REMEDIAL LAW

REVIEW I

CASE DOCTRINES

on

CIVIL PROCEDURE

and

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Submitted by: GENILO, HANNA LIIA P.

Student number: 2014-0085
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
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SERANA vs SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
REYES, R.T., J:

1) The Supreme Court settled that it is P.D. No.

1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019
(The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended), that determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, differentiating the same in that
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No.
3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt
practices and provides for their penalties.

2) It is not only the salary grade that determines

the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. Section 4
(A) (1) (g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations.

DUNCANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) Those that fall within the original jurisdiction

of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the
executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher,
and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section
4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary
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grades. While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers

only officials of the executive branch with Salary
Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions
may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who
are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26

and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the
positions enumerated by the law. In this category,
it is the position held, not the salary grade, which
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to
the general qualification relating to "officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989." As ruled
in Inding: …except for those officials specifically
included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of
their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG
27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial
courts "where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or
higher."
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DE LIMA vs. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject

matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law. It is determined
by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Indeed, Congress has
the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then
that Congress may also, by law, provide that a
certain class of cases should be exclusively heard
and determined by one court. Such would be a
special law that is construed as an exception to the
general law on jurisdiction of courts.

2) The pertinent special law governing drug-

related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules
provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of
RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that
jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively
vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other.
The designation of the RTC as the court with the
exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
apparent in the following provisions where it was
expressly mentioned and recognized as the only
court with the authority to hear drug-related cases

3) The exclusive original jurisdiction over

violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a
position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless
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of whether the violation is alleged as committed in

relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan
to sit in judgment of high-ranking government
officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits
are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,
which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.

4) Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and

felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact
that they were committed "in relation to their
office." In determining the forum vested with the
jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the
laws governing the subject matter of the criminal
prosecution must likewise be considered.

5) Section 4 (b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA

10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed
by high-ranking public officers in relation to their
office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law
excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
violations of RA 9165 committed by such public
officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested
upon the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as
drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of
RA 9165 was committed in relation to the public
officials' office.
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CITY OF MANILA vs. GRECIA-CUERDO

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J p:

1) The authority of the CTA to take cognizance of

petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory
orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is
included in the powers granted by the as well as
inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

2) While there is no express grant of such power,

with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless,
that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law and that judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. It, thus, follows
that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these
cases.

3) A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that

there is included in it the power necessary to
exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will
preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect
to the final determination of the appeal. It carries
with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to
make the decisions of the court thereunder effective.
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The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has

authority to control all auxiliary and incidental
matters necessary to the efficient and proper
exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it
may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the
performance of any act which might interfere with
the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in
cases pending before it.

4) Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers

which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such
powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to
the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as
well as to the due administration of justice; or are
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
execution of their granted powers; and include the
power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render
it effective in behalf of the litigants.

CE CASECNAN WATER & ENERGY CO.,

INC. vs. PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA
G.R. No. 196278 June 17, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) has

exclusive jurisdiction over a special civil action
for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a
local tax case.
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2) It is the CTA which has the power to rule on a

Petition for Certiorari assailing an interlocutory
order of the RTC relating to a local tax case. The
jurisdiction of the CTA was expanded by virtue
of Republic Act No. 9282. This includes its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal
the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by
the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate
jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court has already held
that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in
the CTA, it follows that a petition
for certiorari seeking nullification of an
interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the same court.

LOMONDOT vs. BALINDON

G.R. No. 192463 July 13, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) In Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong, the Court

stated that: . . . [t]he Shari'a Appellate Court has
yet to be organized with the appointment of a
Presiding Justice and two Associate Justices. Until
such time that the Shari'a Appellate Court shall
have been organized, however, appeals or petitions
from final orders or decisions of the SDC filed
with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division
to be organized in any of the CA stations
preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.
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MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, LANAO

DEL NORTE vs. BALINDONG
G.R. No. 193340 January 11, 2017
JARDELEZA, J p:

1) The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the

Philippines (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) vests
concurrent jurisdiction upon Shari'a district courts
over personal and real actions wherein the parties
involved are Muslims, except those for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer.

2) The general jurisdiction of Shari'a district

courts are over those matters ordinarily cognizable
by regular courts. There is, however, a limit to such
jurisdiction: it may only be invoked if both parties
are Muslims. If one party is not a Muslim, the action
must be filed before the regular courts.

UNDURAN vs. ABERASTURI

G.R. No. 181284 April 18, 2017
PERALTA, J p:

1) Under Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall

have limited jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of IPs/ICCs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same
ICC/IP group; but if such claims and disputes arise
between or among parties who do not belong to the
same ICC/IP group, the proper regular courts shall
have jurisdiction. However, under Sections 52 (h)
and 53, in relation to Section 62 of the IPRA, as
well as Section 54, the NCIP shall have primary
jurisdiction over adverse claims and border dispute
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arising from the delineation of ancestral

domains/lands, and cancellation of fraudulently-
issued CADTs, regardless of whether the parties
are non-ICCs/IPs, or members of different
ICCs/IPs groups, as well as violations of ICCs/IPs
rights under Section 72 of the IPRA where both
parties belong to the same ICC/IP group.

2) Primary jurisdiction is the power and

authority vested by the Constitution or by statute
upon an administrative body to act upon a matter
by virtue of its specific competence. The Court
discerns that nothing in the IPRA expressly or
impliedly confers concurrent jurisdiction to the
NCIP and the regular courts over claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs between and
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP
group.
The jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66
of the IPRA is limited to claims and disputes
involving rights of IPs/ICCs where both parties
belong to the same ICC/IP group, but if such
claims and disputes arise between or among parties
who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the
proper regular courts shall have jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, the NCIP has primary jurisdiction
over these cases even if one of the parties is a non-
ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members
of different ICCs/IPs groups. At this juncture, it is
not amiss to state that the NCIP's decision shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
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LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

DALAUTA
G.R. No. 190004 August 8, 2017
MENDOZA, J p:

1) The doctrine of primary jurisdiction tells us

that courts cannot, and will not, resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.

2) In agrarian reform cases, primary

jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more
specifically, in the DARAB as provided for in
Section 50 of . On the other hand, the SACs are the
Regional Trial Courts expressly granted by law
with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE

PHILIPPINES vs. CARPIO
G.R. No. 195450 February 1, 2017
MENDOZA, J p:
1) The "residual jurisdiction" of the trial court is
available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or
the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals
by the parties or upon the approval of the records
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on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the

original records or the records on appeal. In either
instance, the trial court still retains its so-called
residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders,
approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and
allow the withdrawal of the appeal.

Before the trial court can be said to have

residual jurisdiction over a case, a trial
on the merits must have been conducted; the court
rendered judgment; and the aggrieved party
appealed therefrom. In this case, there was no trial
on the merits as the case was dismissed due to
improper venue and respondents could not have
appealed the order of dismissal as the same was a
dismissal, without prejudice. As the Rules of Civil
Procedure provide that no appeal may be taken
from an order dismissing an action without
prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction
to speak of where no appeal has even been filed.

REGULUS DEVELOPMENT, INC. vs.

DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 198172 January 25, 2016
BRION, J p:

The appellate jurisdiction of courts is

conferred by law. The appellate court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties
when an appeal is perfected. On the other hand,
equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice
in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case
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because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the

law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of
the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is
to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution.

The RTC's equity jurisdiction is separate and

distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the
ejectment case. The RTC could not have issued its
orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
since there was nothing more to execute on the
dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders
explained, the dismissal of the ejectment case
effectively and completely blotted out and
cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders
were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC's
equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate
jurisdiction.

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE

PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT vs.
REYES
G.R. Nos. 180771 & 181527 April 21, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

1) To further encourage the protection of the

environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen
suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all
cases filed enforcing environmental laws and
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are
stewards of nature.
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2) The primary reason animal rights advocates

and environmentalists seek to give animals and
inanimate objects standing is due to the need to
comply with the strict requirements in bringing a
suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of
Court demand that parties to a suit be either natural
or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law.
It is worth noting that the Stewards are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.

CITY OF MANILA vs. GRECIA-CUERDO

G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
PERALTA, J p:

1) It would be somewhat incongruent with the

pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction
to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide
the authority over a local tax case filed with the
RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory
orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the
trial court in the same case. It is more in consonance
with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the
grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax
cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it
the power to issue a writ of certiorari when
necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a
complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review,
by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the
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RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the

acts of the latter.

LAGMAN vs. PIMENTEL III

G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145 & 236155
February 6, 2018
TIJAM, J p:

1) Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution

pertains to the Court's judicial power to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The first part is
to be known as the traditional concept of judicial
power while the latter part, an innovation of the
1987 Constitution, became known as the court's
expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded
jurisdiction, courts can now delve into acts of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government
traditionally considered as political if such act was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

DUERO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 131282 January 4, 2002
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) While participation in all stages of a case

before the trial court, including invocation of its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively
bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's
jurisdiction, we note that estoppel has become an
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equitable defense that is both substantive and

remedial and its successful invocation can bar a
right and not merely its equitable enforcement.
Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution.
For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto
must be unequivocal and intentional because, if
misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.

SPS. GONZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 144025 December 27, 2002
CORONA, J p:

1) While an order or decision rendered without

jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be assailed at
any stage, active participation in the proceedings in
the court which rendered the order or decision will
bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. In the
case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who
invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by
instituting an action for reformation of contract
against private respondents. Tijam has been
reiterated in many succeeding cases, in that the
Court affirmed the rule that a party's active
participation in all stages of the case before the
trial court, which includes invoking the court's
authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively
estops such party from later challenging that
same court's jurisdiction.

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORP.

vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI
G.R. No. 139791, December 12, 2003
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
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1) The Court has consistently held that complaints

for specific performance with damages by a lot or
condominium unit buyer against the owner or
developer fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB. While it may be true that the trial court is
without jurisdiction over the case, Manila Banker's
active participation in the proceedings estopped it
from assailing such lack of it. The Court has held
that it is an undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings and submitting its
case for decision and then accepting the judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse. Here, Manila Bankers
failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the
trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect, it
confirmed and ratified the trial court's jurisdiction
over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and
can no longer question the trial court's jurisdiction.

BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 173946 June 19, 2013
PEREZ, J p:

1) The "objection on jurisdictional grounds which

is not waived even if not alleged in a motion to
dismiss or the answer is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. . . . Lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter can always be raised anytime, even
for the first time on appeal, since jurisdictional
issues cannot be waived . . . subject, however, to the
principle of estoppel by laches."
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Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over

the person of a party to a case is not one of those
defenses which are not deemed waived under
Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense must be invoked
when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in
order to prevent a waiver of the defense. If the
objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer, the objection to the jurisdiction
over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant is
deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of
Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

AGAN, JR. vs. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL

AIR TERMINALS CO., INC.
G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547 & 155661
May 5, 2003
PUNO, J p:

1) The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling

within the concurrent jurisdiction of the trial courts
and appellate courts generally applies to cases
involving warring factual allegations. For this
reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial
courts at the first instance to determine the truth or
falsity of these contending allegations on the basis
of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend
on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought
immediately before appellate courts as they are not
triers of facts. It goes without saying that when
cases brought before the appellate courts do not
involve factual but legal questions, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary.
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The said rule may be relaxed when the redress

desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of this Court’s primary
jurisdiction.

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY NATIONAL

vs. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
G.R. No. 154599 January 21, 2004
DAVIDE, JR., C.J p:

1) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is a special civil
action that may be invoked only against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Elsewise stated, for a writ of certiorari to
issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it
must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2)
the tribunal, board, or officer must have acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. Before a tribunal, board, or officer may
exercise judicial or quasi- judicial acts, it is
necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some
specific rights of persons or property under which
adverse claims to such rights are made, and the
controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and
authority to determine the law and adjudicate the
respective rights of the contending parties.
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In Santiago v. Vasquez, the propensity of

litigants and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief
directly from this Court must be put to a halt for
two reasons: (1) it would be an imposition upon
the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would
cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in
some instances had to be remanded or referred to
the lower court as the proper forum under the rules
of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.

SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO

ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF BRETHREN
FOUNDATION, INC. vs. RIEL
G.R. No. 176508 January 12, 2015
BERSAMIN, J p:
1) Although the Court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals in issuing the writ
of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when
there are special, extra-ordinary or compelling
reasons that justify the same.

2) A certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, is

granted only under the conditions defined by
the Rules of Court, to wit: (1) the respondent
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, or any plain,
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speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course

of law.

That the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is

not an alternative to an available remedy in the
ordinary course of law is clear from Section 1 of
Rule 65, which requires that there must be no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. Indeed, no error of
judgment by a court will be corrected
by certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional
errors.

The filing of the special civil action directly in

the Supreme Court is in disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in
issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed
only when there are special, extra-ordinary or
compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court
enforces the observance of the hierarchy of courts in
order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and
impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal
with the more fundamental and more essential tasks
that the Constitution has assigned to it.

INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION vs.

OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION
DEVELOPMENT CO.
G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
LEONEN, J p:

1) Nonetheless, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

is not inviolable, and the Supreme Court has
 22

provided several exceptions to the doctrine. One of

these exceptions is the exigency of the situation
being litigated. Moreover, the Supreme Court
permits the direct resort to it in cases arising from a
decision of the RTC upon questions of law such as
those which Intramuros raises in this case.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS vs. GALLEGOS

G.R. No. 220832 February 28, 2018
TIJAM, J p:

1) Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires

the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which is
the tangible representation of the opportunity given
to the office to correct itself. The plain and
adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule
65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision, which in this case, is the RTC's omnibus
order. The purpose of the motion is to enable the
court or agency to rectify its mistakes without the
intervention of a higher court. To dispense with
this requirement, there must be a concrete,
compelling, and valid reason for the failure to
comply with the requirement.

2) Although this Court has concurrent

jurisdiction with the CA and the RTC in issuing
the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only
when there are special, extraordinary or
compelling reasons that justify the same. The
Court enforces the observance of the
hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from
unnecessary, frivolous and impertinent cases and
thus afford time for it to deal with the more
 23

fundamental and more essential tasks that

the Constitution has assigned to it. Absent any
showing of any special, important or compelling
reason to justify the direct filing of the petition will
cause the dismissal of the recourse, as in this case.

KATON vs. PALANCA, JR.,

G.R. No. 151149 September 7, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J p:

1) Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or

failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from
the complaint filed with the trial court, the action
may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of
Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for
review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of
such cases appropriately ends useless litigations.
2) Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in
a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res
judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the
pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four
excepted instances, the court shall motu
proprio dismiss the claim or action. On the other
hand, the "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is
available at a stage in which the court is normally
deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the
subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the
parties or upon the approval of the records on
appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original
records or the records on appeal. In either instance,
 24

the trial court still retains its so-called residual

jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal, and allow the
withdrawal of the appeal.

PAT-OG, SR. vs. CIVIL SERVICE

COMMISSION
G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013
MENDOZA, J p:

1) Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is

possessed over the same parties or subject matter at
the same time by two or more separate tribunals.
When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
specific matters, it is to be presumed that such
jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that
another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where
concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals,
the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.

FIRST SARMIENTO PROPERTY

HOLDINGS, INC. vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018
LEONEN, J p:

1) To determine the nature of an action, whether

or not its subject matter is capable or incapable of
 25

pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal

action or relief sought must be ascertained. If the
principal relief is for the recovery of a sum of
money or real property, then the action is capable
of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal
relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of
money or real property, even if a claim over a sum
of money or real property results as a consequence
of the principal relief, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.

ALDAY vs. FGU INSURANCE CORP.

G.R. No. 138822 January 23, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:

1) It is not simply the filing of the complaint or

appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

The same rule applies to permissive

counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
 26

MERCADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 150241 November 4, 2004
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) Well settled is the rule that the court cannot

acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case, unless the docket fees are paid. And where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied
by payment of the docket fees, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in
no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

PROTON PILIPINAS CORP. vs. BANQUE

NATIONALE DE PARIS
G.R. No. 151242 June 15, 2005
CARPIO MORALES, J p:

1) While the payment of the prescribed docket fee

is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-payment
at the time of filing does not automatically cause the
dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period,
more so when the party involved demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such
payment.

RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
FORMARAN III
G.R. No. 175914, February 10, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

1) Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction

 27

over a claim by the filing of the appropriate

pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee
but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC. vs.

COBARRUBIAS
G.R. No. 187104 August 3, 2010
BRION, J p:

1) Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner

shall pay to the CA clerk of court the docketing and
other lawful fees; non-compliance with the
procedural requirements shall be a sufficient
ground for the petition’s dismissal. Thus, payment
in full of docket fees within the prescribed period
is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is
an essential requirement, without which, the
decision appealed from would become final and
executory as if no appeal has been filed. . However,
there are recognized exceptions to their strict
observance, such as:
(1) Most persuasive and weighty reasons;
(2) To relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure;
(3) Good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable
 28

time from the time of the default;

(4) The existence of special or compelling
circumstances;
(5) The merits of the case;
(6) A cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules;
(7) A lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) The other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby;
(9) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without the appellant's fault;
(10) Peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case;
(11) In the name of substantial justice and fair
play;
(12) Importance of the issues involved; and
(13) Exercise of sound discretion by the judge,
guided by all the attendant circumstances.

GIPA vs. SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE

G.R. No. 177425 June 18, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) In Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, as with other

subsequent cases of the same ruling, the Court
explained that the procedural requirement under
Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the
payment of the docket and other legal fees within
the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. … The requirement of paying the full
amount of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law
 29

or procedure. The payment of docket fees within the

prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of
an appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected. The appellate court does not acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and
the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes
final and executory. Further, under Section 1 (c),
Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on
its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
ground of the non-payment of the docket and other
lawful fees within the reglementary period as
provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment
of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In
both original and appellate cases, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of
the prescribed docket fees.

2) "A party's failure to pay the appellate docket

fee within the reglementary period confers only a
discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss
the proposed appeal. Such discretionary power
should be used in the exercise of the court's sound
judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play with great deal of circumspection,
considering all attendant circumstances and must be
exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously,
with a view to substantial justice."

3) Suffice it to say that "[c]oncomitant to the

liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking
liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide
by the rules." Those who seek exemption from the
 30

application of the rule have the burden of proving

the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason
warranting such departure. Petitioners' failure to
advance any explanation as to why they failed to
pay the correct docket fees or to complete payment
of the same within the period allowed by the CA is
thus fatal to their cause. Hence, a departure from the
rule on the payment of the appeal fee is
unwarranted.

SY-VARGAS vs. ESTATE OF OGSOS

G.R. No. 221062 October 5, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) In view of the finding that the counterclaim is

permissive, and not compulsory as held by the
courts a quo, respondents are required to pay docket
fees. However, it must be clarified that respondents'
failure to pay the required docket fees, per se,
should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their
counterclaim. It has long been settled that while the
court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-
payment at the time of filing of the initiatory
pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal
provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a
reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on
the part of the claimant to defraud the government.

2) In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation

v. Legasto, citing, Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules
of Court, the Court held that in instances where a
litigant's non-payment of docket fees was made in
good faith and without any intention of defrauding
 31

the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo

should be ordered to assess the amount of deficient
docket fees due from such litigant, which will
constitute a judgment lien on the amount awarded to
him, and enforce such lien.

CAMASO vs. TSM SHIPPING (PHILS), INC.

G.R. No. 223290 November 7, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court

provides that in original actions filed before the CA,
such as a petition for certiorari, the payment of the
corresponding docket fees is required, and that the
failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal of such action.

2) In Bibiana Farms & Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 23

the Court nevertheless explained that while non-
payment of docket fees may indeed render an
original action dismissible, the rule on payment of
docket fees may be relaxed whenever the attending
circumstances of the case so warrant.

Verily, the failure to pay the required docket

fees per se should not necessarily lead to the
dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that
while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fees, its non-payment at the time of filing of the
initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its
dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within
a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention
on the part of the claimant to defraud the
 32

government.

DYNAMIC BUILDERS & CONSTRUCTION

CO. (PHIL.), INC. vs. PRESBITERO, JR.
G.R. No. 174202 April 7, 2015
LEONEN, J p:

1) Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court

provides that "[a] party may not institute more than
one suit for a single cause of action." Moreover,
Section 4 discusses the splitting of a single cause of
action in that "if two or more suits are instituted on
the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of
one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the
others." The splitting of a cause of action "violate[s]
the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose
primary objective [is] to avoid unduly burdening the
dockets of the courts."

RELUCIO vs. LOPEZ

G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002
PARDO, J p:

1) A real party in interest is one who stands "to be

benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. A
necessary party as one who is not indispensable but
who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is
to be accorded those already parties, or for a
complete determination or settlement of the claim
subject of the action.
 33

DE CASTRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 115838 July 18, 2002
CARPIO, J p:
1) An indispensable party is one whose interest
will be affected by the court’s action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The joinder of indispensable
parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed
without their presence. Whenever it appears to the
court in the course of a proceeding that an
indispensable party has not been joined, it is the
duty of the court to stop the trial and order the
inclusion of such party.

ORQUIOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 141463 August 6, 2002
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) Only real parties in interest in an action are

bound by the judgment therein and by writs of
execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.

CHINA BANKING CORP. vs. OLIVER

G.R. No. 135796 October 3, 2002
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) An indispensable party in interest without

whom no final determination can be had of an
action. A party is not indispensable to the suit if his
interest in the controversy or subject matter is
distinct and divisible from the interest of the other
parties. A party is also not indispensable if his
presence would merely permit complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action,
 34

or will simply avoid multiple litigations.

DAVID vs. PARAGAS, JR.

G.R. No. 176973 February 25, 2015
MENDOZA, J p:

1) An indispensable party is a party-in-interest

without whom no final determination can be had of
an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of
indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court
with jurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case.

2) The absence of an indispensable party renders

all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even to those present. The failure to
implead an indispensable party is not a mere
procedural matter. Rather, it brings to fore the right
of a disregarded party to its constitutional rights to
due process. Having Olympia's interest being
subjected to a judicially-approved agreement, absent
any participation in the proceeding leading to the
same, is procedurally flawed. It is unfair for being
violative of its right to due process. In fine, a
holding that is based on a compromise agreement
that springs from a void proceeding for want of
jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable
party can never become binding, final nor executory
and it may be "ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.
 35

LAND BANK OF THE PHILS. vs.

CACAYURAN
G.R. No. 191667 April 22, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) "An indispensable party is one whose

interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are
so inextricably intertwined with the other parties'
that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable."
Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

2) The failure to implead any indispensable party

to a suit does not necessarily result in the outright
dismissal of the complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v.
Heirs of Fian, Sr., the Court definitively explained
that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable
parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and
not to dismiss the case: The non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties
may be added on the motion of a party or on the
initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that court may dismiss the
 36

complaint for the plaintiff's failure to comply with

the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable.

LOTTE PHIL. CO., INC. vs. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 166302 July 28, 2005
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

1) The joinder of indispensable parties is

mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction. Thus,
without the presence of indispensable parties to a
suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain
real finality. the non-joinder of indispensable parties
is not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative
at any stage of the action and/or such times as are
just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court,
the latter may dismiss the complaint/ petition for the
petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor.

CARABEO vs. SPOUSES DINGCO

G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011
CARPIO MORALES, J p:

1) In the causes of action which survive, the

wrong complained affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes
of action which do not survive, the injury
complained of is to the person, the property and
 37

rights of property affected being incidental.

SPOUSES DE LA CRUZ vs. JOAQUIN

G.R. No. 162788 July 28, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J p:

1) The rule on the substitution by heirs is not a

matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as
when the right of the representative or heir a
promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute for
a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to
nullify a trial court’s decision. The alleging party
must prove that there was an undeniable violation of
due process.

NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO

G.R. No. 153788 November 27, 2009
BRION, J p:

1) Only one of the co-owners, namely the co-

owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-
owned property, is an indispensable party thereto.
The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their
participation, since the suit is presumed to have
been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.\

DIVINAGRACIA vs. PARILLA

G.R. No. 196750 March 11, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) An indispensable party is one whose interest

 38

will be affected by the court's action in the

litigation, and without whom no final determination
of the case can be had. The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are
so inextricably intertwined with the other parties'
that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.
Thus, the absence of an indispensable party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

DE SANTIAGO vs. VILAR

G.R. Nos. 225309 & 225546, March 6, 2018
TIJAM, J p:

1) By definition, an indispensable party is a party-

in-interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action, and who shall be joined either
as plaintiffs or defendants. 39 It is a party whose
interest will be affected by the court's action in the
litigation.

2) The joinder of indispensable parties is

mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which
is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the
right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of
indispensable parties to a suit or proceeding,
judgment of a court cannot attain real finality.
 39

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL

ASIA, INC. vs. SCHONFELD
G.R. No. 166920, February 19, 2007
CALLEJO, SR., J p:

1) The settled rule on stipulations regarding

venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that
while they are considered valid and enforceable,
venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule,
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying
or restrictive words. They should be considered
merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place. They are not
exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of
the parties were to restrict venue, there must be
accompanying language clearly and categorically
expressing their purpose and design that actions
between them be litigated only at the place named
by them.

BIACO vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE

RURAL BANK
G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007
TINGA, J p:

1) An action in personam is an action against a

person on the basis of his personal liability. An
action in rem is an action against the thing itself
instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem
is one wherein an individual is named as defendant
and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening
 40

the property.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant is necessary for the court to
validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over
the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of
the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective.
In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, the only
relief that may be granted by the court against a
defendant over whose person it has not acquired
jurisdiction either by valid service of summons or
by voluntary submission to its jurisdiction, is
limited to the res.

BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. vs.

SPOUSES YUJUICO
G.R. No. 175796 July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, ** J p:

1) An action to recover the deficiency after

extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage
is a personal action because it does not affect title to
or possession of real property, or any interest
therein.

2) It is basic that the venue of an action depends

on whether it is a real or a personal action. The
 41

determinants of whether an action is of a real or a

personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of
Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action
is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Thus, an action for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property is a real action. The real
action is to be commenced and tried in the proper
court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated, which explains why the action is also
referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of
Court declares all other actions as personal actions.
Such actions may include those brought for the
recovery of personal property, or for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of
damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damages for the commission of an injury to the
person or property. The venue of a personal action
is the place where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the
case of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff, for which
reason the action is considered a transitory one.

PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK vs.

SPOUSES RAMOS
G.R. No. 228617 September 20, 2017
REYES, JR., J p:

1) Rule 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides

the rules on venue in filing an action, to wit:
 42

Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions

affecting title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in
the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be
commenced and tried in the municipal trial court
of the municipality or city wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, is
situated.

Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All

other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case
of a non-resident defendant where he may be
found, at the election of the plaintiff.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 4. When Rule not applicable. — This

Rule shall not apply.
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law
provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in
writing before the filing of the action on
the exclusive venue thereof.

2) The general rules on venue admit of exceptions

in Section 4 thereof, i.e., where a specific rule or
law provides otherwise, or when the parties agreed
in writing before the filing of the action on the
 43

exclusive venue thereof.

3) Stipulations on venue, however, may either be

permissive or restrictive. "Written stipulations as to
venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or
merely permissive in that the parties may file their
suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the
places fixed by law. As in any other agreement,
what is essential is the ascertainment of the
intention of the parties respecting the matter."

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC. vs. MONDEJAR

G.R. No. 200804 January 22, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small

Claims Cases states that: After the hearing, the court
shall render its decision on the same day, based on
the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-
SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by
the Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases
and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims

case decision under the above-stated rule, the
remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing
party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals
in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings
where appeal is not an available remedy, does not
preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 44

This general rule has been enunciated in the case of

Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation,
wherein it was held that:

2) Considering that small claims cases are

exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its
dispositions should be filed before their
corresponding Regional Trial Courts.

ALBA, JR. vs. MALAPAJO

G.R. No. 198752 January 13, 2016
PERALTA, J p:

1) A counterclaim is any claim which a defending

party may have against an opposing party. A
compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises
out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the
court both as to the amount and the nature thereof,
except that in an original action before the Regional
Trial Court, necessarily connected with the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim or even where
there is such a connection, the Court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the claim or it requires for
adjudication the presence of third persons over
whom the court acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory
 45

counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same

action.

2) A counterclaim is permissive if it does not

arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the
subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed
separately in another case.

3) To determine whether a counterclaim is

compulsory or permissive, we have devised the
following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law
raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent
suit on defendants' claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiffs' claim as well
as the defendants' counterclaim? and (d) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? A positive answer to all four
questions would indicate that the counterclaim is
compulsory.

CHUAN vs. UY
G.R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015
REYES, J p:

1) A dismissal of an action is different from a

mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason,
since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal
may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same
action. In Pinga v. Heirs of German Santiago, the
Court clearly stated that the dismissal of the
 46

complaint does not necessarily result to the

dismissal of the counterclaim.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. vs.

CPR PROMOTIONS AND MARKETING, INC.
G.R. No. 200567 June 22, 2015
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) A counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it

arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter
of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require
for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c)
the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both
as to its amount and nature, except that in an
original action before the RTC, the counterclaim
may be considered compulsory regardless of the
amount.

2) In determining whether a counterclaim is

compulsory or permissive, We have, in several
cases, utilized the following tests:
(1) Are the issues of fact or law raised by
the claim and the counterclaim largely
the same?
(2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent
suit on defendant's claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
(3) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiff's claim as
well as the defendant's counterclaim?
(4) Is there any logical relation between the
claim and the counterclaim, such that
 47

the conduct of separate trials of the

respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of effort
and time by the parties and the court?
This test is the "compelling test of
compulsoriness."

VALDEZ vs. DABON, JR.

A.C. No. 7353 November 16, 2015
Per Curiam p:

1) A negative pregnant is a denial coupled with

the admission of substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at
least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of
the allegation as so qualified or modified are
literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is
admitted.

REPUBLIC vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
CORONA, J p:

1) A negative pregnant is a form of negative

expression which carries with it an affirmation or at
least an implication of some kind favorable to the
adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the
pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
 48

modifying language and the words of the allegation

as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has
been held that the qualifying circumstances alone
are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

CANELAND SUGAR CORP. vs. ALON

G.R. No. 142896 September 12, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

1) Negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with

the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely denied. As
defined in Republic of the Philippines v.
Sandiganbayan, a negative pregnant is a "form of
negative expression which carries with it an
affirmation or at least an implication of some kind
favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in
the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying
or modifying language and the words of the
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally
denied, has been held that the qualifying
circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself
is admitted."

JOSE vs. JAVELLANA

G.R. No. 158239 January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) The denial of a motion for reconsideration of

an order granting the defending party's motion to
dismiss is not an interlocutory but a final order
because it puts an end to the particular matter
involved, or settles definitely the matter therein
 49

disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to

do other than to execute the order. Accordingly, the
claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from
notice of the denial within which to appeal the
denial.

MEDADO vs. HEIRS OF CONSING

G.R. No. 186720 February 8, 2012
REYES, J p:

1) The general rule is that the certificate of non-

forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs
in a case and the signature of only one of them is
insufficient.
However, the Court has also stressed that the
rules on forum shopping were designed to promote
and facilitate the orderly administration of justice
and thus should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective.

COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS vs.

PALER
G.R. No. 172623 March 3, 2010
CORONA, J p:

1) The petitioner in this case is the Commission

on Appointments, a government entity created by
the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There
was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the
verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person
who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in
the petition could sign the verification. With regard,
however, to the certification of non-forum shopping,
 50

the established rule is that it must be executed by

the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not
by counsel. In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show
that he was specifically authorized by the Chairman
to sign the certification of non-forum shopping,
much less file the petition in his behalf.

BASAN vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS

PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 174365-66 February 4, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) While the general rule is that the verification

and certification of non-forum shopping must be
signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature
of only one of them, petitioner Basan in this case,
appearing thereon may be deemed substantial
compliance with the procedural requirement.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that the rule on
verification is deemed substantially complied with
when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in
the petition have been made in good faith or are true
and correct. Similarly, this Court has consistently
held that when under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, as in this case, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the
certification requirement.
 51

UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 173186 September 16, 2015
JARDELEZA, J p:

1) A certification against forum shopping is a

peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an
assurance given to the court or other tribunal that
there are no other pending cases involving
basically the same parties, issues and causes of
action. It must be executed by the party-pleader,
not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to
sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on
his behalf.

2) The general rule is that non-compliance or a

defect in the certification is not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction. However,
there are cases where we exercised leniency and
relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial
compliance, the presence of special circumstances
or compelling reasons. The rules on forum-
shopping are designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice and "should not
be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective
or the goal of all rules of procedure — which is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible."
 52

PEOPLE vs. ARROJADO

G.R. No. 207041 November 9, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as

amended, defines pleadings as the written
statements of the respective claims and defenses of
the parties submitted to the court for appropriate
judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under
Section 2 thereof are the complaint and the answer
in a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4,
Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is
defined as an accusation in writing charging a
person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor
and filed with the court. In accordance with the
above definitions, it is clear that an information is a
pleading since the allegations therein, which charge
a person with an offense, is basically the same as a
complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiff's
cause or cause of action.

2) The Supreme Court of Washington held that:

An information is a pleading. It is the formal
statement on the part of the state of the facts
constituting the offense which the defendant is
accused of committing. In other words, it is the
plain and concise statement of the facts constituting
the cause of action. It bears the same relation to a
criminal action that a complaint does to a civil
action; and, when verified, its object is not to satisfy
the court or jury that the defendant is guilty, nor is it
for the purpose of evidence which is to be weighed
and passed upon, but is only to inform the defendant
of the precise acts or omissions with which he is
 53

accused, the truth of which is to be determined

thereafter by direct and positive evidence upon a
trial, where the defendant is brought face to face
with the witnesses.

POWERHOUSE STAFFBUILDERS
INTERNATIONAL, INC. vs. REY
G.R. No. 190203 November 7, 2016
JARDELEZA, J p:

1) In previous cases, we held that the following

officials or employees of the company can sign the
verification and certification without need of a
board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board
of Directors; (2) the President of a corporation; (3)
the General Manager or Acting General Manager;
(4) Personnel Officer; and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case. The rationale applied in
these cases is to justify the authority of corporate
officers or representatives of the corporation to sign
the verification or certificate against forum
shopping, being "in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the
petition."

HEIRS OF GABRIEL vs. CEBRERO

G.R. No. 222737 November 12, 2018
PERALTA, J p:

1) Section 5, 25 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court

provides that the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the plaintiff or
principal party. The reason for this is that the
plaintiff or the principal knows better than anyone,
 54

whether a petition has previously been filed

involving the same case or substantially the same
issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot
sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must
have been duly authorized.

FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC.

vs. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PHILS., INC.
G.R. No. 207970 January 20, 2016
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) The essential query in resolving a motion for

judgment on the pleadings is whether or not there
are issues of fact generated by the pleadings.
Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not
depends on how the defending party's answer has
dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint. The defending party's answer either
admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts in
the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The
allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit,
being undisputed, will not require evidence to
establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations
of ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being
disputed, will require evidence.

2) The answer admits the material allegations of

ultimate facts of the adverse party's pleadings not
only when it expressly confesses the truth of such
allegations but also when it omits to deal with
them at all. The controversion of the ultimate facts
must only be by specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8
of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes
by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of
 55

fact. The first is by the defending party specifying

each material allegation of fact the truth of which
he does not admit and, whenever practicable,
setting forth the substance of the matters upon
which he relies to support his denial. The second
applies to the defending party who desires to deny
only a part of an averment, and the denial is done
by the defending party specifying so much of the
material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and
material and denying only the remainder. The third
is done by the defending party who is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of a material averment made
in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any
material averment in the complaint not so
specifically denied are deemed admitted except an
averment of the amount of unliquidated damages.

GO TONG ELECTRICAL SUPPLY CO., INC.

vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 187487 June 29, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) Case law enlightens that "[t]he admission of

the genuineness and due execution of a document
means that the party whose signature it bears
admits that he voluntarily signed the document or
it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading
of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formalities required by law,
such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it
 56

effectively eliminated any defense relating to the

authenticity and due execution of the document,
e.g., that the document was spurious, counterfeit,
or of different import on its face as the one
executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the
signatures were unauthorized."

The Court clarifies that while the "[f]ailure to

deny the genuineness and due execution of an
actionable document does not preclude a party
from arguing against it by evidence of fraud,
mistake, compromise, payment, statute of
limitations, estoppel and want of consideration
[nor] bar a party from raising the defense in his
answer or reply and prove at the trial that there is a
mistake or imperfection in the writing, or that it
does not express the true agreement of the parties,
or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an
intrinsic ambiguity in the writing," none of these
defenses were adequately argued or proven during
the proceedings of this case.

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND

DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 160242 May 17, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J p:

1) This right to file a third-party complaint

against a third-party rests in the discretion of the
trial court. The third- party complaint is actually
independent of, separate and distinct from the
plaintiffs complaint, such that were it not for the
 57

rule, it would have to be filed separately from the

original complaint.

BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC. vs. COURT

OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117434 February 9, 2001
MENDOZA, J p:

1) The admission of the due execution and

genuineness of a document simply means that "the
party whose signature it bears admits that he signed
it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in
words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading
of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formal requisites required by
law, such as a seal, an acknowledgement, or revenue
stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him." In
another case, we held that "When the law makes use
of the phrase genuineness and due execution of the
instrument' it means nothing more than that the
instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of
different import on its face from the one executed."
It is equally true, however, that — Execution can
only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it
cannot involve other matters without enlarging its
meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule
was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie,
not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a
defendant from introducing any defense on the
merits which does not contradict the execution of
the instrument introduced in evidence.
 58

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. vs. TANSIPEK

G.R. No. 181235 July 22, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

1) A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different

from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should
be verified and must show fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The
allegations of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect, and of meritorious defenses must concur.

SPOUSES SALVADOR vs. SPOUSES RABAJA

G.R. No. 199990 February 4, 2015
MENDOZA, J p:

1) Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a

defendant is only declared in default if he fails to
file his Answer within the reglementary period. On
the other hand, if a defendant fails to attend the pre-
trial conference, the plaintiff can present his
evidence ex parte.

2) Failure to file a responsive pleading within the

reglementary period, and not failure to appear at the
hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default,
except the failure to appear at a pre-trial conference
wherein the effects of a default on the part of the
defendant are followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be
allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment
based thereon may be rendered against defendant.
 59

BITTE vs. SPOUSES JONAS

G.R. No. 212256 December 9, 2015
MENDOZA, J p:

1) The rule is that "right to appeal from the

judgment by default is not lost and can be done on
grounds that the amount of the judgment is
excessive or is different in kind from that prayed
for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material
allegations of his complaint, or that the decision is
contrary to law." 15 If a party who has been
declared in default has in his arsenal the remedy of
appeal from the judgment of default on the basis of
the decision having been issued against the evidence
or the law, that person cannot be denied the remedy
and opportunity to assail the judgment in the
appellate court. Despite being burdened by the
circumstances of default, the petitioners may still
use all other remedies available to question not only
the judgment of default but also the judgment on
appeal before this Court. Those remedies
necessarily include an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

YUJUICO vs. UNITED RESOURCES ASSET

MANAGEMENT, INC.
G.R. No. 211113 June 29, 2015
PEREZ, J p:

1) Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil

action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so
long as the pleading is amended only once and
before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the
pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten
 60

days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only

amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.

As a matter of judicial policy, courts are

impelled to treat motions for leave to file amended
pleadings with liberality. This is especially true
when a motion for leave is filed during the early
stages of proceedings or, at least, before trial. Our
case law had long taught that bona fide amendments
to pleadings should be allowed in the interest of
justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and the multiplicity of
suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long as it does not
appear that the motion for leave was made with bad
faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts
are justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an
amended pleading. Once a court grants leave to file
an amended pleading, the same becomes binding
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears
that the court had abused its discretion.

LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BANCO DE

ORO UNIBANK, INC.
G.R. No. 143264 April 23, 2012
PERALTA, J p:

1) Amendments to pleadings are generally

favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case, may
so far as possible, be determined on its real facts
and in order to speed up the trial of the case or
prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary
expense. That is, unless there are circumstances
such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the
 61

adverse party by surprise or the like, which might

justify a refusal of permission to amend.

TIU vs. PHILIPPINE BANK OF

COMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 151932 August 19, 2009
PERALTA, J.

1) The granting of leave to file amended pleading

is a matter particularly addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is
broad, subject only to the limitations that the
amendments should not substantially change the
cause of action or alter the theory of the case, or that
it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless,
even if the amendment substantially alters the cause
of action or defense, such amendment could still be
allowed when it is sought to serve the higher
interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and
secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
actions and proceedings.

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP.

vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 133657 May 29, 2002
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

1) Section 2, Rule 1016 of the Revised Rules of

Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
amended as a matter of right before a responsive
pleading is served. This only means that prior to
the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the
absolute right to amend the complaint whether a
new cause of action or change in theory is
 62

introduced. The right granted to the plaintiff under

procedural law to amend the complaint before an
answer has been served is not precluded by the
filing of a motion to dismiss or any other
proceeding contesting its sufficiency.

PALILEO vs. PLANTERS

DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 193650 October 8, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) Settled is the rule that a party is barred from

assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed
from by him. The presumption that a party who did
not interject an appeal is satisfied with the
adjudication made by the lower court applies to it.

Finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact

upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal
if no appeal is perfected, and is conclusive as to the
issues actually determined and to every matter
which the parties might have litigated and have . . .
decided as incident to or essentially connected with
the subject matter of the litigation, and every matter
coming within the legitimate purview of the original
action both in respect to matters of claim and of
defense. And in this jurisdiction, the rule is that
when a judgment becomes final and executory, it is
the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of
execution to enforce the judgment; execution will
issue as a matter of right . . . (a) when the judgment
has become final and executory; (b) when the
judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right
of appeal; or (c) when the period for appeal has
 63

lapsed without an appeal having been filed . . . .

HEIRS OF MIRANDA, SR. vs. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 179638 July 8, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) Under Section 3, 41 Rule 13 of the Rules of

Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case,
the date of filing is the date of receipt. In the second
case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.

SPOUSES VALMONTE vs. COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996
MENDOZA, J p:

1) What gives the court jurisdiction in an action in

rem or quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over
the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff who is
domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated
or attached. Service of summons in the manner
provided in 17 is not for the purpose of vesting it
with jurisdiction but for complying with the
requirements of fair play or due process, so that he
will be informed of the pendency of the action
against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and he can thereby take steps to protect
his interest if he is so minded.
 64

MILLENNIUM INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL

CORP. vs. TAN
G.R. No. 131724 February 28, 2000
MENDOZA, J p:

1) If the defendant is a corporation, Rule 14, §13

requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporation's president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors. The rationale of the
rule is that service must be made on a representative
so integrated with the corporation sued as to make it
a priori presumable that he will realize his
responsibilities and know what he should do with
any legal papers received by him. For there to be
substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons
by the corporation through the person served must
be shown.

E.B. VILLAROSA & PARTNER CO., LTD. Vs.

BENITO
G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999
GONZAGA-REYES, J p:

1) Under the new Rules, service of summons

upon an agent of the corporation is no longer
authorized. The cases cited by private respondent
are therefore not in point. The designation of
persons or officers who are authorized to accept
summons for a domestic corporation or partnership
is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14. The rule now states “general manager”
instead of only “manager”; “corporate secretary”
instead of “secretary”; and “treasurer” instead of
“cashier.” The phrase “agent, or any of its directors”
 65

is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

SANTOS, JR. vs. PNOC EXPLORATION

CORP.
G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008
CORONA, J p:

1) The present rule expressly states that

substituted service (via publication) applies in any
action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his
whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained
by diligent inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any
action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.

SPOUSES MASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 144662 October 13, 2003
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) Notice to enable the other party to be heard and

to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a
trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process.

SPOUSES JOSE vs. SPOUSES BOYON

G.R. No. 147369 October 23, 2003
PANGANIBAN, J p:

1) Substituted service can be availed of only after a

clear showing that personal service of summons was
not legally possible. Also, service by publication is
applicable in actions in rem and quasi in rem, but not
in personal suits.
 66

MANOTOC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 130974 August 16, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired

either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendants’ voluntary appearance in court. When
the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the
court’s jurisdiction or when there is no valid service
of summons, any judgment of the court which has
no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
null and void. If defendant, for excusable reasons,
cannot be served with the summons within a
reasonable period, then substituted service can be
resorted to. While substituted service of summons is
permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in
derogation of the usual method of service.

YUK LING ONG vs. CO

G.R. No. 206653 February 25, 2015
MENDOZA, J p:

1) In court proceedings, there is no right more

cherished than the right of every litigant to be given
an opportunity to be heard. This right begins at the
very moment that summons is served on the
defendant. The Rules of Court places utmost
importance in ensuring that the defendant personally
grasp the weight of responsibility that will befall
him. Thus, it is only in exceptional circumstances
that constructive notification, or substituted service
of summons, is allowed. If the server falls short of
the rigorous requirements for substituted service of
 67

summons, then the Court has no other option but to

strike down a void judgment, regardless of the
consequences.

2) Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired

either upon a valid service of summons or the
defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the
defendant does not voluntarily appear in court,
jurisdiction can be acquired by personal or
substituted service of summons.

DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN

G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J p:

1) Jurisdiction over the person of a resident

defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court
can be acquired by personal service of summons as
provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time, substituted
service may be made in accordance with Section 8
of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country,
any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in
Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country,
with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also
with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the
court may deem sufficient.”
 68

DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. QUILALA

G.R. No. 168723 July 9, 2008
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) A defendant’s voluntary appearance in the

action is equivalent to service of summons. As held
previously by this Court, the filing of motions
seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer,
for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court.

GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. vs. NISSIN-

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP.
G.R. No. 181517 July 6, 2015
PERALTA, ** J p:

1) It is a well-established rule that the rules on

service of summons upon a domestic private
juridical entity must be strictly complied with.
Otherwise, the court cannot be said to have
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.

In the past, the Court upheld service of

summons upon a construction project manager, a
corporation's assistant manager, ordinary clerk of a
corporation, private secretary of corporate
executives, retained counsel, and officials who had
control over the operations of the corporation like
the assistant general manager or the corporation's
Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. The
 69

Court then considered said persons as "agent"

within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably,
under the new Rules, service of summons upon an
agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.
The rule now likewise states "general manager"
instead of "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead
of merely "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of
"cashier." It has now become restricted, limited,
and exclusive only to the persons enumerated in
the aforementioned provision, following the rule in
statutory construction that the express mention of
one person excludes all others, or expressio unios
est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be
made only on the persons expressly listed in the
rules. If the revision committee intended to
liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could
have easily done so by clear and concise language.

GUY vs. GACOTT

G.R. NO. 206147 January 13, 2016
MENDOZA, J p:

1) Jurisdiction over the person, or jurisdiction in

personam — the power of the court to render a
personal judgment or to subject the parties in a
particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action — is an element of due
process that is essential in all actions, civil as well
as criminal, except in actions in rem or quasi in
rem. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is
acquired by the mere filing of the complaint in
court. As the initiating party, the plaintiff in a civil
action voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. As to the defendant, the
 70

court acquires jurisdiction over his person either by

the proper service of the summons, or by his
voluntary appearance in the action.

2) Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997

Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the
defendant is a corporation, partnership or
association organized under the laws of the
Philippines with a juridical personality, the service
of summons may be made on the president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
Jurisprudence is replete with pronouncements that
such provision provides an exclusive enumeration
of the persons authorized to receive summons for
juridical entities.

G.V. FLORIDA TRANSPORT, INC. vs. TIARA

COMMERCIAL CORP.
G.R. No. 201378 October 18, 2017
JARDELEZA, J p:

1) Service of summons is the main mode through

which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant in a civil case. Through it, the
defendant is informed of the action against him or
her and he or she is able to adequately prepare his or
her course of action. Rules governing the proper
service of summons are not mere matters of
procedure. They go into a defendant's right to due
process. Thus, strict compliance with the rules on
service of summons is mandatory.

Service of summons, however, is not the only

 71

mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction

over the person of the defendant. Section 20 of Rule
14 of the Rules of Court provides that “The
defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall
be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.”

2) There is voluntary appearance when a party,

without directly assailing the court's lack of
jurisdiction, seeks affirmative relief from the court.
When a party appears before the court without
qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived
his or her objection regarding lack of jurisdiction
due to improper service of summons. When a
defendant, however, appears before the court for the
specific purpose of questioning the court's
jurisdiction over him or her, this is a special
appearance and does not vest the court with
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
provides that so long as a defendant raises the issue
of lack of jurisdiction, he or she is allowed to
include other grounds of objection. In such case,
there is no voluntary appearance.

SUNRISE GARDEN CORP. vs. COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 158836, 158967, 160726 & 160778
September 30, 2015
LEONEN, J p:

1) While Rule 14, Section 20 212 of the Rules of

 72

Court provides that voluntary appearance is

equivalent to service of summons, the same rule
also provides that "[t]he inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance."

2) In Philippine Commercial International Bank

v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, et al., this court discussed
that voluntary appearance in court may not always
result in submission to the jurisdiction of a court:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a
civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of
legal processes exerted over his person, or his
voluntary appearance in court. As a general
proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had
occasion to declare that the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, is
considered voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the
concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who makes a special appearance to challenge,
among others, the court's jurisdiction over his
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its
authority.

Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear

that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an
exception to the general rule on voluntary
 73

appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e.,
set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading
or motion seeking affirmative relief is
filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.

TUJAN-MILITANTE vs NUSTAD
G.R. No. 209518 June 19, 2017
TIJAM, J p:

1) A trial court acquires jurisdiction over the

person of the defendant by service of summons.
However, it is equally significant that even without
valid service of summons, a court may still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if the
latter voluntarily appears before it.

2) By seeking affirmative reliefs from the trial

court, the individual [petitioner is] deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court
to secure the affirmative relief against his opponent
and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
 74

REPUBLIC vs. DIMARUCOT

G.R. No. 202069 March 7, 2018
CAGUIOA, J p:

1) Reference to Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is

in order:
SEC. 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for
motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party,
every written motion shall be set for hearing by
the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard
and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt
by the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SEC. 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice

of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date
of the hearing which must not be later than ten
(10) days after the filing of the motion.

SEC. 6. Proof of service necessary. — No

written motion set for hearing shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of service
thereof.

The requirements outlined in the cited provisions

can be summarized as follows:
ii. Every written motion which cannot be acted
upon without prejudicing the rights of the
adverse party must be set for hearing;
 75

iii. The adverse party must be given: (a) a copy

of such written motion, and (b) notice of the
corresponding hearing date;
iv. The copy of the written motion and the
notice of hearing described in (ii) must be
furnished to the adverse party at least three
(3) days before the hearing date, unless
otherwise ordered by the RTC (3-day notice
rule); and
v. No written motion that is required to be
heard shall be acted upon by the receiving
court without proof of service done in the
manner prescribed in (iii).

To be sure, the 3-day notice rule was

established not for the benefit of movant but for the
adverse party, in order to avoid surprises and grant
the latter sufficient time to study the motion and
enable it to meet the arguments interposed therein.
The duty to ensure receipt by the adverse party at
least three days before the proposed hearing date
necessarily falls on the movant.

ACAMPADO vs. SPOUSES COSMILLA

G.R. No. 198531, September 28, 2015
PEREZ, J p:

1) The Motion for Reconsideration is a

contentious motion that needs to comply with the
required notice and hearing and service to the
adverse party as mandated by the provisions of the
Revised Rules of Court.

2) The requirements that the notice shall be

 76

directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the

time and place for the hearing of the motion are
mandatory, and if not religiously complied with, the
motion becomes pro forma. A motion that does not
comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of
paper which the clerk of court has no right to
receive and which the court has no authority to act
upon. The logic for such requirement is simple: a
motion invariably contains a prayer which the
movant makes to the court which is usually in the
interest of the adverse party to oppose. The notice of
hearing to the adverse party is therefore a form of
due process; it gives the other party the opportunity
to properly vent his opposition to the prayer of the
movant. In keeping with the principles of due
process, therefore, a motion which does not afford
the adverse party a chance to oppose should simply
be disregarded. Principles of natural justice demand
that a right of a party should not be affected without
giving it an opportunity to be heard.

In keeping with the principles of due process,

therefore, a motion which does not afford the
adverse party the chance to oppose it should simply
be disregarded. Failure to comply with the required
notice and hearing is a fatal defect that is deleterious
to respondents cause.

LAUDE vs. GINEZ-JABALDE

G.R. No. 217456 November 24, 2015
LEONEN, J p:

1) Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court

 77

clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse

party be given notice of hearing on the motion at
least three days prior. Failure to comply with this
notice requirement renders the motion defective
consistent with protecting the adverse party's right
to procedural due process.

2) While the general rule is that a motion that

fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 15 is
a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made
and the motion may still be acted upon by the
court, provided doing so will neither cause
prejudice to the other party nor violate his or her
due process rights. The adverse party must be
given time to study the motion in order to enable
him or her to prepare properly and engage the
arguments of the movant.

SPOUSES DE GUZMAN, JR. vs. SPOUSES

OCHOA
G.R. No. 169292 April 13, 2011
MENDOZA, J p:

1) A motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus

motion, must raise and include all objections
available at the time of the filing of the motion
because under Section 8, "all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived.

BLAY vs. BAÑA

G.R. No. 232189 March 7, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court

 78

provides for the procedure relative to counterclaims

in the event that a complaint is dismissed by the
court at the plaintiff's instance, viz.: Section 2.
Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as
provided in the preceding section, a complaint shall
not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
approval of the court and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems proper. If a
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior
to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for
dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice
to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he
manifests his preference to have his counterclaim
resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court.

As per the second sentence of the provision, if

a counterclaim has been pleaded by the defendant
prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's
motion for the dismissal — as in this case — the
rule is that the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. Commentaries on the subject elucidate
that "[i]nstead of an 'action' shall not be dismissed,
the present rule uses the term 'complaint'. A
dismissal of an action is different from a mere
dismissal of the complaint. For this reason, since
only the complaint and not the action is dismissed,
the defendant inspite of said dismissal may still
 79

prosecute his counterclaim in the same action."

However, as stated in the third sentence of

Section 2, Rule 17, if defendant desires to prosecute
his counterclaim in the same action, he is required
to file a manifestation within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the motion. Otherwise, his counterclaim
may be prosecuted in a separate action. .
The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to
discern: the passing of the fifteen (15)-day period
triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the
complaint and hence, bars the conduct of further
proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's
counterclaim, in the same action. Thus, in order to
obviate this finality, the defendant is required to file
the required manifestation within the aforesaid
period; otherwise, the counterclaim may be
prosecuted only in a separate action.

CHUAN vs. UY
G.R. No. 155701 March 11, 2015
REYES, J p:

1) A dismissal of an action is different from a

mere dismissal of the complaint. For this reason,
since only the complaint and not the action is
dismissed, the defendant in spite of said dismissal
may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same
action.
 80

CHING vs. CHENG

G.R. No. 175507, October 8, 2014
LEONEN, J p:

1) Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

governs dismissals of actions at the instance of the
plaintiff. Hence, the "two-dismissal rule" under
Rule 17, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
will not apply if the prior dismissal was done at the
instance of the defendant.

Dismissals of actions are governed by Rule 17

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In all
instances, Rule 17 governs dismissals at the instance
of the plaintiff, not of the defendant. Dismissals
upon the instance of the defendant are generally
governed by Rule 16, which covers motions to
dismiss.

The purpose of the "two-dismissal rule" is "to

avoid vexatious litigation." When a complaint is
dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred
from seeking relief on the same claim.

2) As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of

Rule 17 are without prejudice except when it is the
second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal.
Accordingly, for a dismissal to operate as an
adjudication upon the merits, i.e. with prejudice to
the re-filing of the same claim, the following
requisites must be present:
(1) There was a previous case that was
dismissed by a competent court;
(2) Both cases were based on or include the
 81

same claim;
(3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the
plaintiff; and
(4) When the motion to dismiss filed by the
plaintiff was consented to by the defendant
on the ground that the latter paid and
satisfied all the claims of the former.

3) Under Rule 17, Section 3, a defendant may

move to dismiss the case if the plaintiff defaults; it
does not contemplate a situation where the dismissal
was due to lack of jurisdiction. Since there was
already a dismissal prior to plaintiff's default, the
trial court's instruction to file the appropriate
pleading will not reverse the dismissal. If the
plaintiff fails to file the appropriate pleading, the
trial court does not dismiss the case anew; the order
dismissing the case still stands.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. SISON

G.R. No. 185954 February 16, 2010
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the

Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the
movant has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be
capable of being properly decided in a separate
proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to
intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and
of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal
 82

operation and effect of the judgment.

OMBUDSMAN V. DE CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 172206 July 3, 2013
PERALTA, J p:

1) It is true that under our rule on intervention, the

allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene
is left to the sound discretion of the court after a
consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
However, such discretion is not without limitations.
One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is
that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and
the Constitution.

AÑONUEVO vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF

JALANDONI
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
PEREZ, J p:

1) A court's power to allow or deny intervention,

albeit discretionary in nature, is circumscribed by
the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that
only a person with interest in an action or
proceeding may be allowed to intervene. 45
Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a
person, who has no interest in an action or
proceeding, to intervene therein.

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake

and allows an uninterested person to intervene in a
case — the mistake is not simply an error of
judgment, but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the
allowance is made in excess of the court's
 83

jurisdiction and can only be the product of an

exercise of discretion gravely abused. That kind of
error may be reviewed in a special civil action for
certiorari.

RODRIGUEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 184589 June 13, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:
1) Although Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is
explicit on the period when a motion to intervene
may be filed, the Court allowed exceptions in
several cases, viz.:

This rule, however, is not inflexible.

Interventions have been allowed even beyond the
period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by
the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also
been granted to afford indispensable parties, who
have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even
after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,
when the petition for review of the judgment has
already been submitted for decision before the
Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order
has already become final and executory. In Lim v.
Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this
Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to
settle once and for all the substantive issues raised
by the parties.

In fine, the allowance or disallowance of a

motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion
of the court after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances. We stress again that Rule 19 of the
 84

Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is

to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice. Its purpose is not to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice.

FERNANDEZ vs. BATO, JR.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J
February 19, 2013
REYES, J p:

1) Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court

provides that a person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated
as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a
person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be
bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary
injunction. Indeed, he cannot be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger.

YAO vs. PERELLO

G.R. No. 153828 October 24, 2003
CORONA, J p:

1) As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion

for intervention may be filed at any time before
rendition of judgment by the trial court. To allow
intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant
has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or
otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be
 85

given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of

the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or
whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in
a separate proceeding or not. Both requirements
must concur as the first is not more important than
the second.

PINLAC vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 91486 September 10, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

1) The rule on intervention, like all other rules of

procedure is intended to make the powers of the
Court fully and completely available for justice. It is
aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of
rival claims overriding technicalities on the
timeliness of the filing thereof.

CHIPONGIAN vs. BENITEZ-LIRIO,

G.R. No. 162692 August 26, 2015
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) Intervention is "a remedy by which a third

party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to
protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
affected by such proceedings." If an intervention
makes a third party a litigant in the main
proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should
form part of the main case.
 86

PEOPLE vs. SERGIO

G.R. No. 240053 October 9, 2019
HERNANDO, J p:

1) Interestingly, nowhere in the present Rules on

Criminal Procedure does it state how a deposition,
of a prosecution witness who is at the same time
convicted of a grave offense by final judgment and
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to
perpetuate the testimony of such witness. The
Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a
testimony of a witness who is unable to testify in
open court because he is imprisoned in another
country.

Depositions, however, are recognized under

Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although
the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is
inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it
may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings
so long as there is compelling reason.

DASMARIÑAS GARMENTS, INC. vs. REYES

G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
NARVASA, C.J p:

1) Depositions are intended as a means to compel

disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a
party or other person which are relevant in some
suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are not
generally meant to be a substitute for the actual
testimony in open court of a party or witness.
 87

PEOPLE vs. WEBB

G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

1) The purposes of taking depositions are to: 1.]

Give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining
the truth and in checking and preventing perjury; 2.]
Provide an effective means of detecting and
exposing false, fraudulent claims and defenses; 3.]
Make available in a simple, convenient and
inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could not
be proved except with great difficulty; 4.] Educate
the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of
their claims and defenses thereby encouraging
settlements; 5.]Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard
against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify and
narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and facilitate
both preparation and trial. A deposition, in keeping
with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be
taken before and not during trial.

Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos

G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
NACHURA, J p:

1) The giving of testimony during trial is the

general rule. The conditional examination of a
witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and
as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.

DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 180564 June 22, 2010
ABAD, J p:
1) There are two instances when the defendant
 88

can take depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23: (1)

after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or the property subject of the action; and
(2) after an answer has been served. Both instances
presuppose that the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant.

GO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the

Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in
civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or
person authorized to administer oaths at any time or
place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer
or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign
state or country, with no additional requirement
except reasonable notice in writing to the other
party.

SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA vs.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
1) As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of
calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not
allowed, unless written interrogatories are first
served upon the latter.
 89

PHIL. HEALTH INSURANCE CORP. vs. OUR

LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL
G.R. No. 193158 November 11, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) Through written interrogatories, a party may

elicit from the adverse party or parties any facts or
matter that are not privileged and are material and
relevant to the subject of the pending action. 31
Like other modes of discovery authorized by the
Rules, the purpose of written interrogatories is to
assist the parties in clarifying the issues and in
ascertaining the facts involved in a case. 32 On the
other hand, the provision on production and
inspection of documents is to enable not only the
parties but also the court (in this case, the PHIC
Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant
and material facts in connection with the case
pending before it. 33 It must be shown, therefore,
that the documents sought to be produced, inspected
and/or copied/photographed are material or contain
evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.

DUQUE vs. SPOUSES YU

G.R. No. 226130 February 19, 2018
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) The scope of a request for admission under

Rule 26 of the Rules of Court and a party's failure to
comply thereto are respectively detailed in Sections
1 and 2 thereof, which read:

SEC. 1. Request for admission. — At any time

after issues have been joined, a party may file
 90

and serve upon any other party a written

request for the admission by the latter of the
genuineness of any material and relevant
document described in and exhibited with the
request or of the truth of any material and
relevant matter of fact set forth in the request.
Copies of the documents shall be delivered
with the request unless copies have already
been furnished.

SEC. 2. Implied admission. — Each of the

matters of which an admission is requested
shall be deemed admitted unless, within a
period designated in the request, which shall
not be less than fifteen (15) days after service
thereof, or within such further time as the court
may allow on motion, the party to whom the
request is directed files and serves upon the
party requesting the admission a sworn
statement either denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he
cannot truthfully either admit or deny those
matters.

Objections to any request for admission

shall be submitted to the court by the party
requested within the period for and prior to the
filing of his sworn statement as contemplated
in the preceding paragraph and his compliance
therewith shall be deferred until such
objections are resolved, which resolution shall
be made as early as practicable.
 91

2) Clearly, once a party serves a request for

admission as to the truth of any material and
relevant matter of fact, the party to whom such
request is served has 15 days within which to file a
sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to
do so, each of the matters of which admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule,
however, admits of an exception, that is, when the
party to whom such request for admission is served
had already controverted the matters subject of such
request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if
the matters in a request for admission have already
been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by
the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled
to admit or deny them anew. In turn, the requesting
party cannot reasonably expect a response to the
request and, thereafter, assume or even demand the
application of the implied admission rule in Section
2, Rule 26. The rationale is that "admissions by an
adverse party as a mode of discovery contemplates
of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed
light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a
pleading, and does not refer to a mere reiteration of
what has already been alleged in the pleadings; or
else, it constitutes an utter redundancy and will be a
useless, pointless process which petitioner should
not be subjected to."

REPUBLIC vs. HEIRS OF ORIBELLO, JR.

G.R. No. 199501 March 6, 2013
CARPIO, J p:

1) Consolidation is a procedural device to aid the

court in deciding how cases in its docket are to be
 92

tried so that the business of the court may be

dispatched expeditiously and with economy while
providing justice to the parties. Severance is within
the sound discretion of the court for convenience
or to avoid prejudice. It is not mandatory under the
rules of court that the court sever one case from the
other cases before a party can appeal an adverse
ruling on such case.

SPOUSES MARAÑO vs. PRYCE GASES, INC.

G.R. No. 196592 April 6, 2015
BRION, J p:

1) Consolidation is proper when two or more

actions pending, not necessarily, before the same
court involve a common question of law or fact. 27
In such cases, the court may: order a joint hearing or
trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions,
order all the actions consolidated, and make such
orders concerning the proceedings therein for the
purpose of avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. vs.

SANDOVAL
G.R. No. 169677 February 18, 2013
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) The rule on separate trials in civil actions is

found in Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,
which reads: Section 2. Separate trials. – The court,
in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,
may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any
separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
 93

claims, counterclaims, third-party complaints or

issues.

Exceptions to the general rule are permitted

only when there are extraordinary grounds for
conducting separate trials on different issues raised
in the same case, or when separate trials of the
issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials
of the issues will further convenience, or when
separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or
when separate trials of the issues will give a fair
trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must
apply.

BERNARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119010 September 5, 1997
BELLOSILLO, J p:

1) In fine, under the new rule on demurrer to

evidence the accused has the right to file a demurrer
to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case.
If the accused obtained prior leave of court before
filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if
his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs
without prior leave of court, or after his motion for
leave is denied, he waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for decision on the
basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This
power to grant leave to the accused to file a
demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the
accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the
proceedings.
 94

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO. vs. SPOUSES

DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J p:

1) When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial

court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court
cannot remand the case for further proceedings.
Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the
evidence proffered by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as
defendants in the present case admitted the due
execution of the Promissory Note both in their
Answer and during the pretrial, the appellate court
should have rendered judgment on the bases of that
Note and on the other pieces of evidence adduced
during the trial.

CABADOR vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
ABAD, J p:

1) When the accused files a demurrer without

leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence and the case shall be
considered submitted for judgment.

A demurrer to evidence shortens the

proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must,
however, be exercised in view of its pernicious
consequence on the right of the accused to present
evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime
charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.
 95

CLAUDIO vs. SPOUSES SARAZA

G.R. No. 213286 August 26, 2015
MENDOZA, J p:
1) A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is
filed after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an
objection by one of the parties in an action to the
effect that the evidence, which his adversary
produced, is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.

FELIPE vs. MGM MOTOR TRADING CORP.

G.R. No. 191849 September 23, 2015
PEREZ, J p:

1) A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss

on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is
presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.

2) The essential question to be resolved in a

demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff has
been able to show that he is entitled to his claim,
and it is incumbent upon the trial court judge to
make such a determination.

REPUBLIC V. SPOUSES GIMENEZ

G.R. No. 174673 January 11, 2016
LEONEN, J p:

1) A demurrer to evidence may be issued when,

 96

upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown
no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence
together with such inferences and conclusions as
may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not
warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer
to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to
evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting
every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and
indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has
failed to make out one or more of the material
elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to
support an allegation necessary to his claim. It
should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is
prima facie insufficient for a recovery.

In case of doubt, courts should proceed with

caution in granting a motion to dismiss based on
demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer
to evidence is a judgment on the merits. This is
because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument
for the expeditious termination of an action," it
specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."

2) The third part of Rule 33, Section 1 of the

Rules of Court provides that "[i]f the motion [to
dismiss] is granted but on appeal the order of
dismissal is reversed [the movant] shall be deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence." As
this court held:

[I]f a demurrer to evidence is granted but on

appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
 97

evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer to

the plaintiff's evidence retains the right to present
their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with
them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on
appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of
them and reverses the dismissal order, the
defendants lose the right to present their own
evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition,
resolve the case and render judgment on the merits,
inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage
prolonged litigations.

MACAPAGAL-ARROYO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953 July 19, 2016
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) The special civil action for certiorari is

generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory
order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary
course of law. 17 Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order
denying the motion for leave of court to file
demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before
judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to
evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory
order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the
proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go
to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may
then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as
among the errors to be reviewed.
 98

REPUBLIC vs. PILIPINAS SHELL

PETROLEUM CORP.
G.R. No. 209324 December 9, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

1) Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of
damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment
may be allowed.

2) Summary judgment is a procedural device

resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings
on file show that there are no genuine issues of fact
to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain
immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that
is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is
allowed to decide the case summarily by applying
the law to the material facts. Even if on their face
the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the
affidavits, depositions and admissions show that
such issues are not genuine, then summary
judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a
matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore,
in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence
or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.

3) For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the

party who moves for summary judgment has the
burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of
genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is
patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine
 99

issue. Genuine issue means an issue of fact which

calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived.

COMGLASCO CORP. vs. SANTOS CAR

CHECK CENTER CORP.
G.R. No. 202989 March 25, 2015
REYES, J p:

1) A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on

the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon
the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the
parties and the accompanying annexes. It is settled
that the trial court has the discretion to grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a
party if there is no controverted matter in the case
after the answer is filed. A genuine issue of fact is
that which requires the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false issue.

PBCOM vs. SPOUSES GO

G.R. No. 175514 February 14, 2011
MENDOZA, J p:

1) Under the Rules, following the filing of

pleadings, if, on motion of a party and after hearing,
the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and
admissions on file show that, except as to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact, and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be rendered.
 100

ADOLFO vs. ADOLFO

G.R. No. 201427 March 18, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) Judgment on the pleadings is proper "where an

answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits
the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading." Summary judgment, on the other hand,
will be granted "if the pleadings, supporting
affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show
that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law."

2) The existence or appearance of ostensible

issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and their
sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what
distinguish a proper case for summary judgment
from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a
proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is
no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of
the defending party's answer to raise an issue. On
the other hand, in the case of a summary judgment,
issues apparently exist — i.e., facts are asserted in
the complaint regarding which there is as yet no
admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific
denials or affirmative defenses are in truth set out in
the answer — but the issues thus arising from the
pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as
shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.

3) An answer would "fail to tender an issue" if it

 101

"does not deny the material allegations in the

complaint or admits said material allegations of the
adverse party's pleadings by confessing the
truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with
them at all. Now, if an answer does in fact
specifically deny the material averments of the
complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses
(allegations of new matter which, while admitting
the material allegations of the complaint expressly
or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery by the plaintiff), a judgment on the
pleadings would naturally be improper." On the
other hand, "whether . . . the issues raised by the
Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a
motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is so only
in a motion for summary judgment. In a case for
judgment on the pleadings, the Answer is such that
no issue is raised at all. The essential question in
such a case is whether there are issues generated by
the pleadings."

FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AND STEWARDS

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. Nos. 178083 & A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC
March 13, 2018
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) The requirement for the Court to state the legal

and factual basis for its decisions is found in Section
14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and
 102

distinctly the facts and the law on which it is

based.

The constitutional provision clearly indicates

that it contemplates only a decision, which is the
judgment or order that adjudicates on the merits of a
case. This is clear from the text and tenor of Section
1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, the rule that
implements the constitutional provision, to wit:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and
final orders. — A judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in
writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based, signed by
him, and filed with the clerk of court.

MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 143370 February 6, 2002
DE LEON, JR., J p:

1) A motion for new trial upon the ground of

newly discovered evidence is properly granted only
where there is concurrence of the following
requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been
discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not
have been discovered and produced during trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and
(c) the evidence is material and not merely
corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of
such weight that if admitted, would probably alter
the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize
the evidence sought to be introduced at the new
trial.
 103

2) It has been held that a lack of diligence is

exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was
necessary or proper under the pleadings, and its
existence must have occurred to the party in the
course of the preparation of the case, but no effort
was made to secure it; there is a failure to make
inquiry of persons who were likely to know the
facts in question, especially where information was
not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek
evidence available through public records; there is a
failure to discover evidence that is within the
control of the complaining party; there is a failure to
follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there
is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures.
Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be
considered as newly discovered evidence to warrant
a new trial.

PEOPLE vs. LI KA KIM

G.R. No. 148586 May 25, 2004
VITUG, J p:

1) The requisites of newly discovered evidence in

order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence
is discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c)
the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight
that, if admitted, would likely change the judgment.
 104

PADILLA-RUMBAUA vs. RUMBAUA

G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009
BRION, J p:

1) A remand of the case to the RTC for further

proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that
is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of
Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move
the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order
already rendered and to grant a new trial within the
period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion
for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1)
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
that could not have been guarded against by
ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the
aggrieved party's rights have probably been
impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that,
with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could
not have discovered and produced at the trial, and
that would probably alter the result if presented.

CHUA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 196853 July 13, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, *** J p:

1) Jurisprudence dictates that there is a 'question

of law' when the doubt or difference arises as to
what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances; on the other hand, there is a
'question of fact' when the issue raised on appeal
pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The test for determining whether the supposed error
was one of 'law' or 'fact' is not the appellation given
by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether
 105

the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised

without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is
a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In
other words, where there is no dispute as to the
facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions
drawn from these facts are correct is a question of
law. However, if the question posed requires a re-
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the
existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relationship to each other, the issue is
factual.

Nevertheless, assuming that the questions

posed before this Court are indeed factual, the rule
that factual findings of the lower courts are not
proper subject of certiorari petition admits of
exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the
lower courts failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances which, if taken into account, would
materially affect the result of the case. The Court
finds the said exception applicable in the instant
case. Clearly, the petition deserves the consideration
of this Court.

SENIT vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192914 January 11, 2016
REYES, J p:

1) A motion for new trial based on newly-

discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence
was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence
could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
 106

(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,

corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that
the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial
but nonetheless failed to secure it." 31 The Court
agrees with the CA in its decision which held that "a
new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence
which was available during trial but was not
presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the
purported errors and irregularities committed in the
course of the trial against [the petitioner's]
substantive rights do not exist.

DE VERA vs. SPOUSES SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 179457 June 22, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of

Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite
having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its
decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC, to
wit:
Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case
without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal
is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits,
the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it,
as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the
ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it
has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on
the merits as if the case was originally filed with
 107

it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded

for further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the
lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall
not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance
with the preceding section, without prejudice to
the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.

2) In Serrano v. Spouses Gutierrez, the Court

explained that the first paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of
dismissal issued without trial of the case on the
merits, while the second paragraph deals with an
appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was
tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however,
involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of
jurisdiction. Verily, the second paragraph refutes
respondents' contention that Section 8, Rule 40
refers solely to cases where the MTC dismissed a
case filed therein without a trial on the merits and
an appeal to the RTC was taken from the order of
dismissal. Therefore, the RTC correctly proceeded
to decide the case on the merits despite the MTC's
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HEIRS OF GARCIA I vs. MUNICIPALITY OF

IBA, ZAMBALES
G.R. No. 162217 July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, ** J p:

1) An appeal brings up for review any error of

 108

judgment committed by a court with jurisdiction

over the subject of the suit and over the persons of
the parties, or any error committed by the court in
the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing
more than an error of judgment.

The filing of the notice of appeal within the

period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the
remedy of ordinary appeal because the appeal is
deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his
timely filing of the notice of appeal. It is upon the
perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties
that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case.
On the other hand, the non-payment of the appellate
court docket fee within the reglementary period as
required by Section 4, is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, the non-compliance with which is
fatal to the appeal, and is a ground to dismiss the
appeal under Section 1, 14 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court.

In contrast, an appeal filed under Rule 42 is

deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the
timely filing of the petition for review before the
CA, while the RTC shall lose jurisdiction upon
perfection thereof and the expiration of the time to
appeal of the other parties.

2) The distinctions between the various modes of

appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily
dismissed, or lightly treated. The appeal by notice of
appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the
appeal by petition for review under Rule 42 is a
 109

matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right,

which refers to the right to seek the review by a
superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial
court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In
contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken
from the decision or final order rendered by a court
in the exercise of its primary appellate jurisdiction,
may be disallowed by the superior court in its
discretion. 16 Verily, the CA has the discretion
whether to due course to the petition for review or
not.

3) The procedure taken after the perfection of an

appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs from
that taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule
41, the clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to
immediately undertake the transmittal of the records
by verifying the correctness and completeness of the
records of the case; the transmittal to the CA must
be made within 30 days from the perfection of the
appeal. This requirement of transmittal of the
records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon
order of the CA when deemed necessary.

MARAVILLA vs. RIOS

G.R. No. 196875, August 19, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of

Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for review
shall be accompanied by, among others, copies of
the pleadings and other material portions of the
record as would support the allegations of the
petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure
 110

of the petitioner to comply with any of the

requirements regarding the contents of and the
documents which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

2) In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, this Court held

that there are three guideposts in determining the
necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the
record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of the
1997 Rules, to wit:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case
records are required to be attached to the petition.
Only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether
the document in question will support the
material allegations in the petition, whether said
document will make out a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court
to give due course to the petition.
Second, even if a document is relevant and
pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended
if it is shown that the contents thereof can also
[be] found in another document already attached
to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in
a position paper are summarized in a questioned
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true
copy of the judgment is attached.
Third, a petition lacking an essential
pleading or part of the case record may still be
given due course or reinstated (if earlier
dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later
submitted the documents required, or that it will
serve the higher interest of justice that the case be
decided on the merits.
 111

3) The mere fact that a petition for review is filed

does not call for the elevation of the record, which
means that until this Court finds that the elevation
of the record is necessary, such record should
remain with the trial court during the pendency of
the appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39,
let alone the fact that in ejectment cases the decision
of the RTC is immediately executory pursuant to
Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. Thus, more often than not, this Court has
resolved petitions for review under Rule 42 without
unnecessary movement of the original record of the
case which could entail not only undue delay but
also the possibility of the record being lost in transit.

GALINDEZ vs. FIRMALAN

G.R. No. 187186 June 6, 2018
LEONEN, J p:

Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that findings of fact of a quasi-judicial
agency, when supported by substantial evidence,
shall be binding on the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, in Solid Homes v. Payawal, this
Court explained that administrative agencies are
considered specialists in the fields assigned to them;
hence, they can resolve problems in their respective
fields "with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice." Thus, this Court has consistently accorded
respect and even finality to the findings of fact of
administrative bodies, in recognition of their
expertise and technical knowledge over matters
 112

falling within their jurisdiction.

DE LOS SANTOS vs. LUCENIO

G.R. No. 215659 March 19, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court

provides:
Section 15. Questions that may be raised on
appeal. — Whether or not the appellant has filed
a motion for new trial in the court below, he may
include in his assignment of errors any question
of law or fact that has been raised in the court
below and which is within the issues framed by
the parties.

This provision embodies the settled principle

that, on appeal, the parties are not allowed, to
change their "theory of the case."

2) An issue not alleged in the complaint nor

raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal as this goes against the basic
rules of fair play, justice, and due process. In the
same way, a defense not pleaded in the answer
cannot also be raised for the first time on appeal.

Mendoza vs. Spouses Palugod

G.R. No. 220517 June 20, 2018
CAGUIOA, J p:

1) As a rule, the factual findings of the CA

affirming those of the RTC are final and conclusive,
and they cannot be reviewed by the Court which has
 113

jurisdiction to rule only on questions of law in Rule

45 petitions to review.

2) The Court in Pascual v. Burgos reiterated that:

A question of fact requires this [C]ourt to review the
truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the
parties. This review includes assessment of the
"probative value of the evidence presented." There
is also a question of fact when the issue presented
before this [C]ourt is the correctness of the lower
courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the
parties.

There are, however, recognized exceptions

where the Court may review questions of fact.
These are: (1) when the factual conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
and conjectures; (2) when the inference is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA
went beyond the issues of the case in making its
findings, which are further contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those of
the trial court; (8) when the conclusions do not cite
the specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; (10) when the CA's
findings of fact, supposedly premised on the
absence of evidence, are contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly
 114

overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the

parties, which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion.

KENSONIC, INC. vs. UNI-LINE MULTI-

RESOURCES, INC. (PHIL.)
G.R. Nos. 211820-21 & 211834-35
June 6, 2018
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) Kensonic's prior use of the mark since 1994

made it the owner of the mark, and its ownership
cannot anymore be challenged at this stage of the
proceedings. Seeking the review of Kensonic's
ownership would entail the examination of facts
already settled by the lower tribunals. Uni-Line's
challenge to the ownership of the SAKURA mark
should stop here because the Court cannot act on a
factual matter in this appeal by petition for review
on certiorari, which is limited to the consideration
of questions of law. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court specifically so provides: Section 1. Filing
of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring
to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court
a verified petition for review on certiorari. The
petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies
and shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed
 115

in the same action or proceeding at any time during

its pendency.

2) The distinction between a question of law and

a question of fact is well defined. According to
Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation
v. Escaño, Jr.: A question of law arises when there
is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must
not involve an examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites
a review of the evidence presented, the question
posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the
appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate
court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case,
it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of
fact.

VALDERAMA vs. ARGUELLES

G.R. No. 223660 April 2, 2018
TIJAM, J p:

1) Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of

Court, there are three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC, viz.:
Section 2. Modes of appeal. —
 116

a. Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court

of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be required
except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where
law on these Rules so require. In such cases,
the record on appeal shall be filed and
served in like manner.
b. Petition for review. — The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.
c. Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where
only questions of law are raised or involved,
the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with the Rule 45.

Moreover, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules

provide that an appeal to the CA raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed outright, thus:
Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the
Court of Appeals. — An appeal under Rule 41 taken
from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals raising only questions of law shall be
dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable
by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of
appeal instead of by petition for review from the
 117

appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall

be dismissed.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright.

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE CO., INC. vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 213525 November 21, 2017
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) The petitioner's non-compliance with the rule

on proof of service and the petitioner's unjustified
reliance on the Fresh Period Rule as the basis to
extend the period for filing of the special civil
actions for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of
Court were already enough ground to dismiss the
petition for certiorari. We need not remind that the
Fresh Period Rule applies only to appeals in civil
and criminal cases, and in special proceedings filed
under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45,
and Rule 122.

2) According to Ginete v. Court of Appeals, only

matters of life, liberty, honor or property may
warrant the suspension of the rules of the most
mandatory character. That is not the situation of the
petitioner herein. It is also true that other
justifications may be considered, like: (1) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely
 118

frivolous and dilatory; and (5) the other party will

not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. 40 But, again,
the petitioner has not shown the attendance of any
of such justifications for excepting its petition for
certiorari from the stricture of timeliness of filing.

SPOUSES MESINA vs. MEER

G.R. No. 146845 July 2, 2002
PUNO, J p:

1) Relief from judgment is an equitable

remedy and is allowed only under exceptional
circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence is present. Where the
defendant has other available or adequate remedy
such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the
adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this
remedy.

2) Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil

Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed
within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of
the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be
set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits
showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting
the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it
should be filed with the same court which rendered
the decision.

3) The procedure in the Court of Appeals and the

Supreme Court are governed by separate provisions
of the Rules of Court and may, from time to time,
 119

be supplemented by additional rules promulgated by

the Supreme Court through resolutions or circulars.
As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals
allow the remedy of petition for relief in the Court
of Appeals.

4) It is a settled rule that relief will not be granted

to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode
of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will
be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which
has already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure by
counsel.

PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF AURORA

vs. MARCO
G.R. No. 202331 April 22, 2015
LEONEN, J p:

1) The remedy of a petition for relief from

judgment is not among those provided under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service. This means that the remedy is not
allowed under civil service rules. 100 Even
assuming that a petition for relief may be filed
before the Civil Service Commission, the party
must show that the assailed judgment became final
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence.
 120

THOMASITES CENTER FOR

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES V. RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 203642 January 27, 2016
REYES, J

1) In Philippine Amanah Bank (now Al-Amanah

Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines, also
known as Islamic Bank) v. Contreras, the Court
stated: Relief from judgment is a remedy provided
by law to any person against whom a decision or
order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. It is a remedy, equitable in
character, that is allowed only in exceptional cases
when there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available
to him, which may either be a motion for new trial
or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court,
and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail of the
remedy of petition for relief.
Otherwise, the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost either because of inexcusable
negligence or due to the mistake in the mode of
procedure by counsel.

2) In Tuason v. CA, the Court explained the

nature of a petition for relief from judgment, thus: A
petition for relief from judgment is an equitable
remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases
where there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available
to him, which may be either a motion for new trial
 121

or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court,

and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail
himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the
effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy
at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to
appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.

3) As provided in Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules

of Court,a party filing a petition for relief from
judgment must strictly comply with two (2)
reglementary periods: first, the petition must be
filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside;
and second, within a fixed period of six (6) months
from entry of such judgment, order or other
proceeding. Strict compliance with these periods is
required because a petition for relief from judgment
is a final act of liberality on the part of the State,
which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any
further the fundamental principle that a judgment,
order or proceeding must, at some definite time,
attain finality in order to put an end to litigation.

DIONA vs. BALANGUE

G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under

Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted
 122

only under exceptional circumstances where a party,

without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule
explicitly provides that it is not available as a
substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the
party's own neglect in promptly availing of the
same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the
notion that annulling final judgments goes against
the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it
is essential to an effective administration of justice
that once a judgment has become final, the issue or
cause involved therein should be laid to rest."

2) While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of

Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of
due process as additional ground to annul a
judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this
Court declared that a final and executory judgment
may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection
thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having
been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due
process of law.

SANTOS vs. SANTOS

G.R. No. 187061 October 8, 2014
LEONEN, J p:

1) Annulment of judgment is the remedy when

the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or
resolution has become final, and the "remedies of
 123

new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other

appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner."

2) The grounds for annulment of judgment are

extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This court
defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of
Legaspi: For fraud to become a basis for annulment
of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is
intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue
involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant
commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
party from having a real contest, or from presenting
all of his case, such that there is no fair submission
of the controversy.

YUK LING ONG vs. CO

G.R. No. 206653 February 25, 2015
MENDOZA, J p:

1) Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable

in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as
where there is no available or other adequate
remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, governs actions for
annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly
provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, that is, extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. 19 Annulment of judgment is an
equitable principle not because it allows a party-
litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment
 124

that has long lapsed into finality but because it

enables him to be discharged from the burden of
being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity
to begin with.

2) Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial

court in rendering the judgment or final order is
either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of
substantive law because statutory law defines the
jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or
nature of the action. The latter is a matter of
procedural law, for it involves the service of
summons or other processes on the petitioner.

LASALA vs. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 171582, August 19, 2015
BRION, J p:

1) As a general rule, final judgments may no

longer be modified as, after finality, all the issues
between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to
rest. This rule embodies the principle that at some
point, litigation must end for an effective and
efficient administration of justice. Hence, once a
judgment becomes final, the winning party should
not, through subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of
the verdict.

2) In Antonino v. Register of Deeds of

Makati, 24 the Court explained the nature of a
petition for annulment of judgment and reiterated
that it is only available under certain exceptional
 125

circumstances, since it runs counter to the general

rule of immutability of final judgments, viz.:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in
character, allowed only in exceptional cases as
where there is no available or other adequate
remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, governs actions for
annulment of judgments or final orders and
resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly
provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. The underlying reason is traceable to
the notion that annulling final judgments goes
against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation
must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective administration of
justice that once a judgment has become final, the
issue or cause involved therein should be laid to
rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is
grounded on the fundamental principle of public
policy and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts and the
award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
at some definite date fixed by law.

3) Since a petition for annulment of judgment is

an equitable and exceptional relief, the Rules of
Court under Rule 47 put in place stringent
requirements that must be complied with before this
remedy may prosper:
First, it is only available when the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner.
 126

Second, an annulment may only be based on

the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Moreover, extrinsic fraud shall not
be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief.
Lastly, if grounded on extrinsic fraud, the
petition must be filed within four years from its
discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

MANGUBAT vs. MORGA-SEVA

G.R. No. 202611 November 23, 2015
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) It must be stressed that the remedy of

annulment of judgment is only available under
certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse
to the concept of immutability of final judgments.
Hence, it is allowed only on two grounds, i.e.,
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

2) In a petition for annulment of judgment based

on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not
merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction
means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the
court should not have taken cognizance of the
petition because the law does not vest it with
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction
over the nature of the action or subject matter is
conferred by law.
 127

SIBAL vs. BUQUEL

G.R. No. 197825 January 11, 2016
PERALTA, J p:

1) A petition for annulment of judgment is a

remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it
may be availed of only if the judgment, final order,
or final resolution sought to be annulled was
rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through
extrinsic fraud, and only when other remedies are
wanting.

Moreover, parties aggrieved by final

judgments, orders or resolutions cannot be allowed
to easily and readily abuse a petition for annulment
of judgment. Thus, the Court has instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for annulment to
lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court that the petitioner should show that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer
available without fault on the part of the petitioner.
A petition for annulment that ignores or disregards
any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

Further, it must be emphasized that not every

kind of fraud justifies the action of annulment of
judgment. Only extrinsic fraud does. According to
Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
fraud is extrinsic when the unsuccessful party has
been prevented from fully exhibiting his case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
 128

false promise of a compromise; or where the

defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which
show that there has never been a real contest in the
trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a
new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and
fair hearing.

2) As a ground for annulment of judgment,

extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse
party, and the fraud must be of such nature as to
have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The
fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the
petitioner's own counsel.

BAÑEZ vs. BAÑEZ

G.R. Nos. 132592 & 133628 January 23, 2002
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) Execution pending appeal is allowed when

superior circumstances demanding urgency
outweigh the damages that may result from the
issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an
instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may
well become a tool of oppression and inequity.

2) Merely putting up a bond is not sufficient

reason to justify her plea for execution pending
appeal. To do so would make execution routinary,
the rule rather than the exception.
 129

SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 155618 March 26, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

1) The SC stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that: A

valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution
pending appeal requires that it should be based upon
good reasons to be stated in a special order. The
following constitute good reasons and a
combination of two or more of them will suffice to
grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest
involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness
of the remaining portion of the term of the contested
office; and (3.) the length of time that the election
contest has been pending.

The rationale why such execution is allowed in

election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, to
give as much recognition to the worth of a trial
judge’s decision as that which is initially ascribed
by the law to the proclamation by the board of
canvassers.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. vs.

TOH, SR.
G.R. No. 144018 June 23, 2003
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) Discretionary execution is permissible only

when "good reasons" exist for immediately
executing the judgment before finality or pending
appeal or even before the expiration of the time to
appeal. "Good reasons" are compelling
circumstances justifying the immediate execution
 130

lest judgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing

party may, after the lapse of time, become unable
to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse
party who may apparently have no case except to
delay.

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY,

INC. vs. FELIX
G.R. No. 148090 November 28, 2006
CARPIO, J p:

1) The posting of a bond, standing alone and

absent the good reasons required under Section 2,
Rule 39 of the Rules, is not enough to allow
execution pending appeal. The mere filing of a
bond by a successful party is not a good reason to
justify execution pending appeal as a combination
of circumstances is the dominant consideration
which impels the grant of immediate execution.
The bond is only an additional factor for the
protection of the defendant’s creditor.

2) The requisites for the grant of an execution of

a judgment pending appeal are the following:
(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing
party with notice to the adverse party;
(b) there must be good reasons for execution
pending appeal;
(c) the good reasons must be stated in the
special order.

3) As a discretionary execution, execution

pending appeal is permissible only when good
reasons exist for immediately executing the
 131

judgment before finality or pending appeal or even

before the expiration of the period to appeal.

ABENION vs. PILIPINAS SHELL

PETROLEUM CORP.
G.R. Nos. 200749 & 208725
February 6, 2017
REYES, J p:

1) It bears emphasis that an execution pending

appeal is deemed an exception to the general rule,
which allows an execution as a matter of right only
in any of the following instances: (a) when the
judgment has become final and executory; (b)
when the judgment debtor has renounced or
waived his right of appeal; (c) when the period for
appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been
filed; or (d) when, having been filed, the appeal
has been resolved and the records of the case have
been returned to the court of origin.

2) The general rule is that only judgments which

have become final and executory may be executed.
However, discretionary execution of appealed
judgments may be allowed under Section 2 (a) of
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
upon concurrence of the following requisites: (a)
there must be a motion by the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party; (b) there must be a
good reason for execution pending appeal; and (c)
the good reason must be stated in a special order.
The yardstick remains the presence or the absence
of good reasons consisting of exceptional
circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the
 132

injury or damage that the losing party may suffer,

should the appealed judgment be reversed later.
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal
is an exception to the general rule, the existence of
good reasons is essential.

3) The sufficiency of "good reasons" depends

upon the circumstances of the case and the parties
thereto. Conditions that are personal to one party,
for example, may be insufficient to justify an
execution pending appeal that would affect all
parties to the case and the property that is the
subject thereof.

OCAMPO vs. ENRIQUEZ

G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116,
226117, 226120, 226294, 228186 & 228245
August 8, 2017
PERALTA, J p:

1) While the Court concedes that execution takes

place only when decisions become final and
executory, there are cases that may be executed
pending appeal or are immediately executory
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules and the
statutes as well as by court order. Yet, the fact that
a decision is immediately executory does not
prevent a party from questioning the decision
before a court of law.
While there are certain judgments that may be
executed immediately or even pending appeal,
these remain specific exceptions to the general rule
that a pending motion for reconsideration results in
a stay of execution of the judgment.
 133

2) Execution pending appeal is discretionary and

may issue only upon good reasons in cases covered
by Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, immediate execution is permitted only
in very specific cases as provided by law, the rules,
or jurisprudence.

3) In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp.,

the Supreme Court declared: Normally, execution
will issue as a matter of right only (a) when the
judgment has become final and executory; (b)
when the judgment debtor has renounced or
waived his right of appeal; (c) when the period for
appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been
filed; or (d) when, having been filed, the appeal
has been resolved and the records of the case have
been returned to the court of origin. Execution
pending appeal is the exception to the general rule.

As such exception, the court's discretion in

allowing it must be strictly construed and firmly
grounded on the existence of good reasons. "Good
reasons," it has been held, consist of compelling
circumstances that justify immediate execution lest
the judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances
must be superior, outweighing the injury or
damages that might result should the losing party
secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons
would make of execution pending appeal, instead
of an instrument of solicitude and justice, a tool of
oppression and inequity.
 134

VILLAREAL, JR. vs. METROPOLITAN

WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 232202 February 28, 2018
TIJAM, J p:

1) Execution may be either through motion or an

independent action. The two modes of execution
under the Rules are available, depending on the
timing when the prevailing party invoked his right
to enforce the court's judgment.

"Execution by motion is only available if the

enforcement of the judgment was sought within five
(5) years from the date of its entry." This is a matter
of right. "On the other hand, execution by
independent action is mandatory if the five-year
prescriptive period for execution by motion had
already elapsed." "[T]he said judgment is reduced to
a right of action which must be enforced by the
institution of a complaint in a regular court." "[T]he
action must be filed before it is barred by the statute
of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten
(10) years from the finality of the judgment."
Corollary, "[a] final and executory judgment may be
executed by motion within five years or by action
for revival of judgment within ten years reckoned
from the date of entry of judgment." The date of
entry, in turn, is the same as the date of finality of
judgment.

2) By jurisprudence, for execution by motion to

be valid, the judgment creditor must ensure the
accomplishment of two acts within the five-year
prescriptive period, as follows: (a) the filing of the
 135

motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and

(b) the court's actual issuance of the writ.

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP. vs.

SERRA
G.R. No. 203241 July 10, 2013
CARPIO, J p:

1) The Rules of Court provide that a final and

executory judgment may be executed by motion
within five years from the date of its entry or by an
action after the lapse of five years and before
prescription sets in. This rule, however, admits of
exceptions as when execution may be made by
motion even after the lapse of five years. These
exceptions have one common denominator: the
delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the
judgment obligor and/or is incurred for his benefit
or advantage.

The purpose of prescribing time limitations for

enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from
sleeping on their rights.

SPOUSES DAVIS vs. SPOUSES DAVIS

G.R. No. 233489 March 7, 2018
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a

"judgment may be executed within five (5) years
from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory. After the lapse of
such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
 136

action." Nonetheless, this Court held that there had

been many instances where it allowed execution
by motion even after the lapse of five years, upon
meritorious grounds. These exceptions have one
common denominator, and that is: the delay is
caused or occasioned by actions of the judgment
debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage.

2) It bears stressing that the purpose of the law in

prescribing time limitations for enforcing judgments
or actions is to prevent obligors from sleeping on
their rights. Moreover, the statute of limitations has
not been devised against those who wish to act but
cannot do so for causes beyond their control.

PANOTES vs. CITY TOWNHOUSE

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 154739, January 23, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

1) An action for revival of judgment is no more

than a procedural means of securing the execution
of a previous judgment which has become dormant
after the passage of five years without it being
executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is
not intended to re-open any issue affecting the
merits of the judgment debtors case nor the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment.
 137

D' ARMOURED SECURITY AND

INVESTIGATION AGENCY INC. vs. ORPIA
G.R. No. 151325 June 27, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

1) SECTION 1. Properties exempt from

execution. – Only the properties of the losing party
shall be the subject of execution, except:
a) The losing party’s family home constituted in
accordance with the Civil Code or Family
Code or as may be provided for by law or in
the absence thereof, the homestead in which he
resides, and land necessarily used in
connection therewith, subject to the limits
fixed by law;
b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for
housekeeping, and used for that purpose by the
losing party such as he may select, of a value
not exceeding the amount fixed by law;
d) Provisions for individual or family use
sufficient for three (3) months;
e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges,
physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers,
surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other
professionals, not exceeding the amount fixed
by law;
f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for
his personal services within the month
preceding the levy as are necessary for the
support of his family;
g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities
accruing or in any manner growing out of any
life insurance;
 138

h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him

in his trade or employment of a value not
exceeding three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
i) Other properties especially exempted by law."
The above Rule clearly enumerates what
properties are exempt from execution. It is apparent
that the exemption pertains only to natural persons
and not to juridical entities.

POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES

MANAGEMENT CORP. vs. MAUNLAD
HOMES, INC.
G.R. No. 215933 February 8, 2017
PERALTA, J p:

1) The power of the court in executing judgments

extends only to properties unquestionably belonging
to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be
issued only against a party and not against one who
did not have his day in court. The duty of the sheriff
is to levy the property of the judgment debtor not
that of a third person. For, as the saying goes, one
man's goods shall not be sold for another man's
debts. Thus, if the property levied by virtue of a writ
of execution is claimed by a third person who is not
the judgment obligor, the third-party claimant may
execute an affidavit of his title or right to the
possession of the property levied, and serve the
same to the officer making the levy and a copy
thereof to the judgment creditor. This remedy is
known as terceria. The officer shall not be bound to
keep the property, unless the judgment creditor files
a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-
party claimant in a sum not less than the value of
 139

the property levied on. An action for damages may

be brought against the officer within one hundred
twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the
bond. It is likewise provided in the Rules of Court
that a third-party claimant may file a proper action
to vindicate his claim to the levied property. The
proper action mentioned in Section 16 would have
for its object the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as
well as damages resulting from the allegedly
wrongful seizure and detention thereof despite the
third party claim and it may be brought against the
sheriff and such other parties as may be alleged to
have colluded with him in the supposedly wrongful
execution proceedings, such as the judgment
creditor himself. If instituted by a stranger to the
suit in which execution has issued, such proper
action should be a totally separate and distinct
action from the former suit.

CITY OF CEBU vs. DEDAMO, JR.

G.R. No. 172852, January 30, 2013
REYES, J p:

1) Under the principle of conclusiveness of

judgment, when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial
has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as
it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them. Stated
differently, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-
litigation in a second case of a fact or question
already settled in a previous case.
 140

FUJIKI vs. MARINAY

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
CARPIO, J p:

1) A petition to recognize a foreign judgment

declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if
it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court provides that a foreign judgment or final
order against a person creates a “presumptive
evidence of a clear mistake of law or fact.” Thus,
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments.

2) Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits

of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits,
i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the
policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction
of other states.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

SECURITIES CORP. vs. GUEVARA
G.R. No. 167052 March 11, 2015
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

1) It is an established international legal principle

that final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
 141

efficacious subject to certain conditions that vary in

different countries. In the Philippines, a judgment or
final order of a foreign tribunal cannot be enforced
simply by execution. Such judgment or order
merely creates a right of action, and its non-
satisfaction is the cause of action by which a suit
can be brought upon for its enforcement.

2) It is usually necessary for an action to be filed

in order to enforce a foreign judgment, even if such
judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in
rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the
losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, and in order for the court to properly
determine its efficacy. Consequently, the party
attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity.

3) Recognition and enforcement of a foreign

judgment or final order requires only proof of fact
of the said judgment or final order. In an action in
personam, the foreign judgment or final order
enjoys the disputable presumption of validity. It is
the party attacking the foreign judgment or final
order that is tasked with the burden of overcoming
its presumptive validity. A foreign judgment or final
order may only be repelled on grounds external to
its merits, particularly, want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
 142

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
 143

Serana vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
REYES, R.T., J p:

1) Section 4 (B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: Other

offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction

over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible
reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses
included in Section 4 (B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly,
estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4 (A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.

2) It is not only the salary grade that determines the

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in
P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, We held that
while the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only
officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second
part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed
 144

under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls

under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law.

3) Section 4 (A) (1) (g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly

vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
Petitioner falls under this category.

RAMISCAL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006
CALLEJO, SR., J p:

1) In People v. Sandiganbayan and Ramiscal, Jr. v.

Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that the AFP-RSBS is
a government-owned and controlled corporation, and
that its funds are in the nature of public funds. Under
Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees
or managers of government owned or controlled
corporations. Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249,
the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers and employees
in relation to their office, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes.

ESCOBAL vs. GARCHITORENA

G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004
 145

CALLEJO, SR., J p:

1) Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as

amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the
following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by
public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed
with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . .

However, for the Sandiganbayan to have

exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes
committed by public officers in relation to their
office, it is essential that the facts showing the
intimate relation between the office of the offender
and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in
the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in
the Information that the crime charged was
committed by the offender in relation to his office
because that would be a conclusion of law.
 146

2) Under the law, even if the offender committed

the crime charged in relation to his office but
occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade
below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or
Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

PEOPLE vs. GO
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PERALTA, J p:

1) Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with

public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty,
held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3
of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy
of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike constituting graft or
corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.

2) The requirement before a private person may be

indicted for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019,
among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public
officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court,
as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.
 147

3) The SB is a special criminal court which has

exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public
officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by
R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are
charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers.

GARCIA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 155574 November 20, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

1) The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article

210 23 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the
following elements: (1) that the accused is a public
officer; (2) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3)
that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or
any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which it is his official duty to do;
and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer. Thus, the acts
constituting direct bribery are: (1) by agreeing to
perform, or by performing, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present an act constituting a
crime, in connection with the performance of his
official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration
of the execution of an act which does not constitute a
crime, in connection with the performance of his
 148

official duty; or (3) by agreeing to refrain, or by

refraining, from doing something which is his official
duty to do, in consideration of any gift or promise.

2) Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer

who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his
office. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as
defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is
that the public officer concerned must have accepted
the gift or material consideration.

PEOPLE vs. BENIPAYO

G.R. Nos. 154473 & 155573 April 24, 2009
NACHURA, J p:

1) In case private individuals are charged as co-

principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.

LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
MARTINEZ, J p:

1) Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under

the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A.
 149

3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten
wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II
of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d)
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in
items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or
employee holding any of the positions enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense
committed is in relation to the office.

2) The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the

Constitution or statute. The elements of that
definition must appear in the complaint or
information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule
that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, and not
by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4
[paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that
the offense charged must be committed by the
offender in relation to his office in order for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. This
jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution
which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by public
 150

officers and employees, including those in

government-owned or controlled corporations, "in
relation to their office as may be determined by law."
This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new
[1987] Constitution when it declared in Section 4
thereof that the Sandiganbayan "shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law."

SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
CRUZ, J p:

1) Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as

amended by P.D. No. 1861, provides:
SECTION 4. Jurisdiction. — The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code;
2) Other offenses or felonies committed
by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other
 151

crimes, where the penalty prescribed

by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 . . .

2) Public office is not of the essence of murder.

The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or public
servant, and the penalty is the same except when the
perpetrator, being a public functionary, took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in
which event the penalty is increased. But the use or
abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an
element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its
materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the
proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public
officials but from the manner of the commission of
the crime.

SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
REYES, R.T., J p:

1) The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other

felonies committed by public officials in relation to
their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in
Section 4 (B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one
of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply
subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is
committed by public officials and employees
 152

mentioned in Section 4 (A) of P.D. No. 1606, as

amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.

2) The jurisdiction herein conferred shall be original

and exclusive if the offense charged is punishable by a
penalty higher than prision correccional, or its
equivalent, except as herein provided; in other
offenses, it shall be concurrent with the regular courts.

DE LIMA vs. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and

felonies committed by public officers is not
determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that
they were committed "in relation to their office." In
determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to
try and decide criminal actions, the laws governing
the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must
likewise be considered.

2) Section 4 (b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA

10660, is the general law on jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses committed
by high-ranking public officers in relation to their
office; Section 90, RA 9165 is the special law
excluding from the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction
violations of RA 9165 committed by such public
officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon
 153

the RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs

court, regardless of whether the violation of RA
9165 was committed in relation to the public
officials' office.

DUNCANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of

the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2)
officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1)
(a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. 31 While
the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of
the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and
higher, its second part specifically includes other
executive officials whose positions may not be of
Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26

and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific
inclusion constitutes an exception to the general
qualification relating to "officials of the executive
branch occupying the positions of regional director
 154

and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and

higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989."

INOCENTES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 205963-64 July 7, 2016
BRION, J p:

1) The applicable law provides that violations of

R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations, and state universities shall be
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. 18 We have clarified the provision of
law defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its
jurisdiction over those officials specifically
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades.
Simply put, those that are classified as Salary Grade
26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions
enumerated by the law. 20 In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 155

CRISOSTOMO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 152398 April 14, 2005
CARPIO, J p:

1) A public officer commits an offense in relation

to his office if he perpetrates the offense while
performing, though in an improper or irregular
manner, his official functions and he cannot commit
the offense without holding his public office. In such
a case, there is an intimate connection between the
offense and the office of the accused. If the
information alleges the close connection between the
offense charged and the office of the accused, the
case falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

ESTEBAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 146646-49 March 11, 2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

1) Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as

amended by Republic Act No. 8249, 10 reads in part:
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crime committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
 156

2) In People v. Montejo, we ruled that an offense is

said to have been committed in relation to the office
if the offense is "intimately connected" with the
office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in
the performance of his official functions. This
intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the
Information. This is in accordance with the rule that
the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts in the complaint or information.
Hence, where the information is wanting in specific
factual averments to show the intimate
relationship/connection between the offense charged
and the discharge of official functions, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.

BONIFACIO vs. RTC OF MAKATI

G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J p:

1) The established policy of strict observance of

the judicial hierarchy of courts, as a rule, requires
that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked
court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher
court. A regard for judicial hierarchy clearly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level courts should be filed in the RTC
and those against the latter should be filed in the
Court of Appeals. The rule is not iron-clad, however,
as it admits of certain exceptions. Thus, a strict
application of the rule is unnecessary when cases
 157

brought before the appellate courts do not involve

factual but purely legal questions.

2) Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such

that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but
constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This
principle acquires even greater import in libel cases,
given that Article 360, as amended, specifically
provides for the possible venues for the institution of
the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.

DISINI, JR. vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

G.R. Nos. 203335, 203299, 203306, 203359, 203378,
203391, 203407, 203440, 203453, 203454, 203469,
203501, 203509, 203515 & 203518
February 18, 2014
ABAD, J p:

1) The designation of special cybercrime courts of

course is not outside our power to undertake: Section
21 56 of the Cybercrime Law grants the Regional
Trial Courts jurisdiction over any violation of the
Cybercrime Law, and provides that special cybercrime
courts manned by specially trained judges should be
designated. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, 57 on the other hand, empowers this
Court to promulgate rules on the pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts.
 158

JIMENEZ vs. SORONGON

G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012
BRION, J p:

1) It is well-settled that "every action must be

prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or
an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. When the
plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest,
the suit is dismissible.

2) Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll

criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of
criminal cases before the CA and before this Court,
the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People,
pursuant to Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.

PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012
BERSAMIN, J p:
 159

1) The real nature of the criminal charge is

determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the
facts in the complaint or information.

2) In People v. Dimaano, the Court elaborated: For

complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state
the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. What is controlling is not the
title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of
law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the
information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined
by reference to the definitions and essentials of the
 160

specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the

elements of a crime in the information is to inform the
accused of the nature of the accusation against him so
as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

3) The State must specify in the information

the details of the crime and any circumstance that
aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement
of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the
accused of the nature and cause of the charge against
him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It
emanates from the presumption of innocence in his
favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the details of the
crime he is being charged with. To have the facts
stated in the body of the information determine the
crime of which he stands charged and for which he
must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense
and with the requirements of plain justice.

4) The allegations in the information are controlling

in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance
between the offense charged in the information and
that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
the offense charged, or of the offense charged
included in the offense proved. 31 In that regard, an
offense charged necessarily includes the offense
 161

proved when some of the essential elements or

ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.

MIGUEL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012
BRION, J p:

1) The test of the information's sufficiency is

whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and
with such particularity with reasonable certainty so
that the accused is duly informed of the offense
charged. In particular, whether an information validly
charges an offense depends on whether the material
facts alleged in the complaint or information shall
establish the essential elements of the offense charged
as defined in the law. The raison d'etre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense.

2) While the suspension of a public officer under

this provision is mandatory, the suspension requires a
prior hearing to determine "the validity of the
information" filed against him, "taking into account
the serious and far reaching consequences of a
suspension of an elective public official even before
his conviction." The accused public official's right to
challenge the validity of the information before a
 162

suspension order may be issued includes the right to

challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding
leading to the filing of an information against him, and
(ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the
acts charged do not constitute a violation of R.A. No.
3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised
Penal Code.

PEOPLE vs. SORIA Y GOMEZ

G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) Where an offense may be committed in any of

the different modes and the offense is alleged to have
been committed in two or more modes specified, the
indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that
the different means of committing the same offense
are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The
allegation in the information of the various ways of
committing the offense should be regarded as a
description of only one offense and the information is
not thereby rendered defective on the ground of
multifariousness." Any objection from the appellant
with respect to the Information is held to have been
waived failing any effort to oppose the same before
trial.
 163

SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the

recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted
with the criminal action refers only to that arising
from the offense charged.

CASTILLO vs. SALVADOR

G.R. No. 191240 July 30, 2014
PERALTA, J p:

1) In Manantan v. CA, we discussed the

consequences of an acquittal on the civil liability of
the accused as follows: Our law recognizes two kinds
of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability
of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that
the accused is not the author of the act or omission
complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not
the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can
never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the
delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused.
 164

DY vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 189081 August 10, 2016
JARDELEZA, J p:

1) Our law states that every person criminally

liable for a felony is also civilly liable. This civil
liability ex delicto may be recovered through a civil
action which, under our Rules of Court, is deemed
instituted with the criminal action. While they are
actions mandatorily fused, they are, in truth, separate
actions whose existences are not dependent on each
other. Thus, civil liability ex delicto survives an
acquittal in a criminal case for failure to prove guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Rules of
Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action
for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto. It, by no
means, includes a civil liability arising from a
different source of obligation, as in the case of a
contract. Where the civil liability is ex contractu, the
court hearing the criminal case has no authority to
award damages.

2) The law and the rules of procedure provide for a

precise mechanism in instituting a civil action
pertaining to an act or omission which is also subject
of a criminal case. Our Rules of Court prescribes a
kind of fusion such that, subject to certain defined
qualifications, when a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense is deemed instituted as well.
However, there is an important difference between
 165

civil and criminal proceedings that require a fine

distinction as to how these twin actions shall proceed.
These two proceedings involve two different
standards of proof. A criminal action requires proof
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt while a civil action
requires a lesser quantum of proof, that of
preponderance of evidence. This distinction also
agrees with the essential principle in our legal system
that while a criminal liability carries with it a
corresponding civil liability, they are nevertheless
separate and distinct. In other words, these two
liabilities may co-exist but their existence is not
dependent on each other.

Hence, a civil action filed for the purpose of

enforcing civil liability ex delicto, even if
mandatorily instituted with the corresponding
criminal action, survives an acquittal when it is based
on the presence of reasonable doubt. In these
instances, while the evidence presented does not
establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty,
the civil action still prevails for as long as the greater
weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of
liability. This means that while the mind of the court
cannot rest easy in penalizing the accused for the
commission of a crime, it nevertheless finds that he
or she committed or omitted to perform acts which
serve as a separate source of obligation. There is no
sufficient proof that the act or omission is criminal
beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a
preponderance of evidence to show that the act or
 166

omission caused injury which demands

compensation.

LIM vs. KOU CO PING

G.R. Nos. 175256 & 179160 August 23, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) A single act or omission that causes damage to an

offended party may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender — (1) civil
liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from
the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is,
civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability
may be based on "an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony," as
provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for
breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on
an act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil
Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical
injuries").

2) The civil liability arising from the offense or ex

delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute
the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently
intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason,
the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with
the criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability
 167

ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the

filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are
suspended until the final outcome of the criminal
action. The civil liability based on delict is
extinguished when the court hearing the criminal
action declares that "the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist."

On the other hand, the independent civil

liabilities are separate from the criminal action and
may be pursued independently, as provided in Articles
31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on
an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.

CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
CARPIO, J p:

1) Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is

 168

"deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only

the action to recover civil liability arising from the
crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no
longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without
any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to
make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent
civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on
these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even
with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are
separate, distinct and independent of the civil action
"deemed instituted" in the criminal action.

Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985

Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the
criminal action, could not be filed until after final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action,
if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action until final judgment was rendered in
the criminal action. This rule applied only to the
separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil
actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, which could proceed independently
regardless of the filing of the criminal action. . . .
 169

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not

change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present
Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate
civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.

Under Section I of the present Rule 111, the

independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with
the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil
action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers
only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action.

CATERPILLAR, INC. vs. SAMSON

G.R. Nos. 205972 & 164352 November 9, 2016
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil action

entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action
may be brought by the injured party in cases of fraud,
and such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution.
 170

PEOPLE vs. ROMERO

G.R. No. 112985 April 21, 1999
PARDO, J p:

1) Pursuant to the doctrine established in People

vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer
a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on
the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict.

MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J p:

1) A prejudicial question is defined as that which

arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the
case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court
or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or
 171

innocence of the accused.

For a prejudicial question in a civil case to

suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that
said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.

Thus, for a civil action to be considered

prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the
suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final
resolution of the civil case, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt
or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question
must be lodged in another tribunal.

If the resolution of the issue in the civil action

will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or there is no necessity "that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case,"
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other.
 172

2) The determination of whether the proceedings

may be suspended on the basis of a prejudicial
question rests on whether the facts and issues raised
in the pleadings in the civil cases are so related with
the issues raised in the criminal case such that the
resolution of the issues in the civil cases would also
determine the judgment in the criminal case.

PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
CARPIO, J p:

1) The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)

the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. The rule is clear that the civil
action must be instituted first before the filing of the
criminal action. Further, the resolution of the civil
action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant
the suspension of the criminal action.

2) There is a prejudicial question when a civil

action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may
proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the
civil action is resolved would be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
 173

A prejudicial question is defined as one that arises in

a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent
of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only
that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.

JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY,

INC. vs. LICLICAN
G.R. No. 208587 July 29, 2015
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) As jurisprudence elucidates, a prejudicial

question generally exists in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the former an issue that must be pre-
emptively resolved before the latter may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The rationale behind the principle is to avoid two
conflicting decisions, and its existence rests on the
concurrence of two essential elements: (i) the civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
 174

the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the

resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.

FENEQUITO vs. VERGARA, JR.

G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
PERALTA, J p:

1) In Reyes v. Pearlbank Securities, Inc., 22 this

Court held: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a
criminal information, has been defined as such facts as
are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.

2) A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on

evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not
on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable
cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of
 175

the rules of evidence of which he has no technical

knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require
an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.

BURGUNDY REALTY CORP. vs. REYES

G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012
PERALTA, ** J p:

1) A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic

judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is
to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed;
and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe
that the accused is guilty thereof.

2) In a preliminary investigation, the public

prosecutor merely determines whether there is
probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. It does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a
judgment of conviction requires after trial on the
merits. The complainant need not present at this stage
proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive
presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is
 176

a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both

parties to substantiate their respective claims.

ABANADO vs. BAYONA

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804 July 30, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, * J p:

1) The conduct of a preliminary investigation is

primarily an executive function. Thus, the courts must
consider the rules of procedure of the Department of
Justice in conducting preliminary investigations
whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in
question.

HEIRS OF TRIA vs. OBIAS

G.R. No. 175887 November 24, 2010
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

1) Under the procedure for preliminary investigation

provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended, 38 in case the
investigating prosecutor conducts a hearing where
there are facts and issues to be clarified from a party
or witness, "[t]he parties can be present at the hearing
but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
They may, however, submit to the investigating
officer questions which may be asked to the party or
witness concerned." 39 Hence, the non-referral by the
OP to the DOJ of the motion for reconsideration of
respondent, in the exercise of its discretion, did not
violate petitioners' right to due process.
 177

2) The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the

existence or non-existence of probable cause is subject
to the power of review by the DOJ. Indeed, the
Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify the
resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall direct
the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information with notice
to the parties. Ordinarily, the determination of
probable cause is not lodged with this Court. Its duty
in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of
whether the executive or judicial determination, as the
case may be, of probable cause was done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with abuse of discretion
amounting to want of jurisdiction. However, this
Court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-
existence of probable cause by examining the records
of the preliminary investigation when necessary for
the orderly administration of justice, 42 or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions.

UY vs. JAVELLANA
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666 September 5, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

1) The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does

not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to
the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A
criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be
 178

commenced in the following manner:

SEC. 11. How commenced. — The filing of
criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule
shall be either by complaint or by information;
Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila
and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information, except when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio.

The complaint or information shall be

accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant
and of his witnesses in such number of copies as
there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court's
files. If this requirement is not complied with
within five (5) days from date of filing, the case
may be dismissed.
SEC. 12. Duty of Court. —
(a) If commenced by complaint. — On the
basis of the complaint and the affidavits
and other evidence accompanying the
same, the court may dismiss the case
outright for being patently without
basis or merit and order the release of
the accused if in custody.
(b) If commenced by information. —
When the case is commenced by
information, or is not dismissed
pursuant to the next preceding
paragraph, the court shall issue an order
which, together with copies of the
affidavits and other evidence submitted
 179

by the prosecution, shall require the

accused to submit his counter-affidavit
and the affidavits of his witnesses as
well as any evidence in his behalf,
serving copies thereof on the
complainant or prosecutor not later than
ten (10) days from receipt of said order.
The prosecution may file reply
affidavits within ten (10) days after
receipt of the counter-affidavits of the
defense.
SEC. 13. Arraignment and trial. — Should
the court, upon a consideration of the complaint
or information and the affidavits submitted by
both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the
accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of
the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case
for arraignment and trial.

If the accused is in custody for the crime

charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if he
enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be
sentenced.

PEOPLE vs. VALENCIA

G.R. Nos. 94511-13 September 18, 1992
NOCON, J p:

1) A person who is lawfully arrested without a

warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule
113, Rules of Court should be delivered to the nearest
 180

police station and proceeded against in accordance

with Rule 112, Section 7. Under said Section 7, Rule
112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in
court without a preliminary investigation.

2) When a person is lawfully arrested without a

warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed
by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or

information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and
in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he
may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding
rule and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT vs. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 194159 October 21, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an

 181

inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not

there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has
been committed and that the person charged should
be held responsible for it. Being merely based on
opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction. "[A preliminary
investigation] is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of [the prosecution's] evidence.
The presence and absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits." Hence, "the validity and merits of
a party's defense or accusation, as well as the
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level."

2) It must be emphasized that in determining the

elements of the crime charged for purposes of
arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts
sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondents are required, not absolute certainty.
Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e.,
a finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less
than evidence that would justify a conviction. 66 To
reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party's
defense or accusations and the admissibility of
testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during
the trial stage than in the preliminary stage.
 182

DE LIMA vs. REYES

G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016
LEONEN, J p:

1) It is settled that executive determination of

probable cause is different from the judicial
determination of probable cause. In People v. Castillo
and Mejia: There are two kinds of determination of
probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive
determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that
properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he
believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to
determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment
of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not
be compelled to pass upon.

2) The judicial determination of probable cause, on

the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that
based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity
for placing the accused under custody in order not to
 183

frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no

probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue
the arrest warrant.

3) The courts do not interfere with the prosecutor's

conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor's determination of probable cause is solely
within his or her discretion. Prosecutors are given a
wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an
information should be filed in court or whether the
complaint should be dismissed.

4) A preliminary investigation is "merely

inquisitorial," and is only conducted to aid the
prosecutor in preparing the information. It serves a
two-fold purpose: first, to protect the innocent against
wrongful prosecutions; and second, to spare the state
from using its funds and resources in useless
prosecutions.

LUZ Y ONG vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
SERENO, J p:

1) Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in

order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. 10 It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person's voluntary submission to the custody of the
one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or
 184

physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest,

is required. It is enough that there be an intention on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.

2) This Court has held that at the time a person is

arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must
show that person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons
shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
they might make could be used against them.

3) The following are the instances when a

warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in
"plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search;
(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and
emergency circumstances.

ANTIQUERA Y CODES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013
ABAD, J p:

1) Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal

Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has
 185

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante
delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done
in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.

2) The failure of the accused to object to the

irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to
sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the
illegal warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE vs. VASQUEZ Y SANDIGAN

G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p:

1) In People v. Cabugatan, it was held that: This

interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures,
however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed
permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1)
search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented
searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search),
and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a
rule, an arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected
with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court
recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot
 186

pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.

ZUÑO vs. CABEBE

A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ (formerly OCA IPI No.
03-1675-RTJ) November 26, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

1) In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,

we held that jurisprudence is replete with decisions on
the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail,
especially in cases involving offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where
bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules,
a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a
matter of right or discretion. It must be stressed that
the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a
matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or
not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, and
the determination of whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion which remains
with the judge. In order for the latter to properly
exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing
to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In
fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a
hearing should still be held.
 187

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. OLALIA, JR.
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:

1) The Philippines, along with the other members of

the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is
enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of
every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to
liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.

LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
CORONA, J p:

1) Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court

provides: Bail, when discretionary. — Upon
 188

conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense

not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the
trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to
the appellate court. However, if the decision of the
trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the
application for bail can only be filed with and resolved
by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the

accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the
same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is

imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid
justification;
 189

(c) That he committed the offense while under

probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

A threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a

showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely
intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable
issue. This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts
will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting
appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a
lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more
significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower court's exercise
of discretionary power was sound, specially since the
rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment
shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals
except for substantial error.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
BERSAMIN, J p:

1) Bail is not granted to prevent the accused from

committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is
to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of
 190

the accused when so required, but it should be no

higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.

2) The general rule is, therefore, that any person,

before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under
arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the
law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional
liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right
to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or
with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Once it has been established that the evidence
of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

3) On the other hand, the granting of bail is

discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment; 29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided
none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
 191

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal

confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under
probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit
another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

NAPOLES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 224162 November 7, 2017
REYES, JR., J p:

1) The accused may be granted provisional liberty

under certain conditions. This right to bail is
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, except when the
accused is charged with a capital offense, viz.: Section
13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

2) While bail may generally be granted as a matter

of right prior to the conviction of the accused, those
 192

charged with a capital offense is granted bail only

when the evidence of guilt is not strong: Section 7.
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No
person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (7a)

ALTOBANO-RUIZ vs. PICHAY

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893 February 19, 2018
PERALTA, J p:
1) Section 17 (a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94
which governs the approval of bail bonds for criminal
cases pending outside the judge's territorial
jurisdiction is instructive, to wit: Bail, where filed. —
(a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the
court where the case is pending, or in the absence or
unavailability of the judge thereof, with any regional
trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge in the province,
city, or municipality. If the accused is arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where the
case is pending, bail may also be filed with any
Regional Trial Court of said place, or if no judge
thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge,
municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
 193

PEOPLE vs. DEL CASTILLO

G.R. No. 153254 September 30, 2004
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

1) Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved (Section 14[2],
Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines) is the rule that in order to convict an
accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all
and each and every hypothesis consistent with his
innocence.

2) In all criminal cases, it is appellant's

constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

MIGUEL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012
BRION, J p:

1) It is well settled that "to be heard" does not only

mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, has been
accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.
2) An opportunity to be heard on one's defenses,
however unmeritorious it may be, against the
suspension mandated by law equally and sufficiently
serves both the due process right of the accused and the
mandatory nature of the suspension required by law.
 194

PEOPLE vs. LARA Y ORBISTA

G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
REYES, J p:

1) The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at

the precise moment custodial investigation begins and
being made to stand in a police line-up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As
this Court previously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-
up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the
case of People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent
case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted
by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation
and cannot be claimed by the accused during
identification in a police line-up because it is not part
of the custodial investigation process. This is because
during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is
usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course
 195

of the line-up.

PEOPLE vs. ESPIRITU Y KINAO

G.R. No. 128287 February 2, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J p:

1) At the outset, we must clarify that the right to

counsel does not mean that the accused must
personally hire his own counsel. The constitutional
requirement is satisfied when a counsel is (1) engaged
by anyone acting on behalf of the person under
investigation or (2) appointed by the court upon
petition of the said person or by someone on his
behalf.

PEOPLE vs. AYSON

G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
NARVASA, J p:

1) The right against self-incrimination, mentioned in

Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right
is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be
a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any
particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer
to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some
 196

crime.

The right can be claimed only when the specific

question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to
the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a
subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the
time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The
witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as
required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may
incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse
to answer on the strength of the constitutional
guaranty.

2) The right against self-incrimination is not self-

executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness,
the protection does not come into play. It follows that
the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by
a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 151258, 154954, 155101, 178057 &
178080 February 1, 2012
SERENO, J p:

1) The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been

enshrined in Sections 14 (2) and 16, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a
 197

trial free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive

delays. The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements
of trial, or when a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or
justifiable motive. In determining the right of the
accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense
must be weighed. Also to be considered are factors
such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-
assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon
the defendant. We have consistently ruled in a long
line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to
the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to
acquittal.

PEOPLE vs. ESTOMACA Y GARQUE

G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996
REGALADO, J p:

1) Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the

arraignment should be made in open court by the
judge himself or by the clerk of court furnishing the
accused a copy of the complaint or information with
the list of witnesses stated therein, then reading the
same in the language or dialect that is known to him,
and asking him what his plea is to the charge. The
requirement that the reading be made in a language or
dialect that the accused understands and knows is a
 198

mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said

Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts.
This the law affords the accused by way of
implementation of the all-important constitutional
mandate regarding the right of an accused to be
informed of the precise nature of the accusation
leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for
him to be able to hoist the necessary defense in
rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution.

2) Pursuant to Binabay vs. People, et al., (L-31008,

January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 445) no valid judgment
can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment.

PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN Y TRINIDAD

G.R. No. 171020 March 14, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

1) Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of

implementing the constitutional right of an accused to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom,
even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of
why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him.
 199

DAAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

1) Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process

whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in
return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge.

2) Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2,

Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
to wit: Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At
arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by
the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which
is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of
the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir.
38-98)

3) Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the

pre-trial stage of the proceedings. But it may also be
made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and
rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is
 200

immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during

the pre-trial stage or that it was made only after the
prosecution already presented several witnesses.

PEOPLE vs. BAHARAN

G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
SERENO, J p:

1) The Supreme Court has ruled that "all trial judges

. . . must refrain from accepting with alacrity an
accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a
speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be
extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his
plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."

2) The stringent procedure governing the reception

of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the
death penalty, is imposed upon the trial judge in order
to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the
accused might have misunderstood the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea. In People v.
Alborida, this Court found that there was still an
improvident plea of guilty, even if the accused had
already signified in open court that his counsel had
explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he
understood the explanation of his counsel; that the
accused understood that the penalty of death would
still be meted out to him; and that he had not been
intimidated, bribed, or threatened.
 201

3) In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if

the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was
not complied with, "[t]he manner by which the plea of
guilt is made . . . loses much of great significance
where the conviction can be based on independent
evidence proving the commission by the person
accused of the offense charged." Thus, in People v.
Nadera, the Court stated: Convictions based on an
improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea
is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict
the accused, the conviction must be sustained, because
then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of
the accused but on evidence proving his commission
of the offense charged.

ENRILE vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 213455 August 11, 2015
BRION, J p:

1) In general, a bill of particulars is the further

specification of the charges or claims in an action,
which an accused may avail of by motion before
arraignment, to enable him to properly plead and
prepare for trial. In civil proceedings, a bill of
particulars has been defined as a complementary
procedural document consisting of an amplification or
more particularized outline of a pleading, and is in the
nature of a more specific allegation of the facts recited
in the pleading. The purpose of a motion for bill of
particulars in civil cases is to enable a party to prepare
 202

his responsive pleading properly.

2) In criminal cases, a bill of particulars details

items or specific conduct not recited in the
Information but nonetheless pertain to or are included
in the crime charged. Its purpose is to enable an
accused: to know the theory of the government's case;
to prepare his defense and to avoid surprise at the trial;
to plead his acquittal or conviction in bar of another
prosecution for the same offense; and to compel the
prosecution to observe certain limitations in offering
evidence.

3) The rule requires the information to describe the

offense with sufficient particularity to apprise the
accused of the crime charged with and to enable the
court to pronounce judgment. The particularity must
be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what the Information means.

4) The general function of a bill of particulars,

whether in civil or criminal proceedings, is to guard
against surprises during trial. It is not the function of
the bill to furnish the accused with the evidence of the
prosecution. Thus, the prosecutor shall not be required
to include in the bill of particulars matters of evidence
relating to how the people intend to prove the
elements of the offense charged or how the people
intend to prove any item of factual information
included in the bill of particulars.
 203

PEOPLE vs. LACSON

G.R. No. 149453 April 1, 2003
CALLEJO, SR., J p:

1) The respondent is burdened to establish the

essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure on provisional dismissal, namely: 1. the
prosecution with the express conformity of the
accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin
perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional
dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified
of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public
prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case. The foregoing
requirements are conditions sine qua non to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of
the new rule.

2) Express consent to a provisional dismissal is

given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive,
direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused
writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional
dismissal of the case No objection or With my
conformity,the writing amounts to express consent of
the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The
mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for
 204

a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to

object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to
express consent.

3) A motion of the accused for a provisional

dismissal of a case is an express consent to such
provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of
the accused, the case may be revived only within the
periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if
a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the
express consent of the accused or over his objection,
the new rule would not apply. The case may be
revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods
subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same
on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival
or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.

PEOPLE vs. DUMLAO Y CASTILIANO

G.R. No. 168918 March 2, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

1) The fundamental test in determining the

sufficiency of the material averments of an
information is whether the facts alleged therein, which
are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essentials elements of the crime defined by law.
Evidence aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the
Information, are not be considered.
 205

2) Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the

grounds of a Motion to Quash. The grounds, as
enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, are as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an
offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had
no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except
when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged,
or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

3) Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for

dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests
its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
 206

Criminal Procedure provides: After the prosecution

rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity
to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused with or without leave of court.

SORIANO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) It is settled that in considering a motion to quash

on such ground (hat the facts charged do not constitute
an offense), the test is "whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined by law.
The trial court may not consider a situation contrary to
that set forth in the criminal complaint or information.
Facts that constitute the defense of the petitioner[s]
against the charge under the information must be
proved by [him] during trial. Such facts or
circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a
motion to quash the information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute the offense".

2) The Court has consistently held that a special

civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to quash an information.
The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused
to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part
to present the special defenses he had invoked in his
 207

motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an

adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners
should not have forthwith filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA and instead, they should
have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses
contained in their motion to quash. There are no
special or exceptional circumstances in the present
case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a
petition for certiorari.

CEREZO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 185230 June 1, 2011
NACHURA, J p:

1) Well-entrenched is the rule that once a case is

filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the
sound discretion of the court. In thus resolving a
motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an
Information, the trial court should not rely solely and
merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice. It is the court's bounden duty to
assess independently the merits of the motion, and this
assessment must be embodied in a written order
disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of
the prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice
is persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
 208

CO vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC

PRODUCTS
G.R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
PERALTA, * J p:

1) The essential requisites of the first paragraph of

Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are conditions
sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the
second paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution
with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio)
dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
(2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues
an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served
with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the
case.

2) The importance of a prior notice to the offended

party of a motion for provisional dismissal is aptly
explained in People v. Lacson: . . . It must be borne in
mind that in crimes involving private interests, the
new rule requires that the offended party or parties or
the heirs of the victims must be given adequate a priori
notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of
the criminal case. … Such notice will enable the
offended party or the heirs of the victim the
opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on
or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a)
 209

the collusion between the prosecution and the accused

for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case thereby
depriving the State of its right to due process; (b)
attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the
provisional dismissal of the case with the consequent
release of the accused from detention would enable
him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine
jurisdiction, provide opportunity for the destruction or
loss of the prosecution's physical and other evidence
and prejudice the rights of the offended party to
recover on the civil liability of the accused by his
concealment or furtive disposition of his property or
the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary
attachment against his property.

PEOPLE vs. DE LEON

G.R. No. 197546 March 23, 2015
PEREZ, J p:

1) Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

provides: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

2) Double jeopardy attaches if the following

elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or
information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the
 210

defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case

against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA vs. LOBRIGO

G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017
PERALTA, J p:

1) RULE 118 (Pre-trial): SEC. 1. Pre-trial;

mandatory in criminal cases. — In all criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment
and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws
or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the
parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the
accused admits the charge but interposes a
lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.
 211

NELSON IMPERIAL vs. JOSON

G.R. Nos. 160067, 170410 & 171622
November 17, 2010
PEREZ, J p:

1) In the case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, this

Court significantly ruled as follows: "While justice is
administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is
orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be
definitely said how long is too long in a system where
justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon
circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it
does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it
must be borne in mind that the rights given to the
accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are
shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give
meaning to that intent.

A balancing test of applying societal interests and

the rights of the accused necessarily compels the court
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been

deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the
delay; (c) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant." . . .

2) Although the Revised Rules of Criminal

 212

Procedure concededly mandates commencement of

the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial
order and the continuous conduct thereof for a period
not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule 119
provides that delays resulting from extraordinary
remedies against interlocutory orders shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial
must commence. In determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required
to do more than a mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case" and to give particular regard to the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.

PEOPLE vs. SERGIO

G.R. No. 240053 October 9, 2019
HERNANDO, J p:
1) In criminal cases, the taking of the
deposition of witnesses for the prosecution was
formerly authorized by Sec. 7, Rule 119 for the
purpose of perpetuating the evidence to be
presented at the trial, without a similar provision
for defense witnesses. However, in the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, only the
conditional examination, and not a deposition, of
prosecution witnesses was permitted (Sec. 7,
Rule 119) and this was followed in the latest
revision (Sec. 15, Rule 119).

2) Depositions are classified into:

a. Depositions on oral examination and
 213

depositions upon written interrogatories;

or
b. Depositions de bene esse and depositions
in perpetuam rei memoriam.

Depositions de bene esse are those taken for

purposes of a pending action and are regulated
by Rule 23, while depositions in perpetuam rei
memoriam are those taken to perpetuate evidence
for purposes of an anticipated action or further
proceedings in a case on appeal and are now
regulated by Rule 24.

3) The court may determine whether the

deposition should be taken upon oral
examination or written interrogatories to
prevent abuse or harassment.

PEOPLE vs. WEBB

G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:

1) The purposes of taking depositions are to:

1.] Give greater assistance to the parties in
ascertaining the truth and in checking and
preventing perjury; 2.] Provide an effective
means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent
claims and defenses; 3.] Make available in a
simple, convenient and inexpensive way, facts
which otherwise could not be proved except with
great difficulty; 4.] Educate the parties in
 214

advance of trial as to the real value of their

claims and defenses thereby encouraging
settlements; 5.] Expedite litigation; 6.] Safeguard
against surprise; 7.] Prevent delay; 8.] Simplify
and narrow the issues; and 9.] Expedite and
facilitate both preparation and trial. As can be
gleaned from the foregoing, a deposition, in
keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery,
should be taken before and not during trial. In
fact, rules on criminal practice — particularly on
the defense of alibi, which is respondent's main
defense in the criminal proceedings against him
in the court below — states that when a person
intends to rely on such a defense, that person
must move for the taking of the deposition of his
witnesses within the time provided for filing a
pre-trial motion.

VDA. DE MANGUERRA vs. RISOS

G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008
NACHURA, J p:

1) It is basic that all witnesses shall give their

testimonies at the trial of the case in the presence
of the judge. This is especially true in criminal
cases in order that the accused may be afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the
witnesses face to face. It also gives the parties
and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to
 215

support their position or to test the credibility of

said witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge
to observe the witnesses' demeanor.

2) This rule, however, is not absolute. As

exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
provide for the different modes of discovery that
may be resorted to by a party to an action. These
rules are adopted either to perpetuate the
testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12,
29 13 30 and 15, 31 Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect
on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses.

Rule 119 specifically states that a witness

may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness
is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if
the witness has to leave the Philippines with no
definite date of returning.

GO vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 185527 July 18, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) Even in criminal proceedings, there is no

doubt as to the availability of conditional
examination of witnesses — both for the benefit
of the defense, as well as the prosecution.
 216

2) The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the

Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions
in civil cases, either upon oral examination or
written interrogatories, before any judge, notary
public or person authorized to administer oaths at
any time or place within the Philippines; or
before any Philippine consular official,
commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country,
with no additional requirement except reasonable
notice in writing to the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in

criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for
trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge,
where the case is pending as required by the clear
mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus: SEC. 15. Examination of
witness for the prosecution. — When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he
may forthwith be conditionally examined before
the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in
his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
 217

examination has been served on him shall be

conducted in the same manner as an examination
at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be
admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

JIMENEZ, JR. vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 209195 & 209215 September 17, 2014
BRION, J p:

1) Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides that In the discharge of
an accused in order that he may be a state witness,
the following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged
with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the
prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state
witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of
 218

the offense committed, except the

testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its
material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

The requirement of absolute necessity for the

testimony of a state witness depends on the
circumstances of each case regardless of the number
of the participating conspirators.

Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a

motion to discharge an accused as a state witness,
what are controlling are the specific acts of the
accused in relation to the crime committed.

2) At any rate, the discharge of an accused to be

utilized as a state witness because he does not appear
to be the most guilty is highly factual in nature as it
largely depends on the appreciation of who had the
most participation in the commission of the crime.
The appellate courts do not interfere in the
discretionary judgment of the trial court on this
factual issue except when grave abuse of discretion
intervenes.
 219

PEOPLE vs. DOMINGUEZ Y SANTOS

G.R. No. 229420 February 19, 2018
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court

pertinently provides: When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the accused
to be discharged with their consent so that they may
be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the
prosecution to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing
in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony
of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) The is no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said
accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material
points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most
guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

2) Evidence adduced in support of the discharge

shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court
 220

denies the motion for discharge of the accused as

state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence. The rule is explicit that the
testimony of the witness during the discharge
proceeding will only be inadmissible if the court
denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state
witness.

CABADOR vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
ABAD, J p:

1) A demurrer to evidence assumes that the

prosecution has already rested its case. Section 23,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, reads: Demurrer to evidence. — After the
prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1)
on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave
of court.

2) A demurrer to evidence shortens the

proceedings in criminal cases. Caution must,
however, be exercised in view of its pernicious
consequence on the right of the accused to present
evidence in his defense, the seriousness of the crime
charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.
 221

PEOPLE vs. TAN

G.R. No. 167526 July 26, 2010
PERALTA, J p:

1) In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Court

explained the general rule that the grant of a
demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is,
thus, final and unappealable, to wit: The demurrer to
evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is
"filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and
when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation
of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the
merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do
so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.
The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends
there.

REPUBLIC vs. DE BORJA

G.R. No. 187448 January 9, 2017
CAGUIOA, J p:|

1) A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on

the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It is a remedy
available to the defendant, to the effect that the
evidence produced by the plaintiff is insufficient in
point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain an issue. The question in a demurrer to
 222

evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in

chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.

2) Case law has defined "burden of proof" as the

duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or
issue by such quantum of evidence as the law
demands in the case at which the issue arises. In civil
cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by preponderance of evidence, i.e.,
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved.
"Preponderance of evidence" means evidence which is
of greater weight, or more convincing than that which
is offered in opposition to it.

3) In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is

premature to speak of "preponderance of evidence"
because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation
of evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to
evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without
the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is
crucial is the determination as to whether the
plaintiff's evidence entitles it to the relief sought.

LLAMAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 149588 September 29, 2009
NACHURA, J p:

1) In People v. Bitanga, the Court explained that the

remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of
in criminal cases, thus —
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits
 223

the scope of the remedy of annulment of judgment to

the following:
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall
govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC

judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal
case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded
Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have
suppletory application to criminal cases.

PEOPLE vs. MONTESCLAROS

G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009
PUNO, C.J p:

1) The particular liability that each accused is

responsible for depends on the nature and degree of
his participation in the commission of the crime. The
penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a
particular crime is imposed upon the principal in a
consummated felony. The accomplice is only given
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
by the law for the crime committed and an accessory
is given the penalty lower by two degrees. However, a
 224

felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise

civilly liable. Apart from the penalty of imprisonment
imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the
victim and to make whole the damage caused by his
act or omission through the payment of civil
indemnity and damages.

2) Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by

all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability —
in which the Revised Penal Code specifically states
the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal,
accomplice and accessory — the share of each
accused in the civil liability is not specified in the
Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to
determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity
which the principal, accomplice and accessory are
respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect
to the basis of the allotment.

3) Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides

that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable
for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for
which each must respond". Notwithstanding the
determination of the respective liability of the
principals, accomplices and accessories within their
respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable
for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other
classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be
liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for
 225

their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other

persons liable".

HIPOS, SR. vs. BAY

G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

1) In the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul, the Court

established that once a criminal complaint or an
information is filed in court, any disposition or
dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the
accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and
discretion of the trial court.

PEOPLE vs. LORENZO Y CASAS

G.R. No. 184760 April 23, 2010
PEREZ, J p:

1) The presumption of innocence of an accused in a

criminal case is a basic constitutional principle,
fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is
guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must
rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and
not on the weakness of the defense.

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of

prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be sustained if
there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug.
The identity of the prohibited drug must be established
 226

with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the

elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that
the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first
place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must likewise be established with the same degree of
certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.

PEOPLE vs. BARON Y TANGAROCAN

G.R. No. 185209 June 28, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is

committed either by reason, or on occasion, of the
robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property
belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with
the use of violence or intimidation against a person;
and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
the crime of homicide, as used in the generic sense,
was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the
robbery is the central purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life but the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery.

2) Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain

conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
have been established; (c) the combination of all
 227

circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt

beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained
when the circumstances proved form an unbroken
chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
as the perpetrator.

ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) It is an established rule in criminal procedure that

a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, the court should award the civil liability in
favor of the offended party in the same criminal
action. In other words, the "extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil
liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil [liability] might arise did not exist."
 228

PEOPLE vs. ASIS Y FONPERADA

G.R. No. 142531 October 15, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J p:

1) Settled is the rule that any objection involving the

arrest or the trial court's procedure of acquiring
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before the arraignment; otherwise, the objection
is deemed waived.

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice

system, the overriding consideration is not whether the
court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether
it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where
there is no moral certainty as to their guilt, they must
be acquitted even though their innocence may be
questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

BASILONIA vs. VILLARUZ

G.R. Nos. 191370-71 August 10, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing

party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution the issuance of which is the trial court's
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. Yet, a
writ issued after the expiration of the period is null and
void. The limitation that a judgment be enforced by
execution within the stated period, otherwise it loses
 229

efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of the court.

Failure to object to a writ issued after such period does
not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts
is solely conferred by law and not by express or
implied will of the parties.

2) Nonetheless, jurisprudence is replete with a

number of exceptions wherein the Court, on
meritorious grounds, allowed execution of judgment
despite non-observance of the time bar. …The
demands of justice and fairness were contemplated in
the following instances: dilatory tactics and legal
maneuverings of the judgment obligor which
redounded to its benefit; agreement of the parties to
defer or suspend the enforcement of the judgment;
strict application of the rules would result in injustice
to the prevailing party to whom no fault could be
attributed but relaxation thereof would cause no
prejudice to the judgment obligor who did not
question the judgment sought to be executed; and the
satisfaction of the judgment was already beyond the
control of the prevailing party as he did what he was
supposed to do. Essentially, We allowed execution
even after the prescribed period elapsed when the
delay is caused or occasioned by actions of the
judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or
advantage.
 230

MORILLO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 198270 December 9, 2015
PERALTA, J p:

1) Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be

assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in
acquitting the accused, committed not merely
reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby
rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there
is grave abuse of discretion, granting the aggrieved
party's prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused
in double jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that
the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. This is because a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and
executory, and the prosecution is barred from
appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy be violated.

ESTINO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 163957-58 & 164009-11 April 7, 2009
VELASCO, JR., J p:

1) Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the

conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction
becomes final when new and material evidence has
been discovered which the accused could not with
 231

reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at

the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.

BRIONES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 156009 June 5, 2009
BRION, J p:

1. An error or mistake committed by a counsel in

the course of judicial proceedings is not a ground for
new trial. In People v. Mercado, we declared: …
Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a
witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of
certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of
proof, . . . failure to introduce certain evidence, to
summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not
proper grounds for a new trial, unless the
incompetency of counsel is so great that his client is
prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his
case.

2. For new trial to be granted on the ground of

newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the
following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence
must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence
could not have been discovered at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence
is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the
merits of the case and produce a different result if
admitted.
 232

3. In petitions for new trial in a criminal proceeding

where a certain evidence was not presented, the
defendant, in order to secure a new trial, must satisfy
the court that he has a good defense, and that the
acquittal would in all probability follow the
introduction of the omitted evidence.

SALUDAGA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 184537 April 23, 2010
MENDOZA, J p:

1) Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of

Court,the requisites for newly discovered evidence
are: (a) the evidence was discovered after trial (in this
case, after investigation); (b) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and
is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably
change the judgment.

LUMANOG vs. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 182555, 185123 & 187745
February 8, 2011
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

1. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the

judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence,
it must be shown that the evidence was "newly
discovered" pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the
 233

Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.

2. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered,

must be one that could not, by the exercise of due
diligence, have been discovered before the trial in the
court below. Movant failed to show that the defense
exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies
from police officers like Jurado, or other persons
involved in the investigation, who questioned or
objected to the apprehension of the accused in this
case. Hence, the belatedly executed affidavit of Jurado
does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that
will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the
judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever
flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court
identification of the accused, the same was cured
when all the accused-appellants were positively
identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the
trial.

PAYUMO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 151911 & 154535 July 25, 2011
MENDOZA, J p:

1. Rule 121, Section 2 of the 2000 Rules on

Criminal Procedure enumerates the grounds for a new
trial, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court
shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial
 234

to the substantial rights of the accused have

been committed during trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the
judgment

2. A motion for new trial based on newly-

discovered evidence may be granted only if the
following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such
weight that, if admitted, would probably change the
judgment. It is essential that the offering party
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed
to secure it.

MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 193217 February 26, 2014
PERALTA, J p:

1. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules

of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on where,
how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. — The appeal may be
 235

taken as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme
Court in the proper cases provided by law, in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court;
and
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — (a) The appeal to
the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be taken by
filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal

must be taken within fifteen days from promulgation
of the judgment or from notice of the final order
appealed from . . . .

Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of

appeal signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself.
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is a mode of appeal of a lower court's decision
or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However,
the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is
not a decision or final order from which an appeal may
be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that
no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can
elevate the matter through a special civil action under
 236

Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong mode of

appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the
appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the petition merits an
outright dismissal.

PEOPLE vs. MORALES Y MIDARASA

G.R. No. 172873 March 19, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) At the outset, we draw attention to the unique

nature of an appeal in a criminal case: the appeal
throws the whole case open for review and it is the
duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether
they are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such
review, we find the present appeal meritorious.

2) Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the

trial court's findings of fact, especially when affirmed
by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal. However,
this rule admits of exceptions and does not apply
where facts of weight and substance with direct and
material bearing on the final outcome of the case have
been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.
After due consideration of the records of this case,
evidence presented and relevant law and
jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the
exception.
 237

QUIDET vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J p:

1) As a general rule, factual findings of the trial

court, which is in a better position to evaluate the
testimonial evidence, are accorded respect by this
Court. But where the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which can
affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound
to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty,
which stands second only to life in the hierarchy of
constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.

BALABA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009
CARPIO, J p:

1) In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled: An

error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to
the appeal. However, the correction in designating the
proper appellate court should be made within the 15-
day period to appeal. Once made within the said
period, the designation of the correct appellate court
may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the
second paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court would apply. The second paragraph of Section
2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: "An appeal
erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be
 238

transferred to the appropriate court but shall be

dismissed outright."

PEOPLE vs. OLIVO Y ALONG

G.R. No. 177768 July 27, 2009
QUISUMBING, J p:

1) It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation

of the testimony of a witness or his credibility, this
Court accords the highest respect and even finality to
the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that
it committed palpable mistake, misappreciation of
facts or grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court
which has the unique advantage of observing first-
hand the facial expressions, gestures and the tone of
voice of a witness while testifying.

2) The well-entrenched rule is that findings of the

trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court,
absent clear and convincing evidence that the tribunals
ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and
circumstances of substances such that, if considered,
the same will warrant the modification or reversal of
the outcome of the case.

Factual findings of trial courts, when

substantiated by the evidence on record, command
great weight and respect on appeal, save only when
certain material facts and circumstances were
overlooked and which, if duly considered, may vary
 239

the outcome of the case.

3) Be that as it may, the present rule is that an

appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and
applicable to the latter.

GUASCH vs. DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 176015, June 16, 2009
PUNO, C.J p:

1) As a general rule, the statutory requirement that

when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and
becomes executory in due course must be strictly
enforced as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business. The purposes for such
statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay
in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally,
to make orderly the discharge of judicial business,
and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at
the risk of occasional errors, which are precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
The rights and obligations of every litigant must not
hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.

However, in exceptional cases, substantial justice

and equity considerations warrant the giving of due
course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of
 240

statutory and mandatory rules of procedure. Certain

elements are considered for the appeal to be given due
course, such as: (1) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (2) the merits of the case,
(3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules, (4) lack of any showing that the review
sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the
other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.

PEOPLE vs. TARUC

G.R. No. 185202 February 18, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

1) An accused is required to be present before the

trial court at the promulgation of the judgment in a
criminal case. If the accused fails to appear before the
trial court, promulgation of judgment shall be made in
accordance with Rule 120, Section 6, paragraphs 4 and
5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled
date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the
promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment
in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof
at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure
of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause,
he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his
arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and
 241

file a motion for leave of court to avail of these

remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at
the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed
to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from
notice. (Emphasis supplied.)

2) Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of

the same Rules allows the Court of Appeals, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the
appeal of the accused-appellant who eludes the
jurisdiction of the courts over his person, viz.:
SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment
or failure to prosecute. — The Court of Appeals
may, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio
and with notice to the appellant in either case,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his
brief within the time prescribed by this Rule, except
where the appellant is represented by a counsel de
oficio.

The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of

the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps
bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency
of the appeal.
 242

TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009
CARPIO, J p:

1) Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General

may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in
criminal proceedings before this Court and the Court
of Appeals. 20 Tiu, the offended party in Criminal
Case No. 96-413 is without legal personality to appeal
the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court.
Nothing shows that the Office of the Solicitor General
represents the People in this appeal before this Court.
On this ground alone, the petition must fail.

COLINARES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
ABAD, J p:

1) The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco,

requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation.
This requirement "outlaws the element of speculation
on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of
his appeal — that when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he
now applies for probation as an 'escape hatch' thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of
his conviction."
 243

VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
SERENO, C.J p:

1) The law requires that an application for probation

be filed with the trial court that convicted and
sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin.

2) A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting

the accused of the offense charged becomes final
under any of the following conditions among others:
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the
grant of a withdrawal of an appeal; when the sentence
has already been partially or totally satisfied or served;
or when the accused applies for probation. When the
decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is
entered in the book of entries of judgments. If the case
was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true
copy of the judgment or final older must be attached to
the original record, which shall then be remanded to
the clerk of the court from which the appeal was
taken. The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction
over the case for appropriate action. It is during this
time that the court of origin may settle the matter of
the execution of penalty or the suspension of the
execution thereof, including the convicts' applications
for probation.

3) Probation is a special privilege granted by the

state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately
 244

admit their liability and thus renounce their right to

appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and
willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a
chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration record
by making them undergo rehabilitation outside of
prison.

DUNGO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015
MENDOZA, J p:

1) An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a

decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher court
authority. The right to appeal is neither a natural right
nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere
statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.

2) Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on
the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty
imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. According to the said provision, "[i]n
cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall
render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The
judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by
notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."
 245

MANANSALA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 215424 December 9, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal

cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for
review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors,
though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even
reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds
other than those that the parties raised as errors. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over
the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase
the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law.

SPOUSES MARIMLA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 158467 October 16, 2009
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, ** J p:

1) A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive

Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of
Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for
search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal
gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-
TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
that the application for search warrant shall be filed
with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction
a crime was committed, and (b) for compelling
 246

reasons, any court within the judicial region where the

crime was committed if the place of the commission
of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.

PEOPLE vs. PUNZALAN

G.R. No. 199087 November 11, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J p:

1) Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides: Search of house, room,
or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses.
— No search of a house, room, or any other premises
shall be made except in the presence of the lawful
occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion residing in the same locality.

2) A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on

the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges
and Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties"
as approved by the Court in its Resolution of January
27, 2004, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the Regional Trial
Courts of Manila and Quezon City. — The
Executive Judges and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges
of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall
have authority to act on applications filed by the
 247

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the

Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-
Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as
well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual
Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act
of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as
amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.

The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of

such agencies or their respective duly authorized
officials and shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to
be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The
Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges
concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which
may be served outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
said courts.

PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS Y GARCIA

G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007
TINGA, J p:

1) The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the

validity of the warrantless searches and seizure made
by the police officers and the admissibility of the
evidence obtained by virtue thereof.
 248

2) Our Constitution states that a search and seizure

must be carried through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom
is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 35
The constitutional proscription, however, is not
absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
a. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
and prevailing jurisprudence);
b. Search of evidence in "plain view." The
elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based
on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search;
c. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
d. Consented warrantless search;
e. Customs search;
f. Stop and Frisk; and
 249

g. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

3) In the instances where a warrant is not necessary

to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter
cannot be performed except without a warrant, what
constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.

4) A search incidental to a lawful arrest is

sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the
search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case
where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

5) Indeed, the constitutional immunity against

unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
which may be waived. However, it must be seen that
the consent to the search was voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e.,
the consent was unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly
 250

inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing

evidence. The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of
the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief
that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment
in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely
and voluntarily given.

VERIDIANO Y SAPI vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200370 June 7, 2017
LEONEN, J p:

1) As a component of the right to privacy, the

fundamental right against unlawful searches and
seizures is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their

 251

persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

To underscore the importance of an individual's

right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article
III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution considers any
evidence obtained in violation of this right as
inadmissible.

2) The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all

forms of searches and seizures. It is only directed
against those that are unreasonable. 66 Conversely,
reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the scope
of the prohibition and are not forbidden.

3) There is no hard and fast rule in determining

when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given
situation, "[w]hat constitutes a reasonable . . . search .
. . is purely a judicial question," the resolution of
which depends upon the unique and distinct factual
circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into "the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or
absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing
 252

searched, and the character of the articles procured."

4) The warrantless search cannot be justified under

the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and
frisk" searches.

5) A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v.

Chua as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s)
or contraband." 108 Thus, the allowable scope of a
"stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective
search of outer clothing for weapons."

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary

law enforcement measure specifically directed
towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard
the right of individuals against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in

conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable
cause is not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot
be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law
enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based
on their experience and the particular circumstances of
each case, that criminal activity may be afoot.
Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none
at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
 253

PEOPLE vs. COSGAFA Y CLAMOCHA

G.R. No. 218250 July 10, 2017
TIJAM, J p:

1) Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states

that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.

MIGUEL Y REMEGIO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 227038 July 31, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:

1) Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution

mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause,
absent which, such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence
obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted
and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit
 254

of a poisonous tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a

warrant before a search may be [e]ffected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.

2) A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a

warrant. With respect to the latter, the parameters of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure should — as a general rule — be complied
with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from
 255

one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)

above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112.

The aforementioned provision identifies three (3)

instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully
effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer,
there is probable cause that said suspect was the
perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;
and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement
to another.

3) In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5

(a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. On the other hand,
Section 5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that
at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal
 256

knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had

committed it.

In both instances, the officer's personal

knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense
is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of
the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just
been committed."

DIMAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 216922 April 18, 2018
PERALTA, J p:

1) For the "plain view doctrine" to apply, it is

required that the following requisites are present: (a)
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b)
the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. As
explained in People v. Salanguit:

2) What the 'plain view' cases have in common is

that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
 257

supplement the prior justification — whether it be a

warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident
to a lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for
being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused — and permits the warrantless
seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately
apparent to the police that they have evidence before
them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.

HILARIO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 161070 April 14, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:

1) The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as

forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a
consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to
restraint or in danger of loss.

2) In criminal cases, the right of an accused person

to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due
process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final
and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and
counsel.

3) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by
 258

law. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of

appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of
Appeals 27 where we ruled that an appeal is an
essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are
advised to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a
party of the right to appeal and instructed that every
party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law,
however, its suppression would be a violation of due
process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus,
the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss
of the right to appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's
negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner.