Ancient Greek warfare

Warfare occurred throughout the history of Ancient

Greece, from the Greek Dark Ages onward. The Greek
'Dark Age' drew to a close as a significant increase in
population allowed urbanized culture to be restored,
which led to the rise of the city-states (Poleis). These
developments ushered in the period of Archaic Greece
(800-480 BC). They also restored the capability of
organized warfare between these Poleis (as opposed to
small-scale raids to acquire livestock and grain, for
example). The fractious nature of Ancient Greek society
seems to have made continuous conflict on this larger
scale inevitable.

Along with the rise of the city-state evolved a new style

of warfare: the hoplite phalanx. Hoplites were armored
infantryman, armed with spears and shields, and the
phalanx was a formation of these soldiers with their
shields locked together and spears pointed forward. The
Chigi vase, dated to around 650 BC, is the earliest
depiction of a hoplite in full battle array. With this
evolution in warfare, battles seem to have consisted
mostly of the clash of hoplite phalanxes from the city-
states in conflict. Since the soldiers were citizens with
other occupations, warfare was limited in distance,
season and scale. Neither side could afford heavy
casualties or sustained campaigns, so conflicts seem to
have been resolved by a single set-piece battle.

The scale and scope of warfare in Ancient Greece

changed dramatically as a result of the Greco-Persian
Wars, which marked the beginning of Classical Greece Ancient Greek marble relief c. 330 BC depicting a
(480-323 BC). To fight the enormous armies of the soldier in combat, holding his weapon above his
Achaemenid Empire was effectively beyond the head as he prepares to strike a fallen enemy; the
capabilities of a single city-state. The eventual triumph relief may have been part of an official Athenian
of the Greeks was achieved by alliances of many city- state memorial; from the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek
states, on a scale never seen before. The rise of Athens collection.
and Sparta during this conflict led directly to the
Peloponnesian War, which saw diversification of
warfare. Emphasis shifted to naval battles and strategies of attrition such as blockades and sieges. Following
the defeat of the Athenians in 404 BC, and the disbandment of the Athenian-dominated Delian League,
Ancient Greece fell under the Spartan hegemony. But this was unstable, and the Persian Empire sponsored a
rebellion by the combined powers of Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos, resulting in the Corinthian War
(395-387 BC). Persia switched sides, which ended the war, in return for the cities of Ionia and Spartan non-
interference in Asia Minor. The Spartan hegemony would last another 16 years, until, at the Battle of
Leuctra (371) the Spartans were decisively defeated by the Theban general Epaminondas.
The Thebans acted with alacrity to establish a hegemony of their own over Greece. However, Thebes lacked
sufficient manpower and resources, and became overstretched. Following the death of Epaminondas and
loss of manpower at the Battle of Mantinea, the Theban hegemony ceased. The losses in the ten years of the
Theban hegemony left all the Greek city-states weakened and divided. The city-states of southern Greece
were too weak to resist the rise of the Macedonian kingdom in the north. With revolutionary tactics, King
Phillip II brought most of Greece under his sway, paving the way for the conquest of "the known world" by
his son Alexander the Great. The rise of the Macedonian Kingdom is generally taken to signal the beginning
of the Hellenistic period, and certainly marked the end of the distinctive hoplite battle in Ancient Greece.

Contents
Military structure and methods in ancient Greece
Hoplite
The hoplite phalanx
Hoplite warfare
Other elements of Greek armies
The economics of ancient warfare
Ancient Greek military campaigns
The Greco-Persian Wars
The Peloponnesian War
Mercenaries and light infantry
Spartan & Theban hegemonies
The rise of Macedon and the end of the hoplite era
The innovations of Phillip II
See also
References
Bibliography
External links

Military structure and methods in ancient Greece

Hoplite

Along with the rise of the city-state evolved a brand new style of warfare and the emergence of the hoplite.
The hoplite was an infantryman, the central element of warfare in Ancient Greece. The word hoplite (Greek
ὁπλίτης, hoplitēs) derives from hoplon (ὅπλον, plural hopla, ὅπλα) meaning an item of armor or equipment,
thus 'hoplite' may approximate to 'armored man'. Hoplites were the citizen-soldiers of the Ancient Greek
City-states. They were primarily armed as spear-men and fought in a phalanx (see below).

Hoplite armor was extremely expensive for the average citizen, so it was commonly passed down from the
soldier's father or relative. Alexander’s Macedonian army had spears called sarissas that were 18 feet long,
far longer than the 6–9 foot Greek dory. The secondary weapon of a hoplite was the xiphos, a short sword
used when the soldier's spear was broken or lost while fighting.
The origins of the hoplite are obscure, and no small
matter of contention amongst historians. Traditionally,
this has been dated to the 8th century BC, and attributed
to Sparta; but more recent views suggest a later date,
towards the 7th century BC. Certainly, by
approximately 650 BC, as dated by the 'Chigi vase', the
'hoplite revolution' was complete. The major innovation
in the development of the hoplite seems to have been
the characteristic circular shield (Aspis), roughly 1 m
(3.3 ft) in diameter, and made of wood faced with
bronze.[1] Although very heavy (8–15 kg or 18–33 lb),
the design of this shield was such that it could be
supported on the shoulder. More importantly, it
permitted the formation of a shield-wall by an army, an
A hoplite armed with an aspis and a doru. nb: it is
impenetrable mass of men and shields. Men were also usually agreed that the doru could not be used two-
equipped with metal greaves and also a breast plate handed with the aspis.
made of bronze, leather, or stiff cloth. When this was
combined with the primary weapon of the hoplite, 2–
3 m (6.6–9.8 ft) long spear (the doru), it gave both offensive and defensive capabilities.

Regardless of where it developed, the model for the hoplite army evidently quickly spread throughout
Greece. The persuasive qualities of the phalanx were probably its relative simplicity (allowing its use by a
citizen militia), low fatality rate (important for small city-states), and relatively low cost (enough for each
hoplite to provide their own equipment).[1] The Phalanx also became a source of political influence because
men had to provide their own equipment in order to be a part of the army.

The hoplite phalanx

The ancient Greek city-states developed a military

formation called the phalanx, which were rows of
shoulder-to-shoulder hoplites. The Hoplites would lock
their shields together, and the first few ranks of soldiers
would project their spears out over the first rank of
shields. The Phalanx therefore presented a shield wall
and a mass of spear points to the enemy, making frontal
assaults much more difficult. It also allowed a higher
proportion of the soldiers to be actively engaged in Reconstruction of a Hoplite Phalanx formation
combat at a given time (rather than just those in the
front rank).

The phalanx formed the core of ancient Greek militaries. Because hoplites were all protected by their own
shield and others’ shields and spears, they were relatively safe as long as the formation didn't break. When
advancing towards an enemy, the phalanx would break into a run that was sufficient to create momentum
but not too much as to lose cohesion.[2] The opposing sides would collide viciously, possibly terrifying
many of the hoplites of the front row. The battle would then rely on the valour of the men in the front line,
while those in the rear maintained forward pressure on the front ranks with their shields. When in combat,
the whole formation would consistently press forward trying to break the enemy formation; thus, when two
phalanx formations engaged, the struggle essentially became a pushing match,[3] in which, as a rule, the
deeper phalanx would almost always win, with few recorded exceptions.
When exactly the phalanx developed is uncertain, but it is thought to have been developed by the Argives in
their early clashes with the Spartans. The chigi vase, dated to around 650 BC, is the earliest depiction of a
hoplite in full battle array. The hoplite was a well-armed and armored citizen-soldier primarily drawn from
the middle classes. Every man had to serve at least two years in the army. Fighting in the tight phalanx
formation maximised the effectiveness of his armor, large shield and long spear, presenting a wall of armor
and spearpoints to the enemy. They were a force to be reckoned with.

Hoplite warfare

At least in the Archaic Period, the fragmentary nature of Ancient Greece, with many competing city-states,
increased the frequency of conflict, but conversely limited the scale of warfare. Unable to maintain
professional armies, the city-states relied on their own citizens to fight. This inevitably reduced the potential
duration of campaigns, as citizens would need to return to their own professions (especially in the case of
farmers). Campaigns would therefore often be restricted to summer. Armies marched directly to their target,
possibly agreed on by the protagonists. Sparta was an exception to this rule, as every Spartiate was a
professional soldier. Spartans instead relied on slaves named helots for civilian jobs such as farming.

If battle was refused by one side, they would retreat to the city, in which case the attackers generally had to
content themselves with ravaging the countryside around, since the campaign season was too limited to
attempt a siege. When battles occurred, they were usually set piece and intended to be decisive. These
battles were short, bloody, and brutal, and thus required a high degree of discipline. At least in the early
classical period, hoplites were the primary force; light troops and cavalry generally protected the flanks and
performed skirmishing, acting as support troops for the core heavy infantry.

The strength of hoplites was shock combat. The two phalanxes would smash into each other in hopes of
quickly breaking the enemy force's line. Failing that, a battle degenerated into a pushing match, with the
men in the rear trying to force the front lines through those of the enemy.[3] This maneuver was known as
the Othismos or "push." Thucydides described hoplite warfare as othismos aspidon or "the push of
shields".[4] Battles rarely lasted more than an hour.[5] Once one of the lines broke, the troops would
generally flee from the field, chased by peltasts or light cavalry if available. If a hoplite escaped, he would
sometimes be forced to drop his cumbersome aspis, thereby disgracing himself to his friends and family.
Casualties were slight compared to later battles, amounting to anywhere between 5 and 15% for the winning
and losing sides respectively,[6] but the slain often included the most prominent citizens and generals who
led from the front. Thus, the whole war could be decided by a single field battle; victory was enforced by
ransoming the fallen back to the defeated, called the 'Custom of the Dead Greeks'..

Other elements of Greek armies

Greek armies also included significant numbers of light infantry, the Psiloi, as support troops for the heavy
hoplites, who also doubled as baggage handlers for the heavy foot. These included javelin throwers
(akontistai), stone throwers (lithovoloi) and slingers (sfendonitai) while archers (toxotai) were rare, mainly
from Crete, or mercenary non-Greek tribes (as at the crucial battle of Plataea 479 B.C.) Greek armies
gradually downgraded the armor of the hoplites (to linen padded thorax and open helmets) to make the
phalanx more flexible and upgraded the javelineers to lightly armored general purpose infantry (thorakitai
and thyreophoroi) with javelins and sometimes spears. Eventually, these types effectively complemented the
Macedonian style phalanx which prevailed throughout Greece after Alexander the Great.

Cavalry had always existed in Greek armies of the classical era but the cost of horses made it far more
expensive than hoplite armor, limiting cavalrymen to nobles and the very wealthy (social class of hippeis).
During the early hoplite era cavalry played almost no role whatsoever, mainly for social, but also tactical
reasons, since the middle-class phalanx completely dominated the battlefield. Gradually, and especially
during the Peloponnesian war, cavalry became more important acquiring every role that cavalry could play,
except perhaps frontal attack. It scouted, screened, harassed, outflanked and pursued with the most telling
moment being the use of Syracusan horse to harass and eventually destroy the retreating Athenian army of
the disastrous Sicilian expedition 415-413 B.C. One of the most famous troop of Greek cavalry was the
Tarantine cavalry, originating from the city-state of Taras in Magna Graecia.[7]

The economics of ancient warfare

Campaigns were often timed with the agricultural season so as to impact the enemies or enemies' crops and
harvest. The timing had to be very carefully arranged so that the invaders' enemy's harvest would be
disrupted but the invaders' harvest would not be affected. Late invasions were also possible in the hopes that
the sowing season would be affected but this at best would have minimal effects on the harvest.

One alternative to disrupting the harvest was to ravage the countryside by uprooting trees, burning houses
and crops and killing all who were not safe behind the walls of the city. Ravaging the countryside cost much
effort and was also dependent on the season because green crops do not burn as well as those nearer to
harvest which are drier.

War also led to acquisition of land and slaves which would lead to a greater harvest, which could support a
larger army. Plunder was also a large part of war and this allowed for pressure to be taken off of the
government finances and allowed for investments to be made that would strengthen the polis. War also
stimulated production because of the sudden increase in demand for weapons and armor. Ship builders
would also experience sudden increases in their production demands.

Ancient Greek military campaigns

The Greco-Persian Wars

The scale and scope of warfare in Ancient Greece changed dramatically as a result of the Greco-Persian
Wars. To fight the enormous armies of the Achaemenid Empire was effectively beyond the capabilities of a
single city-state. The eventual triumph of the Greeks was achieved by alliances of many city-states (the
exact composition changing over time), allowing the pooling of resources and division of labour. Although
alliances between city states occurred before this time, nothing on this scale had been seen before.

The Greco-Persian Wars (499-448 BC) were the result of attempts by the Persian Emperor Darius the Great,
and then his successor Xerxes I to subjugate Ancient Greece. Darius was already ruler of the cities of Ionia,
and the wars are taken to start when they rebelled in 499 BC. The revolt was crushed by 494 BC, but Darius
resolved to bring mainland Greece under his dominion. Many city-states made their submission to him, but
others did not, notably including Athens and Sparta.[8] Darius thus sent his commanders Datis and
Artaphernes to attack Attica, to punish Athens for her intransigence. After burning Eretria, the Persians
landed at Marathon.

An Athenian army of c. 10,000 hoplites marched to meet the Persian army of about 25,000 troops. The
Athenians were at a significant disadvantage both strategically and tactically. Raising such a large army had
denuded Athens of defenders, and thus any attack in the Athenian rear would cut off the Army from the
City. Tactically, the hoplites were very vulnerable to attacks by cavalry, and the Athenians had no cavalry to
defend the flanks. After several days of stalemate at Marathon, the Persian commanders attempted to take
strategic advantage by sending their cavalry (by ship) to raid Athens itself.[9] This gave the Athenian army a
small window of opportunity to attack the remainder of the Persian Army.
This was the first true engagement between a hoplite
army and a non-Greek army. The Persians had acquired
a reputation for invincibility, but the Athenian hoplites
proved crushingly superior in the ensuing infantry
battle. To counter the massive numbers of Persians, the
Greek general Miltiades ordered the troops to be spread
across an unusually wide front, leaving the centre of the
Greek line undermanned. However, the lightly armored
Persian infantry proved no match for the heavily
armored hoplites, and the Persian wings were quickly
routed. The Greek wings then turned against the elite
troops in the Persian centre, which had held the Greek
centre until then. Marathon demonstrated to the Greeks
the lethal potential of the hoplite, and firmly The Greek wings (blue) envelop the Persian wings
demonstrated that the Persians were not, after all, (red)
invincible.

The revenge of the Persians was postponed 10 years by internal conflicts in the Persian Empire, until
Darius's son Xerxes returned to Greece in 480 BC with a staggeringly large army (modern estimates suggest
between 150,000-250,000 men). Many Greeks city-states, having had plenty of warning of the forthcoming
invasion, formed an anti-Persian league; though as before, other city-states remained neutral or allied with
Persia. Although alliances between city-states were commonplace, the scale of this league was a novelty,
and the first time that the Greeks had united in such a way to face an external threat.

This allowed diversification of the allied armed forces, rather than simply mustering a very large hoplite
army. The visionary Athenian politician Themistocles had successfully persuaded his fellow citizens to build
a huge fleet in 483/82 BC to combat the Persian threat (and thus to effectively abandon their hoplite army,
since there were not men enough for both). Amongst the allies therefore, Athens was able to form the core
of a navy, whilst other cities, including Sparta, provided the army. This alliance thus removed the constraints
on the type of armed forces that the Greeks could use. The use of such a large navy was also a novelty to the
Greeks.

The second Persian invasion is famous for the battles of Thermopylae and Salamis. As the massive Persian
army moved south through Greece, the allies sent a small holding force (c. 10,000) men under the Spartan
king Leonidas, to block the pass of Thermopylae whilst the main allied army could be assembled. The allied
navy extended this blockade at sea, blocking the nearby straits of Artemisium, to prevent the huge Persian
navy landing troops in Leonidas's rear. Famously, Leonidas's men held the much larger Persian army at the
pass (where their numbers were less of an advantage) for three days, the hoplites again proving their
superiority.

Only when a Persian force managed to outflank them by means of a mountain track was the allied army
overcome; but by then Leonidas had dismissed the majority of the troops, remaining with a rearguard of 300
Spartans (and perhaps 2000 other troops), in the process making one of history's great last stands. The Greek
navy, despite their lack of experience, also proved their worth holding back the Persian fleet whilst the army
still held the pass.

Thermopylae provided the Greeks with time to arrange their defences, and they dug in across the Isthmus of
Corinth, an impregnable position; although an evacuated Athens was thereby sacrificed to the advancing
Persians. In order to outflank the isthmus, Xerxes needed to use this fleet, and in turn therefore needed to
defeat the Greek fleet; similarly, the Greeks needed to neutralise the Persian fleet to ensure their safety. To
this end, the Greeks were able to lure the Persian fleet into the straits of Salamis; and, in a battleground
where Persian numbers again counted for nothing, they won a decisive victory, justifying Themistocles'
decision to build the Athenian fleet. Demoralised, Xerxes returned to Asia Minor with much of his army,
leaving his general Mardonius to campaign in Greece the following year (479 BC).

However, a united Greek army of c. 40,000 hoplites decisively defeated Mardonius at the Battle of Plataea,
effectively ending the invasion. Almost simultaneously, the allied fleet defeated the remnants of the Persian
navy at Mycale, thus destroying the Persian hold on the islands of the Aegean.

The remainder of the wars saw the Greeks take the fight to the Persians. The Athenian dominated Delian
League of cities and islands extirpated Persian garrisons from Macedon and Thrace, before eventually
freeing the Ionian cities from Persian rule. At one point, the Greeks even attempted an invasion of Cyprus
and Egypt (which proved disastrous), demonstrating a major legacy of the Persian Wars: warfare in Greece
had moved beyond the seasonal squabbles between city-states, to coordinated international actions involving
huge armies. After the war, ambitions of many Greek states dramatically increased. Tensions resulting from
this, and the rise of Athens and Sparta as pre-eminent powers during the war led directly to the
Peloponnesian War, which saw further development of the nature of warfare, strategy and tactics.

The Peloponnesian War

The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC), was fought

between the Athenian dominated Delian League and the
Spartan dominated Peloponnesian League. The
increased manpower and financial resources increased
the scale, and allowed the diversification of warfare.
Set-piece battles during this war proved indecisive and
instead there was increased reliance on naval warfare,
and strategies of attrition such as blockades and sieges.
These changes greatly increased the number of
casualties and the disruption of Greek society.

Whatever the proximal causes of the war, it was in

essence a conflict between Athens and Sparta for
supremacy in Greece. The war (or wars, since it is often
divided into three periods) was for much of the time a
stalemate, punctuated with occasional bouts of activity.
Tactically the Peloponnesian war represents something
of a stagnation; the strategic elements were most
important as the two sides tried to break the deadlock,
something of a novelty in Greek warfare.

Building on the experience of the Persian Wars, the

diversification from core hoplite warfare, permitted by
increased resources, continued. There was increased
emphasis on navies, sieges, mercenaries and economic
The key actions of each phase
warfare. Far from the previously limited and formalized
form of conflict, the Peloponnesian War transformed
into an all-out struggle between city-states, complete
with atrocities on a large scale; shattering religious and cultural taboos, devastating vast swathes of
countryside and destroying whole cities.[10]
From the start, the mismatch in the opposing forces was clear. The
Delian League (hereafter 'Athenians') were primarily a naval power,
whereas the Peloponnesian League (hereafter 'Spartans') consisted of
primarily land-based powers. The Athenians thus avoided battle on
land, since they could not possibly win, and instead dominated the
sea, blockading the Peloponnesus whilst maintaining their own
trade. Conversely, the Spartans repeatedly invaded Attica, but only
for a few weeks at a time; they remained wedded to the idea of
hoplite-as-citizen. Although both sides suffered setbacks and
victories, the first phase essentially ended in stalemate, as neither
league had the power to neutralise the other. The second phase, an
Athenian expedition to attack Syracuse in Sicily achieved no
tangible result other than a large loss of Athenian ships and men.

In the third phase of the war however the use of more sophisticated
stratagems eventually allowed the Spartans to force Athens to
surrender. Firstly, the Spartans permanently garrisoned a part of
Attica, removing from Athenian control the silver mine which
funded the war effort. Forced to squeeze even more money from her
allies, the Athenian league thus became heavily strained. After the
loss of Athenian ships and men in the Sicilian expedition, Sparta was Agrianian peltast holding three
able to foment rebellion amongst the Athenian league, which javelins, one in his throwing hand
therefore massively reduced the ability of the Athenians to continue and two in his pelte hand as
the war. additional ammunition

Athens in fact partially recovered from this setback between 410-

406 BC, but a further act of economic war finally forced her defeat. Having developed a navy that was
capable of taking on the much-weakened Athenian navy, the Spartan general Lysander seized the
Hellespont, the source of Athens' grain. The remaining Athenian fleet was thereby forced to confront the
Spartans, and were decisively defeated. Athens had little choice but to surrender; and was stripped of her
city walls, overseas possessions and navy. In the aftermath, the Spartans were able to establish themselves as
the dominant force in Greece for three decades.

Mercenaries and light infantry

Although tactically there was little innovation in the Peloponessian War, there does appear to have been an
increase in the use of light infantry, such as peltasts (javelin throwers) and archers. Many of these would
have been mercenary troops, hired from outlying regions of Greece. For instance, the Agrianes from Thrace
were well-renowned peltasts, whilst Crete was famous for its archers. Since there were no decisive land-
battles in the Peloponnesian War, the presence or absence of these troops was unlikely to have affected the
course of the war. Nevertheless, it was an important innovation, one which was developed much further in
later conflicts. Sileraioi were also a group of ancient mercenaries most likely employed by the tyrant
Dionysius I of Syracuse

Spartan & Theban hegemonies

Following the eventual defeat of the Athenians in 404 BC, and the disbandment of the Athenian-dominated
Delian League, Ancient Greece fell under the hegemony of Sparta. The peace treaty which ended the
Peloponnesian War left Sparta as the de facto ruler of Greece (hegemon). Although the Spartans did not
attempt to rule all of Greece directly, they prevented alliances of other Greek cities, and forced the city-
states to accept governments deemed suitable by Sparta.
However, from the very beginning, it was clear that the Spartan hegemony was shaky; the Athenians,
despite their crushing defeat, restored their democracy but just one year later, ejecting the Sparta-approved
oligarchy. The Spartans did not feel strong enough to impose their will on a shattered Athens. Undoubtedly
part of the reason for the weakness of the hegemony was a decline in the Spartan population.

This did not go unnoticed by the Persian Empire, which sponsored a rebellion by the combined powers of
Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos, resulting in the Corinthian War (395-387 BC). This was the first major
challenge Sparta faced.

The early encounters, at Nemea and Coronea were typical engagements of hoplite phalanxes, resulting in
Spartan victories. However, the Spartans suffered a large setback when their fleet was wiped out by a
Persian Fleet at the Battle of Cnidus, undermining the Spartan presence in Ionia. The war petered out after
394 BC, with a stalemate punctuated with minor engagements. One of these is particularly notable however;
at the Battle of Lechaeum, an Athenian force composed mostly of light troops (e.g. peltasts) defeated a
Spartan regiment...

The Athenian general Iphicrates had his troops make repeated hit and run attacks on the Spartans, who,
having neither peltasts nor cavalry, could not respond effectively. The defeat of a hoplite army in this way
demonstrates the changes in both troops and tactic which had occurred in Greek Warfare.

The war ended when the Persians, worried by the allies' successes, switched to supporting the Spartans, in
return for the cities of Ionia and Spartan non-interference in Asia Minor. This brought the rebels to terms,
and restored the Spartan hegemony on a more stable footing. The peace treaty which ended the war,
effectively restored the status quo ante bellum, although Athens was permitted to retain some of the territory
it had regained during the war. The Spartan hegemony would last another 16 years...

The second major challenge Sparta faced was fatal to its

hegemony, and even to its position as a first-rate power in
Greece. As the Thebans attempted to expand their influence
over Boeotia, they inevitably incurred the ire of Sparta. After
they refused to disband their army, an army of approximately
10,000 Spartans and Pelopennesians marched north to challenge
the Thebans. At the decisive Battle of Leuctra (371 BC), the
Thebans routed the allied army. The battle is famous for the
tactical innovations of the Theban general Epaminondas.

Defying convention, he strengthened the left flank of the

phalanx to an unheard of depth of 50 ranks, at the expense of The Battle of Leuctra, 371 BC, showing
the centre and the right. The centre and right were staggered Epaminondas's tactical advances
backwards from the left (an 'echelon' formation), so that the
phalanx advanced obliquely. The Theban left wing was thus
able to crush the elite Spartan forces on the allied right, whilst the Theban centre and left avoided
engagement; after the defeat of the Spartans and the death of the Spartan king, the rest of the allied army
routed. This is one of the first known examples of both the tactic of local concentration of force, and the
tactic of 'refusing a flank'.

Following this victory, the Thebans first secured their power-base in Boeotia, before marching on Sparta. As
the Thebans were joined by many erstwhile Spartan allies, the Spartans were powerless to resist this
invasion. The Thebans marched into Messenia, and freed it from Sparta; this was a fatal blow to Sparta,
since Messenia had provided most of the helots which supported the Spartan warrior society. These events
permanently reduced Spartan power and prestige, and replaced the Spartan hegemony with a Theban one.
The Theban hegemony would be short-lived however.
Opposition to it throughout the period 369-362 BC caused numerous clashes. In an attempt to bolster the
Thebans' position, Epaminondas again marched on the Pelopennese in 362 BC. At the Battle of Mantinea,
the largest battle ever fought between the Greek city-states occurred; most states were represented on one
side or the other. Epaminondas deployed tactics similar to those at Leuctra, and again the Thebans,
positioned on the left, routed the Spartans, and thereby won the battle. However, such were the losses of
Theban manpower, including Epaminondas himself, that Thebes was thereafter unable to sustain its
hegemony. Conversely, another defeat and loss of prestige meant that Sparta was unable to regain its
primary position in Greece. Ultimately, Mantinea, and the preceding decade, severely weakened many
Greek states, and left them divided and without the leadership of a dominant power.

The rise of Macedon and the end of the hoplite era

Although by the end of the Theban hegemony the cities of southern

Greece were severely weakened, they might have risen again had it
not been for the ascent to power of the Macedonian kingdom in
northern Greece. Unlike the fiercely independent (and small) city-
states, Macedon was a tribal kingdom, ruled by an autocratic king,
and importantly, covering a larger area. Once firmly unified, and
then expanded, by Phillip II, Macedon possessed the resources that
enabled it to dominate the weakened and divided states in southern
Greece. Between 356 and 342 BC Phillip conquered all city states in
the vicinity of Macedon, then Thessaly and then Thrace.

Finally Phillip sought to establish his own hegemony over the

southern Greek city-states, and after defeating the combined forces
of Athens and Thebes, the two most powerful states, at the Battle of
Chaeronea in 338 BC, succeeded. Now unable to resist him, Phillip
compelled most of the city states of southern Greece (including
Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos; but not Sparta) to join the
Corinthian League, and therefore become allied to him.

This established a lasting Macedonian hegemony over Greece, and

allowed Phillip the resources and security to launch a war against the
Persian Empire. After his assassination, this war was prosecuted by
his son Alexander the Great, and resulted in the takeover of the Paintings of Ancient Macedonian
whole Achaemenid Empire by the Macedonians. A united soldiers, arms, and armaments, from
Macedonian empire did not long survive Alexander's death, and the tomb of Agios Athanasios,
Thessaloniki in Greece, 4th century
soon split into the Hellenistic kingdoms of the Diadochi
BC
(Alexander's generals). However, these kingdoms were still
enormous states, and continued to fight in the same manner as
Phillip and Alexander's armies had. The rise of Macedon and her
successors thus sounded the death knell for the distinctive way of war found in Ancient Greece; and instead
contributed to the 'superpower' warfare which would dominate the ancient world between 350 and 150 BC.

The innovations of Phillip II

One major reason for Phillip's success in conquering Greece was the break with Hellenic military traditions
that he made. With more resources available, he was able to assemble a more diverse army, including strong
cavalry components. He took the development of the phalanx to its logical completion, arming his
'phalangites' (for they were assuredly not hoplites) with a fearsome 6 m (20 ft) pike, the 'sarissa'. Much more
lightly armored, the Macedonian phalanx was not so much a shield-wall as a spear-wall. The Macedonian
phalanx was a supreme defensive formation, but was not intended to be decisive offensively; instead, it was
used to pin down the enemy infantry, whilst more mobile forces (such as cavalry) outflanked them. This
'combined arms' approach was furthered by the extensive use of skirmishers, such as peltasts.

Tactically, Phillip absorbed the lessons of centuries of warfare in Greece. He echoed the tactics of
Epaminondas at Chaeronea, by not engaging his right wing against the Thebans until his left wing had
routed the Athenians; thus in course outnumbering and outflanking the Thebans, and securing victory.
Alexander's fame is in no small part due to his success as a battlefield tactician; the unorthodox gambits he
used at the battles of Issus and Gaugamela were unlike anything seen in Ancient Greece before.

See also
Phalanx formation
Phalangite
Hoplite
Hippeis
Peltast
Ancient Macedonian army
Hellenistic armies
Cretan archers
Toxotai

References
1. Holland, T. Persian Fire (https://archive.org/details/persianfirefirst00tomh/page/69). pp. 69–70
(https://archive.org/details/persianfirefirst00tomh/page/69). ISBN 978-0-349-11717-1.
2. Hanson, Victor (1989). The Western Way of War. University of California Press. pp. 139–141.
ISBN 978-0-520-26009-2.
3. Hanson, Victor (1989). The Western Way of War. University of California Press. p. 169.
ISBN 978-0-520-26009-2.
4. Hanson, Victor (1989). The Western Way of War. University of California Press. p. 173.
ISBN 978-0-520-26009-2.
5. Hanson, Victor (1989). The Western Way of War. University of California Press. p. 35.
ISBN 978-0-520-26009-2.
6. Sage, Michael (2002). Warfare in Ancient Greece: A Sourcebook. Routledge. p. 95.
ISBN 113476331X.
7. Ueda-Sarson, Luke. "Tarantine Cavalry" (http://www.ne.jp/asahi/luke/ueda-sarson/Tarantines.ht
ml). Retrieved 20 March 2014.
8. Holland, Tom (2005). Persian Fire (https://archive.org/details/persianfirefirst00tomh/page/178).
Abacus. pp. 178–9 (https://archive.org/details/persianfirefirst00tomh/page/178).
ISBN 9780349117171.
9. Holland, Tom (2005). Persian Fire (https://archive.org/details/persianfirefirst00tomh/page/192).
Abacus. p. 192 (https://archive.org/details/persianfirefirst00tomh/page/192).
ISBN 9780349117171.
10. Kagan. The Peloponnesian War. pp. XXIII–XXIV.

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External links
The Place of Archery in Greek Warfare (http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/classicsfacpub/9/)
The Five Great Battles of Antiquity (https://web.archive.org/web/20071226094924/http://video.
google.com/videoplay?docid=7343618077473282887) by David L. Smith, Symposion Lectures
(http://symposionlectures.googlepages.com), 30 June 2006.

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