Sie sind auf Seite 1von 18

THE STATE IN BANGLADESHUNDER

ZIA (1975-81)

Syed Serajul Islam

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


The year 1975 saw dramatic changes in the political
environment of Bangladesh. In January, through a "constitutional coup,"
a presidential system of government replaced the parliamentary form. In
June, all political parties were banned and were asked to join the newly
formed national party, Bangladesh Krishak Shramik Awami League. In
August, a bloody military coup took place in which President Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman and his whole family, except two daughters, were
killed. On November 3, there was another abortive countercoup and, on
November 7, there was a "sepoy mutiny" in which Dacca's strong man,
General Ziaur Rahman, consolidated his power in Bangladesh. The fall
of Mujib in August and the "sepoy mutiny" of November 7, from which
General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) emerged as the de facto military ruler,
profoundly altered the state system in Bangladesh. A "new state"
emerged, which seemed to follow a pattern that had been set in preliber-
ation Bangladesh; a marriage of convenience between civil and military
bureaucrats, similar to that existing in Pakistan before its collapse in
1971, evolved in Bangladesh after the November 7 coup.
In a postcolonial society like Bangladesh, it would seem that after an
army take-over of the state apparatus, the military bureaucracy forms an
alliance with the civil bureaucracy in order to consolidate power at both
the national and local levels. The civil and military bureaucrats share one
commonality, that is, they maintain a corporate administrative group
identity. Perhaps it is this administrative elite identity that leads the
bureaucracy to build an "administrative state." In the administrative
state, the civil-military bureaucracy adopts, on the one hand, various
measures for its increasing dominance in the state apparatus, and seeks,
on the other, legitimacy for the regime through various means. Despite
the attempts toward obtaining legitimacy, the state may subsequently

Syed Serajul Islam is Assistant Professor in the Department of


Political Science, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
?
1984 by The Regents of the University of California

556
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 557

face serious opposition from alienated classes and groups. However, the
state may persist for a certain period of time by using the methods of
coercion and/or persuasion but is likely to collapse if contradictions and
crises emerge in the dominant coalition controlling the state apparatus.
Focusing on the new state in Bangladesh under Zia, the analysis in this
article takes up the following questions. What was the nature of the new
state? How did it maintain its legitimacy? Did it face any opposition? Was
there any crisis within the state itself? Why did the new state under Zia

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


finally fall in 1981? In other words, what were the factors that led to the
"fall" of Zia in 1981?

The Installation and Nature


of the New State
The "sepoy revolt" in 1975 reinstated Major-General Ziaur Rahman as
the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army.' Justice A. S. M. Sayem, who
had been appointed earlier by Khaled Mosharaf, continued as both
President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. During the first few
months, without taking formal leadership of the state, Zia ruled the
country while remaining in the background as the Deputy Chief Martial
Law Administrator. On November 30, 1976, however, he decided to
assume responsibility as Chief Martial Law Administrator. Then on April
21, 1977, Zia took over the presidency, forcing Sayem to resign on
grounds of ill health, and retaining his position as Chief Martial Law
Administrator and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.2 After his
assumption of the presidency, Zia slowly and steadily consolidated his
power. The first step in this direction was the restoration of the position
of the civil-military bureaucracy.

1. Ziaur Rahman, a Major in the East Bengal Regiment, made the announcement of the
independence of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong on March 27, 1971. Zia joined the
Pakistan Army in 1953 and was commissioned in 1955. During the liberation war, Zia
formed the "Z" forces. After independence he expected to be the army Chief of Staff, but
Mujib appointed Major General K. Shafiullah, junior to Zia, to the position. The main
reason for by-passing Zia, Marcus Franda points out, was that on March 27, 1971, Zia
declared himself the President of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong. Mujib did not like
Zia's ambitious nature. After the August 1975 coup, Shafiullah was removed from office
and Zia was made the Army Chief of Staff. See Marcus F. Franda,"The Bangladesh Coup,"
American UniversitiesField Staff Reports,South Asia Series XIX, No. 15 (1975), p. 8; see
also his "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," Economicand Political Weekly,Vol.
16, Annual Number (March 1981).
2. In this period Zia considered his main task as putting down unrest in the army in
different cantonments of Bangladesh. On the other hand, Sayem was kept as President
because he was considered neutral and nonpolitical.
558 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984

RESTORING THE STEEL FRAME: REVIVAL OF


THE BUREAUCRACY
In order to restore the power and position of the civil-military bureau-
cracy, the new state first abolished Presidential Order No. 9 of 1972,
which had provided for the dismissal of officials without showing cause.
Furthermore, those bureaucrats who had lost their jobs under this order
after liberation were allowed to appeal their cases. And, in fact, many
such civil servants were placed in key positions by Zia, while some

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


pro-Mujib officers were either dismissed or demoted.3
Of particular importance were certain measures adopted by the new
state to strengthen the position of the armed forces. Many army officers
and soldiers deeply resented the loss of status and influence during the
Mujib period; indeed, the survival of the new state under Zia depended
primarily on the loyalty of the armed forces. The defense budget left
over from the Mujib regime for 1975-76 was immediately revised
upwards, with the original allocation raised from Tk. 750 million (7% of
the national budget) to Tk. 1109.34 million (20% of the national
budget).4 In subsequent years, the defense budget was increased further
(see Table 1).
Apart from the tremendous increases in the defense budget, the
members of the armed forces were provided with many facilities they
had enjoyed in preliberation days, such as payment of travel and dearness
allowances to army personnel deployed in the aid of civil administration,
and accommodation in new residences built exclusively for army officers.
In the two years of strict military rule following Zia's take-over, defense
and civil administration expenditures increased more than Tk. 2 bil-
lion while all other budget categories combined increased by less than
Tk. 1 billion.5
Along with the increase in defense expenditures, the number of army
personnel increased. The armed forces, including the Rakkhi Bahini
(which was integrated into the army after November 1975), expanded

3. For example, Shafiul Azam, former Chief Secretary of East Pakistan, who was
dismissed by the state under Mujib, was reinstated after the August coup. On the other
hand, A. T. M. Syed Hossain, Mujib's brother-in-law and Additional Secretary of the
Establishment Division, was removed from office. In the Army, Major General M. Khalilur
Rahman, Brigadier H. M. Ershad (Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1983), and Brigadier
Quazi Golam Dastgir were elevated in the army hierarchy. See Franda, "The Bangladesh
Coup," p. 8.
4. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, 1980
Statistical Yearbookof Bangladesh (Dacca, 1981), p. 363.
5. Mosharaf Hossain, "Nature of State Power in Bangladesh,"Journal of Social Studies,
No. 5 (October 1979), p. 34.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 559

TABLE 1 Military Expenditureand Its Share in National Wealth, Bangladesh,


1975-78

Expenditure
Year (millions of U.S. dollars) Percentageof GNP

1975 34 0.7
1976 64 1.1

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


1977 98 1.6
1978 130 1.8

SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WorldMilitary Expendituresand Arms Trans-
fers, 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 40.

from about 60,000 men in 1974-75 to about 90,000 in 1976-77;6 Zia


also created a new army division, the 9th division. Defense Forces
Intelligence and National Security Intelligence were strengthened under
the respective directorships of Air Vice-Marshal K. M. A. Islam and
A. B. S. Safdar, both men with long training and experience in the
Pakistan Intelligence Services. The strength of the police force was in-
creased from about 40,000 men to about 70,000;7 a special Reserved
Armed Police Battalion and a metropolitan police force for Dacca were
also created.
DOMINANCE OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY
BUREAUCRATS IN THE STATE APPARATUS
The civil-military bureaucrats had come to occupy important portfolios
in the state apparatus with the overthrow of Mujib. In the national state
apparatus, the main structures of decision-making were the office of the
President and his secretariat, the Council of Ministers, and the sec-
retariat. All the subordinate structures of the state were brought under
the direct control of the President.
Initially, the core of the new state consisted of a Council of Advisers,
which included, apart from seven civilians, the three chiefs of the armed
forces: General Ziaur Rahman, Chief of Staff of the Army; the Naval
Chief, M. H. Khan, who had served in the Pakistan Navy for 20 years;
and the Air Force Chief, M. G. Tawab, who had also served in the
6. Ibid., p. 33. However, according to the estimate of WorldMilitary Expenditures,the
total number of the armed forces was increased from 100,000 in 1974 to 129,000 in 1978.
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 1980 (Washington, D. C., 1980), p. 82.
7. Talukder Maniruzzaman, The BangladeshRevolutionand Its Aftermath (Dacca: World
Book International, 1980), p. 203.
560 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984

Pakistan Air Force. Of the seven civilians, one was a former professor of
Economics at Dacca University and former Minister of Finance in the
government of East Pakistan (1965-69), and the other six had a bureau-
cratic background. The number of advisers was subsequently raised to
24, of whom ten were from the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), three
were military officers, and the rest technocrats.8
After the parliamentary elections in February 1979, President Ziaur
Rahman formed a Council of Ministers, whose members were appointed

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


by the President and held office at his pleasure. The Parliament itself had
been elected under terms and conditions set by the President, and could
be summoned, prorogued, and dissolved by him at will. Earlier, in
December 1978, Zia had decreed an amendment to the constitution,
providing that (1) the President could appoint one-fifth of the member-
ship of the Council of Ministers from among people who were not
members of Parliament; (2) the President had the right to withhold
assent from any bill passed by parliament, which could be overridden
only in a national referendum; and (3) the President could enter into any
treaties with foreign nations in the "national interest" without informing
Parliament.
During the five and a half years of Zia's rule, the civil-military bureau-
crats were continuously dominant in the Council of Ministers and its
predecessor body, the Council of Advisers. In 1981 there were 24 full
ministers in the cabinet of whom six were military bureaucrats, five civil
servants, six technocrats, four businessmen, one landlord, and two law-
yers. In addition to the Council of Ministers, the President had his own
secretariat consisting of three divisions-Personal, General and Eco-
nomic, and Information-all headed by civil bureaucrats.9 Apart from
the national level, the state made an effort to strengthen the position of
civil bureaucrats at the local level. With the subsequent "civilianization"
of the regime, former CSP officers were posted to different districts and
divisions. In 12 of the 19 districts, the Deputy Commissioners were CSP
officers.10 In all four divisions, Zia appointed former CSP officers as
Divisional Commissioners.

