TORTS AND DAMAGES – WEEK 2

UNIVERSITY OF MAKATI SCHOOL OF LAW

[No. 4977, March 22, 1910.]

Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co.

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff and appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT
COMPANY, defendant and appellant.

(fulminating caps experimented by plaintiff; exploded – defendant’s failure to close their premises and exposing the
caps to the children were not the proximate cause – plaintiff minority despite being only 15 did not free him from
contributory negligence; was mature mentally – his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury – defendant
not held liable)

Nature: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila

Ponente: CARSON,J.

FACTS: An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor,
by his father, his nearest relative. The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway
and an electric light system in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the
Pasig River within the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor.

The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a
mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in
mechanics.

On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed the
footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who had
promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was not in his
quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest which both seem to
have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises

Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are approximately
of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin wires by means of which
it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of
dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some discussion as to the ownership of the
caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on a stick, of which each took one
end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years
old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps.

They then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the
contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who, when the
boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a slight
cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles of
the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons
who were called in to care for his wounds.

It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the McKinley
extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's
premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were found the company has a
storehouse for the materials, supplies, and so forth, used by it in its operations as a street railway and a purveyor of
electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were found, was being used by the company
as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of
blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all the circumstances,
and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the
place where they were found by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant
company was either the owner of the caps in question or had these caps under its possession and control.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the provisions of
article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.

In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last resort
in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based thereon. In the
typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant
of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's
premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose, children would be likely to
come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left exposed by the railroad company's employees, one of which
when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a
dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it
would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such
machine. In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises
liable.

ISSUE: WON the Torpedo cases which is the plaintiff’s main contention be applied in the case of petitioner; WON
the defendant’s negligence act of not preventing entry into their premises, and leaving of the fulminating caps
exposed were the proximate causes of the injury

HELD: NO. But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff,
without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion
that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was
not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we
are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its
contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the
plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is directly in
point. In that case the court said: "According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or
negligence is a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause
and effect: but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no
obligation to repair the same, although such acts or omissions were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it
is shown that the immediate cause of the injury was the negligence of the injured party himself."

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and
physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his
denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The
series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was
present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application
of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9
years of age, who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and
ran away. True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might
be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet
he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his
maturity and capacity" he exercised such "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that the
defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries' incurred by him under such circumstances.

The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due
care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so
to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to
understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have
such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be
done by him. But some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be
gathered from an examination of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be
capable of exercising certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it cannot be said that these
provisions of law are of much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule
that the capacity of a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case.
Under the provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a
crime and is to be held criminally responsible therefor, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will
be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a child may,
under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 771). At 14 it
may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be adopted (Id., sec. 765).
And males of 14 and females of 12 are Capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec.
1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible
of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he
was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate
the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which
resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been
the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause
of the accident which inflicted the injury.

[No. L-10126. October 22, 1957]

De Bataclan v. Medina
SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLÁN and the minors NORMA, LUZVIMINDA, ELENITA,
OSCAR and ALFREDO BATACLÁN, represented by their Natural guardian, SALUD VILLANUEVA
VDA. DE BATACLÁN, plaintiffs and appellants vs. MARIANO MEDINA, defendant and appellant.

(Bus fell into canal; overspeeding it turned turtle; fire ensued from the torch who was supposed to help the trapped
passengers – proximate cause of death was the negligence of bus driver not the fire; fire was a natural consequence
of the negligent act of the driver)

Nature: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite.

Ponente: MONTEMAYOR, J.:

FACTS: Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952, bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
owner, defendant Mariano Medina, under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its
way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including
the driver and conductor.

At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the
front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and
turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others had to be helped or
pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclán, Lara and the Visayan and the woman
behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus.

After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end,
evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a
fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would
appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground under and around it, and that the lighted torch
brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire. That same day, the charred bodies of the four
doomed passengers inside the bus were removed and duly identified, specially that of Juan Bataclán. By reason of his
death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to
recover from Mariano Medina.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs, plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus
P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclán to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The
plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter court endorsed the appeal to
us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.

The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclán was not the overturning of the
bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that
at the time the fire started, Bataclán, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive,
and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him

Must-know provisions of the Civil Code:

"ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case.

"ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts
of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."

"ART. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence
of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."

ISSUES:

1. WON there was breach of contract of transportation for hire

2. WON the trial court was correct in saying that the proximate cause cause of the death of Bataclán was not
the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus

HELD:

1. YES. We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the
Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclán safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also
agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one
of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of
the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after
zig-zagging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied
the, brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its
momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.

2. NO.

Proximate cause defined: "The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
 intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom."

When a vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with lighted torch was in response to the
call for help, made not only by the passenger, but most probably by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them;
and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a
torch the most handy and available; and what was more natural, than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.

In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth, they, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked
from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when
spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver
nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal
provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

[No. 30741. January 30, 1930]

Bernal and Enverso v. J.V. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.
TOMAS BERNAL and FORTUNATA ENVERSO, plaintiffs and appellants, vs. J. V. HOUSE and
TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & ICE PLANT, LTD., defendants and appellees.

(mother and daughter attended procession of Holy Friday – daughter fell into the gutter when a car passed; there
was hot water flowing; resulted to death because the 3rd degree burns – contributory negligence, if any, only
mitigated damages; not proximate cause ; they had the right to be on the streets – even if pecuniary loss not
proven, damages proper in loss of life)

Nature: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte

Ponente: MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS: The parents of the five-year old child, Purificacion Bernal, appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, which denied them P15,000 damages from J. V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd.
for the death of the child as a consequence of burns alleged to have been caused by the fault and negligence of the
defendants.

On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with
her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to attend the religious celebration. After the
procession was over, the woman and her daughter, accompanied by two other persons by the names of Fausto and
Elias, passed along a public street named Gran Capitan. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance
of her. mother and her friends.

When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At
that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric & Ice Plant of J. V. House. When the
mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. Her clothes were
immediately removed and, then covered with a garment, the girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There she was
attended by the resident physician, Dr, Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at
11.40 o'clock. The cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, Whole Body," and that the contributory causes were
"Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen."
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the
dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.

ISSUES:

1. WON the contributory negligence on the part of the mother and the daughter, if any, exonerates the
defendant from liability
2. WON the father Tomas Bernal was the proper plaintiff; and proper party to recover the damages; and WON
Tacloban Electric Ice Plant was the proper defendant to recover the damages
3. WON it was proper to award damages even if there is no satisfactory proof to establish the pecuniary loss.

HELD:

1. NO. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban,
Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the
child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an
automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The
doctrines announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Paciftc Co. ([1907], 7 Phil.,
359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of
the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest
sense could only result in reduction of the damages.

2. NO. The plaintiffs are Tomas Bernal and Fortunata Enverso. The latter was the mother of Purificacion
Bernal and the former was the natural father, who had never legally recognized his child. The daughter lived
with the mother, and presumably was supported by her. Under these facts, recovery should be
permitted the mother but not the father.

As to the defendants, they are J. V. House and the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd. J. V. House was
granted a franchise by Act No. 2700 of the Philippine Legislature approved on March 9, 1917. He only
transferred this franchise formally to the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd. on March 30, 1926, that is,
nearly a year after the death of the child Purificacion Bernal. Under these facts, J. V. House is solely
responsible.

3. YES. Counsel for appellees point out that there is no satisfactory proof to establish the pecuniary loss. That is
true. But in cases of this character the law presumes a loss because of the impossibility of exact
computation. There is not enough money in the entire world to compensate a mother for the death of her
child. In criminal cases, the rule has been to allow as a matter of course P1,000 as indemnity to
the heirs of the deceased. In the case of Manzanares vs. Moreta ([1918], 38 Phil., 821), which in many
respects is on all fours with the case at bar, the same amount of P1,000 was allowed the mother of the dead
boy eight or nine years of age.

[No. 15674. October 17, 1921]

Gabeto v. Araneta
CONSOLACION GABETO, in her own right and as guardian ad litem of her three children, plaintiff
and appellee, vs. AGATON ARANETA, defendant and appellant.

(Death of plaintiff’s husband who rode a carromata; the horse sped off; husband jumped from the carromata which
led to his death – defendant was the one who stopped the carromata arguing that he called the carromata first –
actions not the proximate cause of death; it was the driver’s actions that caused the death - an appreciable interval
of time elapsed before the horse started on his career up the street. It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig
by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote)

Nature: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

Ponente: STREET, J.:

FACTS: This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Consolacion Gabeto, in her own right as
widow of Proceso Gayetano, and as guardian ad litem of the three children for the purpose of recovering damages
incurred by the plaintiff as a result of the death of the said Proceso Gayetano, supposedly caused by the wrongful act
of the defendant Agaton Araneta.

It appears in evidence that on August 4, 1918, Basilio llano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay, in
the City of Iloilo, with a view to going to a cockpit in the same City. When the driver of the carromata had turned his
horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his
hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this
carromata first. The driver, one Julio Pagnaya, replied to the effect that he had not heard or seen the call of Araneta,
and that he had taken up the two passengers then in the carromata as the first who had offered employment.

At or about the same time Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton
Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or
to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary
for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to fix the bridle. The horse was then pulled over to near the curb, by
one or the other—it makes no difference which—and Pagnaya tried to fix the bridle. While he was thus engaged, the
horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of
the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few yards further the
side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box
came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street.

Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit, Basilio llano, had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the
sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortu- nately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had
proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and
in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

ISSUE: WON the action of defendant Araneta was the proximate cause of the death

HELD: NO. They both say that while yet in the middle of the street, the defendant jerked the bridle, which caused the
bit to come out of the horse's mouth, and Julio says that at that juncture the throatlatch of the bridle was broken. Be
this as it may, we are of the opinion that the mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping
the horse in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano; because it is admitted
by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle.

The evidence is furthermore convincing to the effect that, after Julio Pagnaya alighted, the horse was conducted to the
curb and that an appreciable interval of time elapsed—same witnesses say several minutes—before the
horse started on his career up the street. It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton
Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be
considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by get ting out and taking his post at the head of
the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be
charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter.

The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be
easily broken. Julio Pagnaya had a natural interest in refuting this fact, as well as in exculpating himself in other
respects; and we are of the opinion that the several witnesses who testified for the defendant gave a more credible
account of the affair than the witnesses for the plaintiff. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who
jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and they say that Julio, after alighting, led
the horse over to the curb, and pro- ceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off,
when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.
[No. 5418. February 12, 1910.]

U.S. v. Tañedo
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant and appellant.

(Accidental killing while hunting chickens – when there is defense of accidental killing; it is the burden of State or
plaintiff to prove that it was intentional beyond reasonable doubt – intention not proven; defendant was not
negligent)

Nature: APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.

Ponente: MORELAND, J.:

FACTS: The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the information, as
follows: "That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of killing
Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with premeditation shot him in
the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide
the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a well.

Undisputed facts: The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino
Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecón or dam on his land.
The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild chickens after he had set his
laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then went a short distance away across a stream to
see how the alteration which he had made in the malecón affected the flow of water from the rice field on the other
side of the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his mother and uncle, had been
living in a small shack for a month or so during the riceharvesting season. The accused asked the uncle of the
deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild chickens Although the accused directed his question
to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the
forest near the edge of which stood the shack. After this, there were conflicting testimonies:

Uncle of deceased testimony: Testified that the boy and the accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens
and that the accused accepted the invitation

Defendant’s testimony: Testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did the deceased
go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "tying something." At any rate the accused went into the
forest with his gun.

"And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens were to be found, I
proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild chickens we would have something to eat on
that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a wild chicken and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a
human cry. I picked up the chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had
wounded a man” xxx

So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the deceased had been
normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused. There was no enmity and no
unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any. There appears to have been no motive
whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has not attempted to show any. The only possible reason
that the accused could have for killing the deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them
during the hunt. That idea is wholly negatived by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time,
there having been only one shot fired.

Relevant provision in Penal Code, Article 8. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. - the following are
exempt from criminal liability: xxx (now Art. 12 in RPC)

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or
intention of causing it.

ISSUE: WON defendant should be held liable for his negligence which caused Sanchez’s death
HELD: NO. In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither
is there any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is
there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The only thing in the case at all
suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.

In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p. 1165) : "Where accidental killing is relied upon
as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence,
because there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the State to show that it was
intentional, and if, from a consideration of all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. * * * But
where accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was
intentional. Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct
the jury that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of the testimony.

If life is taken by misfortune or accident while the actor is in the performance of a lawful act executed
with due care and without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability.

We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.