BP 22

BP 22 Defanged

Posted on May 1, 2017

AUTHOR:  ATTY. JOHN PHILIP C. SIAO 

Originally published in The Philippine Star (Point of Law column)

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22), is
the law that punishes the making or the drawing of a check to apply on account or for value
when the maker or drawer knew at the time of issue that the account against which the
check was drawn had no sufficient funds in, or enough credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of such check or when the maker or drawer of the check issues a stop payment
order on such a check without any valid reason. In both cases, the check is dishonored by
reason of insufficient funds. It is also a violation of BP 22 when the maker or drawer of such
a check fails to maintain sufficient funds in, or enough credit with, the drawee bank to
cover the full amount of the check for a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing
on the check and the check is dishonored for such reason. The penalty for violation of BP 22
is imprisonment for 30 days to one year or a fine, or both (Section 1, BP 22).

BP 22 was enacted to discourage the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks

from becoming “useless scraps of paper,” and to restore respectability to checks. The law
was enacted at a time when the stability and commercial value of checks, which are
recognized as being virtual substitutes for currency, were being threatened by the rampant
issuance of checks that were subsequently dishonored by drawee banks. Because BP 22
imposes imprisonment among its penalties, it is now a common practice for creditors to
require their debtors to issue post-dated checks to cover amortizations of their loan.
Accordingly, BP 22, to a certain degree, has achieved the purpose for which it was enacted.

In the past years, however, there have been two important developments regarding
BP 22. The first is the shift in policy as announced by the Supreme Court in its
Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-01 towards the imposition of a fine only, and
not imprisonment, for violations of BP 22. The second are decisions of the courts holding
that the prosecution in BP 22 must establish that a written notice of dishonor was actually
received by the maker or drawer of the dishonored check.

The Supreme Court in its Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 declared that, in
imposing the penalty for violations of BP 22, courts should follow the policy of “redeeming
valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.” In that regard,
in lieu of imprisonment, a fine in an amount equal to double the amount of the check
involved has been deemed an appropriate penalty for a violation of BP 22. Subsequently,
through Administrative Circular No. 13-01, the Supreme Court clarified that it did not
intend to remove the penalty of imprisonment but that courts should reserve imposing
imprisonment as a penalty for serious cases when the violation of BP 22 was committed in
such a way as would negatively affect the social order.

With regard to the second development, failure to establish that a written notice of
dishonor was actually received by the maker or drawer of the check is a ground for an
acquittal (Rico v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137191, 18 November 2002). This
second development is a very real problem faced by lawyers, either as private or public
prosecutors, in BP 22 cases. Oftentimes, the only, if not strongest, defense raised by an
accused in a BP 22 case is that he/ she never received any notice of dishonor. Numerous BP
22 cases have been dismissed and/ or have resulted in the acquittal of the accused on the
ground that the prosecution failed to establish that the accused had actually received a
notice of dishonor. In order to appreciate the impact of this development, we must realize
how difficult it really is to prove actual receipt of the notice of dishonor.

First, the prosecution in a BP 22 case must establish that (a) notice of dishonor was
sent to the issuer of the dishonored check and (b) that the same was actually received (Yu
Oh v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 125297, 6 June 2003). A notice of dishonor may be
sent to the maker or drawer of the dishonored check by (1) by personal service upon the
issuer or (2) by registered mail. If the notice of dishonor is sent by registered mail, the fact
of sending the notice of dishonor is established by the registry receipt, the registry return
card, and an affidavit executed by the person who mailed the notice of dishonor detailing
the circumstances of the mailing (Victor Ting “Teng See”, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
G.R. No. 140665, 13 November 2000).

As to establishing actual receipt, the prosecution must also prove that the signature
appearing on the registry return card or notice of dishonor, in case of personal service,
belongs to that of the issuer of the dishonored check or, at the very least, to his duly
authorized agent. In the latter case, the prosecution must establish the capacity and
authority of such person as agent. An illegible signature, such as when a recipient merely
signs his/ her initials on the registry return card or notice of dishonor, as the case may be,
does not prove that the issuer actually received the notice of dishonor (Victor Ting “Teng
See”, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 140665, 13 November 2000). It is also crucial
that the registry return card or the notice of dishonor indicate the date it was received in
order to fix the start of the five (5) day period within which the maker or drawer of the
check must pay or make arrangements for the payment of the amount of the check (Section
1, BP 22)(Danao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122353, 6 June 2001).

The notice of dishonor may be sent to the office of the maker or drawer of the
dishonored check but he must receive the notice personally or through his authorized
agent. A corporation or an officer of a corporation that receives a notice of dishonor
addressed to one of its employees has no obligation to forward the notice to the employee
concerned. Thus, such receipt is not the receipt contemplated by BP 22 (Lao v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, 20 June 1997). A notice of dishonor may also be sent to the
residence of the maker or drawer of the dishonored check and received by him/her, the
housemaids or houseboys who are deemed to have a special power-of-attorney to receive
mail in behalf of the addressee, or any member of the family of sufficient age or discretion
(Petilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150792, 3 March 2004). Notably, the notice of dishonor
may be sent to, and received by, the maker or drawer of the dishonored check wherever he
may be found as long as the fact and date of receipt are established.

Based on the foregoing, it is easy to see how, as a practical matter, it is very difficult
to establish actual receipt of the notice of dishonor. Save for physically forcing the issuer of
the check to receive the notice of dishonor, obtaining proof of personal receipt may prove
to be a daunting task, if not an outright impracticable one. Needless to say, most intended
recipients of the notice of dishonor may even refuse to receive the notice. With respect to
receipt of the notice of dishonor by a supposed authorized agent, it is the usual defense to
deny knowing the alleged agent. On the other hand, in the event that it was the househelp
who received the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer may conceivably even resort to
sending the househelp home to the province or to another employer, then deny that the
said househelp was ever in his/ her employ. There are, for the most part, no employment
records for househelp. Finally, it may not be realistic to expect that the registry return card
for the notice of dishonor could clearly state the name and signature of the recipient, since,
in practice, the postman will accept a simple initial from the recipient, which in no way
gives any clue as to the identity of the said recipient. In any event, the postman is not to
blame since he/ she cannot compel anybody to sign the registry return card against their
will. The question now is, how do you prove that the maker or drawer of the dishonored
check actually received the notice of dishonor under any of the above hypothetical
circumstances?

ERLINDA C. SAN MATEO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200090               March 6, 2013

To be liable for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be present: (1)
the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 4

In this case, the third element is present and had been adequately established. With respect
to the first element, the Court gives full faith and credit to the findings of the lower courts
that the checks were issued for value since San Mateo herself admitted that she drew and
issued the same as payment for the yarns she ordered from ITSP. Besides, the Court has
consistently pronounced that the issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of
checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of
a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.5

But the Court finds that the second element was not sufficiently established. Section 2 6 of
B.P. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency
of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however,
arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and
that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangements for its payment.7
Here, there is no basis in concluding that San Mateo knew of the insufficiency of her funds.
While she may have requested Sehwani in her letters dated October 8, 2005 and November
11, 2005, to defer depositing all the checks, with maturity dates of July and August 2005,
otherwise, her account will close, such act did not amount to an admission that, when she
issued those checks, she knew that she would have no sufficient funds in the drawee bank
to pay for them.8

Upon the other hand, the records show that Sehwani tried to serve the notice of dishonor to
San Mateo two times. On the first occasion, Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San
Mateo’s residence at Greenhills, San Juan which the security guard refused to accept. Thus,
the liaison officer left the letter with the security guard with the instruction to hand it to
San Mateo. But the prosecution failed to show that the letter ever reached San Mateo.

On the second occasion, Sehwani’s counsel sent a demand letter to San Mateo by registered
mail which was returned with the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that San Mateo
did not claim it despite three notices to her.

It has been the consistent ruling of this Court that receipts for registered letters including
return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to
serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. 9 To be sure, the
presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the
required proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused received such notice. It is not
enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the accused. The
prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service
provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. 10

In King v. People,11 the complainant sent the accused a demand letter via registered mail.
But the records showed that the accused did not receive it. The postmaster likewise
certified that the letter was returned to sender. Yet despite the clear import of the
postmaster’s certification, the prosecution did not adduce proof that the accused received
the post office notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. The Court held
that it was possible that the drawee bank sent the accused a notice of dishonor, but the
prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that the accused actually
received it. It was also possible that the accused was trying to flee from the complainant by
staying in different addresses. But speculations and possibilities cannot take the place of
proof. The conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. 12
Since there is insufficient proof that San Mateo actually received the notice of dishonor, the
presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise. For this reason,
the Court cannot convict her with moral certainty of violation of B.P. 22.

Nevertheless, San Mateo’s acquittal does not entail the extinguishment of her civil liability
for the dishonored checks.13 An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not preclude the award of civil damages. 14 For this reason, the trial court’s directive
for San Mateo to pay the civil liability in the amount of ₱134,275.00 representing the total
value of the 11 checks plus 12% interest per annum from the time the said sum became
due and demandable until fully paid, stands.

LEONORA B. RIMANDO vs SPOUSES WINSTON and ELENITA ALDABA and PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 203583               October 13, 2014

At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not
necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is
well-settled that "the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment
against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable
doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil
action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there isa finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him."22

In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the
crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps.
Aldaba to induce them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly
traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba
on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the
latter, and assuch, she may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check. 23 Verily,
Rimando’s civil liability to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of ₱500,000.00 does not arise from or
is not based upon the crime she is charged with, and hence, the CA correctly upheld the
same despite her acquittal in the estafa case.

In this relation, the CA is also correct in holding that Rimando’s acquittal and subsequent
exoneration in the BP 22 cases had no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were
founded on the same factual circumstances. In Nierras v. Judge Dacuycuy, 24 the Court laid
down the fundamental differences between BP 22 and estafa, to wit:

What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are
essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored
gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the
same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code.
Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored
check may be convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for
a preexisting obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are imposed in
each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury
to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are
mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita. 25

Owing to such differences, jurisprudence in People v. Reyes 26 even instructs that the
simultaneous filing of BP 22 and estafa cases do not amount to double jeopardy:

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may
refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be
limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of
offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense is
one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because
what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2)
offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is
forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of
information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy. 27

Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of
facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered "separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Therefore, both cases
can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject
to the prohibition on double recovery. 28 Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the
criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in the
criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs CARLOS* DUQUE & TERESA DUQUE

G.R. No. 216467 February 15, 2017

The only issue in the present case is whether or not respondents, as corporate officers, may
still be held civilly liable despite their acquittal from the criminal charge of violation of BP
22.

The Court rules in the negative, as this matter has already been settled by jurisprudence. In
the case of Gosiaco v. Ching,15 this Court enunciated the rule that a corporate officer who
issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly liable when he is
convicted.1âwphi1 In the said case, the Court ruled that:

When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name he

may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute.1avvphi1 The
statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud
another of money or property, draws or issues a check on any bank with
 knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such bank to meet the check on
presentment. Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is
predicated on the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from
his own acts on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal
act.16

The Court, citing the case of Bautista v. Auto Plus Traders, Incorporated, et. al., 17 nonetheless
categorically held that the civil liability of a corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished
with the criminal liability."18

The above rule is reiterated in the recent case of Navarra v. People, et al., 19 where the
petitioner, the Chief Finance Officer of a corporation, who was the signatory of the
dishonored corporate checks, was convicted of the offense of violation of BP 22 and was
ordered to pay the private complainant civil indemnity in an amount equivalent to the
value of the checks which bounced. The Court held thus:

The general rule is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing

corporate check can be held civilly liable when he is convicted. The
criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing checks in behalf of a
corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself,
such civil liability arising from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this
criminal liability with the corresponding civil liability of the corporation
itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability, not from the
corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf. 20

As held above, it is clear that the civil liability of the corporate officer for the issuance of a
bouncing corporate check attaches only if he is convicted. Conversely, therefore, it will
follow that once acquitted of the offense of violating BP 22, a corporate officer is discharged
from any civil liability arising from the issuance of the worthless check in the name of the
corporation he represents. This is without regard as to whether his acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt or that there was a pronouncement by the trial court that the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Moreover, in the present case, nothing in the records at hand would show that respondents
made themselves personally nor solidarily liable for the corporate obligations either as
accommodation parties or sureties. On the contrary, there is no dispute that respondents
signed the subject check in their capacity as corporate officers and that the check was
drawn in the name of FCI as payment for the obligation of the corporation and not for the
personal indebtedness of respondents. Neither is there allegation nor proof that the veil of
corporate fiction is being used by respondents for fraudulent purposes. The rule is that
juridical entities have personalities separate and distinct from its officers and the persons
composing it.21 Generally, the stockholders and officers are not personally liable for the
obligations of the corporation except only when the veil of corporate fiction is being used
as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice, 22 which is not the case here.
Hence, respondents cannot be held liable for the value of the checks issued in payment for
FCI's obligation.
The cases of Mitra v. People, et al.23 and Llamado v. Court of Appeals, et. al., 24 which were
cited by petitioner, may not be made as bases to rule against respondents because the
accused in the said cases were found guilty of violating BP 22. Thus, the general rule that a
corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can be held civilly liable when
convicted, applies to them. In the present case, however, respondents were acquitted of the
offense charged. As such, consistent with the rule established
in Bautista and Gosiaco, respondents' civil liability was extinguished with their criminal
liability. In the same manner, the Court agrees with the CA that the case of Alferez v. People,
et al.25 is neither applicable to the present case on the ground that, while Alferez was
acquitted from the charge of violation of BP 22, the checks which bounced were issued by
Alferez in his personal capacity and in payment of his personal obligations.

ROBERT CHUA vs PEOPLE OF THE PIIlLIPPINES

G.R. No. 196853 July 13, 2015

In order to successfully hold an accused liable for violation of BP 22, the following essential
elements must be present: "(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for
account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of
issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." 33 "Of the three (3)
elements, the second element is the hardest to prove as it involves a state of mind. Thus,
Section 2 of BP 22 creates a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which,
however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of
dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the
check or to make arrangements for its payment.34

In the instant case, what is in dispute is the existence of the second element. Chua asserts
that the absence of the date of his actual receipt on the face of the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993 prevented the legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds
from arising. On the other hand, the MeTC opined that while the date of Chua’s actual
receipt of the subject demand letter is not affixed thereon, it is presumed that he received
the same on the date of the demand letter (November 30, 1993). Moreover, the lower
courts banked on the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel as to the existence of the
demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. By reason of such stipulation, they all held
that Chua could no longer impugn the said demand letter.

In Danao v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court discussed the importance of proving the date of
actual receipt of the notice of dishonor, viz.:

In King vs. People, this Court, through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held: "To hold a
person liable under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was
subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew
‘at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment.’ Because this element involves a
state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima
facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows:

‘SEC 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds – The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit
with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements
for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Thus, this Court further ruled in King, "in order to create the prima facie presumption that
the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a
notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of
the check or make arrangement for its payment."

Indeed, the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 "gives the accused an

opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. This
opportunity, as this Court stated in Lozano vs. Martinez, serves to mitigate the harshness of
the law in its application.

In other words, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker
or drawer of the bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received
by the drawer, then the presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2
of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the
crucial 5-day period."36 (Italics in the original, emphasis supplied)

Similarly in the present case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period under
Section 22 of BP 22 would start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually
received the demand letter dated November 30, 1993. The MeTC cannot simply presume
that the date of the demand letter was likewise the date of Chua’s receipt thereof. There is
simply no such presumption provided in our rules on evidence. In addition, from the
inception of this case Chua has consistently denied having received subject demand letter.
He maintains that the paper used for the purported demand letter was still blank when
presented to him for signature and that he signed the same for another purpose. Given
Chua’s denial, it behooved upon the prosecution to present proof of his actual receipt of the
November 30, 1993 demand letter. However, all that the prosecution did was to present it
without, however, adducing any evidence as to the date of Chua’s actual receipt thereof. It
must be stressed that ‘[t]he prosecution must also prove actual receipt of [the notice of
dishonor] because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of
such notice of dishonor by the accused."37 "The burden of proving notice rests upon the
party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove
notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P. Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of
notice"38 which the Court finds wanting in this case.
Anent the stipulation entered into by Chua’s counsel, the MeTC stated:

In the course of the said proceedings, the defense counsel manifested that he is willing to
stipulate as to the existence of the demand letter and the signature of the accused as
reflected on the face of the demand letter. x x x

xxxx

The prosecution had proved also that private complainant personally sent a written notice
of dishonor of the subject checks to the accused and that the latter personally received the
same. In fact, the defense stipulated in open court the existence of the said demand letter
and the signature of the accused as reflected in the face of the demand letter. x x x In view
of that stipulation, the defense is now estopped in denying its receipt thereof. 39

As earlier mentioned, this ruling of the MeTC was affirmed by both the RTC and the CA.

The Court, however, disagrees with the lower courts. It is plain that the stipulation only
refers to the existence of the demand letter and of Chua’s signature thereon. In no way can
an admission of Chua’s receipt of the demand letter be inferred therefrom. Hence, Chua
cannot be considered estopped from claiming non-receipt. Also, the Court observes that
Chua’s admission with respect to his signature on the demand letter is consistent with his
claim that See made him sign blank papers where the contents of the demand letter dated
November 30, 1993 were later intercalated.

In view of the above discussion, the Court rules that the prosecution was not able to
sufficiently prove the existence of the second element of BP 22.

November 29, 2017

G.R. No. 197849

RAFFY BRODETH and ROLAN B. ONAL, Petitioners

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ABRAHAM G. VILLEGAS, Respondents

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioners Raffy Brodeth (Brodeth) and
Rolan B. Onal (Onal) assailing the 17 May 2011 Decision2 and the 20 July 2011 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33104. The CA affirmed petitioners' criminal liability for
violating Batas Pambansa Big. 22 (B.P. Big. 22).

THE FACTS

On 16 August 2001, petitioners were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30A
Manila (MeTC), with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The informations read:

Criminal Case No. 371104-CR

That on or about September 5, 1999 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make or draw and issue to VILL INTEGRATED
TRANSPORT CORP., rep. by ABRAHAM VILLEGAS to apply on account or for value METROBANK
Check No. 2700111416 dated September 5, 1999 in the amount of ₱123,600.00 payable to Vill
Integrated Transport Corporation said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he/she/they
did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds (DAIF)" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused, failed to pay
said VILL INTEGRATED TRANSPORT CORPORATION the amount of the check or make arrangement
for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.4

Criminal Case No. 371105-CR

That on or about August 31, 1999 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously make or draw and issue to VILL INTEGRATED
TRANSPORT CORP., rep. by ABRAHAM VILLEGAS to apply on account or for value METROBANK
Check No. 2700111415 dated August 31, 1999 in the amount of P 140,000.00 payable to Vill
Integrated Transport Corporation said accused well knowing that at the time of issue he/she/they
did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon
presentment, which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date
thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds (DAIF)" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused, failed to pay
said VILL INTEGRATED TRANSPORT CORPORATION the amount of the check to make arrangement
for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.5

The charges against petitioners stemmed from an affidavit-complaint dated 23 November 2000
filed by Abraham G. Villegas (Villegas), the Operations Manager of Vill Integrated Transportation
Corporation (Vill Integrated). He alleged that in the course of his company's operations, he
transacted with Land & Sea Resources Phils. (L&S Resources), Inc. by providing the latter
equipment and tugboats for its own operations. After the execution of the service contracts, L&S
Resources started using the equipment and tugboats, and even made partial payments to Vill
Integrated. However, L&S Resources had not fully paid all of Vill Integrated's billings and its officers
only made promises to settle them but never did.6

According to Villegas, among the payments made by L&S Resources were three (3) checks drawn
against Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). Two (2) out of these three (3) checks,
particularly: (a) Metrobank Check No. 2700111415 dated 31 August 1999, and (b) Metrobank
Check No. 2700111416 dated 5 September 1999,7 are the subject checks in the instant case. When
the subject checks were deposited to Vill Integrated's account, they were dishonored as they were
"Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF)."8

On 9 October 1999, and on 3 May 2000, due to L&S Resources' growing outstanding balance, its
refusal to comply with continued demand for payment, and on account of its checks that bounced,
Vill Integrated sent demand letters to settle the L&S Resources' account.9

Despite the demands, L&S Resources did not settle its account; hence, the filing of the criminal
complaint against petitioners.

In his counter-affidavit executed on 8 May 2008, Brodeth alleged that L&S Resources' balance
pertaining to the subject checks were settled in cash duly received by Vill Integrated's officer. But,
only one (1) of the three (3) checks was returned. Upon inquiry, Brodeth was informed that the
outstanding accounts were not the obligations of L&S Resources but of one Noli Dela Cerna.10
These allegations were backed up by Onal's letter dated 10 November 1999, explaining that Vill
Integrated should bill Noli dela Cerna instead.11

On 2 July 2008, the MeTC found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offense charged.
The MeTC held that the dishonor of the subject checks was sufficiently shown by the letters "DAIF"
written at the back of the checks, which is prima facie evidence that the drawee bank had
dishonored the checks. Moreover, the MeTC ruled that petitioners had known the checks were
dishonored because they admitted they had the demand letters.12

The MeTC Ruling

With regard to their defense, the MeTC was not convinced that the two (2) dishonored checks were
paid at all, to wit:

The defense contends that it was another officer of Land and Sea Resources by the name of Noli
Dela Cerna who had a remaining obligation to Vill Integrated which was not allegedly the obligation
of their company Land and Sea Resources but a personal obligation of Mr. Dela Cerna. The defense
further argues that since Vill Integrated could no longer locate the whereabouts of Mr. Dela Cerna,
Vill Integrated chose to pressure them into paying the obligation of the latter.

However, in the course of his testimony, Mr. Brodeth somehow made a three hundred sixty-degree
tum on his first contention when he testified that these checks were already paid on staggered basis
as well [as] an alleged arrangement with a certain Cristina Villegas that payment will be made in
cash, fuel oil and food for the crew. However, as Mr. Brodeth himself admitted there were no
receipts to prove such payments.
Be that as it may, the defense was not able to show any convincing proof to back up both
contentions. In fact, their first contention that it was Mr. Dela Cerna who owes the complainant
company was not even heavily relied upon by them.

The accused anchors his defense mainly on the fact that the subject checks were already paid and
made good. Such being the case, the court deems it unnecessary to delve further on this line of
argument and instead will discuss the merits of its main defense that the checks were already paid.

To the mind of the court, it is quite absurd to think that the company or for that matter both
accused would just pay Vill Integrated without any proof to show that payments were indeed made.
This attitude is not normal considering that both accused were engaged in business themselves. As
such they were presumed to know the ordinary and routine duty that a receipt is necessary to
evidence payment. In fact, it is not even a duty to ask for a receipt as proof of a purchase or for any
payment made but it is a common practice and a correlative duty on both seller and buyer or
creditor and debtor to issue one.

Furthermore, no person in his right mind would just part way[ s] with his hard[-]earned money
without any assurance that it will be received by its rightful possessor and in this case it was the
company Vill Integrated.

Accused Brodeth contends that the company closed down sometime in 2000. This is the reason why
he could no longer locate the receipts. To the mind of the court this is a flimsy excuse and could be a
last[-]ditch effort to exonerate them from liability.

It is but natural to safely keep the said receipt[s] if indeed they exist. Sad to say, Land and Sea
Resources, through both accused, were remiss of its simple duty and as such, they should suffer the
consequences.

Moreover, if indeed payments were already made, Vill Integrated would not exert efforts to go
through the painstaking rigors of court trial. Obviously, Vill Integrated was not paid because the
subject checks given as payment were dishonored by the bank, hence, it was forced to file these
present cases.

The defense also offers Exhibit "2" to prove that the amounts of the check were paid. The court
cannot consider this evidence since what has been presented was a mere photocopy. The original
document was never presented in court. In fact, defense counsel undertook to submit the original of
the said document but up to this date the same was not presented in court.

Furthermore, Exhibit "2," which is purportedly a letter addressed to Vill Integrated regarding the
obligations of Land and Sea, does not refer nor does it mention the checks subject of these cases.

To reiterate, the defense was not able to convince the court that the two (2) checks that were
dishonored were paid at all. No documentary proof was shown that the checks were paid or made
good after they were dishonored except the bare allegation of the defense that they were paid.
Without such proof to support its allegation, the defense of payment must fail.

To make matters worse, accused Raffy Brodeth readily admitted in his cross[-]examination to have
issued the two (2) checks and that despite claiming to have already paid it, he could not produce
any receipt to prove his claim.13
Accordingly, the MeTC ordered petitioners to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00 for each check that was
issued, totaling ₱400,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. They were
likewise ordered to pay Vill Integrated ₱283,600.00 as civil indemnity, and the costs of suit.14

On 29 July 2008, petitioners timely filed a notice of appeal, and the case was forwarded to the
Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.15

The RTC Ruling

After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of
Manila (RTC), in Criminal Case Nos. 08- 264256-57, found no reversible error in the MeTC's
decision and affirmed it in toto.16 The RTC's disposition is as follows:

On the first issue, the [c]ourt finds that the lower court has jurisidiction over the cases. The
Affidavit-Complaint of Abraham G. Villegas (Exh. "J"), Operations Manager of Vill Integrated states
that the checks were issued in Manila. Paragraph 9 of the said complaint affidavit, which was
admitted as part of the testimony of Mr. Villegas states:

9. Despite the receipt of the said letters, the above-named principal officers, Rolan B. Onal, Noli de la
Cerna and Raffy Brodeth ignored our letters in refusing to pay not only their account of
Pl,078,238.24 but also refused to redeem the two (2) checks dated August 31, 1999 and September
5, 1999, to our detriment and prejudice, which checks were issued on said dates in Manila, so we
were forced to again refer the matter to our lawyer, Atty. Romualdo M. Jubay, who sent new
demand letters to the said persons dated Octber 15, 2000 and October 27, 2000, xerox copies of
which letters are hereto attached and marked as Annexes "P" and "Q." (emphasis in the original)

A case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 can be filed either at the place where the ckeck was issued or
paid. In the instant case, as already stated, the checks were issued in Manila.

Anent the second issue, accused-appellants insisted that the fact that the prosecution did not
present a bank personnel to attest to the fact of dishonor of the checks created doubt as to the
authenticity and genuineness for the reason therefor, as stamped at the back of the checks. This is
misplaced.

In order to hold[ ... ] liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, aside from the fact of dishonor, it must also
be established beyond reasonable doubt that he knew the fact and reason for the dishonor of the
check. In the instant case, the original checks were presented in court. Accused were notified
through a demand letter of the dishonor of the checks. The defense conceded receipt of the notice of
dishonor. Accused-appellants redeemed one of the checks but failed to redeem the two other
checks. This sufficed to make them fall within the ambit of the law.

On the third issue, accused-appellants posit that they cannot be held liable of the issuance of the
subject checks because they issued them in good faith, and as requested by private complainant to
ensure payment of the obligations of Land and Sea Resources. Accused-appellants were officers of
the corporation. They were the ones who issued the checks in favor of Land and Sea Resources. As
drawers of the subject checks on behalf of the corporation, they must be held criminally liable
thereon. Besides, "Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored
checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee."17 (citation omitted)
After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration,18 petitioners filed a petition for review
before the CA.19

In the assailed decision, the CA denied petitioners' appeal. It emphasized that the gravamen of the
offense charges is the issuance of a bouncing check regardless of the purpose why it was issued.
The fact that the checks were drawn by a corporation cannot exculpate petitions from the charge
against them. Further, the CA maintained that the Me TC had jurisdiction to try the case because the
complaint-affidavit categorically stated that the checks were issued in Manila, to wit:

As regards the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the M[e]TC to try the case, a [v]iolation of B.P. [Blg.] 22
can be filed either in the place where the check was issued or when it was presented for payment.
The RTC ruled correctly that the M[e]TC has jurisdiction to try the case for the reason that the
affidavit-complaint of private complainant categorically stated that the checks were issued in
Manila.20

Petitioners filed the instant petition after the CA promulgated the assailed resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration. They rely on the following grounds in their petition:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED RELIANCE ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE TO

ESTABLISH TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE METRO POLIT AN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED THE APPLICATION OF A PRESUMPTION ON

KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRESENT
EVEN AN IOTA OF PROOF TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS COULD BE CHARGED WITH KNOWLEDGE
OF THE CORPORA TE FUNDS; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY AFFIRMED PETITIONERS' CONVICTION DESPITE THE
APP ARENT FAIL URE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.21

OUR RULING

Without having to consider the other two (2) assignments of errors, we find merit in the petition
because the MeTC had no territorial jurisdiction over the instant case.

Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. In all criminal
prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory
wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients took place. The
fact as to where the offense charged was committed is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint or informations.22

In Isip v. People,23 we explained:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.24 (emphasis supplied)

To reiterate, a court cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory, and if the evidence adduced during trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.25

Petitioners argue that the MeTC had no jurisdiction because Villegas' allegation that the subject
checks were issued in Manila was unsubstantiated. They explain that the lower courts should not
have relied on this allegation for being hearsay considering that Villegas had no firsthand
knowledge about the transaction between Vill Integrated and L&S Resources.

We agree with this position.

A careful review of the rulings of the lower courts would show that the only piece of evidence they
considered connecting the alleged violation of B.P. Big. 22 within the territorial jurisdiction of the
MeTC is the affidavit-complaint of Villegas. In this affidavit, the allegation that the subject checks
were issued in Manila was mentioned only once even though the circumstances behind the issuance
of the checks were referred to a couple of times.26 Moreover, the phrase "in Manila" only appeared
in the ninth paragraph of Villegas' affidavit where the elements of the offense were already being
summarized. Looking at the affidavit itself already casts some doubt as to where the subject checks
were really issued.

More importantly, we agree with petitioners that Villegas could not have testified or alleged in his
affidavit that the checks were issued in Manila because he was not privy to the contractual
negotiations with L&S Resources nor was he present when petitioners issued the checks. In fact, his
position in the company did not give him any opportunity to deal directly with his clients as
brought out in his cross-examination:

Q: Mr. Villegas, you said that you are an Operations Manager of the Vill Integrated Transport
Corporation?

A: Yes sir.

xxxx

Q: You said that you are the operations manager, specifically said that your main duties and
responsibilities (sic) to oversee maintenance of your tugboat, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: So directly or indirectly, you are not involved in dealing with customers of Vill Integrated
Transport Corporation, is that correct?

A: Yes sir.
Q: So, in the particular case the dealing with Rolan Onal and Raffy Brodeth, you are not involved in
any way, is that right?

A: No sir.

Q: As a matter of fact, Mr. Villegas, in the Contract dated 16 August 1999 that was previously
marked by your counsel, you were never a signatory to that contract?

A: No sir.

Q: That confirmed a fact that you are not in any way directly or indirectly involved in the
transaction with both accused.

A: No sir.27

Furthermore, petitioners claimed in defense that the checks were issued as a guarantee for the
payments. As admitted by Vill Integrated's liason officer, their company collects payments from its
clients in their respective offices.28 Considering that L&S Resources' principal place of business is
in Makati City, it would be out of the ordinary course of business operations for petitioners to go all
the way to Manila just to issue the checks.

Our ruling in Morillo v. People29 is instructive as to where violations of B.P. Blg. 22 should be filed
and tried:

It is well-settled that violations of B.P. [Blg.] 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation
occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein
any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the
case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus,
a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed.

The OSG, relying on our ruling in Rigor v. People, concluded that "the Supreme Court regarded the
place of deposit and the place of dishonor as distinct from one another and considered the place
where the check was issued, delivered and dishonored, and not where the check was deposited, as
the proper venue for the filing of a B.P. Big. 22 case." The Court, however, cannot sustain such
conclusion.

In said case, the accused therein obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
in payment thereof, he issued a check drawn against Associated Bank of Tarlac. Thereafter, Rural
Bank deposited the check at PS Bank, San Juan, but the same was returned for the reason that it had
been dishonored by Associated Bank of Tarlac. When all other efforts to demand the repayment of
the loan proved futile, Rural Bank filed an action against the accused for violation of B.P. Big. 22 at
the RTC of Pasig City, wherein crimes committed in San Juan are triable. The accused, however,
contends that the RTC of Pasig had no jurisdiction thereon since no proof had been offered to show
that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge of insufficiency of funds
occurred in the Municipality of San Juan. The Court, however, disagreed and held that while the
check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac Branch, evidence clearly
showed that the accused had drawn, issued and delivered it at Rural Bank, San Juan, viz.:
Lastly, petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court of Pasig had no jurisdiction over this case
since no proof has been offered that his check was issued, delivered, dishonored or that knowledge
of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The contention is untenable.

x x x x.

The evidence clearly shows that the undated check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of
San Juan, Metro Manila on November 16, 1989, and subsequently the check was dated February 16,
1990 thereat. On May 25, 1990, the check was deposited with PS Bank, San Juan Branch, Metro
Manila. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:

Violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or continuing crimes. A suit on the check can
be filed in any of the places where any of the elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the
check is drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. x x x

The information at bar effectively charges San Juan as the place of drawing and issuing. The
jurisdiction of courts in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information. Although, the check was dishonored by the drawee, Associated Bank, in its Tarlac
Branch, appellant has drawn, issued and delivered it at RBSJ, San Juan. The place of issue and
delivery was San Juan and knowledge, as an essential part of the offense, was also overtly
manifested in San Juan. There is no question that crimes committed in November, 1989 in San Juan
are triable by the RTC stationed in Pasig. In short both allegation and proof in this case sufficiently
vest jurisdiction upon the RTC in Pasig City.

The bone of contention in Rigor, therefore, was whether the prosecution had offered sufficient
proof that the check drawn in violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was issued, delivered, dishonored or that
knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in the Municipality of San Juan, thereby vesting
jurisdiction upon the RTC of Pasig City. Nowhere in the cited case, however, was it held, either
expressly or impliedly, that the place where the check was deposited is not the proper venue for
actions involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. It is true that the Court, in Rigor, acknowledged the fact
that the check was issued and delivered at the Rural Bank of San Juan while the same was deposited
with the PS Bank of San Juan. But such differentiation cannot be taken as basis sufficient enough to
conclude that the court of the place of deposit cannot exercise jurisdiction over violations of B.P.
Blg. 22. In the absence, therefore, of any ground, jurisprudential or otherwise, to sustain the OSG's
arguments, the Court cannot take cognizance of a doctrine that is simply inapplicable to the issue at
hand.

In contrast, the ruling in Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner is more squarely on point
with the instant case.1â wphi1 In Nieva, the accused delivered to Ramon Joven a post-dated check
drawn against the Commercial Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check was
deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands. Joven was advised, however,
that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason that the account against
which the check was drawn is a "closed account." Consequently, the accused was charged with
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the accused that said
court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the Court categorically ruled:

As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try
the cases charged herein as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it
to say that such contention has no basis. The evidence discloses that the check was deposited
and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of the Philippine
Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the
crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized
as transitory or continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that a person charged
with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.

In fact, in the more recent Yalong v. People, wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure
were the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred:

Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong's appeal still remains
dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly acquired jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 cases is categorized as
transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in
one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of
the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case;
it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Stated
differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a
criminal case for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements
occurred - in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.

In this case, while it is undisputed that the subject check was drawn, issued, and delivered in
Manila, records reveal that Ylagan presented the same for deposit and encashment at the LBC Bank
in Batangas City where she learned of its dishonor. As such, the MTCC [of Batangas City] correctly
took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 45414 as it had the territorial jurisdiction to try and resolve
the same. In this light, the denial of the present petition remains warranted.

Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of the place
where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with jurisdiction to try
cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject of the instant case was
drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over
the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject check was deposited and presented for
encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable PCIBank. The Me TC of Makati, therefore, correctly
took cognizance of the instant case and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction.30 (emphases in the original and citations omitted)

From the foregoing, we can deduce that a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be
filed and tried either at the place where the check was issued, drawn, delivered, or deposited. In the
present case, however, evidence on record is missing at any of these material places.

Again, the only factual link to the territorial jurisdiction of the Me TC is the allegation that the
subject checks were issued in Manila. In criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the elements
of the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere
allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable.
To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not' be made equivalent to proof.
All said, since the prosecution failed to prove that the subject checks were issued in Manila nor was
any evidence shown that these were either drawn, delivered, or deposited in Manila, the MeTC has
no factual basis for its territorial jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The 17 May 2011 Decision and the 20 July 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33104 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila.
Criminal Case Nos. 371104-CR & 371105-CR are DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.