8. The bio-data on the members of the 1977 Council of Advisers is available in Bichitra
Barashapatra, 1977 (Dacca: Dainik Bangla Prakashani, 1977), pp. 42-48; Holiday (Dacca),
March 18, 1979; also see A Yearbookof the Commonwealth,1978 (London: His Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1979), p. 127.
9. Mahbub Alam Chasi (CSP) and A. H. K. Sadique (CSP), respectively, were the
Personal and Information secretaries to the President. S. A. Khair (CSP) was the secretary
of the Economic Affairs Division.
10. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Establishment Division,
Erstwhile Civil Serviceof Pakistan (Dacca, n.d.); also see Government of the People's
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 561

The civil-military bureaucrats became dominant again not only in the


cabinet, secretariat, divisions, and districts, but also in the chief policy-
making and policy-implementing institutions such as the National Eco-
nomic Council (NEC) and the Planning Commission, and in the public
corporations. The NEC (an earlier Pakistani institution) was revived and
made responsible for development planning in Bangladesh; headed by
the President, it was made the highest policy-making and decision-
making body in the field of development planning. Its main body, the

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


five-member NEC Executive Committee, consisted of civil-military
bureaucrats," as did the eight-member Planning Commission, which was
entrusted with the responsibility of implementing the programs of the
NEC; both the chairman and deputy chairman were civilian bureau-
crats.'2 In 1975 there were 38 public corporations, which were also
dominated by the bureaucratic elites: 11 had chairmen or managing
directors who were former CSP officers, 2 were headed by police
officers, 5 by military officers, and 6 by former East Pakistan Civil
Service members, while the rest were headed by members of the other
services of the central government. This contrasted with the Mujib
regime, when a majority of the corporations were headed by political
elites. Rehman Sobhan and Mujaffer Ahmad comment:
It was not the case that only those sectorswhichperformedpoorly had their
chief executivesreplaced.If we merelylook at the industrialsector for which
fuller performancerecords are available,we find that by the end of 1975 a
100% takeoverof chief executives had been made. This includedthe chair-
men of such corporationsas Sugar,Textiles, Engineeringand Shipbuilding,
Forest industries, Steel, and Food and Allied products, which had shown
profitsand a rising trend in profitabilityduringthis [Mujib]period.13
It is thus evident that during the Zia period the state apparatus in
Bangladesh was dominated by civil-military bureaucrats. The Zia regime
was fundamentally a resurrection of the "administrative state" under
Ayub Khan in Pakistan; as Anderson points out, "there was a striking
resemblance between Bangladesh after the 1975 coups and East Pakistan
before its collapse in 1971. A similar marriage of convenience existed

Republic of Bangladesh, President's Secretariat, Actual Distribution List of Officers(Dacca,


1976).
11. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, 1979
Statistical Yearbookof Bangladesh (Dacca, 1980), p. 8.
12. In 1981 the Chairman of the Planning Commission was M. Abdul Momen Khan, a
Bengal civil servant, recruited in British India. The Deputy Chairman of the Commission
was S. D. Chowdhury (CSP), while the Deputy Chairman under Mujib was an economist.
13. Rehman Sobhan and Mujaffer Ahmad, Public Enterprisein an IntermediateRegime:A
Study in the Political Economyof Bangladesh (Dacca: Bangladesh Institute of Development
Studies, 1980), p. 534.
562 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984

between the military and the civil service."14 And like their forebears in
the administrative state of Pakistan, the civil-military bureaucrats in
Bangladesh as an exclusive administrative group have been deeply im-
bued with a 'guardianship" orientation. The broad administrative
framework in which they worked did not undergo any fundamental
change in Bangladesh. Like Bhutto's regime in Pakistan, Mujib's regime
in Bangladesh was a short interlude in the persisting pattern of the
administrative state.

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


The Quest for Political Legitimacy
Every military regime usually claims that it will restore democracy and
hand power to the civilians as soon as law and order is restored. But what
often happens afterwards is that it tries to remain in power through a
continuous process of civilianization and legitimization. The military
regime of General Ziaur Rahman was no exception to this pattern. In his
first broadcast to the nation on November 11, 1975, Zia claimed that he
was a "soldier," not a politician. But once General Zia formally assumed
the presidency on April 21, 1977, he took a number of steps to
legitimize his regime.15 These included a presidential referendum, presi-
dential election, the formation of a political party, parliamentary elec-
tions, and the creation of new village institutions.

