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ZIA (1975-81)
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face serious opposition from alienated classes and groups. However, the
state may persist for a certain period of time by using the methods of
coercion and/or persuasion but is likely to collapse if contradictions and
crises emerge in the dominant coalition controlling the state apparatus.
Focusing on the new state in Bangladesh under Zia, the analysis in this
article takes up the following questions. What was the nature of the new
state? How did it maintain its legitimacy? Did it face any opposition? Was
there any crisis within the state itself? Why did the new state under Zia
1. Ziaur Rahman, a Major in the East Bengal Regiment, made the announcement of the
independence of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong on March 27, 1971. Zia joined the
Pakistan Army in 1953 and was commissioned in 1955. During the liberation war, Zia
formed the "Z" forces. After independence he expected to be the army Chief of Staff, but
Mujib appointed Major General K. Shafiullah, junior to Zia, to the position. The main
reason for by-passing Zia, Marcus Franda points out, was that on March 27, 1971, Zia
declared himself the President of Bangladesh over Radio Chittagong. Mujib did not like
Zia's ambitious nature. After the August 1975 coup, Shafiullah was removed from office
and Zia was made the Army Chief of Staff. See Marcus F. Franda,"The Bangladesh Coup,"
American UniversitiesField Staff Reports,South Asia Series XIX, No. 15 (1975), p. 8; see
also his "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," Economicand Political Weekly,Vol.
16, Annual Number (March 1981).
2. In this period Zia considered his main task as putting down unrest in the army in
different cantonments of Bangladesh. On the other hand, Sayem was kept as President
because he was considered neutral and nonpolitical.
558 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984
3. For example, Shafiul Azam, former Chief Secretary of East Pakistan, who was
dismissed by the state under Mujib, was reinstated after the August coup. On the other
hand, A. T. M. Syed Hossain, Mujib's brother-in-law and Additional Secretary of the
Establishment Division, was removed from office. In the Army, Major General M. Khalilur
Rahman, Brigadier H. M. Ershad (Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1983), and Brigadier
Quazi Golam Dastgir were elevated in the army hierarchy. See Franda, "The Bangladesh
Coup," p. 8.
4. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Bureau of Statistics, 1980
Statistical Yearbookof Bangladesh (Dacca, 1981), p. 363.
5. Mosharaf Hossain, "Nature of State Power in Bangladesh,"Journal of Social Studies,
No. 5 (October 1979), p. 34.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 559
Expenditure
Year (millions of U.S. dollars) Percentageof GNP
1975 34 0.7
1976 64 1.1
SOURCE: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, WorldMilitary Expendituresand Arms Trans-
fers, 1980 (Washington, D.C., 1980), p. 40.
Pakistan Air Force. Of the seven civilians, one was a former professor of
Economics at Dacca University and former Minister of Finance in the
government of East Pakistan (1965-69), and the other six had a bureau-
cratic background. The number of advisers was subsequently raised to
24, of whom ten were from the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), three
were military officers, and the rest technocrats.8
After the parliamentary elections in February 1979, President Ziaur
Rahman formed a Council of Ministers, whose members were appointed
8. The bio-data on the members of the 1977 Council of Advisers is available in Bichitra
Barashapatra, 1977 (Dacca: Dainik Bangla Prakashani, 1977), pp. 42-48; Holiday (Dacca),
March 18, 1979; also see A Yearbookof the Commonwealth,1978 (London: His Majesty's
Stationery Office, 1979), p. 127.
9. Mahbub Alam Chasi (CSP) and A. H. K. Sadique (CSP), respectively, were the
Personal and Information secretaries to the President. S. A. Khair (CSP) was the secretary
of the Economic Affairs Division.
10. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Establishment Division,
Erstwhile Civil Serviceof Pakistan (Dacca, n.d.); also see Government of the People's
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 561
between the military and the civil service."14 And like their forebears in
the administrative state of Pakistan, the civil-military bureaucrats in
Bangladesh as an exclusive administrative group have been deeply im-
bued with a 'guardianship" orientation. The broad administrative
framework in which they worked did not undergo any fundamental
change in Bangladesh. Like Bhutto's regime in Pakistan, Mujib's regime
in Bangladesh was a short interlude in the persisting pattern of the
administrative state.
14. Robert S. Anderson, "Impressions of Bangladesh: The Rule of Arms and the
Politics of Exhortation," Pacific Affairs, 49:3 (Fall 1976), p. 445.
15. From a newspaper interview by President Ziaur Rahman. See Rodney Tasker and
S. Kamaluddin, "Martial Law, Democracy and the Future," Far Eastern EconomicReview
(FEER), 106:41 (October 12, 1979), p. 30.
16. The Bangladesh Observer,April 23, 1977.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 563
voter turnout. The referendum gave Zia a strong sense of confidence
about his authority in Bangladesh.
17. Before May 1978 all political parties were banned. However, in July 1978 the state
promulgated the Political Parties Regulation which legalized parties on registration with the
state. See The Bangladesh Times, July 29, August 5, and October 25, 1976.
18. From an interview (April 1981) with Enayatullah Khan, a prominent pro-Chinese
leftist, editor of weekly Holiday (Dacca), and a former minister for Land Reforms in Zia's
cabinet.
564 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIV, NO. 5, MAY 1984
Businessmen 57 33.5
Professionals 53 31.2
Agriculturists 28 11.8
Businessmen 84 28.0
Lawyers 78 26.0
Agriculturists 58 19.3
Technocrats 21 7.0
Even though its members were elected, the parliament was not a
sovereign body since it was subordinate and subservient to the President
who was a military bureaucrat. The President was above parliament, and
he could dissolve the parliament whenever he felt it necessary. However,
an elected parliament provided a constitutional facade for what was
essentially an "administrative state."
Sarkars had been organized.22 However, they seem to have been more
the creations of the bureaucracy than the result of genuine political
participation. As Franda observed:
Most of the Gram Sarkars have been chosen by a "consensus" evolved at
village meetings, with the nature of that consensus being determined by Thana
Circle Officers representing the central government.... Observers who have
watched the selection process in several villages suggest that members of
parliament and District officers frequently play a major role in choosing these
26. The Biplobi Gono Bahini was led by Colonel Abu Taher, a freedom fighter who was
dismissed by Mujib for his radical views and for forming the Bahini. On November 7,
1975, when Zia was under house arrest, Taher was said to have rescued him. The Bahini
released him on the condition that he would meet their twelve demands, which included
elimination of differences and discrimination between officers and soldiers, and release of
all political prisoners. On November 18, Zia released the main leaders of the JSD.
However, because of further JSD agitation on the twelve demands, Zia again arrested them
on November 25, 1975. For a detailed discussion of the 12-point demands, see Lawrence
Lifschultz, "The Crisis Has Not Passed," FEER, 90:49 (December 5, 1975), p. 33; also see
"Bangladesh State and Revolution-II," Frontier, 8:31 (December 13, 1975).
27. For a detailed discussion of the criticisms by the opposition inside Parliament, see
The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), May 31, 1980.
28. Kader Bahini was an organization led by Kader Siddique, a guerrilla leader in the
1971 liberation War of Bangladesh. See Maniruzzaman, Bangladesh Revolution,p. 201.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 569
29. On the split within the JSD and the growth of the BSD, see Bichitra (Dacca),
October 30, 1980.
30. In June 1978 the central office of the AL claimed that about 5,000 AL members and
workers had been in jail for more than two years without trial; see Marcus F. Franda,"Ziaur
Rahman's Bangladesh, Part I: Political Realignments," American University Field Staff
Reports, South Asia Series, No. 25 (1979), p. 3.
31. For example, Mohammadullah, Speaker of the Parliament in 1972 and President of
Bangladesh during the Mujib regime, joined Zia's BNP; later, he became Vice-President,
under the Sattar regime, just 12 hours before the March 1982 coup.
32. Rounaq Jahan, BangladeshPolitics. Problemsand Issues (Dacca: University Press Ltd.,
1980), p. 208.
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The system-whatever it is-under whichthis countryis saidto be governed
seems to be on the verge of the collapse.... As things deteriorate, BNP will
not be able to bear the strains.Perhapsit will be destroyedby its own time
bomb of greed, corruptionand self-advancementof its members.33
The civil bureaucracy, another major dominant force in Zia's state, was
already fragmented between "patriots" and "nonpatriots." Zia revived
the disheartened bureaucracy, but he tended to rely heavily on those civil
servants who had been thrown out of office during the Mujib regime. On
33. Cited in Asia ResearchBulletin, 3, Monthly Political Supplement (August 31, 1981),
p. 837.
34. Regarding the death of Zia, Zillur R. Khan writes, "Perhaps he [Zia] wanted to shift
his power base from a military-bureaucratic-industrialcombine to a mass-oriented institu-
tional frame. According to this interpretation, the deaths of Zia and Manzoor can be
attributed to a much larger conspiracy. This view suggests that opponents of critical change
are determined to maintain the status quo, that is, the domination of political life by the
combined military, bureaucratic, and entrepreneurial elites." See Kahn's "Bangladesh in
1981: Change, Stability, and Leadership," Asian Survey, 22:2 (February 1982), p. 165.
35. Franda, "Ziaur Rahman and Bangladesh Nationalism," p. 365.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 571
36. This estimate has been given by Maniruzzaman in Bangladesh Revolution, p. 221.
37. Cited in Asia ResearchBulletin, 2:3 (August 31, 1981), p. 837.
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38. Marcus F. Franda, "Bangladesh After Zia: A Retrospect and Prospect," Economic
and Political Weekly, 16:34 (1981), p. 1388.
39. Ibid.
SYED SERAJUL ISLAM 573
was over. But the coup-makers failed to receive any support from the
other cantonments and most of the rebels had surrendered by the next
morning. The abortive coup of May 1981, even though unsuccessful,
brought an end to Zia's rule, and his stunning exit from the scene
sparked off yet another political crisis in the state of Bangladesh.
Conclusion
In sum, the administrative state that had endured for more than two