JARILLIO V.

PEOPLE 

G.R. No. 164435, [June 29, 2010]

DOCTRINE: 

He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.

FACTS:

On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo,being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo in
1974, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora
Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in 1999.

 On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment of marriage before
the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against Alocillo in 2000.

 For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still
married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and
Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her
marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of
bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor.

 On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when she contracted
marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null
and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of
her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages
were celebrated without a marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.

 In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage to Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and executory. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.

ISSUE: 

W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite the supervening
proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.

HELD: 

No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a
second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid
until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

 The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil action
for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first
marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not
a prejudicial question.
 Braza vs. Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental 
G.R. No. 181174, December 4, 2009

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident. During
the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife
and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick’s birth certificate from
the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1) Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by
the father on January 13, 1997;  and, (2) Patrick was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents;
hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract
showing that Pablo and Lucille were married in 1998.

Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct
the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have
been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on
account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.

Petitioner prayed for the:

1. Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his
acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;

2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA
testing to determine his paternity and filiation;

3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the
declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not
acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, and that the controversy should
be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue: 

May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct entries in the civil
registrar?

Held:

No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil
registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct
clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a
harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested
parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 

The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be
filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as
well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not
through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo.
 Juan De Dios Carlos vs Felipe Sandoval

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each had three parcels of land by virtue of
inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by his wife Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II.
Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos
commenced an action for the annulment of the marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad. In his complaint, Carlos asserted
that the marriage between his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage
license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos
II. He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as
proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

ISSUE: Who may file an action for annulment of marriage?

HELD: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be
filed by any party outside of the marriage. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages
or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory
or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not
to seek its dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988.

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of
the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never
intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law.
They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable
Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the
marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on
March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.

Carlos commenced the nullity of marriage case against Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on
May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to
declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married , or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party
who can demonstrate “proper interest”  can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any
other actions, must be prosecuted or defended  in the name of the real party-in-interest   and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Ninal v. Badayog,  the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
 ENGRACE NIÑAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIÑAL, INGRID
NIÑAL, ARCHIE NIÑAL & PEPITO NIÑAL, JR., petitioners, v. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000

Facts:

Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. She was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were
thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident

After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the
assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not
among the persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issues:

(a) Whether or not Pepito and Norma’ living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts them
from obtaining a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

(b) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity
of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Niñal, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Niñal is already dead

Ruling:

(a) On the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of cohabitation as “husband and
wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. The five-year period should
be the years immediately before the day the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized
by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years, and continuity—that is,
unbroken. Otherwise, if that five-year cohabitation period is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing
with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.

(b) The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void
marriages are not identical. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either,
in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v. GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.

Facts:

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that
respondent’s wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of  Antique who had been
deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; and second, Nolasco’s attempt to have his marriage
annulled in the same proceeding was a cunning attempt to circumvent the law on marriage.

Respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a
bar in England during one of his ship’s port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with
respondent Nolasco on his ship for six months until they returned to respondent’s hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19
November 1980 after his seaman’s contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker in
San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San Jose.

He obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose,  Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica
had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left Antique.

Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in England proved fruitless.
He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired
from among friends but they too had no news of Janet Monica.

The trial court granted Nolasco’s petition hereby declaring the presumptively death of Janet Monica Parker Nolasco,
without prejudice to her reappearance.

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker
presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for
such declaration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.

Issue:

Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

Ruling:

No. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a “well-founded belief” that she is dead. Pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code, a marriage contracted by
any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-
founded belief required by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of
a court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead. Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
trial court’s decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby reversed and both Decisions are hereby
nullified and set aside.
 ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES AM NO. MTJ 92 706 MARCH 25, 1995

FACTS:

This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of impropriety against Judge Brillantes.

Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children with Yolanda de Castro, who are living together in a home purchased by
him in 1987 in Manila. On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told that
Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro. Lupo left the home without confronting Brillantes. Thereafter,
respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection  of his children  from him.
Lupo claims that Brillantes is married to Ongkiko with whom he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged
that Lupo was not married to de Castro and that he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits having 5
children with her. Brillantes claims that when he married de Castro in 1991 at California, he believed in all good
faith and with all legal intents and purposes, that he was single because her first marriage was solemnized
without a marriage license.

Brillantes argues that the provision of Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his first
marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines while the second marriage
which took place in 1991 was governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to Brillantes.

HELD:

 Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988 regardless of
date of the first marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the Family Code said Art. 15 is given “retroactive effect” insofar
as it does prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The
retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman.
 Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity.  The couple got married in
1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and
a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his
parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances.  In
1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged.   Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
her and their child.  Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.  What constitutes
psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction
personalities.  It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the
essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.  Reynaldo’s action at
the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for
psychological incapacity.  The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband
cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability.  In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in
this case:

 Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

 Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 Such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
 Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
 Decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 Court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.
 MARCOS V. MARCOS

Facts

Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.

Issues

 Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a

requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.

 Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.

Held

Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality
of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important,
there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show
that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and
for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.

SUAZO v. SUAZO
G.R. No.  164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo  and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.  Without any means to support
themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most  of
the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage,
Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived.  10 years later, she filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged
physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both
her psychological report and testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not
personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that Angelito is unfit to comply
with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive
dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person
lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it and held that the respondent may have failed to
provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were
manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified.  The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the
marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation.  The evidence that she got from the
petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could
have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit.  The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC
decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and
its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The psychologist evaluated
Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she derived all her conclusions from information coming
from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming
from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively
formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be
conclusive with respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology employed
simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be
suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general
description of Angelito’s purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a
link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s
testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere
refusal to perform marital obligations. 
 It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his
marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations.  Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an
adverse integral element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown.  Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.

FACTS: 

In its June 5, 2002 decision,  the RTC declared Cesar’s marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The petitioner,
through the OSG, appealed to the CA. The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological evaluation report did not
disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely
grounds for legal separation

ISSUE: 

How should “psychologically incapacity” under Art. 36 of the Family Code be interpreted?

How should the doubt be resolved in  voiding  of  marriage cases?

RULING:

1) In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
“downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations”; not merely
the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. The plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage),
gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse.

2) The Court stresses that marriage is an inviolable social institution protected by the State. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity. It
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, Dec.08, 1999

FACTS: Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcio’s
teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on became
sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the family as her husband
continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their marriage went okay. But this
eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another student who was also married. When
Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home
and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened when
he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter
part of 1986.  As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred
that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a
year old.  Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent
time with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her
marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition.
Hence, this case.

ISSUE: W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations

HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist
at the time of the celebration of marriage.  More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use
of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitioner-
appellant’s declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband’s character was on the
“borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky,” could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Lim v. Lim, G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009.

01SEP

[CARPIO, J.:]

FACTS: In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl
bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and
their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards. Edwards
family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl
had no steady source of income.

In 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of his grandmother in what the
trial court described a very compromising situation. Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners,
Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial
court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.

In 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly
support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to
Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial
court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with
Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x. Petitioners appealed to the Court of
Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards
income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order
No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines).

In 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim
(petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all
surnamed Lim (respondents).

ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

HELD: YES.

By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their

descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow
question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the
Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only
upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the childrens
minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority
over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to
her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to
respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and
Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the
nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To
hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating
extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if
ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly
understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to
receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
Unfortunately, Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined
from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.

VALERIO E. KALAW v. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, GR No. 166357, 2015-01-14

Facts:
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses... were premised on
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner's experts
heavily relied on petitioner's allegations of respondent's constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and... neglect of their children. Petitioner's experts opined that
respondent's alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
In his Motion for Reconsideration,[3] the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into
what constitutes psychological incapacity
Issues:
W/N the marriage is void on the ground of psychologically incapacitated. ... there is no basis for concluding that she
was indeed psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling:
molina case

The foregoing guidelines... have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of
the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read... and applied given the clear intendment of
the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its
application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori
assumptions,... predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity
that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in... examining the factual milieu and
the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court."
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage,
the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves... on the matter, and thus enable themselves
to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave,
antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.
We have to stress that the... fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution[14] only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a
marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage... has no legal existence.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the
better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying.[16] The
position and role of the trial judge in the... appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological
incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of
the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we... hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the
psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We
uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the
case records... and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the
veracity of the petitioner's factual premises.
Moreover, it is already settled... that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the
psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by
the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary task and burden...
of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."[18]... there is no requirement for one to be
declared psychologically incapacitated to be... personally examined by a physician, because what is
important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party's psychological incapacity.
Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity,
then actual... medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain
condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts... existed in the record, the expert opinion
should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the
causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or...
speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation
The expert's findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their
exclusion as evidence.
The frequency of the respondent's mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the... time she made her marital vows. Had
she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her
children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and
other vices that would erode their moral... fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent's obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her
family life, particularly on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to
her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling.
Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on... every occasion of her mahjong sessions
was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own
personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children's moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children