ISSUES AND TRENDS

Glen S. Aikenhead, Section Editor

Scientific Literacy for

Decisionmaking and the Social
Construction of Scientific
Knowledge

WADE H. BINGLE
Depurtment of Microbiology, University of British Columbia, 300-6174 University
Boulevard, Vancouver, BC V6T 123, Canada

P. JAMES GASKELL
Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia, Vmcouver, BC, V6T 124,
Canada

Citizens are often required to make decisions about socioscientific issues in a climate
characterized by conflict within both the scientific community and the larger society.
Central to the process of decisionmaking is a critical examination of the relevant
scientific knowledge involved. Individuals capable of performing this task can be
considered scientifically literate in a decisionmaking sense. In this article we explore
two ways of critically examining scientific knowledge in the context of a current
socioscientific dispute: NASA’s Galileo Mission to Jupiter. The two approaches
we outline, termed the positivist and social constructivist positions, are examined
in terms of their inherent views concerning the nature of scientific knowledge, in
particular their use of constitutive and contextual values when evaluating knowledge
claims. Because the social constructivist position acknowledges the importance of
contextual values, it provides citizens with accessible standards for evaluating sci-
entific knowledge claims. The positivist position, on the other hand, relies on
constitutive values which we show are normally inaccessible to ordinary citizens.
The positivist position, however, is most closely associated with the predominant
social issues approach to science-technology-society (STS) education. Implications

Science Education 78(2): 185-201 (1994)

0 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 0036-8326/94/020185-17
186 BINGLE AND GASKELL

for STS education of adopting the social constructivist position as the basis of
scientific literacy for decisionmaking are explored. 0 1994 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

INTRODUCTION
Within the science and science education communities there is a broad consensus
about the need to improve the scientific literacy of students and the general pop-
ulation (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1989; National
Science Teachers Association, 1982; Royal Society, 198.5; Science Council of Can-
ada, 1984). Although, as Roberts (1983) has pointed out, scientific literacy has
many of the characteristics of an educational slogan in which the consensus is
superficial because the term means different things to different people, there is
substantial agreement that the most important aspects of scientific literacy are those
that impinge on everyday life (Champage & Lovitts, 1989), in particular those
which develop the knowledge and skills needed to make decisions and solve prob-
lems where science, technology, and society interface (Brickhouse et a]., 1989;
Laetsch, 1987). Despite some skepticism (Trachtman, 1981) the ability to make
such decisions is usually argued for in terms of the needs of individuals and the
requirements of maintaining informed public participation in a democratic society
(Bybee, 1987). However, problems such as nuclear energy, global warming, and
acid rain, often given as examples of issues on which scientifically literate students
and citizens need to make decisions, are ones usually characterized by conflict both
within the scientific community and the larger society. Although the public has an
interest in the resolution of these socioscientific disputes because of their impact
on how we live, the information required to formulate a rational judgment on them
is complex, arising from multiple sources and is often inconclusive (Barnes, 198.5;
Fleming, 1989; Wessle, 1980).
While making a decision in the context of a socioscientific dispute involves
integrating scientific knowledge with other forms of knowledge and clarifying the
values inherent in the various alternatives (Aikenhead, 1985), central to the process
is a critical examination of the relevant scientific knowledge involved. It has been
argued both explicitly and implicitly that individuals capable of performing this
task can be considered scientifically literate in a decisionmaking sense (AAAS,
1989; Aikenhead, 1985; Fleming, 1989; NSTA, 1982). There are, however, differing
views with respect to how an individual should go about examining scientific knowl-
edge in a critical manner and, therefore, what should be taught in the schools to
improve scientific literacy for decisionmaking. In this article, we will explore some
of the implications for this process, of two broad different points of view, which
we term the positivist and the social-constructivist positions. We will argue that the
social-constructivist position is potentially more useful than the positivist for crit-
ically examining scientific knowledge in the context of decisionmaking surrounding
a socioscientific dispute. The disparate utility of the social-constructivist and pos-
itivist positions is related to the way each views the nature of scientific knowledge.
Finally, we will discuss the implications of this analysis for teaching about science-
technology-society (STS). To better illustrate our argument, a case study involving
a current science-related issue will be used-NASA’s Galileo Mission to Jupiter.
 SCIENTIFIC LITERACY FOR DECISIONMAKING 187

STERILIZING GALILEO: A SOClOSClENTlFlC DISPUTE

On October 18, 1989, the Galileo spacecraft, named for the heretical astronomer
Galileo Galilei, was lifted into Earth orbit by the space shuttle to begin its long
journey to Jupiter. The departure of Galileo was noteworthy from at least one
standpoint: it was the first U.S. spacecraft designed to enter the environment of
another planet which was not sterilized prior to launch. This change in NASA
policy led to the concern on the part of some of the attentive public that terrestrial
microorganisms seeded by Galileo into the atmosphere of Jupiter might subse-
quently grow there with the resulting biomass and waste materials producing an
irreversible alteration in the planet’s natural environment. Letters were sent to
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory critical of the organization’s new policy with
respect to Galileo (Harris, 1990) and two articles appeared in popular science
magazines which advocated canceling the project unless Galileo’s atmospheric
probe and its parachute were sterilized (Strand, 1984a,b). Nevertheless, the space-
craft was launched “dirty” on its 6-year voyage; the atmospheric probe will enter
the Jovian atmosphere on December 7, 1995.
When examining socioscientific disputes like Galileo, it is useful to exploit a
distinction made by several authors (Bauer, 1986; Cole, 1992; Latour, 1987) be-
tween different forms of scientific knowledge. Latour (1987) expresses this dis-
tinction in terms of “ready-made science” and “science-in-the-making.” In ready-
made science, knowledge is taken for granted and seen as uncontroversial and
unrelated to the specific contexts of its development. These scientific “facts” are
statements about reality because “nature is the cause that allowed controversies
to be settled.” In science-in-the-making, on the other hand, statements about
scientific knowledge are seen as claims; they are contestable and subject to revision.
Nature has not yet been defined and, indeed, “nature will be the consequence of
the settlement” (Latour, 1987, p. 99). Ready-made science, then, is the science of
textbooks and school science. Science-in-the-making is the science currently being
done everyday in the laboratory and debated in public forums.
Between science-in-the-making and ready-made science lies debate, controversy,
and competition for recognition within the scientific community. During this time,
facts may be ephemeral entities, existing periodically only as claims. Indeed, an
initial, tentative consensus on a version of the facts may be challenged by the
presentation of new claims. If the challenge is robust, the consensus may dissolve
as the new claims are considered. At some point, a consensus may form around a
new version of the facts or reform around the original version as the new claims
are discarded. Such a dynamic may occur repeatedly until science-in-the-making
solidifies into ready-made science-knowledge characterized by a stable consensus
which scientists consider unproductive to challenge.
When uncertain knowledge associated with science-in-the-making is a part of a
social issue, a socioscientific dispute results because there is no consensus as to the
scientific facts. In such instances, citizens find themselves facing divided exper-
tise-qualified scientific experts who have produced different scientific findings on
an issue or who disagree over the interpretation of the same findings. But socio-
scientific disputes can arise even in the face of a scientific consensus when that
188 BINGLE AND GASKELL

consensus is challenged from outside the scientific community. Although individual

citizens may challenge a scientific consensus for a variety of reasons (Barnes, 1985),
they commonly do so because their personal experiences (anecdotal evidence)
conflict with the “scientific” evidence on which the consensus is based. Citizens
may also perceive that the knowledge relevant to a socioscientific dispute is so new,
that any consensus on its factual nature must be considered tentative at best.
Further, there may be the concern that certain interests are having undue influence
on the consensus position and are working through “nonscientific” means to make
science-in-the-making appear as ready-made science. Two of these considerations
are relevant to the Galileo dispute.
Although the possibility of terrestrial microbial growth on Jupiter has long been
considered a topic worth serious scientific consideration, it seems clear that 6 years
before Galileo was launched (1983) and 1 year after launch (1990), agreement
existed within the community of NASA scientists that any terrestrial microorga-
nisms carried by Galileo posed no significant threat to the Jovian environment
(Harris, 1990; Strand, 1984a,b). However, a member of the public might well
wonder whether this consensus surrounding the environmental safety of the Galileo
project could (or should) be regarded as stable. The little that is known about the
atmosphere of Jupiter has been derived from ground or spacecraft-based remote-
sensing, no actual measurements have been conducted in Jupiter’s atmosphere.
One Galileo scientist said in an interview: “You can go only so far with remote-
sensing science. The next step in studying the planet is direct sampling that leads
to what we call ‘ground-truthing’ of remote data” (Harris, 1990, p. 34). Even the
Space Science Board of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences in its 1978 Rec-
ommendationson QuarantinePolicy has questioned the reliability of the knowledge
central to the Galileo dispute (Strand, 1984a):
Our ignorance as to the ranges of physical and chemical environments on planets
and our knowledge that terrestrial microorganisms possess amazing abilities to
function in a wide variety of terrestrial environments combine to make the esti-
mation of [the probability that terrestrial microorganisms could grow on another
planet] vexatious and inexact. (p. 19)

A citizen might also question NASA’s interest in the consensus position and the
organization’s influence on it. Because planetary astronomy research is highly
dependent on NASA funding (Tatarewicz, 1990), the organization has some degree
of control over the extent, direction, and location of research into contamination
of other planets by its own spacecraft and the disclosure of scientific findings
collected by its employees. Although NASA is clearly not in the business of de-
liberately contaminating other planets with terrestrial microorganisms, it is well
known that the budget for planetary astronomy has been significantly reduced
(Tatarewicz, 1990) so any NASA project must cope with less money. One way to
accomplish this goal is to build spacecraft components that do not have to withstand
sterilization temperatures (Strand, 1984a,b). Of course, just because NASA has
both an interest in the outcome of the Galileo dispute and the nonscientific re-
sources to influence the consensus position does not mean the organization has
done so. However, a member of the public might find some cause for concern in
 SCIENTIFIC LITERACY FOR DECISIONMAKING 189

an article by Joel Harris, the former project information coordinator for the Galileo
project, writing in Astronomy (Harris, 1990). While appearing to respond to some
of the arguments made by Galileo critics, Harris nevertheless invokes fallacious
ad hominum arguments, questioning their credibility by labeling them as “amateur
experts.” He also attempts through the use of rhetorical devices and careful choice
of language, to invalidate the concerns of the Galileo critics suggesting they are
not making arguments worthy of serious consideration. Such attacks on the cred-
ibility of those who would challenge a scientific consensus is a common feature of
socioscientific disputes (Martin, 1988, 1991). It is an attempt by those who have
an interest in the outcome of a dispute to keep a consensus favorable to their
position from dissolving-to make science-in-the-making appear as ready-made
science.
When a citizen decides to question a scientific consensus on the basis that it is
too tentative or perhaps that it is more apparent than real, any guidance that
consensus might have provided in decisionmaking is lost. What was once ready-
made science becomes science-in-the-making and what was once considered a fact
becomes only a claim to a fact. In other words, regardless of whether a socio-
scientific dispute arises in the absence of a scientific consensus or as a result of a
citizen questioning a consensus, from that citizen’s point of view, the socioscientific
dispute is about claims, not about facts. It becomes a citizen’s task to evaluate the
relevant knowledge claims. Those claims considered stronger can be given more
weight in the decisionmaking process.
The Galileo controversy is interesting to analyze because, in a sense, it can be
reduced to a mathematical expression. The likelihood of planetary contamination
by a spacecraft has been given by the equation (DeVincenzi et al., 1983):
P ( c ) = X.mi(o) P(vt) P(uu) P(ar) P(sa) P(r) P ( g )
where
P(c) = probability of contamination
mi(o) = initial microbial burden
P(ut) = probability of surviving space vacuum temperature
P(uu) = probability of surviving ultraviolet space radiation
P(ar) = probability of arriving at planet
P(sa) = probability of surviving atmospheric entry
P(r) = probability of release
P ( g ) = probability of growth
In order to assess the likelihood of biological contamination of Jupiter by Galileo,
as part of an overall decision of whether to send the probe in an unsterilized form,
a member of the public would have to evaluate each one of the terms in the
probability equation and the associated scientific claims. In the remainder of this
article, however, we consider only the probability of growth term, P ( g ) , because
it is the knowledge claims relevant to this component of the equation that have
been most debated. But, if an individual citizen wished to evaluate even these
limited claims, what would be involved? The answer to this question depends on
whether one holds a positivist or social constructivist view of scientific knowledge.
190 BINGLE AND GASKELL

TWO VIEWS OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND EVALUATION OF

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Although both positivists and social-constructivists attempt to account for the

generation of a body of public, reliable, uncontroversial scientific knowledge arising
from the efforts of individual scientists, their accounts differ in important ways.
When considering this dichotomy, it is useful to divide the construction of scientific
knowledge into three stages: (1) the generation of scientific knowledge claims in
the laboratory, (2) the presentation of knowledge claims to the scientific community
for consideration as facts through their publication, and ( 3 ) the transformation of
the published claims into facts by consensus formation (Bauer, 1992; Cole, 1992;
Duschl, 1988).
Positivists “see science as differing from other areas of human endeavour in the
ability of scientists to achieve consensus based upon the dispassionate evaluation
of objective empirical evidence” (Cole, 1992, p. 6). Facts about the natural world
are derived from the objective observations of individual scientists who abide by
the constitutive values of science (Longino, 1983, 1990) that determine what con-
stitutes acceptable scientific practice. Errors that might be produced by scientists
faltering in their adherence to the necessary values, are looked for during the
publication process when a knowledge claim is objectively scrutinized by colleagues
who have no interest in the outcomes of the study they are examining. Final
validation and consensus is achieved when other scientists have been able to rep-
licate the published results either directly through repetition or indirectly in related
experiments. The community of scientists thus acts as a set of examiners who test
whether or not individual scientists have done their work properly. From this point
of view consensus in the community is not necessary in order to produce facts, it
confirms whether or not a scientist has uncovered one.
In a socioscientific dispute, the positivist approach to evaluating scientific knowl-
edge claims asks members of the public to take the role of a scientist given the
task of objectively evaluating a colleague’s work; in this evaluation, a citizen uses
the same standards a scientist would use to evaluate a knowledge claim. The public
is able to take on this role because of the inherently democratic nature of the
positivist view of science. As Barnes (1985) points out, a reliable observation is
one which any individual with normal powers of perception might make and an
acceptable law or theory is one which any individual with normal powers of rea-
soning might justify. The evaluation of the strength of a scientific claim based on
a positivist view of scientific knowledge is made by tracing back the logic of the
claim, making sure that controls have been put in place and the proper methods
have been used based on the standards of the discipline. In a dispute over scientific
knowledge, one side will eventually be seen to be wrong because the knowledge
on which it is relying will be seen to be flawed, because improper or inferior methods
were used, or a mistake was made in not taking account of some factor in the
collection or interpretation of the data.
While there is no monolithic social constructivist view of scientific knowledge,
recent work in the field (e.g., Latour, 1987; Longino, 1990; Mulkay, 1979; Woolgar,
1988) does present the broad outlines of an alternative to the positivist position
 SCIENTIFIC LITERACY FOR DECISIONMAKING 191

although the social constructivist view has not gone unchallenged (Chalmers, 1990;
Cole, 1992). Social constructivists maintain that because science is done by human
beings who are inevitably influenced by ethical, ideological, and cultural values
that the generation of scientific knowledge claims, and the processes by which
scientists decide certain claims should be treated as facts must be influenced by
these contextual values (Longino, 1983,1990). For example, there is little argument
even amongst scientists (Bauer, 1992; Committee on the Conduct of Science, 1989)
that, although they may be motivated by values such as curiosity or humanitari-
anism, scientists also value those things we all value-recognition from peers and
maintaining employment in their chosen profession. Initially then, there appears
to be a paradox inherent in the social constructivist view: how can a highly personal,
fallible, contextualized science-in-the-making lead to the public, reliable, imper-
sonal, ready-made science? Social constructivists resolve this paradox by arguing
that individual scientists do not produce facts, they construct claims. They then
work to sustain their claim in the face of challenges through judicious modifications
and the marshaling of appropriate technical, rhetorical, and social resources. The
claim becomes a fact, when a consensus forms that it is unproductive to mount
further challenges. At this time statements about the fact lose qualifying phrases
and references to particular contexts that were part of the original claim. In the
social constructivist position, consensus formation is not a process of validating a
fact produced by an individual, it is a process of constructing a fact through a
process of social negotiation.
In a socioscientific dispute there is often an absence of a scientific consensus or
the appropriateness of a consensus has been questioned by individual citizens. In
such a situation, contextual issues are prominent. From a social constructivist point
of view, it is appropriate for citizens to evaluate the importance of contextual
factors to the scientific claim being made. Essentially they are engaged in a process
of deciding whether a claim would have been different if the science was conducted
and evaluated by different scientists, in a different context. The more citizens judge
the answer to this question in the affirmative, the less credence is given to the
claim. In extreme cases, citizens may feel, for example, that a knowledge claim is
so value laden-dominated by situation-specific contextual factors-that it deserves
little consideration; claims generated by “advocate experts” are commonly viewed
in this light (Barnes, 1985). Citizens (and scientists) who are engaged in the eval-
uation of contextual influences can only do so through the lens of their own social
situation which is constantly evolving. Contextual values such as the role of gender,
the source of funding, personal prestige or charisma which are seen as unproble-
matic at one time can be seen as important at other times. As Martin (1991, p.
160) says: “There is no such thing as a neutral or unbiased assessment of scientific
evidence. Rather those assessments that are more persuasive and that seem to
others to be more objective are the assessments which are sensitive to the diverse
facts of the social context in which science is embedded.” While judgments con-
cerning the impact of the social context are uncertain and complex, they are also
judgments people are used to making in their everyday lives.
It is beyond the scope of this study to further explore the differences between
positivist and social constructivist views on the construction and evaluation of
192 BINGLE AND GASKELL

scientific knowledge. However, it should be stressed that an evaluation of the social

basis of the consensus surrounding, o r dispute over, relevant scientific claims can
be a productive way to gain insight into a socioscientific dispute. In the next section,
claims related to the Galileo project will be evaluated from a positivist and social
constructivist point of view.

EVALUATING KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS IN THE GALILEO PROJECT

Knowledge claims central to the Galileo dispute have been evaluated using
essentially a positivist approach by science-journalist Linda Strand. An examination
of the content of Strand (1984a) is useful because it illustrates the success any
member of the public is likely to have using a similar approach.’ Strand noted that
much of the consensus surrounding the possible growth of terrestrial microorga-
nisms on Jupiter materialized with a study by Margulis et al. (1977) which examined
the possibility that terrestrial microorganisms could grow in the atmospheres of
the outer planets. Even though this study did not address Jupiter specifically, after
it was published the probability that a terrestrial microorganism would grow on
Jupiter decreased 7 orders of magnitude from its uncertain value of 1 in 10’ to a
very certain, it seems, 1 in 1014 (De Vincenzi & Stabekis, 1984). In their study,
Margulis et al. used mathematical models of planetary atmospheres which were
constructed using remote-sensing data. Then a search was done of the scientific
literature to see if any terrestrial microorganism had been discovered that could
grow under the conditions in the model atmospheres; none was found. As a result
of their study, Margulis et al. reached the following strong conclusion: “. . . the
assumption is that terrestrial organisms borne on spacecraft cannot survive until it
is proved they can do so” (Margulis et al., 1977, p. 795).
Strand criticized the study of Margulis et al. (1977) on the basis of flawed meth-
odology, a common focus of positivist critiques of scientific knowledge claims. She
argued cogently that most terrestrial microorganisms on Earth had probably not
yet been discovered, therefore they could not have possibly been included in the
data base Margulis et al. drew on for their study. Margulis et al. were therefore
guilty of a methodological error by using a nonrepresentative sample on which to
base their conclusion that terrestrial microorganisms carried by spacecraft could
not grow on the outer planets. Further, Strand argued again cogently, we believe
(see Lowe et al., 1993), that as more extreme terrestrial environments were being
studied, microorganisms were being found to grow under conditions previously
thought impossible. She cited a particularly spectacular example of new work
(science-in-the-making) published in the prestigious scientific journal Nature which
claimed that bacteria isolated from the 350°C water near deep sea thermal vents
could grow at temperatures of 250°C in the laboratory (Baross & Deming, 1983),
well above the limit of 85°C that existed at the time that Margulis et al. (1977) was

I Strand did not frame her arguments as cxplicitly as we outline them below. For the purposes of

this article, we have distilled the content of her article and expressed this content in more academic
form.
 SCIENTIFIC LITERACY FOR DECISIONMAKING 193

published.2 However, a biologist would argue that microorganisms capable of grow-

ing under extreme environmental conditions do so because they have evolved over
billions of years in concert with that environment. It is difficult to see, for example,
how a bacterium whose natural environment is a deep ocean thermal vent is going
to find its way onto Galileo. From this point of view, the failure of Margulis et al.
to include these types of microorganisms in their data base is not seen as a flaw.
Strand also argued that the methods used by Margulis et al. for establishing the
environmental conditions prevailing on the outer planets (remote sensing and math-
ematical modeling) were of insufficient quality to support the strong conclusions
made regarding the possible growth of terrestrial microorganisms on these planets.
However, Strand provided no support for this argument and seemed to suggest
that only direct sampling of the atmosphere would provide data of sufficient quality
on which to base a firm conclusion. While it is clear that direct sampling data are
better than that derived from remote sensing, a planetary astronomer would argue
that it is not always necessary to employ the most superior technology as long as
the limitations of the measurements taken are recognized and considered when the
data are interpreted. Indeed, for practical reasons, scientists commonly use methods
that produce rough estimates of certain quantities, even though techniques are
available to them that yield superior accuracy.
The difficulty with the positivist approach to evaluating knowledge claims in
science becomes clear from an examination of Strand (1984a): the public has no
practical access to the standards used by scientists to judge good and bad science.
Although it might seem that a scientist should always use the largest data base or
the most refined measuring technique, this is not the case. There is no set of
universal standards applicable in every instance; appropriate methodology depends
on how the data are interpreted and on the nature of the conclusions reached. In
order to make such subtle distinctions during the course of evaluating a knowledge
claim, it seems inescapable that a member of the general public would have to
attain the same level of education and practical experience as a professional sci-
entist. While this is certainly possible with enough effort by most members of the
public, it is not practical or workable.
Because a social constructivist approach does not attempt to evaluate scientific
knowledge claims separated from the social context, members of the public would
need information about the contextual factors relevant to the Galileo dispute.
Without interviewing the scientists involved or being present when knowledge
claims were generated, this information would be difficult to obtain. However, if
citizens were persistent and had access to a university library, they could cull the
following information from published materials.
Although the consensus surrounding the possibility of terrestrial microbial growth
on Jupiter has remained stable, Carol Stoker, of the National Center for Atmo-

This was an unfortunate study for Strand to choose to support her argument. Almost as soon as it
was published, the study of Baross and Deming (1983) was called into question by Trent et al. (1984)
and White (1984). Despite a rebuttal by Baross and Deming (1984), their original study has remained
controversial. To this day, it is unclear whether bacterial growth was ever really observed at 250°C as
they claimed.
194 BINGLE AND GASKELL

spheric Research and doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado, did briefly
challenge the consensus position. In 1984, she and coworker Penelope Boston
concluded that terrestrial bacteria could grow on Jupiter if deposited there by a
spacecraft. They presented their analysis at a conference, a partial record of which
exists in abstract form (Stoker & Boston, 1984). Science-journalist Richard Berry
attended the conference, observed Stoker’s presentation and interviewed her af-
terwards:
Stoker covered every possible objection before it could be raised-and then the
main points came only after the timer had sounded: “Jupiter can maintain a mi-
crobial biosphere comparable to a terrestrial aquatic environment,” said Stoker,
“and the biomass would be considerable,” reaching steady state about one year
after contamination . . . I asked Stoker afterward if her model wasn’t awfully
favorable to the bugs . . . [she] said, “Yes, it is, but even if I dilute them by a
huge factor (later characterized as a factor of one million times], the biomass is
enormous.” (Berry, 1985, p. 26)
Five years later, however, an article appeared in the scientific journal fcarus
(Stoker et al., 1990) in which Stoker, now an employee of NASA, asserted in
contrast to her original thesis, that growth of terrestrial bacteria on Jupiter would
“seem [to be] impossible” (Stoker et al., 1990, p. 254).’ No evidence was presented
for this assertion beyond citing an unpublished 1985 personal communication with
another scientist, Donald M. Hunten, of the Lunar and Planetary Laboratory,
University of Arizona, a recognized expert in planetary atmospheres who had also
considered the problem and reached a conclusion different from that of Stoker’s.
At the end of the article, we are left with a return by Stoker to the consensus
position regarding the possibility of terrestrial microorganisms growing on Jupiter
with no attempt to inform the reader as to how her original analysis in 1984 differed
from Hunten’s, the contrary analysis she subsequently accepted in 1985. Indeed,
it is clear that the nature of the conflict between Stoker and Hunten was not linked
to some fundamental disagreement over the nature of the Jovian atmosphere. In
1987, Hunten used a model of the Jovian atmosphere proposed by Stoker herself
(Stoker, 1986) as the basis of one of his own publications (Lunine & Hunten, 1987).
Stoker presented her original thesis that terrestrial microorganisms could grow
on Jupiter at a scientific conference while affiliated with the University of Colorado
(National Center for Atmospheric Research) in 1984 but the contrary position in
a peer-reviewed paper while an employee of NASA in 1990. Stoker’s change in
position to the impossibility of terrestrial microbial growth on Jupiter (the result
of a personal communication with Donald Hunten in 1985) occurred in the same
year she acquired a position with NASA’s Ames Research Center.4 Stoker’s coau-
thor for the original abstract and conference presentation asserting that terrestrial

Strictly speaking, Stoker et al. (1990) did not argue that growth of terrestrial bacteria on Jupiter
was impossible rather they argued that it appeared that the concentration of a critical nutrient in the
atmosphere was so low it would seem impossible for bacteria to use it for growth. However, since this
nutrient was the only one under consideration, the two arguments amount to the same thing.
‘This was ascertained by following Stoker’s institutional affiliation on her publications from 1984 to
1986.
 SCIENTIFIC LITERACY FOR DECISIONMAKING 195

microorganisms could grow on Jupiter was a single individual, Penelope Boston.

However, the author list on her 1990 article in Icarus rejecting the notion of
microbial growth on Jupiter is lengthy and includes Carl Sagan of the Laboratory
for Planetary Studies, Cornell University, a long-time collaborator (Boston et al.,
1983). Carl Sagan is (1) cofounder and president of the Planetary Society, a group
that lobbies the U.S. government to support exploration of the solar system; (2)
one of the main driving forces behind, and public spokespersons for, the Galileo
project itself (Gelman et al., 1977); (3) a former spouse of Lynn Margulis; and (4)
the founder of the journal kurus in its present form (Tatarewicz, 1990), the journal
in which both Margulis et al. (1977) and Stoker et al. (1990) published; he was
editor of the journal when Margulis et al. (1977) was accepted for publication and
an associate editor when Stoker et al. (1990) was published.
We will not do a point by point, widely speculative exploration of the possible
impact of the social context on the final conclusions concerning the possibility of
terrestrial microbial growth on Jupiter and the outer planets contained in Stoker
et al. (1990) and Margulis et al. (1977). This would clearly be presumptuous and
unfair to the scientists involved. Further, there is no point to such a treatment
because it is clear that all sorts of interpretations of the “social data” are possible.
The purpose of this examination is simply to show that scientific knowledge relevant
to a real socioscientific dispute could be construed as affected by contextual values,
and that this process might influence a citizen’s evaluation of those knowledge
claims. It is up to the individual citizen to judge the impact of these social factors
on the content and strength of knowledge claims relevant to the Galileo dispute
and to use this information in the decisionmaking process.
The ability to reconnect contextual values to the scientific knowledge associated
with the Galileo project does not mean that the work of the scientists involved is
unusual. It is the story of normal science. In a socioscientific dispute, however, it
is the contextual values which are usually more accessible to citizens making judg-
ments about the strength of a scientific claim. As we have argued above, assessing
adherence to constitutive values is almost impossible unless a person has access to
the standards and methods of a particular specialty area. What are the implications
for teaching about science-technology-society issues in the schools?

fMPLlCATlONS FOR TEACHING SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY-SOCIETY

ISSUES
A variety of writers have argued in recent years that a positivist view of scientific
knowledge is no longer warranted in science education (Aikenhead, 1985; Burbules
& Linn, 1991; Duschl, 1988,1990; Gauld, 1982; Hodson, 1985; Millar, 1989; Millar
& Driver, 1987). This appreciation of the weakness of the positivist view in con-
junction with the recognition that the social constructivist position may be a more
satisfactory explanation for the construction of scientific knowledge has implications
for the way we conduct science-technology-society education.
Within science education, there have been two main ways of approaching STS,
a focus on social issues and a focus on the social studies of science, with the most
common focus in practice being on social issues (Gaskell, 1982; Rosenthal, 1989).
196 BINGLE AND GASKELL

Only the social studies of science approach, however, explicitly discusses the social
construction of scientific knowledge. The social issues approach typically focuses
on issues such as energy use, pollution, food shortages, or the preservation of the
spotted owl, ones that have a significant science and technology component. They
are mainly concerned with developing in students an awareness of the role science
and technology play in creating and solving social problems, and with developing
a sense of responsibility to influence the resolution of these problems. In examples
of this approach (e.g., Yager, 1989), the science involved is usually unproblematic,
ready-made science and there is little opportunity to challenge the positivist account
of the construction of scientific knowledge. While controversy is acknowledged,
the diversity of opinion usually lies in realms of knowledge other than science with
a distinction being made between the nature of knowledge in each. “An STS
approach demands that students explore and analyze problems in terms of both
objective and subjective information” (Brunkhorst & Yager, 1990, p. 63). Such an
approach while emphasizing STS as a context for learning science that will enhance
students’ motivation (Hofstein & Yager, 1982) also reinforces science teachers’
views of scientific knowledge as being uncontroversial, dealing with subject matter
that is certain and that can be marked right and wrong (Gaskell, 1992). While such
a portrait of science may be appropriate for textbook knowledge (ready-made
science), it is not appropriate for science-in-the-making, the knowledge character-
istic of socioscientific disputes where there can be divided scientific expertise.
STS education takes place in the context of concern about citizens being able to
make defensible decisions in a highly complex world where it is often difficult to
distinguish in the news media between outrageous and fanciful claims on the one
hand and stable and respected claims on the other. Important policy documents
(AAAS, 1989; NSTA, 1982) promoting an STS approach to science education try
to address this problem. In addressing it, however, they tend to emphasize that
students need to develop skills at evaluating scientific knowledge claims in terms
of their adherence to traditional constitutive values. For example, the NSTA states
that a scientifically literate person should “. . . know reliable sources of scientific
and technological information . . .” and that this insight involves “. . , distin-
guishing between scientific evidence and personal opinion” (NSTA, 1982). The
AAAS also views the acceptance of dogma (the arrogant declaration of opinion)
in the context of decisionmaking as a danger, suggesting that citizens must be able
to distinguish between “opinion” and “fact” (AAAS, 1989). Even though Science
for All Americans (AAAS, 1989) contains some analysis of science as a societal
process, science is portrayed as based on neutral observation and the influence of
contextual factors on the construction of scientific knowledge is minimal. There is
an inherent positivist view of scientific knowledge (Fourez, 1989).
While it is certainly possible to separate fact from opinion and to discern reliable
knowledge for ready-made science, it is not done, as argued above, by applying
constitutive values but rather by identifying which knowledge is supported by a
stable scientific consensus. In socioscientific disputes, however, the knowledge
involved is usually science-in-the-making. In this context, distinguishing between
fact and opinion or identifying reliable knowledge becomes impossible. There is
 SCIENTIFIC LITERACY FOR DECISIONMAKING 197

little consensus about which statements are fact (i.e., will remain stable when
challenged) and which opinion, (i.e., will be modified when challenged). All knowl-
edge is potentially unreliable when one is dealing with a socioscientific dispute.
The adoption of a social constructivist view of scientific knowledge and its in-
herent way of evaluating knowledge claims clearly has implications for future ap-
proaches to STS education. Although one approach might be to offer a course in
the history, philosophy, and sociology of science, this would not be useful without
reference to the way in which such knowledge can help students to understand the
context of a conflict within the society of scientists and the larger society. As
Rosenthal (1989) argues, a synthesis is needed in which social issues are seen as a
vehicle for studying the social studies of science and the social issues are seen as
a way of making sense of social aspects of science. However, this way of teaching
STS may be difficult to implement. In British Columbia, for example, science
teachers have resisted efforts to include the social context of science within a
traditional university-oriented physics course (Gaskell, 1992) and to teach a grade
11 social issues oriented science and technology course (Gaskell, 1989). This may
be because the current social issues approach is most compatible with traditional
science content as it is now taught: it simply shows the relevance of textbook
knowledge (ready-made science) to contemporary problems. The shift to the ap-
proach suggested above will require a more drastic reorganization of the curriculum,
one that may be resisted by the current stakeholders in science education (Duschl,
1988; Gaskell, 1989).

CONCLUSIONS
The positivist view of scientific knowledge suggests a reliable way of evaluating
scientific knowledge claims exists: just evaluate the science itself using a set of
agreed upon standards that have been constructed by the scientific community.
However, we have argued that this position is unworkable in practice because the
standards which members of the public must call upon to use in their evaluations
are inaccessible to them unless they achieve the level of education and experience
of a professional scientist. We accept that with enough effort such knowledge may
be acquired by someone not formally trained in the area; however, this still leaves
the basic question of the validity of the approach itself because it is based on a
view of scientific knowledge that is no longer warranted.
It is one thing to question the positivist view of scientific knowledge and its way
of evaluating scientific knowledge claims, it is another to suggest that some version
of the social constructivist view is the answer to the failure of the positivist position
(Kelly et al., 1993). Even if one accepts the social constructivist view of scientific
knowledge, its prescription for evaluating scientific knowledge claims is clearly
complex and its generalizability is problematic. Further, unlike the positivist view
which suggests there is a set of generalizable standards to be used in the evaluative
process, the social constructivist view rejects the notion that such a set of universal
standards exists. This is especially evident in the area where one is evaluating the
impact of social factors on the content and strength of a scientific knowledge claim.
198 BINGLE AND GASKELL

The standards used in such evaluations are those derived from “being an inhabitant
of the everyday world” (Harvey, 1980, p. 139) where judgments about the impact
of social context are made all the time.
While the positivist position appears to offer the possibility of democratic par-
ticipation in the evaluation of scientific disputes within a socioscientific issue, a
close examination suggests that it ultimately maintains scientists in a position of
privilege in the decisionmaking process because only scientists themselves have
access to the standards which are necessary to make an evaluation of what they
do (Duschl, 1988). Not surprisingly, scientists actively promote the positivist view
of science (Bauer, 1992; Chalmers, 1990) and this is understandable. A social
constructivist view of science, on the other hand, challenges the scientists’ position
of privilege because individual citizens have just as much access to the standards
for evaluating the impact of the social context as do scientists themselves, a prospect
that would probably be unsettling to most scientists (which includes one of the
authors). While the social constructivist position seems like a more uncertain route
for dealing with socioscientific disputes, it allows members of the public to ask
more questions; it legitimizes questions about the content and strength of scientific
knowledge claims related to the social context. In doing so, it has the potential to
provide more illumination of the processes by which scientific knowledge claims
are generated and presented to the scientific community for consideration as fact.
Such increased knowledge has the potential for increasing the power of citizens to
challenge orthodoxy and to participate in decisions affecting their lives.
The assertion by scientists that the social context has no influence on scientific
knowledge has been going on since the time of Galileo (the astronomer, not the
spacecraft) :
If this point of which we dispute were some point of law, or other part of the
studies called the humanities, wherein there is neither truth or falsehood, we might,
give sufficient credit to the acuteness of wit, readiness of answers, and the greater
accomplishment of writers, and hope that he who is the most proficient in these
will make his reason more probable and plausible. But the conclusions of Natural
Science are true and necessary and the judgment of man has nothing to do with
them. (Galilei, 1953, p. 63).

If we accept the notion that citizen participation in the resolution of socioscientific

disputes is a desirable goal, we must sterilize Galileo’s argument. Only by adopting
a social constructivist view of scientific knowledge and its inherent approach for
the critical examination of scientific knowledge claims will we have the potential
to provide students and citizens with the knowledge and skills which characterize
scientific literacy for decisionmaking.

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Accepted for publication 15 August 1993