ELECTION LAW | ATTY.

PASCASIO
CARLO ANGELO CABRITO

I. ELECTION AND SUFFRAGE

MOYA v. DEL FIERO BALLOTS SHOULD BE READ AND APPRECIATED WITH

LIBERALITY: ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with
Moya and Del Fiero are candidates for the utmost, with reasonable, liberality. No technical rule or rules
Mayor of Municipality of Paracale. The BOC
proclaimed Moya as the winner with 102 should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that
votes margin. intention is discoverable from the ballot itself, not from
evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the very
Del Fiero filed a protest with the CFI. The CA
declared Del Fiero the real winner of the root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification
election with 3 votes margin. for the suggested liberalization of the rules on appreciation of
ballots
Moya assailed the appreciation of the CA
with regard to 4 sets of ballots.
1. Set A (8 Ballots)
SC: 2/ 8 ballots are admitted for
Petitioner.
2. Set B (3 Ballots)- R. Del
Fierro SC: Sustained CA.
3. Set C (7 Ballots)- Rufino Del Fierro
SC: Sustained CA.
4. Set D (72 Ballots) P. Del
Fierro SC: Sustained CA.

SC: All in all, only 2 votes can be discounted

against Del Fierro. Del Fierro still wins
because of a margin of 1 VOTE.

BADELLES v. CABILI REPUBLICANISM IS THE ADOPTION OF REPRESENTATIVE TYPE OF

Consolidated case:
1. For City Mayor of Iligan
Badelles assails the proclamation
of Cabili
2. For City Councilors (5 seats)
Legaspi and Barazon assails the
proclamation of the 5 winners.
They contend that the election of the
protestees were tainted with flagrant
violations of mandatory provisions of
Election Law: (1) More than 200 voters
were registered per precinct contrary to
law; (2) No publication of voters was made;
(3) not less than 8000 voters were not able
to vote;
(4) 8300 not qualified to vote were able t
cast their votes.
RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of
lack of cause of action on their part.
SC: Citing Abes v. COMELEC courts have an
obligation to look into allegations of
GOVERNMENT: As long as popular government is an end to be
achieved and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the
modality and form devised, must continue to be the means by
which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the
receptacular agencies wrought by the people through their
Constitution in the interest of good government and the
common weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption
of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as
the ultimate source of the established authority.
PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAW: ASSURES FREE, HONEST, AND
ORDERLY EXPRESSION OF VIEWSA republic then to be true to its
name requires that the government rests on the consent of the
people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly
recorded, and thereafter counted. Only thus can they be really
looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It
is their undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered
choice.
 misconduct in elections. While COMELEC
has no jurisdiction over allegations of
election fraud, the courts are empowered
to do so.
TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
(CARPIO)
Resolution No. 84 was passed by Senate
certifying the existence of a vacancy
following the confirmation of Sen. Guingona
as the VP of PGMA. The Resolution stated
that the 13th place shall be elected for the
vacancy until the end of the vacated term.
Thereafter, COMELEC issued the assailed
resolution which declared HONASAN as
elected to serve the unexpired term of
GUINGONA.
It is not disputed that according to relevant
laws:
In case a vacancy arises in Congress at least
one year before the expiration of the term,
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended,
requires COMELEC:
(1) to call a special election by fixing the date
of the special election, which shall not be
earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than
ninety (90) after the occurrence of the
vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the
Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular election; and
(2) to give notice to the voters of, among
other things, the office or offices to be voted
for.
The election law has no justification except as a means for
assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is
of the essence that corruption and irregularities should not be
permitted to taint the electoral process.
NOTICE IS PRESUMED WHEN SPECIAL ELECTION IS FOR
SENATOR. NOTICE IS CHARGED BY THE STATUTE ITSELF: The
calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and
place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly
or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to
the election’s validity.26 In a general election, where the law fixes
the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by
the body charged to administer the election.27
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute
that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be
held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the
special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by
law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. 28 This is
because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from
the statute and not from any call for the election by some
authority29 and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of
the time and place of the election.30
Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for
holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix
the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent,
the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a
nullity.31
PURPOSE AND ROLE OF ELECTIONS: the consistent rule has
been to respect the electorate’s will and let the results of the
election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended
the conduct of the elections.35 This is but to acknowledge the
purpose and role of elections in a democratic society such as
ours, which is: to give the voters a direct participation in the
affairs of their government, either in determining who shall be
their public officials or in deciding some question of public
interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be
permitted, unhampered and unmolested, to cast their ballot.
PUNO DISSENTING OPINION RIGHT TO VOTE IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT, ONLY STATUTORY:
IN TOLENTINO v. COMELEC In People v. Corral,[34] we held that (t)he modern conception of
suffrage is that voting is a function of government. The right to
vote is not a natural right but it is a right created by law. Suffrage
is a privilege granted by the State to such persons as are most
likely to exercise it for the public good. The existence of the right
of suffrage is a threshold for the preservation and enjoyment of
all other rights that it ought to be considered as one of the most
sacred parts of the constitution.
SUFFRAGE IS THE PRESERVATIVE OF ALL RIGHTS: The U.S.
Supreme Court recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins[38] that voting is
a fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all
rights. In Wesberry v. Sanders,[39] the U.S. Supreme Court held
that no right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws, under
which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
Voting makes government more responsive to community and
individual needs and desires. Especially for those who feel
disempowered and marginalized or that government is not
responsive to them, meaningful access to the ballot box can be
one of the few counterbalances in their arsenal.[40]
ACTUAL NOTICE IS NECESSARY: Actual notice may be proved by
the voting of a significant percentage of the electorate for the
position in the special election or by other acts which manifest
awareness of the holding of a special election such as
nomination of candidates. In the case at bar, however, the
number of votes cast for the special election cannot be
determined as the ballot did not indicate separately the votes for
the special election. In fact, whether or not the electorate had
notice of the special election, a candidate would just the same
fall as the 13th placer because more than twelve candidates ran
for the regular senatorial elections. Nobody was nominated to
vie specifically for the senatorial seat in the special election nor
was there a certificate of candidacy filed for that position. In the
absence of official notice of the time, place and manner of
conduct of the special election, actual notice is a matter of proof.
Respondents and the ponencia cannot point to any proof of
actual notice.
I respectfully submit that the electorate should have been
informed of the time, place and manner of conduct of the May
14, 2001 special election for the single senatorial seat . A
meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage in a genuinely free,
orderly and honest election is predicated upon an electorate
informed on the issues of the day, the programs of government
laid out before them, the candidates running in the election
and the time, place and manner of conduct of the election. It is
for this reason that the Omnibus Election Code is studded with
processes, procedures and requirements that ensure voter
information.
Bince and Benito further teach us that free and intelligent
vote is not enough; correct ascertainment of the will of the
people is equally necessary. The procedure adopted in the case
at bar for holding the May 14, 2001 special senatorial election
utterly failed to ascertain the peoples choice in the special
election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that the special
election shall be held simultaneously with such general
election. It does not contemplate, however, the integration of
the special senatorial election into the regular senatorial
election whereby candidates who filed certificates of candidacy
for the regular elections also automatically stand as candidates
in the special election.
 II. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

1. COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATION:

Section 1, Art. IX- C

1. There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree,
and must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.

2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

2. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF COMELEC:

Section 2, Art. IX- C: The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers
and functions:

1. Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
2. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided
by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving

elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

3. Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment
of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
 4. Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
5. Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program
of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections.
Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to
achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and
adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government
shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political

parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute
interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground
for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other
penalties that may be prescribed by law.

6. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
7. Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to
prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.
8. Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
9. Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct
of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

PURISIMA v. SALANGA BOARD OF CANVASSERS MUST STOP CANVASSING WHEN

Purisima and Cordero were candidates for
the three seats of the Provincial Board
Members of Ilocos Sur. During the
canvassing, Purisima noted that the returns
showed on their face that the numbers for
Cordero were manifestly erased and
superimposed with other words/ numbers.
Purisima requested for a suspension. The
BOC denied the request since the alleged
THERE IS A PATENT IRREGULARITY IN THE ELECTION RETURNS:
It is the
duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of
patent irregularity in the election returns. In the present case,
there were patent erasures and superimpositions, in words and
figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the
board of canvassers. It was therefore imperative for the board to
stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of authentic
copies and recourse to the courts (Javier v. Commission on
Elections, L-
22248, January 30, 1965). A canvass or proclamation made
discrepancies is not yet substantial to alter
the results.
After all ballots have been read, 1857 margin
in favor of Cordero, Purisma called the BOC’s
attention again. The BOC still denied the
request and proclaimed Cordero. Purisma
filed a petition with COMELEC. COMELEC
declared the canvassing null and void.
A petition for recount was filed with CFI. CFI
dismissed the case.
CAUTON v. COMELEC
Sanidad and Cauton along with Reyes are
candidates for the Representative of 2nd
District of Ilocos Sur.
During the canvassing, Sanidad brought to
the attention of the BOC the returns
submitted from 3 municipalities. He alleged
that they differed from the entries
appearing in the copies in possession of the
LP.
Thus, Sanidad filed a petition with COMELEC
to open the ballot boxes from the subject-
municipalities to verify the discrepancies and
to order the BOC to temporarily refrain from
the canvassing. COMELEC granted the
petition and directed the opening of the
ballot boxes.
Cauton in turn filed this petition for
prohibition. SC gave due course but did not
issue a TRO upon the assailed COMELEC
order. Without a TRO the order was carried
out. It was found out that there was a
discrepancy between the copy of the
Provincial Treasurer and the one inside the
boxes.
Petitioner contends that COMELEC cannot
issue such order because the Election Law
limits such power for purposes of
prosecution of election law violation only
and not to help a candidate win an election.
ROQUE v. COMELEC DEISGNATION AS JOINT VENTURE PARTNER FOR CONDUCT OF
(VELASCO)
notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting proper
remedies, is null and void (Ibid.). In fact, as stated, the
Commission on Elections declared the canvass and proclamation,
made by respondent provincial board of canvassers, null and
void.
AN ORDER TO OPEN BALLOT BOXES TO INVESTIGATE CANVASS
OF ELECTION IS AN EXERCISE OF COMELEC’S POWER TO
ADMINISTER AND ENFORCE ELECTION LAWS: the Commission
on
Elections simply performed a function as authorized by the
Constitution, that is, to "have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and ... exercise all other functions which
may be conferred upon it by law." The Commission has the
power to decide all administrative questions affecting elections,
except the question involving the right to vote.
Commission on Election has the power to investigate and act on
the propriety or legality of the canvass of election returns made
by the board of canvassers. The suspension of the proclamation
of the winning candidate pending an inquiry into irregularities
brought to the attention of the Commission on Elections was
well within its administrative jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive
authority conferred upon it by the Constitution (Art. X ) for the
administration and enforcement of all laws relative to elections.
The Commission certainly had the right to inquire whether or not
discrepancies existed between the various copies of election
returns for the precincts in question, and suspend the canvass all
the meantime so the parties could ask for a recount in case of
variance '
ELECTION IS NOT TANTAMOUNT TO CEDING OF POWERS TO
ADMINISTER ELECTION LAWS: There is to us nothing in Art 3.3
of the automation contract, to support the simplistic conclusion
of abdication of control pressed on the Court. Insofar as
pertinent, Art 3.3 reads:
 3.3 The PROVIDER shall be liable for all its obligations under this
Project and the performance of portions thereof by other persons
or entities not parties to this Contract shall not relieve the
PROVIDER of said obligations and concomitant liabilities.

SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track

record in automated elections, shall be in charge of the technical
aspects of the counting and canvassing software and hardware,
including transmission configuration and system integration.
SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for preventing and
troubleshooting technical problems that may arise during the
elections. (Emphasis added.)

The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner

in charge of the technical aspect of the counting and canvassing
wares does not to translate to ceding control of the electoral
process to Smartmatic. It was in fact an eligibility requirement
imposed.