THE PRESIDENTIAL REFERENDUM


In an address to the nation over the Bangladesh Radio and Television on
April 22, 1977, Zia proclaimed that general elections on the basis of
universal adult franchise would be held in December 1978 to elect the
members of Parliament. He stressed: "I and my government believe in
full democracy and are determined to restore the government of the
elected representatives of the people in due time."'16But for the time
being, Zia announced, he would remain President and seek people's
consent to continuing as President through a referendum. Meanwhile,
Zia issued a broad election manifesto, the 19-point program, which
promised, in part, the promotion of the private sector, self-sufficiency in
food production, population control, and agricultural development. In
the national referendum held on May 30, 1977, Zia won a massive vote
of confidence with an affirmative vote of 99.5% from among the 85%

14. Robert S. Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh: The Rule of Arms and the
Politics of Exhortation," Pacific Affairs, 49:3 (Fall 1976), p. 445.
15. From a newspaper interview by President Ziaur Rahman. See Rodney Tasker and
S. Kamaluddin, "Martial Law, Democracy and the Future," Far Eastern EconomicReview
(FEER), 106:41 (October 12, 1979), p. 30.
16. The Bangladesh Observer,April 23, 1977.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 563
voter turnout. The referendum gave Zia a strong sense of confidence
about his authority in Bangladesh.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION


Having taken a measure of the public support for him and seeking to
enhance his legitimacy, Zia announced eleven months after the referen-
dum that there would be an election for the presidency. New rules and
regulations were promulgated for the presidential election, and restric-

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


tions on political parties were lifted as of May 1978.17 Prior to the
election, various political parties and groups aligned themselves into two
distinct fronts-the Jatlyotabadi Front (JF, Nationalist Front) and
Gonotantrik OikyoJote (GOJ, Democratic United Front). The JF nomi-
nated Ziaur Rahman and GOJ nominated General M. A. G. Osmani
(who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Mukti Bahini in 1971 and a
minister in Mujib's cabinet) as the presidential candidates. When the
presidential election was held, as scheduled, on June 3, 1978, Zia won a
landslide victory, securing 76% of the more than 53% voter turnout.
General Osmani, on the other hand, received 21% of the votes cast.
Through his election for a five-year term, Zia had transformed himself
from a "soldier" into a "politician."

FORMATION OF A POLITICAL PLATFORM


Although General Ziaur Rahman had been elected President, he still did
not have a mass political organization of his own, and he moved steadily
forward to build a political base for his regime. However, he was still
undecided about a possible political front-whether to join an existing
political party or to organize his own political party. In order to ensure
support by all groups, Zia initially adopted the tactic of not being
identified with any political party.18However, in September 1978-just
before the 1979 parliamentary elections-General Zia himself launched
a new political party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The
Jatiyotabadi Gonotantrik Dal (JAGODAL), NAP(B), United People's
Party (UPP), and the Muslim League joined the BNP. As expected, the
BNP manifesto advocated a presidential form of government. It set out
17 goals and objectives, including establishment of "people's democ-
racy," "greater concentration on the private sector," "productivity

17. Before May 1978 all political parties were banned. However, in July 1978 the state
promulgated the Political Parties Regulation which legalized parties on registration with the
state. See The Bangladesh Times, July 29, August 5, and October 25, 1976.
18. From an interview (April 1981) with Enayatullah Khan, a prominent pro-Chinese
leftist, editor of weekly Holiday (Dacca), and a former minister for Land Reforms in Zia's
cabinet.
564 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984

TABLE 2 OccupationalBackgroundof the Membersof the BNP Central Executive


Committee,1981

Occupation Numbers Percentage

Businessmen 57 33.5
Professionals 53 31.2
Agriculturists 28 11.8

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


Teachers 20 11.7
Bureaucrats 11 6.5
Trade unionists 2 1.1
Others 7 4.2
Total 170 100.00
SOURCE: Informationfrom S. M. Fakhruddin,Member,CentralExecutiveCommitteeof BNP,
August 1981, and interviews.

oriented politics," "soical and economic justice," and "multiple political


parties."19
The BNP included a variety of social groups on its Central Executive
Committee. Businessmen constituted the largest contingent with 33.5%
of the committee's membership in 1981, followed by professionals with
31.2%; agriculturists, by contrast, had only 11.8% and teachers had
nearly the same share as agriculturists (Table 2). In one respect, the BNP
represented a significant departure from other political parties in that the
BNP included 1 1 bureaucrats (6.5%) on the Central Executive Commit-
tee. Furthermore, it should be noted that even though Zia had formed
the BNP to serve as his political base, the political elites had very little
influence on decision making in the party since the major decisions were
made by Zia himself in his capacity as party chairman, usually in consul-
tation with the bureaucrat members of the party.20

THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION


Once formal legitimacy for the regime had been won and a mass political
front had been formed, the President proceeded to redeem his pledge

19. Bangladesh Jatiyotabadi Dal, Ghosonapatra, Gothontantra-O-PartyrAdarsha [Proc-


lamation, Composition and Ideology of the Party], (Dacca: Press Secretary of BNP, n.d.).
20. It is difficult to provide any definitive empirical,evidence on this point. However,
the statement is based on information provided by several members of the Central Execu-
tive Committee of the BNP.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 565

TABLE 3 ParliamentaryElectionResults (February1979)

No. of Seats No. of Seats % of % of


Party Contested Won Seats Votes

BNP 298 206 68.3 41.2


AL (Malek) 295 40 13.3 24.4
Muslim League-Islamic

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


Democratic League Alliance 265 19 6.3 10.0
JSD 240 9 3.0 4.9
AL (Mizan) 183 2 0.7 2.8
Independents 425 17 6.1 12.9
Other parties 419 7 2.3 1.7

Total 2125 300 100.00 100.00

SOURCE: Dainik Bangla (Dacca), March 8, 1979.

for parliamentary elections by announcing in November 1978 that such


elections would be held two months later on the basis of adult franchise.
As decided, the election was held in February 1979, and was contested
by 31 political parties. The results of the elections were a virtual en-
dorsement of Zia's regime, with his BNP winning more than two thirds
of the seats although the party obtained only 41.2% of the total votes
cast (Table 3). The massive victory by the BNP underlined the continued
confidence of the public in the leadership of President Zia, the soldier
turned politician.
Although no systematic study on the occupational background of the
members of Parliament of 1979 is available, preliminary data indicate
that while no single group was dominant, businessmen were the largest
group (28%), followed by lawyers (26%); agriculturists were less than
one fifth (19%); technocrats were 7% of the membership; and teachers
6.6% (Table 4). It is interesting that this pattern largely reflects the
composition of the BNP's Central Executive Committee, and that it
marked a significant departure from the results of the 1973 election.
While only one military bureaucrat had been elected in 1973, 19
bureaucrats were elected in 1979; of the 19, 17 were retired military
officers and two were civilian bureaucrats.2'

21. See Holiday (Dacca), March 18, 1979.


566 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984

TABLE 4 OccupationalBackgroundof the Membersof Parliament, 1979

Occupation Numbers Percentage

Businessmen 84 28.0
Lawyers 78 26.0
Agriculturists 58 19.3
Technocrats 21 7.0

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


Teachers 20 6.6
Bureaucrats 19 6.4
Trade unionists 6 2.0
Others 14 4.7
SOURCE: Interviewswith MPs and informationfrom Nur MohammadKhan, an MP and State
Ministerfor Informationand Broadcasting,1981.

Even though its members were elected, the parliament was not a
sovereign body since it was subordinate and subservient to the President
who was a military bureaucrat. The President was above parliament, and
he could dissolve the parliament whenever he felt it necessary. However,
an elected parliament provided a constitutional facade for what was
essentially an "administrative state."

BUILDING NEW VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS


Having consolidated power in the central state apparatusafter the "sepoy
revolt," Zia realized that in order to survive politically over a longer
period, it was necessary to build a solid base of support at the grass roots
village level. With this end in view, two types of village institutions-
Swanirvar Gram Sarkar (Self-sufficient Village Government) and Gram
Pratirakkhi Bahini (Village Defense Force-VDF)-were introduced in
Bangladesh.
In 1976 Zia announced the formation of Gram Parishad, which was
later renamed SwanirvarGram Sarkarin 1980. Like Ayub's Basic Democ-
racies, Gram Sarkars could mobilize support for the regime and also
give the rural people a sense of participation. However, whereas under
the Basic Democracies system there were Union-level governments,
Zia's Gram Sarkarsystem was a village-level government. A Gram Sarkar
consisted of a Gram Prodhan (chairman) and 11 members, including two
female members, who were chosen through a consensus among all eligi-
ble voters of the village present at a meeting (Gram Sava) called by the
Thana Circle Officer (a bureaucrat). By December 1980, 6800 Gram
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 567

Sarkars had been organized.22 However, they seem to have been more
the creations of the bureaucracy than the result of genuine political
participation. As Franda observed:
Most of the Gram Sarkars have been chosen by a "consensus" evolved at
village meetings, with the nature of that consensus being determined by Thana
Circle Officers representing the central government.... Observers who have
watched the selection process in several villages suggest that members of
parliament and District officers frequently play a major role in choosing these

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


"consensual" candidates.23
The Gram Pratirakkhi Bahini (VDF) was another institution created
for building support for the regime at the village level. Consisting of
about 150 persons in each village, the VDFs were organized by the
Home Ministry and were, in fact, modeled after the "Peace Committees"
created by the Pakistan army during the liberation war. Officially, their
main purpose was described as aiding the Gram Sarkarin maintaining law
and order in each village. Initially, the state offered free radios, newspa-
pers, books, and small rewards to those who joined them.24
The foregoing analysis thus indicates that Zia, after consolidating his
power, attempted to gain legitimacy through various means at both the
national and local levels. The state under Zia, gaining such legitimacy,
was able to bring political stability and rule the nation without significant
opposition for a certain period of time, but it could not avert the crisis
that eventually proved fatal for Zia.

The Crisis of Zia's AdministrativeState


In the post-1975 period, while Ziaur Rahman was attempting to consoli-
date the administrative state, serious opposition to his regime emerged.
The Awami League (AL) was the largest and only opposition political
party having a country-wide organization; it mounted a strong agitational
effort against Zia's state.25 The AL blamed Zia's state for distorting the
true story of the liberation movement and charged that, while the true
patriots had been thrown in jail, the enemies of independence and
nationalism had gained ascendancy in the new state. The most serious

22. Azizul Haque, "Bangladesh in 1980: Strains and Stresses-Opposition in the


Doldrums," Asian Survey, 21:2 (February 1981), p. 192.
23. Franda, "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," p. 358.
24. In a handout, the Ministry of Home Affairs announced on August 23, 1979, that
294 village defense forces, consisting of 904,410 members, had been formed throughout
Bangladesh. See Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Ministry of Home
Affairs, Village Defense Parties (Dacca, August 23, 1979).
25. See The StatesmanWeekly(Calcutta), May 31, 1980, p. 11; also see S. Kamaluddin,
"Revolution and Confusion," FEER, 106:44 (November 2, 1979).
568 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984

opposition to Zia's state was organized by the Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal


USD). The JSD and its military front, Biplobi Gono Bahini, made serious
efforts to overthrow Zia, alleging that he had betrayed the cause of the
sepoy mutiny" of November 7, 1975.Y The leaders of the JSD claimed
that the regime could only be overthrown by a popular united movement
and that an armed rebellion was therefore necessary for bringing about a
socialist revolution in Bangladesh.
In addition to such activities by the opposition, the regime was sub-

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


jected to serious criticism inside Parliament. Opposition and indepen-
dent members pointed out that pro-Pakistani officers were governing
Bangladesh in civilian disguise and that the administration was run like an
"operation plan at GHQ." Rashid Khan Menon, the only Marxist-
Leninist MP, described Parliament as not "sovereign," calling it "a
school-debating society with an indulgent president sometimes languidly
watching from the gallery."27 Besides opposition inside and outside
Parliament, insurgency movements gained momentum in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts, seriously threatening Zia's regime. Although insurgency in
this area is an old problem, it became worse during the Zia period
because many freedom fighters, particularly members of the Kader Ba-
hini, who were pro-Mujib and had taken shelter in the border areas after
Mujib's death, allegedly joined the insurgency movement in the Chit-
tagong Hill Tracts, and this gave the insurgents additional strength.28
The state under Zia responded to these threats and the opposition in
two ways-by means of repression and manipulation-that is, a policy of
"sticks and carrots." Of the various opposition parties, Zia considered
the AL and the JSD as his two major opponents, and many of the leaders
and workers of both these parties were arrested and thrown in jail. The
President also adopted a policy of divide and rule. He secretly assured
some JSD leaders of economic and political opportunities if they re-

26. The Biplobi Gono Bahini was led by Colonel Abu Taher, a freedom fighter who was
dismissed by Mujib for his radical views and for forming the Bahini. On November 7,
1975, when Zia was under house arrest, Taher was said to have rescued him. The Bahini
released him on the condition that he would meet their twelve demands, which included
elimination of differences and discrimination between officers and soldiers, and release of
all political prisoners. On November 18, Zia released the main leaders of the JSD.
However, because of further JSD agitation on the twelve demands, Zia again arrested them
on November 25, 1975. For a detailed discussion of the 12-point demands, see Lawrence
Lifschultz, "The Crisis Has Not Passed," FEER, 90:49 (December 5, 1975), p. 33; also see
"Bangladesh State and Revolution-II," Frontier, 8:31 (December 13, 1975).
27. For a detailed discussion of the criticisms by the opposition inside Parliament, see
The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), May 31, 1980.
28. Kader Bahini was an organization led by Kader Siddique, a guerrilla leader in the
1971 liberation War of Bangladesh. See Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution,p. 201.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 569

mained quiet. A group of JSD workers under the leadership of M. A.


Awal responded positively to Zia's assurance, and the result was a split in
the JSD and the emergence of a new party, Bangladesh SamajtantrikDal
(BSD) under Awal.29 In a similar way, while many AwamniLeague lead-
ers, including Abdul Malek Ukil, were put in prison,30 others were
inducted into the BNP.31 In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, strong repres-
sive measures were undertaken but the state also adopted various pro-
grams for developing the neglected tribal areas and introduced a monthly

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


allowance system for the tribal leaders.
However, more importantly, the challenge to the authority of the
administrative state came not only from the opposition parties and the
tribal areas, but also emerged within the various dominant forces of the
state apparatus itself. Three major groups-the BNP, the civil bureau-
cracy, and the military bureaucracy-were dominant in Zia's administra-
tive state. In the strict sense of the term, the BNP was not a single
political party, but was a multidimensional "umbrella" party hastily as-
sembled under the energetic leadership of Zia and consisting of dramat-
ically opposed interests and ideological groups. There was no meeting
ground, for example, between the Islamic fundamentalists and the leftist
factions within the party. The BNP thus contained the germs of conflict
at its very birth. As a "sarkari"(government) party, the BNP attracted
those people who expected a share in state patronage and power;32 such
people did not join the party because of its ideology or program. Conse-
quently, the success of the BNP depended on the access of its members
to the state machinery rather than on the support of the people.
In the last two years of Zia's rule, despite his own popular image and
his call for unity, the BNP was faced with inner party feuds. It remained
divided along various lines-officials vs. politicians, socialists vs. non-
socialists, Islamists vs. secularists, and freedom fighters vs. non-freedom
fighters. These divisions led to bitter internal factionalism. The situation
had come to such a pass that the New Nation wrote:

29. On the split within the JSD and the growth of the BSD, see Bichitra (Dacca),
October 30, 1980.
30. In June 1978 the central office of the AL claimed that about 5,000 AL members and
workers had been in jail for more than two years without trial; see Marcus F. Franda,"Ziaur
Rahman's Bangladesh, Part I: Political Realignments," American University Field Staff
Reports, South Asia Series, No. 25 (1979), p. 3.
31. For example, Mohammadullah, Speaker of the Parliament in 1972 and President of
Bangladesh during the Mujib regime, joined Zia's BNP; later, he became Vice-President,
under the Sattar regime, just 12 hours before the March 1982 coup.
32. Rounaq Jahan, BangladeshPolitics. Problemsand Issues (Dacca: University Press Ltd.,
1980), p. 208.
570 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984
The system-whatever it is-under whichthis countryis saidto be governed
seems to be on the verge of the collapse.... As things deteriorate, BNP will
not be able to bear the strains.Perhapsit will be destroyedby its own time
bomb of greed, corruptionand self-advancementof its members.33
The civil bureaucracy, another major dominant force in Zia's state, was
already fragmented between "patriots" and "nonpatriots." Zia revived
the disheartened bureaucracy, but he tended to rely heavily on those civil
servants who had been thrown out of office during the Mujib regime. On

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


the other hand, the civil servants who were close associates of Mujib
were demoted or placed in insignificant positions. Thus, Zia antagonized
one section of the civil servants, although he was popular, no doubt,
among those bureaucrats who regained power and position after 1975.
However, during the last year of his rule, even the latter became disen-
chanted with Zia because they perceived him to be attaching more and
more importance to the political elites. This was a point on which the
bureaucracy seemed unwilling to compromise, for its training and ethos
allowed for little tolerance of interference by politicians in the adminis-
tration. The growing importance of the BNP caused concern in the
bureaucracy about its role in the system.34
More critically, a crisis emerged within the army, the key force in Zia's
state, mainly for two reasons. In the first place, Zia relied heavily on
those army officers who had been suppressed by Mujib-i.e., mainly the
ones who had been repatriated from Pakistan after liberation. Zia's
obvious preference for the repatriated officers is manifest in the fact that
in 1981 only two of the 50 major-generals and brigadiers in the
Bangladesh Army were men who had fought with the Mukti Bahini in
197 1;35 the other 48 officers were those who had been stranded in West
Pakistan during the liberation war. Of the eight sector commanders of
the Mukti Bahini, only two, in addition to Zia, retained command in the
army by 1980. One was General Shawkat Ali, but he was later stripped of
his operational command in 1980 and appointed Principal of Staff Col-
lege in Dacca; the other was General Manzoor, who was transferred in

33. Cited in Asia ResearchBulletin, 3, Monthly Political Supplement (August 31, 1981),
p. 837.
34. Regarding the death of Zia, Zillur R. Khan writes, "Perhaps he [Zia] wanted to shift
his power base from a military-bureaucratic-industrialcombine to a mass-oriented institu-
tional frame. According to this interpretation, the deaths of Zia and Manzoor can be
attributed to a much larger conspiracy. This view suggests that opponents of critical change
are determined to maintain the status quo, that is, the domination of political life by the
combined military, bureaucratic, and entrepreneurial elites." See Kahn's "Bangladesh in
1981: Change, Stability, and Leadership," Asian Survey, 22:2 (February 1982), p. 165.
35. Franda, "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," p. 365.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 571

1980 from a central position in Dacca to a peripheral one in Chittagong.


Zia's preference for repatriated officers alienated him from those military
officers and soldiers who had fought for independence.
The second reason for the crisis within the army was conflict between
officers and the ranks. Colonel Abu Taher, who had led the "sepoy
revolt" of November 7, 1975, and had rescued Zia, sought to radicalize
the army, emphasizing the elimination of all differences and discrimina-
tion between officers and soldiers. He also organized an underground

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


Biplobi Gono Bahini with the idea of launching an armed revolt against
the officers. As a result of the crisis within the army, there were nineteen
abortive coups between 1977 and 1981.36

The Fall of Zia


The growing strength of the opposition and the internal feuds within and
among the dominant forces of the state itself weakened Ziaur Rahman's
position. In early 1981, the New Nation wrote: "He [Zia] is a prisoner of
his own mixed-up, cross-bed political system [and] of the various vested
interests which have been created during the past few years.... So what
is in store for us in the coming months? Our concern is real."37President
Ziaur Rahman, however, was still personally popular among the masses
for his honesty. The national press as well as the foreign press eulogized
his honesty and sincerity, how he worked 18 hours a day to turn
Bangladesh from an "international basket case" to a basketful of hopes,
his experiments with village-based development, and his bold strides in
restoring democracy and in upholding the country's independence and
sovereignty. It was expected, therefore, that it would perhaps take some
time for Zia's state to collapse. But the violent assassination of Zia in an
abortive coup on May 30; 1981, brought an abrupt end to his rule and
led the nation into a state of uncertainty.
The death of Ziaur Rahman is shrouded in mystery. It is widely
believed that Zia was killed for reasons of personal revenge by General
Manzoor, the alleged leader of the May 1981 coup. Manzoor had been a
very close friend of Zia's during the liberation war and the critical days of
1975-77 when Zia was consolidating his political power. Because of his
close association and friendship with Zia, Manzoor expected Zia, once he
became President, to appoint him Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh
Armed Forces. However, Zia offered this position to Lt. Colonel Gen-
eral Ershad, a repatriated officer, apparently because Ershad was senior
to General Manzoor and also because Zia knew that Manzoor was very

36. This estimate has been given by Maniruzzaman in Bangladesh Revolution, p. 221.
37. Cited in Asia ResearchBulletin, 2:3 (August 31, 1981), p. 837.
572 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984

ambitious.38Zia's decision to promote Ershad brought about a deteriora-


tion in the personal relations between Zia and Manzoor. On the night of
May 30, while Zia was on an official tour in Chittagong, Manzoor
reportedly decided to make one desperate attempt to remove Ziaur
Rahman from power.
This "personal revenge" theory has received wide publicity, but it
apparently does not tell the whole truth about Zia's assassination.It seems
that Zia's death was not an isolated event, but rather part of a larger

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


conspiracy even though there was no involvement of an external power
and the conspiracy was homegrown. It is true that Manzoor was disap-
pointed with his job situation, but this merely served as an "accelerator"
for the coup attempt, which was perhaps related to intense discontent
among a segment of the armed forces. During the last two years of his
rule, Zia had relied heavily on the repatriated and newly recruited
officers and soldiers. In 1981, it is estimated that only 15% of the
members of the armed forces were freedom fighters or had been re-
cruited during the Mujib regime, while 25% had been repatriated from
Pakistan and the remaining 60% were new recruits. Zia felt that the
repatriated soldiers and new recruits were much better and more disci-
plined soldiers than the freedom fighters, primarily because their training
had been more thorough; moreover, the freedom fighters were pro-
Mujib and highly politicized. In order to counter the freedom fighters,
Zia had expanded the army from five divisions in 1975 to nine divisions
by 1981.39 Zia's policy further alienated him from the freedom fighters
both inside and outside the army.
Thus, while Manzoor did have a personal grudge against Zia, the
freedom fighters and officers recruited during the Mujib regime had
sought to seize power long before May 30, 1981, since all the previous
coup attempts against Zia had been led by participants in the liberation
war. Of all the freedom fighters, only General Manzoor had been able to
retain an operational command in the army, and this was in Chittagong.
Therefore, it may be that he was persuaded by the freedom fighters to
stage a coup in Chittagong, after which the freedom fighters posted in
different cantonments would mobilize support both within the army and
from pro-Mujib civilians. As planned, on Friday, May 30, 1981, at 3 A.M.,
some 20 officers led by Colonel Fazle Hassan arrived at the Chittagong
Circuit House where President Zia was staying, and within 20 minutes of
their arrival the operation to kill President Zia and his security guards

38. Marcus F. Franda, "Bangladesh After Zia: A Retrospect and Prospect," Economic
and Political Weekly, 16:34 (1981), p. 1388.
39. Ibid.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 573

was over. But the coup-makers failed to receive any support from the
other cantonments and most of the rebels had surrendered by the next
morning. The abortive coup of May 1981, even though unsuccessful,
brought an end to Zia's rule, and his stunning exit from the scene
sparked off yet another political crisis in the state of Bangladesh.

Conclusion
In sum, the administrative state that had endured for more than two

Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/as/article-pdf/24/5/556/70102/2644413.pdf by guest on 26 June 2020


decades in East Pakistan had been replaced after independence by a state
dominated by politicians, but this only lasted for about four years. After
the August 1975 coup, the civil-military bureaucrats again became domi-
nant in the state apparatusand transformed it into an administrative state.
After regaining their previous position and power, the civil-military
bureaucracy adopted several measures in order to acquire political as-
cendancy and legitimacy. However, subsequently, the state faced tre-
mendous opposition from both the regular political parties like the AL
and the JSD, and the underground revolutionary parties. It also faced
insurgency movements in the tribal areas of the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
Through coercion and persuasion, the state managed to check the ac-
tivities of the opposition, but the crisis emerged within and among the
dominant forces of the administrative state itself. The three dominant
forces-the BNP, the civil bureaucracy, and the military bureaucracy-
began to fight among themselves. It was the internal contradiction and
crisis among the dominant forces of the state apparatus that weakened
the state under Zia and prepared the ground for its eventual collapse.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen