NEG

CP – Consult NATO – CCPW

Topshelf
 1nc
Counterplan text: The United States federal government should engage in a
binding consultation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning the
act of [the aff] prior to its implementation.

Brexit and 2016 elections make the future of NATO uniquely uncertain – past
scenarios don’t matter
Kaufmann, Hertie School of Governance; Laius, Postd1octorate at Otto Suhr Institute; 17 (Sonja, Mathis,
“Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations,” https://www-sciencedirect-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016328716303615)//EF

The transatlantic relationship has always involved questions about future trends and risks.
However, the aftermath of Brexit and the US election in November 2016 has pushed
uncertainty to a new level. Political goals and even shared principles appear to be up for
renegotiation in the transition period from the Obama to the Trump administration. On the
European side, the British vote to leave looms large, populism is on the rise across the board,
and many citizens are still suffering from the ongoing economic and financial crises. Where do we go
from here? In the United States, the direction of foreign policy seems uncertain now that Donald

Trump has won the Presidential elections (Jervis et al., 2017). Scenarios in many forms have been presented to make
sense of what could be ahead in US foreign policy – and its meaning for the transatlantic relationship (see, for example, Ischinger, 2016). At the

time of writing, Trump’s effect seems impossible to predict with any degree of confidence; and
perhaps this caution is warranted considering that his electoral victory had been deemed next
to impossible by geopolitical experts (Bremmer & Kupchan 2016, p. 23). The goal of this article, however, is to
look beyond the immediate consequences of a new US administration. We focus here on trends and scenarios for the next decade of transatlantic
relations. The scenarios discussed in this article reflect the discussions at a number of workshops held in Berlin in 2015 and 2016. Participants in these
workshops – organized as part of the Dahrendorf Forum’s foresight project – exchanged ideas about future EU relations with the United States, but also
other key actors in the world (Sus & Pfeifer, 2016). We followed the logic of multiple scenario generation (see Burrows and Gnad, this issue). First, the
participants discussed basic assumptions about the nature of transatlantic relations. Second, under the guidance of the scenario facilitators we
identified key drivers for the relationship between the two regions. As a third step, small working groups were formed to develop scenarios based on
the most relevant pairs of key drivers identified in the plenary discussion. Finally, the most analytically interesting and policy-relevant scenarios were
then selected by the whole group and developed further. Transatlantic
cooperation plays a key role in many arenas
of global governance, such as the G7 and G20, the UN Security Council, and of course NATO.
Together the United States and the European Union account for 12 per cent of the world
population and roughly half of global (nominal) GDP as well as military expenditures. At the
same time, there is a sense that the transatlantic dominance of world politics has peaked. Given
the global economic and demographic trends as well as recent experiences of political
disagreements, policymakers in the EU and US are well advised to think about priorities and
pitfalls for future cooperation (Tocci & Alcaro 2012, pp. 2–9). Next to the electoral surprises of
2016, a number of indicators suggest trouble ahead: Negotiations about TTIP are at a
standstill. The capabilities, financing and mission statement for NATO are unclear. And beyond
such regional concerns, climate change and other global issues have made it abundantly clear
that transatlantic cooperation and leadership are neither an automatism nor always sufficient
to shape the global agenda in the twenty-first century. Against this backdrop, we present and discuss four scenarios
for the coming decade of transatlantic relations. These are not meant to comprehensively cover all possible outcomes. They rather represent a
selection of important developments and policy implications. In the following section we discuss the key drivers identified by the participants of the
scenario workshop. In the main part of the article we then present the resulting four scenarios: The first scenario sketches a mode of highly selective
transatlantic cooperation; in the second, the EU reluctantly assumes a global leadership role; the third scenario focuses on the common perception of
an external threat; the fourth addresses the consequences of transatlantic disagreement regarding technological innovation. We close with a brief
discussion of common themes and implications.

Dialogue with NATO allies over arms control is key-solves escalation

Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy
and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School, and Lute, Senior Fellow,
Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, February 2019
(Nicholas, and Douglas, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis,”
https://www.belfercenter.org/NATO70, LASA-IZP)

While confronting Russian aggression and bolstering deterrence, NATO must remain open to
dialogue with Russia when it is in the West’s interest. Russia is a major European power that must be
taken into account.68 First, dialogue is fundamental to deterrence , as Russia must clearly
understand NATO’s intent and the consequences of aggression. Second, even in a period of
increased tensions, there are topics for dialogue that serve common interests . The NATO-Russia
Council should continue to meet regularly to address risk reduction measures, provide
transparency on military exercises and exchange views on priority political issues, including the
conflict in Ukraine. Allies should press the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to update the Vienna
Document to improve predictability and transparency of conventional forces in the region.69 Russia should return an ambassador to
NATO and NATO should re-open military-military contacts below the four-star level. It is not in NATO’s interest that the Russian
military liaison cell at Allied Command Operations’ SHAPE remains closed. Third, balancing deterrence and dialogue
is essential to sustaining political cohesion among allies some of whom have differing
perspectives on the nature of the Russian threat and the best responses to it.70 NATO should not
return to “business as usual” with Russia as before 2014, but restricting dialogue is not an effective form of punishment. In
periods of increased tension, the risk of accident and unintended consequences increases—
dialogue can mitigate some of that risk. In short, sustaining and even expanding dialogue with
Russia is in NATO’s interest. Arms control remains an important goal of real dialogue with
Russia. Even during the height of the Cold War, U.S.-Russian agreements, while imperfect, reduced
weapons stockpiles, improved stability and were the basis of a degree of trust .71 The Russian
violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is a serious setback and threatens the “fabric” of
arms control agreements that have contributed to security for decades.72 First, the United States should not
abrogate the Treaty, as this step diverts attention from the Russian violation and is not required by the United States to counter the
Russian deployment. Even now that the U.S. has begun the six-month process of withdrawing, every effort must be made
to preserve the Treaty using diplomacy to hold Russia accountable and bring it back into compliance .
The U.S. should continue to explore every diplomatic angle, while continuously consulting
allies at every step. For example, the parties should explore more fully reciprocal on-site
inspections for Russia at the NATO ballistic missile defense sites and for the U.S. at Russian cruise missile sites.73 Such
negotiations would not be simple or quick, but are worth the effort considering the severe impact of
losing the INF Treaty. Another potential diplomatic approach is to begin discussions to broaden the Treaty to include China,
which has INF systems of concern to both Russia and the U.S. Especially with the renewal of the New START Treaty in 2021, now is
the time to use every tool to preserve and even extend arms control agreements . NATO should
stand united in support of American diplomacy to sustain arms control with Russia by exploring
new measures to prevent a renewed arms race that would be destabilizing and expensive. The
alternative is that in two years there may be no arms control treaties with Russia for the first
time in over 50 years.
NATO key to resolving rising security challenges, Russia expansionism, and
democratic decline – US leadership is key
Weinrod, former presidentially-appointed US national security policy position in US DOD and on Capitol Hill, January 15,
2016 (Bruce, “We Still Need NATO,” https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/01/15/we-still-need-nato/) DR
Strong U.S. leadership is needed to reinvigorate this essential alliance. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, critics have questioned U.S. membership in and support for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). They have argued that NATO successfully accomplished its original
Cold War mission and thus is no longer needed. The charge that NATO is obsolete, however,
overlooks the fundamental importance to U.S. international security interests of a standing
multilateral organization with strong and flexible core military capabilities that can be calibrated
to respond both to a wide range of 21st-century security challenges and the recent resurgence of
Russian expansionism. That said, U.S. administrations over the past quarter-century, and their
counterparts in most of the major European allied states, have allowed significant military
deficiencies to develop within NATO. Some of these deficits reflect a growing political dis-
alignment among the allies in the absence of a Soviet adversary , some of them are the product
of excessive thrift in service of welfare-state budgets, and others are the result of old-fashioned
neglect and lack of leadership. Whatever the mix of reasons, the true test for NATO’s relevance
in the coming months and years will be whether NATO member-states provide sufficient
resources to deter or if necessary prevail against significant threats such as Russia now presents,
as well as to fulfill its other important missions. If the member-states, and especially the United
States, fail this test, they will pros1vide an opening for those who argue that the U nited States
need not and should not be in the business of supplying global common security goods. This
would be a very unfortunate outcome, as it could undermine the ability of the United States to
protect its vital interests.
 U/Q – NATO Weak Now
Trump’s abnormal leadership makes reinforcing trust especially necessary
Burns, Professor of Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School , Lute, Senior
Fellow at Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, 02-19 (Nicholas, Douglas, “NATO at Seventy: An
Alliance in Crisis,” https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis)//EF

NATO’s single greatest challenge is the absence of strong, principled American presidential
leadership for the first time in its history. President Donald Trump is regarded widely in NATO
capitals as the Alliance’s most urgent, and often most difficult, problem. NATO leaders, for
example, considered not holding a 2019 summit to mark the seventieth anniversary this spring
as they did in decades past. They feared President Trump would blow up a meeting in controversy as he has sdone each time he has met with NATO leaders during the past two
years. Wary of his past behavior, NATO plans a scaled down leaders meeting for December 2019.

President Trump’s open ambivalence about NATO’s value to the U.S., his public questioning of
America’s Article 5 commitment to its allies, persistent criticism of Europe’s democratic leaders
and embrace of its anti-democratic members and continued weakness in failing to confront
NATO’s primary adversary President Vladimir Putin of Russia, have hurtled the Alliance into its
most worrisome crisis in memory.3 There is no reason to believe President Trump’s attitude
will change for the better during the next two years. He believes NATO allies are taking advantage of the U.S.4 These are the same allies and
partners who came to America’s defense on 9/11, suffered more than 1,000 battlefield deaths alongside American soldiers in Afghanistan,5 are fighting with the U.S. now against the Islamic State and shoulder the

President Trump is the first U.S. president to view

main burden sustaining a fragile peace in the Balkans, in both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

the European Union as an economic competitor rather than a vital partner of both the U.S. and
NATO. His troubling anti-NATO and anti-Europe bias has caused European governments to
question the credibility of the U.S. as the leader of the West for the first time since the Second
World War.6 The European public confidence in American leadership is also at historically low
depths.7 Every American president before Trump has encouraged the strength and unity of
Europe as a core interest of the U.S. Trump may well cause even greater damage to the
Alliance while he remains in office. For this reason, Republicans and Democrats in Congress must act
together as a blocking force against President Trump’s dangerous policies . Congress, on a
bipartisan basis, should reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the Article 5 defense clause in the
NATO Treaty. Congress should pass legislation this year requiring Congressional approval should President Trump attempt to alter U.S. treaty commitments to NATO allies or to have the U.S. leave
the Alliance altogether.8 Congress should continue to fund the “European Deterrence Initiative” to bolster U.S. military strength in Europe that is the primary deterrent against Russian adventurism.’
 S – Binding/Genuine Consultation Key
Lack of negotiation on defense spending is hurting relations with NATO
Shapiro, nonresident senior fellow in the Project on International Order, 18 (Jeremy,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/09/trumps-meaningless-nato-
spending-debate/)

as in a bad marriage, the arguments of U.S.

President Donald Trump and his European partners have
descended into a sort of ritual exchange . So at this week’s NATO summit, we can be confident that Trump will
complain about the lack of European defense spending and threaten to leave Europe if the
NATO allies don’t stump up. The Europeans will accept the premise of his argument, point to what they have recently
achieved, and pledge to do more. The whole affair has the structure of an Apprentice episode. We don’t know what crazy s**t
Trump will say during the show, but we know how it will end. Such burden-sharing debates are traditional at NATO meetings. The
main difference now is that Trump has an advantage in pushing Europeans to spend more relative to past U.S. presidents. Because
he doesn’t care about the trans-Atlantic alliance, he can more credibly threaten to withdraw the
U.S. security blanket from Europe. And because Europeans still rely on U.S. security guarantees for their defense, they
feel that they simply can’t risk it and so do their best to satisfy his demands. It is a reasonable response. European and American
experts alike, including Trump’s
staunchest foes, admit that the president has a point and that
Europeans should spend more on defense . They often note that every U.S. administration since the 1950s has a
made a similar demand of the Europeans. And so the hope is that if Trump’s gonzo tactics get the allies to finally open their coffers,
the alliance will be better off for the effort. MONEY FOR NOTHING Alas, those who would advise Europeans to accede to Trump’s
demands are not really paying attention to what Trump says he wants and how he operates. Sure, there are good reasons for
Europeans to spend more on defense (though even here the issue is really spending more wisely rather than spending more). But
regardless, there is no satisfying Trump’s demands about European spending. The European response to Trump’s histrionics over
spending is nearly irrelevant to how his administration will treat the alliance. In fact, we have already seen a fair degree of effort to
respond to Trump’s critique. European
defense spending is creeping up—27 of 28 members of NATO are
now increasing their defense spending, eight will meet the 2 percent target this year, and 16 countries are on track to
meet it by the agreed date of 2024. Trump could simply declare victory, claim that he has achieved what all past presidents
(particularly Barack Obama) had failed to do, and go home, leaving NATO to go about its boring daily routine defending of Europe
and supporting America’s wars abroad. But he probably won’t. It seems clear at this point that Trump does not want to solve the
burden-sharing problem. On the contrary, he wants to use Europeans’ collective sense of guilt over their lack of spending, as well as
the European fear of American abandonment, to gain concessions on what really matters to
him: reducing the American trade deficit. Indeed, at the summit, he may explicitly link a continued American security guarantee
with economic concessions from Europe. Trump’s focus on trade means that Europe cannot conceivably meet
his demands on defense spending. If the Europeans parked a brand-new aircraft carrier off the coast of Mar-a-Lago and
tossed the keys onto the 18th green, Trump would simply charge them greens fees. In the end, he doesn’t believe in the idea that
America should defend Europe, so why should the United States pay anything at all? He is only interested in it if it brings in a profit.
So every time Europeans respond to his repeated blandishments on defense spending with new pledges to pay more, he seems to
grow ever more sure that he is on to something and doubles down on his critique. One feels confident at this point that such
critiques will persist at least as long as the U.S. trade deficit with Europe. APPEASING A BULLY Appeasement of Trump’s bullying is
not the right strategy. Of course, Europeans need to get their house in order in defense. Butthat effort has little to do
with symbolic defense spending targets and even less to do with the impossible task of
satisfying Trump. Rather, they should focus on creating a truly independent defense capability. That effort probably does
involve more spending, but more importantly it means creating a European military capability that can stand on its own. Such a
capability will allow the Europeans to negotiate with Trump, and future American presidents,
from a position of equality.
Genuine consultation is key to strengthen NATO – ensures they have the ability
to take a decisive role in crisis
Dempsey 16 –  nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic
Europe. (Judy, 12.08.16, “From Suez to Syria: Why NATO Must Strengthen Its Political Role,”
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/12/08/from-suez-to-syria-why-nato-must-strengthen-its-
political-role-pub-66370) np

What prompted the Report of the Committee of Three, also known as the Three Wise Men’s report, was the Suez Crisis. On
October 29, 1956, France and Britain—without consulting NATO as a whole or the United States in particular—
joined forces with Israel to invade Egypt to secure the Suez Canal as an open trading and commercial route.
The invasion was a political defeat for France and the United Kingdom (UK). It was also a major
blow for NATO, as two of the organization’s leading European members had refused to consult or
cooperate with this young transatlantic alliance. As the report bluntly stated, “an Alliance in which the members
ignore each other’s interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot
be effective either for deterrence or defence . Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.” The signal
that the Suez debacle sent to the Soviet Union greatly worried the three authors of the report—Canada’s Lester B. Pearson, Italy’s
Gaetano Martino, and Norway’s Halvard Lange (see figure 1). While there was some hope of a thaw after the death in 1953 of the
Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, the authors cautioned against complacency. “We must remember that the weakening and eventual
dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal,” they wrote. The Three Wise Men’s proposal
that NATO
members use the alliance for genuine consultation and cooperation on issues of common concern
was not fully implemented. But the days are long gone when a NATO ambassador could believe that any member state
could go its own way on defense issues or take a view of politics that is detached from the security environment. As the Three Wise
Men’s report pointed out, “some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are
going well. Nostate, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action
alone.” After all, as the authors insisted throughout their report, NATO is not just a military organization—it is also a political one.
But the political dimension is so often sidelined. This is a mistake: at a time when defense, security, and politics are so closely
intertwined, NATOneeds to articulate its political side without hesitation . Yet to this day, the
alliance shies away from discussing controversial issues, from speaking and acting politically , and
from taking a stance. To reinforce its political dimension and its commitment to collective defense, NATO needs to take seriously the
concept of resilience, shore up its relationship with the European Union (EU), and improve communication by getting out of the
alliance’s Brussels bubble. These are important political steps, the pursuit of which is crucial to make NATO fit to deal with the
threats facing the Euro-Atlantic community. DEFINING A POLITICAL ROLE FOR NATO NATO needs a clearer political role. First and
foremost, that concerns the political obligation of all members to collective defense, a point that cannot be stressed enough. This
obligation—enshrined in Article 5 of NATO’s founding Washington Treaty, which states that an attack on one ally is an attack on all—
is NATO’s cornerstone and raison d’être.2 Yet there is a political necessity for all member states to reinforce this obligation in words
and actions. This is because some allies, for example the Baltic states, are increasingly nervous and, at times, even doubtful about
the political willingness of other members to defend them in case of an attack, most likely by Russia. NATO is going to need a great
deal more political assurance from the incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump that it is committed to
collective defense. Second, NATO is going to need a great deal more political assurance from the incoming administration of U.S.
President-elect Donald Trump that it is committed to collective defense and, by implication, to NATO. This commitment has to be
backed by strong military capabilities—and by a rapid reaction to threats faced by member states. The ability to react rapidly is now
accepted in NATO, even if the military commitment and resources to protect the Baltic states and Poland is far from adequate. For
the moment, political commitment has become the number one priority for NATO’s Eastern members. NATO has another political
role to play: ensuring resilience. All NATO members face challenges. Some have been attacked by terrorists who have caused many
civilian casualties. Other NATO countries have been threatened or intimidated by Russia or have had to cope with large numbers of
immigrants. Many allies must contend with the increasing negative and dangerous impacts of cyberwar, hybrid warfare, and
disinformation, which have the potential to make democracies highly vulnerable. And populist movements tap into citizens’ fears,
which are often fueled or intensified by social media and disinformation. Resilience, which is mentioned in NATO’s founding treaty,
has several aspects. Among the most important is a readiness to respond immediately if civilian or military infrastructure is attacked.
This requires NATO to work politically with the EU to ensure that the continent is able to recover quickly in the event of this kind of
attack or any kind of destabilization. In this case, having a political role means being prepared, developing a plan, having already
conducted exercises, having worked closely with partners, and having established seamless lines of communication with all NATO
member governments as well as with their relevant civilian authorities. NATO gave resilience some prominence in the conclusions of
its July 2016 summit in Warsaw. Now, resilience should become part of the alliance’s strategy and culture, instead of being ad hoc.
Resilience is neither exclusively military nor exclusively civilian. It spans both—that is, it is political, which is why NATO has to
embrace a stronger political role. This role should not become subject to bureaucracy, committees, or endless haggling about what
should be on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), NATO’s main decisionmaking body. Anyone who works in NATO knows
how the organization can be debilitating at times and then, in rare moments, suddenly creative and flexible. Resilience means being
prepared to manage and respond to crises whose responses cannot be held up by committees. More broadly, a political role means
that the alliance must become a forum for open dialogue about major issues. It must reach out to other international organizations
and engage the public, including by explaining what resilience means and how it is linked to security and defense. NATO must have
information and communications systems in place so that the public recognizes what is happening in the case of an attack and why
action has to be taken. A more political role for NATO is going to require a determination from the secretary general’s office and
from all member countries, particularly the United States. America’s role must not be underestimated: Washington is the guarantor
of Europe’s security and the biggest financial and military contributor to NATO. It has protected Europe since 1949—and in that
time, the European members of NATO have taken that protection for granted. Trump could change that imbalance. During his
election campaign, he called NATO “obsolete.”3 He has since modified his views: on November 18, 2016, he spoke with NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to reaffirm the “enduring importance” of the alliance.4 Whatever policies Trump adopts in office,
it is clear that America’s relationship with NATO is no longer predictable. But what any U.S. administration says about NATO matters.
If Washington does want to reassure its allies, the new administration should use the NAC to explain its position and begin open
discussions about security challenges and political trends facing the alliance. Discussions about political issues have to take place in
the knowledge that the United States is fully committed to collective defense. If that is in any doubt, then the very existence of
NATO could be called into question. As the Three Wise Men’s report stated, “the first essential . . . of a healthy and developing NATO
lies in the whole-hearted acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the confidence
which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if aggression should take place.” DIVISIONS OVER A
POLITICAL ROLE During many interviews, some on the record, others not, analysts were divided over whether NATO should have a
political role. One argument against such a role is that NATO should focus on ensuring collective defense and on being a military
alliance. “Russia is the big threat,” said John Lough, a Russia and Eurasia expert at Chatham House. “Russia is even preparing for war.
NATO is not prepared. We have one almighty problem on our hands.”5 Another security expert, Roland Paris of the University of
Ottawa, said, “NATO is the West’s security architecture. It already faces enough challenges and is overstretched on operational
grounds. I’d be wary about taking the military dimension too far into the political realm.”6 Others say that NATO is already political
—that it assumed that role in 1989 when the Berlin Wall was torn down and Europe was reunited. During the 1990s, NATO was
preoccupied with ending the wars in Yugoslavia and with preparing the former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe,
including the Baltic states, for alliance membership. Both tasks were highly political in nature: they were about reuniting Europe.
Even so, NATO’s political role was not complete. “Since 1989, all kinds of discussions have taken place,” said Paal Hilde of the
Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies. “But there are limitations. Iran and Syria have not been discussed. . . . There are lots of
political issues [on which NATO members] are not necessarily in agreement. As for energy security, this is a big issue [but] there is no
clear role for NATO. NATO can’t do anything on the supply side. This is a political issue. . . . It would be a real challenge for NATO if
our energy were cut off,” he added.7 The issue of energy security points to the broader concern of resilience. If the infrastructure of
any NATO member is damaged to the extent that it could paralyze the country’s economy or harm its citizens, NATO needs to be
able to react quickly to support and, if need be, defend that member state. There are also analysts who believe that pragmatism
must be the driving philosophy. In this context, they argue, NATO and the EU have to cooperate because they share the same values.
NATO has a political role in articulating those values. “Look at Chapter IV of the Three Wise Men’s report,” said Luciano Bozzo of the
University of Florence. “The authors write about the sense of community, of common values, of joint NATO actions. Who cares
whether that should be the role of NATO or the EU? As it is, Europe is falling apart. The transatlantic relationship is under huge
stress. In this regard, we need to strengthen NATO’s political role. That means defending our common cultural values and way of life.
NATO can do this because it is a more efficient organization than the EU,” Bozzo added.8 Divisions over this issue are not new. NATO
has always been plagued by disagreements about whether it should have a political role. “NATO’s future was assured
only when the Allies demonstrated its continued vitality as a military instrument in a new strategic
environment, dealing with non-Article 5, out-of-area contingencies,” Frédéric Bozo of the University of Nantes argued over a
decade ago. “In the absence of such a demonstration, seeking to rejuvenate NATO at the time by
‘politicising’ the organisation would simply have led to the creation of a [talking] shop.” 9 Another talking shop
is exactly what the Three Wise Men’s report wanted to avoid, because the authors knew that it would not address the need for
genuine and transparent political discussions and consultations. It
was the lack of consultation and the scant regard for
smaller members of the alliance before and after the Suez Crisis that threw open the question of a political
role for NATO. It seemed that some allies were more equal than others and could pursue their own military agendas. As the
report stated, “a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt
firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the
Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably
impossible.” The Suez Crisis rocked the credibility of the alliance . It also left France and Britain with
fundamentally different perceptions about the roles of the United States and NATO. “The UK learned to never leave the side of the
United States. . . . The French learned to never trust the British nor rely on the Americans,” Daniel Keohane of the Center for Security
Studies in Zurich has argued.10 And
the crisis damaged NATO unity at a time when the alliance was
involved in a military and ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Three Wise Men’s report was
published just two months after the Kremlin sent Soviet troops into Budapest to crush the anti-Communist Hungarian Uprising. The
foreign ministers who authored the report pulled no punches about the atmosphere in the alliance after the Suez Crisis. “ The
practice of consulting has not so developed in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of
political changes and world trends,” they wrote. “The present need, therefore, is more than simply
broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation . There is a pressing
requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of
national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in
jeopardy. . . . There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy .” Strong words, but did they
have an enduring impact? It seems they did not. Some NATO ambassadors and officials have argued that controversial issues, such
as the wars in Iraq and Syria, Iran’s nuclear program, and Europe’s refugee crisis, have nothing to do with NATO.11 They have
further argued that these are issues for national leaders and foreign ministers to take care of, and not for NATO. That is sidestepping
the issue. One main reason for not wanting candid debates about such topics is the instinctive reflex that doing so would open up
divisions in the alliance. Several of the big NATO countries can block honest and open discussions or have the political clout to start
them. In both cases, large member states are in a much stronger position than smaller ones to set the agenda. This can have a
debilitating if not demoralizing impact on smaller countries. Furthermore, some NATO members, for example Germany and Turkey,
have an instinctive fear and suspicion that once the NAC discusses political or controversial issues, there is an underlying military
agenda. This worries many of the alliance’s European members.12 Europeans were right to suspect this might happen in 2002 when
the United States was considering ways to overthrow the then president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. Bitter shouting matches ensued
between the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, and his French counterpart, Benoît d’Aboville.13 Germany, France, and the
Benelux countries, supported by Russia, which all opposed U.S. plans to invade Iraq, attempted to establish a European defense
structure independent of NATO. Yet the majority of European countries were not prepared to destroy the transatlantic alliance or
have Europe go it alone. It took several years to heal the wounds in NATO. A
strong political role for the alliance also
helps shape strategy. In retrospect, the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War and the way the campaign was conducted
should have persuaded NATO of the need for genuine political consultations , independent of a military
agenda. However, the opposite happened: the war did not embolden individual NATO countries to raise other political and strategic
issues, such as the disastrous aftermath of NATO’s short military operation in Libya in 2011. Nor
has NATO been prepared
to discuss Iran, the Sahel, Somalia, or the impact of climate change on the Euro-Atlantic community. As
for the U.S. shift toward the Asia-Pacific region or tensions between the United States and China
over Beijing’s efforts to control the South China Sea, NATO has been all but silent on these major
political issues. This silence implies a lack of strategic thinking a bout whether NATO has any role to play in
these fields as well as a serious lack of ambition. NATO’S NONPOLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS Throughout 2014
and 2015, Europe faced an inflow of refugees not seen since the end of World War II. The majority
were fleeing the wars in Syria and Iraq, where the self-proclaimed Islamic State had taken over parts of the countries. Hundreds of
thousands of refugees and migrants reached Europe at great risk, crossing the Western Balkans before passing through Hungary and
Austria, on to Germany. Thepressure on the Western Balkan countries was so great that instability and
a backlash against the refugees were waiting to happen. Yet NATO remained largely on the
sidelines. The influx challenged Europe’s basic principle of solidarity and exposed yet again NATO’s reluctance to
think politically and strategically. Indeed, it took many months for the NAC even to put the refugee crisis on its agenda.
NATO members either did not believe the crisis had anything to do with the alliance or did not want to think outside the box and
realize that the refugee crisis was not confined to the political and civilian realms.14 There was also a consensus that this was an EU
problem. In any case, the migration issue had and continues to have complex security implications for Europeans and for the
transatlantic relationship. The migration issue had and continues to have complex security implications for
Europeans and for the transatlantic relationship. When the refugee crisis boiled over in 2015 in a way that led to deep divisions
in Europe, with some countries such as Hungary building high barbed-wire fences to keep refugees out, NATO was silent. The
alliance seemed almost indifferent to a problem that had the potential to undermine the stability of some of its member countries.
Greece, for one, was under immense pressure. An EU and NATO member, it was already trying to overcome a
devastating economic crisis that had shaken the foundations of the EU’s single currency, the euro. Athens was forced to introduce
highly unpopular austerity measures as a precondition for receiving financial assistance. At the same time, it had to cope with tens of
thousands of refugees landing on its islands or reaching the Greek mainland in the hope of moving on to other EU countries.
Turkey, a leading NATO member and an EU candidate country, was under pressure too, sheltering over 2
million Syrian refugees as of October 2015.15 Stoltenberg wanted the alliance to play some kind of
political and civilian role in helping the refugees , but he knew that reaching consensus in the NAC to involve NATO
would be difficult.16 This was despite the fact that the organization has a toolbox to deal with such civilian
crises. The alliance has a Civil Emergency Planning Committee, and its role is unambiguous. According to the committee’s website,
“Civil Emergency Planning provides NATO with essential civilian expertise and capabilities in the
fields of terrorism preparedness . . . humanitarian and disaster response and protecting critical
infrastructure.”17 The alliance also has a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center
based at its headquarters in Brussels. The center is meant to cooperate with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs and other international agencies. This center was not involved during the thick of the
refugee crisis. And NATO has a Civil Emergency Planning Rapid Reaction Team, which is designed to evaluate civilian
requirements and capabilities to support a NATO operation or an emergency situation such as the Western Balkans were facing
during the refugee crisis. Again, there was no evidence of the rapid reaction team being activated.18 “There was no political will to
ask how NATO could get involved in some way, even though Stoltenberg at times felt very frustrated about NATO’s lack of
response,” an alliance diplomat said off the record because he was not authorized to discuss the issue publicly. The diplomat added
that NATO should have used its civilian toolbox to help deal with the refugee crisis.19 The unremitting flow of refugees passing
through or stranded along the Western Balkan route required a special response. Because the civilian, security, and armed forces in
these countries were (and still are) poorly equipped and trained to deal with such emergencies, NATO could have compensated for
these shortfalls in several ways. The alliance could have assisted in bringing order and security to the borders. Such assistance could
have comprised logistics and personnel to provide stability for the authorities and safety for the refugees. The alliance could also
have provided emergency facilities such as housing and field hospitals. It could have worked with the overstretched Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to help register refugees and issue them with identity papers. And NATO could have
offered transportation to take refugees to other countries in Europe. In retrospect, because Western Balkan states and Greece were
struggling to cope, they should have called in NATO to help. Greece, as a member state, was certainly entitled to do so—as was
Turkey. NATO did not deploy its tools, because doing so would have meant giving the alliance a
political role. But the enormous scale of the challenge made it a political task. Again, there was a cultural reflex in NATO that
once an issue was discussed from a political point of view, it was assumed to have military ramifications. In addition, some members
wanted to believe that the EU would be able to deal with the crisis—although it was clear from early on that the bloc was not
equipped to cope with security issues, border management, or humanitarian questions. This is where NATO’s
political role
could have made a difference: it would have been tangible and would have had an impact. A
NATO role in helping deal with the refugee crisis in the Western Balkans, Greece, and Turkey, apart from reducing
the immense strain on these countries, could have improved NATO’s image and demonstrated that it was
not merely a military organization. It would have shown that NATO could project stability and
assistance and could help manage a crisi s. That is what the allies agreed to do at their July 2016 summit in Warsaw:
“The Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively all three core tasks as set out in the Strategic Concept: collective defence,
crisis management, and cooperative security. These tasks remain fully relevant, are complementary, and contribute to safeguarding
the freedom and security of all Allies.”20 In the end, in February 2016, after requests by Germany, Greece, and Turkey, NATO
decided to join international efforts to deal with the refugee crisis.21 NATO ships are now trying to stop illegal trafficking and
irregular migration in the Aegean Sea through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance at the Turkish-Syrian border. And in a
sign of cooperation with the EU, NATO is liaising with the union’s border management agency, Frontex, which is now attempting to
secure the EU’s external frontiers. NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian, which is deployed in the Mediterranean to perform a range of
maritime security tasks, will support the EU-led mission EUNAVFOR Med, also known as Operation Sophia.

Historical examples prove NATO is angered by lack of prior consultation

Kaufman, PhD , 17 (Joyce, Professor of political science and director of the Whittier Scholars Program at
Whittier College https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/93/2/251/2996077, The US perspective on NATO under Trump:
lessons of the past and prospects for the future)//EF
The importance of NATO and the US relationship with the countries of western Europe was further underscored in an address given by Kissinger, in
which he said: ‘The President believes that our relations with Western Europe are of overriding importance—because they are the oldest and closest
allies and also because a stable world is inconceivable without a European contribution.’12 In fact, according to documents mined from the Nixon
Foundation, the trip to Europe was an important part of Nixon's (and Kissinger's) pursuit of the administration's strategic vision and larger foreign policy
goals. Shortly after returning from that trip, at the 20th anniversary meeting of NATO in Washington DC, Nixon asked for the creation of ‘a committee
on the challenges of modern society … to explore ways in which the experience and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be
marshaled toward improving the quality of life of our peoples’ and to help twentieth-century man to learn ‘how to remain in harmony with his rapidly-
changing world’.13 The subsequent creation of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
(CCMS) was designed, in conjunction with the Harmel Report, to ensure NATO's relevance in a
changing world, at least from the US perspective.14 In many ways, the underlying goals of the
CCMS stressed the importance of Article 2 of the NATO Treaty with its emphasis on cooperation
and friendly political and economic relations,15 and the belief that the strength of the alliance
depended as much on the vitality of the individual member states as on their military strength. 16
According to Nichter, the CCMS ‘marked a formal entrance of the alliance into the area of détente’.17 More important, perhaps, is

that Nixon used his European trip and subsequent call for the creation of the CCMS to stress the
need for the allies to bear a greater share of the common defense burden, a point that has been
repeatedly raised subsequently, most recently by Trump. Furthermore, the idea was established
that NATO is not only a collective security agreement but also a relationship with the potential
to bind like-minded countries together in any number of ways for their mutual benefit. Many of
Nixon's policies outraged and further estranged the other members of NATO. An example of this
is Nixon's decision in 1971 to implement a radical change in US monetary policy that resulted in
the end of the Bretton Woods economic system that had been in place since the end of the
Second World War, a decision that was made without adequate consultation with the
European nations.18 In effect, ‘they were supposed to be American allies, but they were not being treated like allies’.19 As Nixon's larger
strategic vision was being implemented, the US relationship with Europe was eclipsed by other priorities . While the Nixon

administration did attempt to repair some of the fractures it had created, these moves were
greeted sceptically by European leaders who had seen this attempted before. Simultaneously, political
changes in European countries, coupled with the movement towards enlargement of what was then the European Economic Community, shifted
attention away from the United States. ‘Over time, Europeans became frustrated with their diminished place in American foreign policy’20 and this was
a concern that the Nixon administration did little to address.
This is further evidence of the emergence of a dual
pattern whereby the United States pursued policies deemed to be in its own national interest,
often at the expense of Europe, while at the same time the European countries were
developing their own policies, both individually and collectively, that minimized or excluded the
United States.

Trump is disrupting collective security – maintaining genuine consultation is key

to Atlanticism
Rynning, Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern Denmark, 3-14-19 (Sten, Journal of
Transatlantic Studies, 17:139-156, p. 152-153)//EF

However, continuity is unlikely to offer relief, as this analysis has argued. NATOconsultations suffered after quite some
enthusiasm in the 1990s when the Atlanticist prescription for cohesion was exported to partners
and friends. Consultations were particularly strained during the early phase of the War on Terror
when the USA decided to invade Iraq. When the allies decided to zoom in on the good war in
Afghanistan, they found an engagement so tough that strategy Americanized, and consultations
withered. The return to Europe in 2014 offered limited relief as Russia annexed Crimea and introduced a revisionist element in European politics,
as China in a more gradual process gravitated toward the center of the American security agenda, and as the Trump presidency

disrupted longstanding collective security priorities. What Europe wants politically from Russia, and what it has to offer
the USA in the bigger Eurasian game, are questions that the European allies now confront and lack strong answers to .
Absent such
answers there is a real risk that Atlanticism will corrode further. The USA might continue taking
the lead in deterring Russia militarily, but there is no substitute for shared political priorities and
sustained consultation in the Alliance. In other words, NATO will not be fine as long as the USA
desire it; it must involve a collective sense of political purpose. If NATO cannot give political meaning to itself,
outside powers will be emboldened in their attempt to sow seeds of division. In 1958 Paul-Henri Spaak spoke of trouble in the West resulting from
“static” and “faint-hearted” foreign policies; some 60 years later these words once again, and from a NATO perspective, regrettably, ring true.
Atlanticism can yet prevail, but it will require a bold engagement on the part of NATO allies with their collective raison d’être in a future shaped by
rising Eurasian powers.

Prior consultation is crucial to trust and alliance credibility

Kirchner, COO and Senior Analyst at Conias Risk Intelligence, July 2018 (Magdalena,
“NATO IN THE SOUTH: HOW TO WIN OVER PARTNERS AND MAINTAIN PURPOSE” Istanbul Policy
Center, http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/NATO-Report-Kirchner.pdf,
LASA-IZP)

Third, NATO has to find a proper balance between its function as a hub and a spoke in the field of
counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in the South. Joining flexible and issue-based cooperative
security initiatives with other international organi- zations and partner states allow NATO
members to diversify their approaches to the highly specific security challenges they face. Although
NATO did not play an active role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in its initial phase, the alliance’s Wales Summit in 2014
provided a public platform for its establishment, and its Brussels headquarters served as the venue of the coalition’s first meeting.
On the one hand, the risk of a trade-off between involve- ment and duplication looms large , especially in
the current field of capacity building, with allies being engaged through different NATO, EU,
coalition, or bilateral formats. Operational learning has to be ensured. On the other, while NATO can certainly
not solve all allies’ security issues, constant coor- dination and deliberation need to take place in
the North Atlantic Council to maintain sufficiently high levels of alliance cohesion and understanding . A
“multi-speed” NATO with a heavy emphasis on EU members of the alliance could exclude, e.g., Turkey—
which doesn’t have an operational agree- ment with Europol yet —from intelligence sharing
schemes in order to regulate and manage the flow of returning foreign fighters and could have
substantial trust-eroding effects. The same goes for unilateral counterterrorism operations
without prior consultation or subsequent transparency and coordination with allies, as happened
earlier this year in Northern Syria.

Especially with the military campaign against ISIS winding down and substantial transatlantic tensions over the future of the JCPOA
deal, the Southern flank is unlikely to dominate the agenda of the upcoming NATO summit in July. Neverthe- less, NATO
would
be—when addressing the need for a new strategic concept—well advised to reflect and seek
paths forward in order to maintain alliance cohesion. NATO should identify its purpose as an
organization beyond being a mere and increasingly lesser institutionalized hub for coalitions of
the willing.
The US is the backbone of NATO operations – the partnership is in everyone’s
mutual interest
Thiem, Military Professor at US Naval War College, 06-26-14 (Don, “NATO Renewed: Building
the New Transatlantic Strategic Alliance,” https://www-tandfonline-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/03071847.2014.927998)//EF

Since the ‘end’ of the Cold War, even with the measured success of the Alliance, the existential
question for NATO remains US participation. Absent the US, NATO lacks the capability to
conduct synchronized high-end operations. At home, though, the US as a nation is predicated on business and a moral
experiment. At its most basic level, the strategic aim of the US is to create stable access to goods, services and markets that allow for continued
economic growth in conjunction with expanded basic human-rights protection for all. Absent a clear and present danger, defining and explaining the
role of NATO within this construct is challenging. Nonetheless, in an interconnected global economy, NATO is highly relevant to this refinement of
assured strategic security. The
US involvement in Europe since 1914 is a strategic aberration. A hundred
years later, the US is focused on pursuing its interests in Asia, and while Europe provides a large
market and economic trading partner, it is no longer the only market. By 2050, Europe – with a
population of 593 million – will have fewer people than West Africa – with an estimated 667
million people, of which Nigeria alone will have 258 million – and much fewer than India, China,
South Korea and Japan with a combined total population of 3.1 billion .3 This means that the economic and
strategic landscape of East Asia will also change correspondingly. In this context, it is no surprise that to the average American, the last century appears
to have been a strategic interruption, and one being paid for in Philadelphia, not Paris or Prague. Even at the height of the Syria crisis last autumn, only
49 per cent of Americans saw NATO ‘in a favorable light’.4 The
strategic requirement for Europe, therefore, is to
convincingly show why the US still needs to be actively involved in European security. NATO is
and can continue to be relevant – but it needs a wide-eyed reassessment that embraces new
security challenges and opportunities. Why the US Needs (to be in) NATO NATO must leave behind the ‘2 per cent, tanks, subs
and nukes’ paradigm and build a non-linear strategic security alliance to seek out, address and track threats, and then attack, deter, degrade or defeat
them. Toprotect itself, NATO needs to be physically engaged outside the Alliance. The US assesses
that the primary threats to stability are not ‘just’ in the US and Europe, but are transregional.
The lifeblood of Europe is what moves in and out of it. The British understood this 300 years ago
and built a navy to match. Today, it is the US Navy which secures the high seas, enabling
Europe's prosperity – which is why it is so refreshing to the US to see multiple partners in the
EU-led, NATO-resourced counter-piracy Operation Atalanta across entire swaths of the Indian
Ocean. This offers an excellent paradigm shift for the future of shared strategic security
partnerships, and clearly demonstrates that the ‘old ways’ no longer fit the current operating
environment. Others will argue that the threats to Europe and the US alike are not susceptible
to kinetic means, but are more asymmetrical and ancient – disease, pestilence, people
smuggling – as well as modern and nebulous – cyber, space, drugs. As Phil Williams has noted,
pandemic disease, economic instability and transnational criminal networks will pose severe and
direct challenges to US security interests. 5 5 See Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown, ‘Drug Trafficking, Violence and
Instability’, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012; see also Stewart Patrick, ‘Weak States and Global Threats: Assessing Evidence of Spillovers’, Center
for Global Development, Working Paper No. 73, January 2006. View all notes The US believes that, for security – broadly defined – the sine qua non is
NATO, not the EU or other constructs. The
Alliance offers an indispensable ‘one-stop shop’ for collective
discourse and action. The average American sees the EU as an economic competitor for jobs
and sales, whereas NATO members are allies. However, while the US would rather deal with NATO on strategy, this is a
decision that can only be made in Europe, not in Dayton, Ohio. The US sees complex challenges as prima facie evidence that, in a European context,
NATO must be the leader for strategic security dialogue. The ability of the governments, leaders and forces of NATO to work together, looking towards
the Fulda Gap, and over the horizon off the coast of Somalia and other out-of-area operational areas, is unsurpassed .
The US needs NATO
as a ‘partner of choice’ to tackle a tough international strategic environment that will only get
more complex and dynamic in the decades to come – Putin's Russia being the latest example.
The new ‘normal’ is not the Westphalian sanctity of nation-states, but the security of their
people. The diplomacy and operational structure that brings NATO forces together for exercises and operations builds a sophisticated approach
that enables the Alliance to address myriad challenges. NATO may not be ‘ready-made’ to fight all of these

challenges, but the shared security culture and processes, built over the last seven decades and
honed in Libya, the Indian Ocean and Afghanistan, provide a framework that is irreplaceable and
unmatched. The Alliance provides unity of effort and consensus, two critical underpinnings to collective strategic security. Selling NATO in the US
is tough: a December 2013 Pew poll showed that a majority of Americans believe that ‘the U.S. should mind its own business internationally’.
However, the following challenges, grouped thematically and not necessarily in order of
priority, represent compelling converging interests that European leaders must demonstrate
to the US as underscoring the importance of NATO.

NATO consultation key to addressing common problems

Burns, Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy
and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School, and Lute, Senior Fellow,
Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, February 2019
(Nicholas, and Douglas, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis,”
https://www.belfercenter.org/NATO70, LASA-IZP)

Politically, too, America benefits from the Alliance. In Europe and Canada, the United States enjoys
more treaty allies than in any other region of the world. The twenty-nine NATO allies, bound
together by common democratic values, are a powerful political bloc on the world stage, the
place to start when forming political coalitions to address global problems. This political strength begins
with the values found in the second sentence of the NATO Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and rule of
law.124 NATO allies are three of five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, six of seven members of the G7
and seven members of the G20. Political cohesion translates into political staying power: consider NATO’s
continued engagement in the Balkans more than twenty years after the 1995 intervention, or the forty-nation NATO-based coalition
in Afghanistan seventeen years after 9/11. NATO allies know one another well, each with a permanent diplomatic mission under one
roof at NATO Headquarters in Brussels and with five annual meetings of foreign and defense ministers, a firm foundation for trusting
political engagement. Allies
do not always agree on political issues, of course, but NATO provides a forum
for regular consultations and a starting point to address common problems.
 NATO Says Yes – Generic
NATO will always say yes – they need the United States’ support to keep NATO
together
Smith, Writer at Foreign Policy, 04-02-19 (Julie, “NATO Needs Solidarity for Its 70th Birthday,”
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/02/nato-needs-solidarity-for-its-70th-birthday-trump/)//EF

The United States plays a unique role in NATO. Part of that role should include pushing allies to meet their defense
spending targets. But working on NATO issues for Defense Secretaries Robert Gates and Leon Panetta

taught me that the U.S. role stretches far beyond that. As the only NATO ally with a global
posture and the capabilities to match, the U nited States, for its part, must alert allies to new threats,
push the alliance toward innovation, and help maintain unity across the members . When the
United States abdicates those other important leadership roles, NATO starts to stall. For Pompeo, a
more effective approach than admonishment would be to issue a call for a return to NATO solidarity,
which must always begin with the United States. Then, to showcase Washington’s commitment, Pompeo could announce
that the State Department and Pentagon officials who were tasked with calculating a bill for allies hosting U.S. troops have been told to stop work.
That would send a strong message to NATO allies. Pompeo should also back off from Trump’s
holier-than-thou approach on defense modernization, admit that waging future war will require new
ways of thinking that can’t yet be found on either side of the Atlantic , and remind allies that
the best solutions to tomorrow’s challenges start with everyone uniting over a common purpose.

It's most strategic for European leaders to comply with all consultations –
they’re practically a rubber stamp
Sloan, Scholar in Political Science at Middlebury College, 03-27-18 (Stanley, “A WAY FORWARD FOR NATO
ALLIES: COPE WITH TRUMP WHILE PREPARING FOR A POST-TRUMP FUTURE,”
https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/what-should-nato-allies-do-coping-with-trump-while-preparing-for-a-post-
trump-future/)//EF

Donald Trump’s ascent to the presidency on an “America First” platform raised the prospect of the
new president qualifying decades of U.S. support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), America’s most important alliance. While far-right politicians across Europe celebrated, British Prime
Minister Theresa May, hoping to convince Trump to take a more positive attitude toward
NATO, advised, “With the threats we face, it’s not the time for less cooperation.” As I wrote in a 2017 essay for the
International Security Studies Forum, candidate Trump disparaged the transatlantic alliance throughout his campaign by suggesting that the United
States might not remain committed to collective defense under Article 5, by calling NATO “obsolete” (though he later walked that back), and by taking a
generally transactional view of the alliance that appeared to undermine the idea of collective defense. Since taking office, Trump has not gone to those
extremes, though his campaign assertions, his insistence to Angela Merkel that Germany still owed “vast sums of money” to the United States and the
alliance for its defense, and his seeming reluctance to condemn Russia’s Vladimir Putin have contributed to a persistent sense of unease about the
future of the transatlantic relationship. Now,
the allies need to develop a coherent strategy for coping with
the demands and unpredictability of the Trump administration and preparing for the future
revitalization of the transatlantic relationship. Fortunately, both can be accomplished together.
Moreover, Europe has already started taking some of these actions. Europeans should realize that America’s commitment to transatlantic relations is
not based solely on the president’s view. Despite Trump’s dramatic criticisms of the transatlantic relationship, both congressional and public attitudes
have remained highly supportive of NATO. While there is certainly room for improving the systems underlying the transatlantic relationship, the
alliance remains a practical vehicle for shared defense of interests as well as a key symbol of the Western values of democracy, individual liberty and
the rule of law. Illiberal tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic have made it clear that those values are being challenged. Europe should
therefore seek to mitigate the short-term impact of Trump’s disruptive views while responding to
legitimate American concerns and build a foundation for the alliance’s future. That future will also depend on whether the
European allies are successful in dealing with the challenges posed by domestic illiberal political movements, like those that
recently scored a big electoral victory in Italy.

NATO and Trump have solidarity on arms controls policy

Gramer, Seligman, National Security reporters at Foreign Policy, 18 (Robbie, Lara, “Trump
and NATO Show Rare Unity in Confronting Russia’s Arms Treaty Violation,” Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/04/trump-and-nato-show-rare-unity-in-confronting-russia-
arms-treaty-violation-inf/)//EF

The Trump administration and NATO, which have been antagonists more often than not,
presented an unusual united front on Tuesday, when U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave Russia a 60-day ultimatum
to come back into compliance with a Cold War-era arms treaty. After a meeting of senior U.S., Canadian, and European diplomats at NATO in Brussels
on Tuesday, Pompeo accused Russia of being in material breach of the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, saying Washington would suspend obligation to the agreement in
60 days if Moscow doesn’t reverse course. Almost immediately, NATO foreign ministers released a joint
statement supporting America’s accusations and acknowledging that Russia was violating the treaty, which prohibits the use
of nuclear and conventional missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km (300 to 3,400 miles). In the case of some of the foreign ministers, the

show of support for the U.S. position may reflect a desire to fix rather than ditch the INF Treaty
altogether, as Trump has previously threatened to do. In a statement that was uncharacteristically strong for the alliance, the ministers
said the United States has remained in full compliance with its INF Treaty obligations, pinning
the responsibility for preserving the arms control agreement squarely on Moscow’s shoulders.
“We strongly support the finding of the United States that Russia is in material breach of its obligations under the INF Treaty,” the statement read. “We
call on Russia to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance. It is now up to Russia to preserve the INF Treaty.” The ministers pointed to Russia’s
development of the Novator 9M729 ground-based cruise missile, which violates the terms of the treaty and poses “significant risks” to the security of
the region. Questions over the INF Treaty have been brewing for years, long predating the Trump administration. “On at least 30 occasions since 2013,
extending to the highest levels of leadership, we have raised Russia’s noncompliance and stressed that a failure to return to compliance would have
consequences,” Pompeo said in public remarks on Tuesday. “Russia’s reply has been consistent: deny any wrongdoing, demand more information, and
issue baseless counter-accusations.” The
NATO statement signaled a rare showcase of solidarity between
the United States and its allies under a president who has regularly spurned NATO and left out
allied leaders from key deliberations on other issues. “It’s one thing for the U.S. to come out and say it, but for NATO to
say ‘We 29 allies know Russia is in breach’ is a strong, supportive agreement from NATO,” said Jim Townsend, the former top NATO policy official at the
U.S. Defense Department under former President Barack Obama. “It’s saying, ‘We’re now confronting this thing head-on
together.’”

NATO has already bent to Trump’s controversial rhetoric over defense

contributions – proves they’ll do anything to preserve American alliances
Clinch, Reid, Writers at CNBC, 02-19-19 (Matt, David, “Trump’s message is having an impact
on NATO, secretary general says,” https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/16/trump-message-is-
having-an-impact-on-nato-secretary-general-says.html)//EF

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told CNBC that President Donald Trump’s rhetoric on
defense spending is having an “important” impact on the military alliance. “I’m saying that his
message has been very clear and that his message is having an impact on defense spending .
And this is important because we need fairer burden sharing in the NATO alliance, ” he told CNBC’s
Hadley Gamble at the Munich Security Conference on Saturday. “We see more nations spending 2 percent of GDP (gross domestic product) on defense
which is the NATO guideline and we see that all nations have stopped the cuts we saw for many years to their defense budgets. And all nations have
started to increase, ” he added.
Contributions to NATO are a highly sensitive topic. Trump has often
criticized other NATO members for not respecting the spending rule. Speaking at a NATO summit in 2017, Trump
said: “Over the last eight years, the United States spent more on defense than all NATO countries combined. If all NATO members had spent just 2
percent of GDP on defense last year, we would have had another $119 billion for our collective defense.”
 AT: Trump Ruined NATO
NATO will only survive Trump through increased bilateral cooperation – the US
can lead in the area of arms spending
Chiampan, PhD, 02-19 (Andrea, Postdoctorate Fellow at Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF), “Trump and the Future of NATO,” Current Affairs in Perspective, p. 7)//EF

Still, NATO will survive Trump—if anything because Trump does not represent the views of
Congress and the US Military Establishment.36 The foreign policy and military elites are
strongly committed to NATO and a change in leadership will most likely reduce transatlantic
tension. This is not to say, however, that Europe should simply sit this presidency in and wait for the storm to pass. Useful lessons about how NATO
can survive Trump’s challenge can be learned from historical analogy. NATO has undergone numerous crises, but it

survived each time—how? Certainly, during the Cold War it survived because NATO was an
essential part of US strategy of Soviet containment, but these rifts were also overcome through
small compromise adjustments that increased trust, cooperation, and reinforced deterrence .
In 1967, for instance, McNamara decided to create the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) to
compensate for the failure of the MLF and to prevent the spread of Gaullist ideas about the
unreliability of the US nuclear commitment.37 It was a small step that however carried
important long-term consequences as the NPG became one of the central poles of decision-
making in the Alliance. NATO will survive this crisis too, but it will also have to take small and
incremental steps in the right direction. For instance, all NATO members and international
security experts agree that Canada and Europe should spend more on defense , but their focus
on a fixed increase in percentage of GDP is not what NATO needs . Spending should be based on
real-world military requirement for defense and deterrence.38 To this regard, the relevance of
the 2% mark is to say the least questionable. NATO should also reach a strategic agreement on
what these military capabilities should be. It is true that geopolitical instability is rising, great
power rivalry might return as a feature of international relations, and new challenges from non-
state actors and new technologies may continue to emerge . But at present, NATO is performing only non-combat
training missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, a peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, and a policing mission in the Mediterranean. It also holds a few maritime
and air standing forces, including the NATO Response Force (NRF). Most of NATO members participate in and contribute to these missions at varying
degrees. It is also clear that the kind of capabilities necessary to perform these roles are not the same needed to fight a war in Europe. It
is
understandably hard for European democracies to demand massive rearmament efforts — for
instance Germany should jump from $40 to $70 billion to meet the 2percent — at a time of
relative peace, even considering recent Russian behavior.

Trump’s small concessions to NATO have been symbolically important – proves

talks are chipping away at – but further action is needed
Keogh, Economics & Business Editor at The Conversation, 17 (Bryan, “When Trump met NATO: Blunt talk and
meaningful silences,” https://theconversation.com/when-trump-met-nato-blunt-talk-and-meaningful-silences-
78444)//EF

Donald Trump’s electoral campaign was notable for his abrasive statements and blunt
assessments about a variety of issues. Among his more unforgettable claims was his suggestion
that NATO was “obsolete.” This comment was largely founded, it seems, on a lack of
understanding about what NATO does or how it functions. Since 1949, NATO has been a bedrock of American
foreign policy, first in Europe against the Soviet Union and its allies, and then in Afghanistan. Trump’s desire to build bridges with the Russians, and his
plain ignorance about NATO’s contribution in the war against the Taliban, largely explains his startling claim. But what interests me as a keen observer
of NATO politics is what Trump’s encounter with the other NATO leaders reveals about their relationship. And what will he claim about that meeting on
his return? As in many other policy areas, some quick tutoring led Trump to completely reverse his
position. Key to that education was undoubtedly Defense Secretary James Mattis, who
reportedly told the German defense minister soon after Trump’s inauguration that NATO
remained the “central pillar” of transatlantic security and commented in congressional
testimony that Russia remained America’s number one security threat. So Mattis himself, Vice
President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson all traveled to Europe in the first 100
days of the Trump administration to reassure NATO allies about the organization’s continued
importance. This sentiment was reinforced by General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, the current supreme allied commander Europe. By April, Trump
had issued a predictably blunt edict in which he reversed course: “I said it was obsolete. It is no longer obsolete. ” Still,

for many of us, a subsequent visit to see those we’d publicly criticized would be awkward. But
just like his meeting with Pope Francis, Trump again demonstrated an amazing capacity to shrug
off his earlier statements without any outward sign of embarrassment – while simultaneously
asserting an authoritative tone. The discussions in Brussels may have been more symbolic than
substantial. But Trump’s ability to assume a claim of leadership – and success – was helped by two developments.

NATO will survive Trump

Baron, executive editor @ defense one, 18 (Kevin, 06.27.18, “NATO Will Outlive Trump (and
Putin), Don’t Worry,” https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/06/nato-will-outlive-trump-
and-putin-dont-worry/149348/) np
Before Trump heads back to Europe, remember that NATO isn’t the G-7 and military relations are much stronger than the political
ones they often endure. Squee!! What is Trump going to say this time? That’s how some of the political press in DC sound already,
both giddy and worried about what President Donald Trump is going to say at the NATO Summit in two weeks. More seriously, many
Americans and Europeans are worried about what Trump is going to say and do in Brussels, and how much further Trump may sink
U.S. relations in general with European and North American allies. You can’t blame them. The G-7 meeting in Canada last month was
a diplomatic disaster that left foreign policy pundit circles aghast yet again at how the American president treated the leaders of his
nation’s closest allies. (Trump supporters loved every minute of it.) Even before that meeting, Foreign Policy had run an article
headlined “Can the U.S.-Europe Alliance Survive Trump?” (They were talking about Trump pulling the U.S. out of the Iran deal.) After
Vancouver, other headlines proclaimed U.S.-European relations at an all-time low. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel said Europe
could no longer “completely rely” on American protection, leading many to question the future of the alliance. There’s only one
problem, or perhaps ray of hope. Relations
between G-7 leaders are not the same as relations between
their countries. And the G-7 is not NATO . NATO is not political Twitter or a TV roundtable. It’s not an economic club.
NATO is a military alliance of treaty-bound governments with troops trained to kill, fight, and die
to protect one another from foreign attack. NATO is a 70-year-old alliance that has withstood
political winds and Cold War nuclear showdowns. It is a pact between democratic nations that their military men
and women will stand that post. It outlasted Kennedy and Kruschev, Brezhnev and Reagan. It will outlast Trump and Putin and
Merkel. Military relations are not like political ones. Take Turkey. Defense One ran the headline “Are U.S.-Turkey
Relations Fraying?” five years ago. They are. Last week, they were “coming to a boil.” But what is happening underneath? Military
leaders in constant contact, still upholding their NATO pledge. Earlier this year, I was talking with one senior
military official who said he understood every American concern about President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s confounding moves in
Syria and toward Russia, but he put it like this: military-to-military relations do and must operate on a level
plane at one level (as he steadily slid his hand flat in the air, back and forth), while political relations and the
sometimes-heated rhetoric of elected officials who come and go occur above them (he raised his
hand above his eyes, making the same gesture). It’s
true in many places. If military relations sour between the
U.S. and China, it is potentially far more disastrous than any downturn in the economic, political,
or trade spheres. But even when those relations are not so great, they’re often steady. In the early
Obama years, when China froze communications with the U.S. military, Pentagon leaders begged the PLA to open up and talk, saying
repeatedly that the U.S. wanted both sides to “avoid miscalculations” that could escalate into war. China opened up, but they also
proceeded with a rapid military technological advance and created new islands to expand their power. Military relations adjusted,
but they continue. At press time, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis is in Beijing discussing mutual issues like North Korean
denuclearization. Or take Israel. Conservatives, liberals, and pro-Israeli and political pundits claimed U.S.-Israeli relations were at an
all-time low when Obama and Netanyahu weren’t seeing eye-to-eye. But at the same moment, military and intelligence leaders of
both sides were saying times were never better at their level; as mutual trust, intelligence coordination, and arms sales were
flourishing. The
relationships of national leaders do not always reflect the relationships of their
peoples or militaries. So when you hear predictions that in two weeks Trump may pull the U.S.
out of NATO, take a breath and think through what it would really take for that to happen. Think
about the military. When Syria’s Bashar al-Assad was routing rebels and some U.S. leaders wanted Obama to intervene with
bombs and troops, there was one group left out of the conversation who also had a vote: the military. At the time, Defense One ran
the headline “Want Syria? Convince General Dempsey.” The point was that as right-left politics shouted at each other over what to
do, Obama’s senior military advisor was sitting atop an officer corps that was extremely wary of leading the U.S. into another unsure
military intervention in the Middle East just two years after pulling out of Iraq. Now
think about the magnitude of a
U.S. withdrawal from NATO. Trump so far has deferred to the generals repeatedly — on Syria,
on Afghanistan, on Guantanamo, on North Korea, and, yes, on NATO. Do you really think Joint
Chiefs Chairman Gen. Joseph Dunford’s “best military advice” to the commander in chief at this
moment in history would be to pull out of NATO? Would any U.S. military leader’s? Would John Kelly’s? Would
Congress’s? Of course not. We’ve been through this before. Trump has been dangling NATO withdrawal (or
cheap disparagement) before his isolationist-but-militaristic base since early in his presidential
campaign. And Trump may continue to dangle it over Europeans, the way he dangles tweets and
falsehoods to manipulate his constituency, the media, and his opponents. We know that game now.
Some of the NATO leaders he is going to meet in July know it more than most. They were the ones he humiliated at the G-7. The G-7
isn’t NATO. NATO will survive July.
 AT: Aff Not Relevant To Agenda
Prior consultation is key to NATO – even when not directly related to the
agenda
Ellehuus, Deputy Director at Europe Program of CSIS, 04-02-19 (Rachel, “NATO at 70—Shaping the Future for
the Next 70 Years,” https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-70-shaping-future-next-70-years)//EF

NATO’s role as a political alliance is often forgotten and arguably underutilized. Consultation is
an integral part of NATO’s decisionmaking process but also a precursor to getting there. Even
absent an impending decision, it allows members to consult and cooperate on defense and
security-related issues in order to solve problems, build trust, and prevent conflict. Under
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, members can bring any issue of concern to the North
Atlantic Council for discussion, particularly those related to the security of member countries. The
alliance has held a handful of Article 4 consultations but can and should hold more by doing away with the misperception that an Article 4 consultation
is a stepping stone to an Article 5 commitment. In this regard, NATO is well-suited to host discussions on the emerging challenge presented by China. To
be clear, this would not be a discussion on military options. Rather, members would share their experiences working with China, particularly with
regard to Chinese investments in critical infrastructure and telecommunications.
They could then discuss what risk such
investments might pose to their national security, intelligence sharing and political freedom of
action. Finally, they might try to reach consensus on steps NATO, national governments, or
other multinational organization such as the Europe Union might take to deter malign behavior
and guard against any security risks.
Impacts
 !! – Generic Conflict
NATO is crucial to preserve long-term peace beyond just the North-Atlantic
Region – also keeps US military spending in check
Burns, former American NATO ambassador, September 5, 18 (Nicholas, “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance,”
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance) DR

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Menendez, you have asked for an assessment of NATO’s value to the
United States.  In my judgment, NATO continues to be of vital importance to American security
interests in five principal ways. First, NATO is at the core of one of the most significant foreign
policy accomplishments in American history—the creation of a long-term peace in Europe
following the close of the Second World War.  Because of NATO and the emergence of the
European Union, Europe is united after centuries of division and war.  NATO’s military strength
has been a major reason for the absence of war with the Soviet Union and Russia since 1949. A
recent Atlantic Council study reminds that America spent 14.1 percent of its GDP on defense
during the First World War, 37.5 percent during the Second World War and 13.2 percent during
the Korean Conflict.  We spend nothing close to those levels now in large part due to the great
power peace we have enjoyed for over seventy years.  NATO has been a major factor in that
peace. And due to the expansion of NATO and the European Union eastward after the fall of the
Soviet Union, millions of East Europeans now live in free, democratic societies—a significant
success for U.S. diplomacy.   

NATO is beneficial for every country in the alliance, successful response to the
Soviet Union proves – US commitment is key
Department of Defense, 4-3-2019 (U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary General Touts NATO’s Benefits at Joint
Session of Congress” https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1805017/secretary-general-touts-natos-benefits-at-joint-
session-of-congress/) DR

WASHINGTON -- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization not only is the longest-lived alliance in
history, but also is the most successful, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told a joint
session of the U.S. Congress here today. Stoltenberg, whose term as NATO’s civilian leader was
extended through 2022, marked 70 years of the defensive alliance. The Washington Treaty, which
established the alliance, was signed April 4, 1949. The 1secretary general’s most repeated message in his
address was “It’s good to have friends.” He was interrupted many times by applause from the members of
Congress, members of the Cabinet and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He received many standing
ovations during his speech. Stoltenberg detailed the history of the alliance and the changes it has made to
stay strong and relevant for 70 years. The alliance was formed in response to the millions of deaths
in two world wars and the increasing danger the Soviet Union posed in 1949. The 12 nations
that formed NATO did so “with a clear purpose: to preserve peace and to safeguard freedom,
with an ironclad commitment by all members of the alliance [and] to protect each other,” he
said. “They made a solemn promise: One for all, and all for one.” Unprecedented Period of
Peace And it has worked. In 70 years, through the waxing and waning of Soviet might, peace has
been preserved and freedom maintained , Stoltenberg said. “The Cold War ended without a shot
being fired in Europe, and we have experienced an unprecedented period of peace,” the
secretary general added. And this is in the best interests of all allies, on both sides of the
Atlantic, he said. “Ever since the founding of our alliance in 1949, every Congress, every
American president, your men and women in uniform, and the people of the United States of
America, have been staunch supporters of NATO,” Stoltenberg said. “America has been the
backbone of our alliance. It has been fundamental to European security and for our freedom.
We would not have the peaceful and prosperous Europe we see today without the sacrifice and
commitment of the United States. For your enduring support, I thank you all today.”

The NATO alliance is important to all countries – studies show a consensus of

both political parties
Pew Research, nonpartisan American fact tank and research center based in Washington, D.C. April 2, 2019 (Pew
Research Center, “Large Majorities in Both Parties Say NATO Is Good for the U.S.” https://www.people-press.org/2019/04/02/large-
majorities-in-both-parties-say-nato-is-good-for-the-u-s/) DR

As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrates its 70  anniversary this month,
th

Americans overwhelmingly say being a member of NATO is beneficial for the United States.
Nearly eight-in-ten Americans (77%) – including large majorities in both parties – say being a
member of NATO is good for the United States. These numbers are essentially unchanged from
April 2016. However, the public is more divided about whether the NATO alliance is more
important to the United States or other NATO countries. A plurality of the public (42%) says
NATO is about as important to the U.S. as it is to other NATO countries. About a third (34%) say
the alliance is more important to other NATO countries, while just 15% say it is more important
to the U.S. While they agree that NATO membership is good for the U.S., Republicans and
Democrats differ over the alliance’s importance to its members. Nearly half of Republicans and
Republican-leaning independents (47%) say NATO is more important to other NATO countries
than the U.S.; only a quarter of Democrats and Democratic leaners say the same. These views
also are little changed since 2016, during the presidential campaign.

NATO distinguishes the US from other world powers – alliance is key to

dismantle international issues like climate change and pandemics
Burns, former American NATO ambassador, September 5, 18 (Nicholas, “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance,”
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance) DR

Third, the NATO allies are among our closest and most supportive global partners as we
confront the great transnational challenges that define this century—the fight against terrorism,
the entire complex of cyber threats, climate change, the risk of pandemics, mass migration and
others. The NATO allies and our partners in the European Union act together with us on these
and other issues.  This is of incalculable benefit to the U.S.   Neither Russia nor China have treaty
allies.  NATO is a significant advantage for the United States when it acts as a force multiplier for
American interests.
The RAP allows NATO to in deter conflict, protecting allies, and maintain
democracy.
NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 6/20/19
(https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm)

NATO is a political and military alliance, whose principal task is to ensure the protection of its
citizens and to promote security and stability in the North Atlantic area. The Alliance must be able to
address the full spectrum of current and future challenges and threats from any direction, simultaneously.
The Alliance has been strengthening its deterrence and defense posture in light of the changed and
evolving security environment. Collective defense remains the Alliance’s greatest responsibility and deterrence is a core
element of NATO’s overall strategy – preventing conflict and war, protecting Allies, maintaining
freedom of decision and action, and upholding the principles and values it stands for – individual liberty,
democracy, human rights and the rule of law . NATO’s capacity to deter and defend is supported
by an appropriate mix of capabilities. Nuclear, conventional and missile defense capabilities
complement each other. NATO also maintains the freedom of action and flexibility to respond to the full spectrum of
challenges with an appropriate and tailored approach, at the minimum level of force. Russia has become more assertive with the
illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the destabilization of eastern Ukraine, as well as its military build-up close to NATO’s
borders. In parallel, to the south, the security situation in the Middle East and Africa has deteriorated due to a combination of
factors that are causing loss of life, fueling large-scale migration flows and inspiring terrorist attacks in Allied countries and
elsewhere. The Readiness Action Plan (RAP), launched at the Wales Summit in 2014, was a major driver for
change in the Alliance’s deterrence and defense posture . The RAP was initiated to ensure the
Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges from the east and from the
south. Building on the RAP, NATO Heads of State and Government approved a strengthened deterrence
and defense posture at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016. It is providing the Alliance with a broad
range of options to be able to respond to any threats from wherever they arise to protect Alliance
territory, population, airspace and sea lines of communication. For instance, four battlegroups were deployed in Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland, and measures have been taken to reinforce security in the south-eastern region of the Alliance. Furthermore,
a number of measures have been undertaken to adapt the Alliance to the challenges emanating from the south. NATO leaders
reiterated their resolve, at the 2018 Brussels Summit, by adopting a Readiness Initiative to enhance the Alliance’s rapid-response
capability, either for reinforcement of Allies in support of deterrence or collective defense, including for high-intensity warfighting,
or for rapid military crisis intervention, if required. With the Readiness Initiative or the so-called “four thirties”, Allies committed to
forming – by 2020 – 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 battleships ready to use within 30 days or less. They will be
able to respond to threats coming from any direction and will further strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defense posture. The
adaptation of NATO’s Command Structure, coupled with logistical enablement of NATO
European territory, will help ensure NATO troops and equipment can deploy across Europe
without delay both for exercises and for reinforcements in an emerging crisis . Moreover, the creation of
a new Cyber Operations Centre in Belgium and the formation of hybrid support teams to assist Allies in need will also boost the
Alliance’s deterrence efforts, especially since NATO has recognized “cyber” as a domain of operations in which it must defend itself
as it does in the air, on land and at sea. The Alliance’s actions are defensive in nature, proportionate and in line with international
commitments given the threats in the changed and evolving security environment, and the Alliance’s right to self-defense. NATO
also remains fully committed to non-proliferation, disarmament, arms control and confidence-
and security-building measures to increase security and reduce military tensions. For instance, all
NATO Allies are seriously concerned by Russia’s deployment of a nuclear-capable missile system, which violates the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and poses a significant risk to security. However, in response NATO Allies do not intend to deploy
new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe nor enter into a new arms race. NATO will continue to maintain a credible and effective
deterrence and defense, while remaining committed to effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Exercises are an
integral part of NATO’s deterrence and defense since military training is an essential requirement to maintain the Alliance’s
readiness levels and flexibility. Allies go beyond the letter of the Vienna Document and other transparency measures in planning and
conducting NATO exercises. The Vienna Document is a politically binding agreement, initiated by the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe, which is designed to promote mutual trust and transparency about a state’s military forces and activities.
More specifically, NATO’s strengthened deterrence and defense posture entails efforts in areas such as conventional forces, forward
presence, joint air power and maritime forces, as well as cyber defense, civil preparedness and countering hybrid threats, including
in cooperation with the European Union (EU). Reinforced relations with the EU include increased cooperation, as well as
complementary and interoperable capability development to avoid duplication and contribute to transatlantic burden-sharing. The
Defence Investment Pledge, adopted by NATO leaders in 2014, called for all Allies to stop cuts to defence budgets and meet the
NATO-agreed guideline of spending 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense within a decade. Allies also agreed, in that same
timeframe, to move towards spending at least 20% of annual defence expenditure on major new equipment, including related
research and development. Finally, the Pledge committed Allies to ensuring that their land, air and maritime forces meet NATO-
agreed guidelines for deplorability, sustainability and other agreed metrics, and that their armed forces can operate together
effectively, including through the implementation of NATO standards and doctrines. Since 2014, Allies have made considerable
progress in increasing defense spending and investing in major equipment. Allies are not just delivering more of the heavier, high-
end capabilities NATO needs; they are also improving the readiness, deplorability, sustainability and interoperability of their forces.
 !! – Security
NATO alliance is key to the economy and solve global security issues, climate
change, and pandemics
Burns, former American NATO ambassador, July 11, 18 (Nicholas, “What America Gets Out of NATO”,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html) DR

None of this, of course, is likely to disturb Mr. Trump, who remains steadfast in his belief that
whatever benefits the United States gained from the trans-Atlantic alliance in the past, the country no
longer profits. But he’s wrong — there are compelling reasons that NATO in particular will be a
distinct advantage for America’s security far into the future. First, NATO’s formidable
conventional and nuclear forces are the most effective way to protect North America and
Europe — the heart of the democratic world — from attack. Threats to our collective security have
not vanished in the 21st century. Mr. Putin remains a determined adversary preying on Eastern
Europe and American elections. NATO is a force multiplier: The United States has allies who will
stand by us, while Russia has none. And while it’s true that most of America’s NATO allies need to
increase their defense spending under the treaty, they’re not freeloaders: The United States has relied
on NATO allies to strike back against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Islamic State in the Middle
East. European troops have replaced American soldiers in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and
contribute the large majority in Kosovo. Our NATO allies are also getting better about contributing their
fair share. They have increased their defense spending by a total of more than $87 billion since Mr. Putin
annexed Crimea in 2014. Fourteen more allies will reach NATO’s military spending target — 2 percent of
gross domestic product — by 2024. Mr. Trump would be smart to claim credit for this at this week’s
summit. A second reason for maintaining the trans-Atlantic alliance is America’s economic
future. The European Union is our country’s largest trade partner, and its largest investor. The United
States and the European Union are the world’s two largest economies, and can steer global
trade to their advantage if they stick together. More than four million Americans work for
European companies in the United States. Forty-five of the 50 states export more to Europe
than to China. Mr. Trump is right that the two sides are also economic competitors, and trade disputes
are inevitable. His predecessors kept this tension in balance lest there be damaging consequences for
American businesses, workers and farmers — a good reminder for Mr. Trump, whose ill-conceived trade
war with Canada and Europe risks harming the American economy. Third, future American leaders will
find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global
security: climate change; drug and cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration
from Africa and the Middle East. And America’s NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in
safeguarding democracy and freedom, under assault by Russia and China. Mr. Trump’s
campaign to undermine the European Union and diminish America’s leadership in NATO serves
none of these interests. He seems driven by resentment about European trade surpluses and
low defense budgets, issues that blind him to all the other benefits Americans derive from our
alliance with Europe and Canada. Mr. Trump may believe his blistering attacks on Europe’s trade
policies and defense budgets are a good negotiating tactic before the summit. But in fact they
have already done enormous damage. While he cannot outright kill NATO — the American
public and Congress support it too strongly — he has eroded significant levels of trust and good
will. As it became clear during my recent visits across Europe, a dangerous breach has opened in
the trans-Atlantic alliance — by far the worst in seven decades. Mr. Trump wants Americans to
believe that their allies are simply taking advantage of them. On Sept. 11, 2001, I witnessed a far
different reality as American ambassador to NATO. Canada and the European allies volunteered
within hours of the attacks to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which compels all members to
respond to an attack on any single member, for the first time in history. They came to our
defense when we most needed them. They sent troops to fight with us in Afghanistan. They are
still there with us 17 years later. Are we now going to throw off that mutual protection, and go it
alone in a dangerous 21st-century world? That would be a historic mistake. But that is where we
may find ourselves if Mr. Trump’s anti-Europe vendetta continues.

Escalation of terrorism has catastrophic impacts – Armageddon kills hundreds

of thousands
Wright, former senior editor at The Sciences and at The New Republic, editor and writer at New York Times, April 28, 07
(Robert, Planet of the Apes, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/28/opinion/28wright.html) DR

(3) Terrorism. Alas, the negative-feedback loop — bad outcomes lead to smart policies — may
not apply here. We reacted to 9/11 by freaking out and invading one too many countries,
creating more terrorists. With the ranks of terrorists growing — amid evolving biotechnology
and loose nukes — we could within a decade see terrorism on a scale that would make us forget
any restraint we had learned from the Iraq war’s outcome. If 3,000 deaths led to two wars, how
many wars would 300,000 deaths yield? And how many new terrorists? Terrorism alone won’t
wipe out humanity. But with our unwitting help, it could strengthen other lethal forces. It could
give weight to the initially fanciful “clash of civilizations” thesis. Muslim states could fall under
the control of radicals and opt out of what might otherwise have become a global civilization.
Armed with nukes (Pakistan already is), they would revive the nuclear Armageddon scenario. A
fissure between civilizations would also sabotage the solution of environmental problems, and
the ensuing eco-calamity could make people on both sides of the fissure receptive to radical
messages. The worse things got, the worse they’d get. So while no one of the Big Three
doomsday dynamics is likely to bring the apocalypse, they could well combine to form a
positive-feedback loop, a k a the planetary death spiral. And the catalyst would be terrorism,
along with our mishandling of it.
 !! – Europe Falls Apart
An abandoned NATO would be overwhelmed by burdens and incredibly frail –
destroys the western order
Rynning, Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern Denmark, 08-25-18 (Sten, “A
EUROPEANIZED NATO? THE ALLIANCE CONTEMPLATES THE TRUMP ERA AND BEYOND,” War on The Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/a-europeanized-nato-the-alliance-contemplates-the-trump-era-and-
beyond/)//EF

NATO is unraveling and world crisis is upon us, writes Robert Kagan in response to the 2018
NATO summit. Kagan thus starkly depicts the worst-case scenario outlined in this essay. If Trump
embodies a fatigue in the U.S. political system with enduring alliances, and if Russia becomes a
U.S. partner of choice in tipping the scales of Eurasian land power against China, then NATO as a
transatlantic alliance would indeed unravel, and Europe’s peace would be in question . Still, even in
this bleak scenario, it is unlikely that NATO would go away. Rather, Britain is likely to step in as continental Europe’s offshore power, though, of course,
with diminished capabilities compared to those of the United States.
A Europeanized NATO would tie Britain to the
continent and perhaps become part of the answer to the troubled British-E.U. relationship. The
European Union would not be able to stand still in the face of such a security transformation.
France and Germany would likely seek to rescue their institutional project by accelerating the
construction of a core that would allow France to extend security guarantees to Germany in
return for French access to German financial governance, and which would create an E.U.
periphery, notably in Eastern Europe, alongside countries such as Ukraine and Belarus. It is
probable that Western Europe could rescue its commitment to collective institutions,
including collective defense, but it is unlikely that it could extend security guarantees far
eastwards, as NATO today is able to. A revised bargain with Russia will then become
necessary, one in which the sovereignty of Eastern European countries will be questioned .
Naturally, this is not the current strategy of choice. Rather, NATO diplomats are hoping to
wait out Trump while simultaneously acting to secure Europe’s greater input into, and say
within, NATO. The hope is that, by Europeanizing NATO sufficiently, the allies can continue the transatlantic bargain that contains the
geopolitical impulses of the European continent — keeping Russia at bay and keeping Germany embedded within a solid collective institution.
However, even if Trump were to go, such a renewed bargain raises difficult questions of how
Europe can take on more burdens and gain a greater voice in an alliance to which the United
States remains committed. In this regard, Trump has done the allies the service of exposing the
scope of NATO’s geopolitical challenge. Perhaps enhanced political awareness thereof will make the strategy of choice — of
continued transatlantic cooperation — more likely to endure, but there is no going back to “your daddy’s NATO,” to paraphrase former NATO
secretary-general Lord George Robertson. Geopolitical adjustment will take place. The question is whether
western leaders will remain in control.

Spurs populism in Europe

Kaufmann, Hertie School of Governance; Laius, Postdoctorate at Otto Suhr Institute; 17 (Sonja, Mathis,
“Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations,” https://www-sciencedirect-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016328716303615)//EF

With populist nationalism on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic, one could expect that
governments focus on isolationism and, in the European case, dismantling supranational
structures. This is not necessarily the case. Instead, they might find a common enemy to fight,
which could even lead to unprecedented cooperation. In this scenario, populist leaders in the US and throughout
Europe declare a war against Islamic extremism, which they see as the central threat to the West. Next to ideological motivations, this can be seen as
strategic behavior to gain support from constituents and to divert attention away from economic hardships. Donald Trump’s victory was
only the beginning of a populist turn in world politics. Several European countries choose or get
very close to electing populist leaders. Even when mainstream parties remain in power, this
populist trend affects the political discourse. Narratives of fear and xenophobia go hand in hand
with the discrimination of minorities. In Europe, Brexit leaves a gap in terms of capacity and funding. Several other states with
strong populist movements discuss leaving the EU as well, hoping to get ‘better deals’ or renegotiate parts of the EU institutional system . The

uncertainty about how international trade will be affected leads to a downturn of economic
growth, especially in export-depending economies like Germany. Following the populist logic of
putting their own people first, the US government establishes a modified version of the
isolationist Monroe doctrine and withdraws from combat zones. Others follow this example,
thus further destabilizing some world regions. Ironically, this withdrawal − paired with inaction regarding new conflicts
elsewhere − leads to increased refugee streams from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Transatlantic relations in this period are largely limited to
populist leaders assuring each other and rejecting more interventionist or liberal positions. Following these developments, central pillars of the EU −
such as the single market, open borders, the Dublin system on refugees, or the Euro currency − are renegotiated or even abandoned. Populists

gain power in more countries and decide to re-nationalize essential tasks such as border
management and foreign policy. Many member state delegates in Brussels no longer seek to
work on European integration, but rather want to keep suspicious EU bodies in check. As a
result, the institutional setup of the EU is hollowed out and its collective action capacity sharply
diminished. In reaction to the reversal of European integration in trade policy, the US reverts to bilateral agreements favoring like-minded
countries. As the Europeans and the US increasingly retreat from the international stage both

militarily and diplomatically, other states and regional blocs are stepping up. Transatlantic
relations are at a low point. Economically, populist policies soon reach their limits, as bringing
back jobs despite technological changes proves impossible. Trade and investment flows decline
sharply due to protectionism and retaliatory sanctions from other nations. At the same time,
social tensions on the continent grow. Refugee camps become hotspots of crime and
extremism – ultimately leading to a vicious cycle of violence and repression. In this heated
political climate, terrorist attacks in Europe then act as triggers to further tighten security laws
also in the United States. Populist leaders, particularly those with right-wing ideologies, are
quick to single out refugees and minorities as political scapegoats. After several steps of escalation they finally
decide to declare war on their perceived enemies. A transatlantic coalition of the willing invades one or multiple countries with a Muslim majority,
which they see as the origin of Islamist extremism and terrorism .
In the name of defending the ‘West’ against Islamist
threats, NATO or a different military alliance is bolstered. Conveniently for populist leaders, such
military adventures abroad also help to bolster domestic support due to a ‘rally around the flag’
effect (Lian & Oneal 1993). Several indicators would point to the realization of this scenario. First, populist nationalism
should continue to be strong in elections in Europe and the US despite a failure to fulfill
economic promises. The continued dominance of nationalist, extreme and discriminatory
rhetoric after populist leaders take office would be another indicator: Escalation could be avoided if societal
actors, or perhaps the populists themselves, take more moderate positions. A final sign to look out for is an increase in

violence by terrorists – which act as catalysts in this scenario – and governments.

 !! – Populism
Populism is one of NATO’s biggest priorities – requires immediate attention
Burns, PhD; Jones, former US National Security Advisor; 16 (Nicholas, James, Atlantic Council: Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security, “RESTORING THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE”)//EF

The fourth major division within Europe is the rise of nationalist, populist Europhobic parties
across Europe. Populism and demagoguery are prevalent all across the Atlantic alliance, from
Viktor Orbán to Marine Le Pen. At the moment, however, the trend appears to be most
developed in Central Europe, particularly Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, where monoethnic
societies have rejected EU obligations to take on a share of the burden in the refugee crisis . But
the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland, the Front National in France, the UK Independence
Party, and other movements across Western Europe is just as serious . NATO’s strength comes
not only from its military force but also its common values and commitment to democracy
and the rule of law. The rise of illiberal attitudes on both sides of the Atlantic is a significant challenge for the Alliance’s future. In the face of
these challenges to Europe, NATO and the European Union must seize on the historic opportunity afforded by a likely Cyprus settlement later this year
to forge renewed political ties and practical cooperation between the two organizations. NATO and the EU have yet to figure out
how to use one military capability for two organizations. This is foremost a political problem, not
a military problem. Political obstacles to stronger NATO-EU cooperation result in duplication of
precious defense resources and leave Europe less safe and secure. The removal of the Cyprus problem as an
impediment to closer NATO-EU ties could create even more acute cultural obstacles to cooperation. Determined leadership by

NATO and EU leaders will be required to leverage the historic opportunity of a prospective
Cyprus settlement and, once and for all, break through the bureaucratic obstacles to closer
collaboration.
 !! – Middle East War
Middle East security issues make NATO unity especially necessary
Burns, PhD; Jones, former US National Security Advisor; 16 (Nicholas, James, Atlantic Council: Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security, “RESTORING THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE”)//EF

The breakdown of the security order in the Middle East is a second strategic challenge for the Alliance. The region faces a deadly mix
of a violent, unstable, turbulent future exacerbated by continued destabilization from
Iran and tensions with Saudi Arabia, declining US engagement, the emergence of
outside actors like Russia, and a revolutionary age for Arab citizens. The Syrian civil war has left the
majority of its citizens homeless and the country destroyed. Yet, the tragedy of Syria is no longer contained to the region. For five

years, the United States and Europe sought to stay out of the Syrian civil war, seeing
insufficient interests at stake to risk our involvement. Yet, the West’s inaction has
proven to have its own unintended consequences . The abuses of the Assad regime and the absence of
power have resulted in vast crimes against humanity and have enabled the rise of ISIS, the most violent and brutal terrorist group on the
planet today. The
power vacuum has also allowed Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia to take a
stronger military role in the Levant through their support for Bashar al-Assad’s brutal
regime. The Syrian crisis is not the only southern challenge facing the Alliance. Just four
years after NATO’s UN-approved intervention, Libya remains a source of instability and
extremism as a result of its failed political process. Yet, NATO and its partners who
participated in the UN-sanctioned Operation Unified Protector have a responsibility to
support the new government in its attempts to restore governance and security to this
strategically significant country. Neighboring Tunisia and Morocco remain the lone hopes for success from the Arab
Spring and worthy recipients of western support and assistance. Iran, too, remains a military threat to the Alliance. After all, NATO
member Turkey borders Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran.

Middle East security relies on a strong NATO

David M. Herszenhorn, 2-15-2020, "Trump asks for NATO help in Middle East," POLITICO,
https://www.politico.eu/article/us-president-donald-trump-asks-for-nato-help-in-middle-east/

U.S. President Donald Trump urged NATO “to become more involved in the Middle East”
during a phone call Wednesday with the military alliance's Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg.

“The President asked the Secretary General for NATO to become more involved in the Middle
East,” according to a NATO summary of the conversation. “They agreed that NATO could
contribute more to regional stability and the fight against international terrorism . They also
agreed to stay in close contact on the issue.”

A White House spokesman said Trump had emphasized to Stoltenberg “the value of NATO
increasing its role in preventing conflict and preserving peace in the Middle East."

The conversation between Trump and Stoltenberg came just hours after Tehran launched a
missile strike against bases in Iraq housing U.S. troops, which was precipitated by the killing of
Tehran's top military commander in a U.S. drone strike last week.
NATO allies have expressed solidarity with the U.S. in its confrontation with Iran but the
hostilities in Iraq have also stalled operations by the U.S.-led international coalition (including
NATO) fighting against the Islamic State.

Some NATO allies have also announced partial troop withdrawals from Iraq given the risk of
further conflict.
 !! – Tech Regulation
Bad transatlantic relations ruins regulation of tech – laundry list of problems:
espionage, automated weapons systems, etc.
Kaufmann, Hertie School of Governance; Laius, Postdoctorate at Otto Suhr Institute; 17 (Sonja, Mathis,
“Ever closer or lost at sea? Scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations,” https://www-sciencedirect-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/science/article/pii/S0016328716303615)//EF

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs); artificial intelligence; autonomous weapons systems;

3D-printing; electronic surveillance and attack systems; nano-scale robotics. These keywords
illustrate how real-world technology has caught up to science fiction in many areas. Political
decision-makers on both sides of the Atlantic; however; lack a strategic vision of how to
regulate cutting-edge technologies. Without a clear set of shared rules; the genie of mass
surveillance – to name just one example – is impossible to put back into the bottle . Blindsided by the
speed and magnitude of technological change, politicians and bureaucrats are slowly beginning to react to regulatory challenges. Technological
progress in key areas such as autonomous weaponry and GMOs is already highly politicized. On both sides of the Atlantic, politicians attempt to balance
broad societal concerns with business interests. Yet
transatlantic leaders fail to jointly address the implications of
private-sector innovation, let alone make an effort to coordinate research and development in
the defense sector. Piecemeal solutions might allow politicians to address voters’ immediate
concerns. In the long run, however, regulatory differences create an uneven playing field, and
the pressure keeps mounting with every far-reaching innovation . In the United States, the federal government
takes a laissez-faire position on private-sector innovation. Military research intensifies as Pentagon officials draw positive conclusions from pilot
programs with autonomous drones and a toolkit to enhance offensive cyber capabilities. They are reluctant to share advanced technology with NATO
partners due to concerns about Russian and Chinese spying. In Europe, by contrast, high-level politicians increasingly point to risks associated with new
technologies. Opinion
polls show that voters are worried about health and security questions related
to genetically modified organisms and artificial intelligence. On the labor market, advances in
robotics show their disruptive potential. Genetically modified crops provided by an American
conglomerate turn out to have unintended side effects on the environment. EU officials also
voice concerns with regard to the privacy of European citizens, whose data is being mined and
used for targeted political advertising on social media platforms hosted in the US and the UK. An
outbreak of avian influenza in continental Europe, meanwhile, leads to a US ban on meat and
livestock imports as well as quarantine rules for European travelers from multiple countries. In
response to public concerns about these issues, the high-level transatlantic technology council
(TTC) convenes for its inaugural meeting. Modeled after an earlier initiative on economic
cooperation, the body aims to enhance cooperation and trust by changing the highly balkanized
and inefficient landscape of technology regulation. After long rounds of negotiations the experts publish a non-binding
whitepaper regarding nano-scale robotics in the health sector. Military usage of these robots remains a possibility as a European proposal for a
moratorium is removed from the final communiqué at the last minute. Another exception concerns ongoing US-Chinese joint ventures, which are in
conflict with EU medical ethics rules. Participants are quick to call the TTC a political success, but in the absence of concrete results the forum fails to
become relevant.
As EU and US negotiators are unable to overcome conflicts regarding broad
societal values as well as concrete technical standards, the future of transatlantic economic
and security cooperation looks doubtful. Three sets of indicators matter for this scenario. Observers should watch for the
framing of technology in political discourse: Future technology is bound to be painted as a huge risk by some while others will warn against over-
regulation. This is linked to economic policy. Economies of scale and winner-takes-it-all dynamics could tempt politicians to pursue policies of economic
nationalism, trying to prop up and protect national champions. Lastly, the incidence of industrial espionage and mutual mistrust will greatly influence
the chances for meaningful transatlantic cooperation.
A US-led NATO is key to deterring Russian tech
Bredlove, US Air Force General; Kosal, PhD; 02-25-19 (Philip, Margaret, 17th Supreme Allied
Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command Operations, Associate Professor at the Sam Nunn
School of International Affairs, “Emerging Technologies and National Security: Russia, NATO, &
the European Theater,” https://www.hoover.org/research/emerging-technologies-and-national-
security-russia-nato-european-theater)//EF

As the United States looks to the future—whether dominated by extremist groups co-opting
advanced weapons in the world of globalized non-state actors or states engaged in persistent
regional conflicts in areas of strategic interest— new adversaries and new science and
technology will emerge. Choices made today that affect science and technology will impact how ably the United States can and will
respond. The changing strategic environment in which security operations are planned and

conducted impacts S&T policy choices made today and affects how S&T may play a beneficial
or deleterious role in the future. Some game-changing technologies have received global attention, while others may be less well
known; these new technologies and discoveries may significantly alter military capabilities and may

generate new threats against military and civilian sectors. Future trend analysis is a tricky task.
Colin Gray said, “Trend spotting is easy. It is the guessing as to the probable meaning and especially the consequences of trends that is the real
challenge.”4 How,
when, where, and in what form the shifting nature of technological progress may
bring enhanced or entirely new capabilities, many of which are no longer the exclusive domain
of the United States, is contested and requires better analytical tools to enable assessment.
Contemporary analyses of these emerging technologies often expose the tenuous links or
disconnections among the scientific and technical realities and mainstream scholarship on
national and international security, especially with regard to the potential to have impact on
strategy and policy. The research underway is advancing the strategic understanding of these game-changing technologies and the
development of meaningful and testable metrics and models to help reduce that surprise. This paper, prepared for the Hoover Institution’s Governance
in an Emerging New World project, seeks
to assess the implications of new and emerging technologies for
national security, with specific emphasis on Russia, NATO, and the European Theater. The paper begins
with an introduction and overview of what the authors consider the broader importance of the role of technology as a factor (not *the* factor) of
importance in national security and military affairs. Next, the paper places itself in the context of previous work on disruptive, emerging, and advanced
technologies and conflict, including the idea of revolutions in military affairs. That
is followed by a discussion of Russian
technology development, including leveraging historical experience from the Cold War and
institutional politics. This is critically important in order to avoid the trap of technological
determinism, i.e., assuming that a state will pursue something on technological grounds only .
An analysis of the national security implications of select emerging technologies—additive
manufacturing (aka 3D printing), machine learning and artificial intelligence, advanced stealth
via metamaterials, hypersonics, and directed energy weapons—follows. A brief discussion of trends in U.S.
entrepreneurship follows. The paper closes with an analysis and conclusions pertinent to the charge from the Governance in an Emerging New World
project’s organizers, to assess implications of emerging technology for U.S. national security with emphasis on NATO and Russia.

The biggest problem for tech is the widening transatlantic rift

Scott, Writer at Politico, 18 (Mark, “Forget ‘techlash’ — The biggest problem for tech is a
widening transatlantic rift,” https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-us-tech-techclash-tax-
competition-data-protection-vestager/)//EF

But belowthe surface of this so-called techlash by policymakers from Brussels to Washington, the
same divisions quickly reappear over how Europe and the United States want to regulate Silicon
Valley's biggest names. For every antitrust charge or tax clawback that policymakers in Brussels or other EU
capitals demand from an Apple, Uber or Twitter, there's a stony silence — or outright derision — from many of

their counterparts in Washington, a lot of whom remain openly skeptical that Europe's heavy-
handed tactics are either merited or can address the increasing concentration of digital power in the hands of a few (mostly West Coast) tech
moguls This transatlantic digital rift is, if anything, widening. The inability for European and U.S. officials to find

common ground does not bode well for the future of the internet. Regional differences over
policing the internet are on the rise. If two of the Western world's largest digital markets can't
agree on the norms underpinning the tech world, it will likely prove difficult to convince others
— notably fast-growing developing countries where people are just now coming online — to
follow the lead of either Brussels or Washington, and not that of Beijing or Moscow and their
more authoritarian approaches to the world wide web. It also will weaken the legitimate — and ever-expanding —
efforts to rein in the excesses of the digital world if Facebook, Google and others continue to get mixed messages from EU and U.S. officials about what
is now expected of them. Competition and data The friction between Europe and the U.S. boils down to different takes on the central issues at the
heart of global digital regulation. On competition, Margrethe Vestager, Europe's antitrust chief, and her national counterparts have been very clear.
From the European Commission's €2.4 billion antitrust fine against Google (the company is
appealing) to Germany's charges that Facebook abused its social networking might (it denies any
wrongdoing), the region's policymakers have made a direct link from these companies' digital
dominance to significant harm to EU consumers, corporate rivals or even our politics. U.S.
officials are unconvinced. Speaking in Washington last week, Makan Delrahim, who heads the Justice Department’s antitrust division,
questioned the broad brush use of competition rules to rejigger entire industries — let alone relying on antitrust law to police digital giants whose
actions may (or may not) harm Western democracies. The same goes for how tech companies use reams of
personal data generated each day. With Europe's new privacy standards roughly a month old,
many of the Continent's policymakers are crowing about how these rules have been adopted
well beyond the EU's borders, helping to reshape global data protection practices from
Argentina to South Korea. Wilbur Ross, the U.S. commerce secretary, has criticized Europe's revamped rules | Chip Somodevilla/Getty
Images That's not how many in Washington see it. Wilbur Ross, the U.S. commerce secretary, has criticized

Europe's revamped rules, known collectively as GDPR, claiming they would harm transatlantic
cooperation on everything from counterterrorism to global trade. American officials similarly
balked at the extra protections the EU demanded under the so-called Privacy Shield agreement,
which allowed companies to freely move information from Europe to the U.S. "Complying with
GDPR will exact a significant cost," Ross wrote in an opinion piece in the Financial Times . "GDPR
creates serious, unclear legal obligations for both private and public sector entities, including the U.S. government." And don't forget tax Not to be
outdone, tax — specifically Europe's plan to create new levies for digital companies that generate billions from the region while employing few in the
28-member bloc — is another bone of contention between two regions that are bracing for a potential trade war. Faced with pressure from France, the
Commission recently proposed collecting up to €5 billion in extra taxes from Apple and Google, among others, through a controversial plan targeting
revenues that online firms generate within the EU but which currently escape the region's tax net. Valdis Dombrovskis, the Commission's vice
president, summed up the mood when he told reporters: "The amount of profits currently going untaxed is unacceptable." Facebook, Google, Amazon
and others take a global view. It's probably about time policymakers start to do the same. In response, Steven Mnuchin, the U.S. treasury secretary,
chastised Europe's efforts to get its hand on this pot of gold just as Silicon Valley giants repatriated, collectively, hundreds of billions of dollars in
overseas cash under the U.S.'s recent tax overhaul. “Imposing new and redundant tax burdens would inhibit growth and ultimately harm workers and
consumers," Mnuchin said. For
sure, much of these transatlantic tensions surrounding tech are long-
simmering. But what has changed is the (gradual) awakening — among both policymakers and
the general public from London to Los Angeles — that these digital giants, just like the big banks
before them, need a global set of rules that can be universally applied, no matter where these
companies operate. An EU-U.S. consensus on what those rules should look like remains a distant
hope — one complicated by vastly different views on the government's role in tackling the
industry.
Effective regulations are necessary to navigate the 21st century threat landscape
– emerging technologies require specialized state responses
Wittes and Blum, 15 – Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution,
where he is the Research Director in Public Law, *Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law at Harvard Law School (Benjamin and Gabriella, The Future of Violence, Basic
Books, Pgs. 160-163).

DIRECT REGULATION: THE LEVIATHAN ORDERS YOU AROUND The magnitude of the problem posed by a world of many-to-
many threats, when one faces it squarely, is so overwhelming that it is tempting to simply ignore
the most direct and simple tool governments have in influencing their citizens: the ability to
compel people to do things and forbid them from doing other things through what one might
call direct regulation. People tend to overlook direct regulation because it seems like such a nineteenth- and twentieth-century approach that is hopelessly
inadequate to the challenge of terrifying new twenty-first-century realities. But, although inadequate, it is certainly not useless. And direct regulation will

continue to be an important tool in the arsenal of governments. The Leviathan may be

weakened, but he is still a pretty fierce beast when he breaches the surface with his teeth bared.
These fangs include the power not only to forbid and require conduct but also to investigate
conduct that might not comply with rules , to define the conditions under which conduct is
tolerated, to license people to engage in certain behaviors, and to punish noncompliance with
the rules. These powers may be used in a heavy-handed or highly calibrated fashion, or anywhere in between. They remain, and will remain, among the most powerful
ways of influencing the behaviors of large numbers of people. All sorts of direct regulations are already in effect with respect

to technologies of mass empowerment. In the cyber arena, for example, a great many intrusions
and online attacks have long been subject to criminal prohibition . Prohibited conduct that can
land an individual in prison includes—to cite only some of the major statutes discussed in the
Department of Justice’s computer crimes prosecution manual—accessing a computer and
obtaining information without authorization, trespassing upon a government computer,
accessing a computer to defraud, malicious damaging of a computer or information, trafficking
in passwords, intercepting communications, gaining unlawful access to stored communications,
and identity theft. In robotics, on the civil side of things, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has been engaged in extensive rulemaking process to regulate the integration of
unmanned aerial systems into the domestic airspace of the United States. These rules will cover who is permitted
to fly what sorts of drones, for what purposes, and under what circumstances. In the biological arena , to note an example in which

criminal penalties back up civil regulation, the law requires people who want to work with
“select agents”—particularly dangerous toxins, bacteria, and viruses—to submit to an FBI
“security risk assessment,” and it imposes criminal liability both for possession of select agents
by those not registered to have them and for transferring select agents to unregistered persons.
The law also slaps strict controls on the export of technologies with military application or of a
dual-use nature. These are only some of a wide array of legal controls on individuals in their handling, acquisition, transfer, and use of technologies of mass
empowerment. We mention these examples merely to emphasize that if government wants to prevent certain dangerous or

malicious behaviors, telling people they cannot engage in them—and creating legal
consequences if they do—is one place to start. 2 The promise of direct regulation is twofold.
First, criminal and civil regulations can establish strong behavioral norms —far stronger than
government’s power actually to enforce those norms . Consider a radically empowering
twentieth-century technology, the automobile, which put in individual hands the power to
travel quickly between cities and also to kill pedestrians and crash into other vehicles at high
speeds. A series of direct regulations governs our use of motor vehicles. You need a state-issued license to operate a
car, a norm that is widely respected even though nobody checks your license before you get into your vehicle. Most drivers, most of the time, display a sufficiently rudimentary
respect for traffic laws that the roads are relatively safe (though far less so than are the airways or the railways)—even though drivers also know that they are likely to get away
with any number of violations. People tend to drive inspected and registered vehicles with insurance, as required—though they could almost certainly get away with driving

The system of direct

without either on any given day. And they drive cars with license plates; every car is registered in a visible sense to its owner.

regulation of our use of this technology works because of a combination of self-interest (people
do not want to hurt themselves or their vehicles or to harm others), social pressures from other
drivers, occasional random enforcement—the cop with the speed gun or the officer who
happens to see you run a red light—and the threat of enforcement if you get into an accident . The
result is that laws that are unenforceable if widely ignored receive enough respect that the platform they are designed to secure operates in a relatively orderly fashion. Even
with tens of millions of people using a lethal technology on a daily basis, direct regulation wields a sufficient influence on mass behavior that people—amazingly, really—retain
confidence in a platform on which relatively untrained people are operating high-powered and very dangerous equipment at high speeds. While some of this influence flows
from the threat of enforcement and the fact that compliance with the law here tends to correspond with safe (and thus self-interested) behavior on the part of the driver, some
of it also simply reflects the power of law itself. In rule-of-law societies, at least, the law carries some moral force, and people tend to default in the direction of compliance.

Second, direct regulations create the legal basis for investigation and enforcement action that
can play an important role in deterring abuse of highly empowering technologies, stopping
and incapacitating those who misuse them, and letting potential bad actors know that
authorities are watching. While enforcement by no means keeps pace with cybercrime, for instance, direct regulations allow federal authorities to initiate
a lot of computer crime prosecutions every year. In fiscal year 2012 alone, for example, the Justice Department reports that federal prosecutors filed 169 computer fraud cases
against 266 defendants, 401 identity theft cases against 567 defendants, and any number of other cases that may have had a hacking dimension. The public knows about Luis
Mijangos, the sextortion hacker we discussed earlier, because of such federal enforcement. And it is notable that Mijangos today is not free to exploit other women and girls

online; as of this writing, he is inmate number 59209-112 in the federal prison system, serving his sentence at the federal correctional facility in Greenville, Illinois. 3 Direct
regulation plays a similar role with other highly empowering technologies. Back in 2002, a
scientist at Texas Tech named Thomas Butler reported that samples of bubonic plague had gone
missing from his lab. The FBI descended in force on the campus to investigate, suspecting a
bioterrorism incident. When it later turned out that the samples had not been stolen and that
Butler may have destroyed them himself, the bureau turned its sights on him. It also turned out,
as the investigation progressed, that Butler had mishandled plague samples and exported them
illegally. The Justice Department prosecuted him for mishandling the highly dangerous agent, for
allegedly lying about it to investigators, and for financial irregularities with respect to his
university. Butler became a cause célèbre among many scientists, who saw his case as one of gross government overreaching against a distinguished scientist who was
certainly no kind of terrorist. For present purposes, however, the point is that having a complex set of civil and criminal regulations

governing the handling of biological materials provided a hook on which investigators could
hang an investigation of someone they clearly regarded as a malicious actor. A jury ultimately convicted Butler on
some charges but acquitted him on others; he served a two-year prison sentence. 4 In the world of many-to-many threats and

defenses, the power of direct regulation will continue to serve as a frontline lever for deterring,
punishing, and smoking out abuses— and policy makers should not underestimate it. As technologies become more
powerful and ever more widely available, we need to be imaginative about the ways people
might use them maliciously or recklessly and how their routine uses might create opportunities
for others to behave abusively or recklessly. We also need to create the kinds of working
regulatory schemes that, as with automobiles, allow huge numbers of people to wield lethal
power in relative safety. The good news here is that we already do this instinctively. As the technologies associated with flying robots become more widely
available, we have a regulatory process associated with integrating drones into the national airspace. As we have seen, regulations and criminal laws have developed around

The trick here is to regulate well, mindfully

cyber- and biotechnology as those platforms have emerged as potential facilitators of deadly acts.

of the realistic benefits of new rules, of their costs for innovation and benign use, and of their
likely effectiveness. Debates over the desirability and efficacy of regulation are endemic in
almost every regulatory sphere, from environmental protection to gun control, and that will be
no less true here. We must also consider the possible costs of regulation for those working to
prevent bad acts; rules encumbering access to select biological agents, for example, make it
harder to do defensive research. Of course, no regulation will deter the truly evil, motivated person, whether her weapon of choice is an AR-47 rifle, a
miniaturized drone, or fleas carrying the bubonic plague. Moreover, at least two features of technologies of mass empowerment make them a greater challenge for regulation
than the threats posed by most other technologies. First, unlike automobiles—for which a certain number of accidents, drunk drivers, and even malicious murders presents a

true technologies of mass empowerment potentially involve actions that, even in

socially tolerable cost—

very small numbers, do not present a tolerable cost. A single major biosecurity event could kill
thousands if not millions of people. This feature makes regulation to prevent such actions more urgent. In addition, however, because technologies
of mass empowerment transcend national boundaries in ways that the threats posed by conventional technologies generally do not, it is just impossible to guard against all
potential threats posed by technologically empowered people around the globe. Just as it may help to think of national security as coming to resemble health and safety
regulation, as we described earlier, this aspect of the problem bears a certain similarity to climate change in that it requires coordinated international action from major
countries worldwide to be truly effective. Even if the United States were to get its carbon emissions under control, China and India would need to as well for emissions globally
to diminish, and even if the United States were to adopt optimal security policies, other countries still might tolerate behavior that menaces Americans both abroad and at
home. This globalized feature of the threat makes domestic regulation, however urgent, simultaneously less effective.

Bioterror, robotics, nanotechnology, and other emerging technologies threaten

survival absent effective regulation.
Wittes and Blum, 15 – Senior Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution,
where he is the Research Director in Public Law, *Rita E. Hauser Professor of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law at Harvard Law School (Benjamin and Gabriella, The Future of Violence, Basic
Books, Pgs. 9-16)

Modern technology enables individuals to wield the

Place the lessons of all these changed scenarios alongside one another: •

destructive power of states. • Individuals, including you personally, can potentially be attacked
with impunity from anywhere in the world. • Technology makes less relevant many of the
traditional concepts around which our laws and political organization for security have evolved.
National borders, jurisdictional boundaries, citizenship, and the distinctions between national
and international, between act of war and crime, and between state and private action all offer
divides less sharp than they used to. • Our nation—and every nation—can face attack through
channels controlled and operated not by governments but by the private sector and by means
against which governments lack the ability to defend, making private actors pivotal to defense.
Strung together, these lessons succinctly describe the security future with which citizens and

governments must now grapple. Much of what we think we know about privacy, liberty,
security, and threat is no longer true. Much of what we have been taught about what threatens
us, about what protects us, and about the risks and benefits of state power versus individual
empowerment is obsolete. In the conventional understanding, international security is a state-to-state affair; the relationships between privacy, liberty,
and domestic order are matters between individuals and their governments; and civilian technologies in the hands of individuals have relatively little to do with the way we
order either governance at home or international security. We built the state to mediate disputes among citizens and to protect them from outside attack. We gave it power to
contend with other states and to ensure it could govern effectively. Because we feared that power, we imposed constraints on it. And we imagined its power and the security it
was meant to provide as being in tension with the liberty we expected it to respect. We built walls around our countries with legal concepts such as jurisdiction. And for the
most part, these intellectual, conceptual, and legal constructions have held up pretty well. Yes, we had to adjust in response to AlQaeda and other transnational nonstate actors.

the way we think about security—what it means, where it

And yes, globalization has complicated the discussion. But

comes from, what threatens it, what protects it, and the relationship between individual and
collective societal security—has remained remarkably stable . In what follows, we mean to persuade you that this way
of thinking is now out of date. Indeed, we argue that our debate about the fabric of security and its governance is based on dated assumptions about a
technological world that no longer exists. In our new world, you can pose a threat to the security of every state and

person on the planet—and each can also threaten you. In our new world, individuals,
companies, and small groups have remarkable capabilities either to protect others or to make
them more vulnerable. In our new world, not only do privacy and security not generally conflict,
but they are often largely the same thing. And in our new world, state power represents a critical line of
defense for individual freedom and privacy, even as the state itself may be losing its ability to
serve its purpose as the ultimate guarantor of security to its citizens . Driving this new environment is a mix of
technological developments. There is the radical proliferation of both data about individuals and technologies of mass empowerment available to individuals. Notwithstanding

the state’s comparative advantage in collecting

Edward Snowden’s spectacular revelations about the National Security Agency (NSA),

data, manipulating it, and exposing individuals to risks or protecting them from threats is
actually eroding, as ever bigger companies occupying ever more powerful market positions take
on data collection and analytics as their business cores. The miniaturization and automation of
weapons further weakens national boundaries—as well as the front door to your house—as
effective lines of defense. Biological research and biotechnology are progressing at an
unprecedented pace, bringing great promise—and great danger—to human security all around
the globe. Our new environment of highly distributed threats and defenses has already changed
our lives, and it will change them more in the years to come. It will change our sense of privacy,
of safety, and of danger. It will change our relationships with corporations, governments, and
individuals whom we have never met. It will change the way we govern our collective security
and how we manage our personal safety. And it may lead us to ask questions about how we
organize ourselves politically at the local, national, and international levels . Today, each person needs to fear an
exponentially higher number of people and entities than only a decade ago. The threats to your personal security now include not merely governments and corporations but
also other individuals around the world: stalkers, identity thieves, scammers, spammers, frauds, competitors, and rivals—everyone and everything from the government of
China to the NSA to Luis Mijangos. You can be attacked from anywhere—and by nearly anyone. And so can countries. All countries now face a similar array of threats—a much
vaster array than in only the very recent past. The inevitable greater reliance by the modern state on computerized systems for all important societal functions—ranging from
national defense to electricity delivery and water distribution to transportation, banking, and just about everything else—makes the state and its inhabitants increasingly
vulnerable to exploitation and attack. Edward Snowden and WikiLeaks can more broadly disseminate closely held government information, which is also far easier to steal; a
much wider range of actors can hack into networked systems and exploit or damage the information they contain or the functions they control. This point is not simply about

Technologies that put destructive power traditionally confined to states in the hands of
cybersecurity.

small groups and individuals have proliferated remarkably far, as a general matter. That
proliferation is accelerating at an awe-inspiring clip across a number of technological platforms
—in particular, networked computers and biotechnology and, in the not-too-distant future,
robotics and nanotechnology as well. The technologies in question, unlike the technologies
associated with nuclear warfare, were developed not in a classified setting but in the public
domain. And they are not simple technologies either. They are platform technologies—that is,
technologies that facilitate generative creativity in their users to build and invent new things ,
new weapons, and new modes of attack. As these technologies become cheaper, more and
more people have the ability to give expression to what resides in their hearts in the digital
world, in the physical world, and in the microscopic coding of life itself . And as these
technologies get cheaper, we become, as a global community, ever more dependent on them
for our health, agriculture, communications, jobs, economic growth and development, and even
our culture. These dependencies make states enormously vulnerable . Just as you are more
vulnerable today to attacks from an ever widening array of actors, so are the United States and
every other country in the world. Whereas once only rival states could contemplate killing huge numbers of civilians with a drug-resistant illness or
taking down another country’s power grids, now governments must contemplate the possibility of ever smaller groupings of people undertaking what are traditionally

The past few decades have seen an augmenting ability among relatively small,
understood as acts of war.

nonstate groups to wage asymmetric conflicts against even powerful states. The groups in
question have been growing smaller, more diffuse, and more loosely knit, and technology is
both facilitating that development and increasing these groups’ ultimate lethality. The trend
seems likely to continue and probably even to accelerate. It ultimately threatens to give every
individual with a modest education and a certain level of technical proficiency the power to
wreak potentially catastrophic damage. As a thought experiment, imagine a world composed of billions of people walking around with nuclear
weapons in their pockets. This problem is not entirely new—at least not conceptually. The mad scientist mwuhhuh-huhing to himself as he swirls a flask and promises, “Then I
shall destroy the world!!” is the stuff of old movies and cartoons. In literature, versions of the scientist creating disaster date back at least to Mary Shelley in the early nineteenth
century. In some sense, it just reflects the old literary fear of people playing gods—Daedalus and Icarus and the Tower of Babel—recast for a more modern, scientific world.
Along with literary works set in technologically sophisticated dystopias, the character of the technologically empowered madman represents one of the ways in which our

society expresses its fears of rapidly evolving technology. The fantasy’s sudden plausibility, however, is new. Across a variety of technological
platforms, individuals and small groups are now playing enhanced roles in the affairs of
countries and regions—and those roles will only grow more strategically significant as
technologies of mass empowerment develop further and penetrate more deeply. At the same
time, the very forces that are causing threats to multiply are also distributing defensive capacity
and responsibility. Only recently, governments alone bore responsibility for protecting nations. Today it is possible to attack a
country without ever confronting a government-owned or government-controlled facility . The data
pipes into the United States, for example, are largely in private hands—so that the government no longer controls the very channels through which this country might face

attack.This means that private actors—and not just BP—are uniquely positioned to defend against
attacks and that private actors must now bear responsibility for some aspects of security. The
more technology proliferates, the less exclusive the government’s security capabilities —and
therefore its security responsibilities—become . Our new world, in short, is one of many-to-many threats and many-to-many defenses.
While it is not yet literally the case, every individual, every group, every company, and every state will soon have

the potential to threaten the security of—and have his, her, or its security threatened by—every
other individual, group, company, and state . We are thus in a moment unlike any other in the history of the world, one in which distance
does not protect you and in which you are at once a figure of great power and great vulnerability. It is a moment that challenges cherished ideas at the core of our political
identities, that requires us to face new realities at once exciting and terrifying. The world of many-tomany threats and defenses is radically populist, a place in which the relative
power of the state to that of the citizenry is reduced and in which we are unleashing the enormous creative potential associated with giving people the power to do great things.
It threatens, however, to be Hobbesian as well—an environment of unaccountable freedom to do great harm, in which the very lack of accountability for the harms we do may
spur some of us to do them. And it raises a giant question of governance: How does a state provide for its security in such a world? How does it organize its relationship with
both the individual subject to its jurisdiction and the individual beyond its jurisdiction who nonetheless threatens its citizens or, indeed, the state itself? And how does a state
negotiate its relationship with other states, all with equal claim to independence and sovereignty, as well as with those other states’ citizens? We mean to address these
questions in this book. A CENTURY AGO, IN 1914, in the wake of the assassination of Austro-Hungarian archduke Franz Ferdinand, foreign affairs writer F. Cunliffe-Owen looked
for the bright side. While “it is only natural that one should be stricken with horror at the brutal and shocking assassination,” he wrote in the New York Sun, “it is impossible to
deny that [the archduke’s] disappearance from the scene is calculated to diminish the tenseness of the [general European] situation and to make peace both within and without
the dual Empire.” The archduke was so universally regarded as a “disturbing factor and as committed to forceful and aggressive policies, that the news of his death is almost
calculated to create a feeling of universal relief.” 8 For anyone presuming to speculate about the future of global security, this article by poor Cunliffe-Owen—and the many
hundreds of others like it that, across time and subject matter, have gotten big questions spectacularly wrong—is a cautionary tale with a loud moral: predicting the future offers
many more opportunities to look stupid than to look prescient. Even with a horizon of just a few weeks, Cunliffe-Owen managed to misinterpret the triggering event for World
War I as one of those moments of sudden relaxation that lets us all breathe a little easier. He was not an idiot; he appears to have been a well-respected foreign policy analyst.
And he was not the only one. In 1913, David Starr Jordan, then president of Stanford University, scoffed, “What shall we say of the Great War of Europe, ever threatening, ever
impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it never will come.” If people like these could fail to anticipate the coming few months within 180 degrees of accuracy,
one should probably approach anticipating the broad security trends of the coming decades with a certain humility. 9 So let us start by making clear that our aim in these pages
is not to sound the alarm about inevitable catastrophic attacks using advanced technologies. Such events, to be sure, may well happen; indeed, they may prove a recurrent
feature of the world we describe. But many people have long predicted the proliferation of catastrophic terrorist attacks employing widely available variations of weapons of
mass destruction and harming thousands or millions of people—and thankfully, these attacks have not yet happened. We are not synthetic biologists, computer scientists, or

Our concern, rather, is

robotics engineers, and we are not aiming to assess the inevitability or likely frequency of malicious exploitations of modern technology.

the general problem of how to govern so as to effectively ensure security in an environment of

simultaneous individual empowerment and individual vulnerability . As such, we advance a single very general prediction:
that modern society has not yet exhausted the implications for security and liberty of the

dissemination around the world of technologies that empower individuals and of information
about individuals. We believe both that this proliferation trend will continue to accelerate across a growing
number of technological platforms and that it will do so in a fashion that will further complicate
the task of governance in the interests of security . As it does so, it will profoundly challenge the
manner in which we currently think about issues of surveillance, civil liberties, security, threat,
and governmental responsibility, power, and accountability . It follows necessarily that a great deal of the United States’ current
discussion of the laws and policies that govern privacy, liberty, security, and safety both within our shores and across borders is out of date—or fast becoming so. And perhaps
more importantly— and more tectonically—it follows as well that the liberal political theory that gave rise to our vision of the role of the state in providing security requires
reconsideration, if only to ensure that the state can meet the challenges of our new technological environment. An enormous literature has developed in the post-9/11 world on
the effects of the rising power of nonstate actors on traditional dichotomies in our law and governance: between the public and the private, between war and crime, and
between the domestic and the international. Much of this literature has emphasized the role of technology in the breakdown of these dichotomies. As the President’s Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies wrote in 2013 in response to the Snowden controversies, “The traditional distinction between foreign and domestic has
become less clear. The distinction between military and civilian has also become less clear, now that the same communications devices, software, and networks are used both in
war zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan and in the rest of the world. Similarly, the distinction between war and non-war is less clear, as the United States stays vigilant against
daily cyber security attacks as well as other threats from abroad.” 10 Some of this literature, particularly the work of Philip Bobbitt, author of two major works on the history of
warfare, and John Robb, a theoretician of asymmetric conflict, has taken on directly the challenge to the modern state that our new security environment poses. We draw on all
of these prior insights but add what we think are a few important twists. 11 For starters, we are not narrowly concerned with the admittedly serious problem of terrorism.

that the new

Rather, we focus on what we believe to be the somewhat broader essence of the security challenge that modern states and individuals alike now face:

world of many-to-many threats and defenses puts enormous power—for good and evil alike—in
the hands of an unprecedented array of actors, making us all at once more powerful and more
vulnerable. That power increasingly includes the power to attack—for whatever reason and by
whatever type of actor—at great distance and with diminished accountability . An honest focus on the world of
many-to-many threats demands a look back at some basic premises of liberal society. In a world in which everyone plays a role in everyone else’s equation of threats and
defenses and national and individual security are hopelessly intertwined, old governance questions demand new answers. We have not yet, as a society, figured out how to
redesign the relationships between citizens and their governments, among governments internationally, or among people themselves for the provision of basic security and

We have not yet given adequate thought to how afraid we are of

freedom in a technologically changing environment.

the countless Little Brothers and MediumSized Brothers our technology is creating—and
whether fear of all these lesser brethren ought to imply some role for their biggest sibling in
keeping them all in check. It is time to start doing so, and in these pages we take a preliminary
stab at suggesting how one might go about it. In doing so, we also attempt to integrate several
debates that seem to take place largely in stovepiped abstraction from one another, despite
their being, in our judgment, flip sides of the same coin—or, more precisely, multiple sides of
the same die. America today has a cybersecurity debate. It has a smaller biosecurity debate. A heated debate surrounds the use of drones in the war on terrorism and,
to a lesser extent, in the civilian sector domestically. We have a rich debate over privacy and civil liberties. Yet there is far less overlap among these debates than there ought to
be. Cybersecurity experts will talk about the novelty of their security arena and mention the facts that attacks can be hard to attribute, capacity to launch attacks has proliferated
very far, and the costs of computing power keep falling. Go to a conference on biosecurity and you will hear all of the same themes—discussed with an equal sense of menace
and novelty—but with reference to an entirely different set of technologies. 12 Debates about drones and targeted killings tend also to be constrained, often ignoring the
impending proliferation of drones and other types of lethal robots far beyond the US government—or any government—and for uses far beyond counterterrorism. The
contemporary American debate contrives to define privacy values as existing in tension with cybersecurity goals rather than seeing good security and strong government
enforcement as essential protections for privacy. We aim here to discuss these issues at a high altitude and to explore how these many issues flow from the same underlying
fact: that technologies of radical empowerment are spreading in fashions that render us all both radically strong and radically threatened.
 !! – Economy
The NATO alliance maintains economic ties with the EU – allows for collective
international action
Burns, former American NATO ambassador, September 5, 18
(Nicholas, “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance,” https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance) DR

Fourth, the great majority of the NATO allies are also members of the European Union.  Every
U.S. President has seen the EU as a strategic partner.  After all, the EU is our largest trade
partner and largest investor in the American economy. Our combined economic might has been
a major reason for the effectiveness of sanctions against both Russia and Iran in recent years.
While we also compete with the EU in trade, previous Presidents have worked hard to prevent
those differences from overwhelming our military and political ties to the EU countries.  Let us
hope that President Trump’s recent meeting with the EU Commission President Jean-Claude
Juncker might ease the trade battles of the last few months across the Atlantic.
 !! – Disease
Pandemics are a worldwide existential issue – cooperation is key to solve
NAS, National Academy of Sciences, nonprofit, non-governmental organization, January 13, 16
(National Academy of Sciences, Future pandemics pose massive risks to human lives, global economic security: New report,
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/01/160113132805.htm) DR

"We have neglected this dimension of global security," said Commission chair Peter Sands,
former group chief executive officer, Standard Chartered PLC in London, and senior fellow,
Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government at the Harvard Kennedy school in
Cambridge, Mass. "Pandemics don't respect national boundaries, so we have a common interest
in strengthening our defenses against infectious diseases in every part of the world. Preventing
and preparing for potentially catastrophic pandemics is far more effective -- and ultimately, far
less expensive -- than reacting to them when they occur, which they will ." For example, in the
past 15 years, the world faced several infectious disease crises, including Ebola, Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and the influenza
virus known as H1N1. The Commission's own estimates suggest that at least one pandemic will
emerge over the next 100 years, with a 20 percent chance of seeing four or more. To protect
against these threats, the top priority must be to reinforce the first line of defense against
potential pandemics, public health capabilities, and infrastructure at a national level, even in
failed or fragile states, because regional or global capabilities cannot compensate for
deficiencies at a national or local level. This requires governments to prioritize investment in
their health systems, as part of their fundamental duty to protect their people , the report says.
It also requires effective engagement of communities, given the vital role they play in outbreak
detection and response. Countries like Uganda have demonstrated that even where resources
are scarce, it is possible to strengthen health systems and contain infectious disease outbreaks.

Pandemics pose an existential threat to the human race – timeframe is now

Srivasta, doctor, inventor, publisher, January 12, 17
(Kadiyali, Superbug Pandemics and How to Prevent Them, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/01/12/superbug-
pandemics-and-how-to-prevent-them/) DR

As antibiotics become increasingly ineffective, we must find other ways to prevent these
disasters. It is by now no secret that the human species is locked in a race of its own making with
“superbugs.” Indeed, if popular science fiction is a measure of awareness, the theme has pervaded
English-language literature from Michael Crichton’s 1969 Andromeda Strain all the way to Emily St. John
Mandel’s 2014 Station Eleven and beyond. By a combination of massive inadvertence and what can only
be called stupidity, we must now invent new and effective antibiotics faster than deadly bacteria
evolve—and regrettably, they are rapidly doing so with our help. I do not exclude the possibility
that bad actors might deliberately engineer deadly superbugs. 1 But even if that does not happen,
humanity faces an existential threat largely of its own making in the absence of malign
intentions. As threats go, this one is entirely predictable. The concept of a “black swan,” Nassim Nicholas
Taleb’s term for low-probability but high-impact events, has become widely known in recent years. Taleb
did not invent the concept; he only gave it a catchy name to help mainly business executives who know
little of statistics or probability. Many have embraced the “black swan” label the way children embrace
holiday gifts, which are often bobbles of little value, except to them. But the threat of inadvertent
pandemics is not a “black swan” because its probability is not low. If one likes catchy labels, it better fits
the term “gray rhino,” which, explains Michele Wucker, is a high-probability, high-impact event that
people manage to ignore anyway for a raft of social-psychological reasons.2A pandemic is a
quintessential gray rhino, for it is no longer a matter of if but of when it will challenge us—and of how
prepared we are to deal with it when it happens. We have certainly been warned. The curse we have
created was understood as a possibility from the very outset, when seventy years ago Sir Alexander
Fleming, the discoverer of penicillin, predicted antibiotic resistance. When interviewed for a 2015 article,
“The Most Predictable Disaster in the History of the Human Race, ” Bill Gates pointed out that one of
the costliest disasters of the 20th century, worse even than World War I, was the Spanish Flu
pandemic of 1918-19. As the author of the article, Ezra Klein, put it: “No one can say we weren’t
warned. And warned. And warned. A pandemic disease is the most predictable catastrophe in
the history of the human race, if only because it has happened to the human race so many, many times
before.”3 Even with effective new medicines, if we can devise them, we must contain outbreaks of
bacterial disease fast, lest they get out of control . In other words, we have a social-organizational
challenge before us as well as a strictly medical one. That means getting sufficient amounts of medicine
into the right hands and in the right places, but it also means educating people and enabling them to
communicate with each other to prevent any outbreak from spreading widely. Responsible governments
and cooperative organizations have options in that regard, but even individuals can contribute something.
To that end, as a medical doctor I have created a computer app that promises to be useful in that regard
—of which more in a moment. But first let us review the situation, for while it has become well known to
many people, there is a general resistance to acknowledging the severity and imminence of the danger.
What Are the Problems? Bacteria are among the oldest living things on the planet. They are masters of
survival and can be found everywhere. Billions of them live on and in every one of us, many of them
helping our bodies to run smoothly and stay healthy. Most bacteria that are not helpful to us are at least
harmless, but some are not. They invade our cells, spread quickly, and cause havoc that we refer to
generically as disease. Millions of people used to die every year as a result of bacterial infections,
until we developed antibiotics. These wonder drugs revolutionized medicine, but one can have too
much of a good thing. Doctors have used antibiotics recklessly, prescribing them for just about
everything, and in the process helped to create strains of bacteria that are resistant to the
medicines we have. We even give antibiotics to cattle that are not sick and use them to fatten chickens.
Companies large and small still mindlessly market antimicrobial products for hands and home, claiming
that they kill bacteria and viruses. They do more harm than good because the low concentrations of
antimicrobials that these products contain tend to kill friendly bacteria (not viruses at all), and
so clear the way for the mass multiplication of surviving unfriendly bacteria. Perhaps even
worse, hospitals have deployed antimicrobial products on an industrial scale for a long time
now, the result being a sharp rise in iatrogenic bacterial illnesses. Overuse of antibiotics and
commercial products containing them has helped superbugs to evolve. We now increasingly face
microorganisms that cannot be killed by antibiotics, antifungals, antivirals, or any other chemical weapon
we throw at them. Pandemics are the major risk we run as a result, but it is not the only one. Overuse of
antibiotics by doctors, homemakers, and hospital managers could mean that, in the not-too-distant
future, something as simple as a minor cut could again become life-threatening if it becomes infected.
Few non-medical professionals are aware that antibiotics are the foundation on which nearly all of
modern medicine rests. Cancer therapy, organ transplants, surgeries minor and major, and even childbirth
all rely on antibiotics to prevent infections. If infections become untreatable we stand to lose most of the
medical advances we have made over the past fifty years.
Pandemics are more dangerous than ever because of advances in globalization
and travel – empirics don’t apply
Harack, author for vision of earth, March 21, 16
(Benjamin, How likely is human extinction due to a natural pandemic?, https://www.visionofearth.org/future-of-
humanity/existential-risks/human-extinction-by-natural-pandemic/) DR

Today, a disease can travel faster than ever before. Thanks to long distance air travel, an
infectious agent can quickly spread to all continents . In fact, most humans are now connected
by one or more of our rapid transportation networks. On the other hand, enormous effort is
being expended to prevent pandemics today. Serious work can be done on many fronts
simultaneously because pandemics arise out of interactions between large numbers of people ,
animals, and institutions. Unfortunately, this complexity also means that for the foreseeable
future our defenses will not be perfect and our uncertainty will be extreme . The complexity of
pandemics is also the reason why straightforward extrapolations from history tend to be deeply
flawed. Human civilization today is unprecedented in several relevant ways. We can’t study past
examples of globe-spanning civilizations who actively tried to protect themselves from this
danger. Knowledge of past pandemics is still incredibly valuable, it’s just very hard to
meaningfully generalize to our situation.
 !! – Democracy
NATO promotes democratic ideals, improves government structures, and
allows for reliable security guarantees – preserving relations is crucial
Epstein, Professor of International Relations at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver,
September 13, 2016

(Rachel, “Why NATO Enlargement Was a Good Idea,” https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2016/09/13/why-nato-enlargement-

was-a-good-idea/) DR

Research shows that NATO made three contributions to security and stability in Europe (and by
extension for the US) through its enlargement policy (see studies by Gheciu and Epstein). First,
in order for post-communist countries to join NATO, they had to resolve regional rivalries
through peace treaties with their neighbors. This alone had a pacifying effect among countries
with historically contested borders, diasporas, and sizable minorities, all against a backdrop of
intense nationalism. Second, NATO pushed aspiring member-states toward democratic civil-
military relations. Eastern Europe had little democratic experience by 1990 and therefore no
history of democratic oversight of the armed forces. A common misconception is that
Communist Party control over militaries eased the transition to democratic civil-military
relations. In actual fact, however, Eastern Europe had a long-standing tradition of executive
oversight with little transparency, accountability, or civilian military expertise that predated
communism. So East European armies in the 1990s engaged in their own arms deals, church-
building, and high-level political decision-making with little civilian or public scrutiny, including
over defense spending. NATO reapportioned authority away from executives and enfranchised
ministries of defense and parliaments. It also trained civilians and military personnel alike in the
desirability of broad-based supervision, including by the media and civil society organizations.

Third and probably most controversially, NATO provided this phalanx of small, weak, and
historically vulnerable states its Article V security guarantee. There is evidence that enhanced
security through NATO membership has undermined nationalistic policy and rhetoric that had
depended on narratives of victimization , even if current illiberal governments in Poland and
Hungary suggest that NATO (and even EU membership) have not been sufficient to keep
exclusionary politics at bay. Nevertheless, the region is no longer the security vacuum that it
once was, which might have confined Russian aggression to countries outside of NATO’s orbit.

Liberal democracy solves every impact

Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, 17 (Garry, 02.16.17, “Democracy and
Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global
Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf)

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by
the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of
the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special
responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound
to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American
principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like
Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human
rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a
shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed
the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world.

But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet
Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those
principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result. American skepticism about
America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their
aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty
intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying.

This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes
around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome
— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you
know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree
states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People
living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace
and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for
liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up
their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them.

The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic
and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American
people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world.
This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the
stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the
cycle of terror, war, refugees, and military intervention that results when America leaves a
vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in
the first place.

The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the
American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The
forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist
movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North
Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator
in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is
threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are
thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive
years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what
happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here.
America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the
meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and
powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an
opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can
be great.

The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every
American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years
later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the
decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that
outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only
tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but
cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an
advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term
goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news.

The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things
better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of
democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today.
War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes.
A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last.

American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for
America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being
envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having
the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

US democracy is key to international collective action on multiple existential

threats and to prevent war—backsliding causes those systems to unravel
Kendall-Taylor, deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National
Intelligence Council, 16 (Andrea, 07.15.16, “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the
International Order,” Center for Strategic & International Studies,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-democracy%E2%80%99s-decline-would-undermine-
international-order) np

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But there

is an emerging consensus in the world of
foreign policy: threats to the stability of the current international order are rising. The norms, values,
laws, and institutions that have undergirded the international system and governed relationships between nations are being
gradually dismantled. Themost discussed sources of this pressure are the ascent of China and other non-
Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to
nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals.
Largely missing from these discussions, however, is the specter of widespread democratic decline.
Rising challenges to democratic governance across the globe are a major strain on the
international system, but they receive far less attention in discussions of the shifting world order. In the 70 years since the
end of World War II, the United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are liberal, capitalist, and democratic.
The United States has promoted the spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our
current international system. However, despite the steady rise of democracy since the end of the Cold War,
over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles
across the globe. A 2015 Freedom House report stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s
dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is
under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.” Although the number of democracies in
the world is at an all-time high, there are a number of key trends that are working to undermine
democracy. The rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of less
consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global
order. Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation
for U.S. cooperation abroad. Research demonstrates that domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior
of states. In particular, democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with
other democracies than with autocracies. Similarly, authoritarian countries have established
mechanisms for cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian
countries, then, would provide a broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to
overcome their divergent histories, values, and interests— factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the
formation of a cohesive challenge to the U.S.-led international system. Recent examples support the empirical data. Democratic
backsliding in Hungary and the hardening of Egypt’s autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have led to
enhanced relations between these countries and Russia. Likewise, democratic decline in
Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations
with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic
standing. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic
backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States
certainly finds common cause with authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited.
Consequently, further democratic decline could seriously compromise the United States’ ability to form
the kinds of deep partnerships that will be required to confront today’s increasingly complex
challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism demand the
coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United
States is a less effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with
other democratic nations. A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current
global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions, including the United Nations ,
the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts
within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to
protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet.
Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to
censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the
“Likeminded Group of Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank,
autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in
exchange for financial support. If successful, diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance
reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries to bypass the IMF and World
Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes
Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial
institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led
alternatives pose the risk that global economic
governance will become fragmented and less effective. Violence and instability would also likely
increase if more democracies give way to autocracy. International relations literature tells us
that democracies are less likely to fight wars against other democracies, suggesting that
interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies declines. Moreover, within countries that are already autocratic,
additional movement away from democracy , or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability.
Highly repressive autocracies are the most likely to experience state failure, as was the case in
the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen . In this way, democratic decline
would significantly strain the international order because rising levels of instability would exceed
the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of peacekeeping, humanitarian
assistance, and refugee flows. Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising
anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United
States and its values. Most autocracies are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as
an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro,
and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This
vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public
support for strongman tactics.
 --AT: DPT Wrong
Empirical data is on our side
Hegre 2018 - Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University
Håvard, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell, "Reassessing the Democratic Peace: A Novel Test Based
on the Varieties of Democracy Data," Working Paper SERIES 2018:64 THE VARIETIES OF
DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE

In this article we have introduced two novelties into the study of the democratic peace. First, we
make use of the V-Dem data and demonstrate that it improves on Polity, the dominant measure
in that literature, along at least two dimensions. First, V-Dem has a superior concept-to-
measurement consistency, given its starting point was the overt modeling of democracy.
Moreover, the V-Dem data are vastly more detailed than Polity, allowing us to operationalize
much more precise theoretical mechanisms than the simpler datasets. Accordingly, our fit tests
show that our V-Dem-based indices model the democratic peace much better than Polity , both
in terms of in-sample goodness of fit and out-of-sample predictive performance.

Second, and more importantly, we have identified a subset of the multiplicity of democracy’s
attributes that seem to explain its ability to deter war-like behavior. Specifically we show that,
when entered individually, electoral accountability, judicial and legislative constraints on the
executive, media freedom and civil society participation promote the democratic peace, when
controlling for the other standard determinants of inter-state disputes. When pitted against
each other, however, only horizontal constraints on the executive and civil society participation
continue to have a direct effect on dyadic peace. We thus find most consistent support for the
horizontal and informal-vertical accountability mechanisms underlying the democratic peace.
Earlier we cited the claim of Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) that ‘the mobilization of … general
public opinion’ matters at the same order of importance as the ‘variety of institutions that make
up the system of government’. Our findings provide support for the institutional side of their
claims but to some extent contradict what they say about social mobilization. We confirm
important aspects of earlier work on the democratic peace such as Doyle’s (1983a,b) ‘liberal
peace’ argument and Choi’s (2010) focus on legislative veto players. However, our results on the
role of civil society suggest that social mobilization is also important. The exclusion of the peace-
making role of civil society in this literature may well be a function of the past paucity of data to
measure it. Given the strong model fit and predictive performance of the models that include
this new V-Dem variable, this omission has been an important oversight in the literature from
the perspective of our constraint-based theorization of the mechanisms behind the democratic
peace.

At first sight, the policy implication of these findings would seem clear: in order to promote
international security, what needs strengthening is not electoral competitiveness or the quality
of elections but horizontal mechanisms of effective constraints on the executive, a more vibrant
civil society that monitors and constrains those exercising executive power, or a combination of
the two. If the goal is order in the international system, legislative and judicial reforms should
trump electoral reform, and the promotion of the initiatives of an organized and active citizenry
in civil society seems more important than the strengthening of opposition political parties.
However, in as much as the mechanism of electoral accountability is connected to these other
aspects of democracy, it cannot be easily dismissed from a policy agenda to promote peace.
Most importantly, it cannot be ruled out that the promotion of electoral accountability is also a
way of strengthening the other accountability mechanisms. Students of judicial independence
and oversight, for example, tend to stress the logic of the “insurance argument”, which holds
that competitiveness at the polls undergirds executive support for judicial constraints by
creating uncertainty about the future prospects of staying in office (for an overview, see
Vanberg 2015). Similarly, to the extent that the state can constrain and harass civil society, the
strength of civil society is arguably not simply an independent source of its own but is
guaranteed by the sort of robust competition at the polls that protects the freedoms of
association and expression that civil society requires.

Despite our reticence to completely reject the impact of electoral accountability, we still believe
we have moved the democratic peace literature forward by stressing the stronger relative
importance of the non-electoral mechanisms of accountability. The essence of constraint is
preventing those who exercise executive power from acting in an arbitrary and ill-advised
fashion, leading to destructive forms of interstate conflict. The electoral mechanism does
determine who holds executive office, but its constraining power is time dependent, tied to the
elections cycle. Both the vertical constraining power of civil society and horizontal constraints
posed the countervailing powers of the legislative and judicial branches of government are not
dependent on the timing of elections, but consistent over time. This plausibly helps to explain
why they are a more effective constraint on the kinds of arbitrary executive action that pose a
threat to peace than the constraints posed by threat of losing office in the future.

Their authors use overlimiting definitions of democracy to make their point –

don’t buy it
Pinker 2018 – Johnstone Professor of Psychology @ Harvard
Steven, Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Penguin
Press, Chap 14

Why has the tide of democratization repeatedly exceeded expectations? The various
backslidings, reversals, and black holes for democracy have led to theories which posit onerous
prerequisites and an agonizing ordeal of democratization . (This serves as a convenient pretext
for dictators to insist that their countries are not ready for it, like the revolutionary leader in
Woody Allen’s Bananas who upon taking power announces, “These people are peasants. They
are too ignorant to vote.”) The awe is reinforced by a civics-class idealization of democracy in
which an informed populace deliberates about the common good and carefully selects leaders
who carry out their preference.

By that standard, the number of democracies in the world is zero in the past, zero in the
present, and almost certainly zero in the future. Political scientists are repeatedly astonished by
the shallowness and incoherence of people’s political beliefs, and by the tenuous connection of
their preferences to their votes and to the behavior of their representatives.21 Most voters are
ignorant not just of current policy options but of basic facts, such as what the major branches of
government are, who the United States fought in World War II, and which countries have used
nuclear weapons. Their opinions flip depending on how a question is worded: they say that the
government spends too much on “welfare” but too little on “assistance to the poor,” and that it
should “use military force” but not “go to war.” When they do formulate a preference, they
commonly vote for a candidate with the opposite one. But it hardly matters, because once in
office politicians vote the positions of their party regardless of the opinions of their constituents.

Nor does voting even provide much of a feedback signal about a government’s performance.
Voters punish incumbents for recent events over which they have dubious control, such as
macroeconomic swings and terrorist strikes, or no control at all, such as droughts, floods, even
shark attacks. Many political scientists have concluded that most people correctly recognize that
their votes are astronomically unlikely to affect the outcome of an election, and so they
prioritize work, family, and leisure over educating themselves about politics and calibrating their
votes. They use the franchise as a form of self-expression: they vote for candidates who they
think are like them and stand for their kind of people.

So despite the widespread belief that elections are the quintessence of democracy, they are
only one of the mechanisms by which a government is held responsible to those it governs, and
not always a constructive one. When an election is a contest between aspiring despots, rival
factions fear the worst if the other side wins and try to intimidate each other from the ballot
box. Also, autocrats can learn to use elections to their advantage. The latest fashion in
dictatorship has been called the competitive, electoral, kleptocratic, statist, or patronal
authoritarian regime.22 (Putin’s Russia is the prototype.) The incumbents use the formidable
resources of the state to harass the opposition, set up fake opposition parties, use state-
controlled media to spread congenial narratives, manipulate electoral rules, tilt voter
registration, and jigger the elections themselves. (Patronal authoritarians, for all that, are not
invulnerable—the color revolutions sent several of them packing.)

If neither voters nor elected leaders can be counted on to uphold the ideals of democracy, why
should this form of government work so not-badly—the worst form of government except all
the others that have been tried, as Churchill famously put it? In his 1945 book The Open Society
and Its Enemies, the philosopher Karl Popper argued that democracy should be understood not
as the answer to the question “Who should rule?” (namely, “The People”), but as a solution to
the problem of how to dismiss bad leadership without bloodshed.23 The political scientist John
Mueller broadens the idea from a binary Judgment Day to continuous day-to-day feedback.
Democracy, he suggests, is essentially based on giving people the freedom to complain: “It
comes about when the people effectively agree not to use violence to replace the leadership,
and the leadership leaves them free to try to dislodge it by any other means.”24 He explains
how this can work:

If citizens have the right to complain, to petition, to organize, to protest, to demonstrate, to

strike, to threaten to emigrate or secede, to shout, to publish, to export their funds, to express a
lack of confidence, and to wheedle in back corridors, government will tend to respond to the
sounds of the shouters and the importunings of the wheedlers: that is, it will necessarily become
responsive—pay attention—whether there are elections or not.25

Women’s suffrage is an example: by definition, they could not vote to grant themselves the
vote, but they got it by other means.
The contrast between the messy reality of democracy and the civics-class ideal leads to
perennial disillusionment. John Kenneth Galbraith once advised that if you ever want a lucrative
book contract, just propose to write The Crisis of American Democracy. Reviewing the history,
Mueller concludes that “inequality, disagreement, apathy, and ignorance seem to be normal,
not abnormal, in a democracy, and to a considerable degree the beauty of the form is that it
works despite these qualities—or, in some important respects, because of them.”26

In this minimalist conception, democracy is not a particularly abstruse or demanding form of

government. Its main prerequisite is that a government be competent enough to protect people
from anarchic violence so they don’t fall prey to, or even welcome, the first strongman who
promises he can do the job. (Chaos is deadlier than tyranny.) That’s one reason why democracy
has trouble getting a toehold in extremely poor countries with weak governments, such as in
sub-Saharan Africa, and in countries whose government has been decapitated, such as
Afghanistan and Iraq following the American-led invasions. As the political scientists Steven
Levitsky and Lucan Way point out, “State failure brings violence and instability; it almost never
brings democratization.”27
 !! – Climate Change
NATO solves climate change but strong relations are key
Schewe, PhD in Modern Middle Eastern History from the University of Michigan, 18

(Eric, https://daily.jstor.org/why-climate-change-is-a-national-security-issue/)

Climate change has not received nearly the same attention or resources from the government as
the other new existential security campaign of the twenty-first century—the “War on Terror.” Granted, the September 11th, 2001
attack was a much more spectacular and specific disaster than creeping global temperatures, and the targets of retaliation, the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda, more vivid. But the rhetorical process of “securitizing” one threat or another follows similar processes—
passing legislation, mobilizing budgetary and bureaucratic resources to confront the threat, the appearance of political interest
groups around the new objective, and the manipulation of public opinion to support new policies. Peter Engelke and Daniel Chiu of
the Atlantic Council examine the potential effects of tying climate security more explicitly to U.S. national security. While it can
create urgency behind the issue, it also can lead to “overly nationalistic or militarized solutions to problems, which are inherently
transnational and that require nonmilitary responses to solve them.” Viewing the climate crisis through a security lens makes it
easier for politicians like President Trump to dehumanize refugee victims, portraying them as the true threat to the powerful
countries to which they are trying to migrate. He is amplifying these fears in the weeks leading to the 2018 midterm elections.
Given the inevitability of military interest in climate change, a compromise between particular
national and global-scale efforts may be in regional treaty organizations such as NATO . Amar
Causevic investigates the way inter-military cooperation in NATO can help member states pool resources and
research about the crisis, and identify collectively with threats that may only affect a few
members. NATO is aiding cooperation in climate change issues, which range from negotiating sovereignty
conflicts in the Arctic Sea to providing relief to neighboring states suffering from climate-related crises, such as flooding in Bosnia
and wetland restoration in Central Asia. NATO
has its own Smart Energy Team seeking to spread alternative
energy sources in all member militaries. However, the vitality of NATO and other regional and
global organizations like the U.N. is also dependent on domestic politics that support a vision of
global cooperation and accountability. Leaders like President Trump, who has denounced the United States’ financial
contributions to this long-term cornerstone of U.S. global hegemony, and insulted its members, could well neutralize it as a positive
source for fighting climate change.
 !! – Cyber
Cybersecurity is a huge up-and-coming risk – only NATO cooperation solves
Ilves, Deputy Director at Lisbon Council, 16 (Luukas, Senior Fellow at Lisbon Council, “European
Union and NATO Global Cybersecurity Challenges: A Way Forward,”
https://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM/PRISM-Volume-6-no-2/Article/840755/european-union-and-nato-
global-cybersecurity-challenges-a-way-forward/)//EF
NATO forecasted today’s cyber threat environment in 2010: “Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organized and more costly […]; they can reach a threshold that

NATO faces a cyber threat landscape that abounds with

threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.”6

hackers, hacktivists, nation-states, and criminals. NATO itself has been targeted directly by
Russian hackers seeking information on its defensive posture against Russia. 7 Furthermore, the
recent attack by Russia on the Ukrainian power grid underscores the fact that Russian cyber
attack capabilities are very real.8 NATO also faces the same types of cyber breaches that affect
businesses in America on a daily basis, ranging from random criminal acts to infiltrate NATO’s
systems to those of a more sophisticated, targeted nature. Despite preventive measures, cyber
criminals around the world continue to gain access to these networks, including those that are
classified.9 In all, the current threat environment embodies much more significant risks than those first exemplified by the Russian cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007,
which initially prompted NATO to address the dangers of cyber warfare. How did NATO get to its current state in cybersecurity ? NATO has always

defended its military communication networks; however, during the 2002 Prague Summit,
NATO stated that cyber defense was also part of its agenda and that it would strengthen its
“capabilities to defend against cyber attacks.” 10 The Prague Summit paved the way for NATO’s creation of the NATO Computer Incident
Response Capability (NCIRC) in 2002. Following the cyber attacks against Estonia in April and May of 2007, NATO issued its first “Policy on Cyber Defence” in January 2008. It
later issued its “Strategic Concept” in 2011, as well as a newly enhanced cyber defense policy in 201411 in which NATO clarified that Article 5 could be invoked for a major digital
attack.12 It also pledged to improve cyber defense education, training, and exercise activities, in addition to its commitment to create a NATO cyber range capability.13

Successful cyber-attacks cause extinction

Cartwright et al 15 (Gen. (Ret.) James E. Cartwright, Chair of the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, Chair in Defense Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Dr.

Bruce Blair, Study Director of the Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, Co-Founder of Global Zero; with Commission members: Ambassador K. Shankar Bajpai, former Chairman, National Security Advisory Board, former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, India; Ambassador
Richard Burt, former United States Chief Negotiator, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START); Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Evgeny P. Buzhinsky, Senior Vice President, PIR Center, former Head, International Treaty Directorate, Main Department of International Military Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Russian
Federation; Ambassador Ivo H. Daalder, President, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, former Permanent Representative of the United States to NATO; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vincent Desportes, Senior Military Advisor, Panhard General Defense, former Director of the Joint War College (College interarmée
de defense, CID), France; Ambassador, (Ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola, former Minister of Defence, Italy, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Mahmud Ali Durrani, former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, former Ambassador of the Republic of Pakistan
to the United States; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, Main Researcher, Center of International Security, The Institute for World Economy and International Relations, former Director, Research Institute No. 4, Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation; Gen. (Ret.) Jehangir Karamat, Founder and Director,
Spearhead Research, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pakistan, former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States; Vice Adm. (Ret.) Yoji Koda, former Vice Admiral of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force; Vice Adm. (Ret.) Verghese Koithara, Independent Strategic Analyst, former Vice
Admiral, Indian Navy; Ambassador Yuji Miyamoto, Chairman of Miyamoto Institute of Asian Research, former Ambassador of Japan to China, former Director of Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan; Gen. (Ret.) Klaus Naumann, former Chairman, NATO
Military Committee, former Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr, German Armed Forces; Gen. (Ret.) Bernard Norlain, President, Conseil d’Administration, Committee for the Study of National Defense, former Air Defense Commander and Air Combat Commander, French Air Force; Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Osamu Onoda,
Asia Center Fellow, Harvard University, former Lieutenant General, Japan Air Self Defense Force; Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Pan Zhenqiang, Deputy Chairman, China Foundation for International Studies, former Director, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, China; Ambassador Tomas
Pickering, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, United States, former Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations, Russia, India, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan; Min. Paul Quilès, former Minister of Defense, Transport, Interior and Public Security, France; Gen. (Ret.) Lord
David Ramsbotham, former Commander Field Army and Inspector General of the Territorial Army, United Kingdom; Rt. Hon. Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, former Secretary of Defense, United Kingdom; Ambassador Yukio Satoh, Vice Chairman,
Japan Institute of International Affairs, former Ambassador of Japan to the United Nations; Gen. (Ret.) John J. Sheehan, former Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Command; Vice Adm. (Ret.) Vijay Shankar, Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence, United Services Institute, India, former Commander in
Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, former Commander in Chief, Strategic Forces Command of India; Min. Song Min-soon, Chair Professor, Kyungnam University, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea; Air Chief Marshal (Ret.) Shashindra Pal Tyagi, Member, National
Security Advisory Board, former Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force; Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Noboru Yamaguchi, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan, former Commanding General of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force Research and Development Command; Maj. Gen. Yao Yunzhu, Director, Center
for China-America Defense Relations, Director, Academy of Military Science, People’s Liberation Army, People’s Republic of China; Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, Director General and Professor of Academic Department of Strategic Studies, National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army, People’s
Republic of China; Baron Karl-Teodor Zu Guttenberg, former Federal Minister of Defense; Fmr. Federal Minister of Economics and Technology, Federal Republic of Germany; and Commission Advisor Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Uzi Eilam, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv
University, former Director General of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, former Chief Scientist and Director of Research and Development in the Ministry of Defense, Israel; “De-Alerting and Stabilizing the World’s Nuclear Force Postures,” Global Zero Commission on Nuclear Risk Reduction, April
2015, p.5-6, http://www.globalzero.org/files/global_zero_commission_on_nuclear_risk_reduction_report_0.pdf)

An arc of latent nuclear instability stretches around the globe. From Central Europe through
South Asia to Northeast Asia and into the seas surrounding China, the nuclear weapons
countries, or their close allies, are involved in geopolitical, territorial and other disputes that
have the potential to combust and escalate. The arc indeed girdles the world inasmuch as instability lies in the nature of
bilateral and multilateral relationships and is affected by global problems of proliferation, terrorism, nuclear

materials and weapons control, transparency and many others . Crisis management is more
difficult in today’s security environment than it was in the bipolar world of the Cold War. Conflict dynamics are
less stable. Under the right conditions, any of the hotspots along this arc could morph into a nuclear
flashpoint. A nuclear crisis could escalate through inadvertence or intention and also spread
virally to other parts of the world . Many countries possess nuclear forces, and their postures are coupled, tightly in some cases and
loosely in others. A nuclear confrontation or detonation would raise nuclear tensions and alert levels

around the world. Such a multipolar nuclear crisis could follow an unpredictable course and
prove difficult to stabilize . This report identifies ways to control crisis escalation and reduce the myriad risks of deliberate or
unintentional use of nuclear weapons. It is both diagnostic in that it examines the risk of nuclear weapons use in the various nuclear weapons countries,
as well as prescriptive in offering some remedies. Any balanced assessment of worldwide nuclear risk finds cause both for encouragement and concern.
One piece of good news is that the global stockpile of nuclear weapons has plunged from a peak of 70,000 in the 1980s to approximately 16,000 today.
If nuclear risk and stockpile size are correlated, then dramatic progress has been achieved. But the
overall decline mCasks the
gloomy fact that some arsenals are growing rapidly and posing greater risks, as in South Asia . This
dichotomous pattern is pervasive. A few examples: Good news: Russian nuclear weapons and fissile materials are substantially more secure against
theft today than they were when the Soviet Union collapsed over two decades ago. Bad news: (i) the world is home to sponsors of proliferation, nuclear
black markets, and promoters of terrorism, (ii) large quantities of nuclear weapons are constantly in transit around the world – and transportation is
the Achilles heel of security, and (iii) the risks of terrorist capture of weapons and materials have increased in South Asia over the past two decades.
Pretty good news: the number of nations possessing nuclear weapons has climbed slowly while a greater number of aspiring proliferators have
abandoned their programs. Bad news: the number of nations that possess or aspire to possess a peaceful nuclear energy program that could be
transformed into a nuclear weapons program is fast growing, and many of these potential proliferators are lacking in good governance. Good and bad
news: non-kinetic and conventional weapons (offensive and defensive) and global surveillance and intelligence have provided a credible alternative to
nuclear weapons for some nations, but they pose threats to other nations that lead them to increase their reliance on nuclear weapons. While these
overly simplified illustrations of risk correlations present a mixed picture, this
commission finds an overall pattern: risks are
generally trending in the wrong direction . The cup appears to be more than half empty in today’s security
environment of proliferation, nuclear build-ups in Asia, spreading extremism, burgeoning cyber
warfare, vulnerable nuclear command and control networks, vulnerable and insecure nuclear
weapons storage sites and delivery platforms (particularly silo-based strategic missiles), and de-stabilizing
global military competition featuring rapid innovation in weapons technology and modalities of
warfare. In the current environment, much needs to be done to reduce nuclear risks. The slope from a crisis to nuclear
brinksmanship to escalation to the use of nuclear weapons with cascading global implications
is a much too steep and slippery one. This latent instability is tremendously aggravated by the
simple fact that the amount of time for decision-making at any point along this spectrum may be
far too short. In general, warning and decision timelines are getting shorter, and consequently the
potential for fateful human error in nuclear control systems is getting larger. The short fuses on U.S. and
Russian strategic forces compound the risks. One-half of their strategic arsenals are continuously maintained on high alert. Hundreds of missiles
carrying nearly 1,800 warheads are ready to fly at a moment’s notice. These legacy postures of the Cold War are anachronisms but they have not yet
been consigned to the trash heap of history. They remain fully operational. These postures – geared
to very rapid reaction –
reflect an entrenched mindset of “use or lose” with roots in the Cold War and in past decisions that perpetuated
vulnerabilities in strategic forces and their chain of command. Bureaucratic inertia perpetuated a status quo that

featured vulnerable land-based forces and nuclear command, control, and communications
networks prone to collapse under the weight of attack, even a small-scale strike . These
vulnerabilities have not gone away. In some respects the situation was better during the Cold War than
it is today. Vulnerability to cyber attack, for example, is a new wild card in the deck. Having many far-
flung missiles controlled electronically through an aging and flawed command-control network
and ready to launch upon receipt of a short stream of computers signals is a nuclear (surety) risk of
the first order. It seems the height of folly in an era of rapidly mutating cyber warfare capabilities.
This concern is reason enough to remove nuclear missiles from launch-ready alert.
 AT: Russia War – Offense
An unrestrained Russia spells nuclear escalation – diversified bases and weapon
stockpiling proves revisionism – only NATO defense solves
Burns, PhD; Jones, former US National Security Advisor; 16 (Nicholas, James, Atlantic Council: Brent Scowcroft
Center on International Security, “RESTORING THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF THE NATO ALLIANCE,” p. 8-9)//EF

Russia is the primary cause of this new threat to NATO. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in
2014, its cynical war that divided Ukraine, and its support for the murderous Assad regime in
Syria undermine the liberal international order and endanger security in both Europe and the
Middle East. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2016, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said “Speaking bluntly, we are rapidly rolling into a period
of a new cold war.” Following the conference, many analysts and observers were quick to downplay or dismiss his comments. But allies should not be fooled. President

Putin is a former KGB operative and has made his views on NATO very clear. He sees NATO as his adversary and the collapse of
the Soviet Union as the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century. Allies should be crystal clear about the threat
at hand and take Prime Minister Medvedev at his word. Moscow aims to undermine the law-based principles of European

security and the liberal international order that the United States and its European allies first established in the aftermath of World War II
and expanded after the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is not just the NATO countries who have an interest in the

preservation of this international system. Democracies and law-based societies around the
world have a stake in preserving the global security order. Given its hostile intent, Russia’s
$700 billion military investment is a cause for concern and a key reason US military officials
repeatedly identify Russia, once again, as America’s greatest existential threat. Alliance officials
express particular concern about Russia’s ability to deter NATO from responding to an Article 5
violation in Europe’s East. An imbalance of Russian firepower in Kaliningrad, illegally annexed
Crimea, and Syria may provide Russia an A2/AD capability. This would prevent NATO militaries from operating with freedom,
even within Alliance territory. This creates strategic imbalance on the Continent. Russia’s A2/AD capabilities are particularly

concerning given Russia’s new military tactics in Europe, from provocative snap military
exercises with up to 100,000 troops to hybrid warfare, which it has adopted and perfected in
Ukraine and Syria. In Syria, Russia demonstrated its ability to project power in the Middle East and
put its modernizing military to the test in combat. And in the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions, Russian jets have taken

to the irresponsible and dangerous practice of “buzzing” allied warships operating in international waters in an attempt to
intimidate NATO from conducting legitimate freedom of maneuver operations. Coupled with its ability to deny
access to NATO militaries in theaters where it had once enjoyed supremacy, this presents a grim picture for transatlantic defense planners for any future military operation.

the threat of an accidental conflict between NATO and

Russia’s threat to the Baltics and Poland is welldocumented. But

Russia is just as high in the Black Sea region, where NATO allies Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey
are situated. The Russian threat to NATO’s southeastern flank was largely overlooked until
Russia’s military build-up in Syria in late 2015 to support the forces of President Bashar al-Assad. Russia’s competition
with NATO member Turkey over the future of northern Syria has already resulted in the Turkish shoot-
down of a Russian fighter and a dramatic rise in tensions between Moscow and Ankara. Russia’s recent
militarization of illegally-annexed Crimea is of great concern to allies such as Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania. Russia’s
military resurgence and renewed assertiveness is also a challenge in the Arctic region and the
high north. As part of its military modernization, Russia has established an Arctic strategic command and
developed new, or has revived and modernized former Cold War, military bases in the region. The Arctic is also home
to Russia’s powerful Northern Fleet, which is currently being modernized and includes Russia’s
seabased nuclear deterrent. Russia’s revised maritime doctrine also points to the high north as the area from which Russia can access the broader
Atlantic with maritime forces. NATO has an Arctic frontier in the high north that must be defended . The United
States, Canada, Norway, and Denmark are all Arctic nations, but each ally takes a different approach to security in the Arctic and the appropriate role for NATO. The Alliance
should seek to cooperate with Russia on the Arctic where possible as a means of testing Russia’s regional intentions, which remain unclear. But NATO must also be prepared to
defend its boundaries and interests in the region in the face of growing Russian capabilities. It is time to break the logjam within the Alliance that has prevented serious

Russia’s threatening tactics are not merely confined to

discussions within NATO about its role in the high north.

conventional weapons, hybrid warfare, or snap exercises. Under President Putin, Russia has
enhanced its reliance on nuclear weapons and engaged in dangerous nuclear gamesmanship
and threats. At the Munich Security Conference in February 2016, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg properly recalled NATO’s continued commitment to both
conventional and nuclear deterrence. Russia is also one of the world’s most formidable cyber superpowers and

possesses the ability to unleash a strategically significant attack on Alliance military or civilian
infrastructure. While NATO has taken steps to strengthen the defenses of NATO networks, the
Alliance still does not treat cyber threats to individual allies as a whole alliance issue. Finally, Russia also
uses its vast energy resources as a weapon in Europe to divide allies from one another. The German-Russian Nordstream 2 gas pipeline is just such an example of Russia’s “divide
and conquer” energy diplomacy and should be rejected by Germany and the European Union. In addition, Russian propaganda and suspected financial support for extreme
political parties in Europe undermines democratic governance across the EU. To respond to this diverse array of challenges, the Alliance will have to be nimble and flexible and
forge a closer relationship with the EU, which has competence in internal security matters.

NATO key to check Russian aggression

Giannangeli, columnist at Express, 18 (Marco, 11.04.18, “NATO has 'nothing to fear from
Russia' observing biggest military games in 20 years,”
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1040715/Nato-russia-putin-military-world-war) np

Admiral James Foggo, head of US naval forces in Europe and Africa, said the "numbers and
capability, the equipment, and technological superiority" of 50,000 soldiers, sailors, air personnel and
marines from 29 nations might deter Russia from military action. The five-week exercise, called
Trident Juncture, is designed to test when one NATO country is attacked and is backed up by all
the others - it comes under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty . It features 10,000 vehicles, 250 planes, and 65 naval
vessels including the US aircraft carrier Harry S Truman. Britain, which will lead a multinational brigade for the main live-firing
element, is contributing 2,800 troops, 250 armoured vehicles, four Royal Navy warships and four Hawk jets. It comes a month after
Russia held its biggest military exercise since the Cold War. As tensions mount, Russia will
respond to Trident Juncture in Norway this week by mounting its own missile exercises in
international waters off the Norwegian coast. While Nato is allowing Russian observers in Norway, Russia does not let Nato near its
military exercises. "There
were two Russian individuals who had come from the Russian Federation to see
how things went on the beach," said Admiral Foggo. "I think what they took away is wow, NATO is united,
NATO is strong. That's what we want the observers to walk away with, so it has the requisite deterrent effect.
"We're ready to defend… We can reduce their return on investment to get them to withdraw."
 AT: Russia War – Defense
NATO alliance prevents Russian revisionism
Burns, former American NATO ambassador, September 5, 18
(Nicholas, “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance,” https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance) DR

Second, NATO delivers additional benefits to U.S. military objectives and operations beyond our
shores.

NATO is at the heart of our defense of North America and Europe from nuclear and conventional
threats. British and French nuclear weapons join ours in deterring aggression in the North
Atlantic area. Since the late 1940s, every Administration has believed that the best way to
defend our country is through American forces forward deployed in Europe with the NATO
allies. This strategy remains right for today given Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, of Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and its current pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
NATO remains our primary vehicle for deterring Putin in Eastern Europe.

The NATO allies host a great number of critical bases for U.S. forces—Ramstein in Germany,
Aviano in Italy, Rota in Spain, Souda Bay in Greece and Incirlik in Turkey—that serve as a
platform for our presence in Europe, as well as for U.S. force projection against terrorist groups
in North Africa and the Middle East and for our continued military operations in Afghanistan.
Europe is a critical link in the development of our Ballistic Missile Defense network focused on
the Middle East with Turkey, Romania, Poland, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, the
UK and other allies all hosting elements of this system. NATO allies continue to participate in the
U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in the Middle East . Many of the allies play lead roles
in other counter terror operations such as French forces in Mali supported by the U.S. In
Afghanistan, the NATO allies remain with us in combat operations and in training the Afghan
military.  Over 1000 soldiers from European and other partner nations have died there during
the last seventeen years. NATO continues to maintain the hard-earned peace in Kosovo with
European troops bearing the large share of the burden. An EU-led force has taken on all of the
peacekeeping responsibility in Bosnia, freeing up the U.S. for other activities.

No war – Russia wants to cooperate with European countries and NATO will be
hesitant to fight
Tsygankov, Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at
San Francisco State University, 16 (Andrei, 02.19.16, “5 reasons why the threat of a global war
involving Russia is overstated,” Russia Direct, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-
why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated) np

First, whateverthe rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their
core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey. The
prospect of confronting Russia's overwhelmingly superior military should give pause even to someone as hot-tempered as Turkish
President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn’t work. So far, NATO has been
careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions, whether it is by responding to Russia
seizing the Pristina International Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia’s side during the
military conflict in August 2008 or by providing lethal military assistance and support for Ukraine.
Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to support Turkey and begin World
War III. Second, Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining
international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them. Its
insistence on Western recognition of Russia’s interests must not be construed as a drive to
destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and
arms control. Third, the United States has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from
escalating or becoming trans-regional . Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years
ago, the U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to restrain key regional players in
any part of the world. Given the power rivalry across several regions, proxy wars are possible and
indeed are happening, but they are unlikely to escalate. Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, the contemporary world
has no rigid alliance structure. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by
American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. The world remains a space in which
international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis. Fifth, with the exception of
the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies.
Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values
by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the United States and Europe, the world majority
does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for. Despite the dangers of the world we
live in, it contains a number of important, even underappreciated, checks on great powers’ militarism. The
threat talk coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk may be a way to pressure the
opponent into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions.
When such pressures do not bring expected results, the rhetoric of war and isolation subsides. Then a dialogue begins. Perhaps, the
increasing frequency of exchanges between Obama and Putin since December 2015 - including their recent phone conversation
following the Munich conference - suggest a growing recognition that the record of pressuring Russia has been mixed at best.

Russia doesn’t want to start war – and interdependence checks escalation

Solovjova, Al Jazeera Reporter, 16 (Jelena, 07.07.16, “Is Russia really a threat to the Baltic
states?,” http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/07/russia-threat-baltic-states-
160707054916449.html) np

As Russian speakers are often exposed to Russian state media, fears

have been expressed that Moscow may seek
to stir unrest among them. "Propaganda and information attacks are part of [Russian] hybrid
warfare. They seek to provoke social and ethnic tensions, promote mistrust in government, discredit our history,
independence, and statehood, and demonstrate that Western democracy is functioning on dual
standards," said Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite in March. Beyond unconventional warfare, there has
also been talk of the threat of a direct invasion. But Peter Duncan, a senior lecturer in Russian
Politics and Society at University College London, told Al Jazeera: "There is no reason for Russia
to want to threaten the sovereignty of the Baltic states in the sense of trying to force them to
leave NATO or still less to invade them. "Military plans always ... unfortunately, work on the basis of making the worst
scenario assumptions on the basis of capabilities rather than … intentions. And the problem with that is the old security dilemma
that you … [end up increasing] your insecurity; say, you think [that] by having more troops or putting them closer to the enemy … or
to [a] potential adversary [that you will be safer] … [but] the potential adversary feels their security upset," he explained. But Agnia
Grigas, a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington DC-based think-tank, said that while Russia is unlikely to resort to direct
aggression, it does not mean that these countries are not at risk. "Russia could resort to fomenting separatists, training local radicals
or militants, sending its own activists and volunteers over the border. Potential conflicts could spill over the border so Russia's
frontier states are right to bolster their defences when the security environment in Europe has been transformed," Grigas told Al
Jazeera. The
Russian president, however, has insisted that he has no intention of attacking a NATO
member country. "I think that only an insane person and only in a dream can imagine that
Russia would suddenly attack NATO," Vladimir Putin said last June. Putin also said that the increase in Russian
drills was in response to NATO increasing its activity in the region and questioned why the latter wasn't perceived as aggressive
behaviour on the part of NATO. "A missile defence system is being deployed under the far-fetched pretext of countering the Iranian
nuclear threat after this threat has been eliminated and a treaty with Iran has been signed ... Next comes an announcement that
NATO's force in the Baltic countries will be enlarged," Putin said during a a press conference. Cold war, hot war or neither? During
the Munich Security Conference in February, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said: "We have slid back to a new Cold War."
But not everyone agrees. In February, Ilves said it is less a cold war than a hot war that is taking place in Europe. "I'd rather have a
cold war in that case, because during the Cold War we weren't having live fire on a daily basis, which we have today [in Ukraine]," he
said. But Duncan told Al Jazeera that he does
not think a Cold War is approaching . "With the rise of China, in
particular, and to a much lesser extent India, Brazil and so on, international
relations are very different [to how they
were during the Cold War]. The hostility between Russia and the West is not something that threatens
the existence of either party. Russia certainly doesn't want to cause unnecessary problems for
the West; rather the Russian economy depends on a prosperous Western European economy."

Russia doesn’t want to challenge US leadership.

NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2/4/19

( https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50090.htm)

For more than two decades, NATO

has worked to build a partnership with Russia, developing dialogue
and practical cooperation in areas of common interest . Cooperation has been suspended since 2014 in response
to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine but political and military channels of communication remain open. Concerns about
Russia’s continued destabilising pattern of military activities and aggressive rhetoric go well beyond Ukraine. After Russia’s illegal
and illegitimate annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Allies suspended all practical civilian and military cooperation in April 2014,
while keeping open channels of political and military communication. The NATO-Russia
Council (NRC) remains an
important forum for dialogue, on the basis of reciprocity, and has met nine times since 2016. At
the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014 and at successive summits since then, Allied leaders have condemned in the
strongest terms Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine, calling on Russia to stop and withdraw its forces from Ukraine and along
the country’s border. Allies continue to demand that Russia comply with international law and its international obligations and
responsibilities; end its illegitimate occupation of Crimea; refrain from aggressive actions against Ukraine; halt the flow of weapons,
equipment, people and money across the border to the separatists; and stop fomenting tension along and across the Ukrainian
border. NATO does not and will not recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea. The Allies have also noted that
violence and insecurity in the region led to the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 on 17 July 2014, calling for
those directly and indirectly responsible to be held accountable and brought to justice as soon as possible. In May 2018, the Joint
Investigation Team, which is investigating the MH17 crash, concluded that the BUK-TELAR that was used to down the aircraft
originated from the 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, a unit of the Russian army from Kursk. Allies stand in solidarity with the
Netherlands and Australia, which call on Russia to take State responsibility for the downing of flight MH17. Allies strongly
support the settlement of the conflict in eastern Ukraine by diplomatic and peaceful means and
welcome the ongoing diplomatic efforts to this end. All signatories of the Minsk Agreements
must comply with their commitments and ensure their full implementation. Russia has a
significant responsibility in this regard .
 AT: Burden On US
Trump’s budgetary arguments are a load of lies
Chiampan, PhD, 02-19 (Andrea, Postdoctorate Fellow at Swiss National Science Foundation
(SNSF), “Trump and the Future of NATO,” Current Affairs in Perspective, p. 7)//EF

In November 2016, the people of the United States elected a president—Donald Trump—who
does not recognize not only the value of NATO as an organization—which he has defined
“obsolete”—but also the value of the transatlantic economic, political, and military partnership
as a whole as well as the international liberal order it promotes. In fact, Trump challenged that global order that
the United States engineered and endured to maintain for over 70 years.13 Once in office, European defense spending and EU exports have become
Trump’s focus of attention. These two grievances seem to be somehow connected in Trump’s world view. Trump accused European
nations to free-ride on their security at great cost for the United States while at the same time
enjoying the prosperity that derives from the trade surplus the EU maintains on the United
States. “We are spending a fortune on military in order to lose $800 billion in trade losses. That doesn't sound very smart to me,” the president said
in a completely misleading characterization of US trade deficit.14 Trump went as far as to call the European Union a “foe” for “what they do to us is in
trade.”15 The US and the EU came close to a trade war as the administration imposed high tariffs on European steel and aluminum and even ventilated
that it might do the same on automobiles. To this, the EU responded with increased tariffs on some American goods, including Harley-Davidson
motorcycles.16 Trump also pointed his finger at Germany’s economic relations with Russia on energy matters .
In particular, Trump
criticized the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project that is due to increase gas streams to Germany and
Western Europe but bypass Eastern European countries. “They want us to protect them against
Russia, and yet they pay billions of dollars to Russia, and we're the schmucks paying for the
whole thing,” the president boasted.17 Trump’s attacks on trade went hand in hand with
complaints about NATO-Europe’s deficient military spending [Fig. 1]. Trump like many
presidents before him would like for the allies to spend more on defense, but his hostile rhetoric
is unprecedented. “They’ve really taken advantage of us, and many of those countries are in NATO and they weren’t paying their bills.”18 In
order to fuel this idea President Trump portrayed NATO as having some sort of a single, collective, and comprehensive defense budget to which every
member contributes, which is incorrect. He
even went as far as arguing that Germany “owes vast sums of
money to NATO, and the United States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive,
defense it provides.”19 However, this is not how NATO budget works. Direct financial
contributions to NATO budget by member countries are set in accordance with an agreed
cost-sharing formula based on Gross National Income (GNI). This form of common funding is the only kind of
contribution that members are required to pour into NATO. For 2017, NATO’s total budget was roughly $2.44 billion. This comprised: a) civil budget for
$262 million, which provides funds for personnel expenses, operating costs, and capital and programmed expenditure of the International Staff at
NATO Headquarters; b) a military budget, amounting to $1.44 billion, which covers the operating and maintenance costs of the NATO Command
Structure (essentially the international military staff and the different strategic commands, and military committees); c) and finally, the NATO Security
Investment Program, for a maximum of $734 million, which is to provide major construction and command and control system investments,
installations and facilities and so on.20 In
this sense, every NATO member country owes a predetermined
share that makes up NATO budget and all countries have regularly paid these mandatory
contributions. The US paid $540.32 million, Germany $357.46, France $259.46 and Britain
$240.3 million. This also means that on a per capita basis Americans are paying far less than
Germans, roughly $1.68 per person for the 2017 NATO budget as opposed to $4.39.21 Of
course, the commonly funded budget does not include the cost of actually running operations,
that is to say the money spent on soldiers, weapons, equipment and other capabilities of each
individual country. These are commonly known as indirect costs, but these are entirely up to
national states to decide and are not part of NATO budget per se . When the North Atlantic
Council (NAC) unanimously decides to engage in an operation, there is no obligation for each
and every country to contribute to the operation unless it falls under Article V. In all cases,
contributions are voluntary and vary in form and scale. These voluntary contributions are
offered by individual allies and are taken from their overall defense capability to form the
combined Alliance capability. But even considering these costs, Trump’s allegation that the US
covers “anywhere between 70 and 90 percent” of all NATO costs is blatantly incorrect. It is hard
to know where Trump learned this information, but he seems to refer to the fact that the US
spends 67% in real terms of what NATO nations combined spend on defense, this amounts to
3.5% circa of its GDP. Clearly, this does not mean that the US covers over 67% of the costs involved
in the operational running of NATO as an organization. This simply means that the US spends
more than any other NATO member on its own defense, which is entirely unsurprising given the
fact that the US is the wealthiest nation in the world, the world’s only superpower, and its
military performs a global role.22 Put simply, saying that the US spends $600 billion on defense is not the same as saying that the US
spends $600 billion to defend Europe from Russia or to run NATO military operations. As one NATO official simply put it, “Because the US has this global
reach and global responsibility then of course the military defense expenditures are going to be very different from a country like Slovenia or
Luxembourg.”23 There is another possible interpretation to Trump’s accusation that Germany (and others) “owe” money to the United States. Trump
might be referring to the fact that Germany like many other countries in Europe (as well as Canada) have not yet met a pledge agreed by Ministers in a
North Atlantic Council meeting in Wales back in 2014 according to which NATO member states should increase their defense spending to 2% of their
GDP.24 However, the 2% pledge was always intended simply as a political guideline and, at any rate, it was to be reached by 2024—not 2018 [Fig.2].
Furthermore, these increases could not in any way be considered part of the members’ financial obligations and they would only indirectly improve
NATO defense capabilities.
AT Disads
 AT German Leadership – Not Possible
Germany can barely keep up with its own domestic issues
The Economist, 02-07-19 (“It is time to worry about Germany’s economy,”
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/02/07/it-is-time-to-worry-about-germanys-
economy)//EF

The world is used to a thriving German economy. A decade ago, during the financial crisis, it shed relatively few jobs, as
unemployment soared elsewhere. Since then it has been an anchor of fiscal stability while much of the euro

zone has struggled with debt and deficits . Its public debt is below the target of 60% of gdp set by eu treaties—and falling.
Thanks to labour-market reforms introduced during the 2000s, Germans enjoy levels of employment that beat job-friendly Britain, even as inequality is
barely higher than in France. Its geographically dispersed manufacturing industries, made up of about 200,000 small and medium-sized firms, have
mitigated the regional disparities that have fuelled populism across the West (see article). Yet
the German economy suddenly
looks vulnerable. In the short term it faces a slowdown . It only narrowly avoided a recession at
the end of 2018. Temporary factors, such as tighter emissions standards for cars, explain some of the
weakness, but there is little sign of a bounceback. Manufacturing output probably fell in January. Businesses are losing
confidence. Both the imf and the finance ministry have slashed growth forecasts for 2019 (see
article). In the longer term, changing patterns of trade and technology are moving against

Germany’s world-beating manufacturers. In response, on February 5th Peter Altmaier, the economy minister, laid out plans to
block unwanted foreign takeovers and to promote national and European champions.

Germany’s international prominence is fading alongside its wrecked economy

Mody, Economics visiting professor at Charles and Marie Robertson, 18 (“Germany’s Economy Will Be Europe’s
Problem,” https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-12-07/germany-s-economy-will-be-europe-s-
problem)//EF

The imminent end of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s final term presents a great challenge
for both her country and the entire European project . If her successor can’t pull the German
economy out of its slide toward second-tier status , the union could lose its most important
financial supporter. Since Merkel’s announcement that she will not seek another term in 2021, the focus has been on whether her
successor will be more willing to engage in the kind of risk-sharing needed to make the euro a
viable currency — meaning a more complete banking union and more fiscal support for struggling member countries. Friedrich Merz, a leading contender to replace
Merkel, has implied he might try, though he remains skeptical of “old French ideas” for financing deeper integration. Yet even if Germany’s next

leader can summon the political will, there’s another obstacle: a diminishing economy, which
threatens to undermine the confidence Germans need to play a more proactive role. Besieged
on multiple fronts, the country is struggling to deliver higher standards of living. For nearly half the population,
incomes haven’t risen in a generation. The warning signs flashed in Merkel’s first term . German companies, for example, had long
excelled in innovation, as measured by the number of patents registered in the U.S. But by 2007, Korean companies had caught up. They now register nearly double the number
that their German counterparts do, thanks to huge investments in education and research. China, too, has been gaining ground, joining Korea in staking a claim to global
technological leadership. Merkel understood the challenge. In 2010, she promised a big push on investment in education and research. She invoked Europe’s Age of
Enlightenment in the 17th century, when dazzling intellectual progress placed Europeans at the frontier of human knowledge. She recognized that Chinese leaders were making
a concerted bid to return to the heyday that Chinese science enjoyed in the 10th century. But Germany fell short. As of 2015, Korean and Chinese high-school students were
outperforming their German counterparts in science and, especially, in mathematics. While Korean universities have not securely established themselves in the top echelons,
the two best Chinese universities rank higher than the best German universities. Indeed, measured by how often their science and technology research is cited, Chinese

universities occupy the top two spots globally and four more of the top 15. No European institution is even on that elite list. The automotive industry
exemplifies how Germany is losing its edge . The country has long enjoyed a formidable reputation for quality, performance and style. But
that might be changing. In an ever-enlarging scandal, American and European regulators have caught German

companies cheating on emission standards in their diesel cars. As they scramble to meet the standards, the country’s
automakers are facing a broader regulatory transformation, with municipal authorities banning cars in city centers. Meanwhile, as electric replaces internal combustion, German
manufacturers remain deeply rooted in the old diesel technology. Merkel and her government have sought to ease their pain by delaying tougher emission standards and

The transition to electric cars will render the

deferring bans on car use, but this is a losing battle. Germans place a premium on cleaner air.

technologies used by automakers and their suppliers largely obsolete, causing wide-ranging
disruption. There’s more. Germany’s fabled banks have served the country’s small and medium-size firms well. But the banks suffer from chronically low profitability —
particularly in the network of quasi-public institutions, the Sparkassen and Landesbanken, typically owned or controlled by municipalities and state governments. In 2001, the

As they lost access to the subsidies, the

European Commission pronounced that the Landesbanken were receiving unfair subsidies.

Landesbanken gambled for redemption in the U.S. subprime market and other risky ventures.
Predictably, they bled profusely. Perhaps Germany’s greatest weakness is Deutsche Bank, whose
stock price is still less than a tenth of where in stood in May 2007, ahead of the subprime crisis . In
recent years, U.S. and British regulators have fined the bank hundreds of millions of dollars for improper representations and possible money laundering. It’s currently under

Its business model is evidently not

separate investigations for assisting criminals and Denmark’s Danske Bank in laundering large sums of money.

working. If it falters, its size and global systemic connections could place a substantial burden on
the government. Ideas propel a modern economy. Yet Germany’s farthest-reaching economic policy of the past generation, the labor reforms of Gerhard Schröder,
reduced incentives to invest in human capital by making it easier to fire employees. Workers became expendable, inequality increased and the sense of insecurity spread.

Climbing the economic ladder became harder. Many discouraged Germans turned to the euroskeptic, anti-immigration Alternative für
Deutschland party. A growing rebellion within Merkel’s Christian Democrats eroded her authority. These deepening political fault lines delivered a fragmented German
Bundestag in the 2017 federal elections, placing Germany’s vaunted political stability at risk. Germany must shed its narrow reliance on engineering excellence and bank funding,
and move toward a more flexible structure where emergent technologies can flourish. This primarily requires the scale of investment in education and curriculum modernization
that Merkel hinted at but did not deliver. Education is twice blessed: It fosters growth and gives hope to those left behind. The government must also consolidate the Sparkassen
and Landesbanken into two or three banks, while severing their subsidies. And if Deutsche Bank is not cleaned up and downsized, it will surely become a public liability.
Economic historian Charles Kindleberger described a hegemonic power as one that makes short-term financial sacrifices to aid other countries, believing that prosperity

Germany is in the last phase of its global prominence, a nation unwittingly

elsewhere comes around to benefit it.

sliding into the ranks of also-rans. The question is whether it’s too set in its ways, with too many
vested interests, to change course. The task for the next chancellor is clear: Reinvigorate the economy. Only then will Germans show a willingness
to do more for Europe.
 AT German Leadership – Not Good
Germany has way too many domestic problems – Merkel screwed them over –
German leadership also ruins Europe
O'Sullivan, Writer for the National Review, 16 (John, Germany Can Do Better than Angela Merkel, National
Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/09/angela-merkel-legacy-incompetent-leadership-germany-europe/,
9-24-2016)//EF

Despite her reputation for competence, Merkel has led her country (and Europe) into one crisis
after another. ‘The graveyards are full of indispensable men,” said De Gaulle, or his predecessor Georges Clemenceau, or New York publisher Elbert Hubbard, or one
of several other less famous people with a good turn of phrase, according to the scrupulously careful online Quote Investigator. Be that as it may, it’s looking increasingly likely
that the (political) graveyard will soon be welcoming an “indispensable” woman, recently sanctified as such on the cover of The Economist, namely German chancellor Angela
Merkel. Her Christian Democrat party fell to third place in Berlin’s local elections last week and may not stay long in the city’s governing coalition. Two thirds of German voters
now want her gone. And the names of successors are being freely canvassed. This decline and the associated rise of the right-wing Alternative for Germany party are being

More than 1 million migrants have done so in

blamed on Merkel’s unqualified invitation to Syrian refugees to come to Germany last year.

the intervening twelve months — many of them neither Syrian nor refugees — and they have led to a large rise in
violent and “hate” crimes, some committed by them, some by those protesting their arrival. These things are frightening not only the voters, but also
nervous members of Merkel’s own parliamentary party devoted to their own careers before hers. For them, the writing is on the Berlin Wall. Even those drafting her advance
obituaries, however, seem to regard her tenure as chancellor as having been an overall success marked by prudence and achievement. She is generally still seen as “a safe pair
of hands” — and indeed the best election poster for the CDU last time was a simple picture of a pair of hands. You can make that case — I’ll do so in a moment as a kind of

exercise — but only on grounds that would alarm her admirers and threaten her reputation. By any respectable criterion, she is a klutz on
a heroic scale. Consider the following examples: Merkel’s energy policy was based upon a
combination of nuclear power and “renewables” in order to close down power stations
dependent on fossil fuels, and help Germany lead the European Union and the world toward a
carbon-free future. She had been a strong defender of nuclear energy against SPD chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s attempts to phase it out. Within a few weeks of
the Japanese nuclear disaster at Fukushima, though, she panicked, reversed herself, and closed down Germany’s entire nuclear program. Her Energiewende

since then has led to a massive increase in power bills for consumers and industry , the movement abroad of
German companies heavily reliant on energy, and, more recently, a phasing out of the phasing out of coal-fired power stations. Merkel and the nuclear companies are still

Meanwhile, no one believes

haggling over how much the German government will pay for the estimated €23 billion cost of shutting down their plants.

that Germany and Europe will meet their official goal of reducing carbon emissions 80-95
percent from their 1990 levels by the year 2050 . The refugee crisis is all too plainly a vast mistake, as Merkel herself has admitted. But
some of its side-effects have produced other crises almost as severe. Example one: though Merkel welcomed “Syrian refugees” without consulting even her colleagues in the
German government, she immediately demanded that other European states within the then-borderless Schengen Zone should accept them as well. That demand was resisted
(and still is) by other governments, and there’s been a long-running “existential” (Jean-Claude Juncker’s word, not mine) crisis in the EU ever since. Example two: Merkel reduced
the flow of Middle Eastern migrants into the EU through a deal with Turkish strongman Recep Tayyik Erdogan to control the border. But the price was high: the EU’s silence over
Erdogan’s arbitrary arrest of thousands of soldiers, police, lawyers, and journalists, and visa-free entry into the EU for 80 million Turks, which could mean another migrant crisis
down the road. There’s no guarantee that Erdogan — who’s skilled at selling the same horse twice — won’t ask for additional concessions from a desperate Merkel and EU,
either. Whether Brexit is a good idea for Britain — as I think it is — Merkel and her EU colleagues all devoutly believe that it’s bad for Europe. But she helped to create the
circumstances that made it happen by rejecting all of PM David Cameron’s demands except for the most trivial — and even then the concessions the EU offered were legally
reversible. It was a serious setback for her and for her lodestar of European unity. And it came about because at a time when populist parties were rising throughout Europe,
including the AFD in Germany, she complacently assumed that the risk of Brexit was not a serious one. She had confidence that Cameron would win but gave him no real help in
doing so. He resigned; she was further weakened. When Merkel won her first election in 2004, she represented a more general shift to the liberal economic right in German
politics. Chancellor Schröder — the SPD leader she narrowly defeated — had ushered in some market-friendly economic reforms that many now credit for making the German
economy more dynamic. Indeed, Merkel herself praised him for doing so. Since then, however, she has presided over a shift back to the Left. By blocking the demands of the
CDU’s traditional coalition partner, the Free Democrats, for tax cuts and a more market-friendly approach, she made them look weak and ineffective. As a result, they fell below
the 5 percent threshold for entry into the Bundestag for the first time since 1945. Though the 2013 election was generally reported as a victory for Merkel and the CDU, in fact it

To retain the coalition and her chancellorship,

ushered in a small parliamentary majority for the Left. That had consequences.

Merkel had to agree to a series of small socialist reforms required by the SPD — notably, a quite
generous minimum wage and a reduction in the pension age. Judged by results, Merkel looks
more and more East German with every passing election. (Incidentally, the Free Democrats now favor some restrictions on
immigration.) Merkel’s Euro policy has proved — astounding though it sounds — even more destructive than her immigration policy. By insisting that

Germany had to prove its loyalty to Europe by ruling out any reform of the Euro’s structure, she
imprisoned Southern European countries in an over-valued exchange rate that inflicted
recession, unemployment, and a debt crisis on them indefinitely . It’s hard to express the damage this has done to millions
of human lives, but here’s one measure: Though the average unemployment rate for the Eurozone hovered between 10 and 12 percent from 2010 to 2016 and the Eurozone
youth-unemployment rate hovered between 20 and 22 percent over the same period, the youth-unemployment rate in Mediterranean Europe has generally been around the 50
percent mark. (There have been corresponding problems for northern Europe in the subsidies their taxpayers have had to pay to keep Greece, Spain, and Portugal solvent and
 Political instability has accordingly flourished in the South, with successive
inside the straitjacket.)

governments losing elections and extreme Marxist parties coming to or near power. Relations
between different European countries — above all, Greece and Germany — have been
permanently poisoned. Democracy itself has been sidelined by Brussels as it replaced elected
prime ministers with its own favored technocrats. In short, nothing has damaged European unity
more than Merkel’s blindly unreasoning insistence on an un-reformed Euro.
 AT German Economy – Alt Causes
Alt causes to German economic decline
Jolly, financial reporter for the Guardian, 19 (Jasper, 06.07.19, “German trade decline raises
fears over global economy,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/07/german-trade-
decline-raises-fears-over-global-economy) np

German exports and industrial output fell sharply in April, triggering fresh fears that trade
tensions and continued Brexit uncertainty are weighing on the global growth outlook. Industrial
production in Europe’s largest economy fell 1.9%, which was the worst monthly fall in almost four years ,
according to Germany’s statistics office. It was much worse than the 0.4% decline forecast by economists.
Exports fell by 3.7% in April compared with the previous month, while imports also fell. German
industry, the powerhouse of the European economy, has suffered in the past year as trade tensions between
the US and China have put the brakes on global trade growth. The German car sector, a major exporter, has
also been hit by a decline in demand for vehicles in the EU and China . The export fall in April was in part
driven by a sharp 8.7% year-on-year fall in exports to the EU’s non-eurozone economies – the largest of
which is the UK. Exports to the UK fell by €1.6bn (£1.4bn) in April compared to the previous year , to
€5.6bn – a 22% year-on-year fall. “This is a horrible start to the second quarter for German industry, as
global trade tensions as well as temporary problems in the automotive sector and chemical industry
have left their marks,” said Carsten Brzeski, the chief economist in Germany for the Dutch bank ING. Germany’s
Bundesbank on Friday sharply downgraded its growth forecasts for this year and next in response to the signs
of a slowdown. Economists at the central bank expect German GDP to rise by only 0.6% this year, down from the 1.6% predicted
back in December.

German economic decline is inevitable

Edwards, editor of Business Insider UK, 19 (Jim, 03.27.19, “'This is a serious recession warning
in the German economy'” https://www.businessinsider.com/this-is-a-serious-recession-warning-
in-the-german-economy-2019-3) np

The single most worrying

issue in the European economy right now is the ongoing collapse of German
manufacturing. Last week, another raft of factory sentiment data came out and the charts look ugly:
Analysts are saying things like "grim," "misery," "horrific," and "this is a serious recession warning in the
German economy." While the European Central Bank is flashing warnings about the economic
health of the whole region — President Mario Draghi on Wednesday said he might halt rate rises on a slump in demand —
Germany is especially alarming. "Winter has come back with a vengeance for the industrial sector," Oxford Economics analyst Ángel
Talavera told his clients. "The shocking plunge
in the German manufacturing index to its lowest since 2012
is a stark reminder that the outlook for the industrial sector continues to be dominated by
uncertainty, overwhelmed by a multitude of potential negative shocks ranging from a hard
Brexit to the imposition of tariffs by the US." PMI refers to the "purchasing managers' index." Although
manufacturing in Germany isn't as large as its services sector, which remains buoyant, the country is psychologically identified with
its historic manufacturing prowess. Think BMW, VW, Audi, BASF, and Bayer. Germanyis also the largest economy in
Europe. It sits at the heart of the eurozone currency area, and its largest non-European trading
partners are China and the US. It is also the fourth largest economy globally. If German manufacturing
sneezes, everyone else can catch a cold, in other words. "The gap between the services and the manufacturing PMIs
has now risen to levels not seen since the global financial crisis," Talavera also wrote, in a note seen by Business Insider.
 AT German Economy – Already Caved
German’s already caved to Trump’s demands – they’re going to raise defense
spending
Geobel, reporter, 19 (Nicole, 05.17.19, “Germany informs NATO of huge defense budget
increase: report,”https://www.dw.com/en/germany-informs-nato-of-huge-defense-budget-
increase-report/a-48770380) np

Germany is ready to raise its share of NATO's budget by €5 billion ($5.6 billion) to €47.3 billion this year,
German news agency dpa reported Friday. The increase would amount to 1.35% of gross domestic product
(GDP) — still a long way off the 2% target NATO members have set themselves. However, the increase would be the
biggest for Germany since the end of the Cold War in 1991. If confirmed, the move could be seen as
a concession to US President Donald Trump, who has been pushing European allies to raise
defense spending, and their share of spending on NATO in particular. At a summit in Wales, UK, in 2014, NATO members
agreed to gradually raise defense budgets to 2% of GDP within a decade. Trump has repeatedly singled out
Germany, criticizing what the US perceives as insufficient defense spending, while Berlin has
pointed out that all members have until 2024 to attempt to reach the target. At last year's NATO
summit, Trump even threatened to leave the alliance if members did not reach the 2% target soon.
Authors
 Prodict – Rynning
Rynning is qualified – he’s studied NATO for many years
SDU, University of Southern Denmark, 19 (SDU, 06.12.19, “New Vice Deans for the Faculty of
Business and Social Sciences,”
https://www.sdu.dk/en/om_sdu/fakulteterne/samfundsvidenskab/sam_nyhedsliste/
nye_prodekaner) np

Sten Rynningcomes from a position as Professor of International Politics at SDU, and has studied
NATO and the war in Afghanistan for many years. Since 2011, Sten Rynning has been in charge of
the Center for War Studies at SDU – a centre, which he himself established, and where he will continue to work on his
research alongside his position as Vice Dean.
 Prodict – Rynning
Rynning is qualified – he’s studied NATO for many years
SDU, University of Southern Denmark, 19 (SDU, 06.12.19, “New Vice Deans for the Faculty of
Business and Social Sciences,”
https://www.sdu.dk/en/om_sdu/fakulteterne/samfundsvidenskab/sam_nyhedsliste/
nye_prodekaner) np

Sten Rynningcomes from a position as Professor of International Politics at SDU, and has studied
NATO and the war in Afghanistan for many years. Since 2011, Sten Rynning has been in charge of
the Center for War Studies at SDU – a centre, which he himself established, and where he will continue to work on his
research alongside his position as Vice Dean.
***PERMS/NBs***
 AT Links to NB – NATO Popular
Past legislation proves support for a strong US role in NATO is bipartisan in
Congress
Killough & Siegel, producer for CNN covering Congress; producer for CNN, 19 (Ashley &
David, 01.22.19, “House passes NATO bill to send a strong message to Trump,”
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/22/politics/nato-house-vote/index.html) np

(CNN) The Democratic-controlled House

approved a bill Tuesday that would reiterate strong congressional
support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance amid recent reports that President
Donald Trump raised the idea of withdrawing from NATO several times l ast year. "It's so disturbing --
troubling to see the United States sending mixed signals about our commitment to the alliance, or treating it as a burden," said
House Foreign Affairs Chairman Eliot Engel, a New York Democrat, at a news conference on Capitol Hill. "You know what a burden
would be?" he asked. "A burden would be for the United States to try and conduct foreign policy without allies, without 28 other
countries that share our values and have fought alongside American troops, sharing the burden of lost blood and treasure at times."
Trump has been clear in his criticism of NATO and has knocked allies for failing to pay enough for their defense. Meanwhile, Russia
has long attempted to divide the alliance, and a US exit would be seen as a major victory for Russian President Vladimir Putin. The
bill, which passed with bipartisan support by 357-22, states that it's US policy to remain a
member of NATO and prohibits funds from being used to withdraw from the alliance. Last year,
the Republican-led Senate approved a motion of support for NATO the same day that Trump arrived in
Brussels, Belgium, for a NATO summit. And a bipartisan group of senators introduced a bill that would
require Senate approval for the US to withdraw from NATO. Backers of the House bill argue it would continue
to put pressure on NATO allies to increase their defense budgets as they have pledged to do. Democratic Rep. Jimmy
Panetta of California said leaving NATO would be a "historic mistake." "Because what we have to realize that is
NATO is not just a transactional relationship," he said. "Our sole focus can't just be on who pays what and who gets what. Being a
member of NATO is not like being a member of a country club." Rep. Tom Malinowski, a former assistant secretary at the State
Department, said the bill prohibits funds from being used to pay for a US departure or to cover expenses like moving troops in what
he described as "an enormous undertaking" after a decades-long footprint in the alliance. "You bet you it would cost a lot of money,
and we have the power of the purse," the New Jersey Democrat said. "It is, in a sense, crazy that we have to be doing this, but we
have to be doing this," Malinowski added. "It is both necessary and urgent." "What we are saying here is that we are not leaving
NATO without a struggle from the United States Congress," he said.

NATO is popular in America

Keil, Fellow at GMF, 16 (Steven, 01.14.16, “How Real is American Disenchantment with
NATO?” GMF, http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2016/10/14/how-real-american-disenchantment-
nato) np

As November draws closer, the shots volleyed from Donald Trump’s campaign continue to cause anxiety
for NATO’s European allies. Though Trump has tried to dial back his rhetoric, his initial comments that NATO is “obsolete”
and contending that he would have no problem seeing it “break up” have NATO partners fretting about the future of the U.S.
commitment. There is hope that institutions and agreements can weather the building storm, but Trump’s apparent disregard for
the Euroatlantic pillar of the U.S. global security posture could have wide ranging implications. Combined with the power of the
president to set the U.S. foreign policy agenda, it is not hard to imagine how U.S. engagement in Europe (and around the globe)
could significantly change. No one really knows where Trump’s policy will end up, but his statements about U.S. allies and the NATO
Alliance should be taken at face value. Extremes of rhetoric aside, the
grievances about burden sharing and the
U.S. role abroad are real. European allies must not dismiss the chord that this year’s electoral politics have struck with
segments of the U.S. population. Following the combat mission in Afghanistan, war in Iraq, and the financial crisis in 2008, there is
limited appetite for conversations encouraging U.S. global responsibility and global commitments. The U.S. presidential
campaign has shown that candidates are rewarded by focusing attention inward at policies that
try to shut out or isolate global realities (trade, foreign policy, et al.). A Pew Research Center Poll earlier
this year showed that a majority of Americans are simply wary of global engagement. The NATO
Alliance has seemingly been swept up in this weariness of a global role. However, public opinion clearly
differentiates between a hesitancy of global engagement and the importance of a long-held
alliance like NATO. The same Pew Research Survey found that 77% of the American public believes
that membership in NATO is a good thing, and even among Trump’s targeted Republican base, only
30% claimed that NATO is bad for the United States. A majority of respondents in a 2015 survey took
their support further, indicating that the United States should confront Russia with military force
if it attacked a NATO ally – reinforcing their support of Article V. While globalization-wary rhetoric may be active in the
campaign, its specific application to NATO is less convincing. That said, it is certainly possible that contagion could affect NATO more
as it continues. U.S. criticisms of Euroatlantic partners’ defense and security efforts are, of course, not new. In the late 1990s, U.S.
Senator John McCain warned about the erosion of American popular support for NATO if it did not improve its burden sharing.
Recently, President Obama bluntly called some of America’s European partners “free riders.” Even talking about the bipartisan habit
of complaining about European defense spending levels and burden sharing in NATO is cliché at this point. If anything is to be taken
from the current discourse in U.S. campaign politics, it is that future
U.S. administrations, as well as the American
public, are likely to only expect more from U.S. allies and partners. This is particularly true for those who are
both economically capable and “nearer to the threat.” If Europe is able to continue a trend of increasing defense spending and
assuming greater leadership in the region, it will go a long way in assuaging U.S. concerns about shouldering too much of the
burden, or at least begin to remove that long-standing element from the discourse.

Majority of voter support NATO

PPC, program for public consultation @ the university of Maryland, 19 (Program for Public
Consultation, 04.03.19, Program for Public Consultation study finds that more than 8 in 10
Americans favor US involvement in NATO,” http://www.cissm.umd.edu/news/program-public-
consultation-study-finds-more-8-10-americans-favor-us-involvement-nato) np
Celebrations of the 70th anniversary of NATO on April 4 may be clouded by concerns about statements by Donald Trump
questioning the US commitment to NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, a
new survey finds that 83%
of American voters favor the US continuing to be part of NATO, including 90% of Democrats, but
also 77% of Republicans and 76% of those who voted for Trump. The survey of 2,416 registered
voters was conducted by the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) at the University of
Maryland, and released today by the nonpartisan organization Voice of the People. Concerns about the US
commitment to NATO have been sparked by Donald Trump’s characterization of NATO as
“obsolete,” and his statements that he might consider withdrawing the US from NATO if other NATO members do not increase
their military spending. Respondents were informed about the controversy stemming from US pressure to get European NATO allies
to spend more on their militaries. While the European allies have agreed to raise their spending to two percent of GDP, many have
failed to do so. Presented three options, only 12% endorsed pressing European allies “to spend more on their military and say that if
they do not the US will disengage from Europe militarily and possibly withdraw from NATO”—21% of Republicans, 4% of Democrats.
Thirty-five percent favored pressing the Europeans but not making threats. The most popular idea—supported by 50% was to
“remain part of NATO but reduce US military investments in Europe to bring them more in line with the level that the Europeans
make” (Republicans 47%, Democrats 50%). “Only
a small minority of Americans show interest in
withdrawing from NATO or using the threat to do so as a source of leverage,” c ommented Steven Kull,
director of PPC. To ensure that respondents understood the issue, they were first given a short briefing on NATO including the
commitment to defend any ally that comes under attack. The content was reviewed by experts on the issues to ensure the briefing
was accurate and balanced, and the strongest arguments were presented. Respondents were then asked to evaluate arguments for
and against remaining in NATO. The
arguments in favor of remaining were found convincing by very large
majorities. These included the argument that Russia is still a potential threat to Europe and it is
in the US’ interest to help Europe contain them (85% found this convincing), as well as the
argument that NATO is a useful symbol for each country’s commitment to freedom and
democracy, and a necessary tool to ensure the continuation of free and open trade (82%
convincing). Large majorities of both parties found these arguments convincing, though
Democrats had larger numbers (89% in both cases) than Republicans (82%, 75% respectively). Far
fewer – no more than four in ten – found the arguments against remaining in NATO convincing. They included the argument that
Russia is not a real threat and US security commitments enable countries to be unnecessarily provocative (40%), as well as the
argument that having a military alliance targeted clearly at Russia violates the post-Cold War understanding between the US and
Russia, and is therefore destabilizing (35%). Republicans were more likely to find these arguments convincing (51% and 42%) than
Democrats (28% for both).
 AT Perm Do Both/Lie Perm
1. The permutation severs immediacy-
a. Should is certain and immediate
Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d
311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation , propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the
weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense.
HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In
the
courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not
sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have
squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the
word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and
could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v.
State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not
instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that
the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859,
554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction
on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the
jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an
instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same
meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of
Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to
convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating
that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

b. Resolved is in the present tense, not future

AHD ‘3
[The American Heritage Dictionary at Dictionary.com]

Full Definition of RESOLVED¶ 1¶ : fixity of purpose : resoluteness¶ 2¶ : something that is resolved¶ 3¶ : a legal or official
determination; especially : a formal resolution
 c. Limits – presume immediate implementation because the
alternative is infinite and abusive- the 2AC can specify the plan is
done before or after crucial disad thresholds mooting not just CP
competition but every offensive argument
d. No offense- if the aff wants to specify timeframe require it in the
1AC- that solves their offense but prevents 2AC clarification after
they’ve heard our strategy
2. The permutation is Intrinsic- ingenuine/nonbinding consultation is not a
mandate of the plan or the counterplan.
a. Moots negative ground- the US is the world’s most powerful actor
and can resolve most impacts through adding planks to the plan
b. infinite regress- if we read a disad to the intrinsicness argument
they can kick it at no cost or make a new intrinsicness argument to
solve the disad- they get the last speech denying us a chance to
respond to their final advocacy
c. Counter interpretation: the aff gets topical intrinsicness
arguemnts-this solves their offense but still requires the aff to win
by justifying the resolution.
3. Trump will leak that the perm was a lie
Swan, national political reporter at Axios, 18 (Jonathan, “Behind the scenes: Trump's habit of
blurting,” Axios, https://www.axios.com/donald-trump-blurting-public-private-statements-
russia-a7e65340-df76-42d4-ba08-0d13d988b0f0.html) np

President Trump’s staff has learned a hard lesson. If the president says something in private , no
matter how geopolitically fraught, it's only a matter of time before he blurts it out in public. Between the lines:
Trump’s Wall Street Journal interview this week is just the latest example of this habit. In that
interview, he contradicted the White House's official narrative by saying he had revoked John
Brennan’s security clearance because of the Russia probe. It's far from the first time Trump has publicly
blurted out something that his aides privately implored him to keep under wraps. Behind the scenes:
A source who's spent hours with Trump in confidential White House settings told me the Journal interview brought back bad
memories. Notonly of Trump's interview last year with NBC's Lester Holt — when the president
admitted "this Russia thing with Trump" was on his mind when he fired then-FBI director James
Comey — but of other times when Trump blurted out thoughts he'd previously expressed in
private that his national security team hoped would stay that way. The two examples the source gave: In a
private meeting last summer, Trump asked senior national security aides, including then-national security adviser H.R. McMaster,
what would happen if the U.S. invaded Venezuela. The aides warned Trump against the idea, but he ended up blurting out publicly
that he wasn't ruling out a "military option" in Venezuela. (The APfirst reported Trump's private comments.) For weeks earlier this
year, Trump had been telling national security officials that Syria was a disaster and he wanted to withdraw U.S. troops ASAP. His
aides, including Chief of Staff John Kelly, privately urged him not to say anything. When Trump traveled to Ohio for an infrastructure
event in March, the text of his speech said nothing about foreign policy, according to a source with direct knowledge of the remarks.
But Trump got up on stage and blurted out that the U.S. would be "coming out of Syria, like, very soon." The bottom line: Trump's
aides have learned the hard way that once they hear the president say something privately —
no matter how harmful it might be — it's only a matter of time before he blurts it out publicly.
"When something is on his mind, everybody will know it soon," the source told me. "The only thing you can do is once you hear him
say something privately, start preparing talking points because sooner or later you will hear it in public."

4. Lying is immoral and must be on face rejected

Murphy 96 <Mark C., 41 Am. J. Juris. 81, The American Journal of Jurisprudence, “Natural
Law And The Moral Absolute Against Lying,” lexis>
Bok's remarks capture the insight that what disturbs people about lying is not fundamentally that lies are contrary to the good of
knowledge, though lies
certainly are contrary to that good. What is most troubling about being lied to is that lies
infect the decisionmaking process, undermining the good of practical reasonableness. Thus, the
account of the moral absolute against lying defended here does justice to what bothers
reflective people about being the victim of lies . 39 I have argued that although Finnis is right to think that the lie is
an act directed against the intrinsic good of knowledge, the wrongfulness of lying is most adequately explained by reference to the
good of practical reasonableness. Lyingis absolutely morally forbidden, in last analysis, because refraining
from lying is necessary to show adequate respect for the status of other agents as practical
reasoners. On this matter, at the very least, natural law theory should affirm its agreement with Kant. 40
 AT Perm Do the Plan then Rollback
Reject the perm
a. Rollback is intrinsic — rollback the plan if they say no isn’t in the CP or
the plan — makes the aff a moving target because they get to spike out
of links
b. Timeframe is intrinsic – sequencing is not part of either advocacy —
moots all neg offense
c. It severs out of certainty—
Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)
"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the
weight of
authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of
courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant
has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not
guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a
sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891
P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is
directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that the
word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554
S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word " should" in an instruction on

circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must " and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have

been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a

defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on
witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v.

Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a

legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation.
McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated
for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

The impact is real world education and argumentative responsibility — fiating

your way out of opportunity costs doesn’t reflect policymaking and kills our
ability to develop advocacy skills —

Independently, it doesn’t solve and still links — consultation needs to be

binding and prior to solve [x] — if not the link is already triggered before they
roll the plan back — that’s 1NC [author]
Double bind — They’ve read say no ev and also the perm — either they don’t
solve the aff because it gets rolled back OR the say no args are false — [explain
why the perm isn’t just a test of competition]
 AT Perm Do the Plan & Consult Another Issue
Reject the perm —
a. It’s Intrinsic — consulting over a different issue isn’t in the plan OR the
CP — that’s a voting issue — aff becomes a moving target because they
can spike out of our links — kills neg ground
b. Still links — passing the plan anyways means that consulting over
something else doesn’t matter because [explain why the aff is a bigger
issue]
IF THEY DIDN’T SPECIFY WHAT THE ISSUE IS

c. Reject it for vagueness — not specifying what the issue is means we can’t
make a solvency deficit to consulting over that issue — don’t reward lazy
perms
 AT Perm Do The CP
The CP severs immediacy and certainty because “Should” means the aff has to
be immediate
Summers 94 - Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 11-8-1994, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver s
Food Warehouse of Durant,” online:
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes
futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be
governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission
(from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phraseni, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression
of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial
judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 ¶5 Nisi prius orders should be so construed as to give
effect to every words and every part of the text, with a view to carrying out the evident intent of the judge's direction.17 The order's
language ought not to be considered abstractly. The actual meaning intended by the document's signatory should be derived from
the context in which the phrase to be interpreted is used.18 When applied to the May 18 memorial, these told canons impel my
conclusion that the judge doubtless intended his ruling as an in praesenti resolution of Dollarsaver's quest for judgment n.o.v.
Approval of all counsel plainly appears on the face of the critical May 18 entry which is [885 P.2d 1358] signed by the judge.19 True
minutes20 of a court neither call for nor bear the approval of the parties' counsel nor the judge's signature. To reject out of hand the
view that in this context "should" is impliedly followed by the customary, "and the same hereby is", makes the court once again
revert to medieval notions of ritualistic formalism now so thoroughly condemned in national jurisprudence and long abandoned by
the statutory policy of this State. [Continues – To Footnote] 14 In praesenti means
literally "at the present time."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or
immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See
Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

Counterplan does not steal the aff it competes because of the internal net
benefit

Their interpretation kills Agenda politics--- that outweighs because it’s key to
process education and is the most real world
Should requires certainty – the CP isn’t definite
Nieto 9. Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d
311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

“Should” is “used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2104
(2002). Courts interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority
appears to favor interpreting “should” in an imperative, obligatory sense. A number of courts, confronted with the question of
whether using the word “should” in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the
reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued
that the word “should” in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the
defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that
the word “conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury.” See State v. McCloud, 891 P.2d 324,
335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that “should” is directional but
not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts
interpreting the word “should” in other types of jury instructions have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of
duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court
interpreted the word “should” in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word “must”
and rejected the defendant’s argument that the jury may have been misled by the court’s use of the word in the instruction.
Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the court erred by not using the word “should” in an
instruction on witness credibility which used the word “must” because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318
S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature’s or
commission’s use of the word “should” is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures “should” be allocated for the purpose of parents’ federal tax
exemption to be mandatory).

Reject severance perms for fairness and education because they create a
moving target and disincentivize counterplan research
***THEORY***
 2NC – Functional Competition Bad
1. Infinitely regressive – people can explain the plan text differently every
round to spike out of DAs
 2NC – Textual Competition bad
1. Incentives vagueness – people will write vague plan text to spike out of
neg ground
2. Not real – world because bills don’t have plan texts
3. Kills ground – Allows grammar counterplans
 2NC – Entirely Plan Inclusive CPs Good
Entirely Plan Inclusive Counterplans are good
a) Topic education – international topics demand evaluating trade-offs
between unilateral and multilateral action as exterior mechanisms to the
aff
b) “Should” is immediate
Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of
Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?
CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

"Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past
tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9,
Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more
detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a
construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability.
Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of
damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to
imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60
Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a
party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was
interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State
v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must"
when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false
testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792
(6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or
immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the
future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201
(1882).

c) Key to neg ground – only way negative can generate offense against
small affs in a broad topic, ie racism bad. Without them, the negative
would have to defend problematic impact turns
d) Literature checks – prevents infinitely regressive counterplans that have
no advocates concerning arms sales, meaning affs can put well-
researched offense on predictable net benefits
e) Err neg on theory – the aff picks the focus of the round, speaks first and
last and gets infinite prep
Reject the argument, not the team.
 2NC – Consultation CPs Good
1. The neg’s burden is to prove that multilateral action is best – we will win
that the CP solves better than the aff which proves that consultation is
the best policy option
2. Education – consultation is necessary before taking actions such as
pulling arms out of a country because it has impacts that don’t only
affect the US, makes the CP unique from the plan, other countries care
about American arms sales so we must evaluate consultation as a real
option. We only read CPs that consult actors relevant to the plan, solves
their unpredictability argument
3. Strategy – consultation CPs force the 2AC to increase critical strategic
thinking about the aff in terms of international politics
4. Neg flex – consult CPs are key to test affs, the aff gets infinite prep time,
the CP is a key generic against unpredictable or small affs
5. Literature demands – there is evidence that says the consultant says yes
– proves that consultation is a key part of the literature on the topic and
it is crucial that we debate it
6. Impact turning the net benefit checks abuse
7. Uncertainty – the aff is certain and immediate but the CP is competitive
in that it is uncertain
8. Should is certain and immediate
Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d
311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation , propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the
weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense.
HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In
the
courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not
sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have
squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the
word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and
could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v.
State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not
instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that
the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859,
554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction
on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the
jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an
instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same
meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of
Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to
convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating
that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).
 2NC – Aff Must Be Certain
Aff’s must be certain –
1. Should is certain and immediate
Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d
311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation , propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the
weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense.
HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In
the
courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not
sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have
squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the
word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and
could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v.
State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not
instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that
the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859,
554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction
on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the
jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an
instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same
meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of
Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to
convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating
that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

2. Resolved means certain or fixed

OED 89 Oxford English Dictionary, “Resolved,” Volume 13, p. 725
of the mind, etc.: Freed from doubt or uncertainty, fixed, settled . Obs.

Prefer our definitions –

1. Neg ground – disad links and counterplan competition is predicated off
the plan being certain – allowing uncertainty kills any neg offense
2. Aff ground – guarantees durability and focus on “should” not “would” –
otherwise AFF would always lose on rollback
 2NC – Aff Must Be Immediate
Affs must be immediate –
Should is certain and immediate
Nieto 9 – Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d
311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation , propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [**15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the
weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense.
HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In
the
courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not
sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have
squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the
word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and
could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v.
State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not
instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [**16] have also found that
the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859,
554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction
on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the
jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an
instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same
meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of
Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to
convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating
that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

Resolved is in the present tense, not future

AHD ‘3
[The American Heritage Dictionary at Dictionary.com]

Full Definition of RESOLVED¶ 1¶ : fixity of purpose : resoluteness¶ 2¶ : something that is resolved¶ 3¶ : a legal or official
determination; especially : a formal resolution

Prefer our definitions –

1. Moving target – the 2AC can specify the plan is done anytime – disad
links and counterplan competition is predicated off the plan happening
now – kills any neg offense
2. Limits – rejecting immediate implementation allows the aff to specify
the plan is done anytime – the neg can never predict and prepare for 2AC
clarifications
 2NC – Delay Fiat Good
Delay Fiat is Good
1. Real World – policymakers delay bills through mechanisms likes
filibusters-debating about time of passage helps us develop skills to
contend with the real policy process which is the only impact that spills
over out of debate
2. Best Policy Option – debate should be a question of the best choice, not
just what would actually happen
3. Education – it’s key to let us debate time-sensitive politics DAs-those
debates teach us about the political process which is an internal link to
the Real-World standards
4. Neg Flex – they’re key generics to check 2AC add-ons and small or new
affs-first and last speech, infinite prep, and biased literature means you
err neg on theory
5. Not Arbitrary – the should in the aff implies immediacy-anything else lets
them spike out of offense by saying the aff happens in 10 years to
overcome uniqueness
6. Reject The Argument Not The Team – their violation doesn’t rise to the
level of a voter since there’s no in-round abuse and kicking the CP solves
 2NC – Words Determine What the Plan Means
Words should determine the meaning of the plan:
a. Predictability- definitions create a stasis point in the literature- aff
clarification is arbitrary because there’s no basis before the round to
predict what they’ll say- exacerbates aff side bias and creates a huge
research burden
b. Moving target- cx doesn’t check because 2AC clarification of plan
implementation can’t be negated by ev and allows them to moot the
1NC
c. Topic education- only definitions access any aff impacts because legal
precision outweighs- only a literature stasis point solves
Words and grammar matter in the real world- small legislative mistakes have
huge consequences and cause rollbacks
Heath 6 (Brad Heath, writer for USA Today, “Small mistakes cause big problems” USA Today,
November 20, 2006, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-20-typo-
problems_x.htm, LASA-IZP)

If you're reading this in New York, you're probably too drunk to drive. That's because lawmakers accidentally got too tough with a get-
tough drunken-driving law, inserting an error that set the standard for "aggravated driving while
intoxicated" below the amount of alcohol that can occur naturally. The one-word mistake makes
the new law unenforceable, says Lt. Glenn Miner, a New York State Police spokesman. However, drivers with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08% or higher
can still be prosecuted under other state laws. In the legislative world, such small errors , while uncommon, can

carry expensive consequences. In a few cases around the nation this year, typos and other
blunders have redirected millions of tax dollars or threatened to invalidate new laws . In
Hawaii, for instance, lawmakers approved a cigarette-tax increase to raise money for medical care and
research. Cancer researchers, however, will get only an extra 1.5 cents next year — instead of the more than
$8 million lawmakers intended. That's because legislators failed to specify that they should get 1.5 cents from

each cigarette sold, says Linda Smith, an adviser to Gov. Linda Lingle. When such mistakes happen, they often come during the last-minute rush of legislative
sessions, says Bruce Feustel, a senior fellow at the National Conference of State Legislatures. What's important, he says, is that lawmakers can

fix them before they cause any harm. Courts generally intercede only in the most obvious cases, says University of Notre Dame law professor
John Nagle. If judges tried to change every legislative error, Nagle says, "you get the courts trying to figure out what they think is a mistake that might not be a mistake at all."
New York's mistake came in a bill meant to set tougher penalties and curb plea bargains for drivers well above the legal intoxication standard. Instead of specifying blood alcohol
as a percentage, as most drunken-driving laws do, New York set its threshold as 0.18 grams — "so low you can't even measure it," Miner says. Lawmakers plan to fix the mistake
the next time they convene, says Mark Hansen, a spokesman for the state Senate's Republican majority. He says it's not clear how the mistake happened, or why nobody caught

The latest gaffe was in Arizona, where a misplaced period on the state's ballots
it before legislators voted.

raised questions about a cigarette tax voters approved Nov. 7. The law called for an increase of
80 cents per pack, but the ballot had .80 cents per pack. The state plans to start collecting the tax when the vote is final, "but who
knows what might happen?" says Arizona Revenue Department spokesman Dan Zemke. "Somebody might go to court and say that's

enough to throw the whole thing out."

Precise grammar is key to legal interpretation and real-world policy skills-
anything else allows misinterpretations
Farrell 8 (Robert C. Farrell, Quinnipiac University School of Law, “Why Grammar Matters:
Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Volume 40,
Issue 1, Fall 2008, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1112&context=luclj, LASA-IZP)

use of grammar to decide legal cases is not a novelty . The United States Supreme Court has stated
The

does not review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians; but neither [does it] regard ordinary principles of
that it "naturally

English prose as irrelevant to a construction of those enactments." Further, the Court has noted that "Congress'
use of verb tense is considered significant in construing statutes ." 13 This article will attempt to demonstrate that a
basic familiarity with the terminology of verb forms is not simply the pretentiousness of a pompous pedant
but is rather a very useful tool in the arsenal of legal argumentation .
AFF
Topshelf
 U/Q – NATO Strong Now
The NATO alliance is stronger than ever
Shaffer, Acting President, London Center for Policy Research,2/4/19

(https://londoncenter.org/nato-is-now-stronger-than-ever/)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is now stronger than ever. What was a Cold War
relic is now returned to service with renewed vigor and teeth.
Take it from NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg himself, who said that President Trump’s pressure on European allies to meet
their military funding commitments has had “real results.” “President Donald Trump is having an impact,” Stoltenberg told Fox News
in a Sunday morning interview. In all, Stoltenberg continued, “by
the end of next year, NATO allies will add $100
billion extra toward defense. So we see some real money and some real results . And we see that the
clear message from President Donald Trump is having an impact.” When asked if he was concerned that President Trump’s tough
rhetoric might be “helping Putin splinter NATO,” Stoltenberg said the exact opposite is happening. “What I see is that actually
NATO is united because we are able to adapt to deliver,” he explained. “North America and Europe are doing more
together now than before.” For context, U.S. defense spending amounted to just under $686
billion in 2017, equating to 3.6 percent of GDP. By comparison , Germany spent around $45 billion on its
armed forces last year, or 1.2 percent of GDP. For years, our NATO allies in Europe have shortchanged the system and relied on the
United States to foot most of the bill for our mutual defense, but President Trump shocked the elites of Washington and Brussels by
demanding that those countries actually meet their pledges to spend at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. President Trump
declared during the 2018 NATO summit that the United States will no longer tolerate other member states spending only a little
more than 1 percent of their GDP on defense while the United States “in actual numbers is paying 4.2 percent of a much larger
GDP,” saying this is not fair to U.S. taxpayers and “we’re not going to put up with it.” While some European diplomats initially
reacted to the President’s pronouncement with outrage, it’s now clear that his strategy is bearing fruit. The biggest loser in all this is
Russia—a country that spent just $66.3 billion on defense in 2017, a 17 percent decline from the previous year and the first year-
over-year drop since 1998. That means the $100 billion in new defense spending promised by our NATO allies in Europe is nearly
double that of Russia’s entire 2017 budget. President Trump is an effective negotiator—proof’s in the pudding so to speak. Despite
political criticism (most of it free of facts) both at home and abroad, his
insistence that our allies meet their
spending commitments has made NATO stronger than it’s been for years . His policy is strength. His
Reaganesque view of security is necessary. His goals of protecting the interests of the United States and our allies are being realized.
Lt. Col. Tony Shaffer is a retired senior intelligence operations officer and Acting President of the London Center for Policy Research.

NATO is strong now and is an irreplaceable building block for the international
order.
Leyen, German defense minister, 1/18/19

(Ursula von der Leyen, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/opinion/nato-european-union-

america.html)

BERLIN — In April, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will celebrate its 70th birthday. Founded in the earliest
years of the Cold War, it is just as relevant today, when many feel that the international order is
shaken again. In fact, if NATO did not exist, those in favor of a free world would have to invent it. While NATO’s key
purpose remains to guarantee the security of its members, it has never been a purely military
alliance. It is a political alliance as well, based on the common aspirations of its members who, as the NATO
Treaty says, “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of its peoples, founded on the
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law .” These principles are under
assault today. Russian aggression in Eastern Europe , Chinese assertiveness in the South China
Sea, the terrorism of the Islamic State spreading from the Middle East to the capitals of Europe, authoritarian regimes
developing nuclear weapons — as different as these challenges are, they have one thread in common: They emanate
from actors who oppose the international order. They try to undermine or even change the rules that have governed the age of
democracy and prosperity since World War II. The democracies of NATO need to stand together to overcome these challenges.
Collectively, we are stronger than even the mightiest of us would be on her own. Accordingly, since 2014, when Russia
invaded Ukraine, NATO has adapted to the situation at hand — as it has done many times in its
history. Among 29 sovereign states with different political cultures and points of view, such adaptations will always be
complicated, and sometimes even messy. But NATO’s ability to change its priorities and its strategies ensures that the alliance will
stand the test of time. The results are tangible. For one thing, all European members of NATO have increased their military spending.
The German defense budget, for example, today has increased by 36 percent compared to when I took office in late 2013. We still
have more to do to fairly share the burden within the alliance, and we are prepared to do more. But we also keep in mind that
burden-sharing is not only about cash, but also about capabilities and contributions. Germany is thus, as the second-largest troop
contributor to NATO, proud to lead NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force NATO
has also increased its presence
in Eastern Europe, plays an active role in training Iraqi security forces and contributing
surveillance to the fight against the Islamic State, continues to support the Afghan government, and develops its
partnerships with like-minded nations such as Australia and Japan, in addition to much more. In fulfilling its three core tasks —
collective defense, crisis management and partnerships — NATO is an irreplaceable building block for an
international order that favors freedom and peace. Most of all, NATO is not a trans-Atlantic organization in name
only. It represents a special, even emotional bond between the American and the European
continents. For a German, images of the fall of the Berlin Wall are inextricably linked with the alliance, and my country is
particularly grateful for the security and the opportunities NATO has been providing for decades. So yes, in addition to the practical
benefits of bases, structures and troops, NATO has a value in and of itself. Maybe the most basic benefit of NATO is that it provides
reliability in an unreliable world. Our unshakable commitment to Article 5, the NATO treaty’s collective defense provision, ensures
that our common security is truly indivisible. We will help our weakest ally just as we have helped our strongest by invoking Article 5
— for the first and only time in NATO’s history — after Sept. 11, 2001. So it is a good thing that the European Union is now
undertaking significant steps to enhance its military prowess. If members of the European Union succeed in harmonizing their
defense planning and military procurement, and in intertwining their armed forces, then all of this will add to NATO’s strength. And
a stronger NATO will serve the security interests of all members. Most of all, it will send a clear signal to those opposing the rules-
based international order: We trans-Atlantic allies are ready and willing to defend our soil, our people and our freedom. Ursula von
der Leyen is the federal minister of defense of Germany.

Relations between the US and NATO are strong now

DOD, Department of defense, 1/28/19

(https://www.defense.gov/explore/story/Article/1741621/us-nato-relationship-spans-70-
years/)

The United States is one of the founding members of NATO, a military alliance that was formed in 1949
and is still going strong today, some 70 years later. Acting Defense Secretary Patrick M. Shanahan welcomed NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to the Pentagon today to discuss the U.S.-NATO relationship.Before their meeting, Shanahan
praised Stoltenberg for his work to arrive at an equitable sharing of the security burden. " Since
President Trump took
office, America’s NATO allies have stepped up defense spending by a total of $41 billion, " he said.
"Allied defense spending increased by more than 9 percent from 2016 to 2018 – the largest
increase is 25 years. By 2020, our NATO allies are projected to increase defense spending by approximately $100 billion."NATO
stands for North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was formed in 1949 to provide collective security against the threat posed by the
Soviet Union. The U.S. viewed an economically strong, rearmed and integrated Europe as vital to the prevention of communist
expansion across the continent.The original members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Though the Soviet Union has long since fallen, the world
has continued to be a dangerous place throughout the nearly seven decades since NATO was formed. Now 29 nations are members
of the alliance. To make it easier for so many countries to communicate, NATO has two official languages: English and French. This
means that it also has two acronyms — in French, NATO is OTAN, which stands for Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord.
NATO promotes democratic values and encourages consultation and cooperation on defense and security issues to build trust and,
in the long run, prevent conflict.One of the founding principles of NATO is Article 5 of its charter, which states that an armed attack
on one member nation would be considered as an attack on all. The alliance invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history following
the 9/11 attacks. In addition to contributing to the war effort in Afghanistan, NATO member nations responded by
helping the U.S. military with airspace defense and security over the United States and with maritime patrols in the
Mediterranean Sea to guard against movement of weapons and terrorists.
 U/Q – NATO Weak Alt Causes
Turkey is an alt cause to NATO stability
Lake, Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering national security and foreign policy, 18 (Eli,
07.11.18, “NATO’s Real Crisis Is Turkey, Not Trump,” Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-07-11/nato-s-real-crisis-is-turkey-not-
trump”) np

The weak link in the alliance, in fact, is Turkey. Here is a country slipping into the sphere of
influence of Russia — the very country that NATO was created to deter. In December Turkey finalized a deal to
purchase the S-400 air defense system from Moscow, and in April the Turks broke ground on a
Russian-made nuclear power plant. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who last month won an unfree and unfair
election, has recently held talks with Putin to discuss the future of Syria. Russia’s attempt to “flip” Turkey — the term
used by U.S. NATO Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchison — is extraordinary considering the two countries came close to war in 2015
when a Turkish jet shot down a Russian one that had flown into Turkish territory. Ideally, this week’s NATO summit would be an
opportunity for the U.S. president to cajole European allies into presenting a unified opposition to Erdogan’s conduct. There is no
mechanism for kicking a member out of the alliance, but Turkey should at least begin to feel some pain and pressure for its drift
toward Russia. Trump has not availed himself of that opportunity. Just look at his confrontational remarks on Wednesday about
Germany or his tweet on Tuesday complaining that NATO allies are “delinquent” in their defense spending. Past presidents,
including Trump’s immediate predecessor, have lodged similar complaints about Europe not paying its fair share. But context
matters. Trump doesn’t prod allies behind the scenes; he issues tweets and diktats aimed at maximizing humiliation. Any chance to
shift the focus to Turkey is lost. “The
president’s seeming inability to draw a distinction between democrats
and authoritarians has meant that Erdogan is getting away with murder not only domestically
but also within NATO by playing footsie with Russia and Putin,” says Gary Schmitt, a scholar and
strategist at the American Enterprise Institute . The emphasis of this NATO summit, he says, should be as much on
Turkey’s misbehavior as on members’ defense spending. The irony is that, for all of his brashness, Trump can claim some success
with his campaign to get the allies to pay more for defense. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at the summit’s opening
that member states are no longer cutting military spending. Eight allies are expected this year to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense,
the longstanding benchmark for the alliance. Meanwhile, NATO has committed to have 30 air squadrons, 30 combat vessels and 30
mechanized battalions ready to deploy within 30 days to defend the Baltic States by 2020. Any other American president, presented
with this evidence of Europe’s renewed commitment to the 70-year-old trans-Atlantic alliance, would be happy to take yes for an
answer. Trump is not, to state the obvious, like any other American president. As he treats
the NATO summit as a
stage for a play about Europeans ripping off America, Turkey is drifting ever closer to Russia.

NATOs weak – don’t have checks on members who are rejecting democracy
Dempsey, nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic
Europe, 18 (Judy, 04.03.18, “NATO’s Bad Apples,”
nphttps://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/75962) np
When a leading NATO member makes public the military positions of another ally deep inside a war zone, possibly endangering
those forces, NATO remains silent. When
NATO members undermine democratic values and the basic
tenets of the rule of law, including an independent media and judiciary, they are not taken to
task. Over the past few years—and in particular, over the past nine months—several members of the U.S.-led
military alliance have run roughshod over NATO solidarity and the basic principles upon which
the alliance was founded in April 1949. Turkey, for example, actually revealed the positions of French
troopsin northeast Syria. Since 2016, according to the AFP, these forces have been based in areas controlled by the
YPG/PKK. The Kurdish YPG dominates the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently sharply criticized
his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, for meeting SDF leaders in Paris and for offering to mediate between the SDF and
Turkey. For Erdoğan, that was tantamount to negotiating with the Syrian branch of the PKK, which Ankara insists is a terrorist
organization. Yet Erdoğan went further. A Turkish news agency revealed the positions of the French forces. What sort of solidarity
and discretion does that amount to, when one ally could endanger another? Closer to home, NATO
has to contend with
Poland and Hungaryundermining the independence of the judiciary and an independent media,
not to mention that way in which nongovernmental organizations in Hungary have been vilified
and refugees refused shelter. Then there is the corruption in the alliance’s newest member,
Montenegro, and the persistent attacks on the judiciary and anticorruption watchdogs in
Romania. Altogether, these examples do much to undermine NATO as an alliance, whose members
pledge “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and
well-being in the North Atlantic area.” Back in the last 1940s, the rule of law and democracy didn’t matter that much for NATO. The
alliance’s priorities focused on the security, safety, and protection of its members (in short, the West). When Greece and Turkey
joined NATO in 1952, their membership was about bolstering the defenses of this part of Europe against the Soviet threat.
Geostrategic interests and strengthening the anti-Communist bulwark took precedence over the rule of law and strong, democratic,
accountable institutions. In recent years, when it’s come to countries wanting to join NATO, there has been more emphasis on
values and democracy. But in its own home, NATO’s
record for upholding basic principles is far from stellar.
And its reluctance to criticize its allies exposes some of its intrinsic weaknesses. The first is that NATO
countries are loathed to criticize each other, either publicly or even behind closed doors in the North Atlantic Council (NAC)—the
forum in which alliance ambassadors meet. The NAC got its fingers badly burned during the U.S-led war against Iraq in 2002. Apart
from NATO countries being so bitterly divided over the invasion, NAC sessions often ended up in shouting matches between the
American and French ambassadors. NATO’s fragility was exposed for all to see. Yet, wasn’t it necessary for ambassadors to speak
out? Yes, they are constrained by their own governments. But if NATO could not—and did not—speak out against torture, or
renditions, or the illegality of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, or what is now happening to Turkey’s democratic institutions, then what does
that say about the alliance’s principles? The second weakness is that NATO doesn’t have formal
mechanisms to suspend an ally. And even if it wanted to discipline a member, that would require consensus. Russia, for
one, would be delighted if NATO washed its dirty linen in public. Ever since its establishment, the Kremlin’s goal has been to divide
and weaken NATO with the eventual aim of getting rid of it. But the fact that countries still want to join NATO show their need for
security and reassurance. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its proxy invasion of eastern Ukraine confirmed why countries want to
sign up to the alliance. NATO, however, does
have an informal mechanism at its disposal. It is intelligence
sharing—or the lack of it. One of the reasons why the big member states of NATO do not share
intelligence across the board is because of the lack of trust, the feeling that the information will
be passed on to non-NATO members ( meaning Russia and China and other countries). Yet none of the above
legitimates a silence over the rule of law, over the erosion of basic democratic principles, and
over how some allies are endangering others. NATO, it’s time to move on . What about scrapping some of
the many talking-shop committees and instead creating a special ombudsperson responsible for NATO’s core principles?
 Consultation Fails
NATO consultations preclude immediacy and certainty — kills effective policy
Taft, Republican leader in the U.S. Senate, ‘86 (Robert A., "Shades of Containment",
Commentary, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/shades-of-
containment/))SEAMUS

From Robert A. Taft---

Taft: The costs of the forces in and for Europe are important and worth discussing, but more
important is the way membership in NATO deprives the United States of the flexibility and
freedom a superpower requires. Why does no one weary of the incessant demands for
consultations, which preclude the rapidity and the discretion —frankly, the secrecy and
sometimes the brutality—that effective international action requires? The consultations over
arms-control negotiations are a case in point. Designing positions that serve U.S. purposes is
hopelessly complicated by the need to protect European interests.
 NATO Fails
NATO is on a path of inefficient, incremental growth – broadening its agenda
will only destroy sustainability
Deni, PhD, 03-18-19 (John R., Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM)
Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Journal of Transatlantic
Studies, p. 158)//EF

Over the last 30 years, NATO’s evolving mission growth has exhibited two of the most
commonly cited typologies of organizational change—adaptive learning and incremental
growth.35 The former is rational, empirically driven, and usually efficient—organizations change
by carefully studying and modifying ends, ways, and means. The latter may be rational but it is
typically not efficient—new tasks are simply added on to old ones, without any critical appraisal
of purpose or goals. With specific regard to the post-Cold War period, or roughly 1990 until 2014, both of these typologies were evident.
In some cases during the 1990–2014 time period, the alliance engaged in a well-informed,
almost methodical shift away from collective defense and toward crisis management and
cooperative security. For example, NATO developed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to build
norms, establish guidelines, and manage the admission of new member states from Eastern
Europe.36 In a similar way, the alliance developed a robust force generation system to manage
the challenge of providing continuous force rotations for operations in Afghanistan during an era
of shrinking resources.37 In other instances during the 1990–2014 time period, it seems clear
that NATO’s post-Cold War shift toward crisis management and cooperative security was
characterized by incremental growth, with member states pushing tasks onto the alliance’s plate
without a knowledge-mediated approach. For example, the addition of energy security to the
alliance’s agenda made little sense at a time when there was (and still is) significant
divergence among the member states over what role NATO should play in this issue area, or
when there was little understanding of what capabilities or capacity NATO could actually bring
to the table.38 In contrast to the post-Cold War 1990–2014 time period, since Russia’s invasion
of Crimea in 2014 NATO appears to have whole-heartedly resorted to incremental growth . It
has done so by recommitting itself to collective defense while also maintaining or even
augmenting its work in crisis management and cooperative security. Notably, there has been no significant
strategic-level reassessment of NATO’s mission set and no new Strategic Concept published since the last was released in 2010. The alliance’s embrace
of an all-of-the-above approach is largely a function of the unique principal–agent dynamic at work within NATO and among its member states, and the
complex array of member state interests. As noted briefly earlier in this article, in contrast to an international
organization like the United Nations, NATO’s potential for action independent of the interests
of its largest member states is extraordinarily limited. Certainly, there are instances when NATO’s international
secretariat or its Secretary General show signs of autonomy. However, the alliance organization’s ability to exploit its

limited autonomy and truly counteract the desires of its member states is limited by several
factors. First, the Secretary General’s position is not a permanent one but rather a rotating one
—most NATO Secretary Generals serve a single 4-year term—and the nominees are subject to
the unanimous approval of all member states. This prevents the development of an entrenched
leader capable of making decisions against the wishes of most member states. In contrast, UN Secretary
Generals are nominated by a minimum of 9 members of the UN Security Council, including no vetoes by the five permanent members, and then subject
to a majority vote of the General Assembly. UN Secretary Generals normally hold two consecutive 5-year terms. Second, while it is true that the NATO
International Staff consists of many permanent civil servants, it also is comprised of staf members temporarily assigned there by individual allied
governments. This limits the autonomy that the International Staff might otherwise develop since temporarily assigned employees usually fail to
develop strong biases toward the institution they work for, or biases that would displace their loyalties to their permanent employer back home.39
Moreover, the International Military Staf (IMS) is comprised almost entirely of military officials on temporary assignments. The same holds true with
regard to the Allied Command Operations based in Mons, Belgium and the Allied Command Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia. At the same
time, the array of sometimes disparate interests among the various alliance member states drives much of NATO’s all-of-the-above approach. NATO

exists for several reasons, such as the fact that the alliance is a community of (mostly) liberal
democracies that share similar values. What is arguably more critical though is the fact that the
alliance continues to exist because it provides more benefits than costs to its members—in
short, it meets their security needs, at least in part, in an efficient and effective way relative to
other options.40 Among other ways of meeting these needs, the alliance satisfies the demands of its member states by engaging in issue areas
of interest to those member states. For instance, Spain wants security in the Mediterranean Sea and stability in northwest Africa. Italy desires the same
as well as capacity-building in Africa. Meanwhile, Germany wants a framework for the further development of its political and economic power that
reassures its neighbors as well as itself. France wants increased intelligence sharing to mitigate the challenge of returning foreign fighters. Poland wants
reassurance against domination from the East (Russia) and possibly from the West (Germany). Farther east, the Baltic States want protection against an
existential enemy. The United States wants political legitimacy and military burden sharing for operations near and far. The
point is, NATO’s
member states often have different security interests , threat perceptions, and strategic
objectives, and yet they all look to NATO as a primary means of fulfilling their interests and
meeting their objectives. Accordingly, the alliance responds by pursuing a broadening agenda.
Arguably, this tendency on the part of the alliance to pursue a broadening agenda to satisfy
the sometimes disparate interests of its member states has only gotten worse with
enlargement. Since 1997, the alliance has steadily grown, and it seems that trend will continue albeit at a slower rate. In July 2018, the alliance
decided to begin accession talks with Macedonia, and it is possible Kosovo may follow. Less likely but still possible is membership for Sweden or
Finland, as addressed by Anna Wieslander elsewhere in this special issue. As membership grows, definitions of ‘why NATO
matters’ may grow as well, and with it NATO’s agenda. 39 See, for example, Weiss [48], and Jordan [49]. 40 For an
examination of how this applies to the USA, see Brands and Feaver [50]. 170 Journal of Transatlantic Studies (2019) 17:157–173 The primary

challenge confronting the alliance today is that it lacks the capability and the capacity to fulfill all
of the various missions and activities that member states wish to saddle it with. European
defense budgets, on average, steadily declined through most of the post-Cold War period, and
trends have only reversed since 2014. Despite the turnaround, that acquisition accounts are
struggling to keep pace with demand, many military units remain whole on paper only, and
readiness continues to be underfunded. Additionally, even though spending increases have been broad based, they have also
been uneven. The most signifcant increases have come from those countries with relatively small military forces, while the ‘big four’ European NATO
members—France, Germany, Italy, and the UK, which together account for roughly two-thirds of European NATO military spending—have been
increasing at a slower pace. Until
these countries pick up their defense spending pace, and until all of the
European allies are able to acquire the equipment, manpower, and training necessary to fulfill
their agreed upon defense plans, the alliance will continue to struggle in its effort to achieve
‘all of the above.’

NATO fails to solve international crisis while making relations with Russia worse
Cohen, professor emeritus of Russian studies and politics at New York University and Princeton
University, 17 (Stephen F., 10.18.17, “Have 20 Years of NATO Expansion Made Anyone Safer?””
https://www.thenation.com/article/have-20-years-of-nato-expansion-made-anyone-safer/ ) np

The expansion of the US-led military alliance , which began in Germany with 13 member states and now stretches to
Russia’s borders with 29, is the largest and fastest growth of a “sphere of influence ” (American) in modern
peacetime history. Throughout the process, Russia has been repeatedly denounced for seeking any sphere
of security, even on its own borders. NATO expansion included two broken promises to Russia
that the Kremlin has never forgotten. In 1990, the Bush administration (and the West Germany government) assured
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that, in return for Russia’s agreeing to a united Germany in NATO, the alliance would “not
expand one inch to the east.” (Though denied by a number of participants and commentators, the assurance has been
confirmed by other participants as well as by archive researchers.) The other broken promise is unfolding today as
NATO builds up permanent land, sea, and air forces near Russian territory, along with missile-
defense installations. NATO “enlargement,” as it is sometimes benignly termed by its promoters,
continues. Montenegro became a member in 2017 and the “door remains open,” officials say repeatedly, to the former Soviet
republics of Georgia and Ukraine. 2. NATO is more than the world’s most powerful military alliance. With lavishly funded offices,
representatives, think tanks, and other advocates not only in Brussels but in many Western capitals, it is also a powerful political-
ideological-lobbying institution—perhaps the world’s most powerful corporation, also taking into account its multitude of
bureaucratic employees in Brussels and elsewhere. In the United States alone, scarcely a week passes without media “news” and
commentary produced by NATO-affiliated authors or based on NATO sources. (See, among other examples, the Atlantic Council and
Newsweek.) 3. Asking whether “enlarged” NATO has resulted in more insecurity than security requires considering the
consequences of several wars it led or in which several of its member states participated since 1997: § The Serbian war in 1999
resulted in the NATO occupation and annexation of Kosovo, a precedent cited by subsequent secessionists and occupiers. § The
2003 Iraq War was a catastrophe for all involved and a powerful factor behind expanding organized terrorism, including the Islamic
State, and not only in the Middle East. The same was true of the war against Libya in 2011, no lessons having been learned. § NATO
promises that Georgia might one day become a member state was an underlying cause of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, in
effect a US-Russian proxy war. The result was the near ruination of Georgia. NATO remains active in Georgia today. § Similar NATO
overtures to Ukraine also underlay the crisis in that country in 2014, which resulted in Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the still
ongoing Ukrainian civil war in Donbass, and in effect another US-Russian proxy war. Meanwhile, US-backed Kiev remains in profound
economic and political crisis, and Ukraine fraught with the possibility of a direct American-Russian military conflict. § Meanwhile, of
course, there is Afghanistan, initially a NATO war effort but now the longest (and perhaps most un-winnable) war in American
history. Any rational calculation of the outcomes of these wars, Cohen points out, reveals far more military and political insecurity
than security, which is mainly pseudo-security or simmering crises. 4. NATO
expansion has also bred political-
ideological insecurities. NATO’s incessant, ubiquitous media saturation and lobbying in Western capitals,
particularly in the United States, has been a major driving force behind the new Cold War and its rampant
Russophobia. One perilous result has been the near-end of American diplomacy toward Russia
and the almost total militarization of US-Russian relations. This alone is a profound source of
insecurity—indeed of possible war with Russia. 5. Meanwhile, the vast resources devoted to NATO
expansion have scarcely contributed anything to resolving real international crises, among them
economic policies in Europe that have helped inspire secessionist movements; international terrorism in the
Middle East and the refugee crisis; the danger of nuclear proliferation, which NATO has abetted by
spurring a new nuclear arms race with Russia ; and others. Nor does NATO’s vast expansion resolve
its own internal crises, as, for example, the growing alliance between NATO member Turkey and
Russia; and undemocratic developments in other member states such as Hungary and Poland.
And this leaves aside the far-reaching implications of an emerging anti-NATO alliance centering
around Russia, China, and Iran—itself a result of NATO’s 20-year expansion. 6. Cohen ends by
considering the counter-arguments made by NATO expansion promoters over the years: § They say the small Baltic and other
Eastern European countries previously victimized by Soviet Russia still felt threatened by post-Soviet Russia and therefore had to be
brought into the alliance. This makes no empirical sense. In the 1990s, Russia was in shambles and weak, a threat only to itself. And
if any perceived or future threat existed, there were alternatives: acting on Gorbachev’s proposed “Common European Home”—that
is, a security agreement including all of Europe and Russia; bilateral security guarantees to those once-victimized nations, along with
diplomacy on their part to resolve any lingering conflicts with Russia, including the endangered status of their own ethnic Russian
citizens. This argument makes no historical sense either: The tiny Baltic states near Russia were among the last to be granted NATO
membership. § It is also said that every qualified nation has a “right” to NATO membership if it wishes to join. This too is illogical.
NATO is not a non-selective fraternity or the AARP. It is a security organization whose sole criterion for membership should be
whether or not membership enhances the security of its members. From the outset, it was clear, as many Western critics pointed
out, it would not. § Later, it is belatedly argued, Russia did become a threat under its leader Vladimir Putin. But as the British
academic specialist Richard Sakwa has compellingly argued, any threat Russia now poses was created by NATO itself, by Moscow’s
reactions to NATO expansion. Cohen puts this somewhat differently: Much of what is today denounced as “Putin’s aggression”
abroad has been his responses to US and NATO policies. There is also another negative consequence. Moscow’s perception that it is
being increasingly encircled by an “aggressive” US-led NATO has had lamentable, and predictable, influence on Russia’s domestic
politics. For the sake of international security, NATO expansion must end now. But is there a way back
from the 20-year folly, Cohen asks. Member states taken in since the late 1990s cannot, of course, be expelled. But NATO expansion
could be demilitarized, its forces withdrawn back to Germany, from which they crept to Russia. This may have been possible in the
late 1990s or early 2000s, as promised in 1997. Now it is mostly a utopian idea, but one without which the world is in ever graver
danger—a world with less and less real security.

NATO is weak and not credible – it won’t be able to deter Russia – BUT weak
members will draw the US into war
Barndollar, reporter @ Real Clear Politics, 18 (Gil, 07.30.18, “Enlargement Is Making NATO
Weaker and More Prone to Risk,” Real Clear Politics,
https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2018/07/30/enlargement_is_making_nato_weaker_a
nd_more_prone_to_risk_112849.html) np

Alliances may not be purely transactional arrangements, but they also cannot be devoid of strategic logic. Macedonia clearly
cannot offer more than a symbolic contribution to NATO’s collective defense. In return, this small,
landlocked country can potentially call on the military might of the United States and most of
Europe through NATO’s Article 5. Adding Macedonia to NATO, or for that matter adding any militarily and
geographically irrelevant nations, contravenes two of the most basic lessons of defensive alliances. First, weak allies often
bring potential liabilities and conflicts with them. Though the historical debate rages on, for a century many
historians have made the case that the cataclysm of World War I began because Germany was dragged
into war by her weak ally Austria-Hungary . More recently, in 2011 we saw the United States pulled
into the strategic idiocy of the Libyan intervention by our weak European allies, Britain and France.
The Balkans have been a proverbial powder keg for centuries. One of the greatest statesmen in history, Otto
von Bismarck, correctly predicted that the next major European war would start over “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.”
More recently, British General Sir Michael Jackson refused a U.S. order to confront Russian troops in Kosovo in 1999, telling General
Wesley Clark, “I’m not going to start the Third World War for you.” While Macedonia does not have any issues as dangerous as the
real and frozen conflicts of Ukraine and Georgia, it remains a nation with plenty of its own troubles. Last month, Macedonia’s
Prime Minister accused Greek businessmen allied with Russia of meddling in his country to
undermine the referendum. Barely a year ago, Macedonia seemed to be on the verge of war
with its large Albanian minority. It has also been described as “the fake news factory to the world.” There is reason
to fear that Macedonia could drag NATO into another nasty little Balkan war. Second, weak and
distant allies undermine deterrence. Deterrence , not token European contributions to U.S. interventions, is
NATO’s chief value now. Yet expanding the alliance with more peripheral members calls NATO’s
credibility into question. Does anyone seriously believe that we would send American soldiers to
die for Macedonia, particularly if the conflict had even a shred of ambiguity via “little green men” or other aggression short of
full-blown conventional war? This weakening of deterrence is already clear to even a casual observer. On July 17, Fox News’ Tucker
Carlson asked President Trump bluntly: “Why should my son go to Montenegro to defend it from attack?” The president’s reply?
“I’ve asked the same question.” Of course, any
lack of clarity about America’s commitment to NATO’s
collective defense under Article 5 makes Russian provocations or even attacks more likely. When
this uncertainty is combined with the continued failure of our wealthy European allies to
meaningfully contribute to collective defense as required by NATO’s Article 3, we have an
alliance that is becoming hard to take seriously. While the commitments exist, America can and must defend its
allies, for reasons of both honor and self-interest. But adding another weak partner to an alliance that is already full of them is the
last thing in America’s -- and NATO’s -- best interest.
 NATO Says No – Generic
NATO won’t approve of Trump’s policies – antagonistic relations kill any chance
at partnership
Burns and Lute, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics at Harvard,
4/5/19

(Nicholas, Douglas and https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/natos-biggest-problem-is-

president-trump/2019/04/02/6991bc9c-5570-11e9-9136-f8e636f1f6df_story.html?
utm_term=.f29ac986c40d)

As NATO marks its 70th anniversary this week, this unique, often unwieldy, 29-member alliance is confronting one of
the most difficult sets of challenges in its history. NATO is still the world’s strongest military
alliance. But its single greatest danger is the absence of strong, principled American presidential
leadership for the first time in its history. Starting with NATO’s founding father, President Harry S. Truman, each of
our presidents has considered NATO a vital American interest. President Trump has taken a dramatically different
path. As former U.S. ambassadors to NATO, we interviewed alliance leaders past and present for a new Harvard
Belfer Center report: “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis.” Nearly all viewed Trump as NATO’s most urgent
and difficult problem. Never before has NATO had a U.S. leader who didn’t appear to believe
deeply in NATO itself. During his first two years in office, Trump has questioned NATO ’s core
commitment embedded in Article 5 of the alliance’s founding treaty — that an attack on one of the allies will be
considered an attack on all. He has been weak and reactive in defending NATO against its most
aggressive adversary, Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump has also been a consistent critic of
European democratic leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel , while publicly supporting anti-
democratic populists such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. Trump is the first president to call the
European Union a “foe,” rather than a partner , of the United States. Fortunately, the vast majority of Republican
and Democratic leaders in Congress disagree with Trump on NATO’s value to the United States. They should vote to approve the bills
working their way through committees that would reaffirm the United States’ commitment to Article 5 and to require congressional
approval should Trump try to diminish our commitment to NATO — or to pull the United States out altogether. Congress would be
acting in unison with the public’s strong support for NATO, according to a 2018 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Critics
who agree with Trump present three main arguments for why he is right to question NATO. First, they say NATO’s core job was
finished with the end of the Cold War. That ignores, however, Russia’s campaign to destabilize NATO members Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Poland. It also ignores Putin’s attacks on the U.S. and European elections in 2016-2018, designed to weaken our
democracies from within. Containing Russian power until Putin’s Soviet-trained generation passes from the scene remains a core
NATO aim. And, as our report shows, there are new challenges beyond Russia confronting the alliance. Second, Trump
has
claimed the allies are “taking advantage of us.” Low European defense spending is indeed a
problem for NATO’s future. Germany, in particular, must do much more. But NATO allies have produced real growth in
defense spending for four consecutive years, starting with Putin’s annexation of Crimea — a collective increase of $87 billion. On this
issue, Trump would be smart to continue to push but while doing so strive to transform himself from chief critic into the unifying
leader NATO desperately needs. A third criticism is that NATO no longer contributes significantly to U.S. security in the world.
Consider the facts: Canada and the European allies came to our defense on 9/11 and invoked the Article 5 mutual-defense clause of
the treaty. They viewed Osama bin Laden’s attack on the United States as an attack on them as well. NATO allies went into
Afghanistan with us where they and partner nations have suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths. Most of those countries remain
on the ground with our soldiers to this day. NATO allies have also fought with us in the successful campaign to defeat the Islamic
State caliphate in Syria and Iraq. They conduct counterterror operations with us in Africa. The European allies have assumed full
responsibility for peacekeeping in Bosnia and the bulk of the burden in Kosovo. U.S. air and naval bases in allied countries also bring
the United States a continent closer to contain Russia in Eastern Europe and confront terrorist threats in the Middle East and South
Asia. This is a decisive advantage for the United States. The reality is that NATO is a net plus for the United States in political,
economic and military terms. In the decade ahead, the United States will fight two battles with authoritarian powers China and
Russia. The first is a battle of ideas that will center on Moscow’s and Beijing’s growing confidence in the superiority of their own
systems. We will need the full weight of our democratic allies in NATO to repudiate the authoritarian model in this intensifying
global debate just as Presidents John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan did in the past. NATO allies will also be critical in a battle of
technology, as the West competes with a more assertive China in artificial intelligence, quantum computing and biotechnology. The
United States has a better chance to maintain its qualitative military edge over China if we enlist the scientific and productive
capacity of all our allies in Europe as well as in the Indo-Pacific. NATO remains the great power differential between the United
States and Russia and China, which have no real allies of their own. Trump should reflect on a last reality that all his predecessors
understood. The United States would be far stronger inside NATO as it faces these challenges than it would be alone. NATO is not
just yesterday’s story but is indispensable if Americans want to reach for the elusive goal we have been chasing since World War II: a
secure United States alongside a united, democratic and peaceful Europe as its closest global partner.
 NATO Says No – Turkey
Turkey says no they are anti-US policy
Walker, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs, 07
(https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Truly-democratic-and-anti-American)

What country in the world is most anti-American ? According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project's 47-nation
survey released Wednesday it would not be one of the usual suspects - the Palestinian Authority, Pakistan, or Venezuela - but rather
America's 50-year-NATO ally, Turkey. This finding should trouble the Bush administration deeply; Turkey is exactly the
type of Muslim-majority democracy that officials have been touting as a model for the Middle East and the Islamic world. Consider
the facts: Turkey ranked dead last in all the most important categori1es on the survey, something which indicates the depth of anti-
American sentiment. Most tellingly, Turks have the lowest favorability for both America and its citizens (9%
and 13%). Moreover, Turkey tied with the Palestinian Authority for the lowest percentage of citizens who think the US is fair in its
Middle East policies, a paltry 2%. Another disturbing sign for US policymakers is the fact that Turkey,
an active partner in
Afghanistan and a crucial transportation hub for Iraq, has the second-lowest level of support for
the US-led war on terror ( 9%) of all nations surveyed. It does not stop at US foreign policy. Turkey had the highest
percentage of respondents who disliked American ideas about democracy (81%) and even the way that Americans do business
(83%). Turks have never been the most pro-American Middle Eastern country, yet the drop in
favorability from when Bush first took office (52% in 2000) and even at the one-year anniversary of the war in Iraq
(30% in 2004) to today is truly unprecedented. It is shocking. THE TRENDS are clear. We are not just dealing with the usual
anti-Bush or anti-US policy sentiment in Turkey. We have now slid into an anti-Americanism that cannot
simply be erased with a new president in January, 2009, or a special envoy to the Muslim world. The causes of this
pervasive anti-Americanism are fairly straightforward and obvious to even the casual observer. US missteps in Iraq have heightened
Turkey's own security on its southeastern border. In particular, the reemergence of PKK terrorism in Turkey, where a soldier dies
daily, has produced a non-stop drumbeat of nationalist and anti-American rhetoric throughout the country in the runup to the July
22 parliamentary elections. The perception that America controls Northern Iraq and restricts the Turkish army from crossing the
border, all while doing nothing to stop the PKK terrorists who operate with impunity in Iraq, is widespread. Bush's words, "You're
either with us, or against us" now rings hollow to Turks. US
policy is increasingly seen as being hypocritical and
Americans themselves are now viewed as untrustworthy. Turkey has officially slid from being
anti-US policy to anti-American. This is particularly worrying given the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy
promotion and reform throughout the greater Middle East. The underlying assumption is that a more democratic and open society is
in the US national interest because such a nation would surely be more pro-American. Within this context, Turkey has been a
particularly important country upon which to focus. It is the only Muslim-majority nation of
NATO and the only fully functioning Middle-Eastern, Muslim democracy. The results from the Pew survey disprove the
preconceived notions of administration experts and should force policymakers to reconsider their underlying assumptions .
TURKEY MATTERS to America. Its geo-strategic position is vital for US interests throughout the
region, but, more importantly, it represents what a truly democratic Middle East might look like. Hating US policy or a particular
president is undesirable, but repairable. Hating America and Americans is a disturbing trend that requires serious attention and
prolonged engagement.
 AT: Trump Makes NATO Weak
Trump is bolstering NATO – his security team, anti-Russia sanctions, and
spending push all prove
Bugajski, Senior Fellow at Center for European Policy Analysis, 02-07-19 (“Trump's criticisms have
reinvigorated NATO,” https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/428920-trumps-criticisms-have-reinvigorated-
nato)//EF

The signing of accession protocols by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ministers and
the government of North Macedonia on Wednesday demonstrates that, regardless of his
intentions, President Donald Trump is boosting NATO and reinforcing Western security . During
and after the election campaign, Trump declared NATO as redundant and threatened a full-scale U.S. military withdrawal from the alliance. His
pronouncements may have misled both Europeans and Russians into believing that Washington would terminate U.S. commitments to Europe’s
defense. Inreality, Trump’s criticisms have helped to reinvigorate NATO’s core missions and
capabilities. Trump’s main indignation has been directed at European governments that
consistently allocate under 2 percent of their GDP for national defense despite NATO’s common
requirements. Trump threatened to cut American support if these targets were not met, claiming that American taxpayers should not bear the
main burden for defending a wealthy Europe. Trump’s words and Russia’s threats have had an impact, with

several capitals pledging to boost their spending and improve their fighting capabilities. NATO
Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently asserted that Trump’s demands have produced
results: By the end of 2020, the allies will have added $100 billion to their defense budgets. But the
White House needs to recognize that more important than the 2-percent spending stipulation is the effective allocation of resources to maximize
military capabilities. Washington must also acknowledge the benefits that NATO consistently affords the U.S., including basing rights, infrastructure,
intelligence sharing, political and diplomatic support and participation in military missions, including Afghanistan. Trump’s
commitment to
strengthening NATO has been evident in the selection of his security team. In particular, his vice
president, secretary of State and secretary of Defense have all been staunch "Atlanticists" and
committed to a strong alliance. The Pentagon in particular understands that the Russian threat
to Europe is growing and that NATO must be better prepared to fulfill its mission of common
defense. During President Obama’s tenure, Europe’s defense was downgraded until Russia’s
attack on Ukraine in early 2014 sparked fears about Moscow’s revisionist ambitions. Trump’s
team has learned lessons from Obama’s naïve expectations about “resets” with the Kremlin.
NATO can only negotiate with Moscow from a position of strength. Trump’s national security team has fortified NATO’s

Enhanced Forward Presence along its eastern flank, whereby troops are rotated in several front-
line states through four multinational NATO battle groups that total some 4,500 soldiers. Poland is
also looking to permanently host a larger contingent of American troops as Moscow escalates its threats and deployments along NATO’s borders.
Washington has also welcomed new members in the Balkans that can contribute to regional
security, with North Macedonia poised to follow Montenegro into the alliance over the coming
year. All these measures have caught the Kremlin off guard . Trump may periodically lavish
praise on Putin, but his cabinet and the Congress continue to ratchet up financial sanctions
against Russia’s corrupt elite and have supported weapons sales to Ukraine and Georgia to
help defend them from Russian attacks. Unsurprisingly, Moscow’s view of Trump has swung from euphoria to trepidation.
Officials are even more worried about Trump’s dismissal of arms treaties with Russia as “bad deals” for Washington. With the imminent

collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a renewed arms race will prove
more damaging to Russia than the United States. Moscow’s violation of the INF Treaty by
developing new land-based cruise missiles to threaten NATO states will boomerang against
Russia, whose defense spending is dwarfed by the alliance. In the 1980s, Soviet leaders were outmaneuvered by
Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and into an arms race that bankrupted their economy. Moscow ended up signing several arms control
agreements and the Soviet empire collapsed. A similar fate could new befall the increasingly impoverished Russian Federation. Nearly
30 years
after the end of the Cold War, there is no viable alternative to NATO as an alliance of solidarity
that guarantees the national security of all members, including the U.S. American forces are
deployed in Europe not as an act of altruism but in order to protect U.S. interests within and
beyond Europe and to detect, deter and defeat adversaries before they feel emboldened to
strike against the U.S. homeland. NATO is constantly in a process of transformation and
adaptation to new conditions and the alliance should welcome Trump’s questioning of its
rationale and capabilities. Complacency weakens NATO and can provoke new aggression both against and within Europe. If a new war
erupted, the ultimate cost to the U.S. would be far greater than the current investment in American security because Washington simply could not
isolate itself while its military, political and economic interests were being crippled.

NATO is shielded from Trump’s belligerence – in the long-term, liberal

democracy checks
Deni, PhD, 03-18-19 (John R., Professor of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM)
Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), Journal of Transatlantic
Studies, p. 158)//EF

For all of these reasons, many of the standard theories regarding alliance duration and dissolution do not work very well in explaining the case of NATO.
In order to better explain NATO’s endurance, many scholars have turned to more NATO specific
models of behavior. That is, these scholars have developed models of NATO behavior, or
behavior of states within a NATO context, not simply alliance behavior. One of the most
compelling examples of such analyses argues that the most important explanatory variable
over NATO’s many decades of existence is the role played by the democratic forms of
government of its member states.29 In terms of alliance duration, the internal workings of democracies enhance long-term
cooperation in three key ways. First, leaders of liberal democracies are periodically replaced , because they

lose to opponents, are term-limited, or decide to retire from office. These changes in leadership
provide necessary opportunities to reexamine old policies and implement news ones. Policy
changes give NATO member states the opportunity to move beyond disagreements of the
past rather quickly. Second, power in democracies tends to be diffuse, certainly among branches
of government but also even within branches. This means that even if a particular political
leader in one country disagrees with the policy of an ally, other political leaders with different
perspectives in those same countries may be able to salvage damaged relations and prevent a
more serious rupture. A good example of this was evident in 2017, as US President Donald
Trump struggled with expressing this administration’s commitment to NATO. As he did so, the
US House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed a resolution expressing American
support for the NATO alliance.30 Consultation and cooperation between allied countries across different branches of government or
between different executive agencies can facilitate more harmony if there is discord at the heads of state level. Finally, politicians get reelected and
their political appointees get promoted for doing something, so saving the alliance from crisis typically gets rewarded. Ambitious
political
up-and-comers always appear on the scene within democracies, offering ways to repair relations
and salvage the alliance.
They overinflate Trump’s effect – his own wavering position, advisers, and
general US opinion prevents disaster
Sayle, PhD, 05-19 (Timothy Andrews, Assistant Professor of History and Senior Fellow at the Bill Graham Centre
for Contemporary International History at the University of Toronto, Enduring Alliance, Chapter 1: “The Specter of
Appeasement,” p. 15-16)//EF

As American officials pillory the European governments for their unwillingness to spend more on
defense, the Europeans look back at the American domestic political scene with trepidation. 17
For so much of the Cold War, European officials worried that the American electorate would
choose a president who would not or could not lead NATO. In 2016, the Republican nominee for
president campaigned against NATO—and Donald J. Trump does not have the intellectual
chops of, says, Robert Taft, to offer another vision of world affairs. Trump told reporters that NATO was
“obsolete and expensive.” He personifies the possible rise to power of the next generation of Americans

that NATO officials had so feared, a generation that Lord Cromer thought celebrated the
“rejection of history and its lessons for mankind.” 1 8 As candidate Trump explained his views on NATO: “So, uh, I look at, I
look at the fact that it was a long time ago.” 19 Trump has continued to sound an uncertain trumpet since his

inauguration as president. In May 2017, Trump addressed the allies at NATO’s newest
headquarters in Brussels. The secretary of state, secretary of defense, and national security
adviser had all made sure the speech would contain an endorsement of the orthodox
interpretation of article 5—to help calm European fears that America was ceding its role as a
European power. Not until the president was speaking did his advisers realize he had changed
the speech to omit any mention of the critical piece of the treaty . 20 The current threat posed to NATO is, as the
alliance leaders feared in the past, a problem of democracy. Counterintuitively, Donald Trump’s election does not

signal an American public that has soured on the alliance. It seems the opposite is true. One
2017 Gallup poll show more Americans think NATO should be maintained—80 percent—than
at any time since 1989. 21
Impacts
 AT: Russia !! – NATO Bad
NATO will decline inevitably – BUT expansion ruins relations with Russia – its
best for the US to pull out now
Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 18
(Stephen M., 07.26.18, “NATO Isn’t What You Think It Is,” Foreign Press,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/26/nato-isnt-what-you-think-it-is/) np

3. NATO expansion was a mistake. Really. If Trump is mostly confused about NATO, its most ardent defenders
remain committed to a set of truisms and dogmas that were questionable when first advanced
and have become less and less defensible with time . Chief among these myths is the idea that
NATO expansion would create a vast zone of peace in Europe and give the alliance a new and lofty purpose in the wake
of the Cold War. It hasn’t quite worked out that way . For starters, NATO expansion poisoned relations
with Russia and played a central role in creating conflicts between Russia and Georgia and Russia
and Ukraine. It’s not the only reason, of course, and I’m not saying Moscow’s responses were legal, proper, justified, or based on
an accurate perception of NATO’s intent. I’m only suggesting that Russia’s response was not surprising, especially in
light of Russia’s own history and the George H.W. Bush administration’s earlier pledges not to move NATO “one inch eastward”
following German reunification. The architects of expansion may have genuinely believed that moving NATO eastward posed no
threat to Russia; unfortunately, Russia’s leaders never got the memo (and wouldn’t have believed it if they had). Furthermore,
expanding NATO increased the number of places the alliance was formally obligated to defend
(most notably the Baltic states) but without significantly increasing the resources available to perform
that task. Once again, proponents of expansion assumed these commitments would never have to be honored, only to wake up
and discover they had written a blank check that might be difficult to cover. And we now know that expansion brought in
some new members whose commitment to liberal democracy has proved to be fairly shallow.
This situation may not be a fatal flaw, insofar as NATO has tolerated nondemocratic members (e.g., Turkey) in the
past, but it undermines the proponents’ claim that NATO is a security community based on shared
democratic values and an essential element of a liberal world order. 4. NATO is an anachronism. Everyone
knows Lord Ismay’s famous quip about NATO’s core mission: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”
Irony aside, that pithy summary made a good bit of sense during the Cold War, and especially during NATO’s earliest years, when the
U.S. commitment was less certain, the Soviet threat loomed larger, and Germany’s post-World War II evolution was just beginning
and its endpoint uncertain. None of these rationales applies today. For all the hype about a resurgent Russia and its obnoxious
efforts to interfere in other states’ democratic processes, Russia is in fact a declining power that poses no threat to dominate
Europe. Its population will decline over time, its median age is rising rapidly, and its economy remains mired in corruption and overly
dependent on energy exports whose long-term value will probably go down as well. Remember, we are talking about a country
whose entire economy—the ultimate foundation of national power—is smaller than Canada, South Korea, and Italy. Putin has
played a weak hand well, but the brutal fact is that Europe does not need the United States to protect it, especially considering that
France and the United Kingdom also have nuclear deterrents of their own. Nobody needs to worry about keeping the Germans down
either. Germany’s population is shrinking and aging, too, and there is no danger of Germany reverting to its Wilhelmine or Nazi past,
and even worrisome right-wing nationalist groups such as the Alternative for Germany party sound more like German isolationists
than future empire builders. If anything, the danger is that Europe’s largest economy won’t do enough to help fix the continent’s
continued economic woes. As former Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski put it back in 2011, he was less fearful of German
power than of German inaction. NATO’s dirty little secret, I believe, is the fear that if the United States leaves, its European members
will fall back into the sort of interstate rivalry that repeatedly convulsed the continent in the past. Few Europeans (or Americans) say
this openly today (although people such as Christoph Bertram did back in the 1990s), but its true purpose now is to preserve
America’s role as Europe’s “pacifier” of last resort. The problem is that Trump doesn’t buy it, and protecting Europe from its own
worst instincts is a harder sell when the United States faces rising deficits (again), a major geopolitical challenge from China, and
cannot seem to extricate itself from Afghanistan, the Middle East, or the far-flung and open-ended war on terror. 5. The United
States cannot fix NATO. There’s no question that Trump’s handling of NATO has been deeply disruptive , to no
good purpose. After all, if you want to get tough with China on trade and do more to constrain Iran’s activities in the Middle East, a
smart strategist would get Europe on your side and work constructively with them toward these ends. Trump has done precisely the
opposite: tearing up the nuclear deal with Iran, starting trade wars with everyone he can think of, insulting European leaders, and
driving his own image (and that of the United States) down to levels unseen in years. That might suit some of America’s adversaries,
but it is hard
to see how it advances any of the country’s core interests or even Trump’s own
stated goals. Even so, NATO’s present problems predate Trump and are largely the result of long-
term structural forces. In the absence of a common, clear, and present danger, sustaining an
elaborate multinational alliance was always going to be difficult , and it is in some ways a testimony to past
diplomatic artistry that NATO has kept going as long as it has and despite the failures in Afghanistan and Libya and the divisions that
erupted over the war in Iraq. Even if Trump had stuck with the status quo, reaffirmed the U.S.
commitment, and played nicely with Europe’s leaders, it would not have reversed the gradual
erosion of the trans-Atlantic partnership. A better course would have been to start a gradual,
constructive, and if possible amiable decrease of the U.S. security role in Europe, making it clear to U.S. allies
that Washington no longer believed it needed to maintain a security presence there and that it
planned to be either completely or nearly out in five to 10 years. The United States might conceivably remain a formal member of
NATO, but it would no longer station forces there, no longer insist that the supreme allied commander in Europe be a U.S. officer,
and no longer expect the Europeans to fall obediently into line whenever Washington barked orders. Trade, investment, and tourism
would continue, and U.S. arms manufacturers would be free to sell to European buyers if these states decided to bolster their
defenses. Meanwhile, the United States would be free to focus on other problems. Contrary to what you might think, I’m not anti-
European, let alone anti-NATO. The alliance was a bold achievement for its time and one that served both the United States and
Europe well in the past. But as I wrote back in 1998: “[N]othing
is permanent in international affairs, and
NATO’s past achievements should not blind us to its growing fragility. Instead of mindlessly extending
guarantees to every potential trouble spot, and instead of basing our foreign policy on a presumption of permanent partnership, it is
time for Europe and the United States to begin a slow and gradual process of disengagement. This is going to happen anyway, and
wise statecraft anticipates and exploits the tides of history rather than engaging in a fruitless struggle to hold them back.” It was true
back then and is even truer today.

Russian aggression escalates into war

Fisher, reporter @ Vox, 15 (Max, 06.29.15, “How World War III became possible,” Vox,
https://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war) np
If you take a walk around Washington or a Western European capital today, there is no feeling of looming catastrophe. The threats
are too complex, with many moving pieces and overlapping layers of risk adding up to a larger danger that is less obvious. People
can be forgiven for not seeing the cloud hanging over them, for feeling that all is well — even as in Eastern Europe they are digging
in for war. But this complacency is itself part of the problem, making the threat more difficult to foresee, to manage, or, potentially,
to avert. There is a growing chorus of political analysts, arms control experts, and government
officials who are sounding the alarm, trying to call the world's attention to its drift toward disaster. The prospect
of a major war, even a nuclear war, in Europe has become thinkable, they warn, even plausible. What they
describe is a threat that combines many of the hair-trigger dangers and world-ending stakes of the Cold War with the volatility and
false calm that preceded World War I — a comparison I heard with disturbing frequency. They
described a number of
ways that an unwanted but nonetheless major war, like that of 1914, could break out in the Eastern European
borderlands. The stakes, they say, could not be higher: the post–World War II peace in Europe,
the lives of thousands or millions of Eastern Europeans, or even , in a worst-case scenario that is remote but
real, the nuclear devastation of the planet . I. The warnings: "War is not something that's impossible anymore"
Everyone in Moscow tells you that if you want to understand Russia's foreign policy and its view of its place the world, the person
you need to talk to is Fyodor Lukyanov. Sober and bespectacled, with an academic's short brown beard, Lukyanov speaks with the
precision of a political scientist but the occasional guardedness of someone with far greater access than your average analyst.
Widely considered both an influential leader and an unofficial interpreter of Russia's foreign policy establishment, Lukyanov
is
chief of Russia's most important foreign policy think tank and its most important foreign policy
journal, both of which reflect the state and its worldview. He is known to be close to Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov. I met Lukyanov around the corner from the looming Foreign Ministry compound (his office is nearby), at a small,
bohemian cafe in Moscow that serves French and Israeli food to a room packed with gray suits. He was candid and relaxed. When
the discussion turned to the risks of war, he grew dire. "The atmosphere is a feeling that war is not something
that’s impossible anymore," Lukyanov told me, describing a growing concern within Moscow's
foreign policy elite. "A question that was absolutely impossible a couple of years ago, whether there might be a war, a real
war, is back," he said. "People ask it." I asked how this had happened. He said that regular Russian people don't desire
war, but rather feared it would become necessary to defend against the implacably hostile
United States. "The perception is that somebody would try to undermine Russia as a country that
opposes the United States, and then we will need to defend ourselves by military means," he explained.
Such fears, vague but existential, are everywhere in Moscow. Even liberal opposition leaders I met with, pro-Western
types who oppose Putin, expressed fears that the US posed an imminent threat to Russia's security. I had booked my trip to Moscow
in December, hoping to get the Russian perspective on what were, at the time, murmurings among a handful of political and arms
control analysts that conflict could come to Europe. By the time I arrived in the city, in late April, concerns of an unintended and
potentially catastrophic war had grown unsettlingly common. Lukyanov,
pointing to the US and Russian military
buildups along Eastern Europe, also worried that an accident or provocation could be
misconstrued as a deliberate attack and lead to war . In the Cold War, he pointed out, both sides
had understood this risk and installed political and physical infrastructure — think of the
"emergency red phone" — to manage tensions and prevent them from spiraling out of control.
That infrastructure is now gone. "All those mechanisms were disrupted or eroded," he said. "That [infrastructure] has
been degraded since the end of the Cold War because the common perception is that we don’t need it anymore." That the world
does not see the risk of war hanging over it, in other words, makes that risk all the likelier. For most Americans, such predictions
sound improbable, even silly. But the dangers are growing every week, as are the warnings. "One can hear eerie echoes of the
events a century ago that produced the catastrophe known as World War I," Harvard professor and longtime Pentagon adviser
Graham Allison — one of the graybeards of American foreign policy — wrote in a May cover story for the National Interest, co-
authored with Russia analyst Dimitri Simes. Their article, "Russia and America: Stumbling to War," warned that an unwanted, full-
scale conflict between the US and Russia was increasingly plausible. In
Washington, the threat feels remote. It does
not in Eastern Europe. Baltic nations, fearing war, have already begun preparing for it. So has
Sweden: "We see Russian intelligence operations in Sweden — we can't interpret this in any other way — as preparation for
military operations against Sweden," a Swedish security official announced in March. In May, Finland's defense ministry sent letters
to 900,000 citizens — one-sixth of the population — telling them to prepare for conscription in case of a "crisis situation." Lithuania
has reinstituted military conscription. Poland, in June, appointed a general who would take over as military commander in case of
war. Though Western publics remain blissfully unaware, and Western leaders divided, many of the people tasked with securing
Europe are treating conflict as more likely. In late April, NATO
and other Western officials gathered in Estonia, a
former Soviet republic and NATO member on Russia's border that Western analysts most worry could
become ground zero for a major war with Russia. At the conference, Deputy Secretary General
Alexander Vershbow spoke so openly about NATO's efforts to prepare for the possibility of Russia
launching a limited nuclear strike in Europe that, according to the journalist Ahmed Rashid, who was in attendance, he
had to be repeatedly reminded he was speaking on the record. One of the scenarios Vershbow said NATO was
outlining, according to Rashid's paraphrase, was that Russia could "choose to use a tactical weapon with a
small blast range on a European city or a Western tank division." A few weeks later, the Guardian reported
that NATO is considering plans to "upgrade" its nuclear posture in Europe in response to Russia's own nuclear saber-rattling. One
proposal: for NATO's military exercises to include more nuclear weapons use, something Russia already does frequently. II. The
gamble: Putin's plan to make Russia great again Should the warnings prove right, and a
major war break out in Europe
between Russia and the West, then the story of that war, if anyone is still around to tell it, will begin with
Russian President Vladimir Putin trying to solve a problem . That problem is this: Putin's Russia is weak. It can
no longer stand toe to toe with the US. It no longer has Europe divided in a stalemate; rather, it sees the
continent as dominated by an ever-encroaching anti-Russian alliance . In the Russian view, the
country's weakness leaves it at imminent risk, vulnerable to a hostile West bent on subjugating
or outright destroying Russia as it did to Iraq and Libya. This is made more urgent for Putin by his
political problems at home. In 2012, during his reelection, popular protests and accusations of fraud
weakened his sense of political legitimacy. The problem worsened with Russia's 2014 economic
collapse; Putin's implicit bargain with the Russian people had been that he would deliver economic growth and they would let
him erode basic rights. Without the economy, what did he have to offer them? Putin's answer has been to assert Russian power
beyond its actual strength — and, in the process, to recast himself as a national hero guarding against foreign enemies. Without a
world-power-class military or economy at his disposal, he is instead wielding confusion and uncertainty — which Soviet leaders
rightly avoided as existential dangers — as weapons against the West. Unable to overtly control Eastern Europe, he has fomented
risks and crises in there, sponsoring separatists in Ukraine and conducting dangerous military activity along NATO airspace and
coastal borders, giving Russia more leverage there. Reasserting
a Russian sphere of influence over Eastern
Europe, he apparently believes, will finally give Russia security from the hostile West — and
make Russia a great power once more. Knowing his military is outmatched against the Americans, he is blurring the
distinction between war and peace, deploying tactics that exist in, and thus widen, the gray between: militia violence, propaganda,
cyberattacks, under a new rubric the Russian military sometimes calls "hybrid war." Unable to cross America's red lines, Putin is
doing his best to muddy them — and, to deter the Americans, muddying his own. Turning otherwise routine
diplomatic and military incidents into games of high-stakes chicken favors Russia, he believes, as
the West will ultimately yield to his superior will. To solve the problem of Russia's conventional
military weakness, he has dramatically lowered the threshold for when he would use nuclear
weapons, hoping to terrify the West such that it will bend to avoid conflict . In public speeches,
over and over, he references those weapons and his willingness to use them. He has enshrined,
in Russia's official nuclear doctrine, a dangerous idea no Soviet leader ever adopted: that a nuclear war could be
winnable. Putin, having recast himself at home as a national hero standing up to foreign enemies, is more popular than ever.
Russia has once more become a shadow hanging over Eastern Europe, feared and only rarely bowed to, but always taken seriously.
Many Western Europeans, asked in a poll whether they would defend their own Eastern European allies from a Russian invasion,
said no. Russia's aggression, born of both a desire to reengineer a European order that it views as
hostile and a sense of existential weakness that justifies drastic measures, makes it far more
willing to accept the dangers of war. As RAND's F. Stephen Larrabee wrote in one of the increasingly urgent warnings
that some analysts are issuing, "The Russia that the United States faces today is more assertive and more
unpredictable — and thus, in many ways, more dangerous — than the Russia that the United States
confronted during the latter part of the Cold War." Joseph Nye, the dean of Harvard University's school of government and one of
America's most respected international relations scholars, pointed out that Russia's
weakness-masking aggression
was yet another disturbing parallel to the buildup to World War I. "Russia seems doomed to
continue its decline — an outcome that should be no cause for celebration in the West," Nye wrote
in a recent column. "States in decline — think of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1914 — tend to become less risk-averse and thus
much more dangerous." III. The drift: How the unthinkable became possible The Cold War was a dangerous game, but it was a game
in which everyone knew and agreed upon the stakes and the rules. That is not the case today. The Western side believes it
is playing a game where the rules are clear enough, the stakes relatively modest, and the competition easily
winnable. The Russian side, however, sees a game where the rules can be rewritten on the fly, even
the definition of war itself altered. For Russia, fearing a threat from the West it sees as imminent
and existential, the stakes are unimaginably high, justifying virtually any action or gamble if it
could deter defeat and, perhaps, lead to victory. Separately, the ever-paranoid Kremlin believes that the West is
playing the same game in Ukraine. Western support for Ukraine's government and efforts to broker a ceasefire to the war there,
Moscow believes, are really a plot to encircle Russia with hostile puppet states and to rob Russia of its rightful sphere of influence.
Repeated Russian warnings that it would go to war to defend its perceived interests in Ukraine, potentially even nuclear war, are
dismissed in most Western capitals as bluffing, mere rhetoric. Western leaders view these threats through Western eyes, in which
impoverished Ukraine would never be worth risking a major war. In Russian eyes, Ukraine looks much more important: an extension
of Russian heritage that is sacrosanct and, as the final remaining component of the empire, a strategic loss that would unacceptably
weaken Russian strength and thus Russian security. Both side are gambling and guessing in the absence of a clear understanding of
what the other side truly intends, how it will act, what will and will not trigger the invisible triplines that would send us careening
into war. During the Cold War, the comparably matched Western and Soviet blocs prepared for war but also made sure that war
never came. They locked Europe in a tense but stable balance of power; that balance is gone. They set clear red lines and vowed to
defend them at all costs. Today, those red lines are murky and ill-defined. Neither side is sure where they lie or what really happens
if they are crossed. No one can say for sure what would trigger war. That is why, analysts will tell you, today's tensions bear far more
similarity to the period before World War I: an unstable power balance, belligerence over peripheral conflicts, entangling military
commitments, disputes over the future of the European order, and dangerous uncertainty about what actions will and will not force
the other party into conflict. Today's Russia, once more the strongest nation in Europe and yet weaker than its collective enemies,
calls to mind the turn-of-the-century German Empire, which Henry Kissinger described as "too big for Europe, but too small for the
world."
 --- XT – Russia War – IL
Russia fears NATO enlargement – any encroachment on their sphere of
influence will cause escalation – a new European security order is necessary
Wolff, Assistant Professor of Political Science, International Studies and Security Studies at
Dickinson College, 15 (Andrew T., 09.16.15, “The future of NATO enlargement after the Ukraine
crisis,” International Affairs, Volume 91, Issue 5, September 2015, Pages 1103–
1121, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/future-nato-enlargement-after-ukraine-
crisis/INTA91_5_10_Wolff.pdf) np

Seeing the world as they do from this geopolitical perspective, Russians perceive
that NATO’s policy of
enlargement is butting into Russia’s ‘region of privileged interests’ .45 Russia believes that it
should naturally have a proportion- ately stronger sway than the West in its near abroad. In a
sense, Russian foreign policy is neo-imperialist in its intention to dominate the foreign and
economic relations of its closest neighbours. 46 Russia has also produced a tailored version of geopolitics called
Eurasianism. Its founder, Alexander Dugin, has a receptive audience among Russian political and military elites, and his ideology
envisions an expanded Russia that has the ability to shape politics in Europe, the Middle East and Asia.47 Eurasianism
theorizes that in order for Russia to be a Great Power it must dominate the entry and exit points
of Eurasia.48 Ideas such as neo- imperialism, Eurasianism and seeking ‘privileged interest’ can all be characterized as geopolitical
views of international relations. In Russia’s geopolitical world-view, NATO expansion is acceptable only so
long as NATO becomes primarily a political forum and is much less military- oriented. For this to
occur, the West has to include Russia in the maintenance of Europe’s security . This inclusion could
be accomplished either by Russia’s joining NATO as a fully edged member or through the construction of a new
European collective security apparatus.49 For its part, the West has never allowed Russia to participate fully in
managing Europe’s security, and this partial exclu- sion has fuelled Russian mistrust and rea rmed its geopolitical perspective. The
fact that NATO greatly expanded its membership without including Russia in the decision-
making process—while also keeping a strong military presence in Europe, attacking the pro-Russian Serbian government in
1999, supporting democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, recognizing Kosovan independ- ence in 2008 without Russian
approval, and proposing a European-based missile defence system—set
alarm bells off in Russia. In this context, the
West’s insist- ence that its liberal-inspired enlargement policy is good for Russia rings hollow. In
Russia’s geopolitical world-view, enlargement is highly destabilizing to its security; and
therefore, annexing Crimea to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO is completely rational. 50 But
only some of the blame for this ideological clash can be placed on western shoulders; for Russia never truly desired to integrate with
the West and refused to adopt a liberal mentality. Even so, given that Russia is apparently unable or unwilling to change its world-
view, then perhaps NATO
should consider altering its liberal-based policies in a way that better copes
with Russia’s intransigence.

NATO is currently useless – but expansionism antagonizes Putin and causes

Russian revisionism
Larison, a senior editor at TAC, 5/14/19

(Daniel, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/yes-nato-expansion-was-a-
mistake/)
Hal Brands complains about critics of NATO expansion: As for the critique that it was NATO
expansion that provoked Russian revisionism, this argument has always been flimsy. Yes, the expansion
angered Russian officials, during Yeltsin’s time as well as Putin’s . It was undoubtedly humiliating for the
fallen superpower. But the idea that NATO expansion caused Russian aggression rests on an implicit counterfactual argument that,
absent NATO expansion, Russia would not have behaved in a domineering fashion toward
countries on its border. There is simply nothing in Russian history — and nothing in Vladimir Putin’s personality — that
supports this argument. NATO expansion has been a mistake for the U.S. because the U.S. didn’t need to add any more security
commitments in Europe or anywhere else after the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the USSR meant that the threat to European
peace and security had substantially diminished. There was arguably no need for NATO at all, much less a
larger one. The larger alliance has not found “new purpose” through expansion , but continues to cast
about looking for some reason to exist now that its only real reason for being, the Soviet Union, has been dead for
almost three decades. That first took the form of “humanitarian” intervention in Kosovo, an illegal war that set a precedent
that Russia would subsequently exploit, and then it morphed into supporting the unending war in Afghanistan. In 2011,
“humanitarian” intervention was once again back on the menu as the alliance was dragged into backing a U.S.-led attack on the
Libyan government that destabilized the country and the surrounding region until today. The last twenty years have seen the
continued growth of the alliance at the same time that the alliance has become increasingly divorced from its original purpose of
defending Europe from attack. NATO’s
expansion during that time has been a mistake, and so has
NATO’s attempt to reinvent itself for a world where it is no longer needed . There is no question
that NATO expansion has antagonized Russia and strained U.S.-Russian relations for the last
two decades. Not every round of NATO expansion has been equally provocative to Russia, but all of it has been unwelcome to
them. Bringing in the Baltic states was a bad idea primarily because it overextended the alliance and because the U.S. was extending
security guarantees to states that it could not actually defend. The alliance has been fortunate that it has never had to back up these
commitments. The U.S. and NATO were able to “get away” with the earlier rounds because Russia was
weakened enough during the 1990s that it wasn’t in a position to do anything about them. That doesn’t mean
that NATO expansion up until that point was a good idea . All that it means is that it hasn’t blown
up in our faces yet. It was the subsequent attempts to push for bringing Ukraine and Georgia into the alliance that proved to
be truly unacceptable to Russia, and it was the 2008 Bucharest meeting when the alliance promised both states that they would
eventually become members that paved the way for the conflict between Russia and Georgia later that year. NATO
expansion
was not the cause of the current conflict in Ukraine, but it created the context for Russia’s reaction to
the overthrow of Yanukovych and the establishment of a pro-Western government in Kiev. Had there been no NATO
expansion after the end of the Cold War, or even if there had been no NATO expansion after 2004, it is unlikely that the August 2008
war and the current war in Ukraine would have ever happened. Sold as something that promotes European stability and peace,
continued NATO expansion has in fact undermined both in the last decade and a half. It’s true that Russia has not invaded any
countries since they became NATO members, but many of the alliance’s new members don’t even share a border with Russia, so it
would be surprising if Russia could have posed a serious military threat to most of them. Then again, Russia hasn’t invaded its other
neighbors that have never contemplated joining the alliance. If Russia were really the aggressive “revisionist” power that Brands and
other hawks make them out to be, surely they should have done some of their “revisionism” somewhere else along their extensive
borders. The fact that Russia hasn’t done anything like that except in Georgia and Ukraine suggests that NATO expansion is at the
very least an important factor in explaining their behavior. What would have happened in eastern Europe in the absence of NATO
expansion? We can’t know that for certain, but we can see how Russia handled relations with its other neighbors that weren’t
considered as possible members of the alliance. Moscow has maintained close ties with the other former Soviet republics since the
dissolution of the USSR, and it hasn’t had armed conflicts with any of the others in all that time. One reason for this is that the other
states have no aspirations to join a hostile military alliance. Georgia and Ukraine have been recent flashpoints because Moscow
views a pro-Western orientation in these countries as a threat, and it views that orientation as a threat in no small part because
NATO’s borders have been been steadily moving eastwards. Russia is responsible for its own actions, but continued NATO expansion
has been a provocation that would sooner or later cause Russia to react badly.

NATO expansionism angers Russia and leads to revisionism

Gotz, Institute of Russian and Eurasian studies Uppsala university, 11/15/18

(Elias, European Politics and society/Volume 20/133-153)

From this perspective, Russia
seeks nothing less than to undermine the very foundations of the liberal
international order. The question of course remains: What lies behind Russia’s revisionist
ambitions and policies? Scholars who subscribe to this perspective argue that Russia’s revisionism can be attributed to three
factors. The first is a deep-seated sense of being wronged by the West over the course of recent decades. It is no secret that the
leadership in Moscow maintains that the West has disregarded Russia’s vital interests after the end of the Cold War and side-lined it
with respect to several important issues – most notably NATO expansion and the formation of a new
security architecture in Europe. Crucially, however, the argument here is that these injustices are perceived rather than
real ‘These are obsessive assertions with little basis in fact and are more a reflection of centuries of Russia’s paranoia about the
vulnerability of its borders and its insecurity as a nation state. A second and related argument is that Russia’s political class has an
imperial mentality, especially towards smaller neighbouring countries in central Eurasia. According to Marcel van Herpen, author of
the provocative , this mentality has its roots in the early modern period. ‘For the Russian state,’ he writes, ‘colonizing neighbouring
territories and subduing neighbouring people has been a continuous process. It is, one could almost say, part of Russia’s genetic
makeupLondon: Seeker & Warburg.  who argue that Russia’s imperialist essence has remained immutable across the centuries,
regardless of the regime in power. Third, scholars accord significant weight to the fact that many members of the Putin regime have
a background in the military and security services and to Russia’s authoritarian form of governance. To quote, once again, van
Herpen ‘the new Russian imperialism is clearly in the interest of Russia’s ruling political and military elite, whose positions are
strengthened and consolidated by a neoimperialist policy., who asserts that Russia seeks conflict with the West. That is
because
the Putin regime – nationalist, revisionist, territorially expansionist – cannot coexist alongside a
democratic Europe willing to stand up for its principles . Moscow sees liberal democracy as a
threat and therefore must defeat it . In essence, the argument is that a confluence of historical, cultural, and domestic
political factors drives Russia’s revisionist attitudes and actions How should the West respond? The answer is clear. The United
States and its European allies must resist Russian revisionism through a mix of containment and rollback. This means that they
should reinforce diplomatic efforts to isolate Moscow, impose more severe sanctions, and increase NATO military deployments in
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states). Facing reality: Getting NATO ready for a new Cold War.  In addition, the West should provide
military support to post-Soviet states that stand up to Russia, such as Georgia and Ukraine, and supply them with lethal weapons.
Some scholars take this a step further and suggest that the West should try to create or foment unrest in Russia). A preclusive
strategy to defend the NATO frontier. The American Interest (online). Retrieved from. The goal of such a strategy is to weaken Russia
from within and, if possible, replace the current regime in Moscow with a more pro-Western government. As Kirchick Russia’s plot
against the West. Politico. Retrieved from writes, ‘If a prosperous and democratic Europe is a core national security interest of the
United States, as it has been for the past 80 years, then the Russian regime is one to be resisted, contained and ultimately
dethroned.’ Offense, in this view, is the best defence.

NATO–Russia tensions are already high – increasing NATO military influence

will risk miscalc and escalation
Carpenter, senior fellow in defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute and a
contributing editor at the National Interest, 18 (Ted Galen, 06.15.18, “Is NATO Pushing Russia
Towards Retaliation?” https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/nato-pushing-russia-
towards-retaliation) np

The United States and its NATO allies continue to find ways to antagonize Russia. The latest
provocation is a request from Norway to more than double the number of U.S. troops stationed
on its territory and deploy them even closer to the border with Russia. Granted, the numbers involved are
not large. There are currently 330 American military personnel in the country on a “rotational” basis. Oslo’s new request would
increase the number to seven hundred. If the Norwegian government gets its way, the new troops would be stationed in the far
north, barely 260 miles from Russia, in contrast to the existing unit in central Norway, several hundred miles from Russian territory.
The rotational aspect theoretically complies with Norway’s pledge to Moscow in 1949 when it joined NATO that Oslo would not
allow U.S. bases on its territory. Indeed, Foreign Minister Ine Marie Eriksen Soriede reiterated that assurance in connection with the
new troop request, contending that there would be “no American bases on Norwegian soil.” Making their official status rotational
supposedly means that the troops are there only on a temporary basis. It is a cynical dodge that fools no one—least of all Vladimir
Putin and his colleagues in the Kremlin. Norwegian officials also insisted that the new deployment was not directed against Russia.
That assurance has even less credibility than the rotational rationale. Oslo’s request came just days after nine nations along NATO’s
eastern flank, including Poland, the Baltic republics, and Romania called for a larger Alliance (meaning largely U.S.) military presence
in their region. In addition to the move to increase the number of U.S. troops in Norway, major NATO military exercises
(war games), code-named Trident Juncture 18, are scheduled for October. The focus of those exercises will be central and
northern Norway, and they will involve thirty-five thousand troops, seventy ships, and 130 aircraft. Nevertheless, Soriede insisted
that she couldn’t see “any serious reason why Russia should react” to Oslo’s proposal for an enhanced U.S. military presence. She
should perhaps receive credit for being able to make such a statement with a straight face. But such transparent dishonesty is a
longstanding feature of NATO’s behavior toward Moscow. Even during the Cold War, Western officials routinely insisted that the
Alliance was not directed against the Soviet Union. In their more candid moments, though, they conceded the obvious—that NATO
was a military mechanism to contain Soviet power. Granted, it was not the sole purpose. Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO’s first secretary
general, stated that NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” The first objective,
though, seemed to be the most important. Containment
of the Soviet Union made sense to keep
democratic Europe out of Moscow’s geopolitical orbit, and NATO was an important component
of that strategy. But Western leaders continued to apply that model to a noncommunist Russia once the
Cold War ended. Indeed, they intensified the containment rationale by adding new members
throughout Eastern Europe and expanding the Alliance to Russia’s border. Those actions were taken despite verbal
assurances from Secretary of State James Baker and West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the time of German
reunification that NATO would not expand beyond Germany’s eastern border. Throughout the Alliance’s inexorable move eastward,
Western officials and pundits insisted that NATO enlargement was not directed against Russia. Indeed, some members of the
Western foreign-policy community argued that the move would benefit Russia by erasing Cold War dividing lines and increasing
Eastern Europe’s political and economic stability. One wonders whether Westerners thought that the Russians were gullible enough
to believe such absurd arguments, or the proponents actually believed their own propaganda. NATO leaders continue to
insist that the Alliance has no offensive intent against Russia or that the Alliance seeks to undermine
Moscow’s interests. But NATO’s behavior belies such assurances. The interventions in Bosnia and
Kosovo that weakened and eventually truncated Serbia, a longstanding Russian ally, was certainly not a friendly act.
Stationing Alliance (most notably U.S.) forces and weapons systems in NATO’s easternmost members, (a process that has
accelerated markedly since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014) likewise is provocative. Yet Western leaders and
publics act as through Russia has no legitimate reason to react negatively to such moves, as Soriede
stated explicitly regarding the proposed increase in the U.S. troop presence in her country. NATO has conducted several
large-scale military exercises in Poland and other member states, as well as naval maneuvers in the Black
Sea near Russia’s important naval base at Sevastopol. Again, the Russians apparently are wrong to regard such actions
as provocative and threatening. U.S. and NATO leaders need to adopt a much more realistic attitude. Any
nation would regard NATO’s behavior as decidedly unfriendly, and even menacing, if conducted on its
frontiers. Continuing such actions while cynically denying their hostile intent could easily lead to miscalculation
and a catastrophic confrontation. As a first step toward mending ties with Moscow, the Trump administration should
summarily reject Norway’s unnecessary request for more U.S. troops.

A strong US role in NATO will provoke conflict with Russia

Kinzer, Senior Fellow in International and Public Affairs at the Watson Institute of International
and Public Affairs at Brown University, 16 (Stephen, 07.04.16 “Is NATO necessary?”
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/07/04/nato-
necessary/DwE0YzPb8qr70oIT9NVyAK/story.html) np

BRITAIN’S VOTE to quit the European Union was a rude jolt to the encrusted world order . Now
that the EU has been shocked into reality, NATO should be next . When NATO leaders convene for a summit
in Warsaw on Friday, they will insist that their alliance is still vital because Russian aggression threatens Europe. The opposite is true.
NATO has become America’s instrument in escalating our dangerous conflict with Russia. We need
less NATO, not more. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 as a way for American troops to protect a war-
shattered Europe from Stalin’s Soviet Union. Today Europe
is quite capable of shaping and paying for its own
security, but NATO’s structure remains unchanged. The United States still pays nearly three-quarters of its
budget. That no longer makes sense. The United States should remain politically close to European
countries but stop telling them how to defend themselves. Left to their own devices, they might pull back
from the snarling confrontation with Russia into which NATO is leading them. Russia threatens none of America’s vital interests. On
the contrary, it shares our eagerness to fight global terror, control nuclear threats, and confront other urgent challenges to global
security. Depending on one’s perspective, Russia may be seen as a destabilizing force in Europe or as simply defending its border
regions. Either way, it is a challenge for Europeans, not for us. Yet the
American generals who run NATO, desperate for
a new mission, have fastened onto Russia as an enemy. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
preposterously places Russia first on his list of threats to the United States. Anti-Russia passion
has seized Washington. This week’s NATO summit will be a festival of chest-thumping, with many warnings about the
Russian “threat” and solemn vows to meet it with shows of military force. The United States plans to quadruple
spending on NATO military projects on or near Russia’s borders. I n recent weeks NATO has opened a new
missile base in Romania, held the largest military maneuver in the modern history of Poland, and announced plans to deploy
thousands more American troops at Baltic bases, some within artillery range of St. Petersburg. Russia, for its part, is building a new
military base within artillery range of Ukraine and deploying 30,000 troops to border posts. Both sides are nuclear-armed. NATO
views trouble between Russia and nearby countries as a military problem. That makes sense. NATO is a
military alliance run by military officers who think in military terms. Our conflict with Russia, however, is essentially
political, not military. It cries out for creative diplomacy. NATO is a blunt instrument unequipped for such
a delicate task. If Europeans believe tit-for-tat escalation is the best way to deal with Russia, let them pursue it. But it should be
their choice, not ours. NATO commanders and their political masters in Washington do not want to
surrender control over European security. They fear Europeans would seek conciliation with Russia
rather than follow the NATO model of in-your-face confrontation. That prospect is abhorrent to American generals, politicians, and
defense contractors. By
continuing to finance NATO, we buy the right to flash our swords on Russia’s
borders. Some Europeans are unhappy with America’s use of NATO to intensify military pressure on Russia. Foreign Minister
Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany called the recent maneuvers in Poland, in which 14,000 American troops participated, “saber-
rattling and war cries.” In a clear rebuke to NATO, he added, “Whoever
believes that a symbolic tank parade on
the alliance’s eastern border will bring security is mistaken. We are well-advised to not create
pretexts to renew an old confronta tion.” NATO helped to keep peace in Europe during the Cold War. It is not suited to
the 21st century. By stoking tension with Russia, it contributes to instability, not stability. Europe needs a
new security system. Unlike NATO, it should be designed by Europeans to meet European needs, run and paid for by Europeans.
That would allow the United States to step back from a long mission that may have been noble, but should not last forever.

NATO gets in the way of Russian foreign policy that escalates and goes nuclear
Marketic , contributor to In These Times. 7/16/18
(Branko, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/07/nato-donald-trump-putin-cold-war)

Meanwhile, back in Europe, NATO’s

continued existence — and, in fact, its expansion — has mostly
served to resuscitate the very issue it was created to solve: Russian aggression. Soviet
leaders had long viewed NATO with suspicion, and the fact that it continued to soldier on even after the
ostensible basis for its existence had ceased to be only heightened this suspicion. According to declassified documents, both Mikhail
Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin were repeatedly assured by the first Bush and Clinton administrations, respectively, that NATO wouldn’t
expand eastward, something Russians viewed as unacceptable. Imagine, for instance, how US policymakers might feel if the Soviet
Union had established a military alliance with a handful of South American states during the Cold War explicitly as a bulwark against
the United States, then when peace at last came, began inviting more and more South and Central American countries to the
alliance while breaking an explicit promise not to do so. This is effectively what NATO has done during the 1990s and beyond in
Eastern Europe. With sixteen member states by the end of the Cold War (all North American and European), NATO has, between
1999 and now 2018, added fourteen new member states, all from Eastern Europe, including two (Latvia and Estonia) right on the
Russian border. Macedonia has officially joined as of last week’s summit. Not all US officials thought this was smart. Kennan, for
instance, warned at the time that eastward expansion of NATO would be a “strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions” and
“the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.” Robert Gates, secretary of defense for both Bush and
Obama, has said that “pressing
ahead with expansion of NATO eastward … aggravated the
relationship between the United States and Russia.” This was compounded, said Gates, by the
fact that just a few weeks after adding its first three eastern European member states in
1999, NATO began bombing Belgrade, a conflict that was only prevented from spinning
into a wider, more dangerous confrontation because NATO captain James Blunt — yes, that
James Blunt — and a British general refused to follow Wesley Clark’s command to take
control of a Russian-held airport in Pristina, Kosovo. Kennan’s warnings about the effect of this
expansion were prescient. He warned that it would “inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and
militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion” and “impel Russian foreign policy in a
direction decidedly not to our liking.” When Yeltsin, leading a weakened Russia, had no choice but to accept
NATO expansion at a 1997 summit with Clinton in Helsinki, Russian politicians denounced it as “the largest military threat to our
country over the last fifty years” and “a Treaty of Versailles for Russia.” “There was no reason for this whatsoever,” Kennan told the
New York Times’s Thomas Friedman about the expansion. “Of course there is going to be a bad reaction from Russia, and then [the
NATO expanders] will say that we always told you that is how the Russians are — but this is just wrong.” As early as 1997, Kennan
fretted that it would result in “a new Cold War, probably ending in a hot one, and the end of the effort to achieve a workable
democracy in Russia.” This is a history that is almost entirely left out of most defenses of NATO in the mainstream press, not to
mention in accounts of Putin’s aggressive actions. And it’s no mere excuse-making on behalf of the Kremlin. Even Michael McFaul —
Obama’s ambassador to Russia between 2012 and 2014, and far from a Putin apologist or dove — acknowledged in a recent debate
that Russian policymakers have reacted to “aggressive US policies,” including the Iraq War and US support for “color revolutions” in
Eastern Europe, which “intensified conflict and tension in US-Russia relations .” McFaul also argues that
the other major ingredient was the 2012 return to power of Putin, a reactive leader paranoid about American intentions in the
region who is inclined to view US actions with mistrust. This
is an alarming cocktail, especially as the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists has warned that the world is closer to nuclear annihilation
than it’s ever been thanks partly due to tensions with Russia . And it’s only been made
worse by last week’s summit. While most of the media spent the NATO summit chiding Trump for supposedly
undermining NATO at the behest of Putin, the summit produced a marked military escalation implicitly
aimed at Russia, and there is evidence that Trump’s haranguing of European leaders actually succeeded in ramping up
already provocative NATO military spending. Yet not only is there an almost total absence of voices in the mainstream media calling
for a de-escalation of tensions between the US and Russia, it’s members of the media — liberal ones, very often — who are virtually
baying for conflict with Putin, arguing, as George Kennan had warned they would, that Putin’s reactive aggression is simply “how the
Russians are.” With two minutes until midnight on the doomsday clock, and an
atmosphere of historically bad
mutual mistrust between Russia and Western leadership, the commentariat has nearly unanimously
cast suspicion on an entirely routine diplomatic meeting between Trump and his Russian counterpart (and one Trump has taken
more than twice as long to undertake than his predecessors) where they are set to discuss reducing their nuclear weapons, before
transitioning to calling for its cancellation. When you ignore Trump’s rhetoric — as commentators correctly tend to do when the
subject is domestic policy — his administration has been one of the more aggressive toward Russia in recent memory. That most of
the media ignores this is mirrored by their fierce,
unanimous defense of NATO, one that entirely leaves
out the alliance’s failures and the fact that it’s brought us to this perilous moment . Turning
Back the Clock At best, NATO is a Cold War relic whose attempts to broaden its mission in the
twenty-first century have been disastrous failures. At worst, it’s a vehicle for anti-Russian
provocation that both strengthens the hand of reactionary forces in Russia and edges
the world closer and closer to armed, potentially nuclear, conflict. Yes, getting rid of NATO is one
of Putin’s most cherished goals. But that fact alone shouldn’t color debate over NATO, any more than it would be a good idea to
launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine just because Putin wouldn’t like it. We are in a dangerous moment in history, as the vast
majority of media coverage has focused on wild conspiracies about whether or not the US president is Putin’s “asset” instead of on
the rapidly escalating tensions between Russia and the West. This escalation should be rolled back. One
way to do that
involves questioning the continued existence of NATO, as it has played a key role in
bringing tensions to their current boiling point. The scope of debate shouldn’t depend on whatever the US
president does or says on any given day.

NATO provokes Russian aggression

German, senior lecturer on Defense Studies at King's College London, 17 (Tracey, 03.01.17,
“NATO and the enlargement debate: enhancing Euro-Atlantic security or inciting
confrontation?” International Affairs, Volume 93, Issue 2, https://academic-oup-
com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ia/article/93/2/291/2996078) np
Russian roadblock The post-Soviet Euro-Atlantic paths of Georgia and Ukraine may be dissimilar, but both countries face Russian hostility to closer ties
and integration with the alliance: Moscow's antipathy towards Georgian and/or Ukrainian membership of NATO and indeed towards any further
enlargement of the alliance continues to act as a roadblock to accession. Enlargement has been a persistent irritant for
Moscow since the end of the Cold War, reflected in statements from Yeltsin's 1995 warning that further enlargement would
mean a ‘conflagration of war throughout Europe’ to the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS), discussed below.54 Russia's then Foreign Minister
Yevgeny Primakov outlined the country's view in 1996 in a statement that, with hindsight, sounds a warning: We do not want the old bloc divisions to
be replaced with new ones that would divide the world into two parts. That is why Russia is against NATO expansion … We have taken a negative
position on this and we will stick to it. Of course, this does not mean that we can veto new admissions … But we have the right to protect our national
interests, and if NATO advances to our territory, we will take adequate measures in terms of military construction and will try to remedy the geo-
political situation.55 Enlargement was perceived to be aimed at checking Russia's foreign and domestic
ambitions and excluding it from any future European security order. NATO's global reach and enlargement
have been consistently criticized by Moscow in formal policy documents since the accession of the
three Baltic states in 2004, which brought the alliance into the post-Soviet space and up to the borders of
Russian territory. The 2009 NSS stated that ‘plans to extend the alliance's military infrastructure to Russia's

borders, and attempts to endow NATO with global functions that go counter to norms of
international law, are unacceptable to Russia’ .56 The 2013 Foreign Policy Concept echoed this antagonistic attitude towards
NATO enlargement, describing the presence of the alliance's military infrastructure near Russia's borders as violating the principle of equal security and
contributing to the emergence of ‘new dividing lines in Europe’.57 NATO'senhanced capabilities, global scope and
enlargement were identified as the principal risk to Russian national security in the 2014 military
doctrine, while the updated NSS, published in 2015, makes several references to NATO's global reach and interests, its ‘violation’ of international
norms, further enlargement and the advance of its military infrastructure towards Russia's borders—all of which are considered as threats to Russian
national security.58 NATO enlargement has contributed to Russia's perception —buttressed by the alliance's action
against Serbia in 1999—that the alliance is an offensive military organization that is seeking to undermine
the Russian regime and its system of values, and is prepared to interfere in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. Moscow's
reaction to the 2008 Bucharest summit and its subsequent military intervention in Georgia surprised many in the
international community, including NATO, and reinforced growing concerns about an increasingly assertive

Russia that would take all possible steps to maintain its traditional ‘sphere of influence’ . Until then,
there had been an assumption that Russian expressions of unease about enlargement were merely rhetorical, leading to disregard of warnings such as
that uttered in March 2008 by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that there would be a ‘substantial negative geopolitical shift’ if either Georgia or
Ukraine became a NATO member state.59 Eight years later, in July 2016, this warning was echoed by Russia's permanent envoy to NATO, Alexander
Grushko, who accused NATO of seeking to impose new dividing lines on Europe and cautioned that Russia
would do everything to
ensure its defence and that NATO's eastwards expansion would be counterproductive, as it
subjected Russia to ‘risks and threats’.60 Unfortunately, the alliance has consistently overlooked (or disregarded) the declared
position of the Russian leadership vis-à-vis further enlargement, thereby triggering the very renewed divisions between East and West that it has
sought to avoid.
NATO creates divisions in European security and provokes Russia – it’ll escalate
into war
Cross, Professor of National Security Studies, George C. Marshall European Center for Security
Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 15 (Sharyl, 07.20.15, “NATO–Russia security
challenges in the aftermath of Ukraine conflict: managing Black Sea security and beyond,”
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 15, 2015 - Issue 2, https://www-
tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2015.1060017) np

The relationship between NATO and the former Soviet Union and now Russia has been at the centre of
European and international politics for over 60 years. Manfred Woerner signalled a clear change in the East–West
relationship in response to transformation in the former Soviet bloc during the first ever visit of a NATO Secretary General to
Moscow in 1990: ‘… The time for confrontation is over. The hostility of mistrust of the past must be buried. We see your country,
and other countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization, no longer as adversaries but as partners …’ (NATO 1990NATO. 1990.
Speech by Secretary General Manfred Woerner to Members of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. NATO-On-Line-Library, July 16.
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1990/s900716a_e.htm(accessed April 4, 2015). [Google Scholar]). Despite these overtures,
NATO and Russia have not been able to achieve the stated intention of forging a partnership.
Russia’s sensitivity regarding the enlargement of the NATO Alliance has been a consistent source
of serious tension. Although few might have anticipated the deterioration of the European/Eurasian security environment
that we have witnessed as a result of the Ukrainian conflict, in many respects, Russia’s clash with the West over
Ukraine might have been anticipated. Regrettably, despite all the changes and new opportunities that were created as
a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, NATO nations and the Russian Federation
still remained very much locked into a perceptual mindset of a bifurcated Europe . While many in the
international security community attempted to move the frame of reference to new realities and building a common European
security community among nations with significant shared interests, there were also those who continued to frame and
amplify issues in terms of the ‘great game’ or ‘contest’ among the West and Russia. Therefore, rather
than fostering a collaborative security community in which nations in the Balkans, Caucasus or
Central Asia could maintain and develop ties both with the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, these countries were
positioned so as to have to make a ‘choice’ – either the West or Russia. The tensions between
Russia and the West have culminated in the current crisis in Ukraine, which threatens not only to
devastate the society, but also to unravel all progress achieved in building greater peace and security in Europe and the
world since the end of the Cold War. The recent annexation of Crimea and intervention in support of
separatist groups in the East represent a desire of the Russian leadership and society to re-
assert Russia’s role in protecting perceived interests and challenging United States and Western
influence among their close neighbours. Moscow’s behaviour with respect to Ukraine has elicited strong objection in
the West. At the Wales Summit of September 2014, the 28 members of the NATO Alliance issued the statement suggesting that
‘Russia’s aggressive actions against Ukraine have fundamentally challenged our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace…’
(NATO 2014NATO. 2014. Wales summit declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in Wales. NATO Press Release. Brussels: NATO, September 5. [Google Scholar]) and also affirming that NATO
nations ‘… condemn in the strongest terms Russia’s escalating illegal military intervention in Ukraine …’ (NATO 2014NATO. 2014.
Wales summit declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Wales. NATO Press Release. Brussels: NATO, September 5. [Google Scholar]). NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg noted in
January 2015 that: ‘Crimea has been annexed-borders have been changed by use of force -for the first time since the Second World
War. And we see that Russia is destabilizing Ukraine and supporting the separatists in eastern Ukraine …’(NATO 2015aNATO. 2015a.
Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. NATO Press Release. Statement at the Christian Social Union (CSU)
Conference, January 8, in Wilbad Kreuth, Germany. [Google Scholar]). Alexander Vershbow, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General,
described the consequences of Russia’s action for the international security environment in Oslo in 2015, noting that … To the East,
Russia has torn up the international rule book. It has returned to a strategy of power politics. It threatens not just Ukraine, but
European and global security more generally … Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident,
but a game changer in European security. It reflects an evolving pattern of behavior that has
been emerging for several years … (NATO 2015bNATO. 2015b. Prospects for NATO–Russia Relations. Keynote Address
by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. Address at the Leangkollen Conference, February 2, in Oslo,
Norway. [Google Scholar]) Russia’s
recent actions in Ukraine have resulted in sanctions from the West
and repositioning of United States (US) and NATO forces and resources in Europe aimed to reassure
allies. Experts in the US, Russia and Europe warn that we have moved into a new ‘Cold War’ or even
potential ‘Hot War’ with the Russian Federation since the rules of the game during the current period of conflict are
far more ambiguous than during the decades of the Cold War.

Ideological differences ensure tensions are high between NATO and Russia –
expansion will only fuel Russian anger
Wolff, Assistant Professor of Political Science, International Studies and Security Studies at
Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 15 (Andrew T., 09.16.15, “The future of NATO
enlargement after the Ukraine crisis,” International Affairs, Volume 91, Issue 5, September 2015,
Pages 1103–1121, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/future-nato-enlargement-
after-ukraine-crisis/INTA91_5_10_Wolff.pdf) np

The Ukrainian crisis has created the deepest rift between Russia and the West since the end of
the Cold War. This rift is a result of a complex mixture of economic, political and historical factors, but one of its more curious
antecedents is a disagree- ment over an alleged promise made over 20 years ago. Russia says the origins of the
Ukraine crisis lie in NATO’s decision to expand the alliance eastward . In a televised interview in the spring
of 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin asserted: ‘We were promised (I mentioned this at the Munich security confer-
ence) that after Germany’s uni cation, NATO wouldn’t spread eastward. The then NATO Secretary-General
told us that the alliance wouldn’t expand beyond its eastern borders .’ Putin went on to admit that the fear
of1Ukrainian entry into NATO had partly motivated his decision to annex Crimea. The Russian
govern- ment views the situation in Ukraine through a lens of repeated western betrayal, creeping NATO
encroachment and disrespect for its security concerns . Western governments see the situation differently. For
them, the crisis in Ukraine was sparked by Russian intervention in the internal a airs of Ukraine via the illegal annexation of Crimea
and the backing of separatist groups in the Donbas region. As for Russia’s complaints of betrayal, western leaders argue that NATO
enlargement plays no part in the crisis because enlargement provides stability for all of Europe, and therefore is not threatening to
Russia.2 The West attributes the persistent tensions between itself and Russia to the latter’s unwillingness to under- take liberal
reforms and to cooperate with western powers, a reluctance it sees as arising from historical phobias and longings for the return of
past greatness. It is clear that the two sides view the Ukraine crisis very di erently. These interpretative differences are more than
semantics or verbal sparring. Russia–NATO tensions have practical implications for stability on the
European continent. Thus, it is important to ascertain what, if any, role NATO’s policy of enlargement did play
in creating the Ukraine crisis and to determine what the future options for enlargement are. This
article contends that the policy of enlargement caused a signi cant and longstanding breach in relations
between the West and Russia. Moreover, the tensions produced by NATO enlargement are part of a
much broader disagreement grounded in the opposition between a liberal-minded West and a
geopolitically-minded Russia. In order to reduce these tensions, NATO leaders must admit they have failed in their
attempts to turn Russia into a reliable, western-oriented partner, realize that their open-door enlargement policy has created
insecurity in Europe, and alter this policy by injecting it with geopolitical reasoning. Geopolitics refers to the policy-making tool that
combines geography, strategy and relative power.3 It considers how concepts of territory and proximity interact with political
variables, and seeks to create a map of power di erentials among vari- ous political units.4 In terms of NATO enlargement,
geopolitics means evaluating countries for membership on the basis not of normative criteria but of how their inclusion increases
overall alliance security, especially in relationship to Russia. It also suggests that buffer
zones play an important role in
international a airs by reducing tensions between the West and Russia through the creation of
separating space.5 A geopolitically driven enlargement policy would seek to establish Ukraine as
a neutral buffer zone. Overall, using geopolitics in enlargement policy would have the e ect of strengthening the alliance,
providing more exibility in dealing with Russia and, ultimately, creating greater stability on the European
continent.6 This article begins by reviewing diplomatic history in order to trace the evolu- tion of NATO–Russia tensions over
enlargement. It shows that Russia’s opposition to NATO expansion, while uctuating in intensity, has been a
consistent source of animosity in NATO–Russia relations since the end of the Cold War. These
tensions are more than a matter of policy dispute; they are fuelled by opposing world-views—Russia’s geopolitical
perspective and the West’s liberal outlook— which clash over the structure of European security. The article also
presents three options for the future of enlargement policy, and shows that a geopolitical strategy would spur the alliance on to
pursue enlargement in the Balkans and Scandinavia, but would deny admission to Georgia and Ukraine. The closing sections explain
the challenges of adopting a geopolitical enlargement policy, and describe how such a policy would bene t the alliance and improve
relations with Russia.
 --- XT – Russia War – Impact
Outweighs on scope, the United States and Russia have the largest nuclear
arsenals a war would be catastrophic and kill off all life
Owen Cotton-Barratt et al, 17 - PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at
Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute; “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and
Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even
in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither
country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and
radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send
massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere , which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling,
severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of
4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it
impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New
Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other
sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and
Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons , with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads
each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war
involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk
of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to
outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely
to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global
climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better
understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It
is very difficult to precisely
estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts
leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between
India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of
human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions
between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further
in the future.
 --- XT – Draws US into War
NATO commitments force the US to come to the defense of allies – it’ll draw
the US into war
Carpenter, senior fellow in defense and foreign-policy studies at the Cato Institute and a
contributing editor at the National Interest, 18 (Ted Galen, 01.22.18, “How Rigid Alliances Have
Locked Us Into Unwanted Conflicts,” https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/how-
rigid-alliances-have-locked-us-into-unwanted-conflicts/) np

NATO’s Article 5 is dangerously close to an automatic commitment to go to war if a member state becomes
embroiled in any armed conflict. But determining whether an ally is victim or aggressor can be
extremely difficult. The Baltic republics, for example, have rather tense relations with their Russian
neighbor. Two of them also have large Russian minorities that would likely look to Moscow for
protection if discrimination against them becomes blatant and onerous. If fighting broke out, it
would be extremely difficult to refrain from coming to the aid of a treaty ally, even if a Baltic government
provoked the incident. There are other worrisome possibilities as well . Consider the November 2015

incident in which Turkey shot down a Russian jet fighter that had strayed into Turkish airspace for a mere 17 seconds.
Moscow’s response to that outrageous action was restrained and peaceful. But what would Washington’s options have been

if Putin had ordered airstrikes against the offending Turkish missile batteries ? One could argue that Turkey
was not the victim of aggression but had committed aggression. Yet U.S. leaders would have been under tremendous

pressure to honor the security pledge to a treaty member. Continuing the forward deployment
of military forces intensifies the risks that rigid U.S. security commitments already entail. It is
imprudent to station troops, tanks, warplanes, and missiles in NATO countries near the Russian frontier.
Even a minor incident could instantly engulf those units in combat, effectively foreclosing Washington’s policy
options. Indeed, that is why those members want the U.S. deployments. Daniel Szeligowski, senior research fellow at the Polish Institute for
International Affairs, emphasized, “From the Polish perspective, the deployment of U.S. troops to Poland and Baltic states means a real deterrence
since it increases the probability of the U.S. forces engagement in case of potential aggression from Russia.” For the United States to severely limit its
policy options regarding war and peace was dubious enough when the stakes involved strategically important allies. But NATO’s

membership expansion since the mid-1990s greatly magnifies the folly. America is now incurring
the same grievous risks to defend tiny, strategically marginal “allies” (actually, dependents) such as
Slovenia, Montenegro, and the Baltic republics . The same effect occurs with the stationing of U.S. forces near the
Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. The DMZ would be the flashpoint in any conflict that erupted between the two Korean states, and
American military personnel would be drawn into the fighting from day one. Denying
U.S. leaders the element of choice
about participating in a war that involved U.S. allies was the whole point of deploying such
tripwire forces during the Cold War. Such inflexibility was unwise even when the United States
faced an existential threat to its security. It is incredible folly to perpetuate those self-imposed shackles when no such threat
exists. America needs a policy for the 21st century that maximizes the republic’s options while reducing both its obligations and attendant risks.
 --- XT – Burden on US
Russia isn’t a threat – NATO only creates an unnecessary burden on the US
Whiton, a State Department senior advisor during the George W. Bush administration, 18
(Christian, 07.06.18, “NATO Is Obsolete,” https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nato-obsolete-
25167) np

Before President Donald Trump attempts real diplomacy with Russian President Vladimir Putin at a summit in
Helsinki on July 16, he'll first be subjected to another summit . That first summit is a gathering of leaders
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These leaders continually assure the United
States they are America's best allies, even as most contribute little to America's defense and
rack up huge trade surpluses with the United States. Trump will insist on a better deal but
should go farther and wind down U.S. membership in NATO. After the alliance was established in
1949, its first secretary general, Lord Hastings Ismay, summed up its purpose concisely: “ to keep the Russians out, the
Americans in, and the Germans down.” The unofficial mission matched the time well: Western Europe’s postwar
future was clouded by the prospect of a Soviet invasion, American insularity, or German militarism—all possible given the preceding
decades of history. Nearly seventy years later, none of these concerns still exist. Furthermore, NATO's
opposing alliance during the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact, quit the Soviet Bloc in 1989, and the Soviet Union itself passed into history
in 1991—twenty-seven years ago. Despite endless searches for a new mission to justify its massive burden
on U.S. taxpayers, NATO has failed to be of much use since then. As its boosters like to remind
us, after 9/11, the alliance invoked its Article 5 mutual-defense provision on our behalf. But action
from America’s allies did not follow the grandiose gesture—the NATO mission in Afghanistan
relied mostly on U.S. forces and effectively failed. Today, the alliance’s bureaucrats and some member
states spotlight a threat from Russia as a reason for keeping the organization alive , along with a
laundry list of “train and equip” missions. Yet NATO members' defense budgets don't reflect a real sense of
danger from Russia or anyone else. Among the twenty-nine members, only the United States is really
serious about its Article 3 obligations to defend itself, spending approximately $700 billion or 3.5
percent of its GDP on defense. No other NATO member comes close to this proportion, and the vast
majority fail even to meet the modest, self-imposed requirement to devote at least 2 percent of GDP to
defense. Britain and Poland are rare members that meet the 2 percent requirement. One of the worst free-riders is Canada, which
spends just 1 percent of its GDP on security, amounting to $20 billion. Furthermore, Germany spends a similarly pathetic 1.2
percent. Compare that to non-NATO members facing real threats, some of which spend 5-10 percent of their GDPs on defense.
These include Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who must contend with Iran and spend nearly a combined $100 billion.
Israel, which faces the same enemy, adds $15 billion to the equation. Despite protestations of poverty at a time when their
economies have never been larger, NATO members are more than willing to rack up additional liabilities,
knowing America has their back. Last year, the alliance welcomed Montenegro. It is now poised
to admit the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which would mean the United States is pledged to defend a nation
that devotes just $120 million per year to its own defense, not quite as much as the Cincinnati Police Department. But the reality
is there is no truly capable Russian foe seriously threatening the West. Russia has one million
uniformed personnel in its military, the world’s second-largest behind America, but the
European Union could easily afford to match that with its combined $17 trillion economy—ten times larger than
Russia’s. However, it needn’t bother as Moscow spends just $61 billion on its overwrought military, which doubles as an
employment program. Russia’s Vladimir Putin has gotten the most from Russia’s military, occupying parts of Georgia and Ukraine
and gaining influence in Syria by backing the Assad regime. Still, his success in all three cases rested heavily on surprises that
Moscow seems unlikely to be able to repeat against prepared and adequately funded European militaries. Yer we should expect to
hear none of this nuance at the NATO summit, as poohbahs of the dying old European political order gather to tut-tut President
Trump in the alliance’s fancy new $1.4 billion headquarters, funded predominantly by American taxpayers. To get out of this abusive
relationship, Trump should begin the process of limiting America's role in NATO. A good model is that of
Sweden, which cooperates with NATO on some matters and not on others. Such an approach could allow joint training, but
end the practice of having over-burdened U.S. taxpayers foot the bill for wealthy Europeans'
security. As part of this plan, Trump could mothball U.S. bases in Europe and shift most resources spent there and in the Atlantic
to the Indo-Pacific region, where China and Iran pose real threats to America—and against which NATO is irrelevant. Europe is
prosperous and treats America like a patsy. Let it stand on its own.
 AT: Russia !! – NATO Ineffective
NATO is ineffective at responding to Russian threats
Glick, columnist, journalist, and author and political activist, July 10, 2018
(Caroline, NATO is the author of its own demise, https://carolineglick.com/nato-is-the-author-of-its-own-demise/)

One of the interesting aspects of the hysteria is that NATO’s supporters never seem to think it is
necessary to explain why it would be a bad idea to end the alliance. In a spate of interviews
ahead of the summit, NATO Ambassador Kay Bailey Hutchinson enumerated the many ways that
Russia threatens Europe and U.S. interests. But while the threats she mentioned – political
subversion through social media, nerve agent attacks in Great Britain, support for Syrian dictator
Bashar Assad, violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ( INF) treaty, and
annexation of Crimea – are all major threats, they are not the main threats that the U.S. faces
today. Moreover, NATO has been ineffective in confronting these malign actions by Russia.
NATO’s ineffectiveness ought to be the key issue of discussion when considering its future. But
to date, that weakness has been largely overlooked in the rush to blame Trump for allegedly
destroying America’s alliances.

NATO would not be able to win a war with Russia – proves they are ineffective
at keeping Russia stable
Ritter, former intelligence officer and weapons inspector, June 7, 2017
(Scott, NATO Would Be Totally Outmatched In A Conventional War With Russia, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/nato-war-with-
russia_b_59381db9e4b0b13f2c65e892)
It was widely expected that President Trump would give remarks appropriate to the occasion,
praising the alliance and reinforcing its unifying principle of collective security. Instead,
America’s NATO allies where chastised for their collective failure to comply with a target level of
defense spending equivalent to two percent of each member’s gross national product . “Twenty-
three of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying and what
they’re supposed to be paying for their defense,” Trump scolded the assembled leaders of
NATO. “If all NATO members had spent just 2 percent of their GDP on defense last year, we
would have had another $119 billion for our collective defense and for the financing of
additional NATO reserves.” While he mentioned the terror attack of 9/11, Donald Trump did not
raise the issue of Article 5, even indirectly. From Donald Trump’s transactional world view, when
it comes to collective defense, you have to pay to play; Europe was in arrears, and the president
was not about to reward them for that fact. For a national defense neophyte like Donald Trump,
military prowess is measured in dollars allocated to the task, something that can be measured
on a spreadsheet for accountants to pore over. For anyone acquainted with the reality of war,
however, these numbers translate into blood and steel. By any standard, blood and steel, circa
2017, is prohibitively expensive. In 1980, the annual cost of maintaining an American soldier
hovered around $30,000; today that cost is $170,000 and growing. The M-1 Abrams main battle
tank, which entered service in 1980, cost $4.3 million each. The cost of refurbishing an M-1 tank
to the new M-1A2 standard needed to fight and survive on the modern battlefield is between
$8-10 million. When combined together into an armored brigade combat team, the 4,700
soldiers, 87 M-1 main battle tanks, and hundreds of other armored fighting vehicles costs a
staggering $2.6 billion per year to operate and maintain in a peacetime environment; combat
operations and/or realistic training deployments increase that cost by at least another billion
dollars. For a national defense neophyte like Donald Trump, military prowess is measured in
dollars. These costs are prohibitively high, which is why only five of the U.S. Army’s 15 armored
brigade combat teams are maintained at full readiness levels. The Heritage Foundation has
estimated that the U.S. Army would need at least 21 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) equivalents to
fight and prevail in a ground war in Europe; it currently maintains three BCTs in Europe,
including one on permanent rotation. Effective European-based deterrence would require an
additional three to four American BCTs, at a cost of more than $15 billion in annual operation
and maintenance costs, and hundreds of millions in basing and support expenses. Blood and
steel for our NATO allies is no less expensive; the cost of a German soldier hovers at just over
$100,000 per year, while the cost of a German Leopard 2 main battle tank built the new 2A7V
standard costs around $10 million; Germany plans on bringing over 100 Leopard 2 tanks back
into service between 2019 and 2023 (enough to equip two armored battalions) and increasing
the Bundeswehr’s inventory to some 320 tanks. Germany would need to double this amount at
a minimum to possess a realistic deterrent capability, an option mooted by the fact that the
German Army has trouble keeping 30 percent of the armored forces it currently possesses
operational. The associated expenses and relative operational readiness status for the French
and British militaries are about the same as Germany; neither country is even remotely
prepared to fight, let alone prevail, in a major ground war in Europe against a Russian foe.
 AT: Democracy !! – Democracy Bad
Democratic promotion causes war
D’Anieri, PhD in Governemtn, 17
(Paul, 09.25.17, “Democratic Peace - or War? Paul D'Anieri Assesses the Russia-Ukraine Conflict”
URI at Harvard University, http://www.huri.harvard.edu/news/news-from-huri/319-danieri-
democratic-peace.html) np

Does the spread of democracy really lead to peace? Or could it actually incite war? On Monday,
October 2, 2017, Paul D’Anieri will explore this topic at HURI’s Seminar in Ukrainian Studies, focusing on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
in 2014. Currently a Eugene and Daymel Shklar Research Fellow at HURI, D’Anieri is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at
the University of California, Riverside. While the talk is centered on the Russia-Ukraine story, it may be of interest to political
scientists and other scholars exploring democratization and the democratic peace theory more broadly. “I’ll be discussing the
paradoxical ways in which two
things that we thought would go together in post-communist Europe—
democracy and peace—came into tension with one another , and how this played into Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine,” D’Anieri said. “The talk also addresses the competing normative orders that the West on one hand, and
Russia and China on the other, are prescribing to maintain peace in the future.” D’Anieri’s presentation, “Democracy and Geopolitics
in the Conflict Over Ukraine,” takes place in Room S-050 of Harvard’s CGIS South Building (1730 Cambridge Street). All are welcome
to attend. A video of the event will also be available on HURI's YouTube channel for those who can’t join us in person. To gain some
more insight into D’Anieri’s research and upcoming presentation, we asked a few questions: HURI: How does this topic fit into the
research you are doing as a Shklar Fellow at HURI? D’Anieri: My
research at HURI is focusing on the long-term
sources of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. I am looking at the problem both chronologically and thematically. The
problem of democracy and the spread of democracy is one that comes up again and again . In the
1990s, people in the West generally assumed that the spread of democracy would be a source of
peace in the region, but by 2013, Russia saw democratization as a threat worth fighting over. I
want to delve into how and why that happened . HURI: Why did you choose this topic? D’Anieri: This is an
aspect of the current conflict that is not well understood, and that has important implications in
the future, not only for Ukraine and Russia, but also for the West’s relationship with China and
other non-democratic powers. HURI: Aside from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, are there other instances you know of
where democracy is perceived as a weapon? Any striking similarities or differences? D’Anieri: The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization is largely dedicated helping the members resist the “colored revolutions” they all see as a threat. While I am not an
expert on China, I think that China probably resists
liberalization not only to preserve the power of the
current regime, but because it fears that democracy would undermine China’s campaign to
become a great power. HURI: Given the perceived “weaponization” of democracy and the backlash it incited, do you think
this relates at all to the alleged Russian involvement in the most recent US election? Does the presidency of Donald Trump change
the game when it comes to this aspect of the Russia-Ukraine conflict? D’Anieri: Russian leaders quite clearly looked at the colored
revolutions and decided that they needed both to be able to resist them, and to deploy the same tactics for their own ends. That
helps explain their intervention in elections abroad. Trump is interesting not only in that he naturally adopts some of the same
practices, but also in that he may agree with Putin that it does not matter whether another country is democratic or not. HURI: Is
there one particular fact or insight about your topic that you find especially interesting? Anything in your research that surprised
you? D’Anieri: I’ve been rereading a lot of the US discussion of Russia from the 1990s, and what’s amazing is that despite the
rancorous partisanship that characterized almost everything else, the
right and left were in unison that the
promotion of democracy was both virtuous and in the national interest . Similarly, while a lot of
people have criticized the expansion of NATO in hindsight, one reason that it went through is that it
made sense both to liberals who supported the spread of democracy and realists who wanted to
hedge against Russian revanchism. HURI: Anything thing else we should know? D’Anieri: If I wanted to provoke, I would
say this: Some of the potential conclusions of this research might make us very uncomfortable. While many skeptics have doubted
that democracy causes peace, we haven’t really considered that trying to spread democracy could be a cause of war. If so, there will
be some hard choices to face in the future.
Democracy causes disease spread – authoritarianism solves
Schwartz, Political Science Professor at State University of New York, 12 (Jonathon, 07.19.12,
“Compensating for the ‘Authoritarian Advantage’ in Crisis Response: A Comparative Case Study
of SARS Pandemic Responses in China and Taiwan,” Journal of Chinese Political Science,
September 2012, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp 313–331) np

In the aftermath of the SARS epidemic much was made of China’s effective efforts at disease
control and prevention. China’s perceived success in controlling SARS stands in stark contrast with
Taiwan’s troubled response to its own SARS outbreak . Why does Taiwan, a geographically small, densely
populated country with a democratic government, wealthy and modern knowledge-based economy, fail to effectively respond to
SARS whereas big, heavily populated, relatively under-developed and authoritarian China succeeds? Does regime type explain
China’s relative success, and to the extent that regime type matters, what can be done to compensate for China’s ‘authoritarian
advantage’ in crisis response? To address these questions I conduct a comparative analysis of pandemic
response by Taiwan and China. Due to space limitations, I focus primarily on Taiwan, drawing on previous studies of
China to highlight the differences between Chinese and Taiwanese responses. In the final section I draw on this comparison to
identify means to compensate for China’s ‘authoritarian advantage’. Crisis and Response The crisis literature distinguishes between
routine crises and novel crises. In routine crises (frequently recurring crises such as fires and floods), political leaders may defer to
operational commanders – people such as fire fighters or police officers - who have dealt with similar crises in the past. These
operational commanders have trained for, and perhaps experienced similar crises and are able to respond effectively with only
moderate adaptation of existing crisis response procedures [1]. However, this approach cannot be followed in the case of novel
crises. Novel crises are crises where there is little past experience to draw on. Such crises include massive events such as hurricane
Katrina, the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami or the 9/11 attacks on the United States that explode on the scene, or more
insidious crises such as the spread of a previously unknown infectious disease that only slowly makes itself evident. Of the two types
of novel crises the insidious type is often far more dangerous. The danger lies in the likelihood that the leadership will fail to
recognize the insidious crisis as a crisis because it develops only slowly and seems amenable to existing response strategies. As a
result, the leadership may become aware of the crisis only after it has become widespread or more threatening [2]. SARS is an
example of insidious crises. It at first went unrecognized and only slowly did the leadership come to realize the immensity of the
threat it represented. Both forms of novel crises require flexible leadership and response capabilities. The leadership must quickly
identify the challenge, engage relevant bureaucracies, implement a response, communicate the nature of the crisis and response
effectively and clearly to the public, and control the message as it is being broadcast by the media to the public. These already
extremely challenging tasks must be accomplished in a compressed timeframe under highly stressful conditions. Not surprisingly,
governments often fail. Some authors
argue that an already challenging situation for leaders is made
even more so if they are functioning in a democratic system. In democracies, major emergencies
require involvement by multiple jurisdictions and many levels of representative government.
Coordinating among these often overlapping and contentious jurisdictions can be difficult.
Politicians must identify and justify priorities and actions to local leaders, the public and the
mass media.1 These same authors suggest that the challenges are less significant in authoritarian regimes.
Authoritarian leaders enjoy an ‘authoritarian advantage’, being less likely to need to negotiate
with bureaucracies over jurisdictional powers or struggle to disentangle overlapping institutions .
Furthermore, the media and by extension the message to the public are more easily controlled.
 AT: Democracy !! – Resilient
Democracy is resilient
Kurt Weyland & RauL L. Madrid 17, Weyland is the Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts at
the University of Texas at Austin, Madrid is professor of government at the University of Texas
at Austin, 12-11-2017, "Liberal Democracy Is Stronger Than Trump’s Populism", American
Interest, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/12/11/liberal-democracy-stronger-
trumps-populism/

When Donald Trump unexpectedly won the presidential election of 2016, many observers worried that the new
President’s populist proclivities would do serious damage to American democracy. International experiences as
much as Trump’s domineering personality and autocratic style inspired these concerns. After all, hosts of populists over many decades—from Juan Perón in Argentina to Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and dozens of
others in-between—have pushed their states toward illiberal or even authoritarian rule. In general, populism stands in inherent tension with liberal democracy. Populist leaders seek to boost their personal power
and hence see checks and balances as obstacles to their efforts to advance “the will of the people.” Whereas liberal democracy disperses and limits political power in order to guard against tyranny and promote
fair political competition, populist leaders seek to concentrate power. Therefore, successful populism tends to hollow out, if not strangle, democracy. Furthermore, populist leaders mobilize their supporters
through direct, personal appeals rather than relying on party organizations: They create new, broad and amorphous mass movements or layer them on top of conventional party organizations with the aim of
weakening or smothering them outright. Populist leaders use confrontation and polarization to attack “enemies” and incite conflict in hopes of energizing their followers and solidifying their backing. Populists
demonize critics and treat their political opponents as foes to be destroyed. By turning politics into a war of “us vs. them,” populism de-legitimates fair competition and weakens free and open public debate, both
of which are crucial for democracy. Populism’s stridency and Manichaean worldview undermine the toleration and humility that are central to liberal democracy. One year into the Trump presidency, how have
these threats played out to date? And what can we expect in the years ahead? Because this country has not had a populist leader occupy the presidency in 180 years, initial expectations varied. Some thought
President Trump would be able to grab political power, infringe on institutional rules, and undermine democratic competition. Others believed that independent parties, a robust civil society, and a strong checks-

and-balances framework would contain his populist assault and forestall damage to democracy. What does the record show so far and what is likely to occur in the future? One way to get at
this question is to employ a comparative perspective . In recent years, many democratic countries in Europe and Latin America have seen the rise—
and sometimes fall—of populist leaders. These experiences provide lessons on how contemporary populists operate, and how liberal-democratic forces might respond. From them we can learn much about the

conditions under which populist strategies and tactics tend to succeed and those that more often portend failure. Four Obstacles in Trump’s Path While
populists in Europe and Latin America bear many similarities to Donald Trump, they have operated in
different political contexts that need to be taken into account when drawing comparisons. The main differences concern aspects of
the institutional framework, the party system, the cleavage structure, and the state of the economy
when the populists take power. These four factors augur well for liberal democracy in the United States, making it difficult for

President Trump’s putative populist machinations to triumph. First, the United States has a presidential system of government with a clear separation

of power between the chief executive, the two houses of Congress, and the courts. These institutional checks and balances hinder the populist

quest for concentrating personal power. The parliamentary systems prevailing in Europe offer
less resistance to would-be populist autocrats. A party that wins a majority in the legislature elects the Prime Minister (such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary), who heads the Executive Branch. This
adds up to a great deal of concentrated power, which facilitates attempts to strangle liberal democracy. Not only is the distinction between legislative and executive branches blurred in such systems, but in

most continental countries the judiciary has less sway over politics than in the United States.
Not even a politically appointed Attorney General can readily obstruct this separation of
authority: Indeed, under Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution, Congress can impeach an Attorney General found guilty of
criminal behavior, whether the President who appointed him objects or not. In practice, Latin America’s systems of
government also diverge from U.S. presidentialism. While the continent’s constitutions prescribe a clear separation of powers, Presidents in the region typically enjoy much greater formal or informal authority
than their counterpart in the United States does. Moreover, some chief executives in Latin America accrue more power through various machinations that override formal strictures. In Europe and Latin America,
therefore, populist leaders who command majority support can often establish political hegemony—which enables them to undermine democracy as they deem desirable. Due to the institutional framework of
the United States, it is much harder for President Trump to do so. Second, populist leaders usually rise to power in countries where party systems are weak or are collapsing. Silvio Berlusconi, for instance, became
Prime Minister after a massive corruption scandal devastated Italy’s postwar party system. Similarly, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori and Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez won the presidency when established parties were
crumbling. In such fluid settings, populist leaders can create and dominate their own flimsy, unorganized mass movements. By contrast, Donald Trump has needed to deal with an existing party that he does not

The new President commands fervent support among the Republican mass base, but faces at least the
control and that did not want him to win its presidential nomination.

residual distrust and aversion of the GOP establishment. Because he has to deal with leaders
and legislators of an established party, no matter how hollow and weak compared to earlier
times, Trump is in a comparatively poor position . In this sense, he resembles Carlos Menem, the Argentine populist who won the presidential candidacy of
the Peronist Party through a primary election in 1988, but who never managed to dominate his venerable party during his ten years as President (1989–99). In fact, another Peronist leader eventually blocked

The political constraints that influential GOP barons still impose on President Trump are
Menem’s attempt to perpetuate himself in power.

also similar to those facing some populist leaders in European multiparty systems. Silvio
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia, for instance, never achieved a parliamentary majority on its own. Instead, the Italian populist needed coalition partners
to win and maintain his premiership. For this purpose, he had to negotiate with powerful
politicians whom he did not control. This is one important reason why Berlusconi never achieved
unchallengeable political hegemony, and so did not do lasting damage to Italy’s liberal
democracy. Third, Donald Trump won the chief executive office in a country that suffers from an unusual degree of political and ideological polarization, which offers him some political
opportunities, but also imposes important constraints on his populist designs. Populist leaders usually emerge when mainstream parties have converged in their policy programs and ideological positions.1
Because “the political establishment” leaves voters few real choices, many citizens flock to populist outsiders who promise to raise neglected issues. Venezuela’s Chávez, for instance, addressed widespread social
problems that previous governments had failed to resolve; in this way, he won the backing of 65-70 percent of the citizenry. In the United States, by contrast, the Republican and Democratic parties have engaged
in significant ideological and cultural sorting from the civil rights era onward. As a result, their party delegations in Congress vote in ever more distinct ways. The mass bases of the two parties have also moved

polarization prevailing in the United

further apart in recent years; in particular, fervent right-wing movements have pulled the GOP away from the moderate center. The

States makes it very difficult for Donald Trump to win majority support, despite the significant appeal of populist entreaties across the
political spectrum. Indeed, his presidential approval ratings have since May 2017 hovered below 40 percent. How can this U.S. populist credibly claim to represent “the people” when a majority disapproves of his
job performance and expresses its aversion to his personal leadership? Latin American populists, like Chávez and to a lesser extent Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández Kirchner in Argentina, have used landslide
victories in plebiscites and elections to cement their political hegemony and dismantle or weaken democracy, but the new U.S. leader’s middling level of support makes such a strategy unfeasible.

Americans are unlikely to coalesce into a broad mass base of support for Trump’s populism as
long as ideological and cultural polarization offers real choices that divide “the people.” Fourth,
Donald Trump faces a paradox, because President Obama left the U.S. economy in good shape
as measured by conventional standards, such as growth, inflation, and unemployment. When Trump ran for and
subsequently took office, the country was not suffering from a perceived severe or acute crisis. In
comparative perspective, the absence of pressing problems is unusual. Right-wing populists often emerge when their country is sliding toward the abyss. By claiming the mantle of the providential savior, these
political outsiders can benefit from dramatic crises as long as they seemingly or actually manage to pull the nation away from the brink. Peru’s Fujimori and Argentina’s Menem, for example, faced hyperinflation of
four to six thousand percent per year. When these populist presidents boldly defeated the scourge of inflation, large majorities felt enormous relief. As a result, Fujimori and Menem won sky-high popularity
ratings of up to 70-80 percent, which subsequently allowed them to dominate politics, change the constitution, and engineer their own reelection. The United States, however, did not suffer from a crisis in 2016
comparable to, say, the Great Depression of the 2007–09 period. Therefore, President Trump has lacked an opportunity to boost his backing dramatically. The structural problems that helped to fuel Trump’s rise,
such as de-industrialization and the loss of well-paying jobs, are not amenable to quick fixes. A bold adjustment plan can stop hyperinflation from one day to the next, but there is no rapid way, especially in a
market economy like that of the United States, to bring back millions of industrial jobs. Even a determined populist leader like Donald Trump cannot turn the Rust Belt into a string of shining, modern factories, or

The absence of an acute but resolvable crisis

magically resuscitate demand for coal when market factors decidedly point in the opposite direction.

deprives President Trump of the chance to win over masses of new followers from the ranks of
independents or Democrats. And a populist who is not very popular is not very powerful. In sum,
international experiences suggest that President Trump lacks important preconditions that
would allow him to win overwhelming support, relentlessly concentrate power , and undermine
liberal democracy. Populist leaders like Berlusconi and Orbán, Fujimori and Chávez encountered
open doors and unusual opportunities . By contrast, the U.S. President faces four sets of
interlocking obstacles. Firm checks and balances limit his power. The unreliable backing of his
own party prevents him from overriding these institutional and political constraints . Ideological
polarization and the absence of an acute crisis restrict his mass support. For these reasons, he cannot
make an end run, grab power, and weaken checks and balances , as Fujimori and Chávez did by convoking government-controlled
constituent assemblies. By international comparison, President Trump confronts an unfavorable environment

for establishing populist hegemony. President Trump’s Populist Strategy Given these four obstacles, what are the prospects of populism in the
United States? International experiences can shed light on President Trump’s political options for dealing with the institutional and political limitations he faces. These
experiences suggest that his limited mass support makes his strategy of relentless confrontation likely to fail. Comparative insights also elucidate the strategic dilemmas
confronting the opposition, which can choose between a direct counterattack against the brash populist or pragmatic efforts to entrap this inexperienced chief executive in a

Liberal democracy in the United States will

web of constraints. What emerges from the following discussion is a sanguine conclusion:

survive the challenges and risks that populist leadership poses . Certainly, Trump will continue to
transgress norms of accountability and civility during his term, but he is unlikely to effect lasting
changes, enshrine them in institutional reforms , and thus do more than temporary damage to
liberal democracy. The U.S. system, sustained by a pluralist civil society , has great resilience. In
fact, there is a good chance that the new President’s norm violations may generate a liberal-
democratic backlash that will reaffirm these principles after Trump’s departure, and perhaps
even strengthen their institutional protection.
 AT: Democracy !! – No Impact
No democracy impact---new trends
Potter, 16 - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia
(Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," Political Violence
at a Glance, 10-14-2016,

The point is that it’s not democracy alone that matters . Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their
leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a
baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out
how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them
from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should. There are four trends that indicate this
process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk. Militaries are less closely tied to voters
Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political
power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to
support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look
like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it. In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the
recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-
day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this
is a limited force supplemented by private sector
contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic
process. The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further
water down the link between society and soldiers . This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-
volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g.
the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to
increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force . In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it
allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long
term, it has the potential to lead to less caution and selectivity when engaging in conflicts.
Adversaries are proliferating and changing The emergence of non-state actors as a primary
threat has further loosened constraints on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with
the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges accelerated the transition from a mass military
to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society . Compounding the challenge, this type of
adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less
binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information,
but the challenge is harder when the adversaries are less familiar, the engagements shorter, and the issues
more complex. Technology is reducing constraint New technologies are driving citizens and
political opposition ever further out of the loop . The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in
combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable
strategic advantages, but there is less visibility and, accordingly, less accountability associated with the use of this
technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come
with casualties. Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president The recent nuclear
agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements
are now unilateral actions of the president . A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little
foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the
other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in
domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this
growing presidential
autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also decreases constraint and with it the foreign
policy “advantages” we associate with democracy . While these advantages are real, they are also
fragile. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are
susceptible to seemingly minor changes in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of
leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional
constraints wax and wane, the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems
may begin to erode. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.

Their studies are epistemically suspect – democracy doesn’t promote peace

Doorenspleet 2019 - Department of Politics and International Studies University of Warwick
Renske, Rethinking the Value of Democracy, Palgrave, p. 90-92

Almost all studies which try to explain war between countries have included the factor of
democracy as one of the possible explanations. However, those studies do not simply include a
country’s level of democracy in their analyses , but instead tend to focus on ‘democratic dyads’.
Hence, they look at explaining peace among democracies. They do not study the involvement of
democracies in war in general, or whether democracies are more peaceful in general. They
study the ‘dyadic democratic peace hypothesis’, which states that it is less likely that
democracies fight with each other, compared to other ‘dyads’ or other pairs of different types of
political systems. The ‘monadic democratic peace hypothesis’ has hardly been tested in
research. This lack of attention is not surprising, given the historical background of the
democratic peace field (cf. Geis et al. 2006: 4). This field has evolved in the subfield of
international relations and started as an alternative to the dominant realist assumptions about
war as a regular feature of politics in an anarchical system. This alternative research programme
was built around topics of international cooperation and regime building, and the main focus
was on how to explain cooperation and peace at the international level. So, the emphasis was,
for example, on the question whether democracies would fight less with each other. However,
in this way, scholars have missed some other crucial questions. For example, how to explain war
in general? Are some types of political systems less war-prone than others? Or, formulated
slightly differently, are democracies more peaceful than other types of political systems? As a
consequence, statistical studies focusing on such questions are rare, and the results are
confusing.

Democratic peace theory is a statistical artifact---empirical analysis

Mousseau 18 – Professor @ UCF, PhD PoliSci @ Binghamton [Michael, Conflict Management
and Peace Science, “Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the
democratic peace”, Vol 35(2) 175-192, SagePub, accessed 8/21/18]
A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace, the observed dearth of
militarized conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized market ‘‘contractualist’’
economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both
the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013;
see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that
democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010). Resolution of this
controversy is fundamental to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest
thing we have to an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the
spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary implication that universal
democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture
legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end
war (and support democracy), the contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and
Meierrieks, 2015; Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015). In the literature are five factual claims for
why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace: (1) an assertion that in three of the five studies that overturned
the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), the insignificance of democracy controlling for contractualist
economy is due to the treatment of missing data for contractualist economy (Dafoe et al., 2013, henceforth DOR); (2) a claim of
error in the measure for conflict (DOR) that appears in one of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau,
2013); (3) an alleged misinterpretation of an interaction term that appears in one of the five studies (Mousseau, 2009) that
overturned the democratic peace, along with in inference of democratic causality from an interaction of democracy with
contractualist economy (Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR); (4) a claim of reverse causality, of democracy causing contractualist
economy (Ray, 2013); and (5) a report of multiple regressions with most said to show democratic significance after controlling for
contractualist economy (DOR). This study investigates all five of these factual claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data
by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the dependent
variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to
investigate a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and
scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can account for differences in test outcomes. The results
are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of
peace. Using DOR’s base model, the impact of democracy is zero regardless of how contractualist economy or
interstate conflict is measured. There is no misinterpreted interaction term in any study that has overturned the
democratic peace, and the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist
economy. Ray’s (2013) evidence
for reverse causality from democracy to contractualist economy is
shown to be based on an erroneous research design. And of DOR’s 120 separate regressions that consider
contractualist economy, 116 contain controversial measurement and specification practices; the remaining four are analyses of all
(fatal and non-fatal) disputes, where the correlation of democracy with peace is limited to mixedeconomic dyads, those where one
state has a contractualist economy and the other does not, a subset that includes only 27% of dyads from 1951 to 2001, including
only 50% of democratic dyads. It is further shown that this marginal
peace is a statistical artifact since it does
not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal opportunity to fight. The results of this
study should not be surprising, as they merely corroborate the present state of knowledge . This is because, while
DOR ardently assert that four alleged errors, when corrected, each independently save the democratic peace proposition—multiple
imputation, the exclusion of ongoing dispute years, an interaction term, and their alternative measure for contractualist economy—
they never actually report any clear-cut evidence in support of their claims. One issue not addressed is Dafoe and Russett’s (2013)
challenge to Mousseau et al. (2013a) on the grounds that our reported insignificance of democracy is not significant. Like the four
claims of error made by DOR addressed here, Dafoe and Russett (2013) made this charge without supporting it. Mousseau et al.
(2013b) then investigated it and showed that it too has no support. This issue appears resolved, as Russett and colleagues (DOR) did
not raise it again. Nor have DOR or anyone else disputed the overturning of the democratic peace as reported in Mousseau (2012a),
which has not been contested with any assertion, supported or unsupported. The implications of this study are far
from trivial: the observation of democratic peace is a statistical artifact, seemingly explained by
economic conditions. If scientific knowledge progresses and the field of interstate conflict processes is to abide by the
scientific rules of evidence, then we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause or correlate of
peace, and stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of
international conflict; the variable to replace it is contractualist economy. If nations want to advance peace
abroad, the promotion of democracy will not achieve it : the policy to replace it is the promotion of economic
opportunity The economic norms account for how contractualist economy can cause both democracy and peace has been explicated
in numerous prior studies and need not be repeated here (Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013). An abundance of prior studies have
also corroborated various novel predictions of the theory in wider domains (Ungerer, 2012), and no one has disputed the multiple
reports that contractualist economy is the strongest non-trivial predictor of peace both within (Mousseau, 2012b) and between
nations (Mousseau, 2013; see also Nieman, 2015). The only matter in controversy is whether democracy has any observable impact
on peace between nations after consideration of contractualist economy. My investigation begins below with the allegation of
measurement error.
DPT wrong – their stats are the result of contractual economies not
democratic norms
Mousseau, Poli Sci Prof @ University of Central Florida, 16 (Michael, Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace
supersedes the democratic peace, Conflict Management and Peace Science 1–18)

the observed dearth of militarized

A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace,

conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized
market ‘‘contractualist’’ economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both the
explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013; see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five

studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that
democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010). Resolution of this controversy is fundamental
to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest thing we have to

an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the
spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary
implication that universal democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development
that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among
them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end war (and support democracy), the

contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015;
Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015). In the literature are five factual claims for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes
peace: (1) an assertion that in three of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), the insignificance of democracy
controlling for contractualist economy is due to the treatment of missing data for contractualist economy (Dafoe et al., 2013, henceforth DOR); (2) a claim of error in the
measure for conflict (DOR) that appears in one of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013); (3) an alleged misinterpretation of an interaction
term that appears in one of the five studies (Mousseau, 2009) that overturned the democratic peace, along with in inference of democratic causality from an interaction of
democracy with contractualist economy (Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR); (4) a claim of reverse causality, of democracy causing contractualist economy (Ray, 2013); and (5) a
report of multiple regressions with most said to show democratic significance after controlling for contractualist economy (DOR). This study investigates all five of these factual
claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the
dependent variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to investigate a causal interaction of
democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can

Using
account for differences in test outcomes. The results are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of peace.

DOR’s base model, the impact of democracy is zero regardless of how contractualist economy
or interstate conflict is measured. There is no misinterpreted interaction term in any study that has overturned
the democratic peace, and the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. Ray’s (2013) evidence

for reverse causality from democracy to contractualist economy is shown to be based on an erroneous research design. And of
DOR’s 120 separate regressions that consider contractualist economy, 116 contain controversial measurement and specification practices; the remaining four are analyses of all
(fatal and non-fatal) disputes, where the correlation of democracy with peace is limited to mixedeconomic dyads, those where one state has a contractualist economy and the

this marginal peace

other does not, a subset that includes only 27% of dyads from 1951 to 2001, including only 50% of democratic dyads. It is further shown that

is a statistical artifact since it does not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal
opportunity to fight.

Democracy does not breed peace---equality and voting can’t get rid of
competing interests between states---nationalism is another reason why
the public could easily support a war
Daniel Larison 12, senior editor at The American Conservative, “Democratic Peace Theory Is False,” 04/17/2012, The American
Conservative //

Rojas’ claim depends entirely on the meaning of “genuine democracy.” Even though there are numerous examples of wars between states with universal male suffrage and
elected governments (including that little dust-up known as WWI), the states in question probably don’t qualify as “genuine” democracies and so can’t be used as counter-

democratic peace theory draws broad conclusions from a short period in modern
examples. Regardless,

history with very few cases before the 20th century. The core of democratic peace theory as I understand it is that
democratic governments are more accountable to their populations, and because the people
will bear the costs of the war they are going to be less willing to support a war policy. This
supposedly keeps democratic states from waging wars against one another because of the built-
in electoral and institutional checks on government power. One small problem with this is that it
is rubbish. ¶ Democracies in antiquity fought against one another. Political equality and voting
do not abolish conflicts of interest between competing states. Democratic peace theory
doesn’t account for the effects of nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the way democratic
nations think about war. Democratic nations that have professional armies to do the fighting for
them are often enthusiastic about overseas wars. The Conservative-Unionist government that waged the South African War (against two states with
elected governments, I might add) enjoyed great popular support and won a huge majority in the “Khaki” election that followed. ¶ As long as it goes well and doesn’t have too

many costs, war can be quite popular, and even if the war is costly it may still be popular if it is fought
for nationalist reasons that appeal to a majority of the public. If the public is whipped into thinking that there is an
intolerable foreign threat or if they believe that their country can gain something at relatively
low cost by going to war, the type of government they have really is irrelevant . Unless a democratic public
believes that a military conflict will go badly for their military, they may be ready to welcome the outbreak of a war that they expect to win. Setting aside the

flaws and failures of U.S.-led democracy promotion for a moment, the idea that reducing the
number of non-democracies makes war less likely is just fantasy. Clashing interests between
states aren’t going away, and the more democratic states there are in the world the more
likely it is that two or more of them will eventually fight one another.
 AT: Terrorism !!
NATO counter-terrorism efforts are ineffective – security issues persist in major
cities
Colibasanu, Geopolitical Futures’ Chief Operating Officer, May 30, 2017
(Antonia, NATO’s Diminishing Military Function, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/natos-diminishing-military-function/)
The alliance’s link to the national interests of its member states is breaking, meaning that
discussions on strategy rarely take place within the alliance . Its military function is declining
because alliance members no longer share a common interest as they once did. This is evident
from the way member states decide to buy new equipment and prioritize defense spending. In
an ideal world, the U.S. would like Europe’s collective military capability to equal at least 50
percent of U.S. military capability. Washington would argue that it is unfair for the U.S. to
account for more than 70 percent of NATO members’ defense spending while its gross domestic
product is only 48 percent of their combined GDP. U.S. President Donald Trump has talked
about his desire to see Europe increase its contributions and capabilities. The Europeans, on the
other hand, have suggested that the fact that they spend less on defense should not be
interpreted as contributing less to the alliance. Each side has presented the issue in its own way,
focusing on how these statements will play at home. NATO has moved its headquarters into a
new building in Brussels and that, along with these disagreements, seems to signal that it is
shifting from being a primarily military alliance to a more political one . Consensus Isn’t Possible.
NATO won’t easily come to an agreement on defense spending because each country faces a
different geopolitical reality and therefore has different needs when it comes to defense. They
may be able to settle on broad political statements but not on specific plans. Portugal has
different national interests than Romania – and not only will they disagree on the amount of
money that they should be spending on defense, but they will also have varying military
priorities and views on how to spend it. The alliance was created during the Cold War, when
members shared an interest: protecting West ern Europe from the Soviet threat. Now, the
alliance no longer has a common enemy, and so coming to an agreement on things like what
military equipment and weapons are needed is impossible. These countries all face different
levels of threats, which explains why defense spending varies from state to state – some
members just don’t see defense as a priority. The lack of consensus is also apparent when it
comes to the alliance’s counterterrorism efforts. During their meeting in Brussels, NATO leaders
pledged to “do more to fight terrorism,” which might seem like a promising sign. But members
have made this commitment and failed to live up to it many times. After the 9/11 attacks, the
U.S. administration insisted that its NATO allies contribute to the U.S. counterterrorism effort .
But France and Germany, along with Russia, opposed the Iraq War. The first Obama
administration asked NATO to increase its troop commitments in Afghanistan to help fight the
Taliban. But with the exception of the United Kingdom and some Eastern European countries
such as Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic and Albania, European allies rejected Obama’s
request. Since 9/11, the U.S. has seen its counterterrorism operations, including the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, as part of NATO’s collective defense principle – the idea that an attack on one
member is an attack on all. Though there are many reasons the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
were problematic, Trump’s insistence that NATO members help in the fight against terrorism
shouldn’t be a surprise. But the U.S. looks at counterterrorism operations differently than the
Europeans do. For the Europeans, their priority is preventing terrorism in Europe, and NATO can
do little to prevent terrorist attacks on the Continent
 AT: Cyber !!
No impact to cyber-terror --- countermeasures, system patches, deterrence,
and deferral.
Chuipka Junior Policy Officer at Transport Canada 1/11/ 17
(https://www.ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/35695)

These cases illustrate that the threat from cyberterrorism is real but can be vastly overstated. Most of the
damage or disruption caused by the cyber-attack was quickly undone, therefore the potential
threat could be considerable but the actual threat is significantly lower. While attrition has
proven to be the only likely strategy that cyberterrorists could pursue, its overall effectiveness is
unconvincing and counterterrorism measures could make it even less effective. First,
cyberterrorism attacks are unlikely to be repeated as the vulnerabilities from that specific attack
are patched up, making future threats of cyberterrorism less credible . Second, if a terrorist
attempts to threaten cyberterrorism, governments can immediately search for vulnerabilities
and patch them, essentially making the attack fail – this may be easier said than done in most cases though
warning always provides the chance to gain an advantage. In some cases you can simply go offline since an
established connection is required for cyberterrorism to ultimately work . Third, Cyberterrorism is
only possible because of vulnerabilities, by hardening systems and patching vulnerabilities –
the chances of cyberterrorism occurring is decreased. This is one of the ongoing efforts by
governments around the world. Fourth, it is also critical that governments are constantly removing zero
day vulnerabilities from the market to prevent terrorists from obtaining them – they are key in a
successful surprise cyber-attack. Fifth, if worst comes to worst and a cyber-attack has proven successful,
one of the most effective strategies against cyber-terrorism is simply denying that the event was
caused by terrorism. Regardless of a terrorist organizations claim, if the cyber-attack is
downplayed by governments as just a “glitch” in the system, it can take away the desired
impact of terrorists and deter future attempts at cyberterrorism . Even if a terrorist successfully
conducted a cyber-attack and claimed to be the perpetrators, cyberattacks have yet to
demonstrate they can actually cause terror – an essential element for a terrorist attack to be
considered a success. Given that high-level cyber-attacks capable of being violent requires vast
resources, intelligence, skill, and time – ultimately too much can go wrong in conducting a
cyber-attack and the costs-benefit analysis weighs heavily towards terrorist use of kinetic
weapons for the time being.

Cyber-attacks won’t escalate

Gudgel 16---Ph.D. Candidate in Public Policy with a Focus on U.S. Cybersecurity Policy
[John E. Gudgel, “Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International System”
Small Wars & Insurgencies, Taylor and Francis Group, Date Accessed: 4-16-17]

Valeriano and Maness view cyber conflict through the lens of international relations and
primarily focus on cyber interactions among states and directed towards states in the realm of
foreign policy. They argue: ‘while cyberspace is a separate domain, it is not unconnected from the normal political domain that is the genesis
of conflicts’ (p. 15). Following an introductory chapter outlining the contours of the cyber conflict world, eight subsequent chapters build and defend
their theoretical framework for the analysis and prediction of cyber conflict in the international system. One of their major conclusions is that ‘cyber

conflict has not changed how states operate, it has not led to a revolution in military affairs,
and the fears associated with the tactic are overblown’ (p. 209). A key component of the authors’ framework described
in Chapter 3 is their Theory of Cyber Restraint that holds that due to fears of collateral damage, blowback,

and replication states will restrain themselves from unleashing the full weight of their cyber
capabilities. In delineating this theory, Valeriano and Maness stake out a clear middle path between authors such as Richard Clarke and Robert
Knake who believe that cyber war has already begun,2 and Thomas Rid who contends that cyber war will never take place.3 They frame their approach
as cyber moderation: the concept that cyber conflict will occur, but that the conflicts themselves will be trivial and will not significantly change state
behavior (p. 39). From their theory and approach, they then propose nine hypotheses on interstate cyber interactions. One of the primary contributions
of the authors’ research is the construction of an open source and peer-vetted database of
cyber incidents and disputes between countries called the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset (DCID). The 1.0 version of the
dataset currently contains 111 cyber incidents (defined as short-term isolated cyber operations) and 45 cyber disputes (defined as longer-term
operations that can contain several incidents) between state-to-state rivals over an 11-year period (2001 to 2011) including 21 cyber incidents and 5
cyber disputes between China and the United States. In creating this dataset, the authors recognized the attribution problem and only included
incidents and disputes where state-based involvement was explicit and evident (p. 84). Using this dataset, Valeriano and Maness in Chapters 4 and 5
quantitatively analyze interstate cyber actions including the ‘scope, length, and damage inflicted by cyber disputes among rival states’ (p. 78) from 2001
to 2011. Some of the research questions they address include: What factors might predict the occurrence, targets, and level of severity in cyber conflict
between states? What are the foreign policy implications of cyber conflict? Do cyber incidents influence and lead to more conflictual relations? What
they found was ‘that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber disputes among rivals do not match
popular perception; only 20 of 126 active rivals have engaged in cyber conflict, and their interactions have been limited in terms of
magnitude and frequency’ (p. 18). Further, they found that most cyber incidents are regional (e.g. India–Pakistan), focused

predominately on espionage and low-level DDoS attacks, and were largely ineffective in getting
states to change behavior. There was also little evidence of state-supported or sponsored
groups utilizing cyber terrorism. They back up their quantitative data with a series of case
studies looking at the most significant recent cyber conflicts involving state (Chapter 6) and non-state (Chapter 7) actors. They then propose a
system of rules and norms in cyberspace based on the Just War tradition (Chapter 8).
 AT: Heg !! – No Erosion
Despite Trump’s current deviations, deep structures prevent erosion of
hegemony
Stokes, PhD, 18 (Doug, Professor in International Security and Strategy in the Department of
Politics at the University of Exeter, International Affairs, 94:1)//EF

Second, the article argues that while system maintenance costs are rising, and the United States
is in the throes of a slow relative decline, the US remains a structurally advantaged hegemon in
a number of very important areas. These include the continued use of the dollar as a global
reserve currency; the global security regimes in which it predominates, which provide it with
leverage over other states’ geopolitical and economic choices; and the still overwhelming
command capacity of the American economy, most notably in its continued preponderance in
global foreign direct investment (FDI). As such, its postwar globalist grand strategy of deep
engagement continues to make rational sense, not least as it gives the US leverage over the
international regimes it underwrites. A reversal of this grand strategy would undermine not only
this leverage but also, I argue, the world economic order, which remains centred on America. It
is thus highly unlikely that the agency of Trump will overcome the deep structures and path
dependencies that incline towards systemic maintenance. Although it is hard to predict how
far Trump will seek to deviate from the postwar norm, or how much damage his learning curve
will inflict on US leadership, it is likely that once his term is over, American elites will seek to
‘snap back’ to the status quo ante, given the goods the United States still derives from its
hegemony.
 AT: Heg !! – Dead Already
US hegemony is already over – NATO can’t shift the state of affairs
Ischinger, German diplomat, 18 Wolfgang,
https://www.securityconference.de/en/news/article/food-for-thought-donald-trump-and-the-
end-of-americas-benign-hegemony/
For Atlanticists in Europe who still think we shouldn't give up on the United States, the loss of John McCain has been particularly
painful. All his life, the US Senator was a staunch defender of the transatlantic partnership – and particularly so since Trump came to
power. At the Munich Security Conference in 2017, McCain had called on Europeans not to count
America out and to keep investing in the transatlantic bond. McCain's words remain of utmost
importance. Yet, they cannot obscure the fact that the liberal hegemon – the hegemon Europe had relied
on for decades – belongs to the past. This became particularly evident in the beginning of July, when President Trump
almost wrecked a NATO summit, offended the hosts of his visit to Britain, and called the
European Union a "foe" of the United States, all the while cozying up to Vladimir Putin, a "good
competitor." For months, Europeans concerned about the president’s statements have been reassured by American friends:
Ignore the tweets, focus on what the administration does, and trust our checks and balances. That made some sense. Senior cabinet
members like the secretary of defense have remained committed to the liberal international order and to America's alliances and
partnerships. Congress has strongly supported NATO. And American troops still guarantee Europe's security. But in international
relations, it's not only deeds that matter; words also do, especially the American president's. Let’s face it: Mr. Trump's core beliefs
conflict with the foundations of Western grand strategy since the mid-1940s. He believes America is getting a bad
deal from its European allies. He expresses admiration for autocrats like Kim Jong-un and Mr.
Putin, while reserving his most acidic comments for democratic partners like Germany’s Angela Merkel and Canada's Justin
Trudeau. He represents the opposite of liberal internationalism. That sends Europe a sad message: The era of America's
benign hegemony may be over, with Europe extremely ill prepared . On July 11 and 12, Mr. Trump undercut
a NATO summit that was yielding results: reaffirming a goal for members to strengthen the alliance by spending 2 percent of their
gross domestic product on the military by 2024. While European military spending has been rising for some time, Mr. Trump was
correct in saying that some members, including Germany, aren’t doing enough. He also has legitimate concerns about trade
imbalances. Still, his mischaracterization of the goal as "dues" owed to America makes it harder for European leaders to ask their
voters for increased military spending. And his bullying comments led Europeans to suspect he might be more interested in leaving
the alliance than in leading it. Such implied threats attack the foundation of the alliance: the idea of solidarity and commitment to
one another's security. Americans tell
us Mr. Trump can't leave NATO without Senate consent — a
debatable notion that misses the point. Any doubt about America’s commitment hurts the
credibility of NATO's deterrence. That is what makes Mr. Trump's statements so dangerous. They may extract a few
billion dollars for defense spending, but they destroy the assurances that those dollars — or euros — are meant to bolster. Those
uncertainties were magnified by the president’s bizarre appearance with Mr. Putin in Helsinki, Finland, right after the NATO Summit.
Mr. Trump in effect disavowed his own intelligence community. He failed to declare Russian meddling in Western democracies
unacceptable. If Mr. Putin does not feel emboldened now, when will he? Who will now believe that interfering in democratic
elections comes at a price? Mr. Trump's performance seemed to indicate that America is ready to give up its ambition to be the free
world's respected leader. That was painful for America's European friends and allies to watch. Throughout the Trump presidency, we
have tried to preserve a close partnership with America, influence the Trump administration and safeguard European interests. It
hasn't worked. Mr. Trump ignored our concerns by leaving the Paris climate pact and the Iran nuclear deal, and he slapped tariffs on
his closest allies. Why, then, should Europeans consider this administration a trustworthy partner? A recent ZDF Politbarometer poll
found that only 9 percent of Germans do. But there is no realistic Plan B yet, posing a conundrum: Europeans cannot simply go it
alone, but we must prepare to be left alone. So we must develop a Plan B. Duck and cover will not suffice. First, Europe needs a dual-
track approach. We should strengthen our military readiness and decision-making capacity while showing the White House more
clearly that its actions have costs for America. We also must address some of Mr. Trump’s justified concerns, like increasing military
spending — but in our own interest, rather than to please him. We should also offer to work closely with those Americans –
Americans like John McCain – who believe that a strong partnership with Europe remains in America's best interest. Europeans need
to engage, engage, engage: with Congress, with governors, with America’s business community and civil society. But can we rely on
the American system of government to work as promised? Now is the time to check and balance! At the risk of "meddling": Are
there Republican senators willing to refuse to vote for any Trump appointee unless he stops denigrating his own intelligence
community? Security should not be an issue that pits the United States against Europe. Many Western societies are divided between
those who believe in preserving the post-World War II order and those who would replace it with 19th-century nationalism.
Europeans who believe that abandoning the Western liberal order would be an extraordinary act of stupidity must step up our
game. But we won’t succeed without strong support from like-minded friends across the Atlantic. American patriots, will you work
with us?
 AT: Disease !! – NATO Bad
NATO causes famine and disease – North Africa proves, fueling the war
Muhawesh, founder, CEO and editor in chief of MintPress News, August 1, 17 (Mnar, NATO’s “War On Terror” Leaves
Famine, Disease In Its Wake In Africa, https://www.mintpressnews.com/natos-war-terror-leaves-famine-disease-wake-
africa/230366/)
Despite living in a time where there is a global surplus of food, millions of people around the
world are still suffering from famine. If you follow mainstream media coverage about these
humanitarian disasters, they’re most likely presented through the lens of climate change , high
food prices and taxes. But in places like Yemen, South Sudan, the Lake Chad basin of West Africa
and Somalia, where images of skeletal children have become commonplace several countries in
Africa and the Middle East, it is perhaps no coincidence that the epidemic of famine is directly
linked to modern-day colonialism and imperialism led by the U.S . It is in this part of the world
where resource exploitation, the war on terror, military occupation and destabilization combine
to create one of the most dire humanitarian crises of the modern era. While environmental
factors do play a role, policies set by powerful oil companies and state actors have created and
reinforced the present situation. In Somalia, where the U.S. has been waging a covert drone
war, people have become accustomed to famine. In a span of just one year, between 2011 and
2012, over 260,000 people died, half of them under the age of 5, marking the worst famine in
the last 25 years. According to data from Somalia’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
(FSNAU), 4.6 percent of the total population and 10 percent of children under 5 died in southern
and central Somalia alone. The organization Somalia’s Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit
(FSNAU) found that “the result was widespread livestock deaths, the smallest cereal harvest
since the 1991-94 civil war, and a major drop in labor demand, which reduced household
income.” Compounding environmental burdens were the wider impacts of British colonialism in
Somalia, as well as U.S. militarism. While the United States plundered Somalia for resources by
way of mineral excavation and so-called oil exploration, past and present administrations have
also applied their full military might. In 1993, during the Clinton presidency, images of famine
and war were used to convince Americans that U.S. military efforts were necessary. “We went
[to Somalia] because only the United States could help stop one of the great human tragedies of
this time,” Clinton said. “In a sense, we came to Somalia to rescue innocent people in a burning
house.” What Bill Clinton didn’t disclose was that the United States was one of the reasons why
the house was on fire to begin with, and military efforts would not help to put out the flames.
 AT: Disease !! – No Impact
Disease doesn’t cause extinction – empirics, vaccines, adaptation
Adalja, an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh, 6/17/16 (Amesh,
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/)
no disease “You’ll tell us when you’re worried, right?” That was the question posed to me countless times at the height of the 2014
West African Ebola outbreak. As an infectious disease physician, I was interviewed on outlets such as CNN, NPR, and Fox News about
the dangers of the virus, and the answer I gave was always the same: “Ebola is a deadly, scary disease, but it is not that contagious. It
will not find the U.S. or other industrialized nations hospitable.” In other words, no, I wasn’t worried—and not because I have a rosy
outlook on infectious diseases. I’m well-aware of the damage these diseases are causing around the
world: HIV, malaria, tuberculosis; the influenza pandemic that took the world by surprise in 2009; the anti-vaccine movement
bumping cases of measles to an all-time post-vaccine-era high; antibiotic-resistant bacteria threatening to collapse the entire
structure of modern medicine—all
these, like Ebola, are continuously placing an enormous number of
lives at risk. But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not
asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a
headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans
succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained. I’m
not afraid of this
apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially
human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience. For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases
were the existential threat to humanity —and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th
century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death
decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all
humans who have ever lived. Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our
species’ recent explosion in
lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation,
vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed
in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods
are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like. So what
would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now? In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the
disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to
combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human
race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is
just as unlikely. Any
apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two
attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be
applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before
symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family
members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to
spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians. The
three infectious diseases most likely to be
considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet
these two requirements. Influenza, for instance , despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its
contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While
there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its
risk. And in the modern era, a
full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective
vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies. HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly
limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola)
requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly
potent antiviral therapy allows most
people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic
mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place . Lastly, simple prevention strategies
such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk. Ebola,
for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it
spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent
mortality rate by simple supportive care. Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe
out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to
knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part
of our evolutionary heritage is our immune
system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the
helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy
imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from
imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this
adaptability ensures that almost any
infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild , in
contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions. While the immune system’s role can never be understated, an even more powerful
protector is the faculty of consciousness. Humans are not the most prolific, quickly evolving, or strongest organisms on the planet,
but as Aristotle identified, humans are the rational animals—and it is this fundamental distinguishing characteristic that allows
humans to form abstractions, think in principles, and plan long-range. These capacities, in turn, allow humans to modify, alter, and
improve themselves and their environments. Consciousness equips us, at an individual and a species level, to make nature safe for
the species through such technological marvels as antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, and sanitation. When humans began to focus their
minds on the problems posed by infectious disease, human life ceased being nasty, brutish, and short. In many ways, human
consciousness became infectious diseases’ worthiest adversary. None of this is meant to allay all fears of infectious diseases. To
totally adopt a Panglossian viewpoint would be foolish—and dangerous. Humans do face countless threats from infectious diseases:
witness Zika. And if not handled appropriately, severe calamity could, and will, ensue. The West African Ebola outbreak, for instance,
festered for months before major efforts to bring it under control were initiated. When it comes to infectious diseases, I’m worried
about the failure of institutions to understand the full impact of outbreaks. I’m worried about countries that don’t have the
infrastructure or resources to combat these outbreaks when they come. But as long as we can keep adapting, I’m not worried about
the future of the human race.

Burnout and variation check disease

York 14 (Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the Immunology
and Pathogenesis Branch of the Influenza Division at the CDC, PhD in Molecular Virology and
Immunology from McMaster University, M.Sc. in Veterinary Microbiology and Immunology from
the University of Guelph, former Assistant Prof of Microbiology & Molecular Genetics at
Michigan State, “Why Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species?” 6/4/2014,
http://www.quora.com/Why-dont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species)

But mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one, the most
dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to another. If the disease is highly lethal,
then the population drops, and it becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the

infectious phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way.¶ Probably the main reason is

variation. Within the host and the pathogen population there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally
resistant. Some pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up with infected
individuals who survive.¶ We see this in HIV, for example. There is a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether
immune to HIV, either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people who were infected with defective
versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. ¶ We can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes contain
many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread through the whole population. Those all
started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific
infectious diseases were serious threats to the species.

Infectious diseases don’t lead to extinction – burnout solves because lethal

pathogens kill their hosts before they can spread
Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, (Owen, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics
at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy
and Governance,” 2/3/2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-
2017-01-23.pdf)//tb

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some
reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and
animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were
ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally
dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction . It
therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a
rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One
underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a
chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore,
pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts .39
 AT: Climate Change !!
NATO can’t solve climate change – they don’t view it as a immediate challenge.
Fetzek, Senior Fellow for International Affairs, 06/09/16

(Shiloh, https://climateandsecurity.org/2016/06/09/nato-secretary-general-climate-change-is-
also-a-security-threat/)
In advance of the NATO Summit Warsaw in July, the Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg sat down for an interview with
POLITICO Europe. When
asked what NATO is doing to address the risks of climate change, he
responded by asserting that climate change is in fact a security risk, and an issue to consider in
the context of conflict prevention, peace and stability. He also noted that NATO does not have
the luxury of choosing the challenges it faces , and has to work to adapt to the changing security environment.
Indeed, the challenges that NATO faces are serious and climate change, particularly if not adequately addressed by NATO member
states, could very well multiply those challenges and ultimately challenge the NATO mission. However, though the
Secretary
General appreciated the risks of climate change to NATO’s security landscape, he unfortunately
stopped short of describing it as a priority of his. From the interview: Alice Stollmeyer: “Last year head of the UN
Climate Summit in Paris NATO has stated that climate change poses significant threat multipliers and I was wondering could you tell
us what NATO is doing to address this and how to, amid all the other crisis, to keep the climate security threats on the agenda?”
Secretary General Stoltenberg: “First of all, I think it is very important to underline what you just said and that is climate change is
also a security threat because it can really change also the conditions for where people live, create new migrant and refugee crises
and scarce resources, water, can fuel new conflicts. So climate change is also about preventing conflicts and creating more stability
and prosperity, which is good for peace and stability. Second, NATO is addressing how we can also address, how we can contribute.
NATO is not the first responder to climate change. We are a military alliance, but partly everything that
can make also military vehicles, military equipment more energy efficient will be good both for the environment but also for the
sustainability of the armed forces. So energy efficiency, less energy dependence of the armed forces is good for both the armed
forces as armed forces and for the environment. And that’s actually the thing we can do as an alliance. We are also sharing this
information with allies, trying to increase their focus and understanding of this, but of course the most important things that can be
done with climate change is more related to energy, to ministers of the environment, to other areas than defense.” (57:18 min
mark) The Secretary General rightly notes that climate change multiplies threats to the security environment, and that
addressing climate risks can increase peace and stability . It is critically important for someone in his position, as
the civilian head of the largest military alliance in the world during a time of significant instability, to acknowledge this. However,
that assessment seems to be contradicted by his statement “climate change is more related to
energy, to ministers of the environment, to other areas than defense.” If indeed climate change
is a security risk, and a factor to consider in conflict prevention and state stability, tasking only
“ministers of environment” to address those risks seems insufficient. Addressing security issues,
particularly complex transnational ones like climate change, requires a whole of government
approach, including defense and foreign ministries (as well as those responsible for environment, energy and
development). Indeed, this is something the US Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, and many NATO member state
governments, have recognized. Nevertheless, the Secretary General is right to focus on the extraordinary challenges facing the
alliance at this moment in history. As he says: I will call it a landmark summit and I will call it one of the most important summits in
the history of NATO because we are faced with such a fundamentally changed security environment. Of course, NATO
is
dealing with significant and immediate challenges on its doorstep, most notably Russia’s
revanchist actions in Ukraine, the turmoil in Syria and the broader Mediterranean, hybrid
warfare, and terrorist attacks within NATO member states, which may understandably diminish
attention to perceived longer term, non-state based risks like climate change. As Stoltenberg states:
All of this has really made the security environment which we are faced with so much more challenging and in many ways more
dangerous and therefore NATO has to respond. And we have started that adaptation but we have to make new, important decisions
at the summit in Warsaw, making sure that NATO changes, NATO adapts when the world around us is changing and that is what we
are going to do at Warsaw. However, it’s important to note that climate change is not necessarily distinct from these other security
risks, but rather, an important factor placing strains on the broader security environment in which these risks play out. Climate
change will multiply stress on factors related to peace and state stability, such as water, energy, food, and migration, all of which are
key elements of instability in NATO’s backyard. As NATO changes and adapts, how climate change will challenge NATO’s core
missions should be a priority. As the Secretary General continues to help steer the NATO alliance, it will be important for him to
connect these dots, as history will likely not be kind to a historic summit that fails to do so. His own advice is pertinent in this
context: We don’t have the luxury of choosing between either addressing the challenges we see to the east, or the threat and the
challenges we see to the south. We have to do both at the same time. And that’s exactly what we are doing. To appropriate an
American colloquialism, Stoltenberg is essentially saying that NATO has to “walk and chew gum at the same time.” That’s exactly
right. However, without significantly and concretely addressing core issues shaping that security environment, such as climate
change, NATO will be left unprepared. For a few ideas from the Center for Climate and Security on some actions NATO could take in
this regards, see here. Also stay tuned for a forthcoming report on the state of NATO preparedness for a changing climate.

Changing climate change approaches must start at the level of national

governments – not NATO
Lippert, Ph.D. from the RAND Graduate School in Santa Monica, 16

(Tyler H. NATO, Climate Change, and International Security: A Risk Governance Approach, 81)

Closer integration at the international level of disaster risk reduction and climate change
adaptation, and the mainstreaming of both into international development and development
assistance, could foster efficiency in the use of available and committed resources and capacity (high confidence). Neither
disaster risk reduction nor climate change adaptation is as well integrated as they could be into current development policies and
practices. Both climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction might benefit from sharing of knowledge and experience in a
mutually supportive and synergistic way. Climate change adaptation could be factored into all disaster risk
management, and weather-related disasters are becoming an essential component of the
adaptation agenda.332 Yet the burden of responsibility to act in this domain, particularly as it
concerns disaster response and migration issues, does not fall exclusively on NATO. National
governments, and other international organizations, have more immediate responsibility than
NATO. But the division of labor is not well delineated, and certain circumstances would require NATO to play a more immediate
and substantive role. Disaster response and humanitarian assistance (DR/HA) is a longstanding function of NATO. That NATO is not
necessarily the first responder in this respect has the potential to obstruct and obscure the perspective of member states. They may,
for instance, not view the issue of disaster response and humanitarian assistance in a uniform manner. And this, in turn, influences,
and potentially muddles, the level of responsibility for NATO to absorb.
Disads
 2AC – German Recession
Trump’s been pushing for more NATO defense spending – consultations viewed
a concession to get what he wants – its traded for an increase in German
spending
Harding, Guardian foreign correspondent, 18 (Luke, 07.12.18, “Could Trump pull US out of
Nato and what would happen if he did?”
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/12/trump-nato-threat-withdraw-what-would-
happen) np

Donald Trump has come close to suggesting the US might unilaterally withdraw from Nato if
other member states fail to dramatically increase their spending on the military bloc. According to
diplomats, he plunged the Nato summit into chaos on Thursday by saying the US would “go it
alone” if European states failed to boost their spending to at least 2% of GDP by January. At an
emergency press conference later, Trump appeared to row back from this threat, claiming Nato
members had agreed to commit an extra $33bn (£25bn). He said it had been “a little tough for a little while” and he had told the
Europeans he would be “very unhappy” if they did not up their spending “substantially”. But he said a “tremendous amount of
progress” had been made. Nato was now “much stronger”, he added, with spending “rocketing” upwards. Could Trump withdraw
the US from Nato? Trump appeared to suggest he had the power to withdraw the US from Nato without the approval of the US
Congress. In fact, the organisation was established by a formal and binding treaty, which means Trump cannot use his executive
power to pull America out of the alliance, in contrast to other international agreements such as the Iran nuclear deal or the Paris
climate agreement, both of which Trump has withdrawn from. The existing funding target – 2% of GDP – is only being met or
exceeded by five of Nato's 29 countries, according to newly published figures. They are: the US on 3.6%, Greece on 2.2%, Estonia
2.14%, the UK 2.10%, and Poland on 2%. France currently spends 1.8% and Germany 1.2%. The escalating costs of defence are well
known. To build an aircraft carrier, a 21st century fighter jet or a cyber unit capable of defeating Russian attacks is rising at a rate
much faster than average inflation. British defence secretary Gavin Williamson has identified a £20bn shortfall in funding over the
next 10 years. Without that money, he will need to make further cuts in annual running costs. President Emmanuel Macron, who
lopped €650m off the French defence budget last year and sacked his military chief for complaining about it, has promised to boost
spending to 2% by 2025, five years earlier than Germany. Where would the money come from? Britain and France have global
ambitions, but run budget deficits. That means any extra spending must come from extra borrowing, higher taxes or cuts to other
departments. As Trump has pointed out, Germany currently runs a budget surplus and could increase its defence spending to 2% –
but doubling it to 4% would be a very long shot. Trump would normally first need to win approval in the Senate and to persuade
Republican senators that the move is necessary and in the US’s long-term security interests. Unsurprisingly, Trump’s apparent threat
caused dismay on Thursday among European allies. There is no certainty it would attract support in Washington from leading
Republicans. What would the consequences be? Leaving Nato would be a seismic step, previously unthinkable, that would shake up
a western alliance that has endured for more than 70 years. It would also be a boon to Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin, whom
Trump will meet on Monday in Helsinki. Ultimately, a decision by the White House to abandon Nato could be challenged legally and
end up in the US supreme court. Trump now has a majority in the court and is likely to succeed in winning approval for his
conservative nominee, Brett Kavanaugh. For
now it appears that Trump’s threat is just that. In more
emollient tones, Trump claimed on Thursday that the US’s commitment to Nato was “very
strong and “remains very strong” following negotiations. Jens Stoltenberg, the Nato secretary
general, is now left with a headache: what to do if Trump returns to this theme of departure and
how might the alliance survive were America really to leave?

German debt is high now – increasing defense spending ensures economic

decline
Tigner, reporter @ Atlantic Council, 19 (Brooks, 02.13.19, “Can Germany Stay the Course on
Defense Spending?” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/can-germany-stay-
the-course-on-defense-spending) np
Germany’s defense budget is on the march upwards, but can Berlin maintain the spending
momentum given the prospects of a slowing global economy? There are also questions about how the
country should spend its defense euros in the long term, say defense officials and policy experts. Germany has long been
an underspender when it comes to meeting NATO’s defense budget guideline of 2 percent of
GDP for each of its allies, but that is now changing. Since the allies’ collective pledge at their 2014 Wales Summit to
march toward 2 percent by 2024 Berlin has repeatedly acknowledged that it won’t make 2 percent by
2024. But it has committed to reaching 1.5 percent of GDP for defense by then. So far, the Wales pledge has been working. NATO
estimates that the European allies plus Canada have spent $41 billion more on defense since 2016, and will have spent $100 billion
more by the end of 2020 compared to the same year. By 2024 they will have spent $350 billion more, the Alliance says. As
for
Germany, Berlin has steadily raised defense spending from 1.18 percent of GDP in 2014 to 1.24
percent in 2018. Moreover, its draft defense budget for 2019 proposes €41.54 billion, a €3 billion year-on-year increase.
Whether this orderly stair-step progress to 1.5 percent will be smooth sailing is another matter.
Germany’s economy is slowing and, along with it, its tax revenues. Recent press reports cite
finance ministry documents that point to an overall government budget shortfall of nearly €25
billion from now through 2023, with possible implications for Germany’s carefully planned defense
spending increases. The final numbers and their implications won’t emerge until the end of March. Despite the risk of lower
increases to its defense budget, Germany still aims to make that 1.5 percent target, according to one German defense policy official.
“We are still working on our 2020 budget and our perspective to 2023, and what this means in concrete terms is still under
discussion,” the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said on February 12. “But we have reaffirmed [to NATO] our intention
to spend 1.5 [percent] by 2024.” So
could Germany’s defense budget be ring-fenced from the impact of a
wider government budget shortfall? “I can’t say, but if we want to reach our 1.5 percent goal, then we will need steady
increases in defense spending,” is all the official would say.

Economic decline triggers nuclear conflict

Mann 14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international
counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential
appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors
@ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND
FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014,
https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure
prominently into the calculus for future conflicts . The findings also suggest that security issues with
economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict,
and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another . The
research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent
vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security,
and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states. ¶
The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in
the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated
with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied
confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional
instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications
for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to
challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen
or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security . The
case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making
weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by
contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent
vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other
non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to
disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status . A more ominous threat originates from states
intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or
engaging financial warfare against the United States.
 --- XT: German Recession
German economies suffering now – further decline will cause a European
recession
Ewing, reporter @ New York Times, 18 (jack, 11.14.18, “German Economy Shrinks
Unexpectedly, Adding to Europe’s Risk,”
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/business/german-economy-shrinks.html) np

BRUSSELS — Germany’s once unstoppable economy has gone into reverse, adding another threat to
European stability just as Italy escalated its dispute with fiscal overseers in Brussels. The European Union’s bedrock economy
unexpectedly shrank 0.2 percent in July through September compared with the previous quarter, according to data published
Wednesday by Germany’s official statistics agency. It was the first quarterly contraction since 2015, with a drop in exports suggesting
the stall was a manifestation of President Trump’s trade war with China. If
the quarterly decline in Germany signaled
a trend — which some economists doubted — the implications for the rest of Europe would be ominous at
a time when Italy is rattling financial market s. Italy’s populist government, which faced a deadline Tuesday to
resubmit a national budget earlier rejected by the European Commission, made only minor concessions. The commission, the
European Union’s executive arm, is expected to respond next week. As
Europe faces a confluence of economic and
political turbulence, Germany and its powerful auto and machinery exporters have provided
crucial stability. Without Germany as a locomotive, Europe would have much more trouble
withstanding shocks that, in addition to Italy, include Britain’s messy separation from the
European Union and trade tensions with the United States. Economists expressed hope that
Germany could bounce back quickly from the surprise decline in output, which was caused in
part by temporary production backlogs at automakers . All of the major carmakers have struggled to adjust to
new, more rigorous European emissions testing procedures. Germany’s Federal Statistical Office blamed the setback on reduced
exports. China is an important customer for Mercedes-Benzes, Volkswagens and BMWs as well as German-made factory machinery.
But China has been buying fewer German goods because its economy has suffered from tariffs imposed by the United States. “I
don’t think this is the start of a trend,” said Carsten Brzeski, chief economist at ING Bank in Germany. “But assuming it is, it
clearly
means bad news for the rest of the eurozone .” Italy’s continued confrontation with the European
Commission could have economic consequences for the eurozone if not the entire world. The
country is seen as a threat to financial stability because of its enormous government debt, which
equals more than 130 percent of gross domestic product.

Germany’s financial leadership is key to preventing Eurozone collapse

Amadeo, US Economy Expert for The Balance (Kimberly, Eurozone Debt Crisis, Balance,
https://www.thebalance.com/eurozone-debt-crisis-causes-cures-and-consequences-3305524,
2-1-2019)//EF

The eurozone debt crisis was the world's greatest threat in 2011. That's according to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. Things only got worse in 2012 . The crisis started in 2009 when the world first realized Greece

could default on its debt. In three years, it escalated into the potential for sovereign debt defaults
from Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain. The European Union, led by Germany and France, struggled to support these members. They
initiated bailouts from the European Central Bank and the I nternational Monetary Fund. These measures didn't keep many
from questioning the viability of the euro itself. A new crisis might be brewing. On August 10, 2018, President Trump announced he

would double the tariffs on aluminum and steel imports from Turkey. He was trying to obtain the release of jailed
American pastor Andrew Brunson. Turkey claims he was involved in the 2016 coup to overthrow the government. The U.S. move lowered the value of

the Turkish lira to a record low against the U.S. dollar. It renewed fears that the poor health of the
Turkish economy could trigger another crisis in the eurozone . Many European banks own stakes in Turkish lenders or made
loans to Turkish companies. As the lira plummets, it becomes less likely these borrowers can afford to pay back these loans. The defaults could severely impact the European

economy. As a result, Germany is considering lending Turkey enough to prevent a crisis. How the Eurozone
Crisis Affected You If those countries had defaulted, it would have been worse than the 2008

financial crisis. Banks, the primary holders of sovereign debt, would face huge losses. Smaller banks would have collapsed. In a
panic, they'd cut back on lending to each other. The Libor rate would skyrocket like it did in 20 08.
The ECB held a lot of sovereign debt. Default would have jeopardized its future. It threatened the survival of the EU itself. Uncontrolled sovereign debt

defaults could create a recession or even a global depression. It could have been worse than the 1998 sovereign debt crisis.
When Russia defaulted, other emerging market countries did too. The IMF stepped in. It was backed by the power of European countries and the United States. This time, it's
not the emerging markets but the developed markets that are in danger of default. Germany, France, and the United States, the major backers of the IMF, are themselves highly

What Was the Solution? In May 2012,

indebted. There would be little political appetite to add to that debt to fund the massive bailouts needed.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel developed a seven-point plan. It went against newly-elected
French President Francois Hollande's proposal to create Eurobonds. He also wanted to cut back on austerity measures
and create more economic stimulus . Merkel's plan would: Launch quick-start programs to help business startups. Relax

protections against wrongful dismissal. Introduce "mini-jobs" with lower taxes. Combine
apprenticeships with vocational education targeted toward youth unemployment. Create special funds and tax
benefits to privatize state-owned businesses. Establish special economic zones like those in
China. Invest in renewable energy. Merkel found this worked to integrate East Germany. She saw how austerity measures could boost the
competitiveness of the entire eurozone. The seven-point plant followed an intergovernmental treaty approved on December 8, 2011. The EU leaders agreed

to create a fiscal unity parallel to the monetary union that already exists. The treaty did three things. First, it
enforced the budget restrictions of the Maastricht Treaty. Second, it reassured lenders that the EU would stand behind its members' sovereign debt. Third, it allowed the EU to
act as a more integrated unit. Specifically, the treaty would create five changes: Eurozone member countries would legally give some budgetary power to centralized EU control.
Members that exceeded the 3 percent deficit-to-GDP ratio would face financial sanctions. Any plans to issue sovereign debt must be reported in advance. The European
Financial Stability Facility was replaced by a permanent bailout fund. The European Stability Mechanism became effective in July 2012. The permanent fund assured lenders that
the EU would stand behind its members. That lowered the risk of default. Voting rules in the ESM would allow emergency decisions to be passed with an 85 percent qualified
majority. This allows the EU to act more quickly. Eurozone countries would lend another 200 billion euros to the IMF from their central banks. This followed a bailout in May
2010. EU leaders pledged 720 billion euros or $928 billion to prevent the debt crisis from triggering another Wall Street flash crash. The bailout restored faith in the euro which
slid to a 14-month low against the dollar. The United States and China intervened after the ECB said it would not rescue Greece. Libor rose as banks started to panic just like in
2008. Only this time, banks were avoiding each other’s toxic Greek debt instead of mortgage-backed securities.
 2AC – German Leadership
Germany assuming reluctant leadership role in NATO now – the counterplan
reverses any progress – Trump’s leadership will just sideline Germany’s work
World Politics Review 17 (“How Germany Is, Reluctantly, Assuming a Leadership Role in NATO,”
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/21838/how-germany-is-reluctantly-assuming-a-leadership-role-in-
nato, 04-13-2017)//EF
WPR: What role does Germany play in the alliance, in terms of participation in recent and ongoing missions and internal debates over Russia and other potential threats? Bunde:

Germany has clearly increased its commitment to NATO in recent years. Most importantly, the government
realized it needed to show more solidarity with NATO’s eastern flank . Berlin played a key role in
setting up the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and agreed to lead one of the four
multinational battalions on NATO’s eastern flank—the one based in Rukla, Lithuania. This was a remarkable shift for Germany, where
elites have traditionally argued that Russia was a difficult partner, but a partner just the same. Although Germany has long contributed to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission,
deploying German soldiers as part of an effort at “tripwire” deterrence sends an important signal to Germany’s allies and to Russia. This new deterrence posture is controversial,
and few German politicians actively defend the deployment, which is risky in the long run. Even some politicians who are part of the coalition that took the decision, including
former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Bavarian Minister-President Horst Seehofer, have warned of the dangers of NATO saber-rattling. As a result, shifts in

Germany
Germany’s stance have not always been widely discussed. They are significant nevertheless, and they extend beyond the eastern deployments. For example,

has begun to implement the so-called Framework Nations concept—a more integrated,
multilateral approach to shoring up NATO members’ defense capabilities—and has opened up
some of its command structures to partners. The Dutch army has two brigades under German command. More recently, the Czech
Republic and Romania have confirmed their interest in developing similar ties to the German army. According to some analysts, Germany’s

army is thus becoming Europe’s “anchor army,” or the “backbone” of NATO’s forces on the
European continent. There is clearly an emerging consensus within Germany’s strategic
community that the country has to play a leadership role—largely out of necessity because
there is no one else to do it. But it is unclear whether the next German government will be willing to spend the necessary resources to continue with this
approach. Widespread reluctance among the broader political elites and the population means Germany will remain a rather

reluctant military power. WPR: What impact have U.S. President Donald Trump’s criticisms of the alliance had on domestic debates and discussions over
defense and security policy? Bunde: While it is too soon to tell what the long-term consequences of Trump’s repeated criticism of European NATO members—and Germany in

there already is a “Trump effect” in the German debate on security policy. Some
particular—will be,

politicians and journalists have initiated a discussion about a potential European—or even German—nuclear
deterrent that would be independent from the U.S . This kind of talk would have been considered completely
outlandish a few years ago. And there is an intensifying debate in Germany on defense spending. While most experts agree that Germany has to spend
more on defense—the current level is around 1.2 percent of GDP— many point out that the actual output is more important

than reaching the 2 percent goalpost . Others also contend that the burden-sharing debate should not be limited to defense spending, and must
also take into account expenditures for diplomacy, conflict prevention and development cooperation. There is a possibility that the “Trump effect” could actually end up hurting
politicians who support increased but smart spending on defense because it may look as though they are merely responding to “The Donald” and not to the changes in
Germany’s security environment. The issue will almost certainly figure prominently in this year’s election campaign, with many now questioning the 2 percent goal. Foreign
Minister Sigmar Gabriel has already quipped that he would not know where to put all the aircraft carriers Germany would need to buy to reach the target.

Faltering German relationship destroys NATO’s effectiveness

Jackson, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, 02-13-2019 (Bruce Pitcairn, Founder and president of the
U.S. Committee on NATO from 1995 to 2000, which supported the integration of new members into NATO and the
European Union, “A Conservative Case for German Leadership in Europe,” https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2019/02/13/a-conservative-case-for-german-leadership-in-europe/)//EF

what is a stake between the United States and Germany

At heart, is an in Eastern Europe not a dispute about pipelines or negotiating tactics; it is

argument over first principles. The U S believes, that “the return of great power
nited tates to quote Mitchell,

competition is the defining geopolitical fact of our time,” and therefore the road to peace in Ukraine
leads through crippling economic sanctions, arms sales, and regime change in Moscow The , ultimately, .

German view is much different The alternative peace leads negotiations to Kyiv, constitutional
. through

reform, and the reconstruction of Eastern Ukraine. In the German approach, international
peacekeepers are more useful than arms sales. Protecting minority rights under the Helsinki Final Act is a more reliable strategy than building up sovereignty by displacing language,

. Dividing gas transit between Germany and Ukraine might even be a better way of
religion, and populations

creating economic interdependence than disrupting trade flows throughout the post-Soviet
world. these are very
The point here is not whether Berlin or Washington have cracked the code to containing Russian aggression. Neither has corralled Moscow. Neither has brought peace to Ukraine. The point is that

different worldviews. The State Department sees Europe’s eastern flank as a no-holds-barred
great-power competition Berlin sees Russian aggression and the humanitarian tragedy in
. And

Ukraine through the lens of European history since 1945. there is a The difference of values implied by these visions matters greatly. Finally,

serious divergence between the United States and Germany on the appropriate relationship
between the economy and the interests of the state Merkel, has a largely benign view . Angela like most Germans,

of economic activity. Growth is good, diminishing inequality within the population and integrating new members. Trade, particularly exports, is wonderful in distributing comparative advantages around the world. Prosperity is its

Germany might even return to

own reward in modern Germany, and trade relations are not intended to achieve the objectives of the German state. One could imagine that, in the not too distant future,

the project of building vast, trans-oceanic free trade zones around in the world. Not so in
Washington in 2019 . There are walls to be built. Economic activity, to again quote Mitchell, draws its “foundational importance from the American nation state and national sovereignty as one of the key sources, along with natural
law, from which political legitimacy ultimately derives.” Setting aside for a moment the odd part about natural law, this is a militant and fundamentally illiberal declaration of mercantilist principles. As Mitchell confirms, “To a much greater extent than in the recent
past, the United States must treat the promotion of U.S. business as inextricably linked to the future of our nation’s strength and influence abroad.” There are two sides to the dysfunctional Atlantic Alliance: Donald Trump’s America, which has selfishly substituted
aggressive mercantilism and exploitative diplomacy for international order; and a fretful Germany, which is oscillating wildly between confusion and denial. It is the interaction between America’s abandonment of altruism in favor of crude economic bullying and
Germany’s tendency to apologize and ingratiate that threatens Euro-Atlantic order. If Europe wants to survive as a community, its leaders must first realize that these are not trivial disagreements. If Assistant Secretary Mitchell is to be believed, the United States will

Unlike most EU member states, Germany has rarely viewed

try even harder to ensure that Europe does not succeed in taking its destiny into its own hands.

its leadership positions in the European Commission as a means for defending German
interests. To date, Germany has done far more to realize the vision of Schumann and Monet than the Brussels bureaucracy has done in practical terms for Germany. Without effective coordination with the European Union, it is not surprising that
the level of German defense spending is set during American Presidential campaigns. German exports of aluminum are regulated by the U.S. Trade Representative, and exports to Iran are within the purview of the Treasury Department. Tariffs on Daimler, BMW, and
Volkswagen are subject to the whim of White House economic advisers. Germany’s energy policy is directed by threats from both the State Department and the Secretary of Energy. The only major aspect of Germany economic decision-making that is not a target of
U.S. interference is climate change policy. And this has been a moot point since 2017, when President Trump withdrew the United States completely from the Paris climate agreement. In this new world of mercantilism, protectionism, and unilateral diktat, German
industry is defenseless. From the heady days of 2014-16, when the largest free trade deal in history between the United States and Europe was within sight, to the trade wars and coercive economic practices of the present, the descent has been profound and more
than a little frightening. Here again, Germany has not reacted effectively to the changed circumstances and has thereby hastened its own financial decline. As the largest economy in the European Union, Germany should at a minimum take steps to secure the
position of Competition Commissioner and support the creation of a European Commission willing to defend the integrity of European industry and markets. Moreover, the U.S. Congress is now playing a significant role in legitimizing mercantilist practices by passing
legislation to pressure EU members. For example, the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) explicitly threatens European companies with criminal penalties. If one believes that there should be no taxation, sanctions, or criminal
penalties imposed on EU citizens without representation, European political parties need to organize defensive blocs in both the Bundestag and the European Parliament. The purpose of these blocs should be to defend a balanced trading system between the United
States and European Union, to void extraterritorial legislation damaging to the European economy, to prohibit coercive practices, and, if appropriate, to retaliate against unfair trading practices and meddling in EU internal affairs. As 2019 opened, both political
parties in the United States responded to Trump’s reckless decision to announce a withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan by adopting Jim Mattis as a contrasting symbol of rectitude and honor. Such theatrics are certainly easier to pull off than it is to explain to
voters that their President (and Congress) have treated their European allies shabbily. Paeans to august personalities are no response to Russian aggression in Europe’s East, or to U.S. withdrawal from NATO’s out-of-area mission. Germany’s silence has enabled the
Washington’s compromised political elite to get away with run-of-the-mill jingoism, a pointless Government shutdown, and the preposterous claim that immigrants are a far greater threat to Western civilization than the violent aggression of ISIS, the Taliban, and
Iran. These falsehoods should have been challenged more directly by German leaders. Certainly isolationism and the duplicitous character of President Trump pose serious threats to American democracy, but Germany’s inability to recognize and explain the greater
threat that American conduct poses to the political cohesion and defensive capability of NATO is far more serious. Having solicited America’s NATO allies to join multiple Washington-led alliances of the willing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Greater Middle East, the
United States cannot now withdraw abruptly, without warning or consultation. Words such as cowardice, betrayal, and desertion exist to describe such conduct on the battlefield, but they have not been heard clearly from anyone in Europe, particularly in Germany.
The conceptual problem here is that conservative German leaders give the impression that ingratiation and flattery are the price to be paid for keeping Donald Trump in a multilateral alliance. This is a very bad idea. Military alliances, like good marriages, are
maintained and strengthened by a readiness to rebel at the first sign of the undermining of the moral values that serve as the foundation for these institutions. The absence of indignation in Berlin at the behavior of President Trump is a sign that the process of
national decathexis, (in this context, the withdrawal of a political and emotional investment) is well advanced in Germany. The fragmentation of NATO cannot be far behind. An asymmetric relationship has developed between the State Department and the German
Foreign Ministry that bodes ill for sustaining a friendship between equals. In Washington, German diplomats are overly polite, often retiring, and usually ignored. In the classical tradition, the German Embassy celebrates the political and cultural achievements of

By contrast, American diplomats in

Germany: brilliant automotive engineering, masterful football teams, the architectural and social triumphs of German Reunification, and pilsner beer.

Berlin are stunningly rude and aggressively lobby against the business interests of their hosts,
against the government, and against the foreign policies of elected German officials. The State
Department is to oppose, to disrupt, and often to undermine.
in Berlin The U.S. Ambassador Richard Grenell has sided with Kaczynski against Germany,
attacked German immigration policy, threatened German companies with U.S. sanctions, and held himself out as a virtual proconsul for U.S. extraterritorial overreach. It is hardly a secret that the European Bureau of the State Department is no ally of Germany.
There are two discrete problems in the current Atlantic relationship. There is the moral hazard of inequality in the application of treaties and the economic danger in deteriorating trade relations between the United States and European Union. In addition to the
unethical connotations of subordinate or second-class states, unequal relations are unstable and pose a danger to an international system of order based on laws being equally applied. No one benefits in a relationship where only one side can do the shouting, the

Unsurprisingly, Germany is the country where Trump

bullying, and the sanctioning. This same point applies to diplomatic manners and protocol.

Administration officials have deliberately behaved most poorly since 2016. Uniquely, Germany is
the only economically successful advanced democracy with little to say about its reasons for
being so, or where its destiny lies. , Germany is virtually mute in a
In sharp contrast to the interminable self-promotion and deceptions of Donald Trump

world of constant conversation. Whether this is due to the reserved personality of Angela Merkel or a standoffish domestic political temperament is irrelevant. Great nations at the beginning of the 21st

. A well-developed explanation
century shouldn’t be ashamed to place the pursuit of their economic and geopolitical interests within the frame of their larger humanitarian, environmental, and political goals

of national purpose and shared political values is a necessity of statecraft. Sadly, perhaps due to
the hesitancy with which Germans are conditioned to view modernity, the stories of German
purpose and leadership are missing. The above recommendations are intended to suggest how German leadership might reverse the deterioration of Western wealth and politics caused by the

the adoption of more disciplined policies on

derangement of America’s moral compass and the deterioration of its capacity for leadership. The basic premise is that and self-interested the

would rebalance the Euro-Atlantic alliance and its system of trade.

part of Chancellor Merkel’s coalition government and its successor serve to I’ve

A conservative sensibility suggests that

attempted here to draw on a tradition of conservative sensibility common to Germany and America that is liberal in its intentions if not in its theory.
Germany could lead more effectively if it were respected rather than merely liked, just as it
would claim that the United States could more easily recover its former status if it were
respected rather than disliked and feared. More to the point, Germany’s leaders should not accept unequal or one-sided relationships as the norm in international politics. These relationships
are fundamentally destabilizing and undermine the principle of fairness on which the NATO alliance and Euro-Atlantic system of free trade rely. If in the past Europeans hated the command economies of the communist world, today they should enthusiastically
oppose the bullying economic policies of the Trump Administration, which also distort economies, coerce free enterprise, and seek unfair advantage in trade wars. Finally, it is a fundamental principle of realism that geography, history, and cultural proximity convey a
seniority of interest to the nation that lies closest to international disorder in terms of shared values, common history, experience, and military and economic risks. Therefore, it is absurd that relations with Russia, peace in Eastern Ukraine, and the energy security of

It is a grave mistake to think that Germany does not have a role

Europe are decided in distant Washington and not by Berlin, Paris, and Brussels.

in enforcing appropriate behavior in diplomacy and ensuring that even Germany’s longtime
allies do not overstep.
 --XT – Germany DA
Germany is a viable leader – foreign policy experience, economic planning, and
communication all prove it’ll do what’s best for Europe
Demesmay, Head of the DGAP's Franco-German Relations Program, Puglierin, Head of the Alfred von
Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies, 17 (Claire, Jana, Foreign Policy and the Next German Government,
“Germany’s Leadership Tasks in Europe,” p. 11)//EF

There are three reasons why Germany should be a major force in consolidating and developing
the EU. First, it has – since its inception – made a foreign policy leitmotif of promoting European
integration over its own national sovereignty . The German public widely believes Germany has a foreign policy responsibility to advocate
for the EU. While Germany also has its Euro-skeptic discourse – as shown by the rise of the right-wing populist party Alternative for

Germany (AfD), which may well soon have a voice in Germany’s parliament – an outright anti EU attitude has yet to reach the

political mainstream in Germany, unlike in many other member states. This allows the German
government fairly broad scope to maneuver on matters of European policy . Second, the German
government has repeatedly proven its leadership in recent years, for example engaging to resolve the
economic crisis in the eurozone and working as part of the Normandy negotiating format (of France,
Germany, Ukraine, and Russia) to resolve the conflict with Russia over Ukraine . It can draw on its experience as a compromise builder and

help bring other parties on board. Third, Germany enjoys solid communication channels to all of its EU partners .

Despite criticism of its leadership position, the German government has become an indispensable actor since the

outbreak of the financial crisis, and it has correspondingly solid networks at all levels of the decision-making process.

Internal EU leadership is necessary to preserving a litany of issues – the United

States fails
Kirch, Research Associate at CISP, 17 (
most EU member states retain their high expectations of German
The latest edition of ECFR’s EU Coalition Explorer confirms that

leadership in European Union. Indeed, Germany’s importance can be seen in the fact that it ranks
higher than any other country across several categories the survey covers. Member states name Germany as their
preferred partner in most EU policy areas, including immigration and asylum, foreign and
security, the completion of the single market, and various aspects of economic and eurozone
governance. As a result, Germany is also the country member states contact most – and that is most responsive
to this outreach. So far, so good. In principle, the EU27 agree that EU cooperation – be it intergovernmental or

supranational, flexible or unanimous – requires decisive German commitment and

engagement. A strong EU voice requires a strong German voice. However, domestic developments could prevent Germany from
fulfilling the role member states demand of it: that of a predictable, forward-looking partner. In 2019, the coalition government in Berlin has been characterized by a series of internal disagreements on a range of
issues. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) seemed to have become more unified in the aftermath of a contest to replace Chancellor Angela Merkel as its leader, and to have begun to work through disputes
with its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Yet the rift between CDU/CSU and the Social Democrats now appears to be widening – on questions of not only the welfare state but also security and defence
policy. In a signal of Germany’s willingness to accommodate France, Merkel used her speech at the February 2019 Munich Security Conference to stress that German compromise is important to establishing a
unified EU strategy on arms exports and defense sector cooperation. This quickly prompted resistance from the Social Democrats. The Aachen Treaty cannot hide the fact that Germany and France have limited
common ground on the future of the EU The Coalition Explorer demonstrates the need for both a functioning Franco-German tandem and a commitment to the strategic partnership among German policymakers.

. However, the agreement

The Aachen Treaty France and Germany signed last January appears to form part of an attempt to revitalize their bilateral relationship at various levels

cannot hide the fact that the countries have limited common ground on the future of the EU –
partly due to a lack of a strong intra-German consensus on European policy and structural
reform. Meanwhile, a mixture of domestic developments, external shocks, and challenges
within the EU has destabilized many EU coalitions . Brexit has the potential to make the EU more Franco-German or more French – given that it has
been French President Emmanuel Macron rather than Merkel who has tried to push the EU agenda forward (most recently by publishing a letter in major newspapers in all 28 member states that calls for the
revival of the European project). The prospect of this shift has caused many of the United Kingdom’s traditional allies – among them states outside the eurozone, market liberalist powers, and countries skeptical of
strengthening the EU’s social dimension – to intensify their search for new partners in Europe and beyond. At the same time, it has reminded Berlin that traditional alliances cannot be taken for granted. Germany
has responded by attempting to diversify its bilateral relationships within Europe, not least through the Federal Foreign Office’s “Like-Minded Initiative”. This project identifies countries such as Sweden, Finland,
and Ireland as allies that might be willing to promote joint European ideas. Germany has also taken an increasingly open-minded approach towards sub-regional cooperation – most visibly, with the Visegrád group

In February, Merkel
(comprising the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). Initially hesitant about the concept of minilateralism, Berlin has now taken a more pragmatic stance.

met with the Visegrád heads of government to identify their shared interests. As such, Germany
has chosen to sit at the table rather than to watch others talking from a distance. This has been
especially true when the United States and China have engaged with countries in central or
south-eastern Europe. For example, in September 2018, Berlin opted to take part in the third summit of the Three Seas Initiative as an observer, after US President Donald Trump joined
the format. Moreover, policymakers in Berlin have taken (justified) accusations of double standards against them to heart. They have realised that it is unsustainable for them to engage in Franco-German
consultations at all political levels while reproaching members of the Visegrád group for exchanging views “behind closed doors”. Since 2015, European leaders have increasingly contested a narrative that re-
emerges in German policy discourse now and then: that German interests are inseparable from European interests. For example, in a statement to mark the beginning of his country’s EU Council presidency in
2018, Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz explicitly criticised German policymakers for often failing to make other EU member states feel that their views were sufficiently valued. Meanwhile, some member states
have heavily criticised Germany for acting unilaterally and playing power games on issues such as migration and the Nord Stream 2 energy pipeline. Against this background, Germany’s manoeuvring within the EU
very much reflects the tension between the inclusive approach in its foreign policy DNA and its attempts to pursue German interests at the EU level. Merkel and various German ministers have repeatedly
emphasised the need to bridge EU divides and to reassure small and medium-sized countries that they are not being pushed to the sidelines. This tension between national and European is often difficult to

Yet, crucially, German policymakers have now begun a discussion on

address and, of course, not a purely German phenomenon.

the degree to which EU solutions require national compromise . It remains to be seen whether German political parties will use the
European Parliament election campaign to constructively engage with ideas and deals Germany can put forward to make the EU more resilient and more capable of defending the interests of EU citizens. Given the
various internal and external challenges the EU faces, it will not be enough for Germany to simply balance east and west – or north and south – by increasing the number of bilateral and minilateral meetings it
holds. The hardest task for Berlin is to push for credible compromises on long-term, strategically important policy issues such as migration and asylum, energy and climate change, defence, cohesion, and social

It is crucial that Germany uses its EU Council presidency in 2020 to continue forging close
security.

ties with and between its partners in the EU, while also putting forward solutions to key policy
challenges.
Authors
 Indict – Rynning
Rynning makes biased assumptions on European relations
Meyer, Professor of European & International Politics at King’s College in London, 5 –
(Christopher O., 2005, “Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist
Framework for Explaining Changing Norms, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.858.9672&rep=rep1&type=pdf) np
The focus on strategic norms along the scale of activism as suggested by Heiselberg (2003: 12–13) has the added advantage of doing
away with the overly rigid dichotomies used in much of the literature on strategic culture. Sten
Rynning speaks of a
‘strong’ and a ‘weak’ European strategic culture, where the latter would allow the EU to prevail in zero-sum
conflict situations, in which opposing actors need to be defeated rather than persuaded to change
their views, interests and behaviour (2003, p. 484). In my view ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ are too crude and
moreover normatively biased measurements to make a distinction.
***PERMS/NBs***
 Links to NB – NATO Unpopular
NATO’s becoming unpopular in the US
Macleod, MintPress contributor, 19 (Alan, 04.05.19, “As Increasingly Unpopular NATO Turns
70, Has the Organization Reached its Retirement Age?”
https://www.mintpressnews.com/increasingly-unpopular-nato-turns-70-organization-reached-
retirement-age/257025/) np

Growing public disenchantment There appears, however, to be increasing public disillusionment with the
organization. A YouGov survey of six key NATO member states (including the U.S.) published this week found that
support for the organization was falling, leading to a rising public ambivalence towards it. Fewer
than 50 percent of Americans responded that they supported their country’s membership in
NATO, as did fewer than 40 percent of French respondents. This ambivalence, however, has not transformed into active
opposition, and it is not known whether this is simply part of a trend of growing popular mistrust of public organizations, such as the
government or the media. As NATO reaches its 70th birthday, a growing number of commentators have pondered its uncertain
future. “If NATO didn’t exist, would we invent it? I suspect not,” asked MIT political scientist Barry Posen, who called for a re-
evaluation of the US role in the organization last month in the New York Times. Perhaps the organization has finally
reached its retirement age, given its less-than-exemplary track record of destruction around the
world. However, like a snake shedding its skin, NATO is attempting to rebrand itself in an effort to remain of service to empire,
greatly expanding its remit as it did after the fall of the Soviet Union. If NATO is to depart the stage, it will likely be
because of public pushback against war rather than as a result of the unpredictable decisions of Donald Trump. When all
you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. The longer it continues the more wars and destruction NATO will cause.

Republicans want to diminish US ties with NATO – they’ll hate the CP

Rothman, reporter @ the Commentary, 19 (Noah, 02.22.19, “Would Republicans Go to War
for NATO?” https://www.commentarymagazine.com/foreign-policy/europe/russia/would-
republicans-go-to-war-for-nato/) np

President Donald Trump

set his sights on the NATO alliance long before he took the oath of office.
“NATO benefits Europe far more than it does the U.S.,” the president wrote in 2016. When pressed by a
New York Times reporter whether, as president, he would come to the “immediate military aid” of NATO allies in the Baltics if Russia
invaded, Trump said that would be contingent only on whether those states had “fulfilled their obligation to us.” As
president,
he has continued to question the value of NATO, even as his Cabinet officials unequivocally back
the Atlantic alliance and his administration pursues admirably hawkish policies toward Russia.
The president’s reflexive defenders lean heavily upon the administration’s actions that strengthen NATO to avoid
confronting the president’s rhetorical efforts to weaken it. But ignoring the damage Trump is
doing does not negate it. And that damage is evident in a recent study conducted by Eurasia Group
research fellow and Professor Mark Hannah. He found that Republican voters are now willing to shirk America’s
responsibility to its allies. When asked if America should “initiate a military operation in Estonia
to expel Russian troops” in the event of an invasion, a “slight majority” of Republicans said “no.”

Republicans are highly skeptical of multilateral bodies – won’t like NATO

consultation
Call, Crow, Ron, Writers at the Brookings Institute, 17 (Charles, David, James, “Is the UN a friend or foe?,”
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/10/03/is-the-un-a-friend-or-foe/)//EF
As the annual United Nations General Assembly convened in September in New York , anxiety over relations with the United
States under President Trump loomed. The United States is the most powerful member and largest contributor to the U.N. U.N.
officials had worried the president would engage in another round of world-body bashing, but wound up relieved by his faint praise for U.N.
peacekeeping and refugee assistance. However,
Trump’s calls for state-centered sovereignty echoed long-
standing conservative skepticism of global organizations. According to a 2016 Pew survey, a
majority of Republicans believe the United States should not let its interests be affected by the
U.N. or other multilateral bodies like the World Trade Organization. In this view, the U.N. is a tool used
by other countries, including America’s enemies, to curb U.S. interests.

Seen as an infringement on US sovereignty – highly unpopular

Goure, VP of Lexington Institute, 12 (Daniel, “National Sovereignty: NATO And The EU’s Fatal Weakness,”
https://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/national-sovereignty-nato-and-the-eus-fatal-weakness/)//EF

Much and perhaps most of NATO and the EU’s current travails can be traced to the same basic
flaw: national sovereignty. Both organizations have elaborate consultative and rule-making structures. NATO has a unified command structure. There is
even a European parliament. Yet, the central fact that determines the way both organizations function — or

in this case fail to do so — is that their members retain their sovereign rights as independent
states. NATO without the United States spends nearly $300 billion a year on defense and maintains some 1.6 million men under arms. This should be enough to produce a
military of enormous power. But such is not the case. As the conflict in Afghanistan and the air war over Libya

demonstrated, NATO has spent its money poorly, buying too much of some capabilities and not
enough of others. On occasion, as when it decided to acquire and operate a fleet of AWACS aircraft or,
quite recently, five Global Hawk Block 40s, NATO can a make good collective investment decision. The same can be said of the

international consortium to acquire the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter which includes a number of NATO members . But most of the military forces the

Alliance has are the result of decisions by individual countries . Rather than this being seen as a serious problem for the
Alliance, its members view the exercise of national sovereignty in ways that do damage to the

collective security of all members as something in which to take pride . The EU’s current problems are a consequence of
protecting its members’ individual rights, particularly the right to cheap money and to mishandle their national budgets, and not mandating individual responsibility. Faced with
the possible collapse of the single currency, the Union’s members cling ever tighter to their sovereignty. High debt countries have moderated their fiscal and budgetary
profligacy only reluctantly and under the threat of even more dire consequences if they did not. Those countries that have managed their economies well are increasingly
wondering if they should exercise their sovereign right to bail on the whole enterprise. Supporters of both institutions will no doubt respond that if national sovereignty had not

However, if national sovereignty is also a fatal

been protected there never would have been a NATO or an EU. Fair enough.

weakness in both, then we are all kidding ourselves about their future prospects.

Both Dems and Republicans are highly skeptical of institutionalization – want

US political authority
Patrick, James H. Binger senior fellow in global governance, 18 (Stewart M., Director of the International
Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) Program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),"Spare Us the Nationalist
Defense of American Sovereignty," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/spare-us-nationalist-
defense-american-sovereignty, 11-14-2018)//EF
The objects of Thiessen’s scorn are “globalists” like French President Emmanuel Macron and his “liberal” fellow travelers in the United States. He castigates progressive
Americans, whom he says are all too willing to subordinate popular democracy to the whims of “unelected bureaucrats presiding over unaccountable institutions.” By contrast,

Thiessen lauds conservative nationalists, “who refuse to cede American sovereignty to

supranational institutions.” The implication is clear: Without conservatives manning the parapet,
liberals would be tearing down the walls of U.S. national sovereignty. Thiessen’s argument rests on a straw man. In
reality, there is no global march toward supranationalism, and little appetite for it among American progressives. To be sure, the world is becoming
more institutionalized. New multilateral frameworks of cooperation are being created to help
manage global problems from financial instability to nuclear proliferation . But the vast majority of
these cooperative arrangements are inter-governmental initiatives among fully sovereign states that
have chosen to enter multilateral organizations , ratify international treaties, or join informal coalitions to get a better handle on
globalization. Crucially, these are horizontal relationships among independent nations, not hierarchical arrangements that subordinate national political authorities to some

the United States remains a very different animal. It

global entity. It is true that European Union (EU) member states have accepted some degree of supranationalism. But

jealously guards it sovereign prerogatives, protecting its Constitution as the repository of

popular sovereignty and the supreme source of political authority . And when proposed
international bodies (like the International Criminal Court) promise to infringe on national sovereignty , they have
elicited skepticism from Democrats as well as Republicans . In sum, the idea that current trends in multilateral cooperation
threaten the American people’s sovereignty is a red herring. Nevertheless, it remains a staple of conservative rhetoric, a canard

frequently invoked to frighten Americans into believing that the United States is on the slippery
slope to some global version of the EU —and eventually a world state. And one can see why. Implying that U.S. “sovereignty” is in jeopardy is a
good way to mobilize American populists against multilateral initiatives like the United Nations and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is akin to implying that
motherhood and apple pie are under attack and is an effective way to distract the public from a more sober assessment of America’s stakes in a predictable, rule-governed world

Trump trotted out this bogeyman in June 2017,

—and of the costs and benefits of particular institutions. No surprise, then, that President

when he denounced the Paris Climate Agreement —based on independently determined national contributions—as an
infringement on U.S. sovereignty.

Republicans want the US to retain control of their resources and leverage itself
as a unipolar decisionmaker
Kharas, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, 17 (Homi Kharas, Multilateralism under stress, Brookings,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/multilateralism-under-stress/, 7-31-2017)//EF
The multilateral development system, led by the United States, has guided development cooperation by Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries, evolving gradually through new institutions and new norms since World War II. Organized by a small group of like-
minded countries, multilateralism has been a way of managing burden-sharing among donors and of
delivering public goods. These functions are now under stress. According to a poll conducted in
December 2016 by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, most Americans (59.3 percent)
support the statement that “when giving foreign aid, it is best for the U.S. to participate in
international efforts, such as through the United Nations. This way it is more likely that other countries will do their fair
share and that these efforts will be better coordinated.” However, a majority of Republican voters disagree, believing

that it is better for the U.S. to provide aid on its own, to ensure control over how money is spent
and to gain recognition for its generosity. This America First sentiment is most concerning
because multilateral institutions are uniquely equipped to respond to today’s development
challenges. They can coordinate among multiple development actors; conduct a coherent policy dialogue with government; build partnerships
with non-state actors; blend aid and loans with private capital; play an honest broker role, especially in government-business dealings; ensure
transparency, consultation, and the application of bestpractice safeguards in projects; and provide accountable administrative structures on finance,
data, and results-evaluation.
--Perm Lie
 2AC – Lie Perm
(___) Perm: do the plan and consult Japan
A. the CP has 2 logical parts- it consults, and it fiats the outcome of
consultation- this doesn’t compete logically: it relies on artificially severing
certainty.
B. Counterplans should be textually and functionally competitive- especially for
hyper generics holding a high bar on competition is key to encouraging topic
education
 1AR Plan + Consult
The CP has 2 logical parts- we permute the part that does consult, this forces
the neg to read a topic link- consult over arms sales key – rather than an
artificial net benefit- just consult solves alliance

Hold the neg to a high bar on competition for entirely plan inclusive
counterplans- key to discourage race to the bottom/topic crowd out
 AT: Severs
-Misunderstands fiat- this argument assumes the plan WOULD be done, not
SHOULD- consultative process is instant due to fiat, the plan is still immediate
- Should isn’t mandatory
Taylor and Howard 5 (Michael, Resources for the Future and Julie, Partnership to Cut
Hunger and Poverty in Africa, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development
assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9-12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-
agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)

Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted:
plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the American Schools and
Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the
International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2
million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with
only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount
available. The difference between shall and should may have legal significance—one is clearly
mandatory while the other is a strong admonition—but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s
need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.

-“Resolved” doesn’t require certainty

Webster’s 9 – Merriam Webster 2009
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb #
Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to
become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult,
deliberate
 AT: Intrinsic
-Not intrinsic- cross apply overview- we permute 1 constituent part , if it’s a lie
it’s a lie of “omission” which means we added nothing
-Disads should be intrinsic- key to topic education and aff ground- otherwise
the neg can Lopez CP every year
 AT: Leaks
-fiat is attitudinal- Trump wouldn’t leak because its not in his interest
No leaks- Trump cracked down
Tucker and Fox, Associated Press, 4-13-2019
(Eric and Ben, “Charging Assange reflects dramatic shift in US approach”
https://www.apnews.com/3d9c190f66cc4e5b8669bcc0b6c1eff9, LASA-IZP)

WASHINGTON (AP) — The decision to seek the extradition of Julian Assange marked a dramatic new
approach to the founder of WikiLeaks by the U.S. government , a shift that was signaled in the early days
of the Trump administration. President Barack Obama’s Justice Department had extensive internal debates about whether to charge Assange amid
concerns the case might not hold up in court and would be viewed as an attack on journalism by an administration already taking heat for leak prosecutions. But senior

Trump administration officials seemed to make clear early on that they held a different view,
dialing up the rhetoric on the anti-secrecy organization shortly after it made damaging
disclosures about the CIA’s cyberespionage tools. “WikiLeaks walks like a hostile intelligence
service and talks like a hostile intelligence service,” former CIA Director Mike Pompeo said in
April 2017 in his first public speech as head of the agency. “Assange and his ilk,” Pompeo said, seek “personal self-
aggrandizement through the destruction of Western values.” A week after the CIA director’s speech, then-
Attorney General Jeff Sessions said the arrest of Assange was a priority, part of a broader Justice
Department crackdown on leakers. “We’ve already begun to step up our efforts, and whenever a
case can be made, we will seek to put some people in jail,” he said. AP reporter Eric Tucker explains the indictment by
the U.S. Department of Justice against WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, who was pulled from the Ecuadorean Embassy in London and hauled into court Thursday. (April 11)
Pompeo, now secretary of state, declined Friday to discuss the issue, citing the now-active legal pursuit of Assange following his removal a day earlier by British authorities from
the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. The administration won’t say why they decided now to charge Assange with a single count of computer intrusion conspiracy that dates to
2010. Back then, WikiLeaks is alleged to have helped Chelsea Manning, then a U.S. Army intelligence analyst, crack a password that gave her higher-level access to classified
computer networks. Nor will they say whether the Obama administration had the same evidence that forms the basis of the indictment, or whether Assange will face additional

a U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss internal

counts if he is extradited to the United States. But

and legal matters, traced the genesis of the indictment to what’s known as the “Vault 7 leak” in
2017, when WikiLeaks released thousands of pages of documents revealing details about CIA
tools for breaking into targeted computers, cellphones and consumer electronics. A former CIA
software engineer was charged with violating the Espionage Act by providing the information to
WikiLeaks and is to go on trial later this year in New York. And the leak was a tipping point in
deciding to pursue Assange, the official said. “Vault 7 was the nail in the coffin, so to speak,” the official said. It ended years of
ambivalence about what to do about Assange, who was hailed by many when WikiLeaks
published hundreds of thousands of State Department cables and U.S. military documents, including
many that revealed previously unknown facts about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the detainees held at the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Even today, Assange and

Daniel
WikiLeaks have supporters around the world, amid a debate over whether the dissemination of raw, unfiltered documents and data counts as journalism.

Ellsberg, the former military analyst behind the famed leak of the secret history of the Vietnam
War known as the Pentagon Papers, called the charging of Assange an “ominous” effort to
criminalize a necessary component of journalism. “The charges are based on facts that were known throughout the Obama
administration, which chose not to indict because of the obvious challenge to the First Amendment that would involve,” Ellsberg said in an Associated Press interview. A former
Justice Department official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss internal discussions, said there was an extensive debate within the government over the feasibility
of charging Assange with the publication of stolen, classified materials. But prosecutors grew concerned that such a case would not hold up in court. Even though officials did not
agree with Assange’s self-characterization as a journalist, the former official said, there was concern that it would be hard to justify charging him with actions that more
conventional journalists take. The former official said the department at the time was more amenable to bringing a case like the one ultimately brought — a narrower
prosecution centered on a hacking conspiracy. It focuses on an entirely different violation that may obviate any First Amendment or press freedom concern. “This is just charging
a journalist with conspiracy to hack into computer systems, which is no different than breaking into a building or breaking into a classified safe,” said Mary McCord, a senior
Justice Department national security official in the Obama administration. “And that’s not First Amendment protected activity.” That is a widely held view in government, even

“This was deliberate and malicious effort to cause harm to

among people generally sympathetic to the mission of the media.

us, to U.S. national security interests, and I think it would be good if there is some accountability
at last,” said David Pearce, who was U.S. ambassador to Algeria in 2010 when WikiLeaks released hundreds of
thousands of secret diplomatic cables. “So far there hasn’t been any accountability for Mr. Assange.”

Trump’s lies don’t matter-all anyone cares about is the story he tells
Grossman, Chicago Tribune, 6-22-2018
(Ron, “Why are Trump’s lies not ruinous to him? Because truth can be in the eye of the
beholder” https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-met-grossman-trump-lies-
supporters-20180621-story.html, LASA-IZP)
I would like to think that Donald Trump has finally told one lie too many. He searched high and wide for someone to blame when his policy of taking children away from parents
caught surreptitiously crossing the border backfired, big time. Before throwing in the towel and ending the practice with a scratch of his pen, Trump said Democrats had to clean
up the mess. Their legislation created it, he claimed. That was a double whopper. Since there is no such legislation, it couldn’t be the Democrats’ fault. Then he claimed that
dangerous criminals are posing as loving parents in order to sneak into our country. That was a riff on the Greek legend of the Trojan horse, and as Trump didn’t offer a scintilla

Trump feels no need to prove even his wiggiest

of evidence, it also belongs on a library shelf labeled “fiction.” The fact is that

claims. Still, I’ve gone on doggedly hoping that the sheer magnitude of his lies would eventually give his supporters second thoughts. The number of
Trump’s false or misleading claims reached 3,251 by May 31, according to The Washington
Post’s fact-checker database. Shortly thereafter, the Gallup Poll found that 87 percent of
Republicans gave him a favorable rating. To me, that means the time has come to look the data
square in the eye. It accords with what history teaches: What one person sees as an obvious lie
appears to another as an undeniable truth. How do I know? The Bible tells me so. Christians read the New Testament account of Jesus being
born of a virgin as literally true. Jews, whose ancestors produced the Old Testament, find the idea incredible, and Muslims deny Jesus’ crucifixion. That suggests a general rule:

When hearing about a subject to which we are emotionally committed, we often don’t judge it
against the standard of objective truth. We accept it if it’s compatible with ideas we hold sacred,
and reject it if it isn’t. Nazi Germany offers a case in point. Hitler came to power by preaching that Germans were the “master race.” That entitled them to
seize control of nations inhabited by the inferior beings. Yet the Fuhrer and his buddies didn’t look like super men. Hitler had a funny little mustache that gave him the
appearance of a clown. Charlie Chaplin so satirized him in “The Great Dictator,” giving movie audiences giggling fits. But Germans didn’t see the reality of Hitler’s gang.
Mesmerized by the pack of lies he was feeding them, they marched into Russia. There millions perished, many wearing summer uniforms in a bitter-cold winter. Hitler said

To grasp Trump’s hold over his followers requires focusing less on his lies
they’d be home before the snow fell.

themselves than the story into which he has woven them. By that worldview, ordinary
Americans have been hoodwinked by a snobbish elite that has profited at the expense of
workaday folks. He’s their champion. A handful of supporting examples to lend just enough credence to his worldview. For example, pundits have
decried Trump’s broadsides against NAFTA. The last three letters of the acronym stand for “free trade agreement.” Yet Canada imposes astronomical tariffs on milk imports.
Why shouldn’t an American dairy farmer cry, “Liar, liar pants on fire!” when hearing the word NAFTA? The lie ringing in the ears of his supporters is that free trade is a fair fight.

Yes, Trump lies

You’re not likely to win that person over no matter how many holes can be knocked into the rest of Trump’s story by wielding an ax of truth.

with remarkable ease and predictable regularity. He said he didn’t know anything about hush
money paid to Stormy Daniels. Then said he did know — without prefacing his revised account
with “I seem to have misspoken myself.” Be that as it may, just throwing that up against Trump isn’t
likely to win an election. People need something to believe in when they step into a voting
booth. They want to hear a compelling story. Something like: “Once upon a time, Democrats saw that people were hurting, so they created
Social Security. Later, they saw that old people couldn’t afford a doctor, so they created Medicare. Sure, they’ve dropped the ball, sometimes. But they own up to that. So how
about I tell you what other nitty-gritty human problems they’d like to tackle. Here’s one …”
 AT: Lying Immoral
-The government isn’t a single “agent”- it can’t have Kantian intent, so it can’t
intend to deceive
It is important for politicians to hide the truth for their countries best interest
Jay, history professor at the University of California-Berkeley, 5/6/10

https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/05/06/why-politicians-should-lie
POLITICIANS GET A BAD rap for their sometimes elusive relationship with the truth. Yet Martin Jay, author of The Virtues of
Mendacity: On Lying in Politics, says there are times when lying may be the right thing to do. After compiling the arguments of
political philosophers through the ages, Jay, a history professor at the University of California-Berkeley, concludes that the American
public should focus less on whether politicians are being truthful and more on the outcomes of their policies. He recently talked with
U.S. News about why Americans should not always expect to get the truth from political leaders. Excerpts: When is lying acceptable?
Well, I don't think there's any single rule. There are, perhaps, more moments when lying is functional rather than dysfunctional. For
example, in the movie Inglourious Basterds, a peasant is asked whether or not there are Jews hiding underneath his floorboards. He
ultimately tells the truth, and the SS man immediately comes and shoots them. It would have been, on some level, maybe more
dangerous, maybe more courageous, but nonetheless, morally justified to lie. There
are other instances when it's
clear that to create coalitions among partners who don't quite share all the same interests and
values, it's necessary to pretend that there is the commonality of those values and interests .
We see this even with primary campaigns: candidates who have been calling each other names
and decrying the possibility of supporting their opponents then, after one is selected, all rallying
around that candidate. Either they were lying before or after, but it's clear that there is some
tacit obstruction of truths to create a kind of coalition. How does America compare to other nations in its
virtues of truth-telling? Certainly in the last decade or so, we've become increasingly obsessed by it as an issue. America began with
the hope that it would be more transparent, that accountability would be more explicit, that in a democracy people were more
prone to be truth-tellers than they were in an aristocratic, or oligarchic, or monarchical system of government. There's a premium
being placed on plain talking, on being honest; you think of Honest Abe, or George Washington, and that famous myth about felling
the cherry tree. Is lying more or less acceptable in a democracy than in a totalitarian government? There's a so-called big lie that we
associate with totalitarianism. In perhaps the worst days of the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, a good part of the citizenry was
fooled by government propaganda into believing they were living in prosperous, and in some ways justifiable, societies. So those are
countries in which the big lie worked, for a while at least. In the United States, luckily, we don't have the capacity for that due to a
relatively free press and a pluralist political system. What we
have instead are many different competing half-
lies, spins, rhetoric, or positions that hide the truth. In a way, it's healthy to have this very mixed
combination of truths, half-truths, and the occasional outright lies, rather than to have a big lie
or a single truth in which one party claims, or one person claims, to have a monopoly on the
truth. I'm always very nervous when a politician claims that he or she alone has personal
integrity, authenticity, and is a truth teller, and all opponents are scoundrels and liars. So, absolute
truth doesn't exist in politics? Absolute truth is very hard in any context, really. Politics is not an arena in which absolute truth is the
goal. Politics is made up of promises about the future, and we don't know what the truth of the future is going to be. It's also made
up of narratives. Narratives, by definition, are always, in a way, semi-representative of what is the case. Also, in politics, we don't do
what we do in a court of law. We don't swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. There are lots of things
about politics that allow us to appreciate aesthetic and rhetorical qualities that are very different from seeking the truth in a
courtroom, or a scientific experiment, or a scholarly debate. Are politicians' lies ever more justified than those of the everyday
citizen? Politicians often have responsibilities, which allow them, at times, to delay the truth. Or,
especially when they're representing us in an adversarial relationship with another country, they may be very sparing
with the truth. Certainly in diplomatic circumstances , and obviously in wartime, politicians who
are responsible for protecting us can withhold the truth . We had no obligation to tell the Nazis where we were
going to land on D-Day. Having said that, there are many examples of politicians who hide behind those justifications as an excuse
not to tell us truths that we are indeed owed, and those politicians often do pay a price. My argument certainly is not a defense of
politics as inherently hypocritical. I think the default position of politics, as in life, has to be telling the truth, simply because lies don't
work unless they're told against the backdrop of the assumption that people are, in fact, telling truths. Do you look at the
government differently after writing this book? There's no policy implication that comes out of this. I'm not urging governments to
lie, and I'm not urging the citizenry to be complacent about mendacity. But what I'm trying to say is that it's more important to focus
on the issues, on the policies, and on the effects these have on people's lives, than to constantly look for discrepancies in promises
and performance, or to look for inconsistencies in a person's career. We need to see how citizens are affected by the policies that
our politicians pursue. That's far more important than looking for a perfect politician. You can have an absolutely incorruptible figure
who is a fool. And you can have somebody who is morally complex, and yet his policies help people more. Why should America's
leaders read your book? It does give them at least some understanding of the complexities, and it may help them back away from
simplistic accusations. Another thing about lying in politics is the inevitability of people accusing their opponents of lying. It's just one
thing that politicians have to understand is part of the game or the life in the world they inhabit. We need to focus more on policies
and their outcomes than on this kind of accusation of mendacity, which gets us nowhere

Lying in cases of public policymaking are moral

Pasquerella, Killilea, PhDs, 14 (Lynn, Alfred, American academic and the President of the Association of
American Colleges and Universities, Professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island, Public Integrity,
ISSN: 1099-9922 (Print) 1558-0989, “The Ethics of Lying in the Public Interest: Reflections on the "Just Lie””)//EF
Almost all commentators on official lying trace the roots of this practice to Machiavelli. Plato is spared paternity of the great lie presumably because he
thought the myths told by his Philosopher King were not really deceptions but stories that portrayed truths that simple minds could grasp only through
fictitious facts. Machiavelli countenanced more outright deception. He was not a skeptic about whether humans can know the truth, but he was a
profound skeptic about whether humans in power can say the truth. Machiavelli did not advise deception for reasons of
mere expediency but for reasons of necessity: a prudent ruler cannot, and must not, honor his
word when it places him at a disadvantage and when the reasons for which he made his promise
no longer exist. If all men were good, this precept would not be good; but because men are
wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you, you need not keep your word to
them. (1981, pp. 99–100) Machiavelli saw politics as a deadly serious pursuit. The prince who wants to achieve something, even (indeed especially) if
it is in the interest of the people, has so many forces aligned against any change that he cannot afford to abide by the rules of ethics that apply in
private life. Whena person of power tries to change the status quo , Machiavelli warned, the people who will
be harmed, even if they are a small minority, can usually stave off the change because they are
more organized, more motivated, more aware of the advantage they will be losing. Those who will gain, especially if they are poor
and downtrodden, will support the change only halfheartedly, for they have not experienced the fruits

of the change and are dubious that there will be any real difference. Anyone who doubts the currency of this 500-
yearold argument need only consider the campaigns of the National Rifle Association against gun

control and the insurance industry against universal health care . Machiavelli has shocked moralists over the centuries
by how candidly and casually he reaches dark conclusions: “But one must know how to colour one’s actions and to be a great liar and deceiver” (1981,
100). However, Machiavelli does not see the political leader who lies as a monster or as necessarily at odds with the interests of the people. He follows
the sentence just quoted with what he considered a reassuring observation: “Men are so simple, and so much creatures of circumstance, that the
deceiver will always find someone ready to be deceived.” Machiavelli seems to think that the outrage of political leaders lying to their citizens is greatly
diminished by one overriding reality—mostcitizens do not want to know the truth. We would like to think
that Machiavelli is simply self-serving in this discouraging conclusion or at the least that it applied only in his
time of greater illiteracy and lack of experience with democracy. But political experience again gives at least
partial validation to Machiavelli’s undemocratic observations . The electorate makes contradictory

demands on candidates to the extent that most are compelled at least to stretch the truth in promising
more services and no new taxes. Plain-speaking truth-tellers very seldom go far in a democracy. People rant about Congress as an
institution and rank the veracity of politicians below that of used-car salespersons, but every two years we return more than 90 percent of the
incumbents to Congress. The shock expressed about the expletives and racial slurs heard on the Nixon White House tapes seems to confirm
Machiavelli’s point that citizens in general want to believe the best about their rulers and do not make it
difficult for rulers to create appearances or outright deceptions. Machiavelli would find it odd that people are shocked by
his defending the telling of lies by those in power. To push the case even further, Machiavelli might argue that because leaders are
responsible not only for their own well-being but also that of their citizens, they have not only the
opportunity and right but also an obligation to become convincing liars.
--Perm Do the Plan, Rollback If They Say No
 Notes
- Read this perm if they make circumvention args in the 1NC — they are gonna be like the
durable fiat is not an answer — the plan can get rolled back
- Don’t explain the perm in the 2ac
- Block is gonna be like you have to defend the 1certainty of the plan
- 1ar is like they contradicted themselves — we’ll concede that the plan can get rolled
back which means the perm is legitimate and the CP is not competitive
 2AC – Do the Plan then – Rollback If They Say No
Perm do the plan and then consult, rollback the plan if they say no
a. It solves — any say yes cards in the 1NC just means that they won’t roll it
back
b. It’s legit — permutation includes all of the aff and rollback is functionally
the same as abiding by the outcome
 1AR – Do the Plan then – Rollback If They Say No
Extend the perm do the plan and then consult, rollback the plan if they say no
— it solves, all the say yes cards prove that they’ll say yes and won’t know that
the consultation wasn’t prior.
 AT: Rollback Is Intrinsic
The perm isn’t intrinsic — functionally operates the same as the CP since a ‘say
no’ means the plan goes away.
the perm includes that
If it is — Intrinsic Perms Good –
a. It’s key to test the germaneness of the link — if they win the link they
beat the perm
b. Key to aff ground — it’s a functional limit on cheaty CP’s like this that are
built on artificial competition
c. Reject the arg not the team.
 AT: Timeframe
The perm isn’t a timeframe perm — it does both immediately but since the
outcome of consultation doesn’t come immediately, then rolling back would
happen after implementation of the plan
 AT: Severs Certainty
It doesn’t sever — the CP competes off implied certainty — the aff doesn’t have
to win that the plan will happen but that it should happen —
“Should” means desirable --- this does not have to be a mandate
AC 99 (Atlas Collaboration, “Use of Shall, Should, May Can,”
http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)
shall

'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied
without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product.
Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where
compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using
'shall' here is too strong.

should

'should' is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is
desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it
probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so
much the better. Examples: # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant." A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant
on all platforms, but we should try. # "Code should be tested thoroughly." Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall'
if this requirement is to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).
 AT: Saying No Is A Solvency Deficit
The perm is just a test of competition, it’s not an advocacy — “say no” is an
answer to the substance of the CP, not its theoretical legitimacy — no cross
applications
--Perm Do the Plan and Consult On Another
Issue
 2AC – Do the Plan and Consult On Another Issue
Perm do the plan and consult on another issue —
a. It solves — their solvency advocates don’t specify the plan as the key
issue — only consulting in general is key
b. It’s legitimate — it includes the entirety of the aff and it consults
 1AR – Do the Plan and Consult On Another Issue
Extend Perm do the plan and consult on another issue — it solves — their 1NC
cards don’t specify what the US has to consult over to maintain alliance — no
reason why consulting over the plan is key
 AT: Intrinsic
It’s not intrinsic — “on another issue” isn’t part of the perm text — it just
clarifies that the indirect object of the verb consult is unknown —
If it is intrinsic — that’s good –
a. It’s key to test the germaneness of the link — if they win the link they
beat the perm
b. Key to aff ground — it’s a functional limit on cheaty CP’s that are built off
artificial competition
c. If we win artificial competition is bad, then the perm is justified
Reject the argument, not the team.
 AT: Links To the Net Benefit
It doesn’t link — no reason why consulting specifically over the aff is key to
solving — whether the aff or another issue will be a bigger issue is completely
arbitrary
 AT: Vagueness
It’s not vague
a. Infinitely regressive — no brightline for how much we should spec about
the issue
b. It’s not about the issue, it’s about the consultation — none of their ev
says the plan is key, only says that we should consult
--Perm Do the CP
 2AC – Do the CP
Should means conditional—it’s not certain
Blumenthal 16 Cynthia, regulatory engineer at ASQ, Shall vs. Should, American Society for
Quality, 6/6/16, http://asq.org/standards-shall-should //AY

SHALL

When used as an auxiliary verb, shall, according to Webster's Online Dictionary, “denotes a
requirement that is mandatory whenever the criterion for conformance with the specification
requires that there be no deviation” (2). This word implies obligation and is traditionally used by
laws and regulations. For example, Chapter V of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FD&C Act), “Drugs and Devices,” begins with the following:

“A drug or device shall be deemed to be adulterated –” (3).

Similarly, the FDA’s regulations frequently use shall to indicate mandatory requirements. In CFR
- Code of Federal Regulations Title 21, Part 803, the regulation for medical device reporting, the
English reporting requirement states:

“All reports required in this part which are submitted in writing or electronic equivalent shall be
submitted to FDA in English” (4).

SHOULD

On the other hand, should “denotes a guideline or recommendation whenever noncompliance

with the specification is permissible.” When used as an auxiliary verb, it expresses “a conditional
or contingent act or state … or moral obligation” (5).

The statement “Incoming materials shall be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse” is
mandatory. All incoming materials must be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse. A
deviation causes a noncompliance with the document.

In contrast, “Incoming materials should be inspected before they are accepted in warehouse” is
a recommendation by the document writer. It allows the document users to make their own
judgment calls.

In reality, the incoming materials will most likely be inspected before they are accepted.
However, the document users at any time can make a deviation based on the specific situation,
as long as the decision making is reasonable and logical. (Recall also that the word should does
imply moral obligation.) Such deviation does not violate the document’s requirement.

Because of the built-in flexibility of the word, if the document writer intends to mandate a
requirement, should is not an appropriate choice.

Should is distinct from will which necessitates certainty

They justify perm do the counterplan by being plan plus

No time abuse, disads based of time are not intrinsic to the topic i.e. politics
 1AR – Do the CP
Perm do the counterplan is not severance from the plan rather the
counterplans binding stuff which we can do

Should does not mean certain means we don’t sever from certainty their
definitions are about specific court cases at the district level not a generic
definition that is accessible

We don’t kill agenda politics they still get the USMCA because we still defend
the process of the plan just not necessarily their interpretation justifies fiat
instantaneous arguments which are net worse for politics debates and either
way politics debates are bad because they kill
***THEORY***
--Consult CPs Bad
 2AC – Consultation CPs Bad
Consult CPs are bad –
1. Moots the 1AC – that’s bad for:
a. Fairness – steals the entirety of the aff and shifts it to negative
offense with net benefits as advantages
b. Education – it turns into debating yourself and they get no unique
offense, it removes clash without authentic offcase competition,
leads to less depth in debates
2. Unpredictability – there are a litany of actors that the neg can choose to
consult – it’s impossible to prep for all the possible CPs and that’s
amplified by a limited specific literature base
3. Plan plus – consult CPs justify plan plus CPs if the actor is guaranteed to
say yes
4. Reading the consult CP as a DA solves all their offense.
 1AR – Consultation CPs Bad – Top
Stealing the entirety of the 1AC is a voting issue for:
a. Fairness and Education – it shifts all the aff’s offense into the neg’s and
turns the net benefits into advantages, it leads to debating ourselves and
it’s impossible to generate authentic solvency deficits
The fact that the actor says yes proves that consultation isn’t necessary, the CP
is functionally plan plus.
 1AR – Consultation CPs Bad – A2: Real World/Education
Fairness outweighs real world – stealing the entirety of the aff should be the
biggest voting issue in the round
Real world is a bad debate – Trump isn’t going to pass plans in any world,
debates should be about how the world should function not how it does.
 1AR – Consultation CPs Bad – A2: Forces 2AC Strategy
Predictability is good – not being able to research in advance disincentivizes
research skills, it’s a bad model of debate
Predictable arguments allow for in-depth pre-round research that creates
deeper dives into arguments within the round, which creates more education.
 1AR – Consultation CPs Bad – A2: Neg Flex
No unique reason this CP is more of a key generic than things like the Russia fill-
in DA or Conditions CPs
Our offense is a reason it shouldn’t be a key generic on the topic.
 1AR – Consultation CPs Bad – A2: Literature Demands
There isn’t enough aff-specific literature about consultation – still means the CP
is unpredictable.
 1AR – Consultation CPs Bad – A2: Uncertainty/Immediacy
[Refer to uncertainty/immediacy blocks]
--Aff Must Not Be Certain
 2AC – Aff Must Not Be Certain
Aff doesn’t have to be certain –

Should isn’t mandatory

Taylor and Howard 5 (Michael, Resources for the Future and Julie, Partnership to Cut
Hunger and Poverty in Africa, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development
assistance for Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9-12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-
agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)

Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted:
plant biotechnology research and development ($25 million), the American Schools and
Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15 million), the
International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2
million). Interestingly, in the wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with
only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID should make the prescribed amount
available. The difference between shall and should may have legal significance—one is clearly
mandatory while the other is a strong admonition—but it makes little practical difference in USAID’s
need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.

“Resolved” doesn’t require certainty

Webster’s 9 – Merriam Webster 2009
(http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolved)

# Main Entry: 1re·solve # Pronunciation: \ri-ˈzälv, -ˈzȯlv also -ˈzäv or -ˈzȯv\ # Function: verb #
Inflected Form(s): re·solved; re·solv·ing 1 : to become separated into component parts; also : to
become reduced by dissolving or analysis 2 : to form a resolution : determine 3 : consult,
deliberate

Prefer our definitions –

1. Topic education – generic counterplans that compete off certainty are
not grounded in the resolution – that kills in depth topic research and
encourages a race to the bottom – teams can read the same counterplan
every year
2. Aff ground – PICs that compete off the mandate of the plan, not assumed
certainty, are legitimate – the counterplan is not – they moot the 1AC
and provide no aff offense except for impact turning the net benefit
 1AR – Aff Must Not Be Certain
The aff doesn’t have to be certain – should isn’t mandatory – it implies a desire
– AND – resolved means to deliberate – its not a mandatory action – that’s
Webster
Prefer it – topic education – they shift the focus from the topic to generic
counterplans that can be run every year – AND – aff ground – PICs that compete
off certainty moot the 1AC and provide predictable aff offense –
 AT: Neg Ground
No neg ground loss – they still get topic specific counterplans that don’t
compete based off certainty – AND we’ll defend the process of the plan so they
get their DA links
 AT: Aff Ground
No aff ground loss – questions of should means rollback doesn’t matter – we
still defend the process of the plan
 AT: Neg Ground
No neg ground loss – we defend the idea of the plan – that still links to DAs
 AT: Aff Ground
No aff ground loss – questions of should means rollback doesn’t matter – they
misunderstand fiat
--Aff Must Not Be Immediate
 2AC – Aff Must Not Be Immediate
Affs do not have to be immediate –
Should isn’t immediate
Dictionary.com 10 – (“Definition: Should”, dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should)

should /ʃʊd/ Show Spelled[shood] Show IPA –auxiliary verb 1. pt. of shall. 2. (used to express
condition): Were he to arrive, I should be pleased. 3. must; ought (used to indicate duty,
propriety, or expediency): You should not do that. 4. would (used to make a statement less
direct or blunt): I should think you would apologize. Use should in a Sentence See images of
should Search should on the Web Origin: ME sholde, OE sc ( e ) olde; see shall –Can be
confused:  could, should, would (see usage note at this entry ). –Synonyms 3. See must1 . –
Usage note Rules similar to those for choosing between shall and will have long been advanced
for should and would, but again the rules have had little effect on usage. In most constructions,
would is the auxiliary chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would support
the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the
complexity of the directions. Because the main function of should in modern American English
is to express duty, necessity, etc. ( You should get your flu shot before winter comes ), its use for
other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get
my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore, should seems an affectation to many Americans when
used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I should
(American would ) have called immediately. I should (American would ) really prefer a different
arrangement. As with shall and will, most educated native speakers of American English do not
follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See also shall. Shall –
auxiliary verb, present singular 1st person shall, 2nd shall or ( Archaic ) shalt, 3rd shall, present
plural shall; past singular 1st person should, 2nd should or ( Archaic ) shouldst or should·est,
3rd should, past plural should; imperative, infinitive, and participles lacking. 1. plan to, intend
to, or expect to: I shall go later.

Resolved isn’t immediate

PTE 9 –( Online Plain Text English Dictionary 2009, http://www.onelook.com/?
other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve: “To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection; as, to
resolve on a better course of life.”
Prefer our definitions –
1. Topic education – topic DAs are not time sensitive –they only lose politics
– that’s bad either way because it shifts the focus and disincentives
research on the topic
2. Limits – the aff can never prepare for any possible delay counterplan –
that moots the 1AC and forces the aff to impact turn the net benefit
anytime
 1AR – Aff Must Not Be Immediate
The aff doesn’t have to be immediate – should means intend to and resolved
means to determine – thats Nieto and PTE –
Prefer it for topic education – they still get topic DAs like fill in BUT lose generic
DAs that shift the focus from the topic – AND – limits – infinite forms of delay
CPs means the aff can never win – no advantage can answer all possible
timeframes – moots the 1AC and kills predictable aff offense
 AT: Neg Ground/Moving Target
No neg ground loss – they still get topic generics – only lose politics DAs but
those are bad either way – that’s the OV
 AT: Limits
No under limiting – there’s no reason timeframe arguments are key to neg
research or strategy – delay cps and poltics are bad either way – that’s the ov –
BUT 1AC CX checks any shifts
 AT: Neg Ground/Limits
No neg ground loss or limits – we defend the idea of the plan – that still links to
DAs and is a predictable stasis
--Words Determine What The Plan Means
 2AC – Words Determine What The Plan Means
The aff should get to determine what the plan means-
a. Arbitrary and regressive – there are infinite ways to define every word in
the plan and incentivizes a race to the bottom to find the most obscure
definition possible to moot the plan
b. Context matters – terms of art all used together in a plan text mean
different things- it’s the aff’s right to determine word placement
c. Topic education – it’s key to aff innovation within the literature which
prevents stale debates and deepens overall clash
d. Functional limits check – solvency advocates mean there’s limits in the lit
base for plan text meaning
e. CX checks – the neg can always clarify plan text meaning or what the aff
defends
 1AR – Words Determine What The Plan Means
The aff should get determine what the plan means- definitions of words are
arbitrary and incentivize a race to the bottom that decks predictability- aff
innovation and education outweighs because functional limits based in
literature ensure a stable stasis point and cx checks any of their abuse claims.
 AT: Predictability
Cross apply the context argument here- literature and solvency advocate
ensure the aff must stay true to their mechanism which disproves arbitrariness
 AT: Moving Target
CX checks all abuse because the aff has to explain how they defend the
mechanisms of the aff and what it does- cross apply the predictability
argument- it’s not a moving target
 AT: Access Education Impacts
Allowing the aff to explain what the plan text means isn’t mutually exclusive
with legal precision- probably means that we actually access it better because
the entirety of the aff is key to better contextualize the literature
 AT: Words and Grammar Matter
Hold the neg to the burden of proving that the way we’ve explained aff
solvency mechanisms or the words in the plantext are incorrect before you
grant them this argument otherwise, we access this just as well as the neg.
--Delay Fiat Bad
 2AC – Delay Fiat Bad
Delay Fiat is Bad
1. Ground – they moot the aff and compete off of immediacy which is
arbitrary and kills fairness
2. Education – they do the whole aff but shift the debate to timeframe
which avoids core topic controversies and education by focusing on bad
politics DAs
3. Unpredictable – there’s no literature base for delays which makes
comparison against the aff impossible
4. Infinitely Regressive – there’s infinite possible time delays which makes it
impossible to be aff since there’s no specific answers-that justifies perm
do the CP
5. Fairness – they make us tear apart our own aff to generate CP answers
which they can cross-apply to the case for to win every debate
 1AR – Delay Fiat Bad
Reject the team for Delay Fiat-they steal the aff which forces us debate our own
aff to generate solvency deficits against the CP-they can cross-apply those
answer onto to the case flow to take out the aff which means they’ll always
outweigh on a DA or go for presumption which isn’t educational and tips the
scales in their favor-fairness should come first since it’s the only impact the
ballot can resolve because losing incentivizes them to not read this again

Delay fiat also kills education by making the debate about an arbitrary time
delay which means we don’t discuss the content of the aff or core controversies
surrounding arms sales so we can’t access topic education which is the only
point of debating anyway

Delay fiat is infinitely regressive because they can fiat unlimited time delays
which is unpredictable since it isn’t defined in the literature base which is the
stasis of the topic and it also makes it impossible to be aff since we need time-
sensitive answers which are impossible to research-that justifies going for perm
do the CP since there’s no other answer
 AT: Real World
Not real world-policymakers don’t decide on specific dates to delay policies
until, they just go through a process of delaying them-fairness should come first
since barely any debate actually become policymakers and an individual debate
won’t change our interactions with policy
 AT: Best Policy Option
Best policy option is arbitrary-the CP and the Plan do the same thing which
means it’s impossible to make a determination on which is best especially since
they have no warrant for this argument
 AT: Education
They’re net worse for education since they shift it onto timeframe instead of
the topic which is unpredictable since the resolution is the only thing everyone
has equal access to and the point of debate is learning about the topic
They can still access education about politics DAs without delay CPs-there’s
inevitably a link and they could just read an actor CP to avoid a link
 AT: Neg Flex
The neg gets 13 minutes of block time and we only have 5 minutes to answer it-
that justifies going for theory since it’s impossible to cover everything with
substance
Infinite prep is a myth because of life and they can access it via generics, the
first/last speech benefit is inconsequential, and the lit isn’t aff-biased-proven by
a deep base on heg and the econ surrounding arms sales
 AT: Not Arbitrary
Immediacy is a bad standard since it isn’t specified in the plan, normal means
goes through the legislative process which can never be immediate since things
like votes take time and there’s no brightline between that time delay and
theirs, and there’s literature in the context of should that doesn’t imply
immediacy-here’s some evidence

A. Should doesn’t mean immediate

Dictionary.com 10 – (“Definition: Should”, dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/should)

should /ʃʊd/ Show Spelled[shood] Show IPA –auxiliary verb 1. pt. of shall. 2. (used to express
condition): Were he to arrive, I should be pleased. 3. must; ought (used to indicate duty,
propriety, or expediency): You should not do that. 4. would (used to make a statement less
direct or blunt): I should think you would apologize. Use should in a Sentence See images of
should Search should on the Web Origin: ME sholde, OE sc ( e ) olde; see shall –Can be
confused:  could, should, would (see usage note at this entry ). –Synonyms 3. See must1 . –
Usage note Rules similar to those for choosing between shall and will have long been advanced
for should and would, but again the rules have had little effect on usage. In most constructions,
would is the auxiliary chosen regardless of the person of the subject: If our allies would support
the move, we would abandon any claim to sovereignty. You would be surprised at the
complexity of the directions. Because the main function of should in modern American English
is to express duty, necessity, etc. ( You should get your flu shot before winter comes ), its use for
other purposes, as to form a subjunctive, can produce ambiguity, at least initially: I should get
my flu shot if I were you. Furthermore, should seems an affectation to many Americans when
used in certain constructions quite common in British English: Had I been informed, I should
(American would ) have called immediately. I should (American would ) really prefer a different
arrangement. As with shall and will, most educated native speakers of American English do not
follow the textbook rule in making a choice between should and would. See also shall. Shall –
auxiliary verb, present singular 1st person shall, 2nd shall or ( Archaic ) shalt, 3rd shall, present
plural shall; past singular 1st person should, 2nd should or ( Archaic ) shouldst or should·est,
3rd should, past plural should; imperative, infinitive, and participles lacking. 1. plan to, intend
to, or expect to: I shall go later.

B. Should is future oriented – context is key

Russell, 8 – Appellate Judge for the State of Iowa (Douglas, IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
CLYDE L. GUTHRIE, Deceased, JAMES GUTHRIE, CLARA LUTZ, AND DORIS DAUBER, Plaintiffs-
Appellees, vs. KAITLYN BUSCH, a minor, AND BROCK BUSCH, Defendants-Appellants. No. 8-093 /
07-1427 COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA 2008 Iowa App. LEXIS 287 May 14, 2008, Filed, lexis)
Clyde's will provides, "in the event any of my children should predecease me leaving issue who
survive me, then the share of such predeceased child shall go in equal shares to his or her issue
who survive me, per stirpes." We find no error in the district court's conclusion  [*6] that an
intent to avoid the application of the antilapse statute is not "clear and explicit" from the terms
of the will. The will states "in the event" Clyde was predeceased by a child, when in fact Clyde
had been predeceased by two of his children at the time the will was written. If the will was
referring to the children who had already predeceased Clyde, there would be no need to say "in
the event." By stating "in the event" it is clear Clyde was looking ahead to possible future events,
when one of his children who were alive when the will was written might predecease him.

Brock and Kaitlyn look to the word "should" in the phrase "in the event any of my children
should predecease me" and claim the district court improperly found the word looked to the
future. They claim the word should be interpreted as the past tense of "shall" to imply a duty or
obligation. See Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (6th ed. 1990). Looking at the phrase as a whole,
however, rather than at a single word, we determine the phrase is considering possible future
events. See In re Estate
--Competition Good
 2AC – Functional Competition Good
Functional competition is good
1. Education-
a. Real world – congressmen fight over implementation, not how the
bill is specifically worded
b. Best Policy Option – tests a wider variety of solutions to the
resolution and different ways to solve versus incremental textual
differences.
2. Ground-
a. Textual competition encourages vague plan writing in order to limit
out textual competition, destroying neg ground. AND it’s infinitely
regressive because any counterplan would be legit- you can just
rephrase the plan text and it would compete the same
 2AC – Textual Competition Good
1. Neg ground – textual completion is key for generic conditions and
process counterplans which are key to check small aff
2. Precision – it’s the only way you can get solvency deficits
3. Encourages specific plan text, the plan text is the only thing pre round
prep is based on
4. Precise grammar is key to legal interpretation and real-world policy
skills-anything else allows misinterpretations
Farrell 8 (Robert C. Farrell, Quinnipiac University School of Law, “Why Grammar Matters:
Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Volume 40,
Issue 1, Fall 2008, https://lawecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1112&context=luclj, LASA-IZP)

The use of grammar to decide legal cases is not a novelty . The United States Supreme Court has stated
that it "naturally does not review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians; but neither [does it] regard ordinary principles of

English prose as irrelevant to a construction of those enactments." Further, the Court has noted that "Congress'
use of verb tense is considered significant in construing statutes ." 13 This article will attempt to demonstrate that a
basic familiarity with the terminology of verb forms is not simply the pretentiousness of a pompous pedant
but is rather a very useful tool in the arsenal of legal argumentation .

5. Real world – policy makers have to make sure the wording of the bill is
correct for effective implementation
6. Legal implementation, policy makers are guided by the wording of the
bill.
--Entirely Plan Inclusive CPs Bad
 2AC – Entirely Plan Inclusive CPs Bad
Counterplans that can result in the exact same action as the aff are illegitimate
a. Decks aff ground – moots the 1AC and kills any possible unique offense –
we can’t leverage specific advantages or mechanisms because they
compete off of implied certainty and immediacy
b. Should is legally variable – not a mandate
Raggi, 3 – US Circuit Judge (Rena, THOMAS DALLIO, Petitioner-Appellant, --v.-- ELIOT L. SPITZER,
New York State Attorney General, MICHAEL MCGINNIS, Superintendent, Southport Correctional
Facility, Respondents-Appellees. Docket No. 01-2718 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SECOND CIRCUIT, 9/9, lexis)
In any event, we note that Faretta's use of the word "should" in identifying warnings relevant to waivers of counsel itself cautions against interpreting
the quoted language as clear establishment of a legal mandate. Although
grammatically the word "should" is simply
the past tense of "shall," see Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide, 931 (1999), in the legal context, the two
words often convey quite different meanings.  "Shall" is universally understood to indicate an
HN9

imperative or mandate, see Black's Law Dictionary, 1375 (6th ed. 1990), whereas "should," to the extent it implies
any duty or obligation, generally references one originating in "propriety or expediency," id. at 1379.
Precisely because the word "should" is legally variable , compare United States v. Anderson, 798 F.2d 919, 924 (7th Cir. 1986) ("the
common interpretation of the word 'should' is 'shall' and thus . . . imposes a mandatory rule of conduct") with Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624, 628 (7th
Cir. 1987 ) ("the word 'should' unlike the words 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must,' is permissive rather than mandatory" ); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 758 F.2d 341, 347 (8th Cir. 1985) [**25]  (holding that "should" is a preferential rather than mandatory
word and that contract provision stating that parties "should" settle disputes in a particular forum was not a mandatory selection
clause),  [*563]  we cannot infer from its use in Faretta the Supreme Court's recognition of a clearly established prerequisite for a waiver of counsel.

c. Destroys clash – the only way to deploy offense is to debate yourself –

negs will inevitably cross apply onto other flows and/or go for
presumption
d. Destroys topic education – shifts debates away from affirmative
controversies and onto contrived questions of implementation
e. Justifies infinitely regressive counterplans that pinpoint non-aff specific
problems – i.e. CP do the aff if racism stops
f. Err aff on theory – negs get a 13-minute block, and we’ve already lost our
1AC
Reject the team – the damage has already been done.
 1AR – Entirely Plan Inclusive CPs Bad
Hold the neg to a high bar on competition for entirely plan inclusive
counterplans- key to discourage race to the bottom/topic crowd out –
especially when they have already mooted 8 minutes of 1AC offense
 AT: Best Policy Option
This isn’t an argument – this defends the neg reading CPs with non-competitive
planks like “give food to all cats” – fairness should frame how this process of
finding good policies operates
 AT: Most Real World/Topic Education
We do defend every word – we don’t think all PICs are bad, but that entirely
plan-inclusive counterplans wreck our unique offense
Policymakers do not reject plans on face for lacking consultation, but just
amend them – likewise there’s no case-specific disad/net benefit
We’ll turn topic education because EPICs shift debate away from core
affirmative controversies
 AT: Should Means Immediate
Summers says “should” and “shall” are equivalent mandates in the context of
specific jury decisions –
Prefer Raggi – indicates that “should” otherwise shouldn’t be conflated with
imperatives, and is much more a preferential term in legal parlance

Strong admonition --- not mandatory

Taylor and Howard 5 (Michael, Resources for the Future and Julie, Partnership to Cut Hunger
and Poverty in Africa, “Investing in Africa's future: U.S. Agricultural development assistance for
Sub-Saharan Africa”, 9-12, http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001784/5-US-
agric_Sept2005_Chap2.pdf)
Other legislated DA earmarks in the FY2005 appropriations bill are smaller and more targeted: plant biotechnology research and
development ($25 million), the American Schools and Hospitals Abroad program ($20 million), women’s leadership capacity ($15
million), the International Fertilizer Development Center ($2.3 million), and clean water treatment ($2 million). Interestingly, in the
wording of the bill, Congress uses the term shall in connection with only two of these eight earmarks; the others say that USAID
should make the prescribed amount available. The difference between shall and should may have legal
significance—one is clearly mandatory while the other is a strong admonition—but it makes little
practical difference in USAID’s need to comply with the congressional directive to the best of its ability.
 AT: Key to Neg Ground
Neg offense can always be generated on case turns that involve the aff and
their disads – reciprocity demands that 1AC offense not be mooted
 AT: Time Tradeoffs
If this argument is true, the net benefit has been thumped repeatedly – hold
them to a high threshold for explaining when their impacts happen
Offense on the net benefit is bad because it still shifts debate away from aff-led
controversies
 AT: Literature Checks
Literature doesn’t check – always generic cards that play off of implied certainty
or immediacy – ie “racism must be resolved now and the government isn’t
focusing on it”
Flows aff – no literature on why the net benefit is germane to the aff