The Concept of a State

STATE v, COUNTRY v. GOVERNEMENT?

GOVERNMENT is merely an instrumentality of the State through which the will of the State is implemented
and realized. (NACHURA)
STATE is independent of outside control, while COUNTRY does not require independence.

PEOPLE:
Are they required to be citizens? Yes, at least some portion (e.g. Vatican, only 450 are citizens)

TERRITORY:
Is it required that the territory be composed of water, air, and land? YES, for sustenance.
Archipelagic Doctrine:“…the waters around, between and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.” (2nd sentence,
Sec. 1, Art. I)

IS THE ARCHIPELAGIC PRINCIPLE A PART OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?

No. The archipelagic principle is not part of international law. Until the International Convention on the Law of
the Sea comes into force and effect, it is not a part of international law. It is merely a part of municipal law and
therefore, it depends upon our own capacity to enforce our own claim.

STRAIGHT BASELINE METHOD: Imaginary straight lines are drawn enclosing the outermost points of
outermost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1 (water to
land); provided that the drawing of baselines shall not depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general
configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the baselines shall be considered internal waters; while the
breadth of the territorial sea shall then be measured from the baselines.

Examples of innocent passage (GAB QUESTION)

Article 52. Right of innocent passage. —
1. Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent
passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3.
2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend
temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension
is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly
published.

Why is the demarcation of the baseline important? Explain.

The demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone.

Are there any distinctions between the constituent and ministrant functions of government? Explain.
None. Under the expanded provisions of the Constitution on social justice, what used to be optional functions of
government became mandated or imposed, hence, they are now mandatory.

Parens patriae is exercised by the State for the purpose of seeing to it that the welfare of the citizens are
taken cared of. Does this apply in criminal cases? Give an example
Yes, it is also applicable in criminal cases, like in People v. Casipit, where it was said that where the victims of
rape are of tender years, there is a marked receptivity on the part of the courts to lend credence to their version of
what transpired, a matter not to be wondered at, since the State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves.

Municipal laws remain in force because they regulate the relations between private individuals in order to
preserve public order.

Page 16 of 250
Principle of Jus Postiliminium
At the end of the occupation, when the occupant is ousted from the territory, the political laws which had been
suspended during the occupation shall automatically become effective again.

Is there any distinction between possession of sovereignty and exercise of sovereignty?

Yes. Sovereignty itself resides and remains with the State as a juristic person, while the exercise of sovereignty
is delegated as a rule to the government or its organs, which may be a king or president, a parliament, or the
Congress, the electorate, or some other entity.

Is there any distinction between possession of sovereignty and exercise of sovereignty?

Yes. Sovereignty itself resides and remains with the State as a juristic person, while the exercise of sovereignty
is delegated as a rule to the government or its organs, which may be a king or president, a parliament, or the
Congress, the electorate, or some other entity.

What are political laws? Give examples.

Political laws are those laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.
Examples are laws on citizenship, right of assembly, freedom of speech, press, etc.
What are non-political laws or municipal laws? Give examples.
Non-political laws are those which regulate the social, economic, or commercial life of the country of the
inhabitants with each other. Examples are civil, or commercial laws.

When is there military occupation over a territory?

There is military occupation over a territory when:
1. There is war between two (2) States;
2. The armed forces of one of the belligerents take actual physical possession of the territory of the other State;
3. The armed forces of the belligerent is able to establish effective control and administration.

If one of these is lacking, there can be no military occupation in the legal sense.

What is the force of the assertion of a territorial claim in a constitution?

It should be remembered that a constitution is municipal law. As such, it binds only the nation promulgating it.
Hence, a definition of national territory in the constitution will bind internationally only if it is supported by
proof that can stand in international law.

What is included by the clause “all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction”?
This includes any territory which presently belongs or might in the future belong to the Philippines through any
of the internationally accepted modes of acquiring territory. It also includes what was referred to under the 1973
Constitution as territories “belonging to the Philippines by historic right or legal title,” that is, other territories
which, depending on available evidence, might belong to the Philippines.

Distinguish “state” from “nation”.

Although for the purpose of political sociology a state, which is a legal concept, may be distinguished from
nation, which is an ethnic concept, for the purpose of constitutional law the two terms are not distinct. The
Constitution uses them interchangeably to designate the legal concept of state as defined above.

Was the government under Cory Aquino and the Freedom Constitution a de jure government?
Yes, because it was established by authority of the legitimate sovereign, the people. It was a revolutionary
government established in defiance of the 1973 Constitution.

How do state, government and administration differ from each other?

State is the corporate entity; government is one of the elements of a state and is the institution through which the
state exercises power, administration consists of the set of people currently running the institution.
Administrations change without a change in either state or government.

Page 17 of 250
UNCLOS/SOUTH CHINA SEA NOTES

Before UNCLOS: UNCLOS replaces the older 'freedom of the seas' concept, dating from the 17th
century: national rights were limited to a specified belt of water extending from a nation's coastlines,
usually 3 nautical miles (5.6 km) (Three-mile limit), according to the 'cannon shot' rule. All waters
beyond national boundaries were considered international waters: free to all nations, but belonging to
none of them

Mandatory Clause: all members of UNCLOS 3 are mandated to submit their controversies involving
issues as to the application of UNCLOS to arbitration.

China refused to participate although it submitted position papers through informal channels. While
China and Philippines are both parties to the UNCLOS, China specifically made a declaration in 2006
to exclude maritime boundary delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement. They
specifically reserved historic titles of China.
Per PCA: Despite China’s absence from the proceedings, since it is a party to the UNCLOS,
the decision of the Tribunal would, in fact, be binding upon it, pursuant to Article 296
(1)[5] and Article 11 of Annex VII[6].

Article 296. Finality and binding force of decisions

1. Any decision rendered by a court or tribunal having jurisdiction under this section shall be final and
shall be complied with by all the parties to the dispute.
2. Any such decision shall have no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular dispute.

Jurisdiction of PCA: Jurisdiction is limited only to the determination of the maritime zones and status
of geologic features (i.e., whether low tide or high tide elevations). It does not include jurisdiction on
territorial sovereignty (over land territory).
China contested jurisdiction on 2 grounds:
1) Issue involves delimitation of territorial boundaries
2) Issue involves historic titles

Article 15 Delimitation of the territorial sea between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is
entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median
line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply,
however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.
Delimitation issue: issue on overlapping boundaries (i.e., overlapping of 200 nm between States).
Per PCA: Based on submission through informal channels, China is not claiming sovereignty
or exercising rights over the area in dispute because the area is beyond 200 nm generated from
its territory. Therefore, the issue does not involve the delimitation of territorial boundary. PCA
has jurisdiction.

China has always argued for historic rights, as demarcated by the ‘Nine Dash Line’ on its official maps
of the region in question; other stakeholders, however, dispute this claim, as shown in the arbitral
proceedings.

Page 18 of 250
The Tribunal is of the view that this usage was understood by the drafters of the Convention and that the
reference to ‘historic titles’ in Article 298(1)(a)(i) of the Convention is accordingly a reference to claims of
sovereignty over maritime areas derived from historical circumstances. This accords with the only other direct
usage of the term, in Article 15 of the Convention, where historical sovereignty would understandably bear on
the delimitation of the territorial sea. Other “historic rights”, in contrast, are nowhere mentioned in the
Convention, and the Tribunal sees nothing to suggest that Article 298(1)(a)(i) was intended to also exclude
jurisdiction over a broad and unspecified category of possible claims to historic rights falling short of
sovereignty.
Per PCA: Historic title refers only to historic rights over bays and near shore waters. The South China
Sea is definitely not a bay and the water under dispute is not a near shore water. Maritime entitlements
must be claimed only from the land. All historic rights in the maritime zones were extinguished upon the
effectivity of the UNCLOS. Therefore, this does not involve historic title, hence, PCA has jurisdiction.

The Philippines sought a determination as to whether certain land features in the Spratly Islands
claimed by both China and the Philippines are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low tide
elevations (LTEs), or submerged banks.
Article 121 Regime of islands
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions
of this Convention applicable to other land territory. It can generate up to 200 nm as long as they can
support human habitation and independent economic activity which are not only extractive.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf. It can generate up to 12nm of territorial sea.
Per PCA: In order to determine the rights of coastal States (to be entitled to either 12 nm or
200nm), the natural condition (i.e., original condition) of the island or of the rocks should be
determined. None of the features in the Spratly Islands generates an EEZ, nor can the Spratly Islands
generate an EEZ collectively as a unit. As such, the Tribunal declared certain areas are within the
Philippines’ EEZ and not overlapped by any possible Chinese entitlement. Most of the contested areas
in the arbitration have already been modified. Moreover, PCA has jurisdiction since this is not a
delimitation issue (since there are no other EEZs that overlap with Palawan EEZ)

3 features in the PH that are submerged during high tide (hence, they cannot generate any
maritime zone; they will belong to the coastal State which has right over the 200 nm):
1) Mischief Reef
2) Reed Bank
3) Second Thomas Shoal
All three are within the PH’s 200 nm. Other features are high tide features (they can generate
their own maritime zones; e.g., Masinloc=no pronouncement as to who has authority over these
area since PCA has no jurisdiction over land territory).

The baseline of analysis is what the features can sustain in their “natural condition” (i.e., not
after construction of artificial islands, installation of desalination plants, etc.). Based on historical
evidence, none of the features in the Spratly Islands can sustain either a stable community of people or
economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature. The current
presence of personnel on the features is dependent on outside support and does not reflect the capacity
of the features in their natural condition

On Scarborough Shoal
Per PCA: Scarborough Shoal contains, within the meaning of Article 121(1) of the Convention,
naturally formed areas of land, surrounded by water, which are above water at high tide.
Page 19 of 250
 However, under Article 121(3) of the Convention, the high-tide features at Scarborough Shoal
are rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own and accordingly
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. Hence, it is capable of generating
the 12nm territorial sea but not the 200 nm EEZ. China violated the Philippines’ “traditional
fishing rights” at Scarborough Shoal

CIR vs Rueda
The expression 'foreign country', used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal
Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international
person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon intangible
personal properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from
such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government
in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the last proviso of Section 122 of our Tax
Code.

Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such that demand
reciprocity — as in this case. And the exemption must be honored."

Magallona vs Ermita

Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State. Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified.

RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands" whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones. Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves.

Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris' technical description, Philippine sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris

WON RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state's
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution embodying the terms of the Treaty of
Paris and ancillary treaties

RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country' Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under
UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play
no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use
rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and continental
shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law

It was opined that the enactment of the baseline law is merely permissive. Why then enact such?
Page 20 of 250
Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find
itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and
continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation
to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas
around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country's case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

RA 9522's Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines' Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas.
Petitioners' assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA
9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location
of basepoints, increased the Philippines' total maritime space. Further, petitioners' argument that the
KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the
KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim
of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal. Had Congress in RA 9522
enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects
would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS
III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart
to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago." Second, Article 47 (2) of
UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles," save for
three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines' claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress'
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "'Regime[s] of Islands' under the Republic
of the Philippines consistent with Article 121" of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State's
responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of
UNCLOS III, any "naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high
tide," such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.

Petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters,
hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III,
including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine
internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. In the
absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty's
limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis-Ã -vis continental coastal
States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit
passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim
all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. The fact of sovereignty does not preclude the
operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters
to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation.
Page 21 of 250
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis
maritime space — the exclusive economic zone — in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS
III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to
200 nautical miles

Bacani vs NACOCO

Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National
Coconut Corporation, Assistant Corporate Counsel of NACOCO requested said stenographers for
copies of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. NACOCO paid the
fees to the stenographers. The Auditor General required the stenographers to reimburse said amounts
on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed
that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the
fees in question.

Under the Rules of Court, the Government of the Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees
provided for therein, and among these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the transcript
of notes. Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of the term "Government of the Republic of
the Philippines" as follows:
"'The Government of the Philippine Islands' is a term which refers to the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippine Islands, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the
central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local
government."

There are functions which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as expressed
in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute of sovereignty, and those which it may
exercise to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter class
belongs the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the government to promote
certain aspects of the economic life of our people such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are
what we call government owned or controlled corporations.

The term "Government" may be defined as "that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an
independent society makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable men to
live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming that society by those who
possess the power or authority of prescribing them"

Does the fact that these corporation perform certain functions of government make them a part of the
Government of the Philippines?
They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation. While NACOCO was organized with the
purpose of "adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the
United States" and of providing "Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper
utilization of coconut by-products", a function which our government has chosen to exercise to
promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct
from our government, for it was made subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law.

Page 22 of 250
 "The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make
it a public corporation. By becoming a stockholder in the National Coal Company, the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the transactions of the
corporation. . . . Unlike the Government, the corporation may be sued without its consent, and is
subject to taxation. Yet the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of
government. Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a
portion of the State.

The term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through
which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local
government. These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities
which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are
governed by the Corporation Law. The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would
only include organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with political and legislative powers
for the local, civil government and police regulations of the inhabitants of the particular district
included in the boundaries of the corporation. This power (i.e., exercise subordinate specified powers
of legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns) of local government
is the distinctive purpose and the distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper.

Philippine Virginia Tobacco vs CIR

Claimants, now private respondents, filed a petition wherein they alleged their employment
relationship, the overtime services in excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the
failure to pay them overtime compensation by PVTA in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.
Petitioner PVTA argued that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising
governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

"The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification
of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to
private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and
only 'because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual
or group of individuals,' continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within
activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing
social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a
greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed
adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the
promotion of social justice."

"The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of government activity. "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional
Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the
responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control
over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare
through state action.

The fundamental law is hostile to the view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez
faire concept. The welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution." It is
Page 23 of 250
much more so under the present Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of
social and economic rights.

Whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental and not
proprietary functions.

As originally established by Republic Act No. 2265, its purposes and objectives were to encourage the
production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both
domestic and foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and to
create a climate conducive to local cigarette manufacture.

GPI vs Monte De Piedad

In June 1863 a devastating earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish Government then
provided $400,000.00 as aid for the victims and it was received by the Philippine Treasury. Out of the
said amount, $80,000.00 was left untouched; it was then invested in the Monte de Piedad Bank which
in turn invested the amount in jewelries. But when the Philippine government later tried to withdraw
the said amount, the bank cannot provide for the amount. The government then filed a complaint. The
bank argued that the Philippine government is not an affected party hence has no right to institute a
complaint. The bank argues that the government was not the intended beneficiary of the said amount.

It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to
the Government, even considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or in other
words, the present Philippine Government cannot maintain this action for that reason. While the
obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish Government was still pending, war between the United
States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United the Treaty
of Paris of December 10, 1898, the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the
United States.

It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damages by this
payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donor or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government
is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring the action. The names of the
contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. The beneficiaries, consisting
of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite numerous also.
And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would
be impracticable for them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover
the $80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to against assume
control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally destined.

The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the
right of the Government to maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a
charity became, in a measure, public property, only applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to
which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public use, and became
part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. To
deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as
tending to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and
prosecuting this action, is exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a
trust devolved upon it when the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. The government
Page 24 of 250
being the protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce such laws that
will promote the public interest.

Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh

Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First
Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio
Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the
Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the
Philippine government under the Japanese).

A civil government or central administration organization under the name of "Philippine Executive Commission was
organized by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was
appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central
administrative organs and judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said
Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.

It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same
and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far it
concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality
of its acts." The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run
by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. The so-called Republic of the Philippines,
apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino
people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of
occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its
authority was the same — the Japanese military authority and government

It is contended that the military occupation of the Philippine Islands by the Japanese was not actual
and effective because of the existence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains and even towns and
villages; and consequently, no government de facto could have been validly established by the Japanese
military forces in the Philippines under the precepts of the Hague Conventions and the law of nations.
The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns, was not sufficient
to make the military occupation ineffective nor did it cause that occupation to cease, or prevent
the constitution or establishment of a de facto government in the Islands. The belligerent
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders became as accomplished fact from the
time General Wainwright, Commander of the American and Filipino forces in Luzon, and
General Sharp, Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao, surrendered and ordered the
surrender of their forces to the Japanese invaders, and the Commonwealth Government had
become incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and the invader had substituted his own
authority for that of the legitimate government in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.

It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in the Kellog- Briand Pact of war as an
instrument of national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules of international law authorizing the
belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a provisional or de facto government in the
Philippines ; and that to give validity to the judicial acts of court sponsored by the Japanese would be
tantamount to giving validity to the acts of these invaders, and would be nothing short of legalizing the
Japanese invasion of the Philippines.
The provisions of the Hague Conventions which imposes upon a belligerent occupant the duty
to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the country unless absolutely
prevented were inserted, not for the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of
Page 25 of 250
 the people or inhabitants of the occupied territory and of those not in the military service, in
order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged

The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore,
exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and
void the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity
to such judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing
as much harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory and prejudice the
latter; it would cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing
his nefarious design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and
rewarding the invader or occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.

As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights or
persons and property and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good and valid even after
occupation has ceased. As there are vested rights which have been acquired by the parties by virtue of
such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or abrogate them without
causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal would deprive them of their
properties without due process of law. They are considered as continuing, unless suspended or
superseded by the occupying belligerent."

Proclamation of Gen. Mcarthur: "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes"

The term “processes” as used in the proclamation should be construed to mean legislative and
constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis." According to this maxim, where a
particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meaning , its
meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found. Hence, it
must be interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the
President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic and
not judicial processes

The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese
military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the
courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of
the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has
been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except
in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion,
administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it
otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion.

(natural consequence of war. Not found in ph consti, not found in japan consti. Gen macarthur has
power to invalidate all acts of Japanese gov as leader of the liberating force)

According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, the belligerent occupant:

a) has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military
occupation

Page 26 of 250
 b) can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he
may see fit,
c) is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the
occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce
public order and regulate social and commercial life of the country.
d) laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of
assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the
territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation.

The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military
possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to
establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation,
nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and
such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and
confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations

Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to,
or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands
had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized
in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge
Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to
the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty
over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power
to exercise its rights as such.

Kinds of de facto governments:

The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and
control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments and
maintains itself against the will of the latter.
The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a
territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount
force
The third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state.

Laurel vs Misa

Anastacio Laurel was charged with treason for alleged collaboration with the enemy during the
Japanese occupation. He filed a petition for habeas corpus on the theory that the sovereignty of the
legitimate government of the Philippines and the allegiance of all Filipinos were suspended.

A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent allegiance,
which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this
absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which of foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as
he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the
laws of the government or sovereign.

The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy to their
legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
Page 27 of 250
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. The
sovereignty must be distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended. What may be suspended is
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by
the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant;

Although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force, unless absolutely prevented
by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life
of the Country (i.e., municipal laws), he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and
may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so for the
control of the country and the protection of his army. Since the preservation of the allegiance or the
obligation of fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not
demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the
enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no power, as a corollary of the
preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the operation of the law of treason, essential for the
preservation of the allegiance owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them
to adhere and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not demanded by the
exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control of the inhabitants.

If an inhabitant of the occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through
force, threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist and die if
necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor. The adoption of the petitioner's
theory of suspended allegiance would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants
of the occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring the risk of
being prosecuted for treason, and thus deprive them all of their own independence or sovereignty;
committing political suicide.

Allegiance has been defined as the obligation for fidelity and obedience which the individual owes to
his government or his sovereign in return for the protection which he receives.

Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or
military bases all over the country. Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his
band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Jurado
relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new
authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Jurado was thus allegedly slain
by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioners' trial, the legality
of which is now being contested.

This was a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondents, the Chief of Staff and the General
Court Martial of the Philippine Army, be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of
petitioners before that body. The ground of the petition was that the petitioners were not subject to
military law at the time the offense for which they had been placed on trial was committed

By the occupation of the Philippines by Japanese forces, the officers and men of the Philippine
Army did not cease to be fully in the service, though, in a measure, only in a measure, they were not
subject to the military jurisdiction, if they were not in active duty. In the latter case, like officers and
soldiers on leave of absence or held as prisoners of war, they could not be held guilty of a breach of
Page 28 of 250
discipline of the command or of a neglect of duty. A prisoner of war, though not subject, while held
by the enemy, to the discipline of his own army, would, when exchanged or paroled, be not exempt
from liability for such offenses as criminal acts or injurious conduct committed during his captivity
against other officers or soldiers in the same status."

The rule invoked by counsel, namely, that laws of political nature or affecting political relations are
considered superseded or in abeyance during the military occupation, is intended for the governing of
the civil inhabitants of the occupied territory. It is not intended for and does not bind the enemies in
arms. This is self-evident from the very nature of things. The paradox of a contrary ruling should
readily manifest itself. Under the petitioners' theory the forces of resistance operating in an occupied
territory would have to abide by the outlawing of their own existence. They would be stripped of the
very lifeblood of an army, the right and the ability to maintain order and discipline within the
organization and to try the men guilty of breach thereof.

By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the General Headquarters of the
6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army amenable to the Articles of War.
The Bolo Area, as has been seen, was a contingent of the 6th Military District which, as has also been
pointed out, had been recognized by and placed under the operational control of the United States
Army in the Southwest Pacific. The surrender by General Wainright of the Fil-American Forces does
not profit the petitioners who were former members of the Philippine Constabulary any more than
does the rule of war or international law they cite.

Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of
courts martial has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as
Commander in Chief, independently of legislation." Unlike courts of law, they are not a portion of the
judiciary.

Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts martial must pertain to
the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided
by Congress for the President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army
and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives.' It must never be lost sight of that the only legitimate object of military
tribunals is to aid the Crown to maintain the discipline and government of the Army."

People vs Gozo

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s
Office and some neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary
permits and then later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office
for violating a municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or
construction within the City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed
and countered that the City of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is
within a Naval Base of a foreign country.

She stands on quicksand when she would deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext
that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American armed forces. While
yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would,
in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise therein
administrative jurisdiction.
Page 29 of 250
"Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may
be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its
limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal.

The principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or
implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what
otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which,
in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive
capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from
the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence."

It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over
certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed
with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear.

"The carrying out of the provisions of the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting parties
alone. The rights granted to the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can
not be raised by the offender.

PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the
common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom,
love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

Doctrine of State Immunity

Par in parem non habet imperium- equals have no sovereignty over each other

Exceptions to state immunity

1) Express consent
2) Enters into contract proprietary in nature
3) Not to perpetrate injustice
4) Commences litigation (only when Government is claiming affirmative relief)
Doctrine of State Immunity will not apply to:
1) Compel performance of a ministerial duty or
2) restrain an act which is prohibited by constitution or law

Sanders vs Veridiano (official character of letters-libel case)

Private Respondents were both employed as game room attendants in the US Naval Station
(NAVSTA). Their employment have been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time.
After the grievance proceedings, the hearing officer recommended the reinstatement of private
respondents to permanent full time status plus back wages. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau,
Commanding Officer of the Subic Naval Base, Petitioner Sanders, Special Services Director of
Page 30 of 250
NAVSTA, disagreed with the recommendation and asked for its rejection. Moreau, even before the
start of the grievance hearings, sent a letter to the chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of the
Private Respondent’s status and requested concurrence therewith. Private respondents filed suit for
damages claiming that the letter contained libelous imputations. They make it clear that petitioners
were being sued in their personal capacity. A motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that the acts complained of was in official character was filed by the petitioner and was
denied.

Whether or not the petitioners are performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they
are being sued for damages.

YES. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment,
work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had
written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information
regarding the case of the private respondents. As for Moreau, the act is clearly official in nature,
performed as the immediate superior of Sanders and directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters
involving the special services department of NAVSTA. In fact, the letter dealt with the financial and
budgetary problems of the department and contained recommendations for their solution, including the
re-designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal or private about it.

The mere allegation that a government functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not
automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of state immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character will not
suffice to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a personal tort
committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settled principles are applicable not only to
the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains to the government
of a foreign state, as in the present case (i.e., US).

Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of
damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal capacities but by
the United States government as their principal. This will require that government to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the judgment, viz., the appropriation of the necessary amount to cover the
damages awarded, thus making the action a suit against that government without its consent.

The doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states
sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived
from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non
habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations.

We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may
directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as
normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice."

A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in the Olongapo Naval Base by the
petitioners in the performance of their official duties and the private respondents are themselves
American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this country to refrain from taking
cognizance of this matter and to treat it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.

Page 31 of 250
Even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
good faith, which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even mistakes concededly
committed by such public officers are not actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

Q: What are the exceptions when a public officer may be sued without the prior consent of the
state? (Sanders vs Veridiano)
1. To compel him to do an act required by law
2. To restrain him from enforcing an act claimed to be unconstitutional
3. To compel the payment of damages from an already appropriated assurance fund or refund tax over-
payments from a fund already available for the purpose
4. To secure a judgement that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the state having to
do a positive act to assist him
5. Where the government itself has violated its own laws because the doctrine of state immunity cannot
be used to perpetrate injustice.

Republic vs Sandoval (mendiola massacre)

President Aquino created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission for the purpose of conducting an
investigation for the disorders, death, and casualties that took place in the Mendiola Massacre.
The most significant recommendation of the commission was for the deceased and other victims of
Mendiola Incident to be compensated by the Government. Petitioners (Caylao group) instituted an
action for damages against the Republic of the Philippines together with military officers and personnel
involved in Mendiola Incident. Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as against the
Republic of the Philippines on the basis that there was no waiver by the state. Petitioners argues that the
State has impliedly waived its sovereign immunity by the recommendation made by the Commission
for the government to indemnify the heirs and victims and by the public addresses made by then
President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings.

WON there was waiver of immunity

The recommendation made by the Commission does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. Whatever recommendation it makes cannot in any way bind the State
immediately, such recommendation not having become final and executory. This is precisely the
essence of it being a fact-finding body. President Aquino's speech promising that the government
would address the grievances of the rallyists cannot result to the inference that the State has admitted
any liability, much less can it be inferred that it has consented to the suit.

WON this is a suit against the State

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the
government. Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging
their official functions when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment
they exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification by the
government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the police and military crowd
dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. Blg. 880 as there was unnecessary firing by them
in dispersing the marchers.

An officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his
office when his acts are wholly without authority. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize
Page 32 of 250