Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1
GM t Was bedeuten asketische Ideale? Aph. 27.
* FWt Aph- 357.
* MA II. WS, Apk 125.
158 Diana L Bchler
reminiscent of Lessing: "Ja, kommen wird auch der dritte Mann, der da
vollbringt was Luther begonnen, was Lessing fortgesetzt und dessen das
deutsche Vaterland so sehr bedarf — der dritte Befreier* — Ich sehe schon
seine goldne Rüstung, die aus dem purpurnen Kaisermantel hervorstrahlt,
,wie die Sonne aus dem Morgenrot!*"8 Aithough Heine himself might have
wished to lay claim to this title, it would perhaps be more justifiable to grant
Nietzsche this place in the historical development of Protestant religious
emancipation.
Certainly Nietzsche represents an important phase, if not the
culmination of this particular reception of Lessing in Germany. Character-
isrically, he mentions Lessing primariiy in his early writings, especially in the
Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, where he takes up the banner of Opposition of
his forerunner Lessing against the philistine leveling of education. His most
extensive reference to Lessing can be found in the essay "David Friedrich
Strauss", which one could term Nietzsche's Anti-Goeze, since here he con-
centraies his crushing polemics upon the most typical representative of that
attitude he labeled "Bildungsphilister*1. His wrath is intense when he accuses
Strauss of daring to praise Lessing's "universality", which Nietzsche
sympathetically views not äs Lessing's mark of excellence, but that of sheer
necessity. Lessing enthusiasts like Strauss have no understanding, "dass ein
solcher Mensch wie eine Flamme zu geschwind abbrannte, ... dass die
gemeinste Enge und Armseligkeit aller seiner Umgebungen und namentlich
seiner gelehrten Zeitgenossen so ein zart erglühendes Wesen trübte, quälte,
erstickte, ja dass eben jene gelobte Universalität ein tiefes Mitleid erzeugen
sollte/*9 This sympatheric outrage at false praise exhibits Nietzsche*s
emotional kinship to Lessing perhaps more poignantly than any other
reference to him.
In the later works Lessing's name appears only sporadically and in
connecrion with peripheral themes, but this is a typical mode of Operation for
Nietzsche. After having absorbed the central impulse of an author, he no
longer mentions the name, but presents that which he has digested äs his own
opinion. It is furthermore symptomatic that Nietzsche (like Schlegel,
Robinson, and Heine before him) concentrates entirely upon the critical,
philosophical, and theological aspects of his forerunner to the virtual neglect
of his poetic and dramatic contributions. Like Euripides, Lessing was for
Nietzsche interesting äs a thinker, not äs a poet, äs an author in whom the
cxtraordinary richness of his critical talent had also manifested itself in a
secondary artistic drive.10
* Werke, Vol. 4, "Zur Getchkhtc der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland/' p. 240.
9
ÜB, DS, Aph. 4.
20
In thist Nieuschc may have bcen influenccd by the Romraucs, panicularly Friedrich
160 Diana L Bchler
Schlegel. GT, Aph. 11. Nietzsche praises the critic Lessing äs superior to the poet and places
him within Germany's "Geschichte der erwachenden Männlichkeit" (KGW.Vtt -35 [44]). In
the heretofore unpublished posthumous works, Nietzsche also refers to Lessing in mäny
instances (especially in the preparatory writings for Geburt der Tragödie, KGW III, 3—4;
i. e., l [81]; l [90], [94]; 2 [12]; 7 [103]. But these references also evidence that Nietzsche
concentrated his iiiterest on the thinker and theoretician and not the poet Lessing.
11
GT, Aph. 15.
12
"On Humanity in dark times; thoughts about Lessing," in: Men in Dark Times (New York,
1968), p. 27.
13
JGB, Der freie Geist, Aph. 28.
14
ÜB, SE, Aph. 2. , · .·
Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 161
Common Features
/
If one goes beyond Nietzsche's specific references to Lessing to their
similarity of philosophical personality, then the dedication to the search for
truth looms äs their most obvious common denominator. Nietzsche's phrase
"I do not wish to deceive myself" and Lessing's aforementioned preference for
the search for truth äs opposed to its possession are exceedingly well known,
but more significant are the underlying reasons for their reluctance to
ascertain one single truth. For Nietzsche, to hope to recognize the character
of the universe in absolute fashion, to all eternity, would be the height of
stupidity; his "nothing is true, everything is permitted"21 phrase is not a sign
of cynicism, but rather sums up his contention that only perspectives are
valid, that any truth once attained becomes subject to investigation, or äs he
states in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft: "Aber ich mag von allen Dingen und
allen Fragen, welche das Experiment nicht zulassen, Nichts mehr hören. Diess
ist die Grenze meines 'Wahrheitssinnes': denn dort hat die Tapferkeit ihr
Recht verloren."22 He wages his battle against any dogma, against the "thou
shalts" and "thou shalt nots", the coercive axioms which derive from
particular truths and limit human freedom. Nietzsche was always fearful that
his own Statements might take oft the aura of permanence, of validity uiider
all circumstances, and warned his readers to be on guard continuously not
only against the "truths" of others, but against Nietzsche's all too seductive
language äs well. Presumably, his externally contradictory style'would prove
sufficient to alert the astute and confound the unsubtle reader.
20
GA XI, 109f.
21
FW, Aph. 344; Za IV, "Der Schatten"; GM, "Was bedeuten asketische Ideale," Aph. 24; KGW
VII 25 [304]; 26 [25].
22
FW, Aph. 51, . .
Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 163
cndanger truth far more than any false premises of orthodox/. In the course
of the essay, Lessing essentially equates Hell with the natural consequences of
sin rather than a place of corporal punishment, the memory of one's own
sinfulness constituting an eternal Hell in itself. Thus, while affirming the
doctrine of eternal punishment, Lessing alters the concept of Hell to such a
degree that he provides a far more damaging criticism of Christianity than the
Wolffians. As Henry Allison states: "Thus relativized, Heaven and Hell
become reduced to states of mind, and given the nature of man they are not
only compatible with, but actually seem to require the notion of eternal
punishment (understood äs the eternal consciousness of one's own
imperfections)."27
Lessing's defense of Leibniz in this argument reveals his own kinship to
him:
Vielmehr bin ich überzeugt und glaube es erweisen zu können, dass sich
Leibniz nur darum die gemeine Lehre von der Verdammung nach allen ihren
exoterischen Gründen gefallen lassen, ja, gar sie lieber noch mit neuen
bestärkt hätte: weil er erkannte, dass sie mit einer grossen Wahrheit seiner
esoterischen Philosophie mehr übereinstimme als die gegenseitige Lehre.
Freihlich nahm er sie nicht in dem rohen und wüsten Begriffe, in dem sie so
mancher Theologe nimmt. Aber er fand, dass selbst in diesem rohen und
wüsten Begriffe noch mehr Wahres liege als in den ebenso rohen und wüsten
Begriffen der schwärmerischen Verteidiger der Wiederbringung: und nur das
bewog ihn, mit dem Orthodoxen lieber der Sache ein wenig zu tun als mit
den letztern zuwenig.
Lessing also defends his position by virtue of the vastly different perspectives
available to man and God: "Denn wenn jene rächende Gerechtigkeit Gott
wirklich zukömmt: welcher endliche Verstand kann ihre Grenzen be-
zeichnen? Wer darf sich zu entscheiden wagen, was für einen Massstab sie bei
diesen ihren Strafen anzunehmen habe, und was für einen nicht? Der
Massstab ihrer eignen Unendlichkeit ist wenigstens ebenso wahrscheinlich als
jeder andere/' Such reasoning may be detected again and again in Lessing's
philosophical thought, but whereas his particular brand of perspectivism
makes him reluctant to cast aside the vestiges of religious tradition, Nietzsche's
allows little to remain intact.
Nietzsche's scepticism towards the attainability of unmitigated truth finds
both artistic and philosophical representation in his wqrks. In the fourth
book of Die Morgenröte, Nietzsche discusses "Eine Fabel. — Der Don Juan
der Erkenntniss", who is characterized by the same fickleness äs the fabled
Don Juan of amorous adventure.28 Nietzsche's Don Juan lacks genuine love
27
Lessing and the Enlightenment: His Philosophy of Religion and its Relation to Eighteenth
Century Thought (Arm Arbor, 1966), pp. 89-90.
28
M, Aph. 327. , -
Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 165
for the things he comes to know and thus searches for ever new modes of ex-
perience, What he does possess are "Geist, Kitzel und Genuss an Jagd und
Intriguen der Erkenntniss — bis an die höchsten und fernsten Sterne der Er-
kenntniss hinauf !" Eventually, there remains nothing for him but the pain of
knowledge, "das absolut Wehethuende der Erkenntniss" which Nietzsche
has so of ten characterized äs perhaps the most distinguishing feature of true
insight. Like one addicted to alcohol, who eventually desires only absinthe
and aqua fortis, the Don Juan of truth, seduced by the challenge of ultimate
knowledge (c<die letzte Erkenntniss0), finally seeks only Hell. But then even
Hell may not provide soiace, for once known and fathomed, it might not live
up to its reputation and disappoint the weary seeker:
Und dann müsste er in alle Ewigkeit stehen bleiben» an die Enttäuschung
festgenagelt und selber zum steinernen Gast geworden, mit einem Ver-
langen nach einer Abendmahlzeit der Erkenntniss, die ihm nie mehr zu
Theil wird! — denn die ganze Welt der Dinge hat diesem Hungrigen keinen
Bissen mehr zu reichen.
Kafka's hunger artist could not find a more understanding or kindred soul!
What detracts from the desirability of the possession of knowledge is its
finality, and for a thinker who revels in the process of thinking, in the testing
of ever new possibiliries, who prides himself in having sät in every corner of
the European consciousness, but continues to try out new corners, this
would be a Hell far surpassing that of Christian doctrine. For Nietzsche, of
course, die search for truth is symbolically associated with reaching higher
realms, with progressive coldness and snowy mountain peaks, and thus äs for
Dante, his Hell might not be one of fire, but of ice.
Nietzsche's respect for the magnitude and awesomeness of absolute
knowledge is not unlike the Old Testament code prohibiting images of God,
since such depiction would constitute a reduction of God to man's limited
understanding and Imagination. For Nietzsche, the attempt to penetrate the
depths of knowledge is a similar act of hybris and in a sense, both God and
truth are demeaned wben man seeks to circumscribe them.29 Thus there is in
Nietzsche's reiationship to truth the same modesty and self-criticism implied
by Lessingfs attitude. It is essentially the Christian virtue of humility, which
in Nietzsche, however, akernates with the demands of the insatiable Don
Juan of knowledge, who üke a flame, consumes all he touches.30
Like Nietzsche, Lessing reaiized that in the pursuit of truth often great
subtlety and dexterity are required, and he often agreed with his obvious
enemies in order to be better on guard against his secret adversaries, äs he
wrotc to his brother Karl in March of 1777:
... weil es im Grunde allerdings wahr ist, dass es mir bey meinen theo-
logischen — wie Du es nennen willst — Neckereyen oder Stänkereyen, mehr
um den gesunden Menschenverstand, als um die Theologie zu thun ist» und
ich nur darum die alte orthodoxe (im Grunde tolerante) Theologie, der
neuern (im Grunde intoleranten) vorziehe, weil jene mit dem gesunden
Menschenverstände offenbar streitet, und diese ihn lieber bestehen möchte.
Ich vertrage mich mit meinen offenbaren Feinden um gegen meine
heimlichen desto besser auf meiner Hut seyn zu können.31
As one critic has noted, the semi-orthodox language of the Erzieh fing perhaps
conceals a deeper radicalism thaii that of many of Lessing's Berlin friends. It
was devised to make the work palatable to the public, whereas the esoteric
meaning covered up his true opinions.32 Lessing did not feel it his duty to
sacrifice life and fortune for truth, but thought one was obliged not to mix it
with falsehood.33
As a young Student, Lessing confessed some inner misgivings about his
relationship to truth in "Die Religion" of 1749.34 He hoped to unveil the
labyrinths of self-recognition, the surest way to religion, but was shocked to
find that the foremost proof of our humanness is not virtue, but vice. "Und
es ist von Gott?" he questions. "Es ist von einem allmächtigen, weisen Gott?
Marternde Zweifel!" But perhaps just these doubts make our minds godlier,
and since we were obviously not created for virtue, perhaps we were
fashioned for truth. But here Lessing's penetrating dialectic begins anew:
"Für die Wahrheit? Wie vielfach ist sie? Jeder glaubt sie zu haben, und jeder
hat sie anders. Nein, nur der Irrthum ist unsör Theil, und Wahn ist unsre
Wissenschaft." Even the body, "ein Zusammenhang mechanischer Wunder,"
evidencing an eternal anist, is joined to dreadful illnesses that are anchored in
its very constitution, illnessess "welche die Hand eines Stümpers verrathen."
The doubting poet feels driven to cönclude:
Der Mensch? Wo ist er her?
Zu schlecht für einen Gott; zu gut für Ungefehr.35
Thus not only method, but an underlying belief in the inaccessibility of the
naked truth to man's eye, a belief in human frailty, forms Lessing's
intellectual stance. Whatever his own reservations and cautiöns, however, he
31
LM, XVIII, No. 546, pp. 226-227. ·
32
Henry Chadwick's introduction to Lessing's Theological Writings. Selections in translation
(Stanford, 1967), p. 44. See also Friedrich Loofs "Lessings Stellungnahme zum Christentum,"
Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 83 (1913), pp. 31-64.
33
LM, XI, pp. 69-70. See also Klaus Bohnes, Geist und Buchstabe. Zum Prinzip des kritischen
Verfahrens in Lessings literarästhetischen und theologischen Schriften (Köln/Wien, 1974) for a
discussion of Lessing's ambivalence of "Geist" und "Buchstabe" äs it relates to the Erziehung
des Menschengeschlechts.
34
LM, I, pp. 255-267.
35
Ibid., p. 256.
Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 167
giebt vielerlei Augen. Auch die Sphinx hat Augen: und folglich giebt es
vielerlei ,Wahrheiten V und folglich giebt es keine Wahrheit." Like his
forerunner, Nietzsche doesn't think it necessary to die for a "truth", since
one could never ascertain its validity in the first place, but he might be willing
to die for freedom of thought: "Aber vielleicht dafür, dass wir unsere
Meinungen haben dürfen und ändern dürfen/*46 Although one may never be
sure of the result, one never pursues truth in vain: "Im Gebirge der Wahrheit
kletterst du nie umsonst: entweder du kommst schon heute hinauf oder du
übst deine Kräfte, um morgen höher steigen zu können."47 What this
truth-seeker realizes and shares with Lessing is that every determination of a
"truth" falsifies it by defining it in human terms, too narrowly, too
permanently, too pettily: "Der Wille zur Wahrheit ist ein Fesi-machen, ein
Wahr-Dauerhaft-Af#cÄeH, ein Aus-dem~Auge-schaffen jenes falschen Cha-
rakters, eine Umdeutung desselben ins Seiende."4* The process of truth-
seeking, of analysis, of sceptical prying, that is what unites the basic drives of
both Lessing and Nietzsche, not the desire to establish truth äs a given
reality. Truth is not something that exists someplace to be discovered for
Nietzsche, but rather something to be created, "das den Namen für einen
Prozeß abgiebt, mehr noch für einen Willen der Überwältigung, der an sich
kein Ende hat: Wahrheit hineinlegen, als ein processus in infinitum, ein
aktives Bestimmen > nicht ein Bewußtwerden von etwas, (das) ,an sich* fest
und bestimmt wäre."49 This is Nietzsche's definition of the "will to power"
and Lessing's will to truth.
As Lessing had often donned the mask of orthodoxy to serve his greater
goals, so did Nietzsche become increasingly aware of the need for the ironic
pose. He even questioned the ulrimate desirability of truth at any cost in Die
Genealogie der Moral, radicaiizing Lessing's atritude: "Der Wille zur Wahr-
heit bedarf einer Kritik — bestimmen wir hiermit unsre eigene Aufgabe —,
der Werth der Wahrheit ist versuchsweise einmal in Frage zu stellen ."50
Like Nietzsche who judged the measure of a man by how much truth he could
withstand,51 Lessing too recognized the suffering involved in truth-seeking.
But for him it was not the amount of truth a person deemed to possess that
determined his worth, but rather the pains he had taken to attain it.52
The pain associated with truth-seeking is not only a battle scar for
Nietzsche, but the ultimate liberator of the spirit: "Erst der grosse Schmerz,
4
» KGW Vll 34 [230]; MA H, WS, Aph, 333.
47
MA II, VIA, Aph. 358.
4
« KGW VIII 9 {91}.
4
* Ibid.
50
GM, WM bedeuten askttwbe Ideale. Aph. 24,
51
JGBt Der freie Geist. Aph. 39.
$?
LM. XVIH, Eine D*pl&. pp. 23-24.
170 Diana I. Hehler
jener lange langsame Schmerz, der sich Zeit nimmt, [...} zwingt uns Philo-
sophen, in unsre letzte Tiefe zu steigen und alles Vertrauen, alles
Gutmüthige, Verschleiernde, Milde, Mittlere, wohinein wir vielleicht vordem
unsre Menschlichkeit gesetzt haben, von uns zu thun."53 Such suffering does
not perhaps improve the individual, but it does give him greater profundity.
Yet in typicai fashion, almost äs if his comrnents might assume the posture of
a truth, Nietzsche in the ensuing paragraph questions this "Wille zur Wahr-
heit", what he calls the adolescent madness residing in the love of truth.
Having once been burned by the searing pain of knowledge, Nietzsche is
again sceptical — he is "zu erfahren, zu ernst, zu lustig, zu gebrannt, zu
tief..." Like the little girl who finds it "unanständig" that God is supposed-
ly omnipresent, philosophers too should eschew the modern mania for knowl-
edge and hold modesty ("Scham") in higher, esteem, for this is the modesty
with which nature has clothed herseif in mysteries and puzzles. "Wir glauben
nicht mehr daran, dass Wahrheit noch Wahrheit bleibt, wenn man ihr die
Schleier abzieht" he remarks, a phrase reminiscent of his romantic.forerunner
Novalis, for whom the deepest truths lie not within the realm of conscious
knowing, but in the recessed regions of the psyche. Of course, Nietzsche is
attacking here primarily the "Jahrmarkt-Bumbum" of the so-called educated
classes who partake of art, music, and books in tasteless greed for purposes
of self-improvement and upward mobility.54 Lessing might have sympathized
with Nietzsche's distaste for the new at any cost and often indicated his own
disdain for the merely modern, particularly in theological matters.
Lessing had to resort to the mask for practical reasons, tp avoid the
censor following the publication of the controversial Reimarus fragments,
and although his polemics had often served to lead his opponents astray, he
eventually took to the stage. Similarly, Nietzsche praised the use of the mask,
the need for self-irony and artistic dissimulation when in the Prologue to
Zaratbustra he depicted the physical vulnerability of one who would dare to
teil the unmitigated truth to an unwilling public. Like Lessing, Nietzsche
realized the advantage of appearing to advocate one positioii, while secretly
maintaining the other, and he enjoyed being understood with difficulty,
letting his readers have some "romping space" within the foregrounds and
backgrounds of his thought. The world of appearances, that Apollonian
realm of language and form, the parable, the myth, -*· all serve the ends of
both authors, and äs Lessing had insisted on the spirit äs opposed to the letter
of theological matters, so did Nietzsche recognize the limitations of verbal
formulations: "Man kann auch seine Gedanken nicht ganz in Worten wieder-
53
FW, Vorrede, Aph. 3.
54
FW, Vorrede, Aph. 4. ,. ·
Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 171
geben," or in more melancholy tones: "Ach, was seid ihr doch, ihr meine
geschriebenen und gemalten Gedanken!"5*
Lessing's rejection of a literal Interpretation of the Bible parallels
Nietzsche's argument against the historical dissection of the living spirit of
Christianity. "Der historische Sinn, wenn er ungebändigt waltet und alle
seine Konsequenzen zieht, entwurzelt die Zukunft, weil er die Illusion zer-
stört und den bestehenden Dingen ihre Atmosphäre nimmt, in der sie allein
leben können/9 Historical truth is in the last analysis historical dissection
performed upon the living body of human existence, and if forced to choose
sides between iife-supporting Illusion and death-dealing truth, then Nietzsche
Stands on the side of life. "Die historische Gerechtigkeit, selbst wenn sie
wirklich und in reiner Gesinnung geübt wird, ist deshalb eine schreckliche
Tugend, weil sie immer das Lebendige untergräbt und zu Falle bringt: ihr
Richten ist immer ein Vernichten." Only within the pious atmosphere of the
illusion of love can the human being create, "nämlich nur im unbedingten
Glauben an das Vollkommene und Rechte."56 These words bring not only
Lessing to mind, but also Novalis in his condemnation of Luthers
introduction of philological biblical analysis and ensuing loss of the unity of
the faithful in his Christenheit oder Europa. Scientific pursuit of knowledge is
not always the most effective means and constitutes for Nietzsche a detour
from reality, or äs Lessing had noted in Paragraph 91 of the Erziehung: "Es
ist nicht wahr, dass die kürzeste Linie immer die geradste ist."57 In this sense
neither author upholds the tenet of objective truth, a virtue so soundly
ridiculed by Nietzsche in his polemics against Hegel and implicitly rejected in
most of Lessing's theological writings: "Womit sich die geoffenbarte Religion
am meisten weiss, macht mir sie gerade am verdächtigsten."58
Whereas for Lessing the gradual enlightenment of the human race
through "Erziehung" envisions the perfectibility of mankind in the course of
59
KGWVI l, 5 [87].
60
MA I, Aph. 242.
61
M I, Aph. 49. Nietzsche discusses here "Das neue Grundgefühl: unsere endgültige Ver-
gänglichkeit. —": "Ehemals suchte man zum Gefühl der Herrlichkeit des Menschen zu
kommen, indem man auf seine göttliche Abkunft hinzeigte: diess ist jetzt ein verbotener Weg
geworden, denn an seiner Thür steht der Affe, nebst anderem greulichen Gethier, und fletscht'
verständnissvoll die Zähne, wie um zu sagen: nicht weiter in dieser Richtung! So versucht
man es jetzt in der entgegengesetzten Richtung: der Weg, wohin die Menschheit geht, soll
zum Beweise ihrer Herrlichkeit und Gottverwandtschaft dienen. Ach, auch damit ist es
Nichts! Am Ende dieses Weges steht die Graburne des letzten Menschen und Todtengräbers
(mit der Aufschrift ,nihil h um an i a me alienum puto4). Wie hoch die Menschheit sich ent-
wickelt haben möge — und vielleicht wird sie am Ende gar tiefer, als am Anfang stehen! — es
giebt für sie keinen Übergang in eine höhere Ordnung, so wenig die Ameise und der
Ohrwurm am Ende ihrer ,Erdenbahn* zur Gottverwandtschaft und Ewigkeit emporsteigen.
Das Werden schleppt das Gewesensein hinter sich her: warum sollte es von diesem ewigen
Schauspiele eine Ausnahme für irgend ein Sternchen und wiederum für ein Gattungchen auf
ihm geben! Fort mit solchen Sentimentalitäten!"
62 HI} Aph. 115: "Die vier Irrthiimer. — Der Mensch ist durch seine Irrthümer erzogen
worden: er sah sich erstens immer nur unvollständig, zweitens legte er sich erdichtete Eigep-
schaften bei, drittens fühlte er sich in einer falschen Rangordnung zu Thier und Natur,
viertens erfand er immer neue Gütertafeln und nahm sie eine Zeit lang als ewig und unbe-
dingt, sodass bald dieser, bald jener menschliche Trieb und Zustand an der ersten Stelle stand
und in Folge dieser Schätzung veredelt wurde. Rechnet man die Wirkung dieser vier Irr-
thümer weg, so hat man auch Humanität, Menschlichkeit und »Menschenwürde* hinwegge-
rechnet."
Cf. also FW I, Aph. 9: "Unsere Eruptionen. - Unzähliges, was sich die Menschheit auf
früheren Stufen aneignete, aber so schwach und embryonisch, dass es Niemand als angeeignet
währzunehmen wusste, stösst plötzlich, lange darauf, vielleicht nach Jahrhunderten, an's
Licht: es ist inzwischen stark und reif geworden. Manchen Zeitaltern scheint diess oder jenes
Talent, diese oder jene Tugend ganz zu fehlen, wie manchen Menschen: aber man warte nur
Nietische and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 173
ändert sich noch — ist im Werden."63 For Nietzsche, however, progress can
relate only to the individual, and mankind should bring forth the great
Personalities who form its goal. Lessing is still a son of the Enlightenment
and sees all historical phases äs parts of the whole,64 but Nietzsche speculates
that humanity lives perhaps in cycles and the historical process may revert to
its beginnings to take the same path over and over again.6? Yet if one regards
the gliminering of a transmigration of souls in Paragraph 94 of the Erziehung,
is there truly such a chasm separatmg their thoughts? The question Lessing
poses: "Warum könnte jeder einzelne Mensch auch nicht mehr als einmal auf
dieser Welt sein?" is indeed not a far cry from Nietzsche's hypothesis that
even the most insignificant human being may return again.66
bis auf die Enkel und Enkelskinder, wenn man Zeit hat, zu warten, — sie bringen das Innere
ihrer Grossvater an die Sonne, jenes Innere, von dem die Grossväter selbst noch Nichts
wussten. Oft ist schon der Sohn der Verräther seines Vaters: dieser versteht sich selber besser,
seit er seinen Sohn hat. Wir haben Alle verborgene Gärten und Pflanzungen in uns; und, mit
einem ändern Gleichnisse, wir sind Alle wachsende Vulcane, die ihre Stunde der Eruption
haben werden: - wie nahe aber oder wie ferne diese ist, das freilich weiss Niemand, selbst der
liebe Gott nicht/*
** KGW VIII 10 [III]: "Z*r Rangordnung: Die Meisten stellen den Menschen als Stücke und
Einzelheiten dar: erst wenn man sie zusammenrechnet, so kommt ein Mensch heraus. Ganze
Zeiten, ganze Völker haben in diesem Sinne etwas Bruchstückhaftes; es gehört vielleicht zur
Ökonomie der Menschen-Entwicklung, daß der Mensch sich stückweise entwickelt. Deshalb
soll man durchaus nicht verkennen, daß es sich trotzdem nur um das Zustandekommen des
synthetischen Menschen handelt, [<.«}"
See also GA XIV, 167,
** LM, XIII, "Erziehung/* No. 92.
*5 KGW VII 2 (5): Das, was kommt. {.. .J Die Menschheit muß in Cydcn leben, einzige Dauer-
form. Nicht die Culntr möglichst lange, sondern möglichst kurz und hoch. ~ Wir im
Mittage: Epoche"
** LM, Xltl, No. 94. See also Za III» Der Genetende: "Ewig kehrt er wieder, der Mensch, dess
du müde bist, der kleine Mensch" -
" Friedrich Nwtzwhe. Phitotopher, Psychologin, Anuchritt (New York, 1956), p. 117f.
** Werke, Vol. 5, I, p. 229, See afco Werke, VoL 4, pp. 243-244.
174 Diana I. Behlcr
69
Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe, ed. Ernst Behler (München, Paderbprn, Wien), II,
"Ideen," p. 256ff. (In the following "KA")
70
Za, Vorrede, Aph. 3.
71
GA XI, 20.
72
Novalis Schriften, ed. Richard Samuel, 2d Edition, II, p. 518;, LM, XIII, Par. 72-75.
Nietische and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 175
73
KA, H, pp. 113-114· H, p. 116. Horst Steinmetz has compiled documentation concerning
the reception of Lessing in Germany in: Lesting — ein unpoetischer Dichter, Dokumente aus
drei Jahrhunderten zur Wirkungsgescbicbte Leasings in Deutschland (Frankfurt am
Main/Bonn« 1969) and notes that one of the few German authors who truly loved Lessing
was Friedrich SchlcgeL Afthou^h Schlegel's fudgmem is marred by tnjustices and weaknesses»
his news result from an attitude towards Lcssing that embraces more than ^respektvolle
Würdigung/' (p. 15) He adds that perhaps one should refrain from critid?ing Schlegel's
competcnce in Lessing criticism^ since perhaps he is "den Deutschen ebenso unheimlich . . .
wie Lessing selbst."
74
KA. II, p. 398.
7
» KA, VIH, p. xxviif.
7
* Werkr, Vol. 4, pp. 229-230, Kaufmann »tatet in his Nietzsche Book that Nietzsche'* identi-
ficanon with Lessing itents from rcasons similar to those öl Heine (p. 127).
" GA XI, I09f. MA Il t WSf Aph. 103,
176 Diana I. Bchier
78
MA I, Aph. 221. '
79
EH, Warum ich so klug bin, Aph. 3; MA I, Aph. 221.
80
GT, chapter 4. See also chapter 5 for Nietzsche's aesthetic justification of existence and
chapter 9 for a discussion of tragedy depicting "Das Unheil im Wesen der Dinge," See also
chapter 21: "So entreisst uns das Apollinische der dionysischen Allgemeinheit und entzückt
uns für die Individuen; an diese fesselt es unsre Mitleidserregung, durch diese befriedigt es
den nach grossen und erhabenen Formen lechzenden Schönheitssinn."
81
AC, Aph. 34: „Wenn ich irgend Etwas von diesem grossen Symbolisten verstehe, so ist es
das, dass er nur innere Realitäten als Realitäten, als ,Wahrheiten* nahm, — dass er den Rest,
alles Natürliche, Zeitliche, Räumliche, Historische nur als Zeichen, als Gelegenheit zu
Gleichnissen verstand. Der Begriff ,des Menschen Sohn* ist nicht eine concrete Person, die in
die Geschichte gehört, irgend etwas Einzelnes, Einmaliges, sondern eine ,ewige* Thatsächlich-
kei.t, ein von dem Zeitbegriff erlöstes psychologisches Symbol. Dasselbe gilt noch einmal, und
im höchsten Sinne, von dem Gott dieses typischen Symbolikers, vom ,Reich Gottes*, vom
,Himmelreich', von der ,Kindschaft Gottes*. [. . .] Das ,Himmelreich* ist ein -Zustand des
Herzens - nicht Etwas, das ,über der Erde* oder ,nach dem Tode* kommt. [. . .] Das ,Reich
Gottes* ist nichts, das man erwartet; es hat kein Gestern und kein Übermorgen, es kommt
nicht in ,tausend Jahren* - es ist eine Erfahrung an einem Herzen; es ist überall da, es ist
nirdends da. . .** See also Aph. 35: „Dieser ,frohe Botschafter* starb wie er lebte, wie er
lehne — nicht um ,die Menschen zu erlösen*, sondern um zu zeigen, wie maiy zu leben hat.
[. . .] Er widersteht nicht, er vertheidigt nicht sein Recht, [. . .]*'. See also Aph. 32-33.
82
AC, Aph. 37-39. Aph. 39: „Das Wort schon »Christenthum* ist ein Missverständriiss -, im
Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 177
Although one can question whether Lessing would have subscribed to such a
view, he nevertheless spoke of Christi "inner purity of die heart" and
presented him äs a practical teacher. In his fragment "Die Religion Christi",
Lessing distinguished between the religion Christ practised and the religion
of Christianity and indicated the incompatibility of the two. It is also
significant that Lessing published the Reimarus fragments "Von dem Zwecke
Jesu und seiner Jünger, Noch ein Fragment des Wolfenbüttelschen Unge-
nannten" of 1778, depicting Christ äs a rational teacher whose message was
corrupted by the apostles in their desire to mold him according to their needs
for a Messiah and fulfillment of the Jewish scriptures.83 Reimarus saw
Christ's death on the Cross äs a symbol of disillusionment, his having
expected God to help him deliver the Jews from foreign domination. He
funhermore contends that not Christ, but the Church invented the doctrines
of atonement and judgment and brought about a Separation from Judaism
never intended by Christ. Basic to both Reimarus' and Nietzsche's views are
the immediacy of the distortion, the difficulty in removing the accretions of
history to glimpse the essence of the personality of Christ, and the fact that a
single step from the origin was a step towards error. Lessing of course
published the first 53 paragraphs of the Erziehung to refute Reimarus, to
indicate that the positive religions do not represent distortions, but rather the
progressive enlightenment of mankind through piecemeal revelation. He
nevertheless considered the fragments worthy of publication and open dis-
cussion.84 Whether Nietzsche actually had access to these specific publi-
cations remains open to question, but he certainiy must have had some
acquaintance with Lessing's religious views during his educational years.
Regardless of "dependencies", the similarities are indeed striking.
Grunde gab es nur Einen Christen, und der starb am Kreuz. Das ,Evangeliuin' starb am
Kreuz."
See also Aph. 40: "Aber seine Junger waren ferne davon, diesen Tod zu verzeihen, -" and
Aph. 42 on St. Paul äs the "Gegentyp" of Christ: "... im Hass, in der Vision des Hasses, in
der unerbittlichen Logik des Hasses. Was hat dieser Dysangelist alles dem Hass zum Opfer
gebracht! Vor allem den Erlöser: er schlug ihn an sein Kreuz/9
» LM, XVI, p. 444.
** The inconsistencies of Lessing's idea of progrcssivity in history and his Deist views are not at
ksuc here. Leonard P. WesseÜ, Jr. has attempted to clarify the "Impasse in secondary
litcraturc*' (l^iüng Yearbook IV, p, 94) regarding the problem of his theology and agrces
with the bask contcntions of the three main schools of Lessing theological scholarship
(F. Loofs; H. TKielccke and O. Mann; j. Schneider and Georges Ports) in what they affirm,
condudmg that **thcrc are imeconcilabie contradicttons in Lessing's theological thougjht and,
that thcse contradtctions hovcr between Enlightenment, immanent, and monistic positions
and Christian, trarocendent* and dualistic posmons," (p. 96) He contends that there is
nevenbclcss a systeraatic unity tmderiytng l-cs«ngf$ thinlung; and in this avpect, one can
casiiy draw obvious analogtcs in Nietzsche** work and the difficultics theic have prcs-cntcd to
critio.
178 Diana I. Bchler
85
FW, Aph. 343.
86
FW, Aph. 125, "Der tolle Mensch."
v Werke, Vol. 4, III, p, 249.
88
Za IV, Ausser Dienst.
89
Werke, Vol. 4, II, p. 246.
90
FW, Aph. 357.
91
JGB, Aph. 55.
Nietzsche and Lessmg: Kindred thoughts 179
one sacrificed human beings to God, perhaps those one loved the best, such
äs the firstborn. In the second, the moral epoch, one sacrificed one's nature,
one's strengest insttncts, to God, and thus the religion of asceticism
flourished. Knally, there remained only one thing left to offer in sacrifice,
namely, all one's precious hopes for future bliss and justicq - all that was
comforting, holy, hopeful, and all beliefs in hidden harmony. Thus one had
to offer up God himself äs the ultimate sacrifice, an act stemming from
self-inflicted croeity which worships "den Stein, die Dummheit, die Schwere,
das Schicksal, das Nichts [...]". The incredibly paradoxical mystery of the
sacrifice of God for nothing, the culmination of the third important stage,
remains a task for the present generation, but Nietzsche and his followers
know of it aiready. This particular passage can be augmented by many others
regarding God's death which reveal Nietzsche's ambivalent attitude towards
this greatest of all historical phenomena* Whereas in Die Genealogie der
Moral he had depicted a tripart development of cruelty in the form of 1)
external revelry in inflicting pain upon others (Christians to the lions, public
hangings, etc.), 2) the internalization of suffering and the development of
conscience and finally, 3} the masochistic psychological self-flagellation of
bad conscience; he now designates man's sacrifice of his God and all that
God denoted — hope and future happiness — äs his most pernicious act of
seif-cruelty. The death of God is not only viewed äs an event long coming
and to be hailed, äs in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaf t92 > an event that will change
the world and permit the open seas of free inquiry, that will topple the
structures of church and society, morals and laws, but has its sadder
components äs well. Nietzsche alternates between a joyful expression of new
horizons beyond God's death, a new immanent humanity and rehabilitation
of the flesh, and the experience of aweful horror at the monumental and
unprecedented deed, for which man himself in his quest for knowledge must
bear the responsibility. Who can forctell the ultimate consequences of the
deed? What will fill the vacuum of empty space, mitigate the coldncss of
nothingness now that God has died?93
At first glance, it may appear that Lessing's ladder of human develop-
ment in the Erziehung is a contrary image, an opümistic projection of man's
desuned moral educadon towards responsibility and seif worth. But is there
not an underlying similarity to be detectcd in the third stage of each author's
dq>iction? God*s death is portrayed äs an almost physical act of violence in
Nietzsche** paragraph, our hands reek with the blood of the sacrifice with a
spoi a$ indcliblc äs Lady MacBeth*s. What, however, becomes of Lessing's
God at the culmination of the education of mankind? When man does good
for the sake of good itself, when morality has become completely inter-
nalized, what function remains to God? His role äs the avenging, jealous
God of the Old Testament, even Lutheran theology, becomes superfluous, äs
does the need for his forgiveness and mercy. Sin and forgiveness, crime and
punishment, cannot exist in Lessing's third stage; and so one could say diät
here too God has died, perhaps a more natural and predictable death.
Without the need for a God, Christ, Mary, the saints, and all other inter-
locutors and religious institutions cease to justify their existence äs well.
Thus, although the approaches taken d by each author are exceedingly
different, the logical outcomes are surprisingly akin with regard to the fate of
the Deity. The salient difference of course is that for Nietzsche all the
structures previously supported by God fall with his demise, whereas for
Lessing they have become self-sustaining and internalized. Nietzsche thinks
it "Naivität, als ob Moral übrigbliebe, wenn der sanktionierende Gott fehlt!
Das Jenseits* absolut notwendig, wenn der Glaube an Moral aufrechterhalten
werden soll."94
One final note of difference should be emphasized here äs well, and that
concerns a basic assumption by Lessing which is severely refuted by
Nietzsche. Lessing presupposes that human education is directed by the
guiding, often invisible hand of God, for he cannot imagine that God only
has a hand in error. Thus his ladder of human development is seen äs
reasonable and desirable. Nietzsche sharply denounces this optimistic belief
held by one he otherwise deems a "scharfer Geist."95 Paradoxically, the similar
outcomes stem from opposing assumptions about the nature of man
underlying both Lessing's Erziehung and Nietzsche's passage discussed.
Whereas Lessing presupposes the good in man and its final flowering,
Nietzsche postulates here that man's innate cruelty might outweigh his
dearest hopes. The question remains äs to the feasibility of a "golden age" of
humanity prophesied by the Romantics ör a world in which man has tran-
scended himself and transformed an external God into immanent
humaneness. The ultimate dispute then is not whether God dies in all of these
speculations, but what remains without him — human beings of internalized
morality and innate goodness, tortured human beings who have lost their
most precious possession through masochistic destruction of their God, or
individuals belonging to a higher history and having greater potential than
ever before because of their greater freedom.
94
SA III, p. 484.
95
JGB, Aph, 55.
Nietzsche and Lessing: Kindred thoughts 181
In his artkie "Zum Thema der Miwwihropic bei Lwing", Euphonon 68* Vol. 1, , -
12, Erich Heller pomtt out Lessing'* bmernes* towards his tot in life and his cominual
strugglei to ovcrcomc negative attaude* and adhere to feelsngs of irust and belkf.
Stockholmer Äu*%abt, Vol. 15, "Adel det Geistes/' p. 5.