JOINT VENTURE PARTNER IS MERELEY A LESSOR OF GOODS

AND SERVICES AND DID NOT THEREBY RESULTED TO
COMELEC’S
ABDICATION OF POWER: Under the automation contract,
Smartmatic is given a specific and limited technical task to assist
the Comelec in implementing the AES. But at the end of the day,
the Smarmatic-TIM joint venture is merely a service provider and
lessor of goods and services to the Comelec, which shall have
exclusive supervision and control of the electoral process. Art.
6.7 of the automation contract could not have been more clear:

6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be issued

by the Commission En Banc, the entire process of voting, counting,
transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall [still] be
conducted by COMELEC’s personnel and officials and their
performance, completion and final results according to specifications
and within specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of
COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis added.)

The aforequoted provision doubtless preserves Comelec’s

constitutional and statutory responsibilities.

PUNO CONCURRING It is clear that the COMELEC has not abdicated its constitutional
OPINION IN ROQUE v. and legal mandate to control and supervise the
elections. Smartmatic and TIM are merely service providers or
COMELEC
lessors of goods and services to the Commission. Indeed, Article
6.7 of the Automation Contract, provides that the entire process

ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE ELECTION OFFENSES:
OF JUSTICE & COMELEC Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
COMELEC and DOJ created a joint
committee and fact finding team to
investigate the electoral fraud and
manipulation cases during the 2004 and
2007 elections.
The JC recommended the filing of
information against GMA with other persons
for electoral sabotage and manipulation.
Thereafter, the JC issued subpoena against
GMA. Therafter, an information was duly
filed with the RTC Petitioners claim that in
creating the Joint Panel, the Comelec has
effectively abdicated its constitutional
mandate to investigate and to prosecute
cases of violation of election in favor of the
Executive Department acting through the
DOJ Secretary. Under the set- up, the
Comelec personnel is placed under the
supervision and control of the DOJ. The
chairperson is a DOJ official. Thus, the
Comelec has willingly surrendered its
independence to the DOJ and has acceded
to share its exercise of judgment and
discretion with the Executive Branch.
of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of
votes shall be conducted by COMELECs personnel and officials.
powers and functions of the Comelec. Paragraph (6) thereof
vests in the Comelec the power to:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions
in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and
prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement
and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the
Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and
honest conduct of elections.The constitutional grant of
prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was amended by
Section 43 of R.A. No. 9369,71 which reads:
Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have the power, concurrent with the other
prosecuting arms of the government, to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and
to prosecute the same.72
As clearly set forth above, instead of a mere delegated authority,
the other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the DOJ,
now exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the Comelec to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses and to
prosecute the same.
COMELEC’S FORMER EXCLUSIVE POWER WAS JUST A CREATION
OF STATUTE NOT THE CONSTITUTION: the grant of exclusive
power to investigate and prosecute cases of election offenses to
the Comelec was not by virtue of the Constitution but by the

ONGSIOKO- REYES v. HRET’S JURISDICTION VS COMELEC’S JURISDICTION: Second, the
COMELEC
Ongsioko ran for the position of
Representative. Tan filed a petition to have
her COC cancelled and denied due course on
the ground of material misrepresentation.
(civil status, residence, birth, citizenship)
COMELEC 1D issued a Reso cancelling her
COC. The En Banc affirmed the decision. 4
days after she was proclaimed winner. No
remedy was invoked against the En Banc
Reso. It eventually ripened into a final and
executory decision. On the same day, prior
to 30 June 2013, Tan took her oath of office.
SC: The fact that she was able to take her
oath of office did not deprive COMELEC of its
jurisdiction.
Omnibus Election Code which was eventually amended by
Section 43 of R.A. 9369.
IN CONCURRENT JURISDICITION THERE IS NO PROHIBITION ON
JOINT AND SIMULTANEOUS EXERCISE: It must be emphasized
that the DOJ and the Comelec exercise concurrent jurisdiction in
conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses. The
doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to
deal with the same subject matter.104 Contrary to the contention
of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous
exercise of power between two coordinate bodies.
jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated
in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the House
of Representatives.
COMELEC’S JURISDICTION ENDS WHEN A CADIDATE BECOMES A
MEMBER OF THE CONGRESS: Once a winning candidate has
been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.
 III. VOTERS
1. QUALIFICATION FOR SUFFRAGE:

ARTICLE V: SUFFRAGE

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for
at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote
without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under
existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect
the secrecy of the ballot.

2. DISQUALIFICATIONS:

Section 118. Disqualifications, OEC - The following shall be disqualified from voting:

(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for
not less than one year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or
granted amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this
paragraph shall automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years
after service of sentence.

(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal
of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any
crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in
accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon
expiration of five years after service of sentence.

(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

MACALINTAL v. COMELEC
Macalintal assails the constitutionality of RA
9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003. In particular, it assail Sec. 5 (d) on the
ground that it contravenes Sec. 1, Art. V of
the PC’s requirement that a voter must be a
resident of the Philippines for one year
preceding the election and 6 months in the
locality where he will vote.
SEC. 5 (d): An immigrant or a permanent
resident who is recognized as such in the
host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that
he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country.
Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or
permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
ABSENTEE VOTING: The method of absentee voting has been
said to be completely separable and distinct from the regular
system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting
from that previously known, and an exception to the customary
and usual manner of voting. The right of absentee and disabled
voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely statutory;
absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the
common law.
AN ABSENTEE IS STILL A RESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR
PURPOSES OF DOMICILE: Ordinarily, an absentee is not a
resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time,
both a resident and an absentee.30 However, under our election
laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining
to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in
the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with
domicile.
RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE IN ELECITION LAW: There is a
difference between domicile and residence. ‘Residence’ is used
to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary;
‘domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is
not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one
domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
ACTUAL & PHYSICAL RESIDENCE IS NOT REQUIRED FOR AN
ABSENTEE VOTER: Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came
into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the
residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any
problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to
enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not
in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly
 mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee
voting.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189

specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who
is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration
or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation
of one’s residence in his country of origin. However, same
Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to
register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to
show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance
of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of
Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of
suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee
voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the
Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the
Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for
absentee voting.

EXECUTION OF AFFIDAVIT IS NOT AN ENABLING OR

ENFRACHISING ACT: Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the
execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or
enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not
only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent
resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but
more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had
not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not
correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section
5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise."

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent

residents abroad because by their status in their host countries,
they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to
this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.

PEOPLE v. CORRAL RIGHT TO VOTE IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT: The right to vote is
not a natural right but is a right created by law. Suffrage is a
Corral was charged with having voted illegally
while laboring under a legal disqualification
(ie sentenced by final judgement of privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are
imprisonment not pardoned)
most likely to exercise it for the public good.

STATE HAS A RIGHT TO RESTRICT QUALIFICATIONS FOR THE

RIGHT TO VOTE: The right of the State to deprive persons to the
right of suffrage by reason of their having been convicted of
crime, is beyond question. "The manifest purpose of such
restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections.
The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of
felony, or other base offense indicative of moral turpitude, is
unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office. The
exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a mere
disqualification, imposed for protection and not for punishment,
the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal
right.
 IV. REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

YRA v. ABANO REGISTRATION IS JUST A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE

YRA and ABANO were contenders for the
position of municipal president of
Meycauayan. ABANO won. YRA instituted a
quo warranto against ABANO.
When ABANO ran and was elected, he was
not a registered voter of Meycauayan, but
rather a registered voter of Manila.
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE: The act of registering is only
one step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that
makes the citizen a qualified voter. One may be a qualified voter
without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer
the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the
right." lawphi1.net

Petitioner contends that since Election Law

(in 1928) requires that the candidate be a
qualified voter of the locality where he
intends to run, ABANO must be disqualified.

SC: ABANO is qualified. The fact that he is

not registered does not negate that he is a
qualified voter since registration is just a
condition precedent.

NOTE: Current Election Laws require the

candidate to be a registered voter.

AKBAYAN- YOUTH v. THE STATE MAY REGULATE REGISTRATION IN THE EXERCISE OF

COMELEC
Akbayan Youth sought to have a special
registration before the May 2001 Elections.
They contend that the original deadline (27
Dec 2000) caused the failure to registered of
around 4M youth.
Following a Senate Hearing on the matter,
COMELEC still resolved to deny the request
of petitioner. This prompted petitioner to
file a petition with the SC.
SC denied the petition.
ITS POLICE POWER: The right of suffrage is not absolute. The
exercise of the right of suffrage is subject to existing substantive
and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution,
statute books and other repositories of law.
As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is
necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements
he must undergo: among others, the process of registration.
Specifically, a citizen in order to be qualified to exercise his right
to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set by
fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register, at present,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known
as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996."

Stated differently, the act of registration is an indispensable

precondition to the right of suffrage. The State undoubtedly, in
the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voter's registration for the
 ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election.

KABATAAN PARTY-LIST v. REGISTRATION IS FORM OF REGULATION AND NOT A

COMELEC QUALIFICATION FOR SUFFRAGE: The concept of qualification
KABATAAN assails the constitutionality of RA
10367 aka Mandatory Biometrics Voters
Registration. The law requires that new
voters and registered voters alike submit
themselves for validation through
biometrics, otherwise, new voters will not
be registered and old voters will be
deactivated.
Petitioners argue that the biometrics
validation rises to the level of an additional
qualification.
insofar as suffrage is concerned should be distinguished from the
concept of registration, which is jurisprudentially regarded as
only the means by which a person’s qualification to vote is
determined.
The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is
not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter
and that one may be qualified voter without exercising the right
to vote. Registration is a form or regulation and not as a
qualification for the right of suffrage.

SC: Nope. The requirement of biometrics

validation is not a qualification but a mere
aspect of registration, which the state may
regulate.
 V. CANDIDATES

POE-LLAMANZARES v. A FOUNDLING IN THE PHILIPPINES IS PRESUMED NATURAL

COMELEC
Petitioner is a foundling. Abandoned as new
born infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, he
was found by a certain Edgardo Militar.
Edgardo Militar passed the care and custody
of the petitioner to his relatives, Emilano
and his wife.
When POE reached the age of 5, spouses
Susan and FPJ successfully adopted her. At
18, she registered as a voter.
She finished her college education in Boston
Colleges with a degree in Pol Sci. In 1991,
she married Llamanzares and migrated to
the US.
In 2001 petitioner was naturalized as an
American Citizen. In April 2004, she returned
in the Philippines to support FPJ’s candidacy
for President.
BORN: There is a disputable presumption that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines
is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than
a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not
statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.
BURDEN OF PROOF LIES WITH A PERSON WHO ASSAILS
CITIZENSHIP: The burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. Her admission that
she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such
status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high
probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

In December 2004 she rushed back to RP

PHRASE “HAVING TO PERFORM AN ACT REFERS TO AN ACT
due to his father’s deteriorating condition. PERSONALLY DONE BY THE CITIZEN: It has been argued that the
FPJ died. Because of this blow, she and process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the
Llamanzares decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines.
issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the
issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
24 May 2005, she came home to the Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized
Philippines:
1. she secured her TIN.
Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2
2. they purchased the condominium unit "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the
3. they enrolled their children in PH Private Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
schools.
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
7 July 2006, Petitioner took her oath of
allegiance to RP pursuant to RA 9225 and 1. In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the
filed with BI a petitioner to reacquire
act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
Philippines citizenship.
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by
October 2010, she was appointed as the authorities.121
Chairman of the MTRCB. July 2012 she took
an Oath of Renunciation of Nationality of the
US. The Certificate of Loss of Nationality was 2. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
issued December 2012. whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
2 Oct 2012, petitioner filed with COMELEC
her COC for Senator wherein she declared 6
years and 6 months as residency prior to the
2013 Election.
15 Oct 2015, she filed her COC for
Presidency. In her COC she declared that she
is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
and a resident of 10 years and 11 months
counted from 24 May 2005. This triggered
the petitions to have her COC cancelled and
denied due course (CDDC).
Arguments:
On Natural Born Citizenship:
1. A foundling cannot be considered as a
NBFC.
2. Assuming she was a NBFC, she lost such
status when she was naturalized as US
Citizen. NBFC should be continuous from
birth.
3. The burden of proving NBFC lies with
petitioner.
4. Assuming she is qualified to reacquire FC,
she did not reacquire the natural born
status.
On Residency Requirement:
1. Poe is bound by her declaration in her
2013 COC declaration.
2. Residency fulfillment should be reckoned
from the date she reacquired her citizenship
—July 2006.
3. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of
such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino
mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
REPATRIATION RESULTS IN THE RECOVERY OF ORIGINAL
NATIONALITY (BENGSON III v. HRET): repatriation results in the
recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-
born Filipino.
“FROM BIRTH” MEANS “AT THE TIME OF BIRTH” the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person
who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is
a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to
"acquire or perfect" one's citizenship
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, THERE ARE ONLY TWO TYPES OF
CITIZENSHIP: It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not
a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be
natural- born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the
loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
RESIDENCY | THREE REQUISITES TO ACQUIRE NEW DOMICILE:
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile:
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
2. an intention to remain there; and
3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152

MAQUILING v. COMELEC
Maquiling is a candidate for Mayor of
Kauswagan against Arnado and Balua.
Maquiling and Balua lost the election while
Arnando won.
The winner, Arnado is a NBFC. He was
naturalized in the US and lost his FC.
Thereafter, he applied for repatriation and
took the Oath of Allegiance on 10 July 2008.
3 April 2009, he took hs Oath of Allegiance
and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation.
30 Nov 2009, he filed his COC. In turn, Balua
filed a petition to disqualify Arnando on the
ground that he is neither a citizen and a
resident. To prove his allegation, Balua
offered as evidence travel records indicating
Arnando’s use of his US Passport in April and
July 2009.
COMELED 1D ruled in favor of the petitioner
and ordered that the Rule on Succession be
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice
must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
FACT NOT STATEMENT OF RESIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE: There is
precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by
167
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, the candidate
mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence
where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said
that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement."
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign
citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just
eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he
recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and
perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he "divest(s) himself of full
employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the
United States of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a
foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by
representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily
applied. COMELEC EB reversed the decision
and ruled that the use of passport does not
operate back to revert to dual allegiance.
Synthesis:
1. He was a NBFC.
2. He was naturalized in the US.
3. He repatriated back. As a result, he
became a DUAL CITIZEN.
4. He took an oath of renunciation of US
citizenship. As a result, he became a
FILIPINO CITIZEN.
5. 11 days after, he used his US passport.
This is in contravention of his OATH OF
RENUNCIATION. As a result, he reverted
back to DUAL CITIZEN status.
ARNADO v. COMELEC
The same factual backdrop as that stated in
Maquiling v. COMELEC issued 16 April 2013.
Thereafter, he executed an affidavit
affirming his 2009 Oath of Renunciation.
He ran for Mayor in the 2013 Election.
Capitan, his opponent filed a petition to
disqualify him from running pursuant to
Maquiling. He won the election.
SC: He should have executed a new Oath of
Renunciation. Absent such, he failed to fulfill
the second requirement of RA 9225.
and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his
US passport.
RENUNCIATION REQUIREMENT IN DUAL CITIZENS BY BIRTH VIS
A VIS BY NATURALIZATION: category of dual citizenship is that
by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required
by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied
renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by
naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also
to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
QUALIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE, CONTINUING
REQUIREMENTS: Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is
lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
REQUISITES TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE OF A FILIPINO WHO
REACQUIRED CITIZENSHIP UNDER RA 9225: Natural Born
Citizens who have lost and subsequently reacquired their
citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 may now run for public office
provided they:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office, and;
(2) make a personal and sword renunciation of all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
oath prior to or at the time of filing their COC.
POPULAR VOTE DOES NOT CURE THE INELIGIBILTY OF A
CANDIDATE: election victory cannot be used a magic formula to
bypass election eligibility requirement, otherwise, the law will
become toothless.
CABALLERO v. COMELEC
Caballero was a NBFC. He became a
naturalized Canadian citizen. He intended to
run for Mayor in the 2013 Election. Because
of this he applied for repatriation and
subsequently took an Oath of Renunciation
in September and October 2012.
His opponent, Nanud filed a petition to have
his COC CDDC on the ground that he did not
comply with the residency requirement.
Caballero argued that he did not lose his
domicile of origin and that his 9 months of
stay is substantial compliance already.
FRIVALDO v. COMELEC
Frivaldo ran and won with a margin of
20,000 against his closest opponent Lee in
the Gubernatorial election. Prior to this, Lee
filed a petition praying Frivaldo’s
disqualification for he is not yet a Filipino
citizen.
SC: Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on
June 30, 1995 -- the very day 32 the term of
office of governor (and other elective
officials) began -- he was therefore already
qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such
office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In
short, at that time, he was already qualified
to govern his native Sorsogon.
RA 9225 TREATS CITIZENSHIP INDEPENDENTLY OF RESIDENCE: A
dual citizen may establish residence either in the Philippines or
in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. However,
when a NBFC seeks for an elective public office, residency in the
Philippines becomes material.
RESIDENCE IN ELECTION LAW MEANS DOMICILE OF LEGAL
RESIDENCE: Legal residence is the place where a party actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain. A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is the place where the child’s parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a
new domicile, domicile of choice.
NATURALIZATION IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY MAY RESULT IN
ABANDONMENT OF DOMICILE IN THE PHILIPPINES.
REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP DID NOT IPSO FACTO MAKE
HIM REGAIN HIS RESIDENCE. He must still prove that after
becoming a Philippine citizen he had reestablished his residence
in his locality as his new domicile of choice.
LAW DOES NOT SPECIFY A DATE FROM WHICH CITIZENSHIP IS
TO
BE RECKONED WITH: It will be noted that the law does not
specify any particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist
of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election
day)
PURPOSE OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT: Philippine citizenship
is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office, 31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none
other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing
allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof
LIBERAL AND LITERAL INTERPRETATION CONCLUDES THAT
CITIZENSHIP MUST ONLY BE POSSESSED AT THE TIME OF
ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE: This is the liberal interpretation that
should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications
 consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So
too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal)
construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. iterally, such qualifications --
unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age
and residence -- should thus be possessed when the "elective
[or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30,
1995

PD 725 IS RETROACTIVE: While it is true that the law was already

in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be
given retroactive effect The reason for this is simply that if, as in
this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority that the
law should apply to past events in order to benefit the greatest
number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to
enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the
fullest effect and expression, then there is all the more reason to
have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to
situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of
such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his
application.

MERCADO v. MANZANO DUAL CITIZENSHIP DIFFERENT FROM DUAL ALLEGIANCE: dual

citizenship is different from dual allegiance. DUAL CITIZENSHIP
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine.

DUAL ALLEGIANCE, on the other hand, refers to the situation in

which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. of jus soli. Such

VILLABER v. COMELEC
Villaber and respondent Cagas were rival
candidates for a congressional seat.
Cagas filed a petition to disqualify Villaber
on the ground of its previous conviction of
BP 22.
Villaber contends that violation of BP 22
does not involve moral turpitude.
LONZANIDA v. COMELEC
1989- Lonzanida ran and won as municipal
mayor of San Antonio.
1992- Lonzanida won again.
1995- Lonzanida won. It was followed by a
petition of Alvez, an opponent. RTC declared
a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
WHAT IS PROSCRIBED IS DUAL ALLEGIANCE: the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20
must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates
of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification
he might have as a dual citizen.
MORAL TURPITUDE: "moral turpitude," we have consistently
adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals."
VIOLATION OF BP 22 INVOLVES MORAL TURPITUDE: The
presence of the second element (The accused knows at the time
of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in,
or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in
full upon its presentment) manifests moral turpitude. In People
vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda20 we held that a conviction for violation of
B.P. BIg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to and affects
the
good moral character of a person.…
AN ORDER TO VACATE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FULL TERM: the
petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term. The respondents' contention that the
petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from
May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that
a failure of election. Decision was appealed
to COMELEC.
COMELEC declared Alvez the real winner by
plurality of votes. (Feb 1998)
1998- Lonzanida filed his COC for the same
position. Opponent, Muli filed a petition to
disqualify him on the ground of the 3 TLR.
COMELEC decided against Lonzanida and
counted his purported 3rd term as fully
served.
ABUNDO v. COMELEC
2001- Abundo elected Mayor
2004- Abundo’s opponent initially was
declared the winner. In 2006, Abundo was
declared the real winner.
2007- Abundo elected again
2010- Filed COC for Mayor again.
RULING: The time when Abundo was not
serving as Mayor because of a wrong
proclamation is considered as a valid
interruption. Thus, the 3-term limit rule is
not
violatesd.
MARQUEZ v. COMELEC
term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he
has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence of
the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which he was elected. "The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three- term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of
the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity
of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that
he did not hold office for the full term; hence, his assumption of
office from 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a term
for purposes of computing the three term limit.
The period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor
because of a prior declaration in favor of his opponent, should
be considered as a BREAK IN HIS SERVICE.
FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE INCLUDES FUGITIVE FROM
PROSECUTION: "fugitive from justice" includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition

DELA CRUZ v. COMELEC
Casimira Dela Cruz filed a COC for the
position of Vice Mayor. She filed a petition
to declare Aurelio Dela Cruz a nuisance
candidate. COMELEC 1D declared Aurelio as
a nuisance candidate. However, his name
was not deleted in the list of candidates.
Subsequently, COMELEC issued Reso No.
8844 which ordered that votes casted in
favor of disqualified candidates be
considered stray.
During the canvassing, the votes cast in
favor of Aurelio were considered stray,
contrary to the demands of petitioner that
they be counter in her favor instead. The
canvassing resulted to a 39 margin in favor
of PACETE, another contender (with almost
532 declared stray since they were for
Aurelio).
Petitioner contends that RESO 8844 violates
her right to equal protection of the laws
since there is no substantial difference
between the manual and automated
elections. She contends that similar to the
rule during manual elections, votes cast in
favor of a nuisance candidate must be
counter in her favor.
RISOS- VIDAL v. COMELEC
Estrada was convicted of Plunder by
Sandiganbayan. He was punished with
reclusion perpetua and perpetual absolute
disqualification. Thereafter, he was granted
an executive clemency by PGMA:
“WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly
committed to no longer seek any elective position or
office,”
truly finds support from jurisprudence . The Court believes and
thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of
the ponente (expressed during the Court's en banc
deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent
that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a
person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final
judgment." is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the
law.
VOTES FOR DISQUALIFIED NUISANCE CANDIDATES MUST BE
COUNTED IN FAVOR OF THE LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE WITH THE
SAME SURNAME EVEN IN CASE OF AUTOMATED ELECTION: We
hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes
cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final
judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the
same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but
counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.
As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’ constructive
knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more
determinable, as it is then more logical to conclude that the
votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the
legitimate candidate, petitioner.
The possibility of confusion in names of candidates if the names
of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day,
cannot be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated
voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly
shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate
instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for
could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the
same.1âwphi1
ABSOLUTE PARDON RESTORES A CONVICT’S CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: Former President Estrada was granted an
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the
pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
He ran for the 2010 Presidential election
where he placed second. Subsequently he
filed his COC for the Mayor of Manila. This
prompted petitioner to file a petition for
disqualification with COMELEC. The
COMELEC 2D and EB dismissed the petition
and MR respectively.
Petitioner contends that the pardon granted
to Estrada was conditioned on the
ARATEA v. COMELEC
D. JALOSLOS v. COMELEC
D. Jaloslos was convicted by final judgment
for the crime of robbery and sentence to PM
with an accessory penalty of Temporary
Absolute Disqualification and Perpetual
Special Disqualification.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in
the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency
extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which
relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed,
which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political
rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached
to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we
apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the textof the pardon that the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty
of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any
public office, or from being elected to any public office. This
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the
judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy.
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by
operation of law,24 the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification.
Under Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to
vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.” A person suffering from these
ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
PERPETUAL SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION DEPRIVES THE PERSON
TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE PERPETUALLY: Clearly, Lacuna instructs
that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
"deprives the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or
hold public office perpetually."
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by
operation of law,15 the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute

QUINTO v. COMELEC CLASSIFICATION IS UNCONSTITIONAL BECAUSE IT IS NOT
(Nachura)
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec.
13, RA 9369 which amended the Automated
Election Law and Reso 8679 implementing
the aforementioned section.
RA 9369 Sec. 13:
“Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of
the armed forces, and officers and employees in
government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and
must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing
of his/her certificate of candidacy.”
Reso 8679:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any
person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall
not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective
office or position.
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under
Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute
disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right
to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office." The duration of the temporary absolute
disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On
the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code
perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall
not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification
constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective
public office, and commits a false material representation if he
states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW. Glaringly absent is
the requisite that the classification must be germane to the
purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive
office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain.
For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the
Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the
Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet
post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed
to take charge of national housing, social welfare development,
interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid
justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs
for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-
President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for
President, retains his position during the entire election period
and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
LAW IS OVERBROAD: First, the provision pertains to all civil
servants holding appointive posts without distinction as to
whether they occupy high positions in government or not.
Certainly, a utility worker in the government will also be
considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his CoC for the
2010 elections. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is
 unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to
wield influence in the political world.

Second, the provision is directed to the activity of seeking any

and all public offices, whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in
character, whether they be in the national, municipal or
barangay level. Congress has not shown a compelling state
interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a
sweeping scale.

QUINTO v. COMELEC (Puno) CLASSIFICATION IS GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF THE LAW: An

election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the
purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. 49 It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote.50 Considering that elected officials are put in office
by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said
that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned
provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign
will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will
of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the
end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is
no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials

is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was
made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and
discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is
outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to
balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest
of deferring to the sovereign will.

MENDOZA v. COMELEC

SOCRATES v. COMELEC INTERRUPTION NEED NOT BE A FULL TERM. The Constitution

does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of
1992- Hagedorn elected mayor.
1995- Hagedorn elected mayor. three years. The clear intent is that interruption "for any length
1998- Hagedorn elected mayor. Since this
was his 3rd term, he did not run during the of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break
2001 election. an elective local official's continuity of service.
2001- Socrates was elected mayor.
2002- Recall election were conducted.
Hagedorn submitted his COC.

RULING: The intervening period between the

time Hagedorn’s term ended until he won a
Recall Election against Socrates is an
interruption of a term that bars the three
term limit rule from operating. The
interruption need not last for a full term, it
requires any length of time, provided, the
interruption refers to the term of office or
the
right to hold the title.
PAMATONG v. COMELEC RATIONALE FOR PROHIBITING NUISANCE CANDIDATES: The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral
PAMATONG filed his COC for President for exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end,
the 2004 National Election. COMELEC
refused to give due course to his COC. He the State takes into account the practical considerations in
moved for reconsideration. The same was conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
denied on the ground that he cannot wage a candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion,
nationwide campaign and/or not supported
by political party. not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should,
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a
SC. He contends that the assailed ruling
violates his right to equal access to mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions
opportunities for public service under Sec. should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
26, Art. II of the PC. whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election
SC: Case must be remanded for factual is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that
aspect. erodes faith in our democratic institutions.

TIMBOL v. COMELEC COMELEC CANNOT MOTO PROPRIO DENY DUE COURSE AN

TIMBOL filed a COC for the Member of
Sangguniang Panlungsod. He was invited for
a clarificatory hearing where he argued that
he was not a nuisance candidate, that he
ranked 8th during the last election and, that
he had sufficient resources to sustain his
campaign.
ALLEGED NUISANCE CANDIDATE’S COC: The power of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to restrict a citizen's right of
suffrage should not be arbitrarily exercised. The COMELEC
cannot motu proprio deny due course to or cancel an alleged
nuisance candidate’s certificate of candidacy without providing
the candidate his opportunity to be heard.

Despite a favorable recommendation from
the clarificatory hearing, his name was not
removed from the list of nuisance
candidates. He filed a petition with
COMELEC praying that his name be
removed.
His petition was denied on the ground that it
was already moot since the ballots are
already being printed.
IT IS A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR COMELEC TO CANCEL
COC WITHOUT AFFORING A CANDIDATE AN OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD: The determination whether a candidate is eligible for
the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where
both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of
their contentions. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as
the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the
SC: petition is denied for being moot, caveat,
see doctrines.
RULLODA v. COMELEC
Romeo Rulloda and Remegio Placido were
contenders for the Baranggay Chairman.
Romeo however passed away due to heart
attack. Petitioner wrote a letter to COMELEC
seeking permission to run as candidate in
lieu of her husband.
Petitioner garnered a higher vote than
Placido. However, pursuant to the directive
of the Election Officer, Placido was still
proclaimed as Chairman.
The COMELEC also issued a resolution
denying the substitution citing Reso 4801
whicl provides that no substitution for
barangay candidates shall be allowed.
Respondent contends that since Baranggay
Election is non partisan, no substitution may
be allowed.
FEDERICO v. COMELEC
Running for mayor are Edna Sanchez vs
Osmundo Maligaya. On the other hand,
running Edna’s husband was running for
governor. Prior to the election, Edna’s
husband died. She immediately filed her
new COC as a substitute candidate for her
deceased husband.
On the other hand, on May 5, 2010, Federico
filed his COC as a substitute for Edna.
Maligaya filed a petition to DDC the COC of
Federico on the ground that the period to
file COC for substitute candidates already
lapsed after 14 Dec 2009.
Edna’s name was retained in the ballots. She
won the election. Thereafter, the votes were
credited to Federico. Maligaya filed a
petition to annul the proclamation of
Federico. COMELEC EB issued the assailed
Reso which
ordered that Maligaya be proclaimed Mayor.
Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present
his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications
for the office he seeks.46 Respondent commits grave abuse of
discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of
candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be
heard.
SUBSTITUTION IS NOT PROHIBITED IN BARANGGAY
ELECTION: the absence of a specific provision governing
substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred
as a prohibition against said substitution. Such a restrictive
construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not
written. Indeed, there is more reason to allow the substitution of
candidates where no political parties are involved than when
political considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must
have been subsumed by law.
COMELEC MAY SET DEADLINES FOR PRE-ELECTION
PROCEEDING: Under the law, "the Comelec, which has the
constitutional mandate to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election," 34 has been
empowered to set the dates for certain pre-election proceedings. In
the exercise of such constitutional and legislated power, especially
to safeguard and improve on the Automated Election System (AES),
Comelec came out with Resolution No. 8678.
DIFFERENT DEADLINES FOR SUBSTITUTION BASED ON
DIFFERENT GROUNDS ARE VALID: Different deadlines were set
to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the
substitution of a candidate due to death, disqualification or
withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had
until midday of the election day to file the COC. In case of
withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should
have filed a COC by December 14, 2009.
The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or
disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has
sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the
 printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the
printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be
accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the substitute will just be
wasted.

ENGLE v. COMELEC
 VI. CAMPAIGN, ELECTION PROPAGANDA
1. CAMPAIGN:
SEC. 79, (b) The term "election campaign"
or "partisan political activity" refers to an
act designed to promote the election or
defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office which shall
include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations,
clubs, committees or other groups of
persons for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign for or
against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences,
meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar
assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or holding interviews for or
against the election of any candidate for
public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign
literature or materials designed to support
or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes,
pledges or support for or against a
candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts if
performed for the purpose of enhancing the
chances of aspirants for nomination for
candidacy to a public office by a political
party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties
shall not be considered as election
campaign or partisan election activity.
Public expressions or opinions or
discussions of probable issues in a
forthcoming election or on attributes of or
criticisms against probable candidates
proposed to be nominated in a forthcoming
political party convention shall not be
construed as part of any election campaign
or partisan political activity contemplated
under this Article.
2. LAWFUL ELECTION PROPAGANDA
Sec. 82. Lawful election propaganda. -
Lawful election propaganda shall include:
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals,
stickers or other written or printed
materials of a size not more than eight and
one-half inches in width and fourteen
inches in length;
(b) Handwritten or printed letters urging
voters to vote for or against any particular
candidate;
(c) Cloth, paper or cardboard posters,
whether framed or posted, with an area
exceeding two feet by three feet, except
that, at the site and on the occasion of a
public meeting or rally, or in announcing the
holding of said meeting or rally, streamers
not exceeding three feet by eight feet in
size, shall be allowed: Provided, That said
streamers may not be displayed except one
week before the date of the meeting or rally
and that it shall be removed within seventy-
two hours after said meeting or rally; or
(d) All other forms of election propaganda
not prohibited by this Code as the
Commission may authorize after due notice
to all interested parties and hearing where
all the interested parties were given an
equal opportunity to be heard: Provided,
That the Commission's authorization shall
be published in two newspapers of general
circulation throughout the nation for at
least twice within one week after the
authorization has been granted.
3. PROHIBITED ELECTION PROPAGANDA:
Sec. 85. Prohibited forms of election
propaganda. - It shall be unlawful:
(a) To print, publish, post or distribute any
poster, pamphlet, circular, handbill, or
printed matter urging voters to vote for or
against any candidate unless they bear the
names and addresses of the printer and
payor as required in Section 84 hereof;
(b) To erect, put up, make use of, attach,
float or display any billboard, tinplate-
poster, balloons and the like, of whatever
size, shape, form or kind, advertising for or
against any candidate or political party;
(c) To purchase, manufacture, request,
distribute or accept electoral propaganda
gadgets, such as pens, lighters, fans of
whatever nature, flashlights, athletic goods
or materials, wallets, shirts, hats, bandanas,
matches, cigarettes and the like, except that
campaign supporters accompanying a
candidate shall be allowed to wear hats
and/or shirts or T-shirts advertising a
candidate;
(d) To show or display publicly any
advertisement or propaganda for or against
any candidate by means of cinematography,
audio-visual units or other screen
projections except telecasts which may be
allowed as hereinafter provided; and
(e) For any radio broadcasting or television
station to sell or give free of charge air time
for campaign and other political purposes
except as authorized in this Code under the
rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission pursuant thereto.
Any prohibited election propaganda gadget
or advertisement shall be stopped,
confiscated or torn down by the
representative of the Commission upon
specific authority of the Commission.
4. PROHIBITED CONTRIBUTION:
ARTICLE XI.
ELECTORAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
EXPENDITURES
Sec. 94. Definitions. - As used in this Article:
(a) The term "contribution" includes a gift,
donation, subscription, loan, advance or
deposit of money or anything of value, or a
contract, promise or agreement to
contribute, whether or not legally
enforceable, made for the purpose of
influencing the results of the elections but
shall not include services rendered without
compensation by individuals volunteering a
portion or all of their time in behalf of a
candidate or political party. It shall also
include the use of facilities voluntarily
donated by other persons, the money value
of which can be assessed based on the rates
prevailing in the area.
(b) The term "expenditure" includes the
payment or delivery of money of anything
of
value, or a contract, promise or agreement
to make an expenditure, for the purpose of
influencing the results of the election. It
shall also include the use of facilities
personally owned by the candidate, the
money value of the use of which can be
assessed based on the rates prevailing in
the area.
(c) The term "person" includes an
individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation, and any other
organization or group of persons.
Sec. 95. Prohibited contributions. - No
contribution for purposes of partisan
political activity shall be made directly or
indirectly by any of the following:
(a) Public or private financial institutions:
Provided, however, That nothing herein
shall prevent the making of any loan to a
candidate or political party by any such
public or private financial institutions legally
in the business of lending money, and that
the loan is made in accordance with laws
and regulations and in the ordinary course
of business;
(b) Natural and juridical persons operating a
public utility or in possession of or
exploiting any natural resources of the
nation;
(c) Natural and juridical persons who hold
contracts or sub-contracts to supply the
government or any of its divisions,
subdivisions or instrumentalities, with
goods or services or to perform
construction or other works;
(d) Natural and juridical persons who have
been granted franchises, incentives,
exemptions, allocations or similar privileges
or concessions by the government or any of
its divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations;
(e) Natural and juridical persons who,
within one year prior to the date of the
election, have been granted loans or other
accommodations in excess of P100,000 by
the government or any of its divisions,
subdivisions or instrumentalities including
government-owned or controlled
corporations;
(f) Educational institutions which have
received grants of public funds amounting
to no less than P100,000.00;
(g) Officials or employees in the Civil
Service, or members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines; and
(h) Foreigners and foreign corporations. It
shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or
receive any contribution from any of the
persons or entities enumerated herein.
Sec. 96. Soliciting or receiving
contributions from foreign sources. - It
shall be unlawful for any person, including a
political party or public or private entity to
solicit or receive, directly or indirectly, any
aid or contribution of whatever form or
nature from any foreign national,
government or entity for the purposes of
influencing the results of the election.
Sec. 97. Prohibited raising of funds. - It
shall be unlawful for any person to hold
dances, lotteries, cockfights, games, boxing
bouts, bingo, beauty contests,
entertainments, or cinematographic,
theatrical or other
performances for the purpose of raising
funds for an election campaign or for the
support of any candidate from the
commencement of the election period up to
and including election day; or for any
person or organization, whether civic or
religious, directly or indirectly, to solicit
and/or accept from any candidate for public
office, or from his campaign manager, agent
or representative, or any person acting in
their behalf, any gift, food, transportation,
contribution or donation in cash or in kind
from the commencement of the election
period up to and including election day;
Provided, That normal and customary
religious stipends, tithes, or collections on
Sundays and/or other designated collection
days, are excluded from this prohibition.
5. EXPENDITURES:
RA 7166
Section 13. Authorized Expenses of
Candidates and Political Parties. - The
agreement amount that a candidate or
registered political party may spend for
election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates. - Ten pesos
(P10.00) for President and Vice-
President; and for other candidates
Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter
currently registered in the
constituency where he filed his
certificate of candidacy: Provided,
That a candidate without any
political party and without support
from any political party may be
allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00)
for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties. - Five pesos
(P5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official
candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding any contribution in cash or
in kind to any candidate or political party or
coalition of parties for campaign purposes,
duly reported to the Commission shall not
be subject to the payment of any gift tax.
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and
Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File
Statement. - Every candidate and treasurer
of the political party shall, within thirty (30)
days after the day of the election, file in
duplicate with the offices of the
Commission the full, true and itemized
statement of all contributions and
expenditures in connection with the
election.
No person elected to any public offices shall
enter upon the duties of his office until he
has filed the statement of contributions and
expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the
political party which nominated the winning
candidate fails to file the statement
required herein within the period
prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay
office, failure to file the statements or
reports in connection with electoral
contributions and expenditures are
required herein shall constitute an
administrative offense for which the
offenders shall be liable to pay an
administrative fine ranging from One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), in the
discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days
from receipt of notice of such failure;
otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ
of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or
municipal election registrar to advise in
writing, by personal delivery or registered
mail, within five (5) days from the date of
election all
CHAVEZ v. COMELEC
Chavez entered into various agreements with
3 persons/ corporations to endorse their
products. Pursuant to these agreements 3
billboards were set up along North
Expressway and 1 billboard was set up along
Roxas Blvd.
Thereafter, Chavez filed his COC for Senator
for the 2004 National Elections. On January
2014, COMELEC issued RESOLUTION 6520.
Under its Sec. 32, all propaganda materials
showing the image or name of a person who
subsequent to their displays becomes a
candidate shall be removed by such
candidate immediately, otherwise he shall
be presumed to have conducted premature
campaign.
COMELEC ordered Chavez to comply with
the assailed order. Chavez replied by asking
an exception from its operation. COMELEC
thereafter finally ordered their removal
prompting Chavez to file this petition for
prohibition.
Chavez contends:
1. The billboards are merely endorsement of
products and do not promote his candidacy.
SC: No, it is a mode of indirectly soliciting
support, hence deemed an election
campaign.
candidates residing in his jurisdiction to
comply with their obligation to file their
statements of contributions and
expenditures.
For the commission of a second or
subsequent offense under this section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty
thousand pesos (P60,000.00), in the
discretion of the Commission. In addition,
the offender shall be subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.
ELECTION CAMPAIGN, DEFINED AND EXTENT: "election
campaign" or "partisan political activity" is defined as an act
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities included
under this definition are:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs,
committees, or other groups of persons for the purpose
of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign for
or against a candidate
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings,
rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the
purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries,
or holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or
materials designed to support or oppose the election of
any candidate; or

2. Resolution is an ex post facto law, when it
punishes acts done prior to the effectivity of
the prohibition. SC: No, it is not the putting
up of billboard that is being punished but
rather the failure to remove.
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or
support for or against a candidate
When he filed his certificate of candidacy, the billboards
featuring his name and image assumed partisan political
character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy.
Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of
powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of
the subject billboards.
COMELECT IS EMPOWERED TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE
ENJOYMENT OR UTILIZATION OF MEDIA: COMELEC is expressly
authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization
of all media communication or information to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election
period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants,
special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary.
Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure
equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to
reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
NO EX POST FACTO LAW: The offense, as expressly prescribed in
the assailed provision, is the non-removal of the described
propaganda materials three (3) days after the effectivity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If the candidate for public office
fails to remove such propaganda materials after the given
period, he shall be liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in this
case.
PENERA v. COMELEC True, that pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
(CHICO- NAZARIO amended, even after the filing of the COC but before the start of
DECISION)
Penera and Andanar were contenders in the
Mayoralty elections. Prior to the election,
Andanar filed a petition for disqualification
against Penera for premature campaigning.
Penera admitted that a motorcade indeed
took place, but contended that it was in
accordance with the usual practice during
the filing of COCs.
Pending its resolution, Penera was
proclaimed as the winner and assumed
office.
COMELED 2D disqualified Penera. Penera
filed an MR with EB. EB affirmed the division
ruling.
The dissenting opinion submits that under
the amended version of Sec. 15, RA 8436
(Automated Election Act) a new definition of
the term candidate makes it impossible for
premature campaigning to be committed.
Under the amended version, a person
becomes a candidate not on the day of filing
the COC but at the start of the campaign.
Thus, a premature campaign –seeking to
promote the election/ defeat of a candidate
cannot be made because there is no
candidate to speak of.
The ponente in resolving this case
harmonizes the express prohibition under
Sec. 80 of the OEC and the amended version
of RA 8436.
1. 8436 a9369 did not contain an express
repeal.
2. Absent an express repeal, only implied
repeal may only be the way to suit dissent’s
submission.
3. Implied repeal is recognized only when
there is an incompatibility.
4. There is no incompatibility because the
two laws can be harmonized.
the campaign period, a person is not yet officially considered a
candidate. Nevertheless, a person, upon the filing of his/her
COC, already explicitly declares his/her intention to run as a
candidate in the coming elections. The commission by such a
person of any of the acts enumerated under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code (i.e., holding rallies or parades, making
speeches, etc.) can, thus, be logically and reasonably construed
as for the purpose of promoting his/her intended candidacy.
When the campaign period starts and said person proceeds
with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we
can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC
and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature
campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Also,
conversely, if said person, for any reason, withdraws his/her COC
before the campaign period, then there is no point to view
his/her acts prior to said period as acts for the promotion of
his/her election as a candidate. In the latter case, there can be
no premature campaigning as there is no candidate, whose
disqualification may be sought, to begin with.
A PERSON CAN COMMIT PREMATURE CAMPAIGN EVEN
WITHOUT BEING A CANDIDATE YET, FILING OF COC
CONSTITUTES AN INTENT TO ENGAGE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGN:
A person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a
candidate (thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can
already commit the acts described under Section 79(b) of the
Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political
activity. However, only after said person officially becomes a
candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can said acts
be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said person officially
becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can
his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature
campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign
period, when the person officially becomes a candidate, that the
undue and iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts,
constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her
benefit. Compared to the other candidates who are only about
to
begin their election campaign, a candidate who had previously
 engaged in premature campaigning already enjoys an unfair
headstart in promoting his/her candidacy.

PENERA v. COMELEC ELEMENTS OF PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING: Thus, the essential

(CARPIO DECISION) elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code are:
Carpio adopted the Lanot Decision.
(1) a person engages in an election campaign or partisan political
1. WHEN IS CAMPAIGN PREMATURE UNDER
SEC. 80, OEC? activity;
-> 3 elements: election campaign,
promotion/ defeat of candidate, done (2) the act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a
outside campaign period.
particular candidate or candidates;
2. WHO IS A CANDIDATE?
-> Sec. 79: a candidate is one who has filed (3) the act is done outside the campaign period.
his COC.
-> RA 8436: he is considered a candidate
only when the election campaign starts.
CANDIDATE, DEFINED: A "‘candidate’ refers to any person
CONCLUSION: There can be no commission aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a
of premature campaigning because outside
the period of campaign there is no candidate
certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited
to speak of. political party, aggroupment or coalition of parties." xxx "any
person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing]
period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."

THERE CAN BE NO PREMATURE CAMPAIGN BECAUSE THERE IS

NO CANDIDATE TO SPEAK OF: Any person may thus file a
certificate of candidacy on any day within the prescribed period
for filing a certificate of candidacy yet that person shall be
considered a candidate, for purposes of determining one’s
possible violations of election laws, only during the campaign
period. Indeed, there is no "election campaign" or "partisan
political activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to public office simply
because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the start of
the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of her
certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider Penera a
candidate at the time of the questioned motorcade which was
conducted a day before the start of the campaign period.

SWS v. COMELEC PROHIBITION OF PUBLICATION CONSTITUTES PRIOR RESTRAINT

OF FREE SPEECH, GOVERNMENT BEARS THE BURDEN OF
Assailed is Sec. 5.4 of RA 9006 / Fair Election PROVING THAT IT IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL: To be sure,
Act which prohibits the publication of surveys
§5.4Iays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and
affecting national and local candidates 15
and 7 days before election respectively.
Petitioners states that it wishes to conduct
surveys and subsequent publication during
the entire election period and even until 2
days before the election day.
SWS contends that the prohibition
constitutes prior restraint on free speech
sans clear and present danger.
COMELEC responds that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power necessary to
prevent manipulation of electoral process.
the press prohibiting the publication of election survey results
affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15)
days immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days
before a local election. Because of tile preferred status of tile
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and he press, such a
measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of
2
invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy Presumption against its
constitutional validity. ...The Government thus carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for in enforcement of such
restraint. "'3 There, thus a reversal of the normal presumption of
validity that inheres in every legislation.
O ‘BRIEN TEST:Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1]
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
PROHIBITION IS NOT UNRELATED TO THE SUPRESSION OF FREE
SPEECH: Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test
because the causal connection of expression to the asserted
governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of
election survey results because of the possibility that such
publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4
actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing
the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by
newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair
theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias
for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring
personal opinion to statistical results.
PROHIBITION IS GREATER THAN IS ESSENTIAL TO THE
FIRTHERANCE OF INTEREST: Even if the governmental interest
sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech
and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental,
§5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test,
namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to
further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims
at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation
of
bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and

GMA v. COMELEC
Assailed is Sec. 9(a) of COMELEC
RESOLUTION 9615 which interprets Sec. 5 of
RA 9006/ FEA such that each candidate shall
only be a allowed the maximum time
provided by law on an aggregate basis.
According to the petitioners, this is a faulty
interpretation of the law and an
abandonment of their previous
interpretation which recognizes that the
maximum time allotted by law shall be for
each station and not total aggregate.
Ancillary Issues:
1) PRIOR NOTICE is not unreasonable.
2) RIGHT TO REPLY is not unreasonable.
resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas."
Thus, under the Administrative Code of 1987, 17 the COMELEC is
given the power:
To stop any illegal activity, or confiscate, tear down, and
stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition
contained in §5.4.
THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS TO MAKE THE MAXIMUM TIME ON
A PER STATION BASIS NOT TOTAL AGGREGATE: The law, on its
face, does not justify a conclusion that the maximum allowable
airtime should be based on the totality of possible broadcast in
all television or radio stations. This is further buttressed by the
fact that the Fair Election Act (R.A. No. 9006) actually repealed
the previous provision, Section ll(b) of Republic Act No. 6646,44
which prohibited direct political advertisements -the so-called
"political ad ban."
Given the foregoing background, it is therefore ineluctable to
conclude that Congress intended to provide a more expansive
and liberal means by which the candidates, political parties,
citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise
may be given a chance to fully explain and expound on their
candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate
to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the
candidates.
THE AGGREGATE BASED LIMIT IS UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF
RESTRICTION: The assailed rule on "aggregate-based" airtime
limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the "aggregate-based" airtime limits -
leveling the playing field - does not constitute a compelling state
interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their
ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
EJERCITO v. COMELEC
Ejercito and San Luis were contender for the
Gubernatorial race for the province of
Laguna during the 2013 Election.
Prior to the conduct of election, San Luis
filed a petition for disqualification against
Ejercito on the ground of vote buying
(Orange Card) and over expenditure
(through commercials)
According to San Luis, Ejercito is only
allowed to spend around 4.5M for election
expenses. He alleged that considering the
number of times his advertisements were
shown on TV, it would be impossible to stay
within the aforementioned limit which
amounted to almost 23.7M.
COMELEC 1D and EB both decided to
disqualify Ejercito on the ground of over
expenditure.
Ejercito contends that the advertisements
were executed without his knowledge and
consent. Furthermore, he contends that any
restriction on such manifestation of support
is unconstitutional on the ground that it
restricts free speech and expression.
CURRENT ALLOWABLE LIMIT ON EXPENSES: Section 13 of R.A.
No. 7166118 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of
candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus:
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties.
– The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered
politicalparty may spend for election campaign shall be as
follows:
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and
Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos
(P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the
constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, a candidate without any political party
and without support from any political party may be
allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter;
and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter
currently registered in the constituency or constituencies
where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any
contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party
or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to
the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift
tax.
LIMIT ON ELECTION EXPENSES REGULATES THE CANDIDATES’
CONTRIBUTOR AS WELL: In tracing the legislative history, the
intent of our lawmakers has been consistent through the years:
to regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but
also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by
including in the aggregate limit of the former’s election
expenses those incurred by the latter.1awp++i1 The phrase
"those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate"is
sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are
contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of
the legal requirement that a contribution or donation should
bear the written conformity of
the candidate, a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person
authorized by such candidate or treasurer."
LIMIT ON ELECTION EXPENSES IS A CONTENT NEUTRAL
REGULATION: The inclusion of the amount contributed by a
donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses
does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of
speech and
of expression under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD v. Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of campaign
COMELEC materials only mentions "parties" and "candidates":
Petitioners posted tarpaulins with 6x10 ft in
size within the compound of the diocese.
The 2nd tarpaulin categorized the names into
TEAM PATAY and TEAM BUHAY according to
their votes to the RH Law.
The COMELEC City Officer notified the
petitioner to remove the said tarpaulin on
the ground that it exceeds the limitation
imposed by COMELEC RESO which is 2x3 ft.
After some correspondence, the petitioner
filed the instant case.
content-neutral regulation,127 the law’s concern is not to curtail
the message or content of the advertisement promoting a
particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among
aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial
resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only
incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the
substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and
reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out
in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art.
XIII of the Constitution.
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may
authorize political parties and party-list groups to erect common
poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public
places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like,
wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit election
propaganda: Provided, That the size ofthe poster areas shall not
exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be
authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten
(10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six
(6) feet or its equivalent. Candidates may post any lawful
propaganda material in private places with the consent of the
owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be
allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates.
The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political
party.125 There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated
with any of the persons named in the tarpaulin regarding its
posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as
part of their advocacy against the RH Law.
SPEECH MADE BY NON CANDIDATES. GENERALLY, CANNOT BE
REGULATED: The traditional view has been to tolerate the
viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her
expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation that
allows public officials to make judgments of the value of such
viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal
approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding
equality in opportunity must provide limits to some expression
during electoral campaigns.

Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral

campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political
parties or their political parties may be regulated as to time,
place, and manner.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns

made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak
as members of a political party which are, taken as a whole,
principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must
consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is
inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible
range of opinions coming from the electorate including those
that can catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the
criteria for the choice of a candidate.

WHEN PRIVATE SPEECH BECOMES REGULATED: Regulation of

election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it
reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who
do not speak as members of a political party if they are not
candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that,
taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of
a candidate only. The regulation

(a) should be provided by law,

(b) reasonable,
(c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the
primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and
(d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object.

The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and
manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the
speech be prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For
this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with
or on private property.
1 UTAK v. COMELEC
Assailed is RESO 9615 of COMELEC
implementing RA 9006 with respect to
posting of campaign materials. The assailed
provision prohibits the posting of campaign
materials in public places without the
consent of the owner. Public places,
according to the rule, includes PUVs and
their terminals.
Petitioner contends that the RESO violates
the right to free speech of the owners. The
fact that they enjoy a franchise, the
franchise distinct from the ownership of the
PUV and terminals, hence they cannot be
prohibited from expressing their views
through their properties.
SUPERVISORY POWERS OF COMELEC DO NOT EXTEND TO
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: Notwithstanding the ostensibly
broad supervisory and regulatory powers granted to the
COMELEC during an election period under Section 4, Article IX-C
of the Constitution, the Court had previously set out the
limitations thereon. In Adiong, the Court, while recognizing that
the COMELEC has supervisory power vis-à-vis the conduct and
manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution, nevertheless held that such supervisory power
does not extend to the very freedom of an individual to express
his preference of candidates in an election by placing election
campaign stickers on his vehicle.
SUPERVISION DOES NOT EXTEND TO OWNERSHIP: The
COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and
regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and
transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to
operate the same.1âwphi1
There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to
operate transportation for the use of the public and the
ownership per se of the vehicles used for public transport.
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and
separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can
own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or
conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the
facilities used to serve the public. The devotion of property to
serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in
control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
FRANCHISE: A franchise or permit to operate transportation
utilities pertains to considerations affecting the operation of the
PUV as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or zones of
operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares,
rates, and other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality. 25 Thus,
a government issuance, which purports to regulate a franchise or
permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations
affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a
regulation or supervision not on the franchise or permit to
operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle used for public
transport.
The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV,
through the posting of election campaign materials on the
vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the
operation of the PUV.
Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate
in an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the
PUV as such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a
PUV, through the posting of an election campaign material
thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate,
but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.

The dichotomy between the regulation of the franchise or

permit to operate of a PUV and that of the very ownership
thereof is better exemplified in the case of commercial
advertisements posted on the vehicle. A prohibition on the
posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a
regulation on the ownership of the vehicle per se; the restriction
on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have
any relation to its operation as a PUV.

On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial

advertisements on windows of buses, because it hinders police
authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe,
is a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate. It has a
direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a PUV, i.e., the
safety of the passengers.

OWNERSHIP OF TERMINALS REMAINS PRIVATE AND CAN BE

USED FOR FREE SPEECH: In the same manner, the COMELEC
does not have the constitutional power to regulate public
transport terminals owned by private persons. The ownership of
transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public
commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public
transport terminals may be required by local governments to
obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to
circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal
as such. The regulation of such permit to operate should
similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of
the transport terminal. A regulation of public transport terminals
based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the
posting of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to
regulating the ownership of the transport terminal and not
merely the permit to operate the same.
 VII. POLITICAL PARTY; PARTY LIST ORGANIZATION

VETERANS FEDERATION FOUR INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS IN THE PHILIPPINE PARTY LIST

PARTY v. COMELEC SYSTEM ELECTION:

First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of

all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering

a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of

the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which

a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion
to their total number of votes."

CONGRESS IS GIVEN THE POWER TO PRESCRIBE MECHANICS

FOR THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM EXCEPT THE RESERVATION MADE
BY CONSTI WITH RESPECT TO THE 20% CEILING: We rule that a
simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested
with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of
the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership
in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.

20% COMPOSITION IS MERELY A CEILING AND NOT

MANDATORY: The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-
list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-
list."
 "(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each;
Provided, That those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; Provided,
finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats."

Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be

shown presently that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats
in Congress.

VETERANS FORMULA WITH RESPECT TO ALLOCATION OF

ADDITIONAL SEATS:

FOR THE FIRST PARTY: If the proportion of votes received by the

first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent
of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the
first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of
three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding
off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six
percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total
of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then
the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.

FOR THE OTHER PARTY: In simplified form, it is written as

follows:

No. of
Additional No. of votes of additional
seats concerned party seats
for = x allocated
concerned No. of votes of to
party first party the first
party
ANG BAGONG BAYANI v.
COMELEC
BANAT v. COMELEC
2007 Elections. COMELEC, as NBC,
2% THRESHOLD FOR DISTRIBUTION OF ADDITIONAL SEATS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: We rule that, in computing the allocation
of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number
of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation
of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional
seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in
relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in
the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."
DISTRIBUTION OF ADDITIONAL SEATS SHALL NOT BE LIMITED
TO THOSE WITH GUARANTEED SEATS UNDER THE 2% RULE:
In
declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not
limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the
two- percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes
cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second
round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List
System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The
whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available
seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties
next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed.
We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of
 seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
ATONG PAGLAUM v. PREVAILING GUIDELINES FOR THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM:
COMELEC
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:
(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or

organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided

they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their either
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations

that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those
who lack "well- defined political constituencies," either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record
of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall

not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

PARTY LIST SYSTEM IS COMPOSED OF THREE GROUPS: the party-

list system is composed of three different groups:

(1) national parties or organizations;

(2) regional parties or organizations; and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.

National and regional parties or organizations are different from

sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or
organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and
need not represent any particular sector.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES NEED NOT REPRESENT

MARGINALIZED SECTORS: R.A. No. 7941 does not require
national and regional parties or organizations to represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all
national and regional parties under the party-list system to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive
and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded
from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PARTIES MUST LACK WELL-DEFINED

POLITICAL CONSTITUENCIES: The major political parties are
those that field candidates in the legislative district elections.
Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections since they neither lack "well-defined political
constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional
parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do
not belong to major political parties. This automatically
reserves the national and regional
parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-
 defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to
have members in the House of Representatives.
PALPARAN v. COMELEC
 VIII. AUTOMATED ELECTION

ROQUE v. COMELEC

CAPALLA v. COMELEC
 IX. RECALL
GARCIA v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Garcia was the duly elected
governor of Bataan during the 1992
elections. In 1993, several mayors, vice
mayors and members of different
Sanggunians constituted themselves as
Preparatrory Recall Assembly (PRA) to
initiate the recall of Garcia. The Resolution
initiating the recall was signed by 80
members. Comelec found 74 to be genuine
(73 votes required to constitute the
majority).
Garcia filed a petition with COMELEC to
deny due course against the resolution.
COMELEC dismissed the petition and
scheduled the recall. This prompted Garcia
to go directly to the SC.
Garcia contends that the Preparatory Recall
Assembly is unconstitutional because the
right to initiate is lodged exclusively with
the people AND it violates the right to equal
protection of the laws of a politician
belonging to the minority.
SC dismissed the petition.
RECALL, DEFINED: Recall is a mode of
removal of a public officer by the people
before the end of his term of office. The
people's prerogative to remove a public
officer is an incident of their sovereign
power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations.
PRA RESOLUTION IS DISTINCT FROM THE
RECALL ITSELF: PRA resolution of recall
merely, starts the process. It is part of the
process but is not the whole process. The
initiatory resolution merely sets the stage
RECALL, MODES: Under the Local
Government Code, there are two modes of
initiating a Recall: (1) directly by the people
and (2) through the Preparatory Recall
Assembly.
REASON BEHIND PREPARATORY RECALL
ASSEMBLY: The legislative records reveal
there were two (2) principal reasons why
this alternative mode of initiating the recall
process thru an assembly was adopted, viz:
(a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating
recall thru the direct action of the people;
and (b) to cut down on its expenses.
PEOPLE DO NOT HAVE THE SOLE AND
EXCLUSIVE POER TO INITIATE A RECALL: To
be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution
that will suggest that the people have the
"sole and exclusive right to decide on
whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The
Constitution did not provide for any mode,
let alone a single mode, of initiating recall
elections. 19 Neither did it prohibit the
adoption of multiple modes of initiating
recall elections. The mandate given by
section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is
for Congress to "enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By
this constitutional mandate, Congress was
clearly given the power to choose
the effective mechanisms of recall as its
discernment dictates.
for the official concerned to appear before the
tribunal of the people so he can justify why he
should be allowed to continue in office. Before the
people render their sovereign judgment, the official
concerned remains in office but his right to
continue in office is subject to question.
LOSS OF CONFIDENCE, SOLE GROUND FOR
RECALL: There is only one ground for the
recall of local government officials: loss of
confidence. This means that the people may
petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly
may resolve to recall any local elective
officials without specifying any particular
ground except loss of confidence. "Loss of
confidence" as a ground for recall is a
political question.
CLAUDIO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Claudio is the elected Mayor of
Pasay City. Barely one year after assuming
office, a Preparatory Recall Election was
constituted by Baranggay chairmen and
council members. The PRA filed its
Resolution with COMELEC.
Claudio contends that (1) the required
majority was not obtained and (2) the recall
referred to by law refers to the process —
adoption of a resolution initiating the recall,
thus, within the one-year prohibition
mandated by law.
COMELEC dismissed the petition. With
respect to (2), COMELEC resolved that it is
official or elect his replacement. Reasons:
(1) the word limitation modifies recall.
Under LGC recall is exercised by the
not the adoption of resolution which is
deemed as recall but the filing of the
resolution with COMELEC. This prompted
petitioner to go directly to the SC.
SC dismissed the petition.
LIMITATIONS ON RECALL — (a) Any elective
local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office
for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1)
year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local
election.
There are two limitations in paragraph (b)
on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall
shall take place within one year from the
date of assumption of office of the official
concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take
place within one year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
PURPOSE OF RECALL: The purpose of the
first limitation is to provide a reasonable
basis for judging the performance of an
elective local official; to prevent premature
action on the voters’ part in voting to
remove a newly elected official before
having had sufficient time to evaluate the
soundness of his policies and decisions. It is
not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of
recall resolutions that produces a judgment
on the performance of the official
concerned; it is the vote of the electorate
in the election that does. Therefore, as long
as the recall election is not held be
RECALL REFERS TO THE ELECTION ITSELF
AND EXCLUDE INITATION: “Recall" refers to
the election itself by means of which voters
decide whether they should retain their
local
registered voters. Thus, recall is the election itself;
(2) the purpose of recall is to affirm confidence,
recall is the judgment of confidence, not the
initiation; (3) it will curtail the right of
people to debate and have informed
decision.
In other words, the term "recall" in
paragraph (b) refers only to the recall
election, excluding the convening of the
PRA and the filing of a petition for recall
with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the
signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for
a petition for recall.
 X. FAILURE OF ELECTION
SISON v. COMELEC
FACTS:
While the canvassing was being held,
petitioner Sison filed with the COMELEC a
petition seeking to suspend the canvassing
of votes and to declare a failure of elections
on the ground of massive fraud committed
during the election. In his petition, he
narrated instances purportedly showing
fraud (ie. Election returns with no inner
seal; inspectors bringing home returns;
precincts with missing returns; suspicious
person sneaking; locks, seal found in trash
bins).
COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of
evidence. Prompting petitioner to proceed
to the SC.
SC found that there is a tension with
respect to the remedy used by petitioner.
SC ruled that in either case (petition to
declare a failure of election and pre-
proclamation controversy) the petition will
not prosper. There can be no FOE because
the petition did not allege specific instances
required by law. There can be no PPC
because such remedy ceases the moment
the respondent assumes office.
THREE INSTANCES WHERE FAILURE OF
ELECTION MAY BE DECLARED: there are
only three (3) instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, namely:
(a) the election in any polling place has not
been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place had
been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the
preparation and transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass
thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes.
GROUNDS FOR PRE-PROCLAMATION
CONTROVERSY: Sec. 243. Issues that may
be raised in pre-proclamation controversy
— The following shall be proper issues that
may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or
proceedings of the board of
canvassers:
(b) The canvassed election returns
are incomplete, contain material
defects, appear to be tampered with
or falsified, or contain discrepancies
in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235
and 236 of this Code:
(c) The election returns were
prepared under duress, threats,
coercion, or intimidation, or they are
 obviously manufactured or not
authentic; and
(d) when substitute or fraudulent
returns in controverted polling
places were canvassed, the results
of which materially affected
standing of the aggrieved candidate
or candidates.
GROUNDS FOR PRE-PROC IS EXCLUSIVE: it
is
well to note that the scope of pre-
proclamation controversy is only limited to
the issues enumerated under Section
243 10 of the Omnibus Election Code, and
the enumeration therein is restrictive and
exclusive. 11 The reason underlying the
delimitation both of substantive ground and
procedure is the policy of the election law
that pre-proclamation controversies should
be summarily decide, consistent with the
law's desire that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as
possible. 12 That is why such questions
which require more deliberate and
necessarily longer consideration, are left for
examination in the corresponding protest.
13
PROCLAMATION OF WINNING CANDIDATE
MAKES PPC NOT VIABLE; QUO WARRANTO
IS THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY: However,
with the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the position contested, the
question of whether the petition raised
issues proper for a pre-proclamation
controversy is already of no consequence
since the well-entrenched rule in such
situation is that a pre-proclamation case
before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the
more appropriate remedies being a regular
election protest or a petition for quo
warranto. 1
AMPATUAN v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Ampatuan was declared winner for the
position of governor. Candao, his opponent,
filed a petition for the declaration of failure
of election. COMELEC thus ordered
suspension of proclamation which was
eventually lifted and affirmed by the Court.
After having been proclaimed and after
assuming office, COMELEC resolved to
consolidate the election protests filed by
respondents and ordered the conduct of a
technical examination. This prompted
Ampatuan to file a petition with the SC on
the ground that his proclamation and
assumption of office served to stop the
petition for declaration of a failure of
election. He contends that the proper
remedy is an election protest, the former
being summary, the latter full blown.
ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE DOES NOT
DEPRIVE COMELEC TO DECLARE A FAILURE
OF ELECTION: While, however,
the Comelec is restricted, in pre-
proclamation cases, to an examination of
the election returns on their face and is
without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind
them and investigate election
irregularities, the Comelec is duty bound to
investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism,
violence, and other analogous causes in
actions for annulment of election results or
for declaration of failure of elections, as the
Omnibus Election Code denominates the
same. Thus, the Comelec, in the case of
actions for annulment of election results or
declaration of failure of elections, may
conduct technical examination of election
documents and compare and analyze
voters
signatures and thumbprints in order to The fact that a candidate proclaimed has
determine whether or not the elections had assumed office does not deprive
indeed been free, honest and clean.[27] the Comelec of its authority to annul any
canvass and illegal proclamation.
 XI. ELECTION OFFENSES
PEOPLE v. FERRER
FACTS:
Accused Ferrer was charged of inducing and
influencing the electors vote in favor of the
candidates of the Liberal Party by delivering
a speech during a political rally of the
Liberal and by causing to be distributed to
the people who attended said meeting
cigarettes and pamphlets concerning the
Liberal Party and went from house to house
and induced the electors to whom he
distributed sample, ballots of the Liberal
Party.
Accused moved to quash the information
on the ground that it charged two offenses.
Trial court granted the quashal on the
ground that giving cigarettes is not
equivalent to giving food as prohibited by
law.
QUASHAL IS AFFIRMED NOT BECAUSE THE
TRIAL COURT WAS RIGHT BUT BECAUSE
THE CHARGE CONTAINED TWO OFFENSES:
The
order appealed from is affirmed, not upon
the grounds relied upon by the trial court,
but on the ground that the information
charges two different violations, without
pronouncement as to costs.
MAPPALA v. JUDGE NUNEZ
FACTS:
The Provincial Prosecutor filed three cases
against Alejandro Angoluan: (1) illegal
possession of firearms; (2) frustrated
murder; (3) violation of OEC. The cases
were consolidated to the court presided by
Nunez.
Respondent judge rendered a decision
finding Angoluan guilty of (1) illegal
possession of firearms and (2) frustrated
homicide but acquitted him in the violation
of OEC.
This prompted petitioner to file an
administrative case againt Nunez. Nunez
contends that he cannot convict the
accused because the firearm was not taken
from his person. For Nunez, OEC only
punishes the carrying within a 100-meter
radius. The firearm was surrendered not
taken.
THE LAW ONLY REQUIRES THAT THE
ACCUSED CARRIED THE WEAPON: it is not
necessary that the deadly weapon should
have been seized from the accused while he
was in the precinct or within a radius of 100
meters therefrom. It is enough that the
accused carried the deadly weapon "in the
polling place and within a radius of one
hundred meters thereof" during any of the
specified days and hours. After respondent
himself had found that the prosecution had
established these facts, it is difficult to
understand why he acquitted Alejandro of
the charge of violation of Section 261(p) of
the Omnibus election Code.
PEOPLE v. BAYONA
FACTS:
Defendant was found guilty by the trial
court of violating Election Law prohibition
against display of firearms in the premises
of the precinct.
On appeal, the OSG argued that a literal
application of the law would be absurd and
that the intention was merely to prohibit
display with intention to influence exercise
of suffrage.
SC affirmed the conviction.
ELECTION PENAL LAWS ARE MALA
PROHIBITA, INTENT IS IMMATERIAL: the
law which the defendant violated is a
statutory provision, and the intent with
which he violated it is immaterial. It may be
conceded that the defendant did not intend
to intimidate any elector or to violate the
law in any other way, but when he got out
of his automobile and carried his revolver
inside of the fence surrounding the polling
place, he committed the act complained of,
and he committed it willfully. The act
prohibited by the Election Law was
complete. The intention to intimidate the
voters or to interfere otherwise with the
election is not made an essential element of
the offense. Unless such an offender
actually makes use of his revolver, it would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
prove that he intended to intimidate the
voters
LOZANO v. YORAC
FACTS:
Defendant was
VOTE BUYING REQUIRES CLEAR AND
CONVINCING PROOF: No clear and
convincing proof exists to show that
respondent Binay was indeed engaged in
vote buying. The traditional gift-giving of
the Municipality of Makati during the
Christmas season is not refuted. That it was
implemented by respondent Binay as OIC
Mayor of Makati at that time does not
sufficiently establish that respondent was
trying to influence and induce his
constituents to vote for him. This would be
stretching the interpretation of the law too
far. Petitioner deduces from this act of gift-
giving that respondent was buying the votes
of the Makati residents.
A finding of Vote Buying requires more than
a mere tenuous deduction to prove the
offense of vote-buying. There has to be
concrete and direct evidence or, at least,
strong circumstantial evidence to support
the charge that respondent was indeed
engaged in vote-buying. We are convinced
that the evidence presented, as well as the
facts obtaining in the case at bar, do not
warrant such finding.
ONG v. HERRERA- MARTINEZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Ong assails the appointment and
assumption as Councilor by respondent
Herrera. Herrera replaced her deceased
father who was a member of the Liberal
Party. Ong was appointed by the Party
Treasurer, however he was excluded from
the session hall. On the other hand, Herrera
complied with the legal formalities prior to
appointment.
Ong seeks to have the appointment
annulled on the ground that it violated the
Election Ban under the OEC.
SC affirmed the appointment and dismissed
the petition.
ELECTION BAN UNDER OEC: Sec. 261 (g) of
the Omnibus Election Code provides thus:
(g) Appointment of new
employees, creation of new
position, promotion, or
giving salary increases.
During the period of forty-
five days before a regular
election and thirty days
before a special election, (1)
any head, official or
appointing officer of a
government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether
national or local, including
government-owned
controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires
any new employee whether
provisional, temporary or
casual, or creates and fills
any new position, except
upon prior authority of
the Commission.
The Commission shall
not grant the authority
sought unless, it is satisfied
that the position to be filled
is essential to the proper
functioning of the office or
agency concerned, and that
the position shall not be
filled in a manner that may
influence the election.
As an exception to the
foregoing provisions, a new
employee may be appointed
in case of urgent need:
Provided, however, That
notice of the appointment
shall be given to the
Commission within three
days from the date of the
appointment. Any
appointment or hiring in
violation of this provision
shall be null and void.
ELECTION BAN COVERS ONLY
APPOINTMENT UNDER CIVIL SERVICE LAW:
The permanent vacancy for councilor exists
and its filling up is governed by the Local
Government Code while the appointment
referred to in the election ban provision is
covered by the Civil Service Law.
REGALADO v. COURT OF
or APPEALS & PEOPLE
FACTS:
An information for violation of Unlawful
Transfer under OEC was filed against
petitioner Regalado. It was alleged that four
days after the elections and while being an
OIC Mayor, petitioner transferred Editha
Barba, a nurse, from Poblacio to Sto. Nino,
25 km away from each other.
This prompted Barba to file a complaint for
violation of OEC. The trial court found
petitioner guilty. CA affirmed the
conviction.
On appeal to SC, petitioner contends that
what is prohibited is transfer and not
reassignment. He contends that the act
done was reassignment only.
SC affirmed the conviction.
VIOLATION OF 261(h): The two elements of
the offense prescribed under §261(h) of the
Omnibus Election Code, as amended, are:
(1) a public officer or employee is
transferred or detailed within the election
period as fixed by the COMELEC, and (2) the
transfer or detail was effected without prior
approval of
the COMELEC in accordance with its
implementing rules and regulations.
TRANSFER IS MODIFIED BY WORD
WHATEVER: Moreover, §261(h) of B.P. No.
881, as amended, provides that it is an
election offense for —
Any public official who makes or
causes any transfer or detail
whatever of any officer or employee
in the civil service including public
school teachers, within the election
period except upon prior approval of
the Commission. (Emphasis added).
As the Solicitor General notes, "the
word transfer or detail, as used [above], is
modified by the word whatever. This
indicates that any movement of personnel
from one station to another, whether or not
in the same office or agency, during the
election is covered by the prohibition."
AQUINO v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Aquino, the president of Philhealth, issued
reassignment orders two days before the
Election Period began. A day after the
Election period began, he issued an
Advisory pertaining to the orders. This
prompted several affected employees to file
a complaint against him for violation of 261
(h), OEC. COMELEC found it appropriate to
file the information against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that reassignments
cannot be covered by the prohibition. He
also contends that the orders were issued
prior election period, hence not covered.
COMELEC contends that the Regalado
ruling is explicit that any movement is
covered by the prohibition. Second,
COMELEC contends that while the order
was issued prior to the election period, they
were implemented during the election
period.
SC found that reassignment is covered by
the prohibition. However, it found that
Aquino cannot be held liable since the
orders were made prior to the election
period. The law punishes the antecedent
act and not the effect.
ANY MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL IS
COVERED BY OEC PROHIBITION: The terms
transfer and detail are modified by the term
whatever such that "any movement of
personnel from one station to another,
whether or not in the same office or
agency, during the election period is
covered by the prohibition
MOVEMENT CAN BE USED FOR
ELECTIONEERING: Any personnel action,
when caused or made during the election
period, can be used for electioneering or to
harass subordinates with different political
persuasions. This possibility – of being used
for electioneering purposes or to harass
subordinates – created by any movement of
personnel during the election period is
precisely what the transfer ban seeks to
prevent.
PLAUSIBILITY NOT ACTUALITY MATERIAL
IN UNLAWFUL TRANSFERS: Thus, it
is
immaterial whether or not the personnel
action has in fact been actually used for
electioneering purposes or whether there
has been any allegation in the complaint to
this effect. The mere existence of such
plausibility for electioneering is the reason
that animated the legal prohibition against
any personnel action, including transfers
and reassignments, during the election
period.
ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF 261 (H): By its
terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the
elements of the offense and its exceptions.
The elements are:
(1) the making or causing of a government
official or employee’s transfer or detail
whatever;
(2) the making or causing of the transfer or
detail whatever was made during the
election period; and
(3) these acts were made without the
required prior COMELEC approval.
As this provision operates, the making or
causing of the movement of personnel
during the election period but without the
required COMELEC approval is covered by
the prohibition and renders the responsible
person liable for the offense. Conversely,
the making or causing (of the movement of
personnel) before or after the election
period even without the required COMELEC
approval, or during the election period but
with the required COMELEC approval are
not covered by the prohibition and do not
render the responsible person liable for this
election offense.
LEGAL PROHIBITION APPLIES ONLY TO THE
ANTECEDENT ACT: The legal prohibition on
transfer or detail undoubtedly affects only
those acts that go into the making or
causing or to the antecedent acts. Any act
that occurs or is performed after the
antecedent act of making or causing or
those acts performed to carry out an
event or
result desired by the antecedent acts, such
as the actual or physical act of transferring,
are no longer the concern of the legal
prohibition.
LAW PUNISHES HIS ACTIVE ACTS,
CONVERSELY LAW DOES NOT PUNISH HIS
PASSIVE ACTS: During this phase of the
entire transfer or reassignment process, the
official responsible for issuing the order
plays an active role at its center. The issuing
of the order are his very acts. Thus, if the
orders are issued prior to the start of the
election period, they are automatically
rendered beyond the coverage of the
prohibition and the issuing official cannot
be held liable for violation of Section 261(h)
of BP 881. Conversely, if the orders are
issued during the election period and
without COMELEC approval, these are
covered by the prohibition and renders the
issuing official liable for violation of Section
261(h).
COMELEC v. TAGLE
FACTS:
The petition is an offshoot of the case filed
by Bautista against the winning mayor of
Kawit for violation of 261 (b), Vote Buying
to which COMELEC recommended the filing
of appropriate information.
Before trial on the Vote Buying Case
commenced, a separate action was filed
against the witnesses in the Vote Buying
Case for the same offense. Prosecutor filed
the cases with RTC Imus. Thereafter,
COMELEC issued a minute resolution finding
the witnesses accused in this case to be
exempt from prosecution. It filed a motion
to dismiss with RTC Imus, however
respondent judge denied the motion on the
ground that the witnesses have not
performed the overt act of testifying
required by law yet.
IMMUNITY MAY BE GRANTED FOR
PROSECUTION OF VOTE BUYING/ SELLING:
One of the effective ways of preventing the
commission of vote-buying and of
prosecuting those committing it is the grant
of immunity from criminal liability in favor
of the party whose vote was bought. This
grant of immunity will encourage the
recipient or acceptor to come into the open
and denounce the culprit-candidate, and
will ensure the successful prosecution of
the criminal case against the latter.
Congress saw the wisdom of this
proposition, and so Section 28 of R.A. No.
6646 on Prosecution of Vote-Buying and
Vote-Selling concludes with this paragraph:
REQUISITES TO BECOME ELIGIBLE FOR
IMMUNITY: The giver, offeror, the promisor
as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient
and conspirator referred to in paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as
principals: Provided, That any person,
otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who
voluntarily gives information and willingly
testifies on any violation thereof in any
official investigation or proceeding shall be
exempt from prosecution and punishment
for the offenses with reference to which his
information and testimony were given:
Provided, further, That nothing herein shall
exempt such person from criminal
prosecution for perjury or false testimony.
Respondent judge lost sight of the fact that
at the time the complaint for vote-selling
was filed with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor, the respondents in I.S. No. 1-
99-
1080 had already executed sworn
statements attesting to the corrupt practice
of vote-buying in the case docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7034-99. It cannot then
be denied that they had already voluntarily
given information in the vote-buying case.
In fact, they willingly testified in Criminal
Case No. 7034-99 per petitioner’s
Memorandum filed with this Court
TAPISPISAN v. COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Tapispisan is a public school
teacher. The controversy began when the
Division Superintendent issued a
designation order addressed to Rumbaoa
and Teves as OIC Head Teacher and OIC
Principal respectively.
Remotely, in the CA the court ruled that the
designation cannot be a prohibited act
during the election period.
SC dismissed the petition.
As a corollary, such designation did not
violate Resolution No. 2731 dated
December 5, 1994 of the Commission on
Elections, which declared as a prohibited
act the transfer of officers and employees in
the civil service during the election period
from January 8, 1995 up to June 7, 1995.
Transfer is defined as "a movement from
one position to another which is of
equivalent rank, level or salary without
break in service involving the issuance of an
appointment."21 The designation of
respondents Rumbaoa and Teves did not
involve a movement from one position to
another. Neither did it involve the issuance
of any appointment to the said
positions in their favor. In fact, respondents
Rumbaoa and Teves retained their
incumbent positions at the Villamor Air
Base Elementary School. As such, their
designation could not be considered as a
"transfer" within the meaning of a
prohibited act during the election period.
CAUSING v. COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Causing is the municipal civil
registrar since 1993. In 2010, Mayor Biron
issued a Memo ordering Causing to be
detailed at the Office of the Mayor, her
table will be provided there.
and legal meanings, transfer and detail
must be construed as such.
Obviously, the movement involving Causing
did not equate to either a transfer or a
detail within the contemplation of the law if
Mayor Biron only thereby physically
transferred her office area from its old
location to the Office of the Mayor "some
little steps" away.34 We cannot accept the
petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the
phrase "any transfer or detail whatsoever"
encompassed "any and all kinds and
manner of personnel movement,"35
including the mere change in office location.

Because of this, Causing filed a complaint

claiming that the order of Biron was an
Unlawful Transfer being made during the
election period.

Biron contends that the transfer was merely

for supervision and such was an exercise of
management prerogatives.

TRANSFER DOES NOT INCLUDE PHYSICAL

TRANSFER: The only personnel movements
prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No.
8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is
defined in the Resolution as "any personnel
movement from one government agency to
another or from one department, division,
geographical unit or subdivision of a
government agency to another with or
without the issuance of an appointment;"
while detailas defined in the Administrative
Code of 1987is the movement of an
employee from one agency to another
without the issuance of an
33
appointment. Having acquired technical