leucaena leucocephala), matarraton (Gliricidia sepium), cañafistola (Cassia spp.),
boton de oro (Tithonia diversifolia), pasto estrella (Cynodon plectostachius) are some of the species that
are used to improve soil fertility in agro ecosystems and silvopastoral systems in Colombia (Chará and
Giraldo 2011).

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from Valle, reserve owners reported that in neighboring villages farmers have had to

resort to manual pollination for some of the most important commercial fruit crops such

as for passion-fruit, banana passion fruits or sweet granadilla. They are aware that the

impacts of deforestation and the pervasive use of agrochemicals have decimated

pollinator populations and many of them are taking measures to avoid the same

negative effects in their communities, advocating for alternative strategies for pest

control that are pollinator friendly.

In sum, due to factors such as topography, water availability, pollination, soil

quality, diversity of production systems, results from this study correspond with previous

findings that defy conventional assumptions that increase of production is only possible

through land sparing (Chandler et al. 2013, Fischer et al. 2014). This study suggests, as

has been reported in many other cases, that agro ecological practices implemented by

reserve owners provide not only conservation benefits that guarantee ecosystem

services (water provision, soil conservation, pollination); but sustainable income and

food security. (Clough et al. 2011, Kremen et al. 2012, Tscharntke et al. 2012b, Kremen

2015). Furthermore, successful application of those strategies may be dependent on

particular regional contexts, climate, spatial heterogeneity and small landholdings

characteristics, and more technological intensive approaches may be appropriate on

homogeneous landscapes with low habitat heterogeneity (Chandler et al. 2013).

Predictive Model for Proportion of Property Allocated to Conservation

The predictive model obtained (5-1) revealed that the household and reserve

variables evaluated on this study account for the 26% of the variance on the proportion

of land allocated to conservation in the reserves. This section provides an analysis of

the influence of the variables that were found significant predictors in the model.

104
Gender of head of household

Gender was one of the variables found as significant predictors of proportion of

property allocated to conservation in the regression model, and Kruskall-Wallis analysis

revealed that women allocated significantly higher portions of their properties to

conservation (Figure 5-8). A big proportion of the women from this sample were totally

reliant reserve owners on small reserves from Tierrandina; and these differences may

be reflect gender differentiated roles in forest management and agriculture (Sunderland

et al. 2014); higher labor, capital and time constraints, and possibly biased access to

some agricultural extension resources. Due to these factors women may opt out of

more intensive activities such as the ones needed to clear forest and to establish bigger

agricultural plots (Mwangi et al. 2011). This coincides with findings from other studies

that indicate that male headed households or households with abundance of male labor

living in recently settled places tended to clear more forests (Wunder et al. 2014).

Reserve’s economic self-sustainability and level of reliance on reserve income

As expected more reliant reserve owners allocated less of their property to

conservation. However, less self-sustaining reserves reported more investment of off-

reserve income when compared with self-sustaining reserves and allocated significant

higher proportions of their properties to forest conservation. Seventy-eight reserves

(30%) that reported being non-sustaining or partially sustaining were the ones that also

reported investment of off-reserve cash, 42 from Resnatur and 25 from Valle. 42).

These observations suggest that at least 67% of Resnatur and 35% of Valle reserve

owners are investing money from other sources to support their conservation activities,

and this has significant positive impact in the proportion of their properties they allocate

to conservation (PC). In general findings from this research indicate that other factors

105
unrelated with income reliance and profit maximization mediate the decisions to

preserve forest for at least 28% of the reserve owners in this sample. Results also

highlight the importance of considering the effect of the diverse livelihood strategies

found among reserve owners, and challenges old assumptions that portray campesinos

as drivers of deforestation. It provides evidence of the active role of diverse groups of

rural inhabitants as active agents of processes of forest regrowth and how these “new

ruralities” should be considered as allies and protagonist in the management and

conservation of human modified landscapes (Hecht 2010, Chazdon 2014).

Small farmers and rural poverty. Eighteen percent of reserve owners reported

that their reserves were not economically self-sustaining. However, this number may be

higher, especially for the particular case of small reserves and totally reliant reserve

owners. In those cases, it is common for several members of the household to work full

time in the farm and they rarely consider the costs of their own labor as part of reserve

expenses. If labor costs were included, economic returns will probably not be enough to

consider many of the reserves as economically self-sustaining. In a particular example a

64 years old male respondent who is protecting 4 ha of native forest in his 10 ha

reserve, explained that he works an average of 10 hours a day and very often even

during the weekends, and at the end of the month his earnings from selling his

produces will not be more than COP 250.000 (USD 125), which is not enough to pay for

the monthly fee of his loans and sustain his family of 4. Despite this, during the

questionnaire he had reported his property as partially self-sustaining. In other cases,

especially for Tierrandina and Valle, some reserve owners reported their properties as

economically self-sustaining, but also recounted (later during the social networks

106
interview) owing a lot of money (to the bank, pawn brokers, the local grocery store or

the middleman who buys their crops). Furthermore, in many reserves the poor

conditions of household appliances, basic property infrastructure (such as rotten or

termite infested wooden poles, leaking roofs and pipes, improvised roof fixings with

plastic in the main house), coffee processing infrastructure, animal barns, water pipes,

storage tanks, etc; was evident. During the interview, they explained that they could not

afford fixings, but they were hopeful that better prices in the next coffee harvest will

provide enough to pay for debts and make the long due improvements in the

infrastructure. One respondent whose house was particularly in bad shape, explained

that they used to paint the house and replace all rotten poles once a year but it has

been a long time since they can afford it due to low Coffee prices10. Unfortunately,

prices dropped even more during the past two years (after the interview in 2014) so

most probably these repairs are still beyond their budget. Such observations rise

questions on what being self-sustaining means for reserve owners of different cultural

and socio economic backgrounds, which may have different hopes and expectations for

their own future and different perceptions of poverty. It also raise questions on how the

availability of alternative livelihood options for small farmers may impact their decisions

of maintaining the property or selling the land and migrating to urban areas; and

stresses concerns regarding labor conditions and the rights of aging campesino

population to social security (Bello and Romero 2001, Altieri and Toledo 2011).

10
By request of staff from the Bridge organization one additional question was included in the
questionnaire: which are currently your more pressing needs? as bridge organizations were interested on
these answers to design future projects. Many of them mentioned conservation related support – tree
seedlings, infrastructure to improve production of compost and worm farming, commercialization or
institutional support – but many of them also mentioned the need to repair basic household infrastructure.

107
 Impact of rural-urban out migration. Another important aspect that impact

reserve owners’ ability to self-sustain their reserve is the increasing migration of

younger generations from rural to urban areas (which is generally related to education

opportunities) and increases the vulnerability of aging households to economic

uncertainly (average age of head of household for the whole sample was 53 ± 12

years). In some of the reserves interviewed, younger generations try to return after

completing their studies (college or university) and many of them look for opportunities

to stay and to adapt their new skills to the local conditions and to create their own

livelihoods. Family ties, sense of belonging, commitment with the improvement of the

conditions of their own communities, connection to the territory and the land and sense

of identity and place were often reported as more valuable than higher economic returns

when pondering the opportunities and taking the decision of staying or not. Several

examples were found in which kids of reserve owners (some even with graduate

degrees) were working actively in local institutions (or independently) and acting as

brokers between their farms and rural communities and the modern world. They look for

ways to use their new skills to create and offer new services in their reserves

(ecotourism, education, new value chains, and research), or operate as local leaders

providing logistical and professional support to community organizations and other local

initiatives. In fact, directors and staff of the local bridge organizations included in this

study were locals, most of them were reserve owners, or kids of reserve owners but

there were also other members of the community that returned to their hometowns after

completing their studies. Nevertheless, those examples are not the norm, and

deteriorating economic conditions, lack of opportunities and market failures created by

108
perverse agricultural policies were often cited as factors that hinder the ability of new

generations to stay permanently in rural areas (Hecht and Saatchi 2007). As a result,

rather than being permanent rural residents, circular migration is very frequent among

household members, a phenomenon that has been described and found in other

tropical forest regions in Latin America (Padoch et al. 2014)

Non-reliant reserve owners investing in conservation. In the case of non-

reliant reserves and non-sustainable reserves, it was found that fixed costs such as

payment of property manager, incidental labor and maintenance of infrastructure,

usually comes from external sources of income and in some cases included remittances

from extended family living overseas. These results coincide with previous studies that

have reported a positive effect of remittances and off farm labor on rural livelihoods and

forest regrowth (Hecht et al. 2015), and the emergence of a “new rurality” in which

campesinos and rural inhabitants are not just farmers or users and extractors of forest

resources (Hecht 2010); instead they are very active agents that change and diversify

their livelihoods in order to adapt to fluctuating economic and social conditions

(Angelsen et al. 2014, Wunder et al. 2014).

For instance, in this study, 10% of the respondents reported that reserves were

only partially self-sustaining but also reported that external income was used to pay for

maintenance of reserve infrastructure or unexpected expenses. In general, further

analysis indicates that for at least 30% of the reserve owners in this sample the fact that

the reserves are not economically self-sustaining is not an impediment to protecting

forests, and actually non self-sustaining reserves were the ones that presented higher

proportions in conservation. This indicates that more educated landowners that tend to

109
be less reliant on their properties for subsistence and have more availability of off-

reserve cash are consistently investing their own resources to support the economic

costs of conservation in their properties.

Influence of Other Economic Factors

Economic incentives and taxes

Under Colombian law, reductions or exemptions on property taxes are part of a

set of policies that aimed to promote conservation by private landowners. Despite being

recognized in the national law, it is up to local governments (city councils) to go through

the administrative process to implement the regulations, establish the terms of the

exemptions on each municipality and to collect property taxes. Colombian Municipalities

are classified on 6 categories according to population per square meter, and these

categories determine the budget that the national government allocates to each one

(DNP 2005). Due to high total area and forest area, and low population size, many of

the municipalities in this study are considered as category 5 or 6, which means that the

annual budget they receive from the national government is extremely low, and local

governments rely heavily on property taxes to complement their own budget. As these

municipalities in category 5 or 6 are usually the ones that have higher areas in forest

cover, implementing national regulations of tax exemptions for forest conservation at the

municipal level will most probably bring many of those municipalities to bankruptcy.

Local authorities see these laws as “perverse” as they punish local governments that

want to promote conservation. These issues in the law are widely known by

environmental authorities and as a possible solution it has been proposed for the

National Environmental Ministry to reimburse municipalities for the amount of taxes they

are forgoing. Nevertheless, to date it is not clear how far they have gone in the design of

110
new laws that would include those changes. Furthermore, those proposals will need to

submitted and approved by the national congress so in the meanwhile no suitable short-

term solution is at sight.

Despite their concerns regarding high property taxes, reserve owners are also

wary about these well-intended solutions, and concerns were brought up during general

meetings of Valle and Resnatur, in which participants mentioned that considerable

sums of money coming from the national government to cover tax exemptions would

most probably promote mismanagement and corruption by local authorities. They

already foresee big areas of non-forested land being reported as forest to get the

economic benefits, and the possibility of embezzlement of public funds. Unfortunately,

these types of crimes are very common, and control and citizen oversight becomes

harder as the sums are greater. Besides corruption, concerns over cooptation of the tax

incentive schemes by illegal armed groups were also mentioned during those meetings.

They concerns are not unfounded, as these types of issues have been already reported

in other regions of the country with community based natural resource management

initiatives, payments for environmental services and pilot REDD+ projects (Ballvé 2013).

Despite all these issues, in many regions of the country, Regional environment

authorities (CARS) certify forest landowners and support them in the process of getting

property tax exemptions from the local authorities. In some cases, such as in Valle,

regional environmental authorities count with independent budgets and have special

incentives programs to provide payments per hectare of forest protected. Nevertheless,

landowners have to go through a lengthy process of paperwork and administrative

proceedings that has to be done in the capital, can take months and even years to be

111
approved and can be very expensive and time consuming. Even though in the long run

these economic incentives can have a positive economic impact, the short term costs

(in terms of travel expenses and number of days they have to leave their farm) are very

high for small landowners and totally reliant landowners; and in many cases going

through the process does not guarantee a long-term solution, as those agreements

need to be renewed sometimes every year. More wealthy, non-reliant land owners are

usually the only ones that can afford to go through that process. As a subsistence

farmer, an owner of a small reserve in Valle mentioned, “I ended up spending more

money on bus tickets and stamps than the actual discount I was able to get." This again

confirms findings from other studies that have reported that transaction costs for

payment for environmental services and economic incentives tend to exacerbate

preexisting income inequalities and are an important factor that hinders the participation

of small farmers in conservation programs (Mahanty et al. 2013, Muradian et al. 2013).

Not only tax exemptions and economic incentives are extremely, but during the

past three years the Colombian Government has been updating and digitalizing the

cadastral database in the whole country. As a result, many rural properties have

undergone changes in zoning categories and property valuation, and taxes have

increased, with some reserves reporting increases as high as 300%, which poses

extreme economic strain for reserve owners. As one of them reported during one

meeting while explaining the hardships he is going through in order to pay for the

property taxes: “Sometimes you feel left alone fighting for your own principles, but those

are values that are impossible to leave behind because they are part of who you are in

this life”. The injustice of being taxed for protecting forests that provide valuable

112
services for the surrounding communities is a common feeling among many reserve

owners.

Opportunity costs

Opportunity costs is the sacrifice of the next best opportunity, is a concept linked

to the notion of scarcity of resources and is commonly used to explain people’s

decisions to protect or preserve natural habitats whose benefits cannot be easily

quantified (Antunes et al. 2013). While people may decide to preserve forests because

they perceive them as providing intangible benefits, when it comes to rural landowners,

a pervasive assumption is that they would only spare forest conservation land that is not

suitable for other economic activities due to unfavorable factors such as rough terrain,

steep slopes or poor soil fertility. However, only 10.3% of reserve owners from this

sample reported unsuitability for other uses as the reason to preserve forest. No

significant correlation was found between reserve economic self-sustainability (ES) and

opportunity costs (OC) (r=-0.09, p=0.18); indicating that regardless of the economic

sustainability of the reserve, landowners are choosing to allocate land that would be

suitable for other economic activities to conservation.

Besides soil and terrain conditions, other common factors that are traditionally

used to explain landowner’s decisions of allocating suitable land to forest conservation

are labor (high costs and scarcity), scarcity of capital and legal constraints.

Nevertheless, field observations indicate that for most of the reserves, none of the

above may be the case. During the interviews and field visits, reserve owners explained

that renting forested land to be transformed for agricultural production is a common

strategy used by landowners that have labor or capital constraints, in other cases

farmers with labor or capital constraints may not rent the land but look for a partner.

113
Both are common practices in many the regions and were reported for some of the

larger reserves from Resnatur. As explained by some of these reserve owners, they

may rent pastures or crop areas to people that have the economic means to invest in

high profitable crops as a strategy to generate income. This allows them to ease the

economic burden of sustaining the property and pay for fix costs such as farm

administrator, taxes, farm expenses (veterinary, animal food, tools and materials),

reserve expenses (nursery materials, seedlings, wire and poles for fences, etc.) or any

other incidental expenses. Some of them see this as a last option to be economically

sustainable and as a way to make sure the forest in their property continues to be

protected; otherwise, economic hardship will force them to sell their reserve.

During the interviews reserve owners also explained how illegal processes of

forest clearing are common in neighboring properties without any legal or economic

consequence for the wrongdoers despite the presence of environmental authorities.

Even though forest clearing in private property is forbidden by the law (logging permits

can be requested under certain conditions and after a long bureaucratic process), law is

rarely enforced in many of these remote municipalities. Even in areas where

environmental authorities are present, fines for forest clearing are extremely low (for

example COP 50.000 or USD 25 per incident -not per area- in some regions), and

people can easily go along with the clearing and pay the fine afterwards without any

further consequence. In other instances, people set fires and report them as accidental

or criminal to the authorities, knowing that further investigations will never progress. As

observed during the field visits these practices can be very common in some regions

and usually a few weeks after the clearing or fire event, land is put to production.

114
 Factors that influence the area in forest conservation vary according to property

size. The higher proportions of forest found in bigger and older reserves, indicates that

for many of these properties, remaining forests are the result of long-term legacies of

colonization processes, land reform policies and particular historical development

trajectories in different regions. In the case of small reserves, forested areas are usually

the result of deliberate efforts for the implementation of sustainable management (agro

ecological practices, agroforestry and silvopastoral systems) and conservation

practices, including setting aside areas for forest regrowth, reforestation, restoration

and. Through these strategies they seek to integrate their livelihoods with forest

conservation improving income, food security and improve the provision of valuable

ecosystem services at the landscape level. Despite the poor presence of government

institutions, local NGOs and diverse community and civil society organizations have

played a key role and filled a noticeable gap, providing support and training regarding

sustainable livelihoods, food security and conservation practices.

Despite the differences on the bridge organizations in terms of external support

from formal institutions and geographical scale, this was not a factor that influenced the

proportion of property in conservation. Instead, forest cover in the property is

determined by the level of reliance on reserve for income, economic sustainability and

in less extent by gender. While the result of totally reliant reserves allocating less

proportion of their properties to forest conservation was anticipated, an unexpected

finding was the fact that reserves that were not economically self-sustaining allocated

higher proportions of their properties to forest. For these reserve owners, livelihood

diversity and off-reserve income positively impact their ability to actively adapt to

115
changes in the household cycle and household economic goals and may be an

important factor that facilitate allocation of land to forest conservation.

There are diverse factors that hinder reserve owner’s ability to develop their

conservation activities. In the case of medium size and big reserves, those are related

with lack of economic incentives, high taxes for forested land and pervasive gaps

between environmental policies at the national level and their implementation at the

regional and local levels. In the other hand for small reserves, current national economic

policies focused on international trade agreements hinder reserve owners’ ability to be

self-sustaining and are perceived as the threat for the long-term sustainability of the

reserves.

Results from this study challenge the dominant notion that reliance on property

income, legal constrains, resource scarcity (cash and labor) or rough terrain are the

main factors that may influence campesinos’ and rural landowners’ decisions to

preserve forest in their properties. Instead it was found that even for farmers with small

reserves who rely on their property for subsistence, forest protection is the result of

intentional decisions and the investment of time, labor and financial resources. For most

of the reserve owner’s, decisions regarding conservation are tied to non-monetary

benefits of forest and natural ecosystems. These of course include ecosystem services

such as water, soil and pollination; but cultural factors, individual motivations, and their

own perception of their relationship with forest and nature are also important factors that

should be considered. As explained by a 59-year old male farmer from Valle when

asked about his motivations to preserve forest, he replied: “Because I love this forest.

Money can be a limitation sometimes, but it will never be a motivation”. He protects 2 ha

116
of forest in his 5 ha Forest/farm property. Examples of the diversity of motivations

shared by reserve owners during the interview are included in Appendix B.

This sample of 234 reserve owners represents only a fraction of the thousands of

campesinos and rural landowners that despite scarce support from formal institutions or

economic incentives; are working to protect forest, implement sustainable agricultural

practices and restore watersheds and soils in rural Colombia. If the contribution in terms

of labor and economic resources of these thousands of rural landowners and their

families were to be quantified, how much would it be? How would this figure look when

compared with the sums that are invested in traditional top-down interventions for

conservation? Answers to those questions are beyond the scope of this study and

would probably be difficult to quantify; however, given the increasing focus on economic

and market-based solutions, it is important to recognize the important role of non-

economic motivations for biodiversity conservation and the protection of ecosystem

services, and look for strategies to improve the integration of conservation practices and

agricultural livelihoods and to promote the effective participation of grassroots initiatives

in forest governance.

117
Table 5-1. List of dependent variables included in this study.
Name of variable
Reserve variables
Property size (PS)
Years of property ownership (YO)
Years on the bridge (YB)
Bridge organization (BO)
Household variables
Household size (SH)
Gender head of household (GH)
Age head of household (AH)
Head of household education (HE)
Max. household education (ME)
Type of Description
variable
Ordinal Total area of the property, including conservation and productive systems
Ordinal Number of years since the property has been managed by the family
(sometimes may include ownership by parents or grandparents)
Ordinal Number of years since the reserve officially joined the bridge organization
Categorical Organization with which reserve owners are associated. It included 3
categories: Tierrandina, Valle and Resnatur
Ordinal Number of members of the household including non-relatives who are
economically reliant on household income for subsistence
Categorical Gender of head of household
Ordinal Age, in years, of head of household
Ordinal Number of years head of household attended school
Ordinal Number of years of school attendance of the member of the household with
maximum level of education
118
Table 5-1. Continued
Name of variable
Reliance on property for
subsistence (RS)
Off-reserve income (OI)
Level of reliance on reserve
income (LR)
Reserve is economically self-
sustaining (ES)
Invest of off-reserve cash on
property (CI)
Opportunity cost (OC)
Description
Categorical Does the household rely on income from reserve productive activities for
subsistence? (Y/N)
Categorical Does the household have sources of income earned outside the reserve
context? (Y / N)
Categorical Household’ reliance on the reserve for subsistence. Is a combination of RS
and OI. Participants that answered yes and no, respectively to these two
questions were considered totally reliant on their property for income. Those
that provided positive responses to both questions were considered partially
reliant, and those who responded no and yes respectively, were considered
non-reliant.
Categorical Is the reserve financially self-sustaining? (Y/ N/ Partially)
Categorical Does the household use off-reserve income to pay for reserve expenses?
(Y/N)
Categorical Is the area of the property allocated to conservation suitable for other
productive activities? (Y/N)
119
Table 5-2. Descriptive statistics of household variables
Age head Household Head household Max. household
household (AH) size (HS) education (HE) education (ME)
Unit Years Individuals Years Years
Type of variable Independent Independent Independent Independent
Count 230 229 230 230
Mean 53.15 4.48 8.87 12.31
Mean LCL 51.60 4.26 8.17 11.77
Mean UCL 54.70 4.69 9.57 12.86
Variance 141.91 2.82 29.29 17.72
Standard Deviation 11.91 1.68 5.41 4.21
Mean Standard Error 0.79 0.11 0.36 0.28
Coefficient of Variation 0.22 0.38 0.61 0.34

Minimum 26.00 1.00 0.00 2.00

Maximum 88.00 15.00 21.00 21.00
Range 62.00 14.00 21.00 19.00

Median 53.00 4.00 7.00 11.00

Median Error 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.02
Percentile 25% (Q1) 45.00 3.00 5.00 11.00
Percentile 75% (Q3) 61.00 6.00 14.75 16.00

Skewness 0.18 1.44 0.39 -0.34

Skewness Standard Error 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Kurtosis 2.81 10.99 1.94 2.88
Kurtosis Standard Error 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32

120
Table 5-3. Descriptive Statistics of reserve variables
P. Property in Property size Conservation Years on bridge Years ownership
Conservation (PC) (PS) Area (CA) (YB) (YO)
Units Proportion Hectares Hectares Years Years
Type of variable Dependent Independent Independent Independent Independent
Count 234 234 234 233 234
Mean 0.47 60.07 36.56 11.25 29.72
Mean LCL 0.44 29.23 20.28 10.58 25.85
Mean UCL 0.51 90.91 52.84 11.92 33.58
Variance 0.09 57332.88 15980.31 27.20 898.97
Standard Deviation 0.31 239.44 126.41 5.22 29.98
Mean Standard Error 0.02 15.65 8.26 0.34 1.96
Coefficient of Variation 0.64 3.99 3.46 0.46 1.01
Minimum 0.00 0.25 0.05 1.00 1.00
Maximum 1.00 3000.00 1000.00 30.00 200.00
Range 1.00 2999.75 999.95 29.00 199.00
Median 0.40 6.45 2.00 13.00 20.00
Median Error 0.00 1.28 0.68 0.03 0.16
Percentile 25% (Q1) 0.23 2.31 0.50 7.00 12.00
Percentile 75% (Q3) 0.67 18.00 8.75 15.00 36.00
Skewness 0.42 8.92 5.31 -0.30 2.43
Skewness Standard Error 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Kurtosis 1.94 101.33 33.67 2.74 9.86
Kurtosis Standard Error 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31

121
Table 5-4. Number of responses of households affiliated with the three different bridge organizations
Variables Categories Bridge Organizations (BO)
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur
Gender of head of household (GH) Male 38 57 25
Female 63 13 33

Reliance on property for subsistence (RS) No 1 17 54

Yes 101 53 8

Off-reserve income (OI) No 70 37 6

Yes 31 34 56

Level of reliance on farm income (LR) Non-reliant 1 18 53

Partially reliant 30 16 3
Totally reliant 70 37 5

Reserve economic self-sustaining (ES) Non self-sustaining 6 0 37

Partially self-sustaining 0 14 11
Self-sustaining 95 47 14

Invests off-reserve income in property (IO) No 94 44 19

Yes 7 25 42

Conservation area suitable for other uses – No 16 7 2

opportunity costs (OC) Yes 85 58 60

Sample size 101 71 62

122
Table 5-5. Opportunity costs analysis
Alternative uses reported Minimum BO / Maximum BO / Region Average profit forgone
profit COP/ Region profit COP /ha/month
ha/ month / ha/ month
COP USD
Pastures 40.000 Valle 160.000 Resnatur/ Cundinamarca 100.000 50
Subsistence and transitory 80.000 Valle 100.000 Resnatur/ Cundinamarca 90.000 45
crops
Flowers (Green house) 1’200.000 Resnatur/Antioquia 1’200.000 600
Vegetables (Green house) 300.000 Valle 300.000 150
Exotic fruits -Lulo 500.000 Valle 500.000 250
Exotic fruits -Granadilla 350.000 Valle 350.000 175
Rice 400.000 Resnatur / Meta 400.000 200
Potatoes 150.000 Resnatur/ Cundinamarca. 150.000 175
Oil Palm 1’000.000 1’000.000 1.500
Shade grown coffee* 300.000 Valle 450.000 Resnatur / Quindío 375.000 187
Cacao agroforestry* 250.000 Valle/ Choco 250.000 125
* Is not common to rent land for this type of land use, Soft loans from the government are usually available

123
 250
Forest and natural
ecosystems 55%

200

Pastures, 26%
No. of reserves

150
Natural regeneration Shade coffee, 3%
12%
Subsistence crops, 1%
100

Reforestation, 1% Other crops, 1%

50

0
0 10
Land use category

Figure 5-1. Land uses reported on the reserves. Sphere represents the percentage of
the total area of the sample (11,026 hectares, N=232). Green shades denote
conservation land uses: Natural ecosystems n=188, Natural regeneration
n=15, and Reforestation n=72. Brown shades denote production land use:
Pastures n= 147, Shade coffee n=107, Other crops n=78.

124
Figure 5-2. Property size for the three bridge organizations

Figure 5-3. Percentage of land allocated to conservation according to size categories

(Small reserves ≤12.5 ha, and medium to big reserves ≥12.5 ha)

125
 100

80
Percentage of reserves

60
Total reliance
Partial reliance
40 Non-reliance

20

0
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur

Figure 5-4. Percentage of reserves on each bridge organization according to different

categories of income reliance. N= 232.

100
Percentage of property on conservation

80

60

40

20

0
Total reliance Partial reliance Non reliance

Figure 5-5. Proportion of property allocated to conservation according to Level of

reliance on reserve for income (LR). Box represents medians and interquartile
ranges, whiskers represents maximum and minimum values Total reliance
Mdn= 25, (n=112), Partial reliant Mdn=50 (n=49), Non-reliant Mdn =67
(n=71).

126
 Percentage of property on conservation 100

80

60

40

20

0
Valle Tierrandina Resnatur

Figure 5-6. Percentage of property allocated to conservation. Valle (n=70), Tierrandina

(n=101), Resnatur (n=61). Box represents medians and interquartile ranges,
whiskers represents maximum and minimum values.

100
Percentage of property on conservation

80

60

40

20

0
Non -sustainable Partially sustainable Sustainable

Figure 5-7. Proportion of property allocated to conservation according to Economic

sustainability. Box represents medians and interquartile ranges, whiskers
represents maximum and minimum values Total reliance Mdn= 66, (n=52),
Partial reliant Mdn=48 (n=24), Non-reliant Mdn =33 (n=151).

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 Percentage of property on conservation 100

80

60

40

20

0
Men Women

Figure 5-8. Proportion of land allocated to conservation according to gender of head of

household. Box represents medians and interquartile ranges, whiskers
represents maximum and min values. Women Mdn= 49.64 (n=108). Men,
Mdn= 32.82 (n=108) Significant differences were found between genders
(Mann-Whitney U Statistic= 5,375.000, p=0.033).

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 CHAPTER 6
ASSESSING CONSERVATION EFECTIVENESS OF VOLUNTARY CONSERVATION
INITIATIVES IN COLOMBIA

Conservation Effectiveness in Private Conservation Initiatives

During the last decade, discussions on evaluation of conservation strategies

have been focused on traditional governance interventions such as protected areas or

community managed areas (Porter-Bolland et al. 2012, Butchart et al. 2015, Coad et al.

2015). Given the paucity on information regarding private protected areas in general, is

not a surprise that studies regarding the impact of these conservation initiatives are

scarce, and only recently, guidelines and evaluation tools specific for this type of

initiatives have started to be developed particularly in Latin America (Chacon 2007,

Delgado et al. 2007, Tacon et al. 2013). Evaluation of private conservation initiatives

represents a challenge not only due to the scarcity of quantitative data, but also

because traditional methods of evaluation may not be suitable for reserves in which

conservation and management decisions, and the implementation of those decisions,

are carried out by the landowner or other household members.

For this study, conservation effectiveness was measured following indicators

developed through a series of workshops and meetings by a broad spectrum of

stakeholders and experts on private conservation in Latin America (Delgado et al. 2007,

Delgado et al. 2008, Mayorquín et al. 2010). These indicators reflect the particular

management challenges faced by reserve owners and seek to evaluate conservation

effectiveness of private conservation strategies using three main categories: Ecological

sustainability, reduction of threats, and management capacity. This methodology has

already been tested on two natural reserves of the civil society (RNSC) in Colombia

(Mayorquín et al. 2010); however, this is the first time that is used to evaluate

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management effectiveness of voluntary conservation initiatives at a larger scale, and

the first time used to also evaluate the impact of socio economic and contextual factors

on conservation outcomes.

The aim of this research is to understand the diverse factors that influence the

conservation effectiveness of individual private reserves, defined by three criteria:

improvement or maintenance of ecological attributes, long-term viability of the

ecosystem, and management capacity. This research will use a mixed methods

approach guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the influence of 3 key factors: a) Property size b) Level of reliance on

their property for subsistence and c) Institutional support through different types
of bridge organizations; on conservation effectiveness?

2. Which of the measured household socio economic characteristics and reserve

(property) characteristics predict the conservation effectiveness of these
reserves?

Results

Overall, conservation effectiveness indexes indicated that most of the reserves

experienced improvements in the criteria evaluated. The average score for the of

conservation effectiveness index for the 234 reserves was 0.78 SD=0.43). When

considering all reserves, perceived support for their conservation activities, household

economic conditions, extreme climate variability, pollution (sewage and solid waste

management), resource extraction (poaching) and unsustainable agricultural practices

(pasture in high slops, use of agrochemicals by neighbors); were the indicators that

received the lowest scores. Ten reserves presented conservation effectiveness scores

higher than 1.5, all of them from Tierrandina. The highest score reported was 1.93.

Only 11 of these 234 reserves (0.05%) received negative scores: 1 from

Tierrandina, 4 from Valle and 6 from Resnatur; and the lowest conservation

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effectiveness value was -0.25. When considering the three conservation effectiveness

criteria management capacity indicators presented the lowest negative scores,

indicating that indicators from these criteria were reported decreasing for a big portion of

the reserve owners. Specifically, of these 11 reserve owners, 9 (82%) reported negative

values for perceived support (including surrounding communities and local institutions)

and 4 out of them (36%) reported negative values for availability of economic resources.

Poaching was most often reported (27% of reserve owners) as posing a negative

impact and/or threat on long-term reserve viability across all four categories. Other long-

term viability issues included extreme climate variability and pollution, reported by 18

and 9% of reserve owners, respectively. Finally, indicators of ecological attributes were

mentioned with less frequency (9%). Only two reserves, one each from Tierrandina and

Resnatur, reported decreases in the conservation area, forest conditions, conditions of

local populations of flora and fauna, and/or deteriorating conditions of water sources. In

both cases, reserve owners reported a decrease in conservation area following forest

fires after prolonged droughts.

Three Key Factors that Influence Conservation Effectiveness

Influence of property size

No significant correlation was found between property size (PS) and

conservation effectiveness indices (r=-0.10, p=0.12). To further analyze the influence of

property size on conservation effectiveness, reserves were divided on two size

categories: small reserves (≤ 12.5 ha) and medium to large reserves (≥ 12.5 ha);

however, no significant differences were found on the conservation effectiveness scores

between reserves between the two class sizes (F=1.04, p=0.30). Additional correlation

analysis within each class size revealed that for small reserves there is a significant

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negative correlation between property size and conservation effectiveness (r=-0.29,

p=0.0001). For the case of medium to big reserves no significant correlation was found

(r=-0.14, p=0.19).

Level of reliance on income

The highest conservation effectiveness scores were reported by total reliant

reserves. However, no significant differences were found in the conservation

effectiveness scores between the three categories of income reliance (H=1.05, P=0.6,

Figure 6-1 and 6-2).

Influence of bridge organization

Significant differences were found in the Conservation Effectiveness (CE) scores

between the Bridge Organizations (H= 31.23, p<0.001, Figure 6-3). The highest

differences were found for the variables measuring Ecological Attributes (such as forest

conditions, water conditions and local population of flora and fauna) where higher

improvements were reported in Tierrandina reserves when compared to Valle and

Resnatur. Slightly higher increases in area in conservation were higher for Resnatur

when compared with the other Bridge Organizations (BO). In terms of Management

Capacity, the variable measuring Use of conservation tools was higher for reserves in

Valle while improvement in economic factors was higher for Tierrandina reserves

(Figure 6-4).

Combined effects of bridge organization and level of reliance on reserve for

income.

To analyze the interaction between Bridge Organizations and Reliance on

Reserve and its influence on conservation effectiveness nine dummy variables were

created for each combination of bridge organizations and levels of reliance (3x3).

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Results from the non-parametric Anova indicate that the interaction of these variables

has a significant effect on conservation effectiveness (H=47.83, p< 0.01). These results

reflect indicate that differences in level of reliance among the three different bridge

Organizations (e.g. most Tierrandina reserves are totally reliant) influence conservation

effectiveness.

Predictive Model for Conservation Effectiveness

No correlation was found between conservation effectiveness (CE) and the

proportion of the property allocated to conservation (PC) (r=-0.06, p=0.40). Significant

positive correlations were found between Conservation Effectiveness and Bridge

Organization (BO) (r=0.29, p=0.00), Gender (G)(r=0.14, p=0.00), Number of Years on

Bridge organization (YB) (r=0.18, p=0.00) and Economic Sustainability (ES)(r=0.14,

p=0.03). Significant negative correlation coefficient was found for Years of ownership

(YO) (r=-0.19, p=0.00) (Appendix A).

A multiple linear regression was used to understand the combined influence of all

the independent variables on conservation effectiveness scores (CE). After applying

stepwise forward regression for model building with AICC as criteria for variable

selection, only two variables remained in the model as significant predictors of CE:

Bridge organization (BO) (r=-0.02, t=-4.07, p <0.001) and Years of ownership (YO) (r=-

0.02, t=-1.85, p <0.001). The model obtained significantly explains 10% of the variation

on Conservation Effectiveness (R2 = 0.10, F=12.68, p <0.001).

CE= 1.09 -0.14 (BO) -0.02 (YO) (6-1)

Discussion

Findings from this research indicate that most of the reserve owners perceive

significant improvements in the conservation effectiveness indicators evaluated

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(average CE = 0.78). Even though wide variation was observed on the conservation

effectiveness scores, the fact that only 11 reserves reported negative scores can be

interpreted as an indication of the positive outcomes of these voluntary conservation

strategies. Most of the reserves reported improvements in ecological attributes and

management capacity indicators, results that can be attributed to the positive influence

of the bridge organizations. On the contrary reserve owners did not reported noticeable

increases on the indicators related to long-term viability of the ecosystem which include

external factors that are out of the control of the reserves and bridge organizations and

which in some cases do not bode well for the future. The following section provides an

analysis of the influence of the different factors on the three conservation effectiveness

criteria.

Conservation Effectiveness Criteria

Ecological attributes

Reserves from the three bridge organizations reported an improvement of the

conditions of the different ecological attributes (area in sustainable management, area

in conservation, forest condition, local populations of flora and fauna, and water

conditions). Regarding Area in Conservation (CA), Resnatur reserves and non-reliant

reserves were the ones that showed higher increases (Figure 6-1) which may be a

result not only of their bigger size and additional land availability but also extra

availability of economic resources to provide basic inputs for conservation such as

nurseries, tree seedlings, poles and fences, watering fountains for cattle, etc. These

inputs are very important for the implementation of landscape conservation strategies

that are focused on the protection of riparian zones, creation of biological corridors and

promotion of forest restoration and regrowth (Sayer et al. 2013, Estrada-Carmona et al.

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2014), which were some of the main strategies implemented for ecosystem restoration

by reserve owners in this study.

While reserves from all Bridge Organizations reported improvement in forest

conditions, water conditions and local populations of flora and fauna; the fact that the

increases were higher for Tierrandina may reflect the low baseline in the conservation

condition of the reserves by the time they joined the bridge organization, and the

positive impact of conservation practices implemented afterwards, as this improvement

in forest conditions and local populations of flora and fauna was achieved with very

small increases in forest area. Some of the practices most commonly implemented are:

Reforestation on riparian zones, enrichment of forest patches with rare native trees,

creation of biological corridors and increase of tree density within productive areas

through silvopastoral systems, live fences, forage trees, and shade grown coffee.

Around the world these strategies are known to be very effective to deliver food security

while improving rural livelihoods and restoring and protecting healthy ecosystems

through the creation of multifunctional landscapes (Hart et al. 2016).

Besides these conservation practices, other activities were promoted by the

bridge organizations to improve sanitation (such as septic tanks, bio-digesters for

biogas production, efficient stoves, sewage systems and solid waste management

programs) and sustainable agricultural management (organic fertilizers, no–till

agriculture, reduction of agrochemicals) among others. An important factor to notice is

that reserve owners mentioned those as activities they implement to improve the overall

conditions in their reserve, and no clear distinction was made between conservation,

sanitation or sustainable agricultural management (this distinction is being made here

135
for explicative purposes). This observation emphasizes the fact that they see the

different components of their reserve (production areas, residential areas and

conservation areas) as part of the same unit, and for them conservation, well-being and

their livelihoods are intertwined. This integration of forest conservation and productive

activities and the rejection of the nature and culture divide is one of the basic principles

of Buenvivir. Buenvivir is a concept that integrates ethical principles of indigenous from

Amazon-Andes cultures, in which the good of the community -and other living beings- is

as important as the individual’s (Gudynas 2011b, 2012). This principle was adapted by

social movements in the 1990s as their alternative proposal to western notions of

sustainable development (Walsh 2004, Gudynas 2011b, a, 2012, Vanhulst and Beling

2014) and is part of the core values that inspired the creation of these reserves

networks.

Besides increases in conservation area and improvement in forest conditions,

almost all the reserves reported maintenance or improvement on local populations of

flora and fauna, a contribution that is widely known by Colombian biologists and

conservationists. RNSC play an active role in the design and implementation of diverse

conservation programs with the participation of reserve owners and the neighboring

communities; some examples are their in-situ collections of endemic species and

endangered species (Orejuela-Gartner 2012), promotion of the protection and

restoration of endangered ecosystems (Peñuela Recio et al.). Resnatur’s has also

partner with other Colombian conservation NGOs (Calidris Foundation and Proaves

Foundation) and WWF, to develop bird banding protocols, and to provide training for

diverse groups to carry out the Neotropical Bird Census (Resnatur et al. 2004, Ocampo-

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Peñuela 2010). They have collaborated on programs for the reproduction and

restoration of the populations of native tree species and the endangered palm

Ceroxlyum spp., which are used by the also endangered yellow-eared parrot

Ognorhynchus icterotis (Salaman et al. 2006). Many of the reserves are located in

areas considered as important bird areas IBAS that protect habitat of endangered bird

species that are not represented on national parks (Franco et al. 2009). It is also widely

recognized that they improve connectivity and act as buffer zones protecting

populations and increasing the representation of key ecosystems in the regional

systems of protected areas (Gómez-Hoyos et al. 2015). Furthermore, RSCN facilitate

ecological and conservation research in a country where resources for field research

infrastructure are extremely limited (Camelo et al. 2012, Franco-Quimbay and Rojas-

Robles 2014), and they are also recognized for their important role in environmental

education, ecotourism and scientific tourism (Orejuela-Gartner 2012). In sum through

direct and indirect actions RNSC play an important role in the maintenance and

improvement of the ecological attributes of diverse types of ecosystems in the country

Long-term viability of the ecosystem

Reserve owners are constantly adapting to external impacts and threats that

affect their reserves. According to the interviews, the small improvement on the

reduction of threats related with resource extraction for Tierrandina and Valle may be a

reflection of the decrease in fire wood extraction in the case of Tierrandina and

reduction of illegal hunting in Valle. Tierrandina reserve owners frequently expressed

gratitude for the support provided by the national park authorities to implement energy

saving stoves and agroforestry systems, which was an effective way to stop illegal

incursions in the national park to harvest firewood, and supplement their livelihoods. In

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the case of reserves from Valle, even though reserve owners reported conflicts with

poachers, they also reported that these have decreased compared with the past. Some

of these reserves are located in regions that had strong presence of armed groups, and

in a lesser extent still may have. Reserve owners reported that being armed in the forest

could be dangerous, as paramilitary groups, guerillas and the army can mistakenly

identify armed civilians as enemy. As a consequence, forest incursions by illegal

hunters dropped drastically in the past decades and hunting culture has decreased.

Another threat to local populations of flora and fauna that was mentioned by reserve

owners were conflicts with feral and stray dogs that come from outside the reserve and

kill armadillos (Priodontes maximus), pacas (Cunniculus paca), agoutis (Dasyprocta

punctata) and porcupines (Echinoprocta rufescens) among others. Some reserves from

Resnatur also mentioned overharvest of medicinal plants and berries from high

mountain forests, elfin forests and moors as a growing threat. They also reported

occasional illegal selective logging; however, the incidence of this threat was very low.

Regarding pollution, Tierrandina and Valle reported small improvements. It is

common for Bridge Organizations to provide material supplies and technical support to

set up septic tanks, bio-digesters and wastewater management systems that use

natural technologies. However, unsustainable agricultural practices such as

indiscriminate use of pesticides in neighboring farms and the negative effects of runoff

on watersheds were often mentioned as an important factor in the decline of water

quality and also as a source of conflict with the surrounding community.

Aggravation of extreme climatic events and climate variability were reported by

reserves of the three categories of income reliance but were particularly stronger for

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reserves of Tierrandina and Resnatur. The negative effect of droughts was witnessed

during field visits to Tierrandina reserves as in some of them, reserve owners were

expecting to loose most of their coffee production due to exacerbated droughts. On the

contrary, Reserves from Valle did not report significant deterioration of climatic

conditions. These reserves are located in the mountain forests of the western

Colombian Andes which are some of the most humid regions in the country. For several

years, agricultural extension agencies have been promoting the planting of shade coffee

varieties, the implementation of agro ecological practices and crop diversification. All

these are considered useful strategies for climate change adaptation and mitigation

(Altieri 2008, Rogé et al. 2014, Altieri et al. 2015), and may have contributed to improve

the resilience of these reserves to extreme climatic conditions such as has been

reported in other studies (Altieri et al. 2015).

Management capacity

Scores for the management capacity indicators (use of conservation tools,

participation, perceived management capacity and external support), were similar

between the three different levels of Income reliance (Figure 6-2); however, an

interesting result is that in contrast to non-reliant reserves, total reliant and partially

reliant reserves reported improvements in their economic conditions. As most of the

totally reliant reserves were associated to Tierrandina, this result can be considered as

an effect of Tierrandina initiatives to increase productivity in the properties and to

provide added value through improvements in technology and commercialization.

Farmers from Tierrandina, belong to cooperatives and producer organizations that

provide financial support (i.e. loans through revolving funds) and facilitate logistics and

coordination for commercialization activities. On the contrary reserves from Resnatur

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and Valle reported deterioration of Economic conditions. Even though similar initiatives

for commercialization and technological improvement are found in Valle, unlike

Tierrandina, most of the production of the reserves in the area is not directed to local

markets but to markets in main cities that are several hours away. These reserve

owners not only face high transportation costs but have also been severely affected

during the past years for the drops in the prices, which they attribute to the national

implementation of free trade agreements with the U.S. in 2012. Reserve owners from

Resnatur mentioned similar challenges, as the prices of milk and other common

agricultural products have dropped highly during the past few years, which is

corroborated by recent reports on the skyrocketing of imports of basic food staples in

the country (Zamudio 2016). The increased offer of cheap products coming from

external subsidized markets is considered by many of the reserve owners as one of the

main factors that threatens their ability to continue with sustaining their reserves and

carrying out their conservation activities. During reserve visits I was able to witness how

many crops, particularly fruits were left to rot on site as the costs of harvest and

transportation were higher than the prices offered to them by the middle men or the

official prices on regional markets. This finding supports other studies’ assessments that

consider overproduction as one of the main threats to food security and economic

resilience of small farmers, as they are continually subject to boom and bust cycles

(Perfecto and Vandermeer 2010).

Reserves from Valle presented higher scores on the use of conservation tools.

Many reserves in Valle were created through bridge organizations with economic

support from Regional Environmental authorities, and some of the bridge organizations

140
receive financial support to conduct basic biological and agricultural characterization of

the reserves, to define a management plan and to support reserve owners in defining

priorities for implementation of different management and conservation strategies.

Given that the use of these management and planning tools is usually a requirement for

funding, most of these reserves have incorporated the use of management plans and

species inventories as a common standard. While those organizations rarely provide

cash to reserve owners, their economic support is key and involves provision of basic

materials and technical assistance for the implementation of the management plan.

Participation of reserve owners on bridge organization projects’ is usually contingent in

their commitment to provide the labor and other minor expenses for the implementation

and to participate in capacity building activities. Management priorities are not

necessarily conservation related and very often priorities involve basic sanitation

infrastructure (such as water pipes, sewage systems, septic tanks), and production

infrastructure (improvement of coffee processing facilities to increase productivity and

product quality and reduce water waste) and the implementation of other integrated

landscape management strategies (Estrada-Carmona et al. 2014).

One of the factors that may have influenced Tierrandina’s positive results in

terms of improvement of the economic conditions of its associates, has been the long-

term commitment of Tierrandina staff and authorities from the neighboring protected

area (Galeras National Park) to work together to support reserve owners in the

improvement of their management capacity, and developing new commercialization and

value chains. Furthermore, Tierrandina has capitalized on this partnership to secure

funding from international agencies and to provide continuity to their conservation and

141
development initiatives. Galeras National Park efforts have been widely recognized, and

is one of the three national parks in South America included by the IUCN in their Green

List of Well Managed Protected areas; which is a new standard that seeks to recognize

the contribution that protected areas make to sustainable development through the

conservation of nature and provision of associated social, economic, cultural, and

spiritual values (IUCN 2014).

Diverse Factors that Influence Conservation Effectiveness

Small reserves: tradeoffs between efficient management and property size

Property size did not have a significant influence on conservation effectiveness

and no significant differences in conservation effectiveness were found between the two

categories of property size, which indicates that both small farmers’ reserves and big

properties are attaining similar positive results through their conservation activities. The

negative correlation between conservation effectiveness and property size when small

reserves were analyzed independently, may denote that owners of smaller reserves

perceive themselves as more effective when compared to those with reserve sizes >

12.5 ha. Given that managing costs (which may include, labor, fencing, maintenance

and property taxes) grow in proportion to property size, it is reasonable to infer that

owners of small reserves and those who rely on their property for subsistence, would

chose to focus their efforts on improving the quality of the protection and their

management effectiveness in the area they already own rather than increasing the

amount of land protected. Other studies that have analyzed qualitatively economic

aspects of private reserves in Costa Rica have shown that household constraints are a

determinant factor that may limit reserve owners’ management capacity and may have

a noticeable influence on reserve size (Langholz et al. 2000).

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Bigger reserves: the influence of external threats and local contexts

In the case of bigger reserves, conservation effectiveness may not depend on

landowners’ ability to manage their land, increase the area in conservation, or improve

the overall forest conditions. As discussed in the previous chapter, bigger and older

reserves tended to have bigger areas of old forest, which means that effective

implementation of conservation practices may not cause direct increase on forest area

or improvements of ecosystem conditions. In the other hand, external impacts and

threats (such as poaching, logging or illegal firewood harvest) faced by these reserves

may have less to do with the size of the property but with the surrounding contexts,

which are out of the control of reserve owners The same applies to other management

capacity indicators (such as perceived support or availability of economic resources)

that may be independent of property size or proportion of property allocated to

conservation and instead reflect reserve owners perceptions of external conditions and

how those impact the members of the household. These results coincide with previous

studies that indicate that reserve owners prefer to keep their property at a manageable

size, and time and effort and external context are important factors that influence their

own perception of conservation effectiveness (Langholz et al. 2000). Besides being a

protected area, for these reserve owners the reserves is their land, and is the land they

may want to pass on to their kids, so they strive to be effective. As one non-reliant

reserve owner mentioned when explaining his management decisions: “I do not want to

pass a headache onto my children”, implying that even though he would like to acquire

more land for conservation he recognizes the management challenges he faces as a

reserve owner.

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Diversified livelihoods promote bigger conservation areas

In general, the level of reliance on the reserve for family income was not a key

factor affecting the different indicators of conservation effectiveness measured. One

indicator however, area or amount of land designated for conservation, did tend to

increase more over the study period for owners who were not reliant on their reserve for

income. For these landowners, sparing additional land for conservation may not impact

their livelihoods, and external sources of income of some members of the household

may pay for conservation related expenses (nursery, seedlings, fences, labor costs) or

allow them to spend more time managing and taking care of their land. In some cases,

non-reliant reserve owners reported that they received remittances from relatives

overseas with the explicit indication of using the money to make improvements in the

reserve. This is an important finding as highlights results found in other studies on the

importance of diversified livelihoods for forest conservation (Wunder et al. 2014) and the

role of remittances as important factors that have influenced forest resurgence in

Central America (Hecht and Saatchi 2007).

The importance of long-term institutional and personal commitment

Reserves associated with all three bridge organizations showed an overall

increase in conservation effectiveness over the time of the study period, with

Tierrandina scores showing greatest overall improvement. These reserve owners

attributed their positive outcomes to the environmental education and capacitation

programs delivered by their organization. This highlights that even in communities

where members are rather new or have migrated recently (Mean years of ownership =

22.5, Std. = 14.4), environmental education and capacity building efforts can have a

very positive impact. These results also help to understand the fact that years on the

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Bridge organization was an important predictor of conservation effectiveness in the

regression model and highlights the cumulative effect of the logistic, technical and

economic support offered to reserve owners by their organization. This support provides

them with the minimum resources to improve their livelihoods and to implement

conservation and sustainable management practices, which would very difficult to

achieve otherwise due to economic constraints. It also underlines the importance of

long-term institutional and personal commitment on conservation projects. In the

particular case of Tierrandina, the first interactions between Galeras National Park

authorities and surrounding communities started in 2000 with environmental education

workshops, which catalyzed further process of community organization that led to the

creation of Tierrandina three years later. Since then National Park authorities have been

working with the surrounding communities through a collaborative and horizontal

partnership relationship. Protected Area staff (including PA director) has a very close

and friendly relationship with Tierrandina staff and with the members of the community

in general; and most of them have facilitated and participated in community

conservation initiatives since the beginning of their interactions with the local

communities. When necessary, professional and technical support has been provided to

Tierrandina by the National Park, for example to solve land tenure issues and for the

design and implementation of their own community development projects and

proposals. This long-term support has been a key factor in the ability of Tierrandina to

secure funding from international agencies and to provide continuity to their

conservation and development initiatives. Galeras National Park efforts have been

widely recognized, and is one of the three national parks in South America included by

145
the IUCN in their Green List of Well Managed Protected areas (IUCN 2014), which is a

new standard that seeks to recognize the contribution that protected areas make to

sustainable development through the conservation of nature and provision of associated

social, economic, cultural, and spiritual values1. Tierrandina example, contrasts with

traditional project oriented interventions that are characteristic of most top-down

conservation strategies.

Reserves from Valle were associated to four different small Bridge organizations

(Ecofuturo, Acerg, Corpoversalles and Serraniagua) that collaborate and coordinate

their conservation activities to protect the Serranía del Los Paraguas Mountain range

and other strategic ecosystems and to create biological corridors connecting with

Tatamá National Park in the North. A common complaint of reserve owners from

Corpoversalles (the oldest Bridge Organization in the area) was a lack of consistency in

their support, an issue that they are not always able to address due to lack of staffing

and financial resources; which has been reported as factors that hinder the successful

implementation of integrated landscape management strategies in other countries in

Latin America (Estrada-Carmona et al. 2014). Scarce funding prevents reserve owners

from maintaining basic property and conservation infrastructure such as septic tanks,

bio-digesters, sewage systems or fences to separate riparian zones from pastures.

Many of these were installed when the reserve was declared were more than 10 years

old, and presented evident signs of deterioration. In general, lack of consistent funding,

technical assistance and difficult commercialization of their products were some of the

main concerns of reserve owners from Valle reserves.

1
https://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/gpap_home/gpap_quality/gpap_greenlist/

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Tensions between bridge organizations and formal institutions

On the other hand, the relationship between local Bridge Organizations from

Valle and Regional Environmental authorities (such as CVC) has experienced ups and

downs during the past years. It is frequent for formal environmental authorities to

outsource conservation projects through professionals and NGOs who come from the

capital and are hardly familiar with the local contexts. This is usually done without

consulting with the communities or considering local capacities. Even though in many

cases local professionals or para-biologists are more than capable to conduct research

and carry out monitoring activities; institutional funding is usually tied to complicated

bureaucratic procedures and unreasonable requirements that local organizations may

not be able or find hard to comply. Some examples are the requirements of

certifications and diplomas from project staff, the very high percentages of matching

funds or the requirement to execute specific project activities that are focused on

funder’s goals but do not match real community needs. Those rigid institutional rules not

only thwart participation of local communities, but are also perceived by locals as ways

to facilitate conditions for corruption and appropriation of public funding that should be

allocated to conservation. The fact that attempts of formalize participation of grassroots

initiatives usually ends up in their cooptation by mid-level institutions has been

repeatedly reported by authors from diverse regions, and represents a huge factor that

hinders real and effective participation of the civil society in conservation. All of these

are detrimental factors to grassroots participation in conservation and were reflected in

low the conservation effectiveness scores for the indicator of participation in Valle

reserves (Figure 6-4). Due to these issues, Serraniagua, one of the Bridge

Organizations located closer to the National Park, decided to cut their relationship with

147
environmental authorities (even rejecting funding offers and official recognition by the

environmental authorities), and work independently in their conservation initiatives.

Even though they rely mostly on their own social and economic resources (such as their

community store and coffee shop, and cooperative revolving loans) to support

associated reserve owners in their conservation and productive activities and to provide

for administrative expenses; they have been able to secure partial funding directly from

international organizations they actively use social media; and have built long-term

partnerships with national and international Universities, international Bird watchers

groups and Bird conservation organizations to conduct research, which they use to

inform their biodiversity conservation initiatives. Despite the total lack of official support,

on 2008, this organization won the Equator Initiative Prize awarded by the United

Nations Development Program, which recognizes local organizations that advance local

sustainable development solutions for people, nature and resilient communities; and

just recently, his director was recognized as one of the 15 world conservation heroes in

the IUCN world conservation congress 2016.

Reserves of the Civil Society’s contribution to conservation

There is an ongoing discussion on the role of conservationist and conservation

organizations in a human dominated world, and several authors question whether or not

conservation organizations should focus their efforts on improvement of the living

conditions of local communities (Miller et al. 2011, Soule 2013, Marvier 2014, Miller et

al. 2014). Results from this study concur with the contrasting positions of the “new

conservation” stances, that focuses on people’s benefit from conservation (Kareiva

2014), advocate for considering human rights and self-determination (Springer et al.

2010), for incorporating the values that local people ascribe to nature (Kirby 2014); and

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that support the idea that the provision of basic human needs for small rural landholders

can be an effective complementary strategy to achieve long-term conservation

outcomes in any socio-ecological system (Morrison 2015).

The reserve owners included in this study are implementing diverse integrated

farm-landscape conservation strategies, which are key to prevent the negative impacts

of landscape homogenization on biodiversity (Perfecto et al. 2009, Perfecto et al. 2014,

Cottee-Jones et al. 2015, Ribeiro de Castro et al. 2015). Ecologist and conservationist

are increasingly recommending this practices to improve habitat connectivity,

maintaining functionally linked forests mosaics and to diminish pervasive negative

ecological impacts of edge effects (Harvey et al. 2008, Chazdon et al. 2009, Ribeiro et

al. 2009, Chazdon 2013, Chazdon 2014). This sample of 234 reserve owners

represents only a fraction of the thousands of rural landowners that are working to

protect forest and implement sustainable agricultural practices, restoring watersheds,

soils, ecosystems and populations of endangered species. This research is a first

attempt to assess the contributions of these reserves and the factors that foster or

hinder their ability to successfully carry out their conservation activities. However,

besides the outcomes at the reserve level, the positive conservation and social

outcomes of these initiatives at broader scales are still yet to be explored.

In times when the adequacy of current conservation strategies to protect

biodiversity are seriously questioned (Doak et al. 2015), there is a growing uneasiness

among renowned conservationists regarding the relationships of big conservation NGOs

with destructive corporations (Hance 2016a) and the fact that more and more

conservation strategies are shaped by their funding agendas (Hance 2016b). However,

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senior ecologists and conservationists, such as Andrew Mack, are also asking very

uncomfortable questions:

How much of the global conservation budget is invested in people? How

large is the slice of the pie going for training people in tropical rainforest
countries? Sadly, the answer to these questions shows why I think
conservation is failing. Anyone in the business knows how common it is
for conservation donors to stipulate ‘no salaries.’ The smaller
organizations getting results cannot get those big grants, and they often
do not have the staff to handle onerous reporting requirements when they
are eligible. They must rely on smaller sources of funds, many of which
explicitly stipulate “no salaries or overheads.” Most are for less than three
years. So the most effective people and organizations cannot support
themselves, or only barely manage through incessant fundraising. The
system is stacked against small and efficient national conservationists in
favor of large and inefficient international organizations. We undervalue
conservationists in the tropical nations. Interview with Andy Mack
(Kimbrough 2016)

Results from this research highlight the positive conservation outcomes that can

be achieved by these farmers and rural landowners and the grassroots organizations

that support them. They also highlight, however, the challenges many of them face in

their attempts to achieve their conservation goals while at the same time preserving

their livelihoods. It is necessary to design and implement policies to adequately support

these initiatives that greatly contribute to the long-term conservation of endangered

species and important ecosystems.

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 2.0

1.5
Conservation effectiveness score

1.0

0.5

0.0

-0.5

-1.0 Total reliance Parcial reliance No reliance

-1.5

-2.0
Figure 6-1. Conservation effectiveness scores for the three different categories of
income reliance. Box represents medians and interquartile ranges, whiskers
represents maximum and minimum values Total reliance Mdn=0.85 (n=112),
Partial reliance Mdn=0.76 (n=49), No reliance Mdn=0.75 (n=71).

Figure 6-2. Conservation effectiveness variables for the three different categories of
income reliance. Light blue line indicates no change in the conditions. Green
shade indicates improvement in the conditions, pink shade indicates decline
in the conditions.

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 2.0
Conservation effectiveness score

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0 Valle Tierrandina Resnatur

-1.5
-2.0

Figure 6-3. Conservation effectiveness scores for the three different Bridge
organizations. Box represents medians and interquartile ranges, whiskers
represents maximum and minimum values. Valle Mdn 0.65 (n=70),
Tierrandina Mdn= 0.95 (n=101), Resnatur Mdn=0.70 (n=61).

Figure 6-4. Conservation effectiveness variables according to bridge organizations

(BO). Light blue line indicates no change in the conditions. Green shade
indicates improvement in the conditions, pink shade indicates decline in the
conditions.

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 CHAPTER 7
PERSONAL NETWORKS: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SUPPORT IN VOLUNTARY
CONSERVATION INITIATIVES

The is a growing recognition of the importance of social networks in shaping

landowners’ decisions regarding the management of their land, and increasing evidence

reveals that management practices of civil society groups play a crucial but neglected

role in conservation and protection of ecosystem services.

This chapter aims to characterize the sources of social support received by

campesinos and rural landowners that actively participate in voluntary conservation

initiatives known as “Networks of Reserves of the Civil Society”. Through a comparative

analysis of the composition and structure of the personal networks of reserve owners

associated to three different bridge organizations, this research seeks to understand the

influence of social support in two conservation outcomes: proportion of property

allocated to conservation and conservation effectiveness. Two research questions guide

this research:

1. How do support networks form reserve owners associated to the three different
bridge organizations differ in terms of: a) Network composition (Including gender
homophily, type of relationships and institutional affiliation of their alters); and b)
Network structure (Components, isolates, density and measures of network
centrality)?

2. Which compositional and structural variables of the personal networks are

significant predictors of positive conservation outcomes measured as the
proportion of the property allocated to forest conservation and conservation
effectiveness?

Results

Characterizing Personal Networks by Size, Age and Gender

Significant differences were found on the size or number of alters reported with

affiliation to the three organizations (H=71.78, p<0.001). Tierrandina reserve owners

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reported the smaller number of alters (Mean = 5.55, SD=2.13), followed by Resnatur

(Mean 7.04, SD=4.77) and Valle (Mean= 11.62, SD=4.631). Tierrandina, values were

significantly lower than Valle (Q= 7.933, p<0.05) and Resnatur (Q=5.524, p<0.05). Age

of reserve owners was significantly different between the three organizations (H=6.21,

p<0.01). The average age for Tierrandina was 49.69 years (SD=18.26), for Valle was

43.53 years (SD= 20.60) and for Resnatur was 52.86 (SD = 11.92). These age

differences were only statistically significant between Valle and Resnatur (Q=2.18,

p<0.05).

From the total of 215 reserve owners interviewed, 55% (117) were males and

45% (94) were females. Even though differences in gender proportions were not high

when the whole sample was considered, significant gender differences were found

among the three bridge organizations (H = 30.699, p<0.001. Table 7-1, Figure 7-1).

Valle had a significantly larger percentage of men than Tierrandina and Resnatur

respectively (Q= 4.74, p<0.01 and Q=2.89, p<0.01 respectively. Table 7-1).

Personal Networks Composition

Significant differences were found on personal network compositional variables

(alter’s attributes) from the three bridge organizations. While no significant differences

were found for most of the variables between Valle and Resnatur, significant differences

were found between Resnatur and Tierrandina, and results were mixed when

comparing Tierrandina and Valle (Table 7-1).

Homophily by gender

Significant differences were found in the proportion of female and male alters

listed by reserve owners on the three different bridge organizations (F=14.11, p<0.001),

with a higher proportion of men than women in all cases (Figure 7-2). This indicates that

154
females account for a significantly lower proportion of the social support reported by

reserve owners on all three Bridge organizations (F=7.99, p <0.001). Interestingly in the

case of Tierrandina, although the trend was weak, both males and females reported

fewer women as sources of social support. (Table 7-1, Figure 7-2). In contrast, for Valle

and Resnatur male representation on men and women networks was around 20%

higher than for females (Table 7-1, Figure 7-3). A Two-way ANOVA was performed to

evaluate the effect of both Gender and Bridge organization as factors that influence the

proportion of alters of the same sex that were reported by the respondents. Both the

effect of the factors (Gender F= 20.97, p<0.01; Bridge Organization F=3.280, p<0.05)

and factors’ interactions were found statistically significant (F= 4.845, p<0.01).

Type of relationship

The most salient aspect of personal networks composition was the high

percentage of family members on personal networks of Tierrandina reserve owners

(Mean = 91%, SD=0.21). Friends were predominant in Resnatur (Mean=50%, SD=

0.28) and Valle personal networks (Mean = 40%, SD=0.23) (Figure 7-4a).

Place of residency

Most alters reported by Tierrandina reserve owners lived on the reserve (Mean =

58%, SD=0.32) or in the same village (Mean =37%, SD=0.31) with almost no

representation of alters residing in more distant places. In contrast, the percentage of

alters residing in the reserve was 10% for Valle (SD=0.11) and 11% for Resnatur

(SD=0.13). For Valle a higher percentage of alters were village residents (Mean = 36%,

SD= 0.25) and people from the same municipality (Mean = 37%, SD= 0.22).

Furthermore, reserve owners form Resnatur reported 20% (SD=0.24) of alters residing

155
in the same village, 27% (SD=0.25) residing in the same municipality but also reported

high percentage of alters (Mean = 25%, SD=0.26) residing out of state (Figure 7-4b).

Institutional affiliation

One of the most relevant results in terms of personal networks composition was

the predominance of alters with no affiliation with formal institutions for all three bridge

organizations. This type of alters accounted for an average of 98% (SD=0.09) of

Tierrandina alters, 58% (SD=0.26) of Valle alters and 63% (SD=0.31) of Resnatur

alters. Alters from local NGOs accounted for an average of 19% (SD=0.17) in Valle and

16% (SD=0.20) in Resnatur. While alters that provided financial support were almost

totally missing in Tierrandina, those accounted for an average of 14% (SD=0.19) of

Valle personal networks and 9% (SD=0.17) of Resnatur. These alters included formal

financial institutions and also community financial institutions (such as cooperatives with

revolving loans) and informal moneylenders (Figure 7-4c).

Personal Networks Structural Variables

A comparative analysis of the structural variables revealed that Tierrandina

networks on average had fewer alters, components, cliques, isolates and scored lower

on centrality measures when compared with Valle and Resnatur (Table 7-2, Figure 7-5).

As a result, this group also presented the highest density values in their personal

networks. All differences were statistically significant (Table 7-3). On average Valle

presented that highest number of alters (Mean = 11.62, SD=4.63), followed by Resnatur

(Mean=7.04, SD=4.77) and Tierrandina (Mean=5.5, SD=2.13). Resnatur presented the

highest number of components (Mean=3.66 SD=3.76) and Valle the highest number of

cliques (Mean= 4.14, SD=3.38).

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Central Actors in the Networks

A more detailed analysis was performed to have a better understanding of the

influence of personal network composition on the different measures of centrality. From

each bridge organization, a subset of the personal networks with alters that scored the

highest 20 values of degree centrality, closeness centrality and betweenness centrality

were chosen. For each centrality measure, the type of relationship between the alter

and the reserve owner was determined, and the frequency of alters on each category of

type of relationship was calculated. This analysis revealed interesting differences on the

reserve owner’s main sources of social support. In the case of Tierrandina, kids scored

higher more often on all the centrality measures, followed by parents and partners. In

other words, close kinship relationships are the main source of social support. In the

case of Valle reserves, the more frequent source of support came from the extended

family, and partners, kids continued to play and important role, while parents were much

less frequent. In contrast with Tierrandina, friends had a more predominant role in

reserve owners' personal networks. Finally, for Resnatur, the alters that obtained the

highest scores on centrality measures were partners, followed by friends (Figure 7-6).

Interactions Between Compositional and Structural Variables

Significant correlations were found between network density and the different

measures of network centrality. Network density was positively correlated with the

percentage of female (r=0.20, p=0.00), percentage of family members (p=0.45, p=0.00),

the percentage of alters with no institutional affiliation (p=0.38, p=0.00) and percentage

of alters living in the reserve (p=0.43, p=0.00). Significant negative correlations were

found between density and other measures of network composition such as percentage

of friends (p=-0.26, p=0.00), neighbors (p=-0.16, p=0.03) and acquaintances (r=-0.37,

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p=0.00) percentage of alters with different types of institutional affiliation (NGOs,

government institutions, environmental and extension agencies) and alters living further

away from the reserve (other municipalities, states or overseas). The opposite trends

were observed between Degree centrality and network composition (Appendix B).

Proportion of property allocated to conservation

Weak positive correlations were found between the proportion of property in

conservation; degree centrality (r=0.15, p=0.03), the percentage of alters reported as

friends (r=0.26, p=0.00), living out of state (r=0.22, p=0.00) and those representing an

NGO (r=0.16, p=0.02) or environmental authorities (r=0.22, p=0.00). A negative

correlation was found between proportion of property in conservation and the

percentage of alters that were reported as family (p=-0.22, p=0.00) without any

institutional affiliation (r=-0.18, p=0.01) or residing in the reserve (r=-0.18, p=0.01) or the

same village (r=-0.14, p=0.05) (Appendix B).

The variables that were found to be significant predictors of proportion of

property allocated to conservation were: Bridge organization, percentage of female

alters (positive coefficients) and percentage of alters associated with extension

agencies (negative coefficient). The model obtained was:

PC = 0.044 + 0.174 BO + 0.302 %Fem - 0.762 Ex.ag (7-1)

Conservation effectiveness

Positive correlations were found between conservation effectiveness and the

percentage of alters reported as family members (r=0.3, p=0.00), non-affiliated with any

institution (r=0.33, p=0.00) and residing in the reserve (r=0.32, p=0.00). Weak but

significant negative correlations were found between conservation effectiveness and

degree centrality (r=-0.29, p=0.00), betweenness centrality (r=-0.20, p=0.00),

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percentage of alters that were not relatives (friends r=-0.16, p=0.02; neighbors r=-0.16,

p=0.02; acquaintances r=-0.23, p=0.00), were reported as being associated with

institutions (NGOs r=-0.31, p=0.00; environmental agencies r=-0.14, p=0.04; extension

agencies r=-0.14, p=0.05; financial institutions r=-0.16, p=0.02) or lived in another

municipality (r=-0.24, p=0.00)(Appendix B).

For conservation effectiveness, the coefficients of the following variables were

significant and thus included in the regression model: percentage of alters with no

institutional affiliation, percentage of alters living in the reserve and percentage of alters

that were friends; all of them related with network composition. Neither the type of

bridge organization nor the structural variables of the personal networks were significant

predictors of conservation effectiveness. The model obtained was:

CE = 0.219 + 0.474 % No-Inst + 0.414%Living in reserve (7-2)

+0.304 % Friends

Discussion

In general, personal networks from Tierrandina reserve owners were significantly

different in terms of composition and structure from those of Valle and Resnatur. Age

and gender differences found between reserve owners (heads of household) reflecting

the different family structures, socioeconomic and cultural context of members of these

three bridge organizations. In the case of Valle, reserve owners were predominantly

coffee growers or cattle ranchers between 30 to 40 years old, and were predominantly

the sole or main source of labor on their reserves. In the case of Tierrandina most

reserves were small, and reserve owners were women with grownup kids or even

grandkids who worked on the reserve and relied on reserve income for subsistence.

Resnatur reserve owners were a more diverse group, they included subsistence

159
farmers, but mostly were professionals of different ages (from very young to retired)

who did not rely (or partially relied) on their reserve for subsistence. The following

section includes a comparative analysis of the personal networks of landowners from

the three bridge organizations.

Personal Network Composition

Homophily

One aspect of social interactions that can potentially influence conservation

outcomes is the principle of homophily, or the tendency for contact between similar

people to occur at higher rates that among dissimilar people (McPherson et al. 2001).

The analysis of gender homophily on the personal networks in my study revealed

significant differences not only on the gender composition of the respondents, but also

in the gender composition of the alters listed by them. Even though gender differences

were less strong in the case of Tierrandina, for the three bridge organizations both men

and women more frequently reported men as sources of support in their personal

networks (Figure 7-2). In other words, gender homophily mediates men’s interactions

with their sources of social support, while women tend to be gender heterophilous in

their social support interactions. These results support theories on social organization

that have found that despite the fact that general populations may be sex

heterogeneous, it is common for social groups to be highly sex segregated. Homophily

is usually found in the members of dominant group, while the minority sex tend to be

more heterophilous (McPherson et al. 2001). This pattern tends to be stronger when

ties of advice, friendship or emotional support are considered (Ibarra 1997), and it has

been long-established in different cultures and work settings that both men and women

tend to use men to connect and get information in different areas (Bernard et al. 1988).

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These patterns can have noticeable impacts on different aspects of social learning and

resource management, which will be discussed in further sections.

Type of relationship and place of residence

Tierrandina reserves have productive systems that are predominantly focused on

subsistence agriculture and household members carry out most farm and reserve

activities. Reserve owners from this bridge organization reported fewer alters as

sources of social support and those alters were mainly close family members or other

relatives that usually live on the reserve or in the same villages, and do not represent

any formal institution (Figure 7-4a). The fact that these family-dominated networks

presented higher density measures and were significantly different from those from

Valle and Resnatur supports previous studies that have found that family ties tend to

create different social structures than those formed by voluntary associations. Due to

the strong emotional intensity and intimacy bonds, amount of time shared, long term

support and slow decay, and high reciprocity; these ties tend to be stronger and

perceived as more valuable by the respondents (Krackhardt et al. 1992). In general, it is

common for family-dominated networks to be smaller and more dense than networks

with more diverse types of ties (Crowell 2004).

One special characteristic of Tierrandina reserves is that they are located in

municipalities that are relatively close (1 hour or less) to Pasto, the state capital. Public

K-12 education is available for children at these municipalities, and college and

technical education is available in the capital. This means that in most cases, children

do not have to migrate to the city to obtain education and usually continue to live at

home while carrying out their studies. Three generations of the family may live together

and share household responsibilities and participate in reserve activities. Children may

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continue to live with their parents even marriage and bearing children, and take active

part in the economic activities of the household and the management decisions that

affect the reserve. Younger generations are an important source of advice as they

usually seek to apply the new knowledge they have gained in college or technical

school (i.e. agricultural-related, business management, marketing) in ways that can

improve their family farm or the performance of the bridge organization. This was

particularly evident in the case of Tierrandina, where the core staff was integrated by a

team of young adults who are children of reserve owners, in their twenties and recently

graduated from college or technical school. Grandchildren also actively participate on

farming and small husbandry activities, and are an important source of emotional and

logistical support for their parents and grandparents. This type of intergenerational ties

of exchange of resources and affection create age heterophilous personal networks,

which are common in situations where younger generations follow educational and

occupational opportunities, and create ties of very different educational and

socioeconomic levels (McPherson et al. 2001). In contrast to Tierrandina, social support

for Valle reserve owners, came mainly from alters that did not live in the reserve, but

were part of their extended family that oftentimes lived in cities, other states, or even

overseas (Figure 3-4 a,b). These alters may act as brokers and sources of information

and other resources, providing weak ties to these otherwise very closed and strong tied

networks, and which can be an important source of social capital (Granovetter 1973). In

the case of Valle and Resnatur reserves, friends and acquaintances with or without

institutional affiliation are also very important sources of social support (Figure 7-4a).

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Institutional affiliation

Tierrandina as an example of effective collaboration between formal

institutions and local communities. One salient observation during reserve visits,

meetings and workshops was the friendly, positive and in some cases very warm

interaction between reserve owners and NGO staff. In the case of the local bridge

organizations (Tierrandina and Valle) this can be explained by the fact that team

members of those NGOs are locals or live in nearby towns and cities. They have a

firsthand understanding of the diverse social and economic challenges faced by the

communities, and for more than a decade have been working together on a regular

basis not only to create strategies for livelihood improvement, but to address other local

social and environmental issues.

In the particular case of Tierrandina, effective participation of communities in the

design and implementation of conservation strategies has been always a priority for

Galeras National Park and NGO staff, and they usually go above and beyond

institutional and logistical constraints to uphold those principles. Nevertheless, this

positive long term institutional partnership has only been possible due to a consistent

interaction that goes beyond the duration of specific projects. It is sustained by the long-

standing personal commitment of team members from both institutions. Since the early

stages of their interaction, National Park authorities and community leaders have

capitalized on formal mechanisms for local governance such as JACs, JAVs, and

diverse committees1; and traditional forms of social organization such as “mingas” and

1
Juntas de Accion communal and Juntas de acueductos and comites de salud among others (Arévalo et
al. 2001)

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“convites”2, which are forms of collective action that incorporate ancestral notions of

cultural identity, community and solidarity economy (Rodríguez and Sosa 2009). The

main strategy for working with these local communities has been focused on creating

partnerships and working together rather than proposing -or imposing- external

solutions or interventions through approaches that follow the basic principles of

Participatory Action Research (Fals Borda 1971).

Considering this context, I expected that Tierrandina and National Park staff to

be often mentioned in the reserve owners’ personal networks as sources of social

support and information; however, surprisingly this was not the case. Besides the

aforementioned institutional commitment to promote effective participation; reserve

owners associated to this organization have a long tradition of collaboration, community

work and cooperation. For years they have created and sustained cooperatives of

producers, diverse farmers associations and revolving funds, all with the objective of

improving not only individual’s livelihoods, but also the overall well-being of the

community (Uribe et al. 1989). Consistent support received through these diverse forms

of traditional community organization may be the reason why, contrary to Valle and

Resnatur, Tierrandina reserve owners did not report government, environmental or even

financial institutions or informal moneylenders in their personal networks.

While sharing bus and jeep rides, listening to conversations and witnessing

interactions between Tierrandina members, it became evident to me that they perceive

improvements in livelihood conditions, community well-being and conservation issues

2
The terms "minga" and "convite" refer to cooperative forms of work common in Andean countries that
involve diverse forms of collective and reciprocal labor. It can relate to family or household labor in family
farms and local communities to larger process of socio-economic change (Guillet 1980).

164
as community and organizational issues not individual issues. In their conversations,

topics such as elderly care, education, watershed conservation, solid waste

management, soil degradation, state welfare, crop prices and local political issues were

all intertwined. They perceive themselves as active members of their community and

bridge organization, with the power to speak up, influence decisions and take action.

For many, these types of interactions may be so ingrained that they do not perceive

Tierrandina -or other community organizations and cooperatives they are affiliated to-

as a source of support because they are Tierrandina. Interactions with other institutions

such as Galeras National Park or regional or local environmental authorities and

extension agencies are just part of the day to day business of the organization.

Challenges for collaboration between grassroots organizations and formal

institutions. On the other hand, in the case of Valle and Resnatur, board members,

fellow members and staff of the bridge organizations were frequently mentioned on their

personal networks. Particularly for Valle, almost 20% of alters were reported as

associated to local NGOs Acerg, Ecofuturo and Corpoversalles. These three NGOs

from are highly dependent on diverse sources of external funding to cover their

administrative expenses and to pay their staff; and have not been able to capitalize as

much as Tierrandina on previous forms of traditional and cooperative and community

organization. For some of them, their staff is not comprised by fellow members but by

local professionals who do not own a farm or a reserve. While they are constantly

looking for funding opportunities that will benefit the members and the NGO in general,

these funds also provide the resources to pay their own salaries. As a consequence,

165
members see them as doing the job they are being paid for and expect them to deliver

results and provide diverse means to support the reserves.

Despite the efforts of NGO staff to create spaces to build institutional capacity

and to facilitate active engagement by members in the design and implementation of

those community initiatives; economic support is scarce and is usually tied to the

objectives and institutional culture of official environmental agencies that provide the

resources. As a result, the capacity of the NGOs to provide support and effective means

of participation to their members is shaped by the strong power imbalances embedded

in those interactions. Those agencies typically have very specific and rigid requirements

and guidelines in terms of project format, themes, budget allocation, allowed expenses,

implementation and evaluation strategies. Member’s initiatives end up being

constrained by those requirements and often times more urgent and pressing needs

have to be left aside to comply with those institutional demands. One issue that was

often brought up by reserve owners and NGO staff from Valle was the requirement of

formal professional qualifications; which prevented locals with extensive experience and

empirical knowledge from leading workshops and trainings. In some cases, these

institutions even required that their projects include specific positions, coercing or

imposing the names of professionals to be appointed, regardless of their lack of

practical experience or lack of familiarity with the local contexts. Needless to say that

high levels of apathy, disengagement and mistrust can characterize community

involvement on any further activities carried out by these professionals.

This practice of using government budgets -that should be allocated to

community development and conservation projects- as a way to pay political favors,

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adds to the poor perception of formal institutions by many communities. It is just one of

the many examples of how corruption shapes the pervasive lack of trust by the general

population of official institutions and their relationship with NGOs. Despite their good

ideas and capacity many local leaders then chose to not to get involved in

administrative tasks of the bridge organizations, and sometimes it is hard to find

members that will volunteer for positions on the board.

Interviews revealed that most of the reserve owners from these three

organizations, rather than referring to the organization or organization staff as a source

of support; when they reported an alter as representing the bridge organization it was

almost a norm that the type of relationship was reported as friendship (instead of

neighbors or acquaintances) and they were also reported as residing in the same village

or same municipality. These observations suggest that for them, in these small

community NGOs from Valle, the sense of belonging and ownership and the institutional

trust observed in Tierrandina (and as we will see also in Serraniagua), is replaced by

friendship trusts and perceived support from specific individuals holding administrative

positions in the bridge organization. the interactions are shaped by trusts in individuals

rather than trust or commitment to the organization. Even though no indicators of trust

were quantified, these observations allow to infer that friendship, and frequent and close

interactions with their alters (neighbor relationship), are important factors that mediate

reserve owners’ interactions with these grassroots institutions.

The possibility of cooptation of farmer’s participation and collective organization

initiatives is an issue well known by members of the bridge organizations in Valle (and

many other regions in Colombia); however, situations as the one previously described

167
are the result of the historical, social and economic distress experienced in the region

through the past decades. During informal conversations and a regional symposium

organized by Corpoversalles, members of the community made detailed accounts of the

long-term tradition of collective action and collaboration in their community. They

recalled times when grassroots organizations of producers were thriving and people

actively participated in mingas, meetings, and all sorts of community associations and

groups to the point that during the 1980s the town was touted as a successful case

study of community development by international scholars (Hirshman 1984). During the

early 1990s, it received national recognitions for the positive impact of community

organizations on improving overall conditions of the population (Lundy 1995, Arévalo et

al. 2001). Nevertheless, during the late 90s and early 2000s this region suffered

firsthand the terrors of the armed conflict, forced displacement by paramilitary groups

and a drastic drop and instability of coffee prices. These social and economic shocks

caused precipitous drops in population, deep economic stagnation, and the almost total

disappearance of entire villages. These events took a very negative toll on those once

prosperous grassroots organizations. At the time and as a strategy to keep

Corpoversalles alive, members voted to modify the statutes to allow for participation and

representation of the local government on the board, which would in turn, ensure a

steady annual budget to cover administrative staff and basic expenses. This strategy

however was soon regretted, and the next local administrations started to use these

managerial positions as a means to pay political favors. After much struggle

Corpoversalles was able to partially recover control of the administrative positions;

however, the grassroots spirit of these initiatives was lost, and the general perception of

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institutional trust has not recovered so far. These examples show how despite good

intentions and integrity, due to the lack of transparency and power imbalances

embedded in the institutional interactions between bridge organizations and

government, NGO staff often find themselves caught up in project bureaucracy and

hard ethical decisions. Sometimes they have to choose between complying with the

demands of that institutional culture or not getting much needed resources. The

following section presents an example in which they chose the second option.

When autonomy and transparency are more important than economic

support. In contrast, reserve owners from Serraniagua (a fourth local network from

Valle) only occasionally mentioned NGO staff and project leaders as part of their social

support networks. Such as was observed in Tierrandina, Serraniagua members have a

long tradition of collective organization and community work. Even during difficult

financial times, they sustained the organization with member’s regular contributions by

members (annual fees or percentages of their profits) and in-kind volunteer work. They

have created their own biodiversity-friendly self-certified coffee label, and opened a

coffee shop and a store where they sell diverse member-made products. Through these

diverse activities they bought their own building that houses a new coffee processing

facility that complies with high quality standards. It also houses a coffee shop and

community store, their administrative office and rooms to host community meetings and

cultural gatherings. Through these strategies they avoid middlemen and receive fairer

prices for their products while continuing to allocate a portion of their profits to

economically support the organization and secure seed capital to provide credit to

member’s productive enterprises through revolving loans. Members of this organization

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have witnessed how autonomous initiatives for self-organization from neighboring

villages can easily suffer from corruption or be coopted by political interests of the local

government or environmental institutions. As a strategy to maintain their independence

and upkeep the credibility and trust they have earned over the years among their

members and the rest of the community, they have very purposefully avoided

requesting support and even rejected funding offers from government institutions

These findings posit important questions on the potential for success of external

institutions, interventions and programs in communities where traditional forms of social

organization based on solidarity, reciprocity and trust used to be the norm, but have

been undermined by violent armed conflict or deteriorating socioeconomic conditions or

spoiled by corruption and mistrust in formal and informal institutions. In many regions of

the country, these factors go hand in hand with the often-negative effects of national

agricultural development policies. The pervasive lack of government support and

economic opportunities provide a fertile ground for illegal armed groups. Under these

circumstances, which lessons could be learned and which strategies could be used to

recover the social structures necessary to support resilient rural communities and

guarantee the long-term sustainability of those valuable and bio diverse ecosystems?

Some examples of how several communities are addressing those issues are

considered in Chapter 9.

Personal Network Structure

In general, structural characteristics of personal networks from Tierrandina

reserve owners were significantly different from those of Valle and Resnatur. These

networks were characterized by having on average one main component, very few

isolates and comprised mainly by family members. They also presented high density

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(48%), and very low centrality measures (degree, betweenness and closeness of less

than 10%), all of which are indicators of high network cohesion (Table 7-2, 7-3, Figure

7-5). These results indicate that alters from these personal networks are equally

connected, and the support in terms of resources and information the reserve owners

receive from them tended to be direct and not mediated or controlled by other alters.

Given the cohesiveness of these personal networks, ego and alters may share the

same knowledge and information, have access to similar types of resources. This type

of social structure may favor close interpersonal relationships, trust, and reciprocity in

the different types of exchange, but does not provide much access to new knowledge or

information.

No significant differences were found in the structural measures of personal

networks of reserve owners from Valle and Resnatur. These networks were less dense

(low network density and cohesion) than those from Tierrandina and presented more

alters with higher centrality values when compared to the rest of the members of the

organization. These alters with higher centrality may be key intermediaries or brokers

and may provide the ego with types of information and support that are not readily

available through other sources of support or interactions.

A more detailed analysis of the alters with higher centrality measures for the

three bridge organizations (Figure 7-6), revealed that such as would be expected, in

Tierrandina, the alters with the highest measures of centrality were egos’ partners and

children. In the case of Valle those were mostly members of the extended family, kids

and friends. Finally, for Resnatur the most central alters in the personal networks were

partners and friends. These results also emphasize the significant relationships

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between compositional and structural variables found in the correlation analysis

(Appendix B).

Personal Networks and Conservation Outcomes

Proportion of property allocated to conservation

The positive correlations between proportion of property in conservation and the

percentage of alters reported as friends (r=0.26, p=0.00) highlight the importance of

reserve owners’ diverse social interactions in conservation outcomes. Friends are

generally perceived as trustworthy sources of information and advice. Social support

provided through friendship is a direct result of solidarity and reciprocity, is based in

shared values and worldviews and goes beyond social status barriers, cultural traditions

and kinship citations on friendship and shared values as key characteristics of

grassroots initiatives.

Another interesting result was the positive correlation between proportion of

property allocated to conservation and the percentage of alters representing NGOs (r=

0.16, p=0.02). For years local NGOs have been promoting the implementation of

landscape conservation strategies such as reforestation of watersheds, protection of

forest patches and water springs, live fences, the creation of biological corridors; as well

as biodiversity friendly and sustainable agricultural practices such as agroforestry and

silvopastoral systems, planting of forage banks (legume trees and shrubs as sources of

protein for cattle and pigs), all strategies that directly contribute to increase forest and

sustainable management areas in the reserves. For the communities on my study areas

– such as for many rural areas in Colombia-, local NGOs and community organizations

play an important role in supporting agricultural activities. They execute functions that

would typically be the responsibility of extension agencies replacing diverse government

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institutions as providers of basic information, services and support in Colombia (Arévalo

et al. 2001) and other countries in Latin America (Bebbington and Thiele 1993,

Bebbington 1996, Dongier et al. 2003). Further descriptions of the role of bridge

organizations and local NGOs will be further discussed in Chapter 8.

On the other hand, the positive correlations with the percentage of alters living

out of state (r=0.27, p=0.00) and representing environmental authorities (r=0.22,

p=0.00) may be an indication of better socioeconomic conditions of non-reliant reserve

owners (Chapter 5) which is reflected on their ability to travel or maintain

communication with individuals and environmental institutions distant from the reserve

or in the capital city capital. Smaller reserves and totally reliant reserve owners have

more limited transportation options, limited money to pay for bus tickets and expensive

cellphone charges or live in villages where no cellphone or Internet signal is available.

All these factors prevent these reserve owners from expanding their social interactions

beyond the village, and it makes them more reliant on bridge organizations, other NGOs

or government welfare as sources of support3.

Significant negative correlations indicate that reserve owners who reported alters

as sources of support who were members of their family (r=-0.22, p=0.00), lived in the

reserve (r=-0.18, p=0.01), in the same village (p=-0.14, p=0.05); or had no institutional

affiliation (r=-0.18, p=0.01) were also the ones that allocated smaller portions of their

property to conservation. Given that the proportion of property allocated to conservation

is the inverse of the proportion allocated to production; this negative trend, rather than

3
While these programs may be common in some villages, questions regarding benefits received from
government welfare programs such as “Familias en Accion” and “Sisben” were not included in the
interviews

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suggesting that personal networks with these characteristics are correlated with lower

proportions of forest in the property, highlights the importance of household members

and neighbors as sources of support for the productive activities in the reserve.

Considering the fact that those results reflect proportions rather than total area and the

significant correlations between bridge organization and level of reliance on the reserve

for subsistence (Chapter 5) it can be inferred that these results are mostly the result of

the high proportion of small family farms in Tierrandina.

Bridge organization was found to be a very important predictor variable for

proportion of property allocated to conservation. However, network structural variables

were not significant predictors in the model; instead, two network compositional

variables had significant coefficients: percentage of female alters (positive) and

percentage of alters associated with extension agencies (negative). Again, these

findings suggest that women’s labor in subsistence agriculture and the implementation

of agro ecological practices can have positive impacts on the proportion of property

allocated to conservation. Through the implementation of agroforestry and agro

ecological practices, owners of small reserves were able to increase forest cover, while

relying less on the support of extension agencies which are usually focused on

technological solutions that rely on the use of GMO seeds and external chemical

fertilizers and pesticides. Instead of other women, household members and neighbors

become important sources of advice and support.

Conservation effectiveness

Reserve owners whose personal networks had high centrality measures, high

proportions of alters that were not relatives, or were associated with institutions reported

lower conservation effectiveness scores. Instead, higher conservation effectiveness

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scores were associated with lower values of degree and betweenness centrality, higher

proportions of alters reported as family members residing in the reserve and non-

affiliated with any institution. In general low centrality values were associated with

personal networks in which access to information and control is evenly distributed

among all alters. In other words, power and influence were not concentrated within a

few alters that were better connected to other ones. Conservation effectiveness scores

reflect reserve owner’s perceptions of their own performance in several conservation

management variables and their perception of the external social, economic and politic

factors that affect the reserve. In this sense, it is reasonable to think that a higher

percentage of alters that were family and resided in the reserve provide not only readily

available sources of support reflected on ego’s own positive perception of their ability to

implement conservation and sustainable management practices, but an increased

sense of efficacy and collective achievements. As in the case of proportion of property

allocated to conservation, personal networks structural variables were not significant

predictors of conservation effectiveness in the regression model. Percentage of alters

reported as friends with no institutional affiliation, and residing in the reserve were found

to be significant predictors of conservation effectiveness. In sum active involvement of

family members and neighbors that share a common knowledge of conservation

practices and provide support to reserve owners were key factors that influence positive

conservation outcomes.

Other Sources of Support and Limitations of the Personal Networks Methodology

This chapter focused on individuals that were reported as a source of social

support by reserve owners, which in most of the cases coincided with the head of

household or the person making the management decisions in the reserve, attending

175
formal meetings and interacting more regularly with the bridge organization and other

formal institutions. However, other informal sources of support and information that

were rarely mentioned in the interviews were evident during fieldwork: jeep drivers

(jeeps are the only method of public transportation in many villages), clerks from the

transportation companies, pharmacists, nurses or even coffee shop managers and

attendants from nearby towns. Even though they may not provide advice or information

regarding specific reserve issues, they act as hubs of information and have the power to

shape public opinions and decisions to participate in certain community initiatives. For

some reserve owners they constitute the few contacts outside the town, though they

may not live in the village or directly support reserve owners, they are important actors

in the social life of many small communities.

It is also important to stress that while most reserve owners mentioned other

members of the household as sources of support, the social interactions of these other

household members may also impact on reserve conservation outcomes; however,

these were not properly captured by the personal networks interview. Through my

observations during field visits, meetings, workshops, everyday life and other events in

the villages, it became clear that there were many instances in which other members of

the family were actively receiving information, resources, support or advice that would

influence reserve activities. Even though head of household perceptions of support may

cover some of the interactions of other household members, if the social interactions of

household members were to be considered, the relative importance of alters that are

neighbors, friends and are not affiliated with any institution might have been higher than

that reflected by the results.

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 During the many interviews, it was clear that children and elders actively

participate in decision-making and actively exchange information, favors and resources

with other members of the community. In rural areas school kids are important brokers

as they travel several miles from the reserve to the school every day. There they meet

with children of other reserve owners and members of the community, and act as

messengers of important information that can range from news from other villages and

reserves, diverse farm issues (crops and animals), requests for help and advice,

perform market transactions, exchange seeds; or disseminate diverse opportunities

such as upcoming meetings or projects, visits from extension agents or veterinaries,

market opportunities or rides to the city. In places with poor or no access to mobile

phone signal, or for families who cannot afford the mobile charges, children play an

important and understudied social role. One recommendation for this type of studies, in

which other actors important to ego may also influence management outcomes; would

be to adapt the methodology in such a way that their social interactions can be included.

Dense social networks, in which social support comes from neighbors and family,

are usually considered as a sign of cultural and social capital. That was the case for

Tierrandina and San Isidro, one small village in Valle; where interactions are tightly

woven around kinship, friendship and proximity, providing a higher sense of trust,

solidarity and community. Several examples from small villages in Latin America, have

shown that these types of ties are common in communities that use diverse traditional

forms of social organization, and in many cases personal network ties translate not only

to specific positive outcomes at the individual level but also produce resilient

177
communities that show better abilities to adapt to social, economic and environmental

shocks.

Juggling the day-to-day activities associated with taking care of a forest and

providing a sustainable livelihood for the family represents a big challenge for these

reserve owners. To sustain their long term commitment to conservation, reserve owners

need diverse sources of social support that are dependable and consistent over time.

Unfortunately, most studies tend to focus on formal types of institutional support such as

participation in meetings and workshops or informal information exchange, while other

important aspects of support (such as emotional, social and nonmonetary economic

support) remain highly understudied. Understanding the complexity of the social

dynamics behind the informal interactions that are the basis for these social networks of

support represents a challenge for the study of grassroots participation and collective

action for conservation. It is due to the diverse nature of these social interactions that

reserve owners constantly create, innovate and adapt to often times difficult

environmental, social and economic contexts. They also adapt to their own changing

household cycles and negotiate and balance diverse life goals and needs of the

different household members. Social life is complex, and a more holistic consideration

of those factors is important to improve current conservation strategies and to create

new ones that go beyond traditional institutional and rational economic approaches. The

importance and richness of these social interactions as sources of support for reserve

owners in their conservation activities is exemplified by this answer from one of the

reserve owners when asked why he decided to join the bridge organization, other

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examples of the different motivations of reserve owners to join the bridge organizations

and to work towards their conservation goals are included in Appendix D.

I joined because of the meetings. It has been 18 years and I haven’t miss
one. I like to learn. I like sharing the experiences with other people, we
exchange products and seeds, we cook, and sing, some people share
their poems. They bring us to visit other’s reserves so we can learn from
what our fellow members are doing. We receive support to improve the
reserve. They give us trees to plant. Vicente, 58 years old, farmer from
Valle. He protects 1.2 ha in his 7 h reserve

In general studies of personal networks and natural resource management seek

to assess the effect of the exchange of information and resources on management

outcomes and the potential role of information and institutions to influence those

outcomes. Given the voluntary nature of the initiatives studied in this dissertation, the

almost total absence of institutional actors in the personal networks of reserve owners

involved in these grassroots conservation strategies is not a surprise. It questions the

dominance of conservation and natural resource management policies designed under

principles of institutional analysis and rational economics that may be useful in other

contexts; but that are extremely costly and inefficient in low governance contexts. How

useful and effective are these strategies in Colombia and other Latin American

countries? How effective is to continue with the pervasive application of these strategies

in remote places where forced displacement, dispossession and deep inequalities

promoted by devastating national development policies and low governability are the

norm? What type of interventions could be designed that capitalize and support diverse

forms of social traditional organization that are rooted on local realities and are

ecologically, socially and culturally appropriate? Many of these initiatives are already in

place and provide clear examples of informal social structures that respect individual’s

autonomy while at the same time promote community well-being and integrate

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landscape and ecosystem conservation strategies which are also mindful of basic

human needs.

Given the current challenges posed by the negotiations of peace agreements in

Colombia and the calls for peace building and reconstruction of beaten rural

communities, it is more urgent than ever to increase efforts on understanding the local

realities from the ground up, and to analyze the factors that foster trust, empathy and

solidarity; social conditions that are basic to creating the mesh works that sustain both

resilient communities and ecosystems.

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Table 7-1. Comparative analysis of ego and alter compositional attributes between the
three Bridge Organizations. Second column presents Anova test results (F) or
Kruskall-Wallis (H). Columns 3-5 present results of pairwise Multiple
Comparison of Holm-Sidak (t) test and Dunn's Method (Q). Tierrrandina n=99,
Valle n=62 and Resnatur n=51.
Variable H Tierrandina – Tierrandina Valle vs
vs Valle vs Resnatur Resnatur
Ego attributes
Gender H = 30.699 *** 4.745 ** 1.256 ns 2.897 **
Age H = 6.213 •• 2.164 ns 0.037 ns 2.184 *
No.alters H = 71.780 *** 7.933 ** 5.524 ** 1.717 ns
% Females F = 7.995 *** 3.916 *** 2.161 ns 1.364 ns
Homophilia F = 14.110 *** 5.285 *** 1.399 ns 3.226 **

Alters attributes
-Type of relationship
% Partner H = 21.501 *** 3.655 ** 3.604 ** 0.175 ns
% kids H= 56.600 *** 5.626 ** 6.304 ** 0.961 ns
% parents H = 8.430 ** 2.013 ns 1.434 ns 0.308 ns
% extended family H= 24.938 *** 3.193 ** 4.616 ** 1.492 ns
% total family H = 129.721*** 8.991 ** 9.411 ** 0.929 ns
% friends H = 94.784 *** 7.320 ** 8.058 ** 1.118 ns
% neighbors H = 26.032 *** 3.170 ** 2.013 ns 0.863 ns
% acquaintances H = 84.911 *** 6.874 ** 6.075 ** 0.312 ns

-Institutional
affiliation
% Non-inst H = 111.138 *** 8.855 ** 6.978 ** 1.176 ns
% NGO H = 80.651 *** 7.466 ** 5.207 ** 1.609 ns
% Gov H = 14.422 *** 0.513 no test 1.398 ns 0.839 no
test
% Env agency H = 43.672 *** 0.569 ns 3.498 ** 2.708 **
% Extension agency H = 65.286 *** 4.931 ** 0.462 ns 3.764 **
% Edu.& research H = 31.764 *** 1.333 ns 3.038 ** 1.637 **
% others H = 54.958 *** 5.540 ** 2.796 ** 2.169 ns

-Place of residence
% Reserve H = 100.405 *** 8.562 ** 7.788 ** 0.186 ns
% same village H = 13.709 *** 0.353 ns 3.284 ** 3.299 **
% same municipality H = 113.921 *** 9.455 ** 6.470 ** 2.151 ns
% another municip. H = 58.197 *** 5.338 ** 5.095 ** 0.102 ns
% other state H = 72.774*** 1.783 ns 6.095 ** 4.044 **
% overseas H = 43.633 ** 0.891 ns 3.550 ** 2.480 **
* p = 0.05; ** p = 0.01; *** p = 0.001; ns = not significant

181
Table 7-2. Descriptive statistics for structural variables of personal networks.
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur
N = 99 N= 62 N=51

Mean SD Min / Max Mean SD Min / Max Mean SD Min / Max

Number of alters 5.55 2.13 2 / 15 11.62 4.63 2 /26 7.04 4.77 2 /40
Number of 1.00 0.22 0/ 1 1.03 0.40 0/2 3.66 3.76 0 /4
components
Number of cliques 1.18 0.78 0/6 4.14 3.38 0/8 1.18 0.75 0/ 12
Number of isolates 0.04 0.24 0 /2 1.37 1.86 0 / 14 1.50 1.90 0/8
Network density 0.48 0.18 0.14 / 1.0 0.27 0.33 0.08 / 0.5 0.32 0.26 0.05 / 1
Degree_NC 6.09 14.30 0 / 66.66 34.24 15.63 0 / 83.33 34.63 20.27 0 / 70.00
Betweenness_NC 3.95 11.95 0 / 66.66 20.94 17.76 0 / 83.33 21.16 22.63 0 / 74.44
Closeness_NC 9.15 22.91 -1 / 102.85 13.89 28.77 -1 / 152.38 16.22 31.74 -1 / 97.38

NC = normalized centrality

182
Table 7-3. Comparative analysis of structural measures of personal networks of reserve
owners from the three Bridge Organizations. Second column presents Anova
test results (F) or Kruskall-Wallis (H). Columns 3-5 present results of pairwise
Multiple Comparison of Holm-Sidak (t) test and Dunn's Method (Q).
Tierrandina n=99, Valle n=62 and Resnatur n=51.
Variable H Tierrandina - Tierrandina Valle -
Valle - Resnatur Resnatur

One way ANOVA

Number of alters H = 71.780 *** 7.933 ** 5.524 ** 1.717 ns
Isolates H = 77.441 *** 6.188 ** 6.028 ** 0.229 ns
Components H = 6.131 ** 0.820 no test 1.412 ns 0.598 no test
N-cliques H = 46.216 *** 5.979 ** 4.314 ** 1.156 ns
Density H = 78.918 *** 8,493 ** 5.363 ** 2.333 ns
Degree_NC H = 99.194 *** 8.163 ** 7.773 ** 0.107 ns
Between_NC H = 80.456 *** 7.625 ** 6.427 ** 0.662 ns
Closeness_NC H = 34.858 *** 4.187 ** 4.396 ** 0.071 ns

Two-way ANOVA
Degree_NC
Gender F= 1.374 ns
Bridge Organization F= 62.65 *** 4.310 *** 5.711 *** 0.629 ns
Gender x Bridge O F=0.525 ns

Between_NC
Gender F= 0.506 ns
Bridge Organization F= 10.891*** 8.251 *** 9.743 *** 0.265 ns
Gender x Bridge O F= 0.538 ns

Closeness_NC
Gender F= 0.700 ns
Bridge Organization F= 0.900 ns
Gender x Bridge O F= 0.063 ns

Density
Gender F= 0.245 ns
Bridge Organization F= 32.783 ns 7.664 *** 4.841 *** 3.056 **
Gender x Bridge O F= 2.630 ns

* p = 0.05; ** p = 0.01; *** p = 0.001; ns = not significant

183
Table 7-4. Regression coefficients for personal networks compositional and structural
variables and conservation outcomes
Unstandarized Standarized coefficients
coefficients
Conservation Outcomes B STd. Error Beta t pvalue

Proportion property in conservation (PC)

- Constant 0.44 0.069 0.645 0.520
- Bridge organization 0.174 0.024 0.465 7.174 0.000
- % Female alters 0.302 0.099 0.203 3.046 0.003
- % Extension agents -0.762 0.379 -0.132 -2.013 0.046

Conservation effectiveness (CE)

- Constant 0.219 0.116 1.884 0.061
- % No-institutional affiliation 0.474 0.121 0.308 3.906 0.000
- % Living in reserve 0.414 0.109 0.317 3.080 0.000
- % friends 0.304 0.124 0.207 2.447 0.015

184
 100%

80%

60%
Female
Male
40%

20%

0%
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur
Figure 7-1. Gender composition of reserve owners (egos) interviewed by each Bridge
Organization. Tierrandina n=99, Valle n=62, Resnatur n=51.

185
 100%

80%

60%
Female alters

40% Male alters

20%

0%
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur

Figure 7-2. Gender composition of alters. Average percentage of male and female alters
reported during personal networks interviews. Tierrandina n=99, Valle n=62,
Resnatur n=51.

100%

80%

60%
Homophily F
40% Homophiy M

20%

0%
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur

Figure 7-3. Average homophily for men and women in each of the three bridge
organizations. Percentage of male alters in men personal networks and
percentage of female alters in female’s personal networks. Tierrandina:
females n=58, males n=41. Valle: Females n=11, males n=51, Resnatur:
females n=24, males n=26)

186
 100%

80% a)
60%
TIERRANDINA
40%
VALLE
20%
RESNATUR
0%

100%
80%
b)

60%
40% TIERRANDINA
VALLE
20%
RESNATUR
0%

100%
80% c)
60%
40% TIERRANDINA
20% VALLE
0% RESNATUR

Figure 7-4. Comparative analysis of personal networks composition for reserve owners
of three bridge organizations according to: A) Type of relationship, B) Place of
residence and C) Institutional affiliation. Tierrandina n=99, Valle n=62,
Resnatur n=52.

187
 100

80

60
Tierrandina
40 Valle
Resnatur
20

0
Degree_NC Close_NC Density
Between_NC

Figure 7-5. Comparative analysis of normalized centrality measures of personal

networks of reserve owners from the three bridge organizations. Tierrandina
n= 94, Valle n= 60, Resnatur n= 49.

188
 10 a)

8 Partner
Parents
6
Kids
4 Family

2 Friends
Acquitances
0
Degree Close Between

10 b)
8 Partner
Parents
6
Kids
4 Family

2 Friends
Acquitances
0
Degree Close Between

10 c)

8 Partner
Parents
6
Kids
4 Family
Friends
2
Acquitances

0
Degree Close Between
Figure 7-6. Frequency of different types of alters with the 20 highest centrality measures
in the ego-networks for the three bridge organizations A) Tierrandina, B)
Valle, C) Resnatur.

189
 CHAPTER 8
WHOLE NETWORKS. SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF
GRASSROOTS CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS

Grassroots associations and organizations are defined as locally-based,

volunteer-run, nonprofit, common interest groups (Smith 1997). These organizations are

widely recognized for their central role in development (Carroll 1992, Bebbington et al.

2008) and their contributions to address sustainability and environmental issues (Ghai

and Vivian 2014). Examples are diverse, ranging from environmental education (Blum

2009), social learning for sustainable natural resource management (Berkes 2009),

productive conservation (Hall 1997), agroforestry systems and tree domestication

(Degrande et al. 2006), water governance (Kustudia 1998, Hoogesteger 2012),

reforestation (Postel and Heise 1988, Becker 2003, Nagendra 2007, Horwich et al.

2011) to research and activism in environmental conflicts (Antunes et al. 2013).

Colombian networks of Reserves of the Civil Society can be seen as grassroots

initiatives that have successfully bridged the gap and contradictions between national

conservation and development policies and resource management implementation at

the local level. They actively contribute to the integrated management of landscapes

and to the conservation of biodiversity and critically important ecosystems in Colombia.

Resnatur was the first bridge organization of Reserves of the Civil Society in Colombia,

and today, more than 20 bridge organizations (including Tierrandina and the three ones

from Valle included in this study) have incorporated several of Resnatur principles and

adapted them in to their own socio-ecological contexts. Respect for life in all its forms,

as well as respect for the difference, pluralism, tolerance, solidarity, reciprocity,

autonomy, democracy, gender and intergenerational equity are the core principles listed

190
on Resnatur constitution1; and since its establishment all of them have been considered

key for weaving and expanding strong “Social Meshworks” (Tejido social)2 . These

values are considered the basis to advance Civil society conservation strategies, and to

support of alternative livelihoods and models of development.

Research that focuses on organizational governance should consider institutional

diversity and plurality (Mair et al. 2015). Voluntary and non-profit organizations different

“ethos” and other important characteristics that distinguish them from private and

government institutions and should not be lumped with other types of organizations

(Prell 2006). These organizations have distinctive types of social structures; where

traditional boundaries that apply between non-profit, private and government functions

tend to be blurred (Bromley and Meyer 2014). Non-profit organizations usually balance

more goals and services directed to more diverse groups of people, they face major

financial and resource constraints and are usually understaffed and underpaid (Potter

2001, Prell et al. 2010). All these constraints and pressures require different

perspectives on the role of social connections and networks, and because social

interactions in these informal institutions are based on trust, reciprocity and exchange of

resources; they may operate differently and play different roles than traditional

institutions (Prell 2006).

1
http://www.resnatur.org.co/sobre-resnatur/misión-visión-y-principios/
2 According to Escobar (Escobar 2008), there are many kinds of networks (dominant and positional,
regional and transnational, hierarchical and centralized). The term meshwork is preferred to describe
more self-organized decentralized and non-hierarchical meshwork’s that coexist, intermingle and give rise
to each other characterize many contemporary movements.

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 While the previous chapter focused on the sources of social support at the

individual (ego) levels; this chapter uses a whole network approach to analyze the

social networks and understand the patterns of social organization of these voluntary

grassroots conservation initiatives at the organizational level. To my knowledge this is

the first study that uses a social networks approach to understand the patterns of social

organization of grassroots organization for conservation in Colombia. Through a

comparative analysis of the three bridge organizations this chapter will focus on the

following research questions:

1. How do the networks of social support from the three grassroots organizations
compare in terms of:

a) Members participation, b) Gender, and c) Institutional affiliation? (network

composition); and d) network structural variables at the node level and e)
network structural variables at the whole network level?

2. How do member’s information exchange networks from these three grassroots

organizations compare in terms of: a) Gender participation, b) Member’s
participation, c) Density fragmentation and d) Centralization?

Results

Overlapping Personal Networks

Comparing network composition

Members’ participation. Tierrandina network had a total of 144 nodes, and 76

of the 101 reserve owners originally interviewed were part of the whole network of social

support. While this value means that 53% of the nodes in the network were members of

the organization, a closer analysis revealed that only 30% of the members were part of

the main network component. Sixty-eight (47%) of the nodes were non-members (Table

8-1). In the case of Valle, all 62 reserve owners originally interviewed were part of the

whole network. This network had 145 nodes, 62 members (43%) and 83 non-members

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(57%), and only 21% of the members were part of the main component. Finally, for

Resnatur 30 of the 52 reserve owners interviewed were part of the whole network. This

network had a total of 101 nodes, 30 members (30%) and 71 non-members (70%); and

23% of the nodes were part of the main network component (Figure 8-1).

Gender. In Tierrandina network, women accounted for 58% of all nodes (60% of

the nodes representing members, and 55% of the nodes representing non-members.

Women represented 60% of the isolates (Table 8-1, Figure 8-1); and when considering

only the main component of the network gender composition was more balanced with

54% of nodes being women and 46% men (Table 8-1). In the case of Valle, women

represented 32% of all the nodes, (20% members and 40% non-members), 10% of the

isolates and 31 % of the nodes of the main component. In the case of Resnatur, women

represented 46% of the total number of nodes (40% of members, 50% non-members),

50% of the isolates and 48 % of the main component. Results indicate that these

differences in gender composition were significant when comparing the three networks

(F= 9.70145, p< 0.001, Figure 8-2).

Institutional affiliation. An analysis of the institutional affiliation for the networks

of the three bridge organizations, revealed that 68 nodes were individuals not formally

associated to the organization, most of them (79%) did not have any institutional

affiliation and only 8% were reported as associated with other local NGOs (Table 8-1

and Figure 8-3). No nodes were reported as representing local government and less

than 4% of nodes in this network represented environmental authorities or extension

agencies. Eighty-three (57%) of Valle’s network were non-members, of these 50% did

not have any institutional affiliation, 16% were reported as associated with local NGOs,

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20% represented sources of formal or informal financial support and 15% of the nodes

represented formal institutions such as local government, environmental authorities,

extension agencies, universities or schools. In the case of Resnatur, 71 (70%) of the

nodes were non-members, 56% of them did not report any institutional affiliation, 17%

were associated with NGOs, 14% represented sources of formal or informal financial

support, 4% environmental authorities and 8% education or research institutions. Nodes

representing local government and extension agencies were not reported in the

network.

Comparing network structure.

Centrality measures at the node level. Average normalized values of degree,

betweenness and closeness centrality were higher for Valle and Resnatur when

compared with Tierrandina (Table 8-1, Figure 8-4). In the case of normalized degree

centrality significant differences were found between the three organizations (H=

128.334, p <0.001) and also when pairwise comparisons were performed. Significant

differences were found when comparing normalized betweenness centrality values for

three organizations (H= 57.700, p<0.01), however differences were not significant

between Valle and Resnatur. Significant differences were also found in closeness

centrality measures between the three organizations (H=242.007, p< 0.001) and when

compared with each other. Values were higher for Valle and Resnatur when compared

to Tierrandina (Table 8-1 and 8-2).

Centralization measures at network level. The three organizations presented

networks with isolated alters that were not part of the main network component (Table

8-1, Figure 8-1). Tierrandina’s network presented the lower values of network density

(2.75%), connectedness (12.8%), and the higher values of fragmentation (87.2%). This

194
was also the network with more components (67), 58 of them were isolates and all of

them were members that were not mentioned by any other members during the

personal networks interview. Eight components were isolated pairs of nodes and one

was a small fragment with 7 nodes. Valle and Resnatur presented similar number of

components (17 and 20), lower levels of fragmentation (23.3% and 37.4%), higher

levels of connectedness (76.7% and 62.6%) and density (8.40% and 5.90%).

Network Degree Centralization values were higher for Valle (6.98%) and

Resnatur (10.20%) when compared with Tierrandina (5.54%). Values of network

Betweenness centralization were higher Valle and Resnatur values (19.24% and

12.24% respectively) than those of Tierrandina (10.25%).

Member’s Information Exchange Network

Responses from 100 of the 101 Tierrandina reserve owners were used to create

a members’ communication and information exchange network for the organization

(Figure 8-4). This number accounts for the 40% of Tierrandina associated families. The

network obtained had 373 nodes and 978 ties; 142 of them men and 231 women. This

network presented a very low network centralization index (1.19%), low network density

(1.40%) and high values of network fragmentation (94.5%). In the case of Valle, the

member’s information exchange network was created with the responses of 62 reserve

owners (81% of Valle members) (Figure 8-4). The network obtained had 96 nodes and

321 ties, 74 of them were men and 22 women. The centralization index for this network

was 2.78%, density was 7.0%, and represented fragmentation of 84%. Responses from

51 Resnatur reserve owners (which accounted for the 33% of Resnatur active

members) were used to create a network with 163 nodes and 351 ties; 87 of them men

and 76 women was obtained. The network centralization index was 6.39%, density

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2.65% and fragmentation 86% (Table 8-3). Significant differences were found on all

centralization measures between the three member’s information exchange networks at

the node level (Table 8-4).

Discussion

Social Support Networks. Who are the Key Actors?

This section uses mixed methods in which visual and quantitative exploration of

compositional (membership, gender and institutional affiliation) and structural variables

(Degree and Betweenness centrality) of the whole networks of social support, are used

to analyze the interactions between individual’s characteristics and their social position

within the social support networks.

Tierrandina. One unexpected finding was the low representation of Tierrandina

reserve owners in the network of social support. While non-members with no

institutional affiliation accounted for most of the nodes of the network, members who

were also Tierrandina staff occupied the nodes with higher degree centrality values.

This result can be explained taking a closer look at the type of relationships between

individuals with the higher degree centrality values and the respondents that reported

them in their networks. Close relatives, especially partners and children are the most

frequent sources of social support for Tierrandina reserve owners. Most owners

represented are in their mid-forties and fifties with some older members in their 70s.

This local NGO has grown and evolved around member’s commitment to improve

environmental conditions and community well-being, this growth tended to influence not

only the head of household but also other household members who participated in

workshops, trainings, mingas and other community initiatives. During the past 15 years

both Tierrandina and member’s children and grandchildren have grown up; and parents

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and grandparents have passed on leadership roles and NGO responsibilities to them.

Many of those children have completed their college education or are working towards

it, and the organization has become their first choice when seeking employment. While

applying their newly gained skills and capitalizing on close relationships of friendship

and trust and their first hand understanding of community issues, these young people

work to design and implement projects that will benefit the organization and their

community and while simultaneously serving as a source of professional and personal

development for them. Fewer numbers of nodes presented high values of betweenness

centrality, however, all of them also presented high degree centrality and occupied

bridge positions in the network.

Valle. Reserve owners represented only a small percentage of the nodes in the

main Valle’s component, and most tended to be peripheral nodes. Few members

presented high degree centrality measures and the ones who did were the current

presidents of Juntas de Acción Comunal (Village councils). Two relatively new members

also presented high degree centrality; they were visibly enthusiastic and engaged,

participate in all activities and meetings and were eager to learn and exchange with

more experienced members. Another common characteristic of these members was

that they all owned a motorcycle, and could easily move between villages and travel to

the town to attend meetings. The bad shape of the roads and difficult and expensive

transportation in those remote mountain areas was mentioned several times during the

interviews as a limitation for commercialization of reserve products, and it is most

probably the reason for the high frequency of isolates and reserve owners on peripheral

positions of the network.

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 As in Tierrandina, this network also had a high percentage of nodes with no

institutional affiliation. Many of them were friends and extended family members such as

cousins and uncles. Nodes representing formal or informal sources of financial support

were common in the periphery of the network; these could be formal financial

institutions, but moneylenders were also very common.

In contrast to Tierrandina there was a higher proportion of nodes representing

NGOs, with high degree centrality measures. The most central alters in the network

were NGO directors and project coordinators, followed by the village's grocery store

owners. Unlike Tierrandina network in only in two cases members’ children occupied

central positions in the network. One, the daughter of the owner of one of the oldest

reserves from Acerg, who had a Master degree in agronomy and currently is one of the

project coordinators. The other example is the daughter of one of the most active

woman in the Serraniagua who was later elected as village representative for the

municipal council.

The main component of Valle network presents 3 clusters of nodes that

represent 3 different geographical areas (Figure 8-4). The most numerous and dense,

represent reserves from Versalles and El Dovio. These localities are relatively close to

each other and leaders from the bridge organizations lead diverse conservation

activities, as reflected in the high degree centrality values. Other clusters correspond to

the Village of San Isidro, which is located in a different municipality and is part of a

neighboring watershed. This group of reserves is supported by Ecofuturo, which is

headquartered in a town located more than 2 hours away. This village is relatively

isolated, road access is very precarious and they rarely have access to mobile phone

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signal or internet. The more central positions for the network in this village were

occupied by members of the community that did not own a reserve were not

institutionally affiliated and were reported as friends.

The third cluster was composed of reserves associated to Serraniagua in the

municipalities of El Cairo and San Jose del Palmar. In this case there was a similar

proportion of nodes with no institutional affiliation and nodes representing the local

NGO. Nevertheless, unlike Corpoversalles and Acerg, members and reserve owners

who volunteered their work to the organization were part of Serraniagua staff. This

strategy resembles the one from Tierrandina, although in that case were mainly

member’s children who fulfilled organization’s roles. Tierrandina reserves are relatively

close to small towns and the city capital, and as a result young people can pursue their

education without moving to the city. This is not the case for reserves from Valle, and

may be a factor that hinders young people ability to contribute not only in their parent’s

reserve but also to participate in the improvement of the conditions of their own

community.

Fewer individuals showed high values of betweenness centrality than degree

centrality in Valle network, and the most significant factor that they shared was that all

were reserve owners and occupied leadership positions in one of the four bridge

organizations. In the particular case of Serraniagua three household members (children

and partners) who also occupied bridge positions presented high values of

betweenness centrality.

Resnatur. In the case of Resnatur, reserve owners also represented a relatively

small percentage of the network but were more frequently located in the main

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component when compared with Valle and Tierrandina. The highest degree centrality

measures in the network came from Resnatur members who were reserve owners also

have (or had) administrative roles in the bridge organization. Examples include the past

director, who has intentionally focused his efforts in maintaining regular contact with the

members through reserve visits, meetings or phone calls. Other were reserve owners

who hold positions in the board and are unofficial regional readers that usually

coordinate activities and meetings between reserve owners in the different department

(such as the case of Risaralda, Quindío Cundinamarca and Chocó). Other nodes with

high centrality were represented by non-members such as the current director and

coordinators of a regional environmental NGO (Fundación Orquidea), who promotes

conservation activities in Quindío and provides support to some Reserve owners

thorough their projects.

A visual analysis of Resnatur’s network reveals one main component with a

dense central cluster of reserves located in the central Andes (Risaralda, Quindío and

Tolima) and Cundinamarca. Three other clusters that are part of the main component

represent groups of reserves from different departments (Antioquia and Chocó and

Valle). While some reserve owners and bridge organization representatives act as

bridges between these groups and the main component, shared friends that do not

belong to Resnatur but are very engaged in conservation and environmental activism

occupy many of the key bridge positions on the network. Other positions are occupied

by alters representing research institutions, and to a lesser extent environmental

authorities or institutions that were mentioned as source of economic support.

Regarding betweenness centrality, nodes that presented high values of degree

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centrality and occupied bridge positions were the ones who presented the higher values

of betweenness centrality.

Members Information Exchange Network

While the previous analysis included all individuals who were considered sources

of different types of support, the following analysis is focused on the dynamics of

communication and information exchange between members of each one of the bridge

organizations (Table 8-3, Figure 8-4).

With 373 nodes, Tierrandina information exchange network was the biggest

among the three organizations; and reserve owners who participated in the interview

represented only 27% of the nodes. This reflects Tierrandina’s wide membership base,

which includes not only reserve owners but also families from neighboring communities

who despite not having a reserve are active members of the organization and work

together to improve their livelihoods through trainings and commercialization projects.

The high number of nodes occupied by non-reserve owners corroborates that these

other members are important sources of information. As observed in the social support

network, women continue to dominate (62% of nodes) the communication network.

Also, young professionals who are part of Tierrandina staff occupy nodes with higher

degree and betweenness centrality.

In the case of Valle, there was also a strong similarity both in structure and

composition between the social support network and the information exchange network.

Reserve owners accounted for 81% of the nodes, which means that reserve owners

from Valle count with very limited sources of information from non-reserve owners of the

bridge organization. This network was male dominated, with 77% of the nodes

representing men and 23% women. Another salient characteristic was that the network

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presented three main components that reflected the geographical distance between the

villages. The biggest and densest includes Serraniagua reserves, and had the highest

proportion of women and also the highest number of nodes from members of the

organization that without a reserve. As in the case of Tierrandina, farmers and families

who do not own a reserve are also part of the organization. Serraniagua also has a long

history of working with women and children, and has very active informal groups such

as “Grupo de Mujeres Campesinas” (Women Farmers Group), which is a self-organized

group in which women organize trainings and diverse activities to improve their

livelihoods and the commercialization of their products. Another group that is particularly

active is “Herederos del Planeta” (Heirs of the Planet) an environmental group led by

two women reserve owners and which seeks to promote the involvement of the whole

family, but especially of children in conservation activities and ecological research.

Many of the kids that have participated as Heirs, have grown up and returned to the

town after having studied in the capital and were among the main sources of information

mentioned by reserve owners. The other subgroup represents reserves from Versalles

and El Dovio. These three villages are closer to each other (located in the mid

Garrapatas river watershed), and reserve owners usually attend the same trainings,

workshops, meetings and product exchange fairs. A visible characteristic of this

component is the low representation of women. The only women in this network are

farmers whose children have worked closely with one woman who is the leader of

Acerg, one of the bridge organizations, and who is also the principal of the only agro

ecological high school in the area. The third component includes reserves from the

Village of San Isidro, which is located in another watershed. Due to the poor shape of

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the roads and lack of phone service or Internet, reserve owners from this village are

very isolated and basically reported each other as their main sources of information.

Only 31% of the 163 nodes reported on Resnatur information network were

represented by research participants, and while the number of nodes on this information

network was very similar to the number of reserve owners associated to the

organization (154), most names included in the network did not match the official list of

Resnatur active members. On one hand this indicates that a significant proportion of

Resnatur reserve owners are not exchanging information with the most active members

of the organization; however, it may also mean that many reserve owners who are not

paying dues and therefore are not formally considered by the organization active

Resnatur members; are still recognized as members by reserve owners who

participated in this study and considered important sources of information. As in the

case of the support network, gender representation was balanced in the information

exchange network, with men accounting for 53% and women 47% of the nodes. Both

men and women occupied central positions in the main component and those with the

highest degree centrality measures corresponded to reserve owners who occupy or

have occupied formal positions in the organization as members of the board. Two

reserve owners who are neighbors and friends were part of the only isolated component

found in this network. Another interesting characteristic of this network was the high

proportion of pendant nodes, which means that some of the reserve owners in the

periphery of the network are communication about reserve topics with people who were

not reported by anybody else as their main source of information. In many cases those

pendant nodes were found to be former Resnatur members.

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Social Structure of Grassroots Organizations for Voluntary Conservation

Interactions between network composition and structure. In general

grassroots networks are expected to be less centralized and denser that networks from

formal institutions. These measures of low network centralization occur both at the node

and network levels, and are usually paired with high values of network density. Denser

networks allow for effective communication and sharing of information; high tie density

is common in situations in which everybody knows and deals with everybody else,

which is an important feature for equitable participation in decision making processes

and reinforces the importance of the individual ties in informal institutions (Rivera-

Santos and Rufín 2010). These characteristics were particularly noticeable for

Tierrandina whose networks were mostly family based, and were less evident for Valle

and Resnatur, which presented less dense networks and higher values of centrality and

centralization.

Even though empirical evidence that is specific to these types of studies is

scarce, one recent example that applied social networks analysis to participation

networks in governance of protected areas in México found that when participation of

external actors (lower tie density) such as of government institutions, academia or

NGOs increases; the participation of community and individual private actors is

restricted (Martínez et al. 2015). This study suggests that including a wider diversity of

stakeholders does not necessarily increase participation of local communities; due to

potentially conflicting goals and power imbalances, participation of less privileged actors

in the networks may be hindered. This indicates traditional approaches focused on top-

down perspectives of cross scale and inter-institutional collaboration may not apply to

initiatives grassroots initiatives. In contrast, the high density of ties that is commonly

204
found in bottom-up initiatives is considered by some authors to be a positive trait that

may help overcome weak institutional environments, but only if individual actors

representing external stakeholders and formal institutions develop enough local

legitimacy and become part of the local network (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010). The

positive influence of network density to strengthen collaborative governance was an

aspect observed on the networks of the three bridge organizations where the more

central nodes were occupied by individuals who are local leaders or institutional actors

that have a deep understanding of the local social dynamics, have built long term

relationships based on trust with many members, and are considered as part of the

community. In general, low centralization and high density found in the three bridge

organizations highlights the importance of individual ties for informal institutions.

According to theory, specialized intermediaries are important providers of

information and resources that are not available in the network. They promote

innovation and learning and improve network resilience and capacity to adapt to

changing conditions (Burt 2004, Burt et al. 2013). However, grassroots organizations’

networks tend to lack specialized intermediaries. Specialization may not be as important

for these types of networks which are characterized by blurred separation of domains as

members cannot isolate the diverse dimensions of their social interactions with other

members of the community (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010). These different

dimensions create what is known as multiplexity, which occurs when actors in a network

are connected by more than one type of interaction (multiple ties) (Koehly and Pattison

2005, Newig et al. 2010). Though multiplexity was not calculated for this study, it was

frequent for reserve owners to mention the same person as a source of important

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information and emotional or economic support. In many cases they could be both

family members and neighbors, or represent several formal and informal institutions.

These observations suggest that in grassroots networks with high values of network

density and multiplexity, learning and innovation are not contingent on the presence of

specialized intermediaries, result from the internal dynamics and support from other

members of the organization. One recommendation for formal institutions that want to

interact with grassroots initiatives would be to widen the scope of their engagement to

different domains, adapt to the specific needs of the local communities (to include

social, cultural, economic and environmental dimensions of the local communities), and

include diverse objectives that may seem unrelated to the main goal. This openness to

plurality of goals has been a key principle of these grassroots organizations, which is

rooted in the deep understanding of the interconnectedness between livelihoods,

conservation, and family and community well-being. Rather than focusing on the

conservation or protection discourses, their focus is on the factors that promote

Buenvivir (Escobar 2011, Gudynas 2011b, Vanhulst and Beling 2014, Waldmüller

2014); a concept which includes several aspects of individual well-being (such as

sanitation, education, health and household economy), and also recognizes the

importance of forest, water, nature rights and nature well-being for the well-being of the

community and the future of younger generations. This plurality of values requires

organizations to be flexible and open to move from a top down project-driven

managerial culture, towards less centralized and more horizontal management styles

(Suárez and Esparza 2015), which may result in more complex management and lower

centralization measures.

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 The important role of local leaders. Such as has been found in other studies in

Costa Rica (Kuzdas et al. 2015), deeply rooted rural distrust in formal institutions was

an issue that repeatedly came up during interviews, not unlike other rural communities

in Colombia. Building and restoring relationships with these institutions and overcoming

disappointment and the legacies of corruption and exclusion is a huge challenge for

several of the communities where the reserves are located. Nevertheless, results from

this study highlight the positive influence of local leaders and their important role as

trusted links and brokers between these organizations and the surrounding

communities. Leaders from these organizations are formulating and continuously

adapting new conservation and development strategies and implementing innovative

governance systems at small scales. Other studies from Brazil show that organization

leaders are key drivers for positive collaboration between communities and government

agencies in rural areas (Abers 2007). Through their leadership they boost participation,

promote the inclusion of otherwise disconnected rural groups and facilitate sharing of

program costs and benefits. Building trust and collaboration and supporting local

leaders through trainings, exchanges and capacity building opportunities can be a very

effective strategy for formal institutions that seek to engage with local communities to

achieve broader and positive environmental and social impact.

Challenges and Proposals to Strengthen Grassroots Initiatives for Voluntary

Conservation

There is a paucity of empirical studies that use social networks to analyze the

internal social structure of voluntary grassroots initiatives for conservation such as the

ones in this study. While there is a lot of literature focused on the importance of bridge

organizations and NGOs as catalysts of learning and social change for improved natural

207
resource management, very few empirical studies have focused on understanding the

social structures that underlie these networks (Martínez et al. 2015).

In order to provide an appropriate context for analysis, I will incorporate literature

stemming from the fields of development economics corporate social responsibility and

entrepreneurship; in which grassroots initiatives have been better studied. Within those

fields those initiatives are known as Base of the Pyramid (BOP) initiatives, a term that

refers to the people in the “bottom” as dynamic actors in the improvement of their own

economic and social conditions (Prahalad and Hammond 2002a, Prahalad and

Hammond 2002b). The BOP concept original emphasized the role of formal institutions

in this process; however, nowadays, it has dramatically shifted its focus towards the

important role of small companies, nonprofits and social entrepreneurs. In general, this

literature emphasize the importance of inclusive forms of governance that strive for real

participation, social justice and empowerment of people on the periphery (Sengupta

2016). It highlights the value of community knowledge, and the importance of bridging

ethical and legal approaches to generate social benefits (Beninger and Francis 2016).

Scholars from this area stress that while we are only starting to understand how to

balance the tradeoffs and institutional challenges that exist between economic, social

and environmental impacts (Kolk et al. 2014), innovative and alternative business and

technological paradigms that are based in principles that promote real inclusion and

participation are possible (Pansera and Owen 2016). While most successful examples

come from experiences for South Asia (and only recently from Latin America), most are

focused on consumer products, finance, healthcare and water supply; very few

208
examples come from grassroots initiatives that involve of small farmers in rural areas

(Kolk et al. 2014).

This literature highlights that traditional approaches used in formal institutional

settings do not apply when formal business and institutions are looking forward to

cooperate with these more informal and resource-constrained initiatives which are

characterized by highly decentralized decision-making, unclear functional boundaries

and often times conflicting internal and external goals (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010).

I argue that natural resource management scholars have given poor attention to

valuable lessons from the fields of business management and that entrepreneurship,

and incorporation of findings from this literature could be highly beneficial to improve

formal institutions’ interactions with bottom-up initiatives. As in the field of natural

resource governance and co-management, a main cause of unsuccessful interactions

between formal institutions and BOT initiatives is that they engage the poor as

recipients rather than as co-inventors (Rivera-Santos and Rufín 2010, Kolk et al. 2014).

Instead, successful examples come from experiences that have moved beyond the one

size fits all approaches, consider the nuances of the cultural and socioeconomic

environments in which interventions involving BOT initiatives are imbedded and have

been open to significant change and adaptation of their institutional practices to fit the

cultural nuances of the local contexts, to fulfill specific needs of products services and

technologies (Duke 2016). They argue that without this intentional effort of formal

institutions to be socially embedded, success is highly limited. They call for companies

to move past bounded instrumentality (Hahn and Figge 2011), to leave their comfort

zones and to focus in co-creation and business models based in an intimacy that

209
includes a wider set of goals that go beyond economic gains and consider social well-

being (Gutiérrez and Vernis 2016); and go beyond ecological, social and economic

efficiency to also integrate equity (Young and Tilley 2006)

I consider that the grassroots initiatives for conservation analyzed in this study

mirror BOP initiatives, they respond to the different needs of their members, are

adapted to the specificities of the different cultural contexts, and have used different

strategies to interact (or not) with formal institutions at different scales. A thoughtful

analysis of the intrinsic differences in social structure between formal institutions and

voluntary initiatives is necessary to advance our understanding of the factors that may

foster or hinder the effective participation of these initiatives in environmental

governance.

While my study did not include explicit comparisons of the interactions of bridge

organizations with formal institutions (macro level), qualitative results from the

interviews support the notion that participation of formal institutions in governance

processes may constrain participation of local communities and individuals. One

example comes from one of the reserve owners in Quindío, who explained his

experience as a representative of Resnatur in the public hearings for the design of new

zoning and management plan for the municipality. He explained that even though

representatives of four formal community organizations (Village councils – Juntas de

Acción Comunal) were among participants, political interests tainted their participation;

and that he was the only attendant who represented a Civil Society group without any

political affiliation. The public hearing included 30 actors, all of them representing

different government authorities and companies that provided basic services (drinking

210
water and electricity) that used to be public but were recently privatized; so he found

himself alone trying to protect important watersheds from potential threats of mining and

water concessions. These imbalances that hinder effective participation of local

communities on territorial planning for watershed and ecosystem conservation are very

common, and are aggravated by a lack of research studies and the prevalence of

economic interests of dominant stakeholders. As a result, these processes end up

imposing negative impacts on the well-being of the communities and the ecological

integrity of the territories, and create huge issues of social and environmental justice

(Balanta Martínez 2016). A broader and more effective participation of local

communities and grassroots initiatives for conservation and autonomous development

are sorely needed to guarantee not only the long-term ecological sustainability and

socioeconomic well-being, but also social stability and peace.

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Table 8-1. Composition and Structure of whole networks for the three Bridge
Organizations (inclusion criteria =2, Ego always included)
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur

Network composition: membership and gender

Total # of nodes 144 145 101
Male 61 (42.3%) 98 (67.5%) 54 (53.4%)
Female 83 (57.6%) 47 (32.4%) 47 (46.5%)
Total # of ties 292 880 298

Members of BO 76 (52.7%) 62 (43.5%) 30 (29.70%)

Male 30 (39.4%) 49 (79.0%) 18 (60.00%)
Female 46 (60.5%) 13 (20.9%) 12 (40.00%)
Nonmembers of BO 68 (47.2%) 83 (57.2%) 71 (70.29%)
Male 31 (45.0%) 49 (60.0%) 36 (50.0%)
Female 37 (55.0%) 34 (40.0%) 35 (50.0%)

Network composition: Institutional affiliation

Non members 68 83 71
No institutional affiliation 60 (78.9%) 41 (49.3%) 40 (56.6%)
Local NGO 6 (8.8%) 13 (15.6%) 12 (16.9%)
Local government 0 3 (3.6%) 0
Environmental authorities 1 (1.4%) 1 (1.2%) 3 (4.2%)
Extension agencies 1 (1.4%) 7 (8.4%) 0
Education and Research 0 1 (1.2%) 6 (8.4%)
Financial support 0 17 (20.4%) 10 (14.0%)

Network structure
Avg nDegree 1.34 3.17 2.67
Avg nBetweenness 1.64 1.20 1.82
Avg nCloseness 1.00 2.51 3.19
Indeg H-Index 8 14 8
Deg Centralization 5.5% 10.2% 6.9%
Bet centralization 10.2% 19.2 % 12.2%
Density 2.7% 8.4% 5.9%
Components 67 17 20
Component Ratio 0.462 0.111 0.19
Connectedness 0.128 0.767 0.626
Fragmentation 0.872 0.233 0.374
Closure 0.71 0.434 0.356
Avg Distance 4.148 3.511 3.719
SD Distance 2.06 1.357 1.479
Diameter 11 8 9

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Table 8-2.Non parametric Anova (Kruskall-Wallis) and Dunn’s pairwise comparison test
for Centralization variables between support networks of three Bride
Organizations. Tierrandina n=144, Valle n=145, Resnatur n=101.
Variable H Tierrandina Tierrandina vs Valle vs
vs. Valle Resnatur Resnatur

Degree 128.334 *** 7.480 ** 4.098 ** 10.893 **

Betweenness 57.700*** 6.900** 5.086 ** 1.170 ns
Closeness 242.007 **** 15.371 ** 6.201 ** 8.336 **
Eigenvalue 95.834 *** 8.728 ** 7.558 ** 0.396 ns

213
Table 8-3. Structural measures for communication networks of the three bridge
organizations
Tierrandina Valle Resnatur
Number of nodes 373 96 163
Number of ties 978 321 351
Men 142 74 87
Women 231 22 76

Node measures
Avg Degree 2.595 3.344 2.153
nDegree centralization 0.003 0.018 0.006

Network measures
Network centralization 1.19% 2.78% 6.39%
Density 1.40% 7.0 % 2.65%
Fragmentation 0.945 0.844 0.869
Closure 0.415 0.438 0.28

Table 8-4.Non parametric Anova (Kruskall-Wallis) and Dunn’s pairwise comparison test
for Centralization variables between networks of members of three Bridge
Organizations. Tierrandina n=373, Valle n=96, Resnatur n=163
Variable H Tierrandina Tierrandina Valle vs.
vs. Valle vs. Resnatur Resnatur

Betweeness 20.335 *** 3.21 ** 0.41 ns 2.59 **

nOutDegree 65.889 *** 6.82 ** 1.83 ns 4.73 **
nInDegree 80.973 *** 8.68 ** 3.86 ** 4.90 **
Out closeness 521.453 *** 18.22 ** 16.20 ** 4.38 **
In closeness 495.010 *** 19.02 ** 15.63 ** 5.51 **
Out reciproc 56.613 *** 6.27 ** 2.49 ** 3.76 **
In reciprocity 62.805 *** 7.58 ** 4.06 ** 3.78 **

214
 a)Tierrrandina

b) Valle

c) Resnatur

Figure 8-1. Support networks for the three different bridge organizations. Size
represents degree centrality, shapes represent gender (Squares=Males,
Circle=Female.), Colors represent institutional affiliation (Black= members,
light blue= no institutional affiliation, Green= Local NGO, Blue= Local
government, Pink= Environmental authorities, Violet= Extension agencies,
Orange=Research and education and Yellow=Financial institutions)

215
 100%

80%

60%

40% Female
Male

20%

0%
R -Whole

T - Whole
V - Members
R - Members

V - Whole

T - Members

Figure 8-2. Gender composition in networks of the three bridge organizations when
considering only members and the whole network. Resnatur (R), Valle (V)
and Tierrandina (T).

216
 a) Tierrandina

Members
No institutional affiliation
Local NGO
Local gov
Environ agency
Extension agency
Education and Research
Financial support

b) Valle

Members
No institutional affiliation
Local NGO
Local gov
Environ agency
Extension agency
Education and Research
Financial support

c) Resnatur

Members
No institutional affiliation
Local NGO
Local gov
Environ agency
Extension agency
Education and Research
Financial support

Figure 8-3. Whole Network composition in terms of bridge organization membership and
different categories of institutional affiliation A) Tierrandina, B) Valle, C)
Resnatur

217
 a) Tierrandina

b) Valle

c) Resnatur

Figure 8-4. Whole networks for the three different bridge organizations. Blue male
members, Pink female members. A) Tierrandina, B) Valle, C) Resnatur

218
 CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation provides insights on the growing initiative of Reserves of the

Civil Society in which diverse groups of rural landowners in Colombia voluntarily decide

to allocate a portion or all of their properties to forest conservation. For these

landowners, the objectives of the reserves go beyond strict protection of the forest.

They also strive to implement sustainable management and agro-ecological practices in

the areas allocated to their agricultural livelihoods. These reserves are places in which

nature well-being, individual well-being, and community well-being are all intertwined.

While the implementation of such practices relies on landowners’ individual decisions,

their mission goes beyond the limits of the reserve. These individual reserve owners are

organized through Reserve Networks, which are community-based NGOs (also known

as bridge organizations) that facilitate coordination, collaboration, and sharing of

experiences and knowledge with fellow reserve owners and other members of the

community. These include capacity building activities (workshops, trainings,

exchanges), which aim to promote the integration of forest conservation and sustainable

livelihoods in the reserves and community well-being and conservation at the landscape

level. This research focuses on understanding the contributions of these organizations

and their associated reserves in terms of conservation outcomes. It also aims to

understand their social structure at the micro (individual) and meso (organization) level,

and how this social structure affects conservation outcomes and individuals' motivations

to engage in voluntary forest conservation in Colombia.

219
 Conservation Outcomes

Quantitative results in Chapter 5 indicated that reserve owners are making a

substantial contribution to protected forest area on their properties, with 79% of reserve

owners allocating at least 20% of their properties to conservation. While results showed

that larger reserves tended to allocate bigger proportions of the property to

conservation, further analysis according to two categories of property size indicates that

in the case of small reserves, property size does not influence the proportion of property

allocated to conservation.

Results from this chapter also revealed that the level of reliance of the property

owner on the reserve for subsistence is an important factor that influences the area

allocated to forest conservation. The more reliant reserve owners allocated smaller

proportions of their properties to conservation. One unanticipated finding of this chapter

is that larger proportions of the property were allocated to conservation in reserves that

were reported as not being economically self-sustaining. This result highlights the fact

that reserve owners that are less reliant on their reserve for subsistence and can invest

off-reserve income on their properties, can support larger areas in conservation. For

most of the reserve owners in this sample, the lack of suitability of other profitable land

uses was not a factor that influenced their decisions of allocating portions of their

property to conservation. On the contrary, for most of these reserve owners,

conservation decisions were influenced not only by the value they ascribe to important

ecosystem services such as water, soil conservation, and pollination, but also to non-

instrumental factors such as diverse emotional, cultural and spiritual motivations.

Results from Chapter 6 indicate that overall these reserves are perceived by their

owners as successful. Ninety-five percent of reserve owners reported positive

220
conservation effectiveness indexes. This means that according to their owners,

ecological conditions and the long-term viability of the ecosystem have improved, and

that they perceive themselves as having achieved improvements in their management

capacity. Conservation effectiveness values reported by reserve owners were not

influenced by property size nor level of reliance on the reserve for income. Most reserve

owners reported large improvements in ecological conditions, such as areas under

sustainable management, forest area, and water quality and quantity. All of which are

precisely the factors emphasized by bridge organizations during diverse workshops and

trainings, and are results that reserve owners are intentionally working towards. This

was also reflected in their positive perceptions of their own management capacity.

Nevertheless, results were mixed in terms of economic conditions, which presented

strong declines for Valle and Resnatur. This likely reflects the general deteriorating

conditions of farmers in most of the country, influenced mainly by national economic

policies and poor support for local agriculture. On the contrary, Tierrandina reserve

owners reported improvements in their economic conditions, which reflects the success

of this organization on supporting its own producer cooperatives as a strategy to

improve members’ livelihoods, but also highlights the influence of other structural

factors such as proximity to cities and markets. Overall, years of affiliation to the bridge

organization were an important factor that influenced conservation effectiveness.

Empirical evidence presented in this chapter makes it clear that the influence of external

economic factors varies according to local contexts. They can hinder the efforts of

reserve owners to improve their economic conditions and can limit their management

capacity. Clearly, bridge organizations play an important role as sources of support for

221
reserve owners and improve their capacity to adapt to external changes and these

negative impacts.

Social Support

In Chapter 7, I found strong variations in the composition and structure of the

personal networks of reserve owners of the three bridge organizations. Family members

dominated Tierrandina's personal networks, friends dominated Resnatur’s, and Valle

presented a balanced composition of family and friends. Most Tierrandina alters were

individuals residing in the reserve or in the same village. These results highlight the

importance of intrinsic differences in terms of culture, diverse roles of family members

and geographical proximity in the community in the social organization and the social

support available to reserve owners.

Type of bridge organization and percentage of female alters were positive

predictors of the proportion of property allocated to conservation, while the proportion of

extension agents was a negative one. This result may indicate that reserve owners with

female dominated personal networks tend to prefer less intensive land uses that do not

require much consultation from external agencies and rely more on knowledge

exchange and support from family and friends. These results were similar for

conservation effectiveness, in which higher values of the conservation effectiveness

index were associated with higher proportions of family and friends with no institutional

affiliation in the personal networks. Consideration of these factors may provide valuable

insights to formulate strategies that seek foster the social conditions that better support

these voluntary conservation initiatives.

In Chapter 8, personal network data were combined to create whole networks for

each bridge organization, from which multiple network measures were calculated. The

222
support networks of the three bridge organizations were significantly different in terms of

network structure and composition. Resnatur and Valle were more diverse in terms of

institutional affiliation. In contrast, Tierrandina members were predominant in the

support networks reported by the reserve owners.

Information exchange networks from Valle were dominated by other reserve

owners, which may reflect the geographical isolation of these reserves. In the case of

Resnatur and Tierrandina, information exchange networks included a wider variety of

alters such as other members or past members of the organization who do not

necessarily own a reserve. In the case of Tierrandina, this can be explained by their

diverse goals, which go beyond supporting reserve owners, and in the case of

Resnatur, by its wide geographical scope.

Broader Implications and Recommendations

The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation contributes to a better

understanding of the emerging grassroots initiatives for voluntary conservation in

Colombia. It provides evidence of the actual contributions of Natural Reserves of the

Civil Society to conservation in terms of forest area and conservation effectiveness. It

highlights that these reserves represent effective conservation strategies that have a

long lasting effect on the improvement of ecological conditions and the reduction of

impacts and threats to biodiversity and natural ecosystems.

Conventional conservation approaches still continue to focus on the role of

formal and external institutions and understanding the potential of individual economic

incentives to promote the conservation of valuable forest and ecosystem services.

However, findings from this research highlight the importance of other factors such as

reserve owners' perception of the intrinsic values of nature, as well as emotional,

223
cultural and spiritual motivations. While most of the reserve owners reported that

unstable economic conditions were one of the more pressing factors that hinder their

capacity to expand their initiatives, many of them also reported strong negative

perceptions regarding economic incentives for forest conservation. This negative

perception varied among reserve owners, but included personal as well as collective

aspects. On one hand, many reserve owners see economic incentives as interventions

that may undermine not only their autonomy, but also their sense of identity as

conservationists and group social recognition. On the other hand, in these

organizations, everyone’s contribution and knowledge is considered very valuable,

regardless of the amount of land being preserved, their socioeconomic conditions or

literacy level. Individual economic incentives tend to provide higher benefits to big and

more educated landowners, a factor that would probably disrupt the sense of equality in

the group and undermine the complex social interactions that are based on solidarity,

reciprocity and trust.

This research provides valuable insights into the informal social structures that

sustain these bottom-up initiatives and the role of social support in conservation. People

in these rural areas rely heavily on their personal networks for information, emotional,

social and economic support. In these organizations, social interactions based on

kinship and friendship are extremely important, and the evidence highlights that those

informal social interactions are important sources of motivation, encouragement and

social learning. These initiatives not only promote the implementation of diverse

conservation and sustainable management practices, but are also very strong, reliable,

and serve as long-term sources of social support. They are deeply embedded in their

224
own cultural traditions, sense of place and belonging, and have very positive

conservation impacts.

Reserves from this sample represent landowners from different regions, cultural

and socioeconomic backgrounds. Quantitative evidence from this dissertation highlights

that the relative contribution of external institutions (government institutions and external

NGOs) in the support of conservation in these rural areas in Colombia is extremely

limited, a finding that most probably can be extrapolated to other areas of the country.

This does not mean that the role of these institutions is not important, however; results

from this dissertation are a call to expand our perspectives on how to engage with rural

communities to address conservation and development challenges, and to give more

thoughtful consideration to the influence of cultural and social aspects that are context

specific.

One of the key common characteristics of the three local networks analyzed in

this study and most of the other reserve networks in Colombia, is their focus on plurality.

They promote the respect and recognition of the abilities and capabilities of their

members; they recognize the value of their own cultural traditions and strive for

equitable participation and for maintaining their own autonomy. Results from this

research indicate that a strategy for external institutions that seek to work with rural

communities and to support their efforts to improve their livelihoods and protect valuable

ecosystems should be focused on upholding those principles.

Unfortunately, top-down approaches are still the dominant strategy used by

NGOs and environmental authorities. Projects and interventions have their own

predefined agendas, objectives, action plans, methodologies, budgets, timelines, and

225
mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. Very rarely are external institutions willing to

interact with rural communities as equals and co-create strategies based on the real life

experiences of local people and their capacities to find their own solutions. As a result,

external institutions are perceived as actors that seek to impose and enforce their own

agendas. For many of these community organizations, one of the main challenges in

interacting with these formal institutions is to secure the funding necessary to support

organizational expenses without compromising their autonomy and their concern for

member's real needs. Nevertheless, results from this research provide hope and clear

examples of two different instances in which collaboration with external and formal

institutions delivered very positive and long-term outcomes, not only in terms of

conservation but also for community well-being. One example is the economic and

logistical support provided by WWF Colombia during the early stages of Resnatur

creation. This support was key for development of capacity building activities,

strengthening administrative capacity and to expanding the geographical scope of the

organization. The other example from this research came from the support provided by

Galeras National Park authorities, which was key for the creation of Tierrandina. In both

cases, these external institutions were long-term allies who, rather than imposing their

own agendas, worked with community organizations as equal partners in conservation,

providing economic support while respecting their initiatives and their autonomy. In the

other hand reserve organizations of Valle are clear examples of the complexity and

contradictions in the interactions between grassroots organizations and formal

environmental institutions. While Serraniagua have been able to achieve long term and

positive results in terms of conservation and community development, while maintaining

226
its autonomy; the other local organizations (Corpoversalles, Acerg and Ecofuturo) are

still learning to balance their efforts to consolidate as self-sustaining organizations with

the demands of the formal institutions that are their main sources of funding. Further

research that analyses the influence of history, systemic structural variables

(environmental and economic policies), and the interaction dynamics between formal

and informal institutions in different contexts, could help us to gain a deeper

understanding of the factors that foster or hinder a more effective and equitable

participation of civil society in conservation and natural resource governance.

Reserve owners’ motivations for voluntary conservation were very diverse.

Traditional models of institutional economics fall short in explaining the motivations of

reserve owners for working together and organizing themselves through the networks of

reserves of the civil society. This research calls for deeper attention to the importance of

other factors that go beyond economic and instrumental reasons for conservation, such

as the social, cultural, emotional and spiritual motivations behind landowners’ decisions

to preserve forest on their properties. The inclusion of these perspectives is also a call

to broaden our perspectives in terms of how to include the values of others and their

different perspectives and possibilities with the environment that go beyond individual

utility maximization and include community and nature well-being.

Even though there is generalized sense of urgency to advance our

understanding of the factors that improve long-term sustainability and resilience of

socio-ecological systems, so far in Colombia, most of the research has been focused on

the biophysical and ecological aspects of sustainability, and there is a striking paucity of

studies that focus on the factors that foster social resilience at different levels. This

227
research contributes to a better understanding of the factors that determine the creation

of networks that serve as the basis for strong community organizations, promote

intrinsic motivation and active participation of civil society in territorial governance

and conservation initiatives. Colombian reserves of the civil society represent examples

of grassroots initiatives that are actively addressing the pervasive impacts of climate

change on ecosystems and rural livelihoods. They are working to improve habitat

connectivity, to promote reforestation and ecological restoration, and to promote the

implementation of agro-ecological and sustainable management practices. Despite

limited funding, the adverse consequences of national government policies that

exacerbate market and economic inequalities, and the negative impacts of violent

conflict, these networks of reserves have proven to be resilient and sustainable in the

long term. Learning from those successful experiences can help us better understand

the potential of these informal institutions in the creation of strong social bonds that are

rooted in principles of trust, reciprocity, and solidarity, which are the basis for social and

ecological resilience at the landscape level, and are necessary to uphold national hopes

for prosperity and peace.

228
 APPENDIX A
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PROPERTY AND LANDOWNER VARIABLES

229
 APPENDIX B
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COMPOSITIONAL AND STRUCTURAL VARIABLES OF PERSONAL NETWORKS AND
CONSERVATION OUTCOMES

% %Ex.A %Muni
BO PC CE G D DegN CloN BetN Hom %Fem %Fam %Fri %Nei %Acq %NGO %Gov %En.ag %Ed&R %Fin %Res %Vill %Stat %OoS %Over
NoInst g c

BO R 1.
p-value
PC R 0.38 1.
p-value 0.
CE R -0.3 -0.05 1.
p-value 0. 0.51
G R -0.16 0.09 0.15 1.
p-value 0.02 0.21 0.03
D R -0.37 0.02 0.03 0.2 1.
p-value 0. 0.73 0.69 0.
DegN R 0.58 0.15 -0.29 -0.24 -0.41 1.
p-value 0. 0.03 0. 0. 0.
CloN R 0.12 0. -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 0.55 1.
p-value 0.08 0.99 0.52 0.22 0.23 0.
BetN R 0.41 0.1 -0.2 -0.17 -0.34 0.83 0.65 1.
p-value 0. 0.17 0. 0.01 0. 0. 0.
Hom R 0.15 -0.05 -0.13 -0.36 -0.17 0.2 0.08 0.14 1.
p-value 0.03 0.49 0.07 0. 0.01 0. 0.23 0.05
%Fem R -0.18 0.12 0.18 0.07 0.2 -0.14 0.08 -0.15 -0.07 1.
p-value 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.31 0. 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.34
%Fam R -0.75 -0.22 0.3 0.23 0.45 -0.56 -0.09 -0.42 -0.25 0.22 1.
p-value 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.19 0. 0. 0.
%Fri R 0.6 0.26 -0.16 -0.16 -0.26 0.43 0.08 0.29 0.19 -0.09 -0.8 1.
p-value 0. 0. 0.02 0.02 0. 0. 0.23 0. 0.01 0.18 0.
%Nei R 0.17 0.03 -0.16 -0.12 -0.16 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.15 -0.12 -0.29 -0.05 1.
p-value 0.01 0.62 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.07 0. 0.49
%Acq R 0.43 0.01 -0.23 -0.12 -0.37 0.31 -0.02 0.25 0.11 -0.21 -0.53 0.01 0.04 1.
p-value 0. 0.91 0. 0.09 0. 0. 0.73 0. 0.11 0. 0. 0.91 0.57
%NoInst R -0.56 -0.18 0.33 0.17 0.38 -0.48 -0.03 -0.34 -0.16 0.19 0.7 -0.49 -0.12 -0.54 1.
p-value 0. 0.01 0. 0.01 0. 0. 0.66 0. 0.02 0. 0. 0. 0.09 0.
%NGO R 0.41 0.16 -0.31 -0.21 -0.21 0.47 0.05 0.3 0.17 -0.12 -0.5 0.49 0.08 0.16 -0.73 1.
p-value 0. 0.02 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.44 0. 0.01 0.09 0. 0. 0.23 0.02 0.
%Gov R 0.22 0.09 -0.11 0.08 -0.15 0.14 -0.01 0.13 -0.04 -0.09 -0.2 0.11 -0.03 0.23 -0.28 0.18 1.
p-value 0. 0.21 0.12 0.26 0.03 0.05 0.86 0.05 0.58 0.21 0. 0.1 0.69 0. 0. 0.01
%En.ag R 0.36 0.22 -0.14 0.02 -0.16 0.11 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.31 0.08 0.19 0.36 -0.38 0.1 0.21 1.
p-value 0. 0. 0.04 0.75 0.02 0.1 0.48 0.24 0.9 0.31 0. 0.27 0.01 0. 0. 0.14 0.
%Ex.ag R 0.12 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16 -0.27 0.27 0. 0.18 0.19 -0.26 -0.34 0.18 0.04 0.35 -0.42 0.12 0.05 0.09 1.
p-value 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.02 0. 0. 0.94 0.01 0.01 0. 0. 0.01 0.56 0. 0. 0.08 0.51 0.21
%Ed&R R 0.36 0.18 -0.04 0.14 -0.17 0.2 0.02 0.15 0.05 -0.05 -0.32 0.27 -0.07 0.24 -0.41 0.27 0.35 0.06 -0.02 1.
p-value 0. 0.01 0.55 0.04 0.01 0. 0.81 0.03 0.5 0.43 0. 0. 0.35 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.36 0.79
%Fin R 0.29 0.06 -0.16 -0.11 -0.29 0.19 0.01 0.17 0.04 -0.09 -0.43 0.2 0.08 0.48 -0.66 0.08 -0.04 0.18 0.3 0.07 1.
p-value 0. 0.42 0.02 0.11 0. 0.01 0.87 0.01 0.58 0.18 0. 0. 0.25 0. 0. 0.24 0.55 0.01 0. 0.3
%Res R -0.63 -0.18 0.32 0.18 0.43 -0.54 -0.18 -0.42 -0.28 0.18 0.73 -0.6 -0.24 -0.34 0.52 -0.39 -0.15 -0.2 -0.23 -0.24 -0.3 1.
p-value 0. 0.01 0. 0.01 0. 0. 0.01 0. 0. 0.01 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.03 0. 0. 0. 0.
%Vill R -0.22 -0.14 -0.08 0. 0.11 -0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.2 -0.19 0.18 -0.15 -0.12 -0.08 0.04 -0.14 -0.1 -0.35 1.
p-value 0. 0.05 0.22 0.95 0.11 0.3 0.18 0.48 0.02 0.09 0.86 0.66 0. 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.23 0.53 0.04 0.15 0.
%Munic R 0.47 0.09 -0.24 -0.21 -0.34 0.47 0.1 0.35 0.18 -0.29 -0.54 0.41 0.13 0.33 -0.5 0.4 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.12 0.3 -0.5 -0.3 1.
p-value 0. 0.21 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.13 0. 0.01 0. 0. 0. 0.06 0. 0. 0. 0.09 0.02 0. 0.07 0. 0. 0.
%Stat R 0.42 0.22 -0.17 -0.06 -0.23 0.38 0.11 0.33 0.04 -0.13 -0.42 0.32 0.07 0.28 -0.47 0.47 0.21 0.18 0.1 0.29 0.16 -0.38 -0.25 0.17 1.
p-value 0. 0. 0.01 0.35 0. 0. 0.11 0. 0.56 0.06 0. 0. 0.32 0. 0. 0. 0. 0.01 0.16 0. 0.02 0. 0. 0.01
%OoS R 0.54 0.27 -0.04 0. -0.31 0.23 -0.04 0.13 0.06 -0.08 -0.3 0.31 -0.08 0.15 -0.17 0.13 0.17 0.15 -0.13 0.28 0.05 -0.31 -0.31 -0.04 0.17 1.
p-value 0. 0. 0.61 0.97 0. 0. 0.59 0.05 0.41 0.22 0. 0. 0.24 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.06 0. 0.44 0. 0. 0.59 0.01
%Over R 0.2 0.08 0.02 -0.06 -0.23 0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.14 0.09 -0.19 0.01 -0.04 0.39 -0.21 -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.38 -0.17 -0.15 -0.03 0.03 0.16 1.
p-value 0. 0.27 0.8 0.35 0. 0.51 0.85 0.26 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.93 0.59 0. 0. 0.86 0.74 0.39 0.67 0.2 0. 0.01 0.02 0.64 0.69 0.02

230
 APPENDIX C
MOTIVATIONS TO PRESERVE FOREST, DIRECT QUOTES FROM RESEARCH
PARTICIPANTS.

Why did you decide to preserve the forest in your property?

(Names from research participants have been changed for confidentiality)

I like the forest and the birds, I like doing conservation. To protect the springs, water is
very important for the future of the community. Claudia, 28 years old, subsistence
farmer. Tierrandina. Protects 0.5 ha in her 4.5 ha reserve.

This forest is the most beautiful part of my reserve, it gives me water. People ask me
why did you ruin the paddocks planting Arboloco1? I like it, I am passionate about
nature, plants, animals. Being close to the land is the best way of life. Rafael, 52 years
old. Valle. Farmer and cattle rancher. Protects 20 ha of cloud forest in his 68 ha
reserve.

Those are the best soils of my land. I could plant anything there, but that forest is my
greatest wealth. I would rather buy the timber and logs than cutting a tree from that
forest. When people cut down a tree is like they are ripping my feelings. I am preserving
this forest, but this is not for me, is for the community. People ask me: how come you
are putting from your own money to maintain that forest? Juan, 56 years old. School
teacher. Valle. Protects 4.6 ha of forest in 10.2 ha reserve.

To cut the trees? … That would be a sin. They have always been there; you have to let
them live. The farm (agroforestry system) is not very productive but I have not given up
because of the community. If I sell the land or change the land to pastures a lot of
people would lose their jobs and would have to migrate. That would be the end of the
little village where I was born. Francisco, 54 years old. Owner of the local grocery store.
Valle. Protects 2.5 ha of forest in hir 13 ha reserve.

As a Biologist you deliver documents and more documents, but where are the results? I
had a strong need of seeing concrete results. Conservation is different from
conversation. I had a crisis in my life, solastalgia2 or nostalgia of losing the place that
represents what your own life means. I had a very strong relationship with the land
since I was a little girl. Natalia 46 years old. Resnatur. Protects 6 ha in her 10 ha
reserve.

Because I love this forest. Money can be a limitation sometimes but it will never be a
motivation. Ricardo, 59 years old farmer. Valle. Protects 2 ha of forest in his 5 ha
Forest/farm property.

1
Montanoa lehmannii. A fast growth native tree species commonly used in Colombia to promote forest
regrowth in degraded areas.
2
Solastalgia: Distress cased by environmental change (Albrecht 2006)

231
I do not’ know, maybe I am too sentimental, but people do not know the true value of
the forest. Carlos, 58 years old farmer. Valle. Protects 1.8 ha of forest in his 5 ha farm.

When I am working I listen to the birds, they sing to me, I feel the dirt in my hands, the
sun in my arms, the wind in my face … I feel at peace. I wouldn’t change this for
anything. That’s why I love being a farmer and I love my reserve. Lucia, 74 years old.
Valle. Widow and small farmer she protects 2 ha of forest in her 4.5 ha reserve

How does a man who cries when a seed that he planted germinates can answer such a
question? Rodrigo, 56 years old. Resnatur. Works with the local government. Protects
35 ha of rainforest on his 43 ha reserve

You know? People say this is beautiful and natural, but no. For me this is not natural,
this forest is supernatural. Mary 45 years old. Resnatur. Protects 110 ha of cloud forest
in her 140 ha reserve

232
 APPENDIX D
MOTIVATIONS TO JOIN THE BRIDGE ORGANIZATIONS, DIRECT QUOTES FROM
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS.

Why did you decide to join the bridge organization?

(Names from research participants have been changed for confidentiality)

To get organized with other people. To work together for conservation with young
people of the community. I want to work with my community. Is not an external NGO,
we are all from here. I wanted to work in conservation since I was a little girl. Nancy, 35
years old. Tierrandina farmer. Recently earned a college degree in environmental
management. Protects 1.6 ha in her 3.3 ha reserve

You get used to meet and try to work with other people to make things happen. When
you are in group you have more knowledge and opportunities. The organization help us
a lot with the improvements in the reserve. Manuela 64 years old. Tierrandina farmer.
Protects 0.4 ha of forest in her 1.4 ha reserve

We started attending the meetings because they (National park authorities) offered
some food staples to workshop attendants, but then we liked the idea of protecting
nature and we stayed. We receive support and trainings to improve the reserve. I like
learning and working with the community. Miriam, 63 years old. Tierrandina farmer.
Protects 2 ha of forest in a 2.5 ha reserve.

I was interested in receiving support to build pig and chicken barns. I wanted to help my
husband with the expenses. I learn practical things that I can implement in my farm. Ana
54, years old. Tierrandina farmer. Protects 1 ha of forest on her 4 ha reserve.

If we know that people from another reserve has any issue we mobilize to help. We are
trapped, we have to be owners to be able to protect, is just the way things are right now.
But conservation has nothing to do with property. This is not mine. We are here
because a global sense of belonging, its altruism. We should imitate the generosity of
the forest. I used to be an activist in Bogota. We are here because we want to be with
people that are going in the same direction even if they do and think differently. Diego,
44 years old. Resnatur. Lawyer. He considers himself a neo-campesino. Protects 12 ha
in his reserve.

Because it is a shared identity of people who loves nature and want to teach others. It
also considers the social aspects and the need to use your reserve for production. We
protect. We are being accountable to our own consciousness without the need of having
the authorities over our shoulders telling us what to do. Maritsa, 65 Resnatur. Protects 7
ha of forest on her 21 ha reserve.

Because my daughter wanted us to join, she was driving me crazy. Then I started to
understand and get more environmentally conscious. You get to know many people,
everyone has its own problems and its one piece of knowledge and advice on how to

233
solve issues and they share it with you. The social part, that’s the best of being part of
this network. This makes me feel full and complete. Cristina, 63 years old. Resnatur.
Retired IT professional. Protects 48 ha in her 80 ha reserve.

Because of the meetings. It has been 18 years and I haven’t miss one. I like to learn. I
like sharing the experiences with other people, we exchange products and seeds, we
cook, and sing, some people share their poems. They bring us to visit other’s reserves.
We receive support to improve the reserve they give us trees to plant. Felipe, 58 years
old. Valle farmer. Protects 1.2 ha in his 7 ha reserve

Because Sandra is my friend (NGO director), she invited me. You need to be informed
and get the knowledge to defend ourselves from the Government and the Mines
Ministry. If we allow them they will destroy the land and the water. What will be left for
us? How are we going to live? Federico, 58 years old. Valle, farmer. Protects 1 ha of
forest in his 8.5 ha coffee farm.

Because it is important for the people to work together and have the support of an
organization. Some people say I am wasting my time. But no, I am getting many
benefits, knowing that there is a lot of people who are working for conservation just like
me. I have learned a lot. In this community we are like family with all neighbors, we do
not need blood ties. We all get along if we need to work or collaborate with someone in
need we do it. That’s the way it is. Jesus 59 years old. Valle, farmer. Protects 1.5 ha of
forest in his 5 ha reserve.

234
 APPENDIX E
IRB AUTHORIZATIONS

235
236
 APPENDIX F
QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT: RESERVE INFORMATION (SPANISH VERSION).

NOMBRE RESERVA_______________________ PROPIETARIO __________________________

TEL ______________________________ EMAIL _______________________________________
DEPTO _____________ MUNICIPIO ____________ VEREDA ____________ CUENCA _______
ASOCIACION/ORGANIZACIÓN __________________ ECOSISTEMA _____________________
COORDENADAS ____________________________ ALTITUD ______________ A REA _______
INFORMACION SOCIO-ECONOMICA FAMILIAR
Nombre Relación Edad Escolaridad Ocupación

1. Hace cuanto tiene la finca? ____________ En que año ingresó a la red? ________________
2. Tiene escritura de esta propiedad? SI ! NO ! Es Poseedor ! Tenedor !
3. Numero de escritura o adjudicación? ___________________________
4. La finca es su vivienda principal? SI ! NO ! ___________________________
5. Depende de la finca para sostener a su familia? SI ! NO ! ___________________________
6. Su propiedad le genera ingresos o tiene que
invertir de su propio dinero para sostenerla? SI ! NO ! ___________________________
7. Su familia tiene otras fuentes de ingreso? SI ! NO ! ___________________________
8. Posee maquinaria para el trabajo en su finca? SI ! NO ! ___________________________
9. Posee vehículo propio? SI ! NO ! ___________________________
10. Hay nacimientos o quebradas en su finca? SI ! NO ! Cuantos? ___________________
11. Estimado de pulgadas por nacimiento ________________________________________________
12. Su propiedad cuenta con los siguientes servicios?
Alcantarillado ! Pozo séptico ! Electricidad ! Televisión !
TV cable ! Internet ! Computador ! Teléfono !
Acueducto ! Agua propia _____________________________________________

ZONIFICACION USO DEL SUELO Y ACTIVIDADES PRODUCTIVAS PRINCIPALES

Favor indicar el área en hectáreas y tiempo aproximado en años en que se ha mantenido ese uso.
Uso actual No. Ha Tiempo Uso actual No. Ha Tiempo
Bosque natural (años) Ha (años)
Bosque regeneración natural
Bosque reforestación
Potreros
Cultivo 1:
Cultivo 2:
Cultivo 3:
1. Considera que el área que se encuentra actualmente en bosque sería apta para otras actividades
productivas? SI ! NO ! Cuales? ____________________________________ ________
2. Por qué decidió dejar el bosque en esta parcela? __________________________ _____________
3. Si no hubiera decidido conservar este bosque que uso –hipotético– le estaría dando a esa parcela?
_________________________________ _____________________________________________
4. Costo del jornal en la zona $ ___________ 5. Valor de alquiler por ha en la zona $ ____________
6. Valor del avalúo catastral $____________ 7. Valor comercial de la propiedad $ _____________

237
EMPLEO PRINCIPALES PRODUCTOS /ACTIVIDADES
Actividad Familia Trabajador Dias / mes Producto Ganancia / ha / año

PRÁCTICAS DE CONSERVACIÓN Y MANEJO SOSTENIBLE

Cuales prácticas de manejo sostenible y conservación ha implementado en su propiedad durante los
últimos años? Como aprendió sobre ellas? Hay algunas que implemento en el pasado pero después
descontinuó? (Implementada !, descontinuada ", Ausente -, # de años). Cual fue la razón?
Práctica Fuente Estado actual Motivo

Su reserva cuenta con un Plan de manejo? SI ! NO ! Periodo _____________________

BIODIVERSIDAD ESPECIES AMENAZADAS

Tiene ficha de caracterización de biodiversidad?
SI ! NO ! Fecha ? ______________

Inventarios ( No. Especies)

Flora Aves Mamíferos Peces Otros

Comentarios: ___________________________
_______________________________________
_______________________________________
_______________________________________

238
 IMPACTOS Y AMENAZAS
Por favor indique las amenazas que actualmente afectan los recursos naturales en su propiedad
(ausente, muy poco, presente, muy fuerte) y su tendencia comparado con los últimos 5 años (aumento
mucho ++, aumento un poco +, se mantuvo igual =, disminuyó un poco -, disminuyó mucho - -)
Impactos y Amenazas Estado actual Tendencia Comentarios
Practicas agricolas no sostenibles actual
Practicas ganaderas no sostenibles
Cacería
Tala o entresaca de madera
Recolección de leña
Contaminación fuentes de agua
Basuras y residuos solidos
Derrumbes y/o deslizamientos
Quemas
Erosión
Eventos climáticos extremos
Otros

CONSERVACION Y CAPACIDAD DE MANEJO

Por favor indique cómo han cambiado las siguientes condiciones en su propiedad durante los últimos
5 años (aumento mucho ++, un poco +, se mantuvo igual =, disminuyó un poco -, mucho - -)
Durante los últimos 5 años Tendencia ( ++/+/=/- /- -)
El área en la que ha implementado prácticas de manejo sostenible
El área dedicada a conservación de bosque en su finca
Las condiciones generales de los bosques
Las condiciones generales de las especies amenazadas
Las condiciones generales de las fuentes de agua
Factores sociales que favorecen la conservación
Factores económicos que favorecen la conservación
Factores políticos que favorecen la conservación
Los recursos necesarios para manejar su finca de manera sostenible
Su participación en iniciativas comunitarias para la conservación
Su capacidad para implementar prácticas de manejo sostenible y conserv

Considera que actualmente cuenta con los recursos necesarios para conservar y manejar su
propiedad de una manera sostenible? ________ Que le falta? ________________________ ______
_________________________________________________________________________________

Capacitación/ conocimiento ! Materiales/Insumos ! Mano de obra !

Apoyo de la comunidad ! Apoyo institucional ! Oportunidades de mercado !

239
 PARTICIPACION COMUNITARIA
Por favor indique si pertenece o ha pertenecido a alguna organización comunitaria, asociación,
junta, ONG, o representa a su comunidad en algún cargo público. Ingresó por su propia iniciativa?
Esperó a que otros amigos o vecinos ingresaran o se lo recomendaran antes de participar?
Iniciativa propia (P) # amigos que
Organización # años Cargo
Recomendación (R) ingresaron antes

INFORMACION PARA FUTUROS PROYECTOS

1. Estaría interesado en aumentar el área en conservación en su reserva? SI £ NO £
Como? Regeneración pasiva £ Reforestación / Restauración £ ___________________
2. Tiene registros detallados de su actividad productiva y estaría dispuesto
a compartir esta información para un ejercicio de evaluación económica? SI £ NO £

OTROS COMENTARIOS

Porqué decidió ingresar a la Red? ____________________________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________

Aspectos positivos o negativos? ______________________ ________________________________

_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
Sugerencias para mejorar? _________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
Como ve el futuro de su reserva? _____________________________________________________
_________________________________ _____________________________________________ ___
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________ _________________________________________________
Otros comentarios _________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________ _________________________________________

240
 APPENDIX G
QUESTIONNAIRE INSTRUMENT SOCIAL NETWORKS (SPANISH VERSION).

241
242
243
244
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 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Constanza has bachelor's degree in biology from Universidad del Valle in

Colombia and a master's degree in ecology from the Instituto Venezolano de

Investigaciones Cientificas. She has worked as a researcher on forest population

dynamics and conservation biology of endangered trees in the Instituto Humboldt in

Colombia and as practitioner and consultant in community conservation projects with

several NGOs in Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil. After working for several years she

became increasingly aware of how important is to go beyond conventional assumptions

about local people and their relationship with forest and to get a deeper understanding

of their perceptions and motivations for forest conservation. With her dissertation

research she is trying integrate her background in conservation biology with social

sciences to understand the factors that foster or hinder civil society participation on

voluntary conservation initiatives.